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Transition to Rights-based Fishing: The Case of Iceland

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Science (both theory and experience) has established:


To maximize the sustainable flow of benefits from ocean resources, fisheries **must** make a **transition** from open access to rights based fishing

This transition can happen in many ways

Depends on country, situation, history and possibilities

Here review one particular case: The case of Iceland

Iceland: Location and EEZ







Iceland: A sizeable fishing nation

- Annual catch \approx 1.5 m. mt (Korea 1.7 m. mt)
- Approximately 1.8% of global marine catch
- Ranked \approx 10-15th, in the world

By far the largest fishing nation in catch per capita

- 6 mt/capita
- Next nation; Norway: 0.5 mt/capita
- Korea: 0.03 mt/capita



The Icelandic fisheries: Basic facts

- The industry: Advanced, high tech, capitalistic fisheries (run for profits)
- The harvest:
 - Demersal species (cod, haddock, flatfish); 2/3 of value, 1/3 of volume
 - Pelagic species (herring, capelin, mackerel); 1/3 of value, 2/3 of volume
 - 98% is exported!
- Fleet (high tech; both large and small scale)
 - Active vessels: \approx **550**
 - Deep-sea trawlers (freezer and fresh; 50-70m., 1500-2500 GT): \approx 40
 - Pelagic vessels (purse seiners and mid-water trawlers; 70-90 m. 3000-4000 GT): ≈ 30
 - Multipurpose demersal vessels (gill-nets, long-line; 20-40 m., 100-400 GT):≈ 140
 - Artisanal (handline, longline; 8-15 m., 6-15 GT): \approx 340
- Fishers: ≈ 3700 (including owner-operators)
 => Harvest per fisher ≈ 405 mt



Typical deep-sea trawler (50-70 m.; 1500-2500 GT)





Typical pelagic fishing vessel (70-90m.; 3-4000 GT)





Typical demersal vessel (20-40 M.; 100-400 GT)





Typical artisanal vessel (8-15 m.; 6-15 Gt)





The Transition

Until 1976: (Before the extension of the EEZ to 200 miles) Open international access (international common property fishery)

=> Minimal fisheries management

1976 to 2004: Stepwise adoption of an ITQ system

Did not work

With interim use of (i) Restricted access, (ii) TACs (iii) Limited fishing days



Key steps in the adaptation of the ITQ system

Share of		total fishery
•	1976: Herring fishery	1%
•	1984: Most important demersal fisheries	50%
•	1991: All fisheries (small vessels (<8 m.) exempted)	90%
•	2004: Small (artisanal) vessels in a separate ITQ-system	n 95%



Motivation

Not scientific research and theories! (Not advice from FAO)

Initially: Poor profitability: "Something has to be done", IQs seemed a practical way to go.


Subsequent steps: Initial steps worked well. "Why not do more of the same". Plus theoretical justification.

The driving force: The industry!

Government was dragged along (common story around the world).




Outcomes: Stocks and fishing mortality






Outcomes: Evolution of fleet (Demersal fisheries: Number of active vessels)





Outcomes: Industry profitability (EBIDTA, Percent of revenues)





Impact: Summary

- Biological: Good
- Economic: Excellent
- Social: Equivocal



Can this success

be replicated in developing countries?

- Only to a certain extent
 - Not many developing nations have the administrative capacity to run ITQs in all fisheries
- Industrial fisheries (large, high tech vessels, off-shore)
 - Possible to operate ITQs in most cases
- Artisanal fisheries (small, low tech vessels, inshore)
 - ITQs generally too costly to enforce
 - \Rightarrow Must look for alternatives

Some form of community rights seems most promising

