

Agricultural policy indicators for selected countries of the Former Soviet Union

Quantifying incentives and disincentives to agriculture in six European and Central Asian countries: Preliminary results

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Presentation outline

- Overview of the FAO pilot study
- Methodology
- Preliminary results:
 - agricultural price incentives/disincentives (policy indicator: NRP)
 - budgetary & other transfers to agriculture
- Discussion
- Conclusions and recommendations

Overview of FAO pilot study on agricultural policy indicators

- Key aim: to calculate agricultural policy indicators for 6 Former
 Soviet Union countries based on FAO MAFAP methodology (2015);
 to establish systematic monitoring of agricultural policy distortions in the region in order to support evidence-based policy
- Analyzed countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic and Moldova
- Continuation of AGRICISTRADE (Volk et al., 2014 and 2015)
 efforts/network: for 5 partner countries; KY new, AZ new partner
- Pilot study financed by: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
- Duration: 11 months (December 2017 November 2018)



International team and national experts

International team:

- Andrea Zimmermann (responsible officer on behalf of FAO), Ekaterina Krivonos (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations - FAO), in collab. with Signe Nelgen
- Maja Kožar, Marjeta Pintar, Sara Bele (Agricultural Institute of Slovenia pilot study leader)
- **Emil Erjavec** (University of Ljubljana, Biotechnical Faculty)

National experts:

- Armenia (AM): Vardan Urutyan (International Center for Agribusiness Research and Education Foundation)
- Azerbaijan (AZ): Rashad Huseynov (Khazar University)
- Belarus (BY): Vasilina Akhramovich (FAO national correspondent for Belarus)
- Georgia (GE): Ketevan Gachechiladze, Natali Kldiashvili (The Fund "Georgian Center for Agribusiness Development")
- Kyrgyz Republic (KY): Roman Mogilevskii, Zalina Enikeeva (University of Central Asia in Kyrgyzstan)
- Moldova (MD): Eugenia Lucasenco (National Institute for Economic Research)



Methodology: Introduction

- Key aim: Estimate indicators measuring price and market (dis)incentives that affect agricultural sector; for key commodities in analyzed countries
- Agricultural policy indicators to be calculated:
 - Nominal rate of protection (NRP) observed, at farm gate only!
 - Nominal rate of assistance (NRA) observed, at farm gate only!
- NRP: domestic-to-border-price ratio; gap between (possibly) distorted domestic price and undistorted reference price (without influence of domestic policies or markets):

$$NRP_{ofg} = \frac{P_{fg} - RP_{ofg}}{RP_{ofg}} * 100$$
 $P_{fg} = \text{observed domestic price at farm gate } RP_{ofg} = \text{observed reference price at farm gate}$

 NRA: extension of NRP by including commodity specific public expenditures (budgetary and other support - BOT)

$$NRA_o = \frac{(P_{fg} - RP_{ofg}) + BOT}{RP_{ofg}} * 100$$



Methodology: Data required to calculate NRPs and NRAs

By key commodities, national level, by individual years in period 2005-2016:

- Trade status and trade intensity (foreign trade data)
- Benchmark prices: prices at a border of a country
- Domestic prices: at farm gate level (producer prices) and at point of competition (wholesale level)
- Exchange rates
- Market access costs: from border to point of competition and from farm gate to point of competition
- Budgetary and other transfers (BOT) to agriculture
- Quality and quantity adjustment parameters: for production and foreign trade
- Additionally: Description of key value chains and processing

Methodology: Steps

- 1. Selection of key commodities: commodities that cumulatively account for at least 70% of value of production (à priori analysis of FAO-STAT data)
- **2. Determining unit import/export values as observed benchmark prices:** analysis of trade data (trade status, trade intensity) based on aggregate HS codes
- 3. Consideration of observed access costs and adjustment factors by quantity: for calculating observed reference prices at farm gate
- **4. Determining alternative reference prices at farm gate** in case unit export/import value were not used as observed benchmark price (reasons: level of unit values calculated not realistic for the region in the analyzed period etc.)
- 5. Alternative reference prices used (20/45 cases):
 - Observed domestic price at f. g., in case average trade intensity in period <2% (NRP=0.0); non-tradable commodities (e.g. potatoes)
 - OECD reference prices at farm gate (EU28, RF, TUR, UA)
 - Moldovan observed reference price at f. g. (grapes: AM, GE)



- 6 countries
- 14 different commodities
- 6-8 commodities/country
- Altogether: 45 commodity cases!

	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Belarus	Georgia	Kyrgyzstan	Moldova
Crops:						
	Wheat	Wheat	Wheat		Wheat	Wheat
			Maize	Maize		Maize
					Beans	
	Potatoes	Potatoes	Potatoes	Potatoes	Potatoes	Potatoes
						Sunflower
	Tomatoes	Tomatoes				
		Hazelnuts		Hazelnuts		
	Grapes			Grapes		Grapes
Livestock:						
	Cattle meat					
	Pigmeat		Pigmeat			Pigmeat
					Sheep meat	
		Chicken	Chicken			Chicken
		meat	meat			meat
	Cow's milk	Cow's milk				
	Eggs	Eggs	Eggs	Eggs		
Total:		8	8		7	6

	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Belarus	Georgia	Kyrgyzstan	Moldova
Crops:						
Wheat	Wheat	Wheat	Wheat		Wheat	Wheat
Maize			Maize; OECD Ukraine	Maize		Maize
Beans					Beans	
Potatoes	Potatoes; domestic price at	Potatoes; OECD Russian	Potatoes; domestic price at	Potatoes; OECD Turkey	Potatoes	Potatoes
	f. g.=reference price at f.	Federation**	f. g.=reference price at f.			
	g.*		g.*			
Sunflower						Sunflower
Tomatoes	Tomatoes; domestic price	Tomatoes				
	at f. g.=reference price at f.					
	g.*					
Hazelnuts		Hazelnuts		Hazelnuts		
Grapes	Grapes; Moldovan			Grapes; Moldovan		Grapes
	reference price at farm gate			reference price at farm gate		
Livestock:						
Cattle meat (beef and veal)	Cattle meat	Cattle meat	Cattle meat	Cattle meat	Cattle meat	
Pig meat	Pigmeat		Pigmeat			Pig meat; OECD EU28
Sheep meat					Sheep meat; domestic price	
					at f. g.=reference price at f.	
					g.*	
Chicken meat (Poultry meat)		Chicken meat; OECD	Chicken meat			Chicken meat; OECD
		Russian Federation				Russian Federation
Cow's milk	Cow's milk	Cow's milk; OECD Ukraine	Cow's milk; OECD Ukraine	Cow's milk; OECD Ukraine	Cow's milk; OECD Ukraine	Cow's milk; OECD Ukraine
Eggs	Eggs; domestic price at f.	Eggs; OECD Turkey	Eggs	Eggs; OECD Turkey		
	g.=reference price at f. g.*					
Total no. of key	8	8	8	7	6	
commodities:						

^{*} Average trade intensity for 2005-2016 below 2%; observed domestic price at farm gate is used for observed reference price at farm gate (NRP=0.0)

^{***} Moldovan observed reference price at farm gate



^{**} OECD prices: Reference prices at farm gate (Source: http://www.oecd.org/agriculture/agricultural-policies/producerandconsumersupportestimatesdatabase.htm)

Methodology: Steps – cont.

- **6. Budget compilation and classification:** as per OECD PSE/CSE classification scheme (same as in AGRICISTRADE approach; Erjavec et al., 2017)
 - Basic OECD PSE/CSE classification scheme (OECD, 2010) of budgetary support (explicit and implicit budgetary transfers):
 - a) Budgetary transfers to producers (PSE BOT)
 - b) Budgetary transfers to general services (GSSE BOT) and
 - c) Budgetary transfers to consumers (CSE BOT)
 - d) Total budgetary and other transfers (Total BOT): a)+ b) + c)
- 7. Allocation of public expenditures to key commodities: only directly commodity attributable public expenditure considered in this pilot study
- 8. Calculation of policy indicators as per MAFAP: NRPs, NRAs

Preliminary results

- This is a pilot study and preliminary results: caution needed when interpreting the exact values!
- Nevertheless, main characteristics of markets and policies, as well as trends can be evaluated!


Preliminary results shown today:

- NRPs:
 - cross-country: aggregate NRPs for all countries (average 2010-2013 vs. 2014-2016)
 - country level: aggregate NRPs by years (aggregated for all analyzed key commodities in a country representativeness!) and NRPs and NRAs by key commodities analyzed
- Budgetary and other transfers



Preliminary results: Aggregate NRPs by countries


$$NRP_g = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{i=n} NRP_i * PROD_i * RP_{fgi}}{\sum_{i=1}^{i=n} PROD_i * RP_{fgi}}$$



- Agricultural price incentives (positive aggregate NRPs): AZ & KY
- Modest price incentives (moderately positive NRPs): AM & GE
- Price disincentives (negative aggregate NRPs): BY & MD
- Representativeness of analyzed key commodities: 45-68 % of VOP (average range for 2005-2016; AM: 2008-2016)





Armenia: Aggregate NRPs; 2010-2016





- Positive aggregate NRPs: modest price incentives for agricultural producers
- But problem of low representativeness of commodities, data (producer prices)

Armenia: NRPs by commodities















FOR DISCUSSION:

- 1) Does fairly liberal market situation (no incentives/disincentives) contribute to the increase in productivity and competitiveness of agriculture, taking into account prevailing subsistence farming and fragmented land structure?
- 2) Pig meat: fairly high level of domestic prices?




Azerbaijan: Aggregate NRPs; 2010-2016



- Except last year very strong price incentives for agric. producers in AZ
- Possible reasons: subsistence farming, influence of purchasing power, relatively closed market
- Data problem



Azerbaijan: NRPs by commodities



FOR DISCUSSION:


1) Tomatoes: market after 2014?

2) Chicken meat: current situation in the market?

3) Hazelnuts: market after 2013?





Belarus: Aggregate NRPs; 2010-2016





- Price disincentives: Aggregate NRPs typically negative
- Possible reasons: terms of trade, competitiveness in reality, domestic policies (monetary, agricultural, trade etc.)


Belarus: NRPs by commodities

















FOR DISCUSSION:

1) Price disincentives for most analyzed commodities: possible reasons: e.g. policies – monetary, agricultural? 2) Differences in the incentives / disincentives by different commodities (e.g. potatoes & eggs vs. milk & wheat): possible reasons: different levels of productivity or export orientation of specific commodity groups? 18



Georgia: Aggregate NRPs; 2010-2016




Very modest price incentives, less than AM

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- Implies more liberal markets with (analyzed) agricultural commodities, no special incentives for producers
- Commodity representativeness problematic, even more than in AM (fragmented production – many commodities)


Georgia: NRPs by commodities



FOR DISCUSSION:

- 1) Does fairly liberal market situation (no incentives/disincentives) contribute to the increase in productivity and competitiveness of agriculture, taking into account prevailing subsistence farming and fragmented land structure?
- 2) Hazelnuts: situation in this market after 2013?


Kyrgyz Republic: Aggregate NRPs; 2010-2016





- Price incentives fairly high: NRPs markedly positive
- Possible reasons (assumptions only!): closed economy, subsistence farming, sales on local markets prevailing, influences of policies probably not very pronounced etc.
- Additional research needed





Kyrgyz Republic: NRPs by commodities















FOR DISCUSSION:

- 1) Which commodities will be in policy focus in the near future?
- 2) Beans: do presented results show the real picture? Development of domestic prices in 2013 and 2014?



Moldova: Aggregate NRPs; 2010-2016




- Price disincentives: negative NRPs, most pronounced among the analyzed countries (most years)
- **Possible reasons:** asymmetrical distribution of market power, export orientation to very competitive markets, low cost agriculture etc.
- Additional research needed

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
Moldova: NRPs by commodities



FOR DISCUSSION:

- 1) Do price disincentives hinder development of agriculture; any government measures in this respect?
- 2) Wheat, maize, sunflower, grapes: Please comment the situation in these markets; the domestic prices are lower than reference prices, can you describe possible reasons?


Armenia: Budgetary and other transfers to agriculture; 2007-2016



- **Low support**; about 2% of the total value of agricultural production (2.6% in 2015-16)
- Consumer budgetary support is not implemented
- In 2015-16 around 75% for partial subsidization of inputs and services (irrigation costs, fertilizers, fuel...)




Azerbaijan: Budgetary and other transfers to agriculture; 2007-2016



- **Relatively strong support**; about 14% of the total value of agricultural production (16% in 2015-16)
- Data available only for some direct producer support measures
- In 2015-16 around 75% are tax concessions and VAT exemption




Belarus: Budgetary and other transfers to agriculture; 2011-2016



- **Decreasing strong support;** about 14% of the total value of agricultural production (12.5% in 2015-16)
- In 2015-16 around 69% for budgetary support to producers with the biggest share for repayments of debts and loans for purchased inputs and direct subsidies to farms




Georgia: Budgetary and other transfers to agriculture; 2005-2016



- Support to agriculture varies significantly; about 5% of the total value of agricultural production (7% in 2015-16)
- In 2015-16 cca. 56% for budgetary support to prod. and 44% for general services
- In 2015-16 around 9% payments based on output; 21% for subsidies for inputs and 26% for transfers reducing on farm investment costs




Moldova: Budgetary and other transfers to agriculture; 2005-2016



- Relatively low support; varies considerably between years; about 4% of the total value of agricultural production (3% in 2015-16)
- In 2015-16 around 65% for budgetary support to producers with majority for transfers reducing on farm investment costs; consumer budgetary support is not implemented




Total: Budgetary and other transfers to agriculture; average 2015-2016



- Relatively strong support (AZ, BY), low support (AM, MD) and GE in between
- Composition of budgetary and other transfers to agriculture varies (100% for PSE in AZ and 56% in GE)






Budgetary and other transfers to agriculture, allocated by specific commodities & NRAs

Crops:	AM	AZ	BY	GE	MD
Wheat	2010-2013				
Maize					
Sunflower					
Tomatoes					
Potatoes	_		2012,2013	2009	
Grapes				2007-2016	
Hazelnuts					
Beans	_				
Livestock:					
Cattle meat (beef and veal)		2016			
Pig meat					
Sheep meat	-		_		_
Chicken meat (Poultry meat)					
Cow's milk	_		2011-2016	150%	
Eggs				100%	

- Only few measures commodity-specific; small differences NRPs vs. NRAs (where applicable)
- Grapes in Georgia; only case where NRAs can be calculated for the whole period
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Discussion

 All countries: Please give general comment about how realistic you find our estimations of price incentives/disincentives to agriculture for your country?

Armenia:

- 1) Does fairly liberal market situation (no incentives/disincentives) contribute to the increase in productivity and competitiveness of agriculture, taking into account prevailing subsistence farming and fragmented land structure?
- 2) Pig meat: fairly high level of domestic prices?

Azerbaijan:

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- 2) Differences in the incentives / disincentives by different commodities (e.g. potatoes & eggs vs. milk & wheat): possible reasons: different levels of productivity or export orientation of specific commodity groups?



Discussion – cont.

Georgia:

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Moldova:

- 1) Do price disincentives hinder development of agriculture; any government measures in this respect?
- 2) Wheat, maize, sunflower, grapes: Please comment the situation in these markets; the domestic prices are lower than reference prices, can you describe possible reasons?

Conclusions and recommendations

Preliminary results:

- Three groups of countries by aggregate NRPs: strong agricultural price incentives (AZ, KY), modest price incentives (AM, GE) and price disincentives (BY, MD)
 - **Budgetary and other transfers to agriculture:** relatively strong support (AZ, BY), low support (AM, MD) and GE in between
- Preliminary results confirm general aggregate trends in agricultural price incentives/disincentives estimated in AGRICISTRADE project (Erjavec et al., 2017)
- Key factors influencing the estimations appear to be (further analysis recommended!): besides policy related distortions also market inefficiencies and imperfections (limited market integration, asymmetrical distribution of market power, etc.); quality and completeness of data
- Exact values of policy indicators need to be treated with some caution!

Conclusions and recommendations - cont.

Recommendations for possible future similar efforts:

- Improve representativeness of analyzed commodities
- Additional training of partners (capacity building material, specific for the region)
- Additional validations of results

Overall conclusion:

- MAFAP approach successfully applied in the analyzed countries
- Huge effort done by country experts and research team (45 commodity cases)!
- Highly recommended to further invest in the expert network and building of national capacity for policy monitoring to enhance evidence-based policymaking in the region



Thank you for your attention!

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- sara.bele@kis.si

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