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Transition to Rights-based Fishing: The Case of Iceland

Tenure and UserRights 2018

Yeosu, Republic of Korea,
10 - 14 September 2018

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Science (both theory and experience) has established:

To **maximize** the **sustainable flow of benefits** from ocean resources, fisheries **must make a transition** from open access to rights based fishing


This transition can happen in many ways

Depends on country, situation, history and possibilities

Here review one particular case:

The case of Iceland

Iceland: Location and EEZ



Iceland: A sizeable fishing nation

- Annual catch \approx **1.5 m. mt** (Korea **1.7 m. mt**)
- Approximately **1.8%** of global marine catch
- Ranked \approx **10-15th**, in the world

By far the largest fishing nation in catch per capita

- **6 mt/capita**
- Next nation; Norway: **0.5 mt/capita**
- Korea: **0.03 mt/capita**

The Icelandic fisheries: Basic facts

- The industry: Advanced, high tech, capitalistic fisheries (run for profits)
- The harvest:
 - Demersal species (cod, haddock, flatfish); **2/3** of value, **1/3** of volume
 - Pelagic species (herring, capelin, mackerel); **1/3** of value, **2/3** of volume
 - **98%** is exported!
- Fleet (high tech; both large and small scale)
 - Active vessels: **≈ 550**
 - Deep-sea trawlers (freezer and fresh; 50-70m., 1500-2500 GT): **≈ 40**
 - Pelagic vessels (purse seiners and mid-water trawlers; 70-90 m. 3000-4000 GT): **≈ 30**
 - Multipurpose demersal vessels (gill-nets, long-line; 20-40 m., 100-400 GT): **≈ 140**
 - Artisanal (handline, longline; 8-15 m., 6-15 GT): **≈ 340**
- Fishers: **≈ 3700** (including owner-operators)
=> Harvest per fisher **≈ 405 mt**



Typical deep-sea trawler

(50-70 m.; 1500-2500 GT)





Typical pelagic fishing vessel (70-90m.; 3-4000 GT)





Typical demersal vessel (20-40 M.; 100-400 GT)



Typical artisanal vessel (8-15 m.; 6-15 Gt)



The Transition

Until 1976: (Before the extension of the EEZ to 200 miles)

Open international access (international common property fishery)

=> Minimal fisheries management

1976 to 2004: Stepwise adoption of an ITQ system

With interim use of

- (i) Restricted access,
- (ii) TACs
- (iii) Limited fishing days

} Did not work

Key steps in the adaptation of the ITQ system

Share of	total fishery
• 1976: Herring fishery	1%
• 1984: Most important demersal fisheries	50%
• 1991: All fisheries (small vessels (<8 m.) exempted)	90%
• 2004: Small (artisanal) vessels in a separate ITQ-system	95%



Motivation

Not scientific research and theories!
(Not advice from FAO)


Initially: Poor profitability: *“Something has to be done”*,
IQs seemed a practical way to go.

Subsequent steps: Initial steps worked well. *“Why not do
more of the same”*. Plus theoretical justification.


The driving force: **The industry!**

Government was dragged along (common story
around the world).


Outcomes: Stocks and fishing mortality



Outcomes: Evolution of fleet (Demersal fisheries: Number of active vessels)



Outcomes: Industry profitability (EBIDTA, Percent of revenues)



Impact: Summary

- Biological: **Good**
- Economic: **Excellent**
- Social: **Equivocal**

Can this success be replicated in developing countries?

- Only to a certain extent
 - Not many developing nations have the administrative capacity to run ITQs in all fisheries
 - Industrial fisheries (large, high tech vessels, off-shore)
 - Possible to operate ITQs in most cases
 - Artisanal fisheries (small, low tech vessels, inshore)
 - ITQs generally too costly to enforce
- ⇒ Must look for alternatives

Some form of community rights seems most promising



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