SD: Institutions : Communal systems of land tenure and fair access to the land: the case of Lesotho

Posted November 1997

Communal systems of land tenure and fair access to the land: the case of Lesotho

by Agostino Ambrogetti
Land Tenure Consultant

Contributed by the author. Based on the M.Sc. Dissertation "The Social-Economic Aspects of Soil Erosion in Lesotho", submitted at University of Wales, Swansea, UK, academic year 1994-95 for the course Development Policy and Planning. Information and viewpoints presented are the sole responsibility of the author.

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyse whether the agrarian system of Lesotho, characterized by the communal ownership of the land, ensures a fair and effective distribution of the natural resources among all the entitled social groups. Particularly under scrutiny is the mechanism of distribution of the land and its consequences. The evidence indicates a concentration of land for those who have the right to distribute it (the chiefs), and landlessness or land scarcity for the other citizens, with different and negative impacts for agriculture and society. This concentration of land, interacting with other factors, contributes to the poor results of the country's rural sector.

The juridical framework

Lesotho's form of state is a parliamentary monarchy. Besides the King and the government there is a hierarchy of the chiefs who act as authorities at village level. The fundamental principle of the relationship between the population and the land is that 'the land belongs to the nation'. The right to all the land is communal and this implies that every adult male Basotho, as the Lesotho population is called, has the right to an allocation of a certain quantity of land (without paying anything).

The land is held in trust by the King who delegates this trust to the chiefs, and the chiefs have the right to allocate the land to all the citizens. Allocation of land is on an annual basis and the land cannot be bought and sold. Whatever is produced on the allocated land belongs to the landholder (the person who receives the right to cultivate the land for one year), and if there is no proper cultivation or no cultivation at all of an allocated field, the chief is allowed to reallocate the land to someone else.

Implications of such a system

The annual allocation has been identified as a major cause of very low agricultural performance. The rationale of this perspective is that the farmer is not motivated in engaging in soil-sound cultivation practices and in long-term investments because he is not certain about receiving the allocation of the same piece of land in the following year.

Considerations on the soundness of cultivation practices and, in a broader sense, of the entire land-management process, are central everywhere but even more so in an extreme geographical context of Lesotho. Main features of the country are:

the limited extension of its territory (30,355 sq. km.) and its landlocked location;
its extremely rough topography (two-thirds of Lesotho are very mountainous and all the land is above 1,000 m);
the consequent very small amount of arable land (in 1992: 14% of total land);
the unfavourable climate;
the nature of the soils.

Another fundamental implication of the mechanism of land allocation by the chiefs is that they have the right to allocate land to themselves as well. In fact, the concentration of land in the chiefs' hands has proved to be a key negative factor in social relationships and, in general, for the effectiveness of agriculture and the national economy. The supposed unsecurity of the tenure is not considered a deterrent for good management of the fields given that, as we have already seen:

production of the piece of land is completely for the landholder;
improper cultivation can be a reason for not having that plot allocated again

Furthermore, praxis shows that revocation of allocation does not take place frequently as long as a piece of land is either under cultivation, either by the landholder himself or with the participation of sharecroppers.

Concentration of land and of social power

The customary tenure system has meant a steadily decreasing amount of available land for the commoner Basotho over time.

Table 1. **Landlessness and Land Scarcity**
Holding Size Acres	% of Households				% Points of change	% Acreage
	1950	1970	1986	1990	1950-70	1970
Nil	7.2	13	20	27	+5.8	0
0-3.99	33.1	43			+9.9	22.8
4-7.99	36.9	30			-6.9	38.4
>8	22.8	14			-8.8	38.8

The decrease in the holding size for households of the lowest social groups, coupled with a strong increase of population, leads to exacerbation of the population pressure on land. From the reduction of arable land in absolute terms (due to soil degradation) stems a decrease in the average holding size:

	1986	1990
Ave. holding size	1.4 ha	0.9 ha
Population	1,577,000	1,770,000

The low and decreasing acreage for the bulk of the rural population appears to play a more decisive role than the supposed uncertainty of the tenure in creating a context characterized by poor agricultural performance.

Other fundamental factors and features are:

the low use of productive assets: (draft-power, seeds, fertilizers, etc.);
competition from South African agricultural products;
the prevalent role in rural households incomes of remittances from emigrants working in South African mines;
scarce investment in farm activities and lack of care of the land;
lack of a male labour force due to emigration;
decreasing quantity and quality of arable land due to soil erosion.

All these factors and aspects are interrelated and mutually reinforcing.

Historically, Lesotho was a British Protectorate from 1868, gaining the full independence in 1966. Its position in the British economic sphere was a key element in development of national agriculture. In fact, the opening of the first diamond mines in South Africa in 1868 led to an exodus of male workers. This migrant stream, which deprived Lesotho of around 50% of its male work force for long periods, was fully in the interest of the British administrators, who had substantial shares in the enterprises involved in the extraction activities.

Against this background the cooperation of the local power structure (the King and the chieftainship) with the British in stimulating male emigration was completely instrumental to the need for a cheap labour force for the mines. The main means in this process of turning farmers into miners were the levy of taxes and the diminishing quantity of land allocated to the commoner Basotho. As paying taxes on income from a declining quantity of land became increasingly difficult, the only alternative to farm based activities for large strata of population was the mines.

For the chiefs, this cooperation ensured maintenance of their position of power in the rural areas and, in addition, their direct control of large amounts of land through self-allocation. Even looking at the combined ownership of cattle and land, it can be seen how the situation for the lowest social groups worsened between 1960, 1970 and mid-seventies.

Table 2. Types of households and regional distribution, 1960

Type of Household	Number	% of Total	Border Lowlands	Caledon Lowlands	Foothill Zone	Mountain Zone	Orange Valley
			Regional Percentages
With both and land stock	113.395	65.6	67.2	59.9	63.0	73.3	63.1
With land but without stock	44.777	25.9	24.8	28.5	28.4	20.6	29.5
With stock but without land	5.623	3.2	2.6	4.1	3.3	3	2.1
Without either land or stock	9.161	5.3	5.3	7.6	5.4	3.2	5.2
Total number of households	172.956	-	17.864	43.388	39.847	50.260	16.597
Source : POL 1960

Table 3. **Cattle distribution 1970**
Percentage Households	Percentage Cattle	Average Number	Cumulative Percentage Households	Cumulative Percentage Cattle	Land Ownership (acres)
50.0	0	0	50.0	0
6.8	9.2	4	56.8	9.2	0-2.9
12.9	23.6	5.4	69.7	32.8	2-3.9
4.6	8	5.6	74.3	41.6	8-9.9
6.7	13.0	5.7	81.0	54.6	6-7.9
12.0	24.4	6.0	93.0	79./0	4-5.9
3.8	9.6	7.5	96.8	88.6	10-14.9
1.1	3.5	9.5	97.9	92.1	No land
2.1	7.9	10.9	100	100	15+
Source : KOL 1970

Table 4 **Distribution of stock in the mid-seventies**
Herd Size (livestock units)	Percentage of households	Percentage of stock	Average household size
No stock	48	-	4.4
0.1 - 4.9	27	16	5.2
5.0 - 9.9	15	26	6.1
10.0 - 19.9	6	21	7.1
20.0 and more	4	37	7.8
Total	100	100	5.2
Note : One livestock units is equivalent to one largestock or five smalistock Source : Van der Wiel 1977 : 86

If in 1960 only 25.9% of households had no stock, in mid seventies that figure had risen to 48%. The image of inequality, which was already evident in relation to the land, is borne out and enhanced. The presence of cattle is important in itself and for better ploughing of the land. The income structure which is the result of variables based on the farming and off-farming gives us fundamental insights into the situation and the consequent attitudes and choices of Basotho families.

The distribution of incomes is very skewed, with concentration of the wealth among small social groups at the top of the table; furthermore remittances largely exceed farm incomes. These two facts shape the approach of the main part of the population towards the customary land tenure system and farming in general.

Table 5. **Distribution of rural income 1967/1969**
Average Income	Percentage		Cumulative Percentage
	Households	Income	Households	Income
172	14.8	8.3	14.8	8.3
196	22.5	14.4	37.3	22.7
205	22.2	14.9	59.5	37.6
323	9.3	9.8	68.8	47.4
354	5.7	6.6	74.5	54.0
406	4.7	6.2	79.2	60.2
559	9.4	17.1	88.6	77.3
585	5.7	10.3	94.3	88.1
643	5.7	11.9	100	100
Source: GOL in ILO 1979: 287

Table 6. **Income distribution in Lesotho**
Population group	Percentage of total income
Lowest 5%	3
Lowest 20%	15
Lowest 50%	30
Highest 40%	52
Highest 20%	33
Highest 5%	16
Source: GOL 1975

Table 7. **Average available monthly cash income per household by source of main income and location of household income 1986-87**
Source of Main Income	Rural	Lesotho
Subsistence Farming	158	158
Cash Cropping/livestock	151	151
Business income	257	318
Wages and salaries	230	359
Cash remittances	350	351
Other sources	90	86
Total	235	259
Indices using total average income as the base - Average income = 100
Subsistence farming	67	61
Cash cropping/livestock	64	58
Business income	100	123
Wages and salaries	98	139
Cash intermittances	149	136
Other sources	38	33
Source: KOL 1987 in Codesria 1992: 261

Table 8. **Source of income**
Source of income	Total
	R	%
Crops	47	6
Livestock	90	11
Subtotal Agric.	137	17
Lesotho off - farm	92	12
Migrant labour	554	71
Subtotal off - farm	646	83
Domestic income	229	29
Migrant income	554	71
total income	783	100
Source: Van der Wiel 1977: 88

In such a situation two facts are evident:

uncertainty and hardship for the bulk of the people;
farming income can constitute only a complement (not decisive) to the livelihood of the families who have small or even medium quantities of allocated land (obviously even more for those who have no land) and, consequently, they are compelled to rely on off-farming incomes (remittances, etc.).

Therefore, difficulty on one side leads to the need for a buffer good, which can be found in land (which is unable anyway to provide full livelihood), while uncertainty over the future increases popular preference for the tenet of the free allocation of land, even if the system has proved to be very unfavourable and unfair for very relevant sectors of the society (the lowest in the incomes table). They oppose any change in the legal system of land tenure. In fact, if land were a marketable asset, the less affluent people would have poor access owing to their limited purchasing power.

During the 1980s, a new class appeared in Lesotho society, a class of "commercial-progressive farmers" that has at its disposal significant financial resources. For them land is an asset that has to be intensevely exploited in order to create a substantial profit from the agricultural production. They would prefer to have a system based on the total marketability of land.

For the land-rich groups (the chiefs) the fact of having a lot of allocated land does not represent an opportunity for large output - high rates of fallow land express very well their attitude. In their view, the land is a sign of social power, and the under-utilization of the land which they possess gives evidence of that.

Consequently they oppose any attempt to change the legal framework of land tenure that would usher in changes in the allocation and/or redistribution of land, because they want to leave unaltered relationships among Lesotho's social groups.

Concluding remarks

Even in the case of Lesotho, distribution of resources among social groups has proved to be fundamental factor in creating opportunities for development and for enabling the most disadvantaged classes to improve their situation.

As the resource land is concentrated in the hands of the chiefs, most farmers are compelled to make their livelihood outside the rural areas, and so are expelled from the countryside. Even considering only agricultural effectiveness, the lack of land or the land scarcity for large strata of the population is a decisive factor, in creating a context of poor agricultural performance. On the other side, availability of land for the chiefs is not utilized as a basis for increased output, which contributes to stagnation in agriculture and the general economic situation. Politically and socially, maintaining the current framework of land tenure contributes importantly to leaving the balance of power unaltered.

Attempts at development can come only from changes in land tenure aiming at a fairer distribution of land and of other inputs (cattle, labour and other) applied to the agricultural productive process. These changes would have decisive micro-economic consequences for the single farmers.

Evidence from other semi-arid, degradation-prone African areas shows that a process of agricultural intensification focussed mainly on labour input can lead to increasing production coupled with stable or even improving soil situation.

Empirical studies from Kenya and Nigeria show successful examples of sustainable management of resources attained during steady increases in population. In two particular areas of these two countries, the following trends occurred:

increasing quantities of labour inputs
decrease in both extension and intensity of soil erosion
increase in arable land and consequently of cultivated land
decreasing size of holdings (with a clear prevalence for smallholdings)
stable or increasing livestock population (particularly important sign of the ability of the two farming systems to manage livestock pressures on land)
increase in yields due to the introduction of inorganic fertilizer
increase in the prices paid for land
increase in the cost of labour hiring and likelihood of its occurrence
increasing percentage of farmers using the ox-plough and farmyard manure

All these facts reflect a situation of intensification, with agriculture becoming more and more economically important for the area. The most important reasons of the success of these agricultural systems appear to be the increasing quantity of labour inputs utilized and the incentive of producing for internal and external markets.

Sound agricultural systems are always the result of a whole complex of variables which interact together and mutually reinforce.

In Lesotho, the link between intensification (more labour, capital, inputs and produce per same unit of land) and conservation (of land and its natural qualities) has not been attained. The substitution of labour for scarce land cannot take place as the most productive labour force is employed in migrant work and not in agriculture. High population density is coupled with a population structure that is extremely age- and sex- imbalanced (with majority of women and elderly). Competitiveness of South African agricultural products is another major factor leading to, inter alia, very little investment or reinvestment in agriculture. With high population pressure and low inputs to agriculture, low productivity of agricultural labour and degradation of renewable resources are virtually unavoidable, making Lesotho the country with the highest rate of soil erosion in Africa.

Attempts to improve the situation can also come from macro-economic measures, such as a policy for changing the terms of external trade and a remunerative price policy for farmers.