Evaluation of FAO’s contribution to the humanitarian–development–peace nexus

2014–2020
Abstract

The Evaluation of FAO’s contribution to the humanitarian–development–peace (HDP) nexus constitutes an important addition to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations’ (FAO) efforts to develop an effective and innovative Strategic Framework, centred on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 2030 Agenda and ‘leaving no one behind’ - through better production, nutrition, environment and life.

A key perspective that underpins the analysis of the evaluation is that the HDP nexus is not a new area of work or a particular type of programme, but instead it is a mind-set, a systemic way of thinking, and a new way of working. Its main features are about joined-up, multi-partner, flexible and adaptive programming across the three HDP pillars that is anchored in context analysis and evidence, and is people-centred and inclusive.

The evaluation revisits and brings together in a coherent narrative the many approaches of conflict management and peace-sustaining work carried out over the years on natural resources management and rights-based frameworks. At the same time, it analyses the body of work developed through emergency activities, in crisis and conflict contexts – shaped by the ever-stronger recognition of the need to focus on longer-term resilience. The evaluation recognizes that the heart of FAO’s work in prioritizing and implementing an HDP approach has been at country level, and has pieced together a number of examples from across countries to inform the narrative and provide lessons.

The main overarching message from the evaluation is that FAO is ideally placed to invest in a major corporate effort to mainstream and adopt HDP nexus ways of working as part of its organizational DNA. It needs to make a deliberate and informed use of approaches and practices such as technical diplomacy, information systems and context analysis to inform conflict-sensitive programming, rights-based frameworks and people-centred approaches to achieve inclusive and peace-sustaining results. At the same time, FAO should step-up its footprint in, and contributions to, coordination and multi-partner fora and policy dialogues at country, regional and global levels. FAO has a comparative advantage deriving from its technical expertise and knowledge, but it should ensure this is sustained by skilled, well-informed and well-supported leadership at all levels, and by an enabling organizational system and culture, so it can deliver innovative and long-lasting results on peace to its membership, no matter whether in crisis or development settings.
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Abbreviations and acronyms

DAC  Development Assistance Committee
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GEF  Global Environment Facility
GNCF  Global Network against Food Crises
HDP  Humanitarian–development–peace
IASC  Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IFAD  International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFI  International Financing Institutions
IOM  International Organization for Migration
IPC  Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
M&E  Monitoring and Evaluation
NGO  Non-governmental Organization
NWOW  New Way of Working
OCHA  Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OED  FAO Office of Evaluation
OER  Office of Emergencies and Resilience
RNE  FAO Regional Office for Near East and North Africa
SDGs  Sustainable Development Goals
SP  Strategic Programme
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund
WFP  World Food Programme
Executive summary

1. The Evaluation of FAO’s contribution to the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus constitutes an important addition to FAO’s efforts to develop an effective and innovative Strategic Framework, centred on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 2030 Agenda and Leaving No One Behind - through better production, nutrition, environment and life. The evaluation draws its vision from the first session of the Conference of FAO, where it was stated that “…the Food and Agriculture Organization is born out of the need for peace as well as the need for freedom from want. The two are interdependent. Progress towards freedom from want is essential to lasting peace.” (FAO, 2006).

2. Over the decades, FAO has been active in more than 90 countries, working to secure food and nutrition security for all, across conflict, fragile and crises contexts as well as in more stable development ones. Over the years, evaluations have provided evidence and recommendations on how FAO could better address the short- and long-term causes of malnutrition and food insecurity across different contexts and provided solutions and support to Member States in identifying sustainable pathways to inclusive and equitable development and food security.

3. The starting point for this report is the 2014 evaluation of FAO’s contributions to crises-related transition: linking relief to development, which explored the progress FAO had made on linking its emergency and development work to better respond to the needs of countries in crises (FAO, 2014). The current evaluation picks up the analysis from 2014 but importantly overlays explicitly the peace dimension to the humanitarian and development ones as well as extending the analysis beyond crises contexts, to cover contributions to peace in development settings.

4. A key perspective which underpins the analysis of the evaluation is that the HDP nexus is not a new area of work or a particular type of programme, but instead is a mindset, a systemic way of thinking, and a new way of working. Its main features are about joined-up, multi-partner, flexible and adaptive programming across the three HDP pillars that is anchored in context analysis and evidence and is people-centred and inclusive. Likewise, the leadership required for effective HDP approaches needs to be innovative, principled, and transformative as well as enable dialogue across disciplines, sectors and pillars of the aid architecture and provide a vision that uses the technical expertise and mandate of agencies such as FAO to promote dialogue, collaboration and longer-term sustainable results. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) – Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Recommendation on the HDP Nexus is one of the key texts spelling out this approach (OECD, 2019).

5. The external drivers for the evaluation are the evolution of the aid context, where there has been a call by the United Nations (UN) Secretary General for all of the UN to address peace as a centrepiece of its work (UN, 2016), and ultimately to work to this triple HDP nexus. The internal drivers are both the development in 2018 of FAO’s Corporate Framework to Support Sustainable Peace in the Context of Agenda 2030 (FAO, 2018a), the establishment of the Conflict and Peace Unit and the growing body of FAO’s work engaging with conflict dynamics, and an ongoing ambition to better link its development and humanitarian work. The evaluation revisits and brings together in a coherent narrative the many approaches of conflict management and peace-sustaining work carried out over the years on natural resource management (NRM) and rights-based frameworks. At the same time, it analyses
the body of work developed through emergency activities, in crisis and conflict contexts – shaped by the ever-stronger recognition of the need to focus on longer-term resilience.

6. The evaluation recognizes that the heart of FAO’s work in prioritizing and implementing an HDP approach has been at country level. The evaluation has pieced together a number of examples from across countries to inform the narrative and provide lessons. Nevertheless, the corporate understanding of the HDP nexus as well as the programmatic coherence and consistency across teams and countries remain fragmented: for example, there is little consistency in the scale of FAO’s humanitarian offer, or in its engagement with conflict dynamics. The main over-arching message from the evaluation is that FAO is ideally placed to invest in a major corporate effort to learn from its years of experience and successful examples, to mainstream and adopt HDP nexus ways of working as part of its organizational DNA, making deliberate and informed use of approaches and practices such as technical diplomacy, information systems and context analysis to inform conflict-sensitive programming, rights-based frameworks and people-centred approaches to achieve inclusive and peace-sustaining results. At the same time, FAO should step-up its footprint in, and contributions to, coordination and multi-partner fora and policy dialogues, at country, regional and global levels. FAO has a comparative advantage deriving from its technical expertise and knowledge, but it should ensure this is sustained by skilled, well-informed and well-supported leadership at all levels, and by an enabling organizational system and culture, so it can deliver innovative and long-lasting results on peace to its membership, no matter whether in crisis or development settings.
1. Introduction

1.1 Purpose of the evaluation

1. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) made a corporate commitment to work on the humanitarian-development nexus at the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016. FAO’s Director-General endorsed the Commitment to Action (FAO, 2016a). In line with FAO’s mandate to ensure “humanity’s freedom from hunger” (FAO, 2017a), linking the humanitarian-development nexus has long been an organizational ambition. Exploring how FAO was linking relief, rehabilitation and development was at the heart of an evaluation of FAO’s contribution to ‘Crisis-related Transition’ carried out in 2014 (FAO, 2014). More recently, in 2018, FAO developed a ‘Corporate Framework to support sustainable peace in the context of Agenda 2030’ in response to the United Nations Secretary-General’s 2016 call to all UN entities to regard sustaining peace as an important goal to which their work can contribute (UN, 2016), and to integrate this into their strategic planning (FAO, 2018a). In the last couple of years, the double nexus has been replaced by the triple humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus, with a plethora of documents and key messages in the wider sector about what this means.

2. FAO’s Programme Committee requested this evaluation, to contribute evaluative learning to FAO’s strategy development on the HDP nexus, and to provide lessons for programming at country level. It is a formative evaluation. It ‘takes stock’ of the extent to which FAO is currently addressing the humanitarian-development components of the nexus, and implicitly or explicitly engaging with the peace dimension of the HDP nexus.

3. As stated by the recommendation of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) on the HDP nexus, it is about “strengthening the coherence between humanitarian, development and peace efforts, (with) the aim of effectively reducing people’s needs, risks and vulnerabilities, supporting prevention efforts and thus, shifting from delivering humanitarian assistance to ending need.” (OECD, 2019) Thus, it is principally about adapting and adjusting ways of working, in line with the New Way of Working (N WOW) that emerged from the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit. This is the approach taken by this evaluation, exploring the extent to which FAO has taken on board new, connected and coherent ways of working. As a strategic evaluation, it looks across the Organization in terms of different thematic areas where the HDP nexus appears most relevant, and different levels from global to regional to country-level.

4. The evaluation sets out to address three broad topics: i) the relevance of the HDP nexus to FAO’s mandate and work, and FAO’s strategic positioning for addressing the HDP nexus; ii) the results of FAO’s programme contribution to address the interface between humanitarian, development and peace interventions, as well as examples of contributions to sustaining peace; and iii) organizational performance, and the factors that have facilitated or constrained FAO in working in an integrated way in line with the HDP nexus. As this is the first evaluation that any United Nations (UN) agency has carried out of its work against the HDP nexus, it is breaking ground methodologically, and much can be learned from the experience.
2. **Background to the HDP nexus**

5. This chapter begins with a review of the literature, exploring the origins of the triple nexus and unpacking the different dimensions of the concept, while recognising that operationalising the HDP is still an emergent process. The relevance of the HDP nexus to FAO is explored in section 4, in response to the evaluation questions. The second part of this chapter provides a brief description of the UN architecture and how it is institutionally organized around three pillars: humanitarian, development and peace. The evaluation will focus on the peace pillar, in order to situate FAO’s engagement, particularly in relation to the peace component of the nexus.

2.1 **Understanding the nexus**

6. The idea of strengthening the links and connections between humanitarian action and aid for development is not new. This agenda dates back at least to the early 1990s (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1994). It has been expressed in various forms: linking relief, recovery and development, or disaster risk reduction (DRR), and is a central tenet of the resilience aid paradigm that has gained momentum in the last decade. The motivation behind all of these efforts is in large part due to the division of the aid sector into a development arm and a humanitarian arm. While these two sub-sectors may have different objectives, be underpinned by different frameworks and guiding principles, have different modus operandi, and work to different timeframes, in practice they have often faced difficulties working in complementary ways. At times their objectives may conflict, the two sub-sectors may be in competition, and they are usually characterised by very different working cultures. As described above, the initiative to extend the double humanitarian-development nexus to the triple HDP nexus, including peace, is associated with United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’ remarks to the General Assembly upon taking office in December 2016, that “sustaining peace is the third leg of the humanitarian response, sustainable development triangle” (SIPRI, 2019).

7. Rationale for the HDP nexus: This renewed commitment to a more coherent, complementary and coordinated approach, now incorporating peace, is in response to a number of factors and trends:

i. Conflicts are increasingly protracted and humanitarian caseloads are growing. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the average length of crises with an active inter-agency appeal rose from four years in 2005 to seven years in 2017 (OCHA, 2018). Almost 90 percent of humanitarian aid is now going to protracted crises (OECD, 2019).

ii. In 2017, the number of recorded armed conflicts reached a record high over a 30-year time period (SIPRI, 2019). Most conflict is intra-state and much involves non-state actors with patterns of often low intensity but enduring asymmetric conflict covering larger geographical areas. Forced displacement of people, the vast majority resulting from conflict, continues to rise, with 79.5 million people displaced globally in 2019 (UNHCR, 2020).

iii. As a result, increasing amounts of total earmarked overseas development assistance (ODA) are being spent in fragile contexts: 65 percent in 2016. The OECD

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1 Drawing on UNSDG & IASC, 2019; OECD, 2019; Fanning and Fullwood-Thomas, 2019.
estimates that nearly half of the 836 million people living in extreme poverty live in
fragile contexts, and this proportion will rise to 80 percent by 2030 (OECD, 2019).
See Figure 1. Although similar data do not exist for year-on-year prevalence of food
insecurity and hunger in fragile states, trends in food insecurity are likely to follow
poverty trends.

iv. The Global Report on Food Crises has, for the last four years reported conflict as
the primary driver of acute food insecurity. The State of Food Security and Nutrition
in the World 2019 report confirms a rise in world hunger for a third year in a row.
“The number of hungry people is back up to where it was a decade ago. (…) Conflicts
and the climate crisis constitute the greatest drivers of hunger.” (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF,

v. In addition, climate change is triggering greater frequency and intensity of climate-
related shocks. This in turn can fuel local-level conflicts, for example over access
to natural resources (Fanning and Fullwood-Thomas, 2019).

Figure 1. The rising proportion of the global poor living in fragile contexts

8. All of this makes it increasingly challenging to deliver on the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs). Reducing the impact of protracted crises on affected populations requires
meeting immediate humanitarian needs and also investing in medium- to long-term
development to address the systemic causes of poverty and to reduce chronic vulnerability
and risk. Long-term solutions and sustainable development, in turn, are not possible
without peace. SDG 16 is specific to peace with its goal of promoting just, peaceful and
inclusive societies. Activities which contribute to peace and conflict prevention are essential
to end protracted crises and need to be planned and started at the onset of a crisis, in close
coordination with humanitarian actors and mindful of humanitarian principles. Hence, the
HDP nexus, which can be interpreted as: “prioritising prevention, mediation and

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2 Today, one weather- or climate-related disaster occurs every one to two days, with an estimated 108 million people needing
life-saving assistance in 2018. This number could double by 2050 (IFRC, 2020).
Background to the HDP nexus

peacebuilding, investing in development whenever possible, while ensuring immediate humanitarian needs continue to be met” (OECD, 2019). A recent Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) paper makes the point that: “Humanitarian assistance, development cooperation and peacebuilding are not serial processes: they are all needed at the same time in order to reduce needs, risk and vulnerability.” (IASC, 2020a).

9. The institutional dimension to the HDP nexus: This dimension dominates many discussions of the HDP nexus. The approach to the HDP nexus is seen as going beyond previous programmatic or conceptual approaches. From an institutional perspective it encourages more fundamental structural shifts within the aid system that relate to how aid is planned, financed and delivered (Fanning and Fullwood-Thomas, 2019). This has implications for how different actors – humanitarian, development and peace actors – work together. The NWOW is an expression of efforts to operationalize the HDP nexus, principally by removing barriers to the humanitarian, development and peace silos (OCHA, 2016). Humanitarian, development and peace actors are expected to work more closely together towards collective outcomes, underpinned by joined-up multi-year funding, more closely involving international financial institutions (IASC, 2020b). The widespread buy-in to the institutional dimension of the HDP nexus is promising in terms of the potential for bringing about real institutional change that has evaded earlier ‘linking’ efforts (OECD, 2020).

10. More joined-up programming is a cause of concern to some humanitarian actors. They fear that closer integration and association with peace and development actors will dilute and compromise the humanitarian principles that guide their work, particularly neutrality and independence, the operational principles upon which they often depend to negotiate access to those in need, and that humanitarian action will be subsumed by a political agenda (Tronc et al., 2019). This is a hotly debated topic as some other humanitarians, for example Du Bois (2020), argue that the HDP nexus offers an opportunity to strengthen humanitarian programming and realization of its principles. Expanding the scope and extending the time perspective of the (wider) sector’s analysis should mean that it is better able to address the root causes of poverty and conflict, and humanitarian actors can focus more on their core business. The HDP nexus could be an opportunity to find common ground between different actors around the principle of humanity and its implications for human dignity, development and peace, as well as support the specific achievement of SDG 16. How this plays out in practice will depend upon how the HDP nexus is operationalized. This is still very much work in progress.

11. The inclusion dimension to the HDP nexus: The above approach to the HDP nexus is characterised by some as an overly top-down and institutional approach, driven from agency headquarters, that will do little to address the power dynamics inherent in the sector. Instead, local context and people must be the central organizational principle, in a ‘sil-o-free whole of society response’ (DuBois, 2020). This is reinforced by the UN’s commitment to ‘leaving no one behind’ through the SDGs (UNSDG, 2019). A study by the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) makes the point that this is where development actors need to be in the driving seat as they “already have the mandates and skill-sets for longer-term partnerships, are likely to take a more central role in ensuring more profound commitments to localisation and inclusion across the nexus.” (Christoplos et al., 2018). Yet, development actors have been

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1 Some current thinking in relation to the crisis in the Sahel usefully refers to three themes: i) humanitarian access and principles while at the same time, ii) responding to the developmental crisis of a structural gap in basic social services, and iii) recognizing that this is fundamentally a crisis of protection, also addressing the root causes of the conflict (OCHA, 2020).
largely out of the loop on the nexus which has been driven from the humanitarian side, not least coming out of the World Humanitarian Summit (Christoplos et al., 2018). Section 5 further unpacks what a people-centred approach means to the HDP nexus in FAO’s areas of work.

12. The HDP nexus and gender: There is concern amongst some that considerations of gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls are not being given adequate attention in current HDP nexus processes (OCHA, n.d.). This raises a question about how implementation of an HDP nexus approach could support transformational change in how gender features in humanitarian action, through longer-term support to women’s organizations and ensuring that women’s rights, needs, risks and vulnerabilities, are integral to both immediate responses and longer-term outcomes. The international Agenda on Women, Peace and Security is highly relevant to the peace component of the nexus, underpinned by UN Security Council resolution (SCR) 1325 that reaffirms the important role of women in conflict prevention and resolution, peace negotiations, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and post-conflict reconstruction.

13. Contextual and geographic dimension to the HDP nexus: In view of the trends described above, illustrated in Figure 1, there is an understandable focus on the relevance and application of the nexus to fragile states. NWOW launched at the World Humanitarian Summit focuses specifically on protracted and repeated crises. And the OECD-DAC (2019) recommendation refers to the need for complementary and collaborative HDP actions, ‘particularly in fragile and conflict-affected situations’ (OECD, 2019). In recognition of these trends some development actors and agencies, like the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the World Bank and some of the regional banks and international financial institutions (IFIs), have been paying much greater attention to working in fragile contexts.

14. The relevance of the HDP nexus to other contexts is less well-explored, although there is a need for more integrated and systemic ways of thinking in contexts and countries before they become fragile to address some of the underlying structural drivers of fragility, and to anticipate crises rather than wait for them to happen. Weishaupt (2020) makes the case that contextual factors and contextual differences need to be better acknowledged and taken into account in configuring an HDP nexus approach or response, and this includes the presence and capacity of government authorities. So far there is little guidance on this, but joint analyses could provide the entry point to assessing the most appropriate HDP nexus configuration in a particular setting (Weishaupt, 2020).

15. What the HDP nexus is, and what it is not: In conclusion, the HDP nexus is fundamentally about encouraging a different way of thinking which will, in turn, result in different ways of doing things. DuBois describes this as requiring a shift from focusing on structures to a focus on how people in the three sectors think: ‘Structural nexus programme linkages should never become mandatory. Nexus-inspired programme thinking, however, should’ (DuBois, 2020). Weishaupt warns against the conceptualisation of the HDP nexus as a blueprint, but instead sees its potential in encouraging thinking beyond distinct spheres of competence and intervention. He usefully distinguishes between ‘bridging silos’, in other words making connections between different sectors, and ‘breaking silos’ where the silo itself is the problem in terms of constraining thinking and imagination. The HDP nexus is thus predominantly about the ‘how’ which may, in turn, impact the ‘what’ (Weishaupt, 2020).
2.2 FAO and the peace component of the HDP nexus

16. In 1945, the UN Charter established the three founding pillars of the UN system: peace and security, human rights, and development. These pillars, with rule of law as a crosscutting theme, have provided the framework for the UN architecture and modus operandi. Article 1 of the UN Charter establishes as one of the main purposes of the Organization to maintain international peace and security and to bring about by peaceful means the settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace, in conformity with the principles of justice and international law. At the international level, the UN works to i) prevent conflict; ii) helping parties in conflict make peace; iii) peacekeeping; and iv) creating the conditions to allow peace to hold. The UN Security Council has the primary responsibility for international peace and security, with the General Assembly and the Secretary-General playing major and complementary roles, along with other UN offices and bodies. At the national level, the UN works to support national rule of law institutions to prevent further conflict, to assist in de-escalating from a conflict situation, and to create an environment that is conducive to peace and security.

17. On the development pillar, the aim of the UN is “to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”. The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is the organ most associated with achieving this goal. It is responsible for coordinating the development mandates of 14 UN specialized agencies and five regional commissions. Sustainable development is the core aim of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted by Member States in 2015, with the 17 SDGs adopted by all UN Member States as part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development which set out a 15-year plan to achieve the goals. The SDGs are a universal call to action to end poverty, protect the planet and improve the lives and prospects of everyone, everywhere.

18. As stated by its Charter, one of the purposes of the UN is “to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character.” The Organization is now relied upon by the international community to coordinate humanitarian relief operations due to natural and human-made disasters in areas beyond the relief capacity of national authorities alone. The scope of humanitarian activity ranges from humanitarian crises resulting from war and violent conflict to natural and technical disasters. Complex emergencies with multiple causes that require a broad and comprehensive assistance approach have become increasingly important. OCHA, within the UN Secretariat, is responsible for coordinating responses to emergencies. It does this through the IASC, whose members include the UN system entities most responsible for providing emergency relief. FAO is often called on to support populations engaged in agriculture re-establish production following floods, outbreaks of livestock disease, conflict, socio-economic crises and similar emergencies, as well as strategic and analytical support on food security and nutrition.

19. The different peace interventions of the UN range from conflict prevention, mediation and social cohesion activities to peace-making, sustaining peace, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and peacebuilding, although the boundaries between them have become increasingly blurred. See Box 1. Peace operations are rarely limited to one type of activity.4 Within this landscape, FAO is an actor in the sustaining peace component of the UN peace architecture. While it may indirectly contribute to the other components, this will only

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4 This is recognized by the UN (n.d.b.).
happen at country level, under the aegis of the UN resident or humanitarian coordinator, as part of the UN country team/humanitarian country team and is usually limited to activities such as the provision of information for areas covered by its mandate, for example conflict over access to natural resources, or coordination on security and logistics for operational aspects. At the global level, FAO contributes through providing periodic briefings, jointly with the World Food Programme (WFP), to the UN Secretariat and thereby UN Security Council on the links between conflict and hunger. This aspect is further analysed below in section 4.

Box 1. The peace pillar within the UN

The peace pillar of the UN architecture is composed of the following areas of intervention:

Conflict prevention and mediation: diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict, and includes early warning, information gathering and analysis of the factors driving conflict.

Peace-making: generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement.

Peacekeeping: while UN peacekeeping operations are, in principle, deployed to support the implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement, they are often required to play an active role in peacemaking efforts and may also be involved in early peacebuilding activities.

Peace enforcement: involves the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. It requires the explicit authorization of the Security Council.

Peacebuilding: Peacebuilding aims to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development.

20. The peacebuilding component of the UN peace architecture, in which FAO is playing an increasingly active role, even if still small, is led by three main actors/mechanisms: the Peacebuilding Commission, an inter-governmental body that advises the General Assembly and the Security Council on peace related matters, the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) within the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), which supports the Peacebuilding Commission and administers the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), a multi-donor pooled fund (currently funded by 48 countries) that finances UN agencies’ peacebuilding activities. FAO is one of the UN agencies that is a recipient of the PBF, with a growing portfolio (further detail below in section 5).

21. As described in section 3, the reference points for the evaluation in terms of FAO’s role and engagement in the peace architecture are set out in the 2018 ‘Corporate Framework to Support Peace in the Context of Agenda 2030’ (FAO, 2018a), and building on the Committee on Food Security 2015 ‘Framework for Action for Food Security and Nutrition in Protracted Crises’ (CFS-FFA). The momentum for the CFS-FFA was in turn prompted as a measure to address the issues raised in the 2010 ‘State of Food Security in the World on Addressing Food Insecurity in Protracted Crises’ which brought to the forefront the clear link between peace, conflict and food security (FAO, 2010).

5 The CFS-FFA is articulated along 11 principles for action which cover both the humanitarian and development mandate of the Organization, focusing on meeting the humanitarian needs and building resilience, addressing the underlying causes of food security and undernutrition and adapting to specific challenges around ways of working and cross-cutting themes (FAO, IFAD & WFP, 2015).
22. For the purpose of the evaluation, it is important to note that FAO favours the use of the term ‘contributions to sustaining peace’ (rather than peacebuilding) to describe the focus of its activities and that it unofficially distinguishes between activities that contribute to the ‘big P’ and the ‘small p’ (where P and p stand for peace), although in reality the two are usually inextricably linked. In terms of defining the measure and modalities of intervention around peace-sustaining activities, the Conflict and Peace Unit of FAO has identified a scale of progressive requirements and interventions, from foundational minimum requirements of ensuring conflict sensitivity and doing no harm in all interventions, to identifying where its activities may contribute to positive effects in terms of conflict prevention and social cohesion, to proactively addressing conflict drivers and designing interventions aimed at building peace (see Figure 2 below).

Figure 2. Minimalist and Maximalist Approaches

Avoiding harm – proactively mitigating risks to and from agencies presence (including local partners), strategy and programmes

Contributing to peace and stability – within existing operational and policy frameworks and commitments, but no change to primary objectives of programmes

Directly and deliberately addressing causes and drivers of conflict - engagement aligned, where appropriate, with national strategy for building peace and stability where all programmes have primary objectives related to conflict reduction

Minimalist

Maximalist


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6 The small p refers to contributions to sustaining peace at the local level, often with communities, local and sub-national institutions that foster local peace, while the big P involves central government and traditional peacebuilding actors.

7 The Conflict and Peace Unit is under a co-management arrangement between ESA-OER and provides support to decentralized offices across a number of thematic and technical areas, including conflict analysis, conflict sensitivity and contributions to sustaining peace. The Conflict and Peace Unit also provides technical coordination to Conflict Sensitivity Programming Specialists in REOWA, RTEA and FAO Jordan (for the Near East) (FAO, n.d.a.).
3. **Methodology and constraints**

3.1 **The evaluation framework and its reference points**

23. The team developed an evaluation framework during the inception phase that was widely shared for comment and feedback. See Appendix 2. It is based on three key UN/sector-wide documents on the HDP nexus: i) the NWOW,\(^8\) to which FAO is a signatory; ii) key messages on the nexus by the UN Sustainable Development Group and IASC which unpacks the NWOW four priority areas; iii) the OECD-DAC Recommendation on the HDP nexus which provides a framework for its member countries. Although not legally binding the OECD-DAC Recommendation on the HDP is regarded as holding ‘a strong moral force’ (SIPRI, 2019). With a focus on fragile and conflict-affected situations, it identifies three broad thematic areas, and a number of actions within each. FAO has not adhered to it, but other UN agencies, such as WFP, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) are in the process of adhering to it.

24. Appendix 3 provides a summary of the themes and priority areas from each of these three documents. These are predominantly about ways of working and approaches, all of which are relevant to FAO. The evaluation team has also included Oxfam’s unpacking of the soft skills implicit in the HDP nexus ways of working, such as systems-thinking and consensus-building (Fanning and Fullwood-Thomas, 2019).

25. While these three documents, and especially the OECD-DAC Recommendation, are the main reference points for the sector on the HDP nexus, they describe nexus ways of working and approaches as general statements. There are no specific benchmarks or indicators against which to evaluate. Indeed, as stated above, FAO’s evaluation against the HDP nexus is the first to be carried out in the sector so it is breaking new ground. After exploring the relevance of the HDP nexus to FAO (see section 4.2), the evaluation team has therefore had to interpret what the nexus means for each of these general statements in relation to FAO’s mandate and portfolio of work. This has been done in close consultation with FAO personnel through interviews, and with input from external stakeholders.

26. There is both an internal and an external element to the HDP nexus. The internal element explores the extent to which FAO is working in more joined-up and connected ways within the Organization, for example through changes in its programming approaches, putting local people and actors at the centre of its programming, and through its organizational culture, for instance engaging in adaptive and flexible management, and systemic thinking. The external element explores the extent to which FAO is collaborating with other actors across the three pillars of the HDP nexus, for example through strategic partnerships to achieve a different degree of joined-up programming and inter-connectedness.

27. As the peace component of the HDP nexus is the newest for FAO (which has long been working on linkages between the humanitarian and development components of the nexus, as well as its technical competencies on matters contributing to sustaining peace), the evaluation has paid particular attention to FAO’s progress in engaging with conflict and peace in its work, and with peace actors. ‘FAO’s Corporate Framework to support sustainable peace in the context of Agenda 2030’ is a key reference point (FAO, 2018a).

28. This has therefore been more of a process evaluation, of FAO’s ways of working and the extent to which they are aligned to the HDP nexus. Because the HDP nexus is relatively new, very few FAO

\(^8\) See Agenda for Humanity, n.d.
projects and programmes have been explicitly designed with the HDP nexus approach in mind, and it has not been possible to evaluate in any depth the results and impact of FAO’s work against the HDP nexus. This is further complicated by the fact that FAO’s monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems are not currently producing robust findings at the outcome and impact levels, as discussed below.

3.2 The evaluation questions

29. There are six evaluation questions behind the three broad topics for this evaluation:

i. Relevance and strategic positioning:
   - What is the relevance of the HDP nexus to FAO’s mandate and work?
   - How effective is FAO’s strategic positioning for addressing the HDP nexus, and how could its strategic positioning be strengthened?

ii. Programme contribution and results:
   - What have been the results (positive and negative, intended and unintended), at all levels and for different population groups (e.g. women, men, youth, displaced), of FAO’s efforts to address the interface between humanitarian and development interventions, of beginning to address the HDP nexus, and what are the lessons learned for applying the nexus in the future?
   - What can be learned from FAO’s programming experience related to conflict and peace, for addressing the HDP nexus, with particular reference to the peace dimension?

iii. Organizational performance:
   - What organizational factors have facilitated or constrained FAO in working in an integrated way in line with, and conducive to the HDP nexus?
   - How can FAO create a more enabling environment to promote the nexus in its ways of working in the future?

30. These high-level questions have been broken down into a number of sub-questions in the evaluation matrix (see Appendix 4). The evaluation matrix has been mapped onto the evaluation framework, indicating which sub-questions relate to which way of working.

3.3 Defining the scope of the evaluation

31. During the scoping mission for the evaluation the team consulted with FAO personnel at headquarters, and in regional and country offices, leading to the identification of eight thematic areas that are central to FAO’s work and particularly pertinent to the HDP nexus. These thematic areas have been the main focus of the evaluation; the list is selective rather than exhaustive, to ensure the evaluation was do-able in the time available.

32. The eight thematic areas are: i) food and nutrition security; ii) resilience; iii) climate change adaptation; iv) land and natural resource management (NRM); v) food chain crises; vi) pastoralism; vii) social protection; and viii) rural-urban interface, subsequently replaced by forced displacement. Thematic areas were assigned to team members for investigation and analysis. Some of the themes cover core areas of FAO’s work, for example on resilience⁹ and food security,

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⁹ FAO defines resilience as “the ability to prevent disasters and crises as well as to anticipate, absorb, accommodate or recover from them in a timely, efficient and sustainable manner. This includes protecting, restoring and improving livelihoods systems in the face of threats that impact agriculture, nutrition, food security and food safety.” (FAO, n.d.b.)
and others cover newer areas of work, for example on social protection. There is inevitably a degree of overlap between them. During the main evaluation phase ‘rural-urban interface’, for which there was extremely limited material, was replaced with ‘forced displacement. The thematic areas were selected through a consultative process with FAO personnel and served as a way of grounding the HDP approach to priority areas of policy and programmatic work. This was instrumental to facilitate an understanding of what an HDP approach would look like in practice, in FAO’s work.

3.4 Methodology

33. Evaluation synthesis: A source for the evaluation was a review and synthesis of over 100 FAO evaluations conducted since 2014, categorised into: global (with sub-categories of project and thematic), regional, country and project evaluations. The whole evaluation team took part in this synthesis.

34. First, the evaluation reports were scanned for a preliminary assessment of their relevance to the HDP nexus, using a simple three-point scale (3 as highly relevant and 1 as not relevant). Second, the evaluation reports were reviewed to extract evaluative findings and evidence of NWOW and HDP approaches to programming using a template based on the evaluation framework above. For evaluation reports that had nothing or very little to say of relevance to the HDP nexus, only the executive summary was reviewed. For evaluation reports that had more to say of relevance to the HDP nexus, the whole report was reviewed, assisted by word searches. The respective reviewer took notes taken against the template, often cutting and pasting relevant sections from the report, supplemented with a short bullet-pointed summary that indicated which of the eight thematic areas the evaluation covered, and which of the nexus ‘way of working’ the evaluation threw light on, whether ‘good practice’ and/or ‘poor practice’.

35. It quickly became apparent that few evaluations contained findings of direct relevance to the HDP nexus. This is not surprising as the HDP nexus is a relatively new concept and had not been used as a reference point for project or programme design, nor for the evaluations. But this did mean that findings relevant to this nexus evaluation often had to be inferred, for example from evidence of different parts of FAO working together in some semblance of joined-up and more systemic programming, or from evidence of how FAO was partnering with other actors. The evaluations that yielded greatest insight were those carried out at global level, for example of FAO’s performance against the strategic framework, and those carried out at country level. The scope of these were usually at a more strategic level than mid-term or final project evaluations.

36. Realising the limited contribution that this sample of evaluations was able to make and taking into account that they do not cover all of FAO’s work, the evaluation team realised that the interviewing phase of the evaluation would have to be given much greater emphasis. This was substantially scaled up as a result.

37. Key informant interviews: As the evaluation synthesis was being completed, stakeholder mapping was carried out to identify potential key informants to be interviewed. Groups of stakeholders were categorised according to the eight thematic areas, with an additional category of ‘overarching’ stakeholders. This latter group included FAO’s Director-General and Assistant Director-Generals. The majority of stakeholders identified in the initial mapping exercise were internal to FAO. Through snowball sampling, whereby initial interviewees recommended other key informant interviews, additional external stakeholders were identified and contacted. Over a period of four to five months the team carried out over 120 interviews. FAO personnel were selected to cover headquarters, regional, and country offices, as well as the eight thematic areas.
External informants included representatives of UN agencies, donors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academics, and multi-lateral institutions. Through interviews and a review of evaluations, the team covered over 25 countries where FAO has a presence.

38. As the HDP nexus is a relatively new concept, at all levels the interviews explored understanding and application of the nexus and examples of FAO operationalising the nexus, often implicitly, as well as constraints. Quotes from interviewees have been used in the evaluation report where they illustrate a common finding or widely held perception that emerged in a number of interviews. Due to COVID-19 restrictions all interviews were conducted over voice over IP (VoIP). A list of key informants is available in Appendix 1.

39. Case studies: Of these 25 countries covered through interviews, four FAO country programmes were explored in more depth as mini case studies. The scoping paper for the evaluation had proposed the following as mini-case studies: Colombia, Palestine, the Philippines and Somalia. Although some interviews were carried out with FAO personnel in Palestine, it was not possible to carry out a sufficient number to retain this as a mini case study. Instead, the FAO office in Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh was found to have relevant experience of joined-up programming in line with the HDP nexus, so this replaced Palestine. Detailed in Appendix 2, Appendix Table 2 summarises the criteria for selection of the mini case studies, and which of the eight themes they relate to. The case study interviews particularly focused on projects and programmes that demonstrated HDP nexus ways of working, supported by documentation, to be as illustrative as possible.

40. Survey: A survey (drafted in three languages – English, French and Spanish) was conducted and sent to over 250 FAO personnel (from headquarters, country, and regional offices). Survey questions (both closed and open formats) included levels of engagement on conflict or peace issues, and overall understanding of the HDP nexus and NWOW, reflecting the questions in the evaluation matrix. The survey was partially successful, with 55 responses out of 259 recipients. It has not, therefore, been used as a sole source of information, but more to triangulate feedback and findings from the interviews. It was also used to identify and guide additional interviews with FAO country offices where the survey indicated they had experience relevant to the HDP nexus that the evaluation could draw upon.

41. Literature review and secondary documentation: A wide range of secondary documentation has been reviewed, ranging from literature on the HDP nexus, to FAO policy and programming documents, to the results of the consultation exercise related to the new Office of Emergencies and Resilience (OER) (see Bibliography). A lot of literature is still being produced on the HDP nexus, thus, the literature review has been an ongoing process with new articles still being reviewed during drafting of the report.

42. Iterative analysis process: The team carried out an iterative process of analysis through a series of remote meetings over the duration of the evaluation. This was in line with the inductive approach to the evaluation, whereby observations of good and poor practice in applying the nexus have been used to further develop and articulate nexus ways of working as relevant to FAO.

43. Validation workshop: A virtual validation workshop was carried out towards the end of the analysis phase, at the end of September, bringing together 30 selected FAO personnel (from headquarters, regional and country offices) covering FAO’s major areas of work. The evaluation team shared their preliminary findings for feedback and discussion. Participants were divided into breakout groups to discuss and brainstorm emerging recommendations. This assisted the evaluation team in refining recommendations.
3.5 Constraints

44. A major limitation, not foreseen when developing the terms of reference for the evaluation, was the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting restrictions on travel and meetings in person. The evaluation team therefore had to revise the evaluation plan and especially the data collection phase to remote interviews and remote team working. While virtual interviews allowed the evaluation team to cover more countries, the limitation was triangulation through field visits, particularly of ‘good practice examples’ of HDP approach. The examples in this evaluation should therefore be regarded as illustrative.

45. A second major challenge has been a methodological one: evaluating against a concept as broad-ranging and complex as the HDP nexus, defined at a high level of generality without specific benchmarks. The evaluation therefore had to piece together what the HDP nexus can and does look like for FAO from a range of sources, particularly from interviews, past evaluations, as well as identifying gaps and shortcomings. When this evaluation was first mooted it was suggested that it could serve as a baseline for FAO which is still new to the HDP nexus. Thus, future monitoring and evaluation can assess subsequent progress, for example including the HDP nexus as a reference point in future evaluations. The experience of this evaluation also offers methodological learning about how to evaluate against the HDP nexus.

46. A limitation, but also an opportunity, has been the organizational restructuring of FAO during the course of the evaluation. The limitation was understanding the functions, roles, responsibilities and implications of the new structure, ensuring the evaluation remained relevant to the ongoing changes. But the evolving structure and emerging strategic framework have also been an opportunity for the evaluation’s findings and recommendations to inform and feed into these processes.
4. Relevance of the HDP nexus to FAO’s mandate and FAO’s strategic positioning

4.1 Understanding of the HDP nexus within FAO

Finding 1. There is widely varying understanding of the HDP nexus and perceptions of its relevance amongst FAO personnel, particularly of the peace component, including at senior management level. There is greatest engagement from the humanitarian side, and it is generally seen as most relevant to programming in fragile contexts.

47. Although FAO is regarded by many (personnel and external stakeholders) as primarily a development organization, most thinking about the HDP nexus has been done from the emergency end, and particularly by Strategic Programme (SP) 5 personnel who commissioned a discussion paper on the implications of the HDP nexus for resilience.

48. Understanding of the HDP nexus from the development side of FAO is mixed, but there has generally been much less engagement with the concept from development personnel. Amongst some – probably a minority – there is a resistance towards FAO’s emergency work, implying that even the covering of humanitarian and development components in its mandate has not yet been accepted by all. FAO’s substantial investment in resilience programming in recent years has helped to break down some of this conceptual and programmatic resistance (as described below). While some see FAO’s resilience work as more of a relabelling of its emergency programmes, particularly during an era when there was little support for emergency work from the top, others see substantial progress in integrating the humanitarian and development components through resilience.

49. A pattern amongst interviewees at all levels was to comment that they did not really understand the HDP nexus – with some even saying they did not think it applied to their area of work – but their description of how some of them were working indicated that they were already adopting nexus ways of working, just not labelling it as such. The results of the online survey carried out for this evaluation showed that around two-thirds of respondents from country offices self-reported as having a medium to high understanding of the HDP nexus, and a third little or no understanding (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. FAO personnel perceptions of understanding of the HDP nexus, at country level

Source: Evaluation online survey.
50. Considering this is a relatively new concept this is not a bad result. But when delving into how interviewees understand the nexus, a wide range of interpretations emerges. In terms of the concept itself, one described it as a triangle, others talk about ‘working across’ the nexus. The linear and sequential nature of the continuum that characterized the early ‘linking relief, rehabilitation and development’ debate in the 1990s, and that is now largely discredited (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri, 2005), was rarely mentioned. Instead, the humanitarian-development part of the nexus was generally interpreted as better integrating humanitarian and development thinking and programming that may be going on simultaneously within a geographical area. But what this means and looks like in practice is less clear.

51. The peace component of the HDP nexus is the most contentious, as explored below. This is also the component that generates the widest range of interpretations amongst interviewees, from those who stress the technical essence of FAO which they interpret as inherently neutral and are therefore uncomfortable with an explicit commitment to promoting and sustaining peace, to those who interpret it as FAO being conflict sensitive in all that it does, to those who see it as a critical opportunity to proactively address underlying conflict and power dynamics which may be present in apparently peaceful contexts as well as in acute emergencies. In the words one interviewee: ‘what are we doing to incorporate peace responsiveness in all our work? Where are the opportunities to directly improve prospects for peace within FAO’s scope of work? This means working with different actors’.

52. These more expansive interpretations are very much in line with FAO’s ‘Corporate Framework to support sustainable peace in the context of Agenda 2030’, with its statement on i) working on conflict (conflict drivers); ii) working in conflict (conflict impacts); and iii) working through conflict (conflict-sensitive development). But there is still work to be done to bring all FAO personnel on board. Concerningly, some FAO personnel interviewed for this evaluation working on programmes in countries experiencing conflict or recently post-conflict did not think the HDP nexus had any relevance to them. On the other hand, interviewees more familiar with FAO’s work in conflict environments and with a strategic perspective saw the HDP nexus as an opportunity to better systematize FAO’s work on conflict/peace, so that it is less ad hoc and dependent on the interests of senior leadership and personnel at country level, and indeed can contribute to SDG 16.

53. In terms of context, a number of interviewees implicitly or explicitly indicated that the HDP nexus has most relevance in fragile states, in line with wider thinking in the sector (see section 2). In particular, how can you programme with a longer-term perspective, ensuring you are peace responsive? However, other interviewees stressed the importance of the HDP nexus being appreciated by the development side of the house as well, even in apparently more peaceful contexts where there will always be underlying tensions and fault lines which, if ignored, may result in a country or area descending into fragility.

54. The range of different ways in which the HDP nexus is understood by FAO personnel is as apparent amongst FAO’s senior leadership as it is amongst personnel at other levels. A clear and consistent perspective did not emerge at this level either. What is particularly apparent is the change in perspective at the top of FAO, lending weight to all three components of the HDP nexus and clear about their relevance to FAO. In the words of the Director-General: ‘food and agriculture is a basic human right. When you talk about basic human rights it is essential to have peace’.
55. In short, the evaluation reveals a range of different interpretations of FAO’s mandate. This is not surprising as the whole sector is still trying to get to grips with the meaning of the HDP nexus. But it does point to the need for a clear corporate statement on the nexus, emphasizing that this is about ways of working as described in section 2 above, with examples of what that looks like for FAO programming drawing on some of the examples quoted in this evaluation, while also clarifying what it is definitely not, i.e., a new brand of projects or programmes labelled as HDP. At least one external commentator warned that parroting the HDP nexus as rhetoric, without translating it into different and improved ways of working, will result in disillusion with the concept, especially amongst programme personnel who will see it as empty words to describe the latest fad. Although this comment was made in relation to the broader sector, it is equally relevant to FAO. Oxfam provides a useful reminder that: ‘While leadership is critical, the nexus cannot ‘belong’ to any one discipline – an ongoing conversation on the basis of complementarity and equality is essential’ (Fanning and Fullwood-Thomas, 2019).

4.2 What is the relevance of the HDP nexus to FAO’s mandate and work?

Finding 2. The HDP nexus is highly relevant to FAO in its efforts to defeat hunger; the peace component is highly relevant as i) conflict is the main driver of chronic and acute food insecurity; ii) common drivers of conflict relate to FAO’s mandate, for example land disputes and access to natural resources; and iii) development is not a purely technical process at any level, especially a rights-based approach to development that, for example, takes account of the right to food.

56. The case for FAO to engage in both the humanitarian and the development components, and to connect them, is clear, even if this is not yet fully acknowledged by all personnel. FAO is now accepted as an important actor in the international response to humanitarian crises with its emphasis on supporting and protecting livelihoods, especially agricultural livelihoods. Figure 4 shows how close to 50 percent of FAO’s resource mobilization since 2014 has been SP5, for both humanitarian work (normally called emergencies within FAO) and for resilience programming. In 2020 this increased to almost two-thirds.

Figure 4. Annual resource mobilization: SP5 and non-SP5

57. The 2014 evaluation of FAO’s contribution to crisis-related transition identified FAO’s mandate as one of its major comparative advantages in crisis contexts, and this helps to explain why most

10 A mapping and synthesis report of 100 UN agency evaluations, commissioned by UNEG in 2018, focusing on the humanitarian-development nexus, highlighted the multifarious range of definitions of the double nexus (let alone the triple nexus). It pointed to very low levels of convergence and learning on this much-debated topic.

11 SP5 leads the implementation of SOS and is formed by the Emergency and Resilience Division (PSE) and representatives from a wide range of Technical Divisions.

12 An emergency is defined by FAO as “an extraordinary situation in which people are unable to meet their basic survival needs, or there are serious and immediate threats to human life and well-being” (FAO, n.d.c).
thinking and strategizing for linking the humanitarian and development components comes from the emergency side of FAO, driven by FAO’s work on resilience. The same evaluation concluded that: ‘FAO generally sees itself narrowly confined to (ostensibly ‘neutral’) technical work in its mandated areas, as opposed to other international actors, including some UN agencies, who have more of a peacebuilding mandate. In such cases, capacities in conflict resolution, peacebuilding and governance seem to be more relevant than FAO’s competencies in agriculture and natural resource management. However, capacities in conflict analysis and management cannot be completely outside of the responsibilities of any agency active in fragile states, if its goal is to help vulnerable populations. (…) FAO … has the ability, and, this evaluation suggests, the responsibility, to make a positive contribution to conflict resolution and peacebuilding through its technical role in support of agriculture and food security. FAO’s potential role in conflict prevention – which is all about moving from crisis into development, and therefore about transition – is both enormous and important, but developing this role will require significant commitment, skill development and investment of resources’ (FAO, 2014).

58. As described above, there has been resistance from some Member States who have questioned the appropriateness of FAO as a technical agency engaging with the peace agenda. But in the last few years the Organization has clearly made the case for engaging with what it has called the small ‘p’ component of the nexus. This is described by the IASC Results Group 4 as ‘actions focused on building the capacity for peace within societies’. It is about working on conflict and peace issues at the local level, for example around natural resources, and contrasts with big ‘P’, which refers to ‘actions that support and sustain political solutions and securitised responses to violent conflict’ (IASC, 2020a).

59. First and foremost, the analysis provided by the Global Network against Food Crises (GNFC)\(^{13}\) reveals that conflict is the main driver of both acute and chronic food insecurity, in 2019 affecting 77 million people according to the 2020 Global Report on Food Crises (GNFC, 2020). Humanitarian needs are rising, and development efforts are undermined as a direct consequence of violent conflict. FAO must therefore understand and engage with conflict dynamics, especially as a number of common drivers of conflict specifically relate to FAO’s mandate and areas of technical competence.

60. In addition, FAO’s ‘Corporate Framework to support sustainable peace in the context of Agenda 2030’ clearly spells out the impact of conflict on food security, nutrition and sustainable development. And a number of common drivers of conflict specifically relate to FAO’s mandate and areas of technical competence. These include competition over natural resources and the breakdown in governance to manage the natural resource base, disputes over land rights and issues of land tenure, neglect by governments of marginalized areas and/or environmental mismanagement (FAO, 2018a). FAO’s work on resilience over the last five to six years has helped the Organization have a deeper understanding of these conflict drivers, especially where supported by a dedicated context/conflict analysis.

61. As many interviewees stressed, development problems and challenges cannot be understood as purely technical. Development means engaging with the human and social dynamics as well, to ensure grievances, tensions and hostilities are neither created nor inflamed. A number of interviewees pointed out that FAO has been taking these dynamics into account for many years in its work at community level, for example where it has been working with pastoralists and settled communities dependent on the same natural resource base, where FAO projects have paid

\(^{13}\) The Global Network against Food Crises is an alliance of humanitarian and development actors working together with the aim of tackling the root causes of food crises through increased sharing of analysis and knowledge, and through evidence-based approaches to prevent, prepare for and respond to food crises: it specifically cites promoting collective efforts across the HDP nexus (GNFC, n.d.).
attention to relationships and to building social cohesion between these two user groups in the management of natural resources. But only recently and in a handful of cases has this conflict/peace dimension to FAO’s work been explicit.

62. A number of ‘technical’ threats to agriculture, food production and livelihoods, such as pest infestations, plant and animal disease, do not respect borders. There is no better reminder of this than the current desert locust emergency affecting numerous countries, indeed entire regions. The same goes for the management of watersheds, rivers used for irrigation, and marine areas and lakes shared and sometimes contested across countries. Although FAO may see itself predominantly engaged in finding a technical solution, that solution may require engaging in diplomatic negotiations between actors (including governments) that may otherwise be hostile towards each other. There is thus also a political and non-technical dimension with which FAO is ideally placed to engage, from the entry point of its technical convening role. Examples are provided in section 4.4 below.

63. At another level, the trajectory of a growing number of countries from apparently peaceful contexts where it was possible to implement long-term development projects, to conflict and instability which undermined those development projects and/or reversed development gains, has made it clear that development processes cannot and must not be blind to underlying faultlines and tensions. These tensions can be within society, or can be political dynamics at sub-national, national and/or regional levels, as well as long-term trends that can drive conflict. Some interviewees argued that FAO must be more alert to conflict drivers even in peaceful contexts, quoting the recent trajectory of countries in the Middle East, North Africa and across the Sahel to make this point. FAO may be able to respond to some of those drivers where they relate to FAO’s mandate, for example tensions over land rights and water management, thus clearly relating to the small ‘p’ (see Box 2 on the Syrian Arab Republic). At the very least, FAO must ensure its development work is informed by robust political and contextual analysis, by insightful risk analysis, and is designed and implemented to be adaptive and flexible to dynamic and uncertain contexts.

64. On the other side of the coin, development efforts are usually still relevant and needed in countries experiencing conflict: i) recognising that parts of the country may be stable and therefore conducive to development while other parts may be in the grip of conflict and only accessible for humanitarian assistance, and ii) acknowledging that some more ‘developmental’ activities such as pest management cannot wait until the conflict has subsided.
Box 2. Syrian Arab Republic

The protracted crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic is one of the more recent and striking examples where natural resource management, climate change, and the resulting food security issues are found to have a direct link to conflict escalation resulting in the current civil war with millions of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Numerous studies point to a clear link between NRM and the conflict, including a study which indicates that although the region experienced the most severe drought on record in the years preceding the uprising in 2011, this was especially catastrophic for ‘Syria, a country marked by poor governance and unsustainable agricultural and environmental policies, the drought had a catalytic effect, contributing to political unrest.’ As reported in another study of the links between the conflict and natural resources, the effects of the drought were greatly exacerbated by the mismanagement of natural resources through government sanctioned underground wells. The conditions were further worsened by unsustainable water management decisions, poor planning and policy errors.

Government efforts and policies to address these issues were misguided and misplaced. Increased digging of wells and extensive over-exploitation of groundwater did not help. Failure to address these issues for years led to displacement, unemployment, hunger, and poverty which was an additional stress to the political instability leading to the current crisis.

65. Interviewees made the case that FAO must engage with longer-term trends such as rural-urban migration which may be a consequence of, and/or fuel conflict, and climate change. Both have implications for changing human settlement patterns, economic activity and livelihoods, and the potential for future and ongoing conflict.

66. Two current examples of major crises in which FAO is fully engaged demonstrate well the relevance of the HDP nexus to its mandate and work:

i. The COVID-19 pandemic:
   - With its negative impact on food security, and therefore increasing numbers of people facing acute food insecurity, requiring immediate humanitarian assistance.
   - The need for a longer-term approach that understands the impact on food systems (e.g. including trade) which may be undermined by the pandemic, and how those systems and the institutions that support them can be shored up.
   - Both of these impacts are exacerbated wherever there is conflict, as in Yemen, the Syrian Arab Republic, and indeed can fuel conflict and exploitation as in Colombia.14
   - The pandemic has also shone a light on the necessity of international actors, including UN agencies, working through and with local actors, in line with HDP nexus ways of working that put local actors centre-stage, in effect accelerating the process of localization,15 and taking into consideration gender aspects (FAO, 2020a).

Thus, analysis and assessment of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic must connect the humanitarian, development and conflict consequences, and the response must similarly be planned and coordinated across the three pillars of the HDP nexus. This was reiterated by a number of interviewees for this evaluation.

ii. The desert locust crisis:
   - Which transcends borders, requiring political engagement and collaboration between countries, including countries which may otherwise be hostile to each other, for example India and Pakistan.

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14 See, for example, Taylor, 2020.
15 See, for example, Barbelet et al., 2020.
Where the outbreak is directly related to the conflict-related destruction of infrastructure to control desert locusts at the breeding stage, in Yemen and in Iran, thus threatening the agricultural livelihoods and food production of many other countries.

4.3 Alignment and coherence of FAO’s policies, strategies and programmes, with respect to the HDP nexus

Finding 3. Although the most recent FAO Strategic Framework encouraged greater interdisciplinarity and systems-thinking on the development side, linkages between the humanitarian and development components of FAO’s work are still weak. FAO’s ambivalent (until recently) engagement in humanitarian work has resulted in an inconsistency between FAO country programmes: some have large humanitarian portfolios, others very limited, regardless of the scale of humanitarian need.

Finding 4. There is a lack of coherence and alignment between FAO’s corporate commitment to sustain peace and work in conflict environments on the one hand, and the absence of policies and guidance for senior leadership in-country in highly politicized conflict contexts on the other hand.

As HDP is about joined up and systemic ways of thinking and working, this section reviews the evidence of such coherence and alignment at the corporate strategic level, and touches upon the implications at country level. Given FAO’s recent commitment to sustaining peace, this section particularly focuses on the coherence of its approach in highly politicized conflict environments.

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68. FAO’s Strategic Framework for the period 2014 to 2017 aimed to bring greater coherence and alignment to FAO’s work, bridging and breaking down silos. OED’s evaluations against FAO’s Strategic Objectives concludes that the Strategic Framework has made a significant contribution, for example: ‘The SOs have helped to broaden perspectives towards more holistic food-systems thinking, foster inclusive approaches to safeguarding the interests of smallholders and marginalized producers, initiate FAO into new thematic areas towards comprehensive approaches to tackling food insecurity, with an emphasis on cross-cutting issues such as gender, and expand FAO’s engagement beyond the traditional counterpart ministries.’ (FAO, 2019a).

69. Steering FAO towards more interdisciplinary approaches, the evaluation concludes that the Strategic Framework also better prepared it to engage with the 2030 Agenda which requires such interdisciplinarity, cross-sectoral thinking and collaboration with diverse partners (FAO, 2019a). This is very much in line with the HDP nexus ways of working, even if that terminology was not being used at the time. However, the breaking down of sectoral and technical boundaries and distinctions with more systemic approaches, has been principally from the development perspective. Even in relation to the humanitarian-development components of the nexus, the evaluation concluded more needed to be done: ‘The linkages between the five SOs will need to be reinforced and further refined with theories of change that seamlessly blend the interconnected themes of hunger, poverty, natural resource sustainability and risk resilience.’ (FAO, 2019a). During the period of the last Strategic Framework, the peace component of the nexus was not yet an FAO corporate commitment. Conflict and peace are not even mentioned in the evaluation report. The recent statement of the FAO Regional Conference in Africa in August 2020, is however a welcomed move, addressing the HDP nexus in the continent (FAO, 2020b).

70. SOS – which aimed to increase the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises – was expected to cut across the humanitarian-development distinctions in FAO’s work, thus contributing to greater alignment and coherence in this respect. While the SP5 team is credited with breaking down silos, the SOS evaluation noted the potential for greater collaboration with other SPs (FAO, 2016b). For many in FAO, ‘resilience’ was at least partially a retagging of some of its humanitarian work to ensure its acceptability in a culture that was not supportive of FAO’s role in emergencies.
(as mentioned above). There emerged a de facto geographical demarcation between FAO’s resilience programming and its development work according to the frequency and severity of humanitarian crises, with SPS taking the lead in most countries affected by severe crises, and protracted crises (FAO, 2016b). This effectively limited the geographical coherence and alignment of FAO’s strategies and programme initiatives across different countries as the nature of their programming, ways of working, and organizational culture could differ considerably.

71. The lack of coherent messaging on FAO’s role in emergencies, impacting the humanitarian-development components of the nexus, has resulted in a further fragmentation and inconsistency of approach at country level. The emergency teams (the former Emergency and Rehabilitation Division (PSE) now the Office of Emergencies and Resilience (OER) but also country and sub-regional resilience hubs personnel with relevant profiles, usually part of SPS) have managed to develop large programmes in a handful of countries in crises contexts. In South Sudan and Somalia, for example, there are big humanitarian programmes, country-level resilience strategies, as well as some development programming. In contrast, in Iraq FAO was not engaged as a humanitarian actor and was not even co-ordinating the food security cluster for some years, although this has changed now. Whether and how FAO engaged in humanitarian action and therefore the humanitarian-development components of the nexus has been highly dependent not only on support from PSE but also the interests and experience of senior leadership in-country. Indeed, several interviewees external to FAO commented on this inconsistency between FAO country programmes. A comparison of the five-year average voluntary contributions for eight fragile states experiencing major protracted crises demonstrates this clearly, especially when this is broken down per capita. Even when adjusted to account for the proportion of the population that participates in the agriculture sector, similar patterns were observed (see Figures 5 and 6).

**Figure 5. Yearly average, over a period of five years, for total FAO voluntary contributions in eight fragile states**

![Average Total Voluntary Contributions, 2015-2019 (in USD)](source: FPMIS data)
72. Following the UN Secretary General’s call in 2016 to all UN agencies to contribute to peace, FAO has made substantial progress at a corporate level in exploring and clarifying why this is important and what it means to the organization, especially through the ‘Corporate Framework to support sustainable peace in the context of Agenda 2030’. This has been driven by the small but dynamic Conflict and Peace Unit in headquarters since 2018. However, little was invested in the rollout of the new framework, and there is a sense of disconnect and lack of alignment between global and country levels. In the words of one interviewee: ‘(FAO has) done a lot, developing a corporate framework. But this is not grounded in what we are doing in terms of programming. The approach has been back to front’. A number of personnel interviewed at country level, including some FAO Representatives (FAORs), had not heard of the Conflict and Peace Unit, or if they had, they had not yet made use of its resources and expertise. At headquarters, linkages with those working on the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (VGGT) and other human rights approaches need to be strengthened, making use of the body of work and experiences they have garnered.

73. Where FAO appears to have faced its biggest challenges is working in highly politicized conflict environments. This is where there is least coherence and clarity in its policies and approach. The crisis transition evaluation identified FAO’s challenge of navigating its close relationship with government in such contexts, especially where government is an actor in the conflict and ‘assisting the poorest, most food insecure or most vulnerable may not be fully compatible with this exclusive channel of communication and action.’ (FAO, 2014). But six years later there appears to have been little progress in addressing this dilemma at the corporate level. While FAO promotes its technical mandate to secure access to affected populations at country level, the conclusion reached by the 2014 evaluation still seems to hold at the corporate level, that: ‘there is still a tendency in FAO to consider technical assistance as neutral, non-political and non-conflictual. This, however, is questionable, as in situations of conflict, no intervention can be completely neutral’ (FAO, 2014). FAO personnel working at country level in such politicized conflict environments are very much aware of these dilemmas and of how any programming interventions, however ‘technical’, can be perceived as partial, can inadvertently fuel tensions as a result of conflict insensitive targeting, and can be manipulated for political purposes.
74. While FAO has made a corporate commitment to sustain peace and work in conflict environments, it lacks policies and practical guidance for its senior leadership working in highly politicized conflict contexts, as is further explored in Finding 29. Instead, it is left very much to individual FAORs to navigate this difficult territory, for example to make strategic as well as day-to-day decision-making about programming, and to manage the relationship with government. This indicates a worrying lack of coherence and alignment between FAO’s corporate commitment to work in conflict environments and its fitness-for-purpose to do so at country level. This may have been exacerbated by FAO’s high-level ambivalence to working on emergencies, until recently. The consequences are most evident in its largest country programmes such as Somalia and South Sudan. This is further explored in section 6, including a comparison between FAO’s lack of policies and practical guidance for working in such contexts and the guidance that some other UN agencies provide to their senior leadership.

75. And yet, the case of Colombia is an incredible example of when there is a will, leadership and support from headquarters, FAO can play a critical role in the peace process implementation. In 2016, the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia asked FAO to collaborate in the implementation of the first point of the peace agreement, which focuses on fighting hunger and promoting rural reforms and development. FAO Colombia played an important role in the implementation of the peace process – a politically savvy leadership, a technical mandate and a strong programme in the country allowed FAO to take on this role. They were backed by an SP3-led workgroup at headquarters dedicated to Colombia that provided technical support, and they received the visits and support of the Director General over an extended period of time.

76. What is particularly surprising is the Organization’s lack of engagement with humanitarian principles (OCHA, 2010). The evaluation team was unable to find any clear FAO corporate commitment to humanitarian principles (OCHA, 2010). While this does not mean that no FAO personnel are familiar with humanitarian principles – some on the humanitarian side are well-versed with principled humanitarian action – the lack of organizational engagement with humanitarian principles is concerning in terms of the implications for its humanitarian programming and the lack of compass to guide its personnel. As indicated in section 2, there is an active debate within the aid sector about how humanitarian principles can be respected while pursuing HDP nexus ways of working. In order to engage in this debate, and ensure coherence in its humanitarian work across contexts, it is imperative that FAO clarifies its position on humanitarian principles.

77. It is also surprising that FAO has not yet developed a protection policy given its engagement in conflict environments and protracted crises. Compared with the progress made by its sister agencies, and the obligations of UN agencies to adopt a rights-based approach, this is a major gap.

4.4 FAO’s strategic positioning in relation to the HDP nexus

Finding 5. FAO is well-positioned strategically on resilience, although its leadership role has waned as other actors have developed capability and programming experience. It plays a critical leadership role in food and nutrition security analysis and has a high profile through the Global Network against Food Crises, bringing humanitarian and development actors together and promoting a systemic approach to understanding and strengthening food systems. Most progress so far is at global level and needs to be grounded and stronger at country level.
Finding 6. There are two areas where FAO plays a leadership role directly related to its technical mandate, that are highly relevant to the HDP nexus. First, in developing guidance and codes of conduct for negotiated access to natural resources. Second, FAO plays an important role in technical diplomacy at regional level, for example using its technical mandate as an entry point to build relationships between countries, regions, and even at time parties to conflict within a country, to address common challenges such as pest management, but the significance of this role is not fully acknowledged by the Organization.

Finding 7. FAO continues to play a leadership role in food and nutrition security analysis building on years of work in this area and many different initiatives. This is reinforced by FAO’s custodianship for tracking SDG indicators on food insecurity. Yet, FAO’s positioning and engagement in high-level debates and decision-making in New York City and Geneva is weaker than it should be, (although improving), and has not been strategic. The importance of this level of engagement has been historically undervalued by FAO which has been overly Rome-centric, although recent progress on building FAO’s position in New York City in particular, has provided opportunities for increased visibility and influencing of humanitarian, HDP nexus and climate security policy. FAO’s positioning on the IASC has strengthened although is still constrained by limited human resources.

This section focuses particularly on FAO’s strategic positioning at global level while also reflecting on its strategic positioning at regional and country levels and how the three connect. Strategic positioning refers to FAO’s position within the wider international community, in terms of providing leadership, coordination and guidance to support and promote HDP nexus ways of working. This section therefore focuses on areas and themes where FAO is well-positioned to do this, and the programmes and projects that contribute to FAO’s strategic positioning in relation to the HDP nexus.

The rights-based global instruments that FAO has developed, such as the VGGT and Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF) with the related small-scale fisheries guidelines, are directly relevant to the HDP nexus. Even if the agreements are non-binding, the fact that an increasing number of Member States are signatory, provides an important basis for progress. Providing guidance and codes of conduct for NRM, these instruments have conflict management embedded in them as well as taking into account the gender differential access to tenure and rights. This is an area where FAO has played a leadership role directly related to its mandate.

Since 2014/15, FAO has played a leading role in relation to the resilience paradigm that has become so prominent in the aid sector in the last five to six years and has been seen as key to the humanitarian-development components of the nexus. This is very much in line with the recommendation from the 2014 crisis transition evaluation, that: ‘FAO should continue and strengthen development of the conceptual, strategic and institutional direction that the Organization is taking in capitalizing on its comparative advantages and new Resilience Agenda to build stronger links between the relief, rehabilitation and development aspects of its emergency response work.’ (FAO, 2014). FAO’s contributions include its conceptualization and promotion of the resilience agenda at the global level, collaboration with other UN agencies to develop joint resilience strategies at country level, and its pioneering work on resilience measurement (FAO, 2016b). However, the SO5 evaluation noted that FAO’s leadership role at regional, sub-regional and country levels was constrained by lack of capacity (FAO, 2016b). In Somalia, where FAO played a prominent strategic leadership role on resilience a few years ago, a number of interviewees felt that it had since lost this positioning as other agencies, especially NGOs, have really developed

16 It is also highly relevant to the peace component of the nexus, although this dimension has been less developed.
their capabilities, experience and insights in resilience programming. The recent evaluation of the Information for Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED) programme has highlighted limitations in the application and take-up of resilience index measurement and analysis (RIMA), FAO’s signature econometric resilience measurement tool. This is discussed in section 5.3.1. below. Adaptations are needed for FAO to regain and then maintain a leadership on resilience measurement.

81. Meanwhile, FAO continues to play a leadership role in food and nutrition security analysis, building on years of work in this area and many different initiatives. This is reinforced by FAO’s custodianship for tracking SDG indicators on food insecurity. One of the more recent expressions of FAO’s leadership role is in GNFC, an alliance of humanitarian, development and peace actors working together with the aim of tackling the root causes of food crises, giving it strategic prominence (GNFC, n.d.). So far, FAO has played a leadership role on the GNFC’s first pillar on understanding food security crises, funded initially by the INFORMED programme, promoting a consensus-based multi-partner analytical process to produce the flagship Global Reports on Food Crises. Published annually since 2017, these reports have drawn attention to conflict as the driving factor of food insecurity in the world’s worst humanitarian crises, as mentioned above. They build on the role that FAO has played over many years in promoting the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) as the global international standard for analysis of acute food insecurity, now also through a multi-partnership Global Strategic Programme.

82. The full potential of the GNFC is yet to be realized, however, particularly its second and third pillars on ‘strategic investments’ and ‘going beyond food’ by seeking synergies and coordination with other sectors to address the full spectrum of humanitarian, development and sustaining peace needs. However, the systemic approach to understanding and responding to food systems promoted by the GNFC is very much in line with HDP nexus ways of thinking. This evaluation notes three particular challenges to achieving the full potential of the GNFC:

i. Ensuring engagement goes beyond the humanitarian end of the spectrum, fully involving development colleagues (some of whom feel the GNFC is too short-term oriented) and influencing development. The GNFC’s emerging partnership with the Food and nutrition security impact, resilience, sustainability and transformation (FIRST) programme and its connection with the FAO Investment Centre are moving in the right direction.

ii. Translating the ambition and vision of the GNFC into positive change and improved food security at country level. Most progress so far has been at the global level, through its analysis, with limited engagement at country level.

iii. Ensuring that the work of the GNFC is accompanied by strong and insightful research, monitoring and evaluation that builds an evidence base for learning and improved policymaking and programming. There is much to learn from FAO’s work on resilience, where there is a general consensus that it has failed to generate a strong evidence base of how resilience can most effectively be built (FAO, n.d.e.).

83. FAO’s evolving work on early warning early action (EWEA), now renamed ‘anticipatory action’, is also establishing FAO in an important leadership role in this area of work that is key to operationalizing the HDP nexus. According to the INFORMED evaluation: ‘Stakeholders noted that FAO is “ahead of other agencies on the conceptualisation of EWEA” and that “the fact that FAO has dedicated resources and teams on this issue has allowed FAO to lead conversations.”’ (FAO, n.d.e.).

84. The same evaluation sets out a clear agenda for FAO to move forward from the pilot stage of its work on EWEA, and thus to further develop its contribution and leadership role. This includes

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17 For example, the Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture (GIEWS), the State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World (SOFI), the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), etc.
advancing the concept and practice of anticipatory action which is particularly important to operationalizing the HDP nexus. See section 5.7. below for further analysis of FAO’s role in data collection, analysis and information.

85. The examples above where FAO has established a strong strategic leadership position that relates to the HDP nexus originate from the humanitarian end of the spectrum. Less clear is FAO’s strategic positioning on the HDP nexus from the development side, although as a technical agency FAO has much to offer in terms of expertise and knowledge for the agriculture and livestock sectors. One area where FAO could make a substantial contribution is in linking risk analysis to agricultural policies and programming. In the words of one senior FAO personnel member: ‘risk management is a development issue. Big shocks that disrupt countries have to be taken into account by development. This is now imperative with COVID-19’. So far most of FAO’s work on risk analysis has focused on EWEA, driven from the humanitarian side.

86. Although climate change is highly relevant to the HDP nexus, FAO does not appear to be well-positioned to play a strategic leadership role on climate change and the HDP nexus. Instead, FAO’s work appears to be somewhat fragmented and lacking coherence. Personnel interviewed pointed to an increasing recognition of the conflict and peace dimensions at the programmatic level that are starting to influence the policy and positioning aspect of the work. For example, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF) are increasingly embedding conflict dynamics in their policy guidance, and this is having an effect on implementing agencies. But it is not evident that this is an area where FAO is well positioned strategically, nor well-placed to play a leadership role.

87. Considering that FAO is a relative newcomer to collaborative work on conflict that relates to the ‘p’ component of the HDP nexus and has limited dedicated human resources, it has made considerable progress at the global level in finding a seat at the table. It is an active member of the IASC’s Results Group 4 on humanitarian-development collaboration with links to peace, contributing to their thinking and outputs. At the time of writing, FAO had played a leading role in the IASC paper on ‘Exploring Peace within the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus’. This IASC work is bolstered by the Director-General now regularly attending IASC Principals meetings. This level of engagement with the IASC is important as this is a key forum for inter-agency debate and thinking on the HDP nexus. With support from Interpeace (see section 4.5 below), FAO is regularly contributing to webinars and conferences. FAO also contributes to the UNSDG Task Team on Transitions and Peacebuilding and sits on the Peacebuilding Contact Group.

88. In some parts of the world FAO has used its technical mandate as an entry point to make a significant contribution to building relationships between countries at regional level to address common challenges – for example between India and Pakistan over locust control (see section 4.2 above), and between forest pest management in other regions. This has given it an important strategic role in technical diplomacy at regional level. As a number of interviewees (usually those working at an operational level) pointed out, FAO’s technical mandate can give it preferential access to contested geographical areas and population groups because its work to promote agriculture, food production and livelihoods is prioritized, whether by governments or by armed non-state actors. There are some examples of this at country level, including Somalia. But for FAO to sustain and build upon its strategic positioning at global and regional levels, it is crucial that its programming work catches up, and more explicitly contributes to conflict management and sustaining peace, supported by a solid evidence base that can inform and give credibility to its global and regional work.
Overall, FAO’s strategic positioning related to the nexus appears to be stronger at the global level but not sufficiently grounded in its work at country level. This was a common refrain in interviews carried out for this evaluation. It is also borne out by the results of our online survey: only half of the respondents described FAO’s work at country level as providing strategic leadership on the HDP nexus.

However, despite some positive examples of FAO’s strategic positioning on the nexus at global level, the organization’s contribution to, and positioning on high-level debates and decision-making in New York City and Geneva that relate to the HDP nexus are much weaker. This feedback from a number of interviewees is reflected in the following quote: ‘FAO is Rome-centric and does not realise it is missing important conversations at the New York City level, and to a lesser extent Geneva... The UN humanitarian system are all physically located in New York City as well as all the SDG conversations’. FAO’s New York City office has a limited capacity compared with many other UN agencies, and engagement has been event by event rather than strategic. In key processes such as the Secretary-General’s task force on reform of peace and security architecture, FAO is regularly represented by personnel at a more junior level than other UN agencies. It misses out on some other processes altogether, for example discussions on the HDP nexus in relation to the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) guidance, and the opportunity to promote food and nutrition security when the terms of reference for UN missions are under discussion. FAO has recently played an important role in partnership with WFP in raising the issue of conflict and hunger with the UN Secretariat and thereby UN Security Council, contributing to SCR 2417, and has an opportunity to build on the Director-General’s annual presentation to the UN Security Council. FAO could and should occupy a much stronger and more influential position at both the New York City and Geneva levels, based on its mandate, experience and knowledge of livelihoods and food security, ensuring high-level discussions around UN reform are sufficiently grounded in the realities and challenges from the community level upwards. There is an opportunity for FAO to be more proactive and less responsive.

4.5 FAO’s strategic partnerships, collaboration and the HDP nexus

According to the 2020 OECD-DAC recommendation on the HDP nexus, one of the aims of a nexus approach is to strengthen collaboration, coherence and complementarity, capitalising on the comparative advantage of each pillar. It states clearly the need to engage a diverse range of actors based on their respective comparative advantage. Comparative advantage refers to demonstrated capacity and expertise, not just mandate (OECD, 2020). Oxfam’s thinking on the nexus makes reference to ‘consensus-building, brokering and the formation of (unusual) partnerships’ (Fanning and Fullwood-Thomas, 2019: pp. 31). In addition, partnerships and collaboration can promote more systemic ways of thinking and working in line with the HDP nexus. The evaluation uses all of these as the reference points for evaluating FAO’s collaboration and strategic partnerships, at global, regional and country levels. ‘Strategic partnerships’ are guided by a strategy over a period of time with a clearly articulated purpose, and thus differ from one-off project or operational partnerships. This section begins with an overall review of FAO’s record on collaboration, then evaluates the nature of FAO’s partnerships and collaboration in three different ways: i) in terms of collaboration with conflict/peace actors; ii) in relation to particular categories of partners, such as government, other UN agencies, international financial institutions, the private sector, NGOs; and iii) in relation to collective outcomes at country level, a key vehicle for promoting a collaborative nexus way of working.

Finding 8. At the global level FAO has broadened its partnerships in ways that contribute to the HDP nexus, through multi-stakeholder initiatives and with other UN agencies, but often these do not translate into strategic partnerships at regional and country levels.
92. FAO’s most recent strategic framework is credited with having encouraged the expansion and diversification of FAO’s portfolio of partnership at global, regional and country levels (FAO, 2019c). This is important in ensuring that FAO is open to, and well-placed to develop future partnerships and collaboration in ways that could contribute to the HDP nexus. This is clearly the vision of FAO’s current senior leadership, to strengthen this trajectory.

93. However, this evaluation found that the partnerships FAO has developed at global level have not always extended downwards, with many country offices unaware of them and therefore not taking advantage of them. Instead, the range and nature of FAO’s collaboration at regional and country levels is overly dependent on the approach and personality of FAO’s senior leadership at these two levels. It is often constrained by a lack of consistent capacity on FAO’s part (for example on food security information and analysis) (FAO, 2016b), by an overly internal focus on FAO’s technical areas of expertise without taking account of how this may interact with the work of other UN agencies,18 and by FAO’s contractual and bureaucratic procedures that govern many of its partnership arrangements as described in section 6.19 Collaboration has been ad hoc through project development rather than strategic.

Finding 9. FAO has developed an exemplary strategic partnership with Interpeace at headquarters level and is developing a promising relationship with the United Nations Secretary-General’s Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). Its engagement with big ‘P’ actors such as peacekeeping missions is limited to a few countries, but FAO has valuable knowledge and experience to offer from its small ‘p’ engagement and there are examples where it has regular informal exchanges with peacekeeping actors.

94. As the peace component of the HDP nexus is the newest to FAO, this is where the organization must be most open to new and sometimes ‘unusual’ partnerships, drawing on Oxfam’s parlance. This is acknowledged in FAO’s ‘Corporate Framework to support sustainable peace in the context of Agenda 2030’: ‘Making a transformative change in supporting sustainable peace will require reshaping the nature of some FAO partnerships, and focusing on potential engagement with more local partners, especially those that are explicitly conflict-sensitive’ (FAO, 2018a). The evaluation has identified three different types of FAO collaboration with peace actors: i) for capacity-building; ii) around project funding; and iii) engagement with ‘P’ actors. Partnership with local actors is addressed under ‘NGOs’ below.

95. In the first category of capacity-building collaboration, FAO has developed a partnership with the International Peacebuilding Alliance (Interpeace)20 at headquarters level. The explicit objective is to build FAO’s capacity and skills to work on conflict and peace: ‘support to strengthen conflict sensitivity and contributions to peace in FAO programming’.21 This appears to have been a highly effective partnership for FAO’s Conflict and Peace Unit, supporting them to develop FAO’s capabilities to engage with the ‘p’ component of the HDP nexus. For example, Interpeace worked with the unit to develop “Pathways to sustaining peace at the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations” (FAO & Interpeace, 2020) which underpinned FAO’s projects funded by

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18 As described by a donor representative interviewed for this evaluation.
19 This evaluation heard of three different cases where the personal relations from previous employment of personnel interviewed were described as key in the development of partnerships with NGO consortiums or other UN agencies.
20 Interpeace is an international organization that grew out of the UN’s ‘War-Torn Societies Project’ in 1994. Its mandate is i) strengthening the capacities of societies to manage conflict in non-violent, non-coercive ways by assisting national actors in their efforts to develop social and political cohesion, and ii) assisting the international community, and in particular the UN, to play a more effective role in supporting peacebuilding efforts around the world (Interpeace, n.d.).
21 As indicated in the letter of agreement (LOA) between FAO and Interpeace of August 2019.
the PBF. The words used to describe this partnership, from stakeholders at the headquarters level of both organizations, indicate the positive and constructive nature of this collaboration: ‘an equal and evolving partnership, that is process-oriented’, ‘accompaniment’ to FAO, with an ‘organic approach based on shared learning’; ‘cannot overstate how important it has been’. Although Interpeace has supported some FAO country offices with training and conflict analysis, for example FAO Somalia, the evaluation generally found there was little knowledge of the Interpeace partnership with FAO at country level.

Second, in terms of collaboration around funding, FAO is developing a deeper relationship with the PBF. During the past four years PBF funding to FAO has increased from USD 1.5 million in 2016, to a maximum of USD 13.6 million in 2018. Although this has mostly been for small-scale projects, PBF funding appears at times to have played a catalytic role, for example allowing FAO to pilot initiatives on the role of women in water conflict resolution in Yemen or improving social cohesion in Liberia through the promotion of rural employment for youth in conflict-prone areas. With UN partnerships as a main requirement for project design, PBF funding has been important in encouraging FAO to widen its base of UN agencies with whom it works, for example partnering on land tenure with UN-Habitat in South Sudan or on pastoralism with IOM across the Chad and Central African Republic border. Joint analysis, a key first step in the development of proposals, enabled FAO Sudan to receive funds in early 2020 along with UNDP, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), IOM, International Labour Organisation (ILO) and UNICEF, after developing in 2018–2019 a common context analysis.

In interviews carried out for this evaluation, PBF personnel have noted FAO’s wide range of entry points to the root causes of conflicts, its comparative advantage on key issues, such as pastoralism and NRM, and how it allows FAO to “think out of the box” and propose a wide range of contributions to sustaining peace, dealing with rural employment and livelihoods support, NRM, host-displaced community relations, reintegration and cross-border programming. The upcoming PBF evaluation by FAO is an opportunity to explore further and validate this feedback. The small amounts of funding involved, however, have meant that this work has gone unnoticed by many within FAO, aside from the country offices and a team at headquarters carefully nurturing these partnerships.

Despite the positive feedback received, in those PBF projects where FAO was not the lead, it was sometimes unclear how the partnership had come about or if it was just a matter of ticking the box to access funding. PBF funding does not appear to have encouraged a broader range of partnerships with peace actors beyond other UN agencies even though this may change.

Third, in terms of FAO’s collaboration with big ‘P’ actors, the evaluation found a few examples, such as FAO Sudan partnering with the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), Sudan and FAO Mali with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). While FAO is clear that its comparative advantage is in the small ‘p’, its country offices may have knowledge and experience to offer such peacekeeping missions, for example on land tenure and NRM, where it may also be able to play a technical brokering role between groups and communities competing for access to natural resources. Coordination and negotiation with big ‘P’ actors however always need to be done first through the UN Country Team (UNCT) and

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22 The PBF addresses the following needs: i) Safety and security, including rule of law; ii) Support to political processes and reconciliation; iii) Basic services such as water, health and primary education; iv) Institution building and public administration; and v) Economic revitalization, including jobs and livelihoods.

23 Established by the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) in 2006, PBF is a multi-year funding mechanism for post-conflict and peacebuilding activities.

24 OED has recently started systematic evaluations of the PBF projects which will explore the lessons and results through an over-arching evaluative framework.
the UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator (R/HC). Various FAO countries interviewed detailed also how when discussing access, they went under the R/HC umbrella when discussing with peacekeepers.

**Finding 10. Governments remain the main partner in many FAO operations. The role played by the FAO Partnership and Liaison Office in Colombia during its peace process implementation is a positive example of the potential of FAO’s contribution when backed with strong leadership and vision.**

100. Government: At country level, FAO’s main partnership is with government. As FAO’s Corporate Framework to Support Sustainable Peace acknowledges, FAO is well-placed to ‘leverage the value of the political capital gained through its technical work in agriculture, food security and natural resources with at risk communities in order to become more engaged in conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution’ (FAO, 2018a). On the one hand this technical offerand close relationship with government gives FAO a comparative advantage. On the other hand, as explained above, this relationship can be challenging to manage in highly politicized conflict environments, particularly where government is an actor in the conflict.

101. The last Strategic Framework necessitated a broadening of FAO’s engagement beyond its traditional counterpart, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, to include other ministries, parliamentarians and sometimes even non-state actors (FAO, 2019a). This is important for more systemic and integrated programming in the future, better aligned to the HDP nexus.

**Box 3. FAO Colombia’s role in the implementation of the peace process and its partnerships**

As previously highlighted, in 2016, the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, asked FAO to collaborate in the implementation of the first point of the peace agreement. This first point focused on fighting hunger and included a multifaceted plan for rural development that attacked the roots of rural poverty and hunger, through the creation of a land fund to be distributed among untenured peasants and large-scale initiatives to provide public goods and services. It also promoted development programmes with a territorial approach and measures to stimulate agricultural productivity throughout the country, created by local communities – especially in the regions with the highest rates of poverty and those most affected by the conflict. To do this, FAO partnered with a wide range of organizations explicitly and implicitly, including press organizations, academia, civil society and the different branches of the Government of Colombia.

102. However, there is untapped potential in FAO’s relationship with government to work in more HDP-aligned ways. The Partnership and Liaison Office in Colombia provides a positive example of what this can look like. An arrangement devised to save funds for the Organization and that with strong FAO country leadership resulted in a closer way of working with Colombian institutions at a critical time during their peace process implementation. The Partnership and Liaison Office had a large number of bilateral trust fund (UTF) agreements that allowed Colombia to benefit from FAO’s technical expertise. The wide range of partnerships the office developed was exemplary as outlined in Box 3.

103. A new dimension that country offices are also increasingly being asked to intervene are with issues across borders. In Central Asia, FAO was requested to support watershed management issues that crossed borders. Through its technical mandate FAO has the ability to bring warring countries to discuss cross border matters, at times away from the limelight such as through Commissions on Fisheries and management of fish-stocks and fishing rights, or Commissions on Locusts or other

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25 In some highly conflictual situations this has allowed FAO to do surveys and seek different data, especially because of FAO’s connection with the food security cluster and the IPC.
technical inter-governmental working groups. The case of FAO’s work in the Gaza Strip is an excellent example of how “technical arguments were functional to push the political agenda in the negotiations FAO was involved in to extend the fishing limits in the Gaza Strip on the basis of arguments relating to food security and sustainability.” (FAO, 2017b).

104. UN Agencies: There are a number of examples of FAO developing partnerships with other UN agencies in recent years which have encouraged a more systemic approach within the UN. Under SO4, for instance, FAO has partnered with the World Health Organization (WHO) and with the World Organisation for Animal Health which have been instrumental in its food safety work and in promoting a ‘One Health’ approach (FAO, 2019a).

105. As described in section 5, below, FAO has a growing portfolio of work in contexts of forced displacement, targeting internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees, refugees and host communities. This area of work calls for an HDP nexus approach: forced displacement is often both a cause and effect of conflict and must therefore be understood as a humanitarian, development and peace challenge. It is an area of work that requires a systemic approach looking at the whole context to find durable solutions rather than fragmentation into short-term sectoral support. In 2018, FAO signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with IOM to bridge the work of the two agencies by mainstreaming agriculture development considerations in interventions targeting migrant, displaced and host communities while thinking of the longer-term implications for the environmental and natural resource base. In 2019 an MOU was signed with UNHCR. However, in the 2019/20 biennium, 59 percent of FAO projects were undertaken with no UN partner agency specializing in forced displacement,26 despite the signed MOUs and the importance of partnerships as outlined in FAO’s Migration Framework.

106. Nevertheless, there are examples of FAO working in partnership with IOM, and recently with UNHCR in ways that do promote a nexus approach. An example of the work carried out in partnership with IOM is the Safe Access to Fuel and Energy Plus Livelihoods (SAFE Plus) project at Cox’s Bazar refugee camp in Bangladesh that aims together with WFP to mitigate deforestation and improve livelihood opportunities by distributing liquefied petroleum gas and stoves, reforestation and improved access to food production, supporting both host and refugee communities in a complementary manner and diminishing tensions between communities.

107. Since the MOU was signed a year ago with UNHCR, there are promising signs of how FAO can bring to the partnership the possibility to think of long-term solutions for IDPs and refugees together with host communities. The initial focus has been East Africa, with the appointment of a dynamic jointly funded FAO-UNHCR officer in the region. Strong collaboration appears to have developed between the two agencies, exchanging information, developing joint visibility events and sharing practices and funding possibilities, for example from the Ikea Foundation. Projects are now being developed jointly in Djibouti, Ethiopia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda. There are discussions of this being replicated in Dakar to cover West Africa. However, this partnership needs organization-wide engagement to fulfil its potential, so it is not dependent on a few enthusiastic and dedicated individuals. Similarly, further investment is needed to more systematically develop the partnership with IOM so that FAO can strengthen its foothold in this important area of work and work to its comparative advantage on livelihood and natural resource issues.

108. Declining aid budgets can easily trigger competition between UN agencies over collaboration, and a number of examples emerged in interviews for this evaluation. This will require clear and

26 FAO Forced Displacement Portfolio Analysis, as of 30 June 2020.
Finding 11. FAO needs to expand on the range of partnerships it seeks and promotes across the three pillars of the HDP nexus. Strategic partnerships with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have been strengthening, in particular in Africa in ways that relate to the HDP nexus, for example with the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), but this requires engaging at the policy level as well as programming, especially to address constraints to development at the more political level. More can be done to build and strengthen partnerships with International Finance Institutions (IFIs) and the private sector in fragile contexts, following the example of the engagement in the Famine Action Mechanism (FAM). Academia and research institutions have an important role to play by contributing much-needed analytical skills and supporting efforts to build an evidence base to FAO’s work across the HDP nexus.

109. International Financial Institutions (IFIs): The OECD-DAC recommendation on the HDP nexus makes a particular point of the need to incentivize partnerships with multilateral development banks, particularly in fragile states, in order to promote coordination across the HDP architecture. FAO has made some progress in this respect, beyond its traditional collaboration in more peaceful contexts. In Afghanistan, for example, it now has its first Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme (GAFSP) project partnering with the Asian Development Bank. FAO Yemen is implementing a programme in partnership with the World Bank that supports smallholder farmers resume production in seven of the country’s most conflict-affected provinces. But these remain more of an exception than the norm. The time is ripe for FAO to develop a strategy for a more systematic approach to developing partnerships with multilateral development banks in fragile states, identifying how FAO can play to its comparative advantage across this part of the international aid architecture. FAO has joined the Famine Action Mechanism, a 2018 initiative set up by the World Bank that aims to be a global partnership dedicated to scaling up anticipatory and early action to protect lives and livelihoods from emerging food security crises (World Bank, n.d.).

110. Regional Organisations: FAO’s partnerships with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have been strengthening, particularly in Africa: the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS). While these have mostly begun with collaboration around food security analysis, it is more relevant to the HDP nexus where it has become multi-faceted. FAO’s relationship with IGAD is a good example, as demonstrated in Box 4.
Box 4. FAO’s strategic partnership with IGAD and the HDP nexus

FAO and IGAD co-chair the Food Security and Nutrition Working Group (FSNWG), a collaboration that is key to raising the alarm about deteriorating food insecurity, advocating for the timely release of funds, including the release of contingency funds from IGAD member states, and developing joint response plans. While FAO’s partnership with IGAD has a strong foundation on food security and resilience analysis, it has expanded into other areas including pastoralism. FAO and IGAD have established a resilience partnership programme in the Mandera Cluster: the border regions between Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya. FAO provides technical support to IGAD and to governments, training and help with community mobilization in each of the three countries, whereas IGAD handles work in the policy, coordination and funding domains of the programme as well as the cross-border dimension, thus playing to each agency’s comparative advantage. This builds on another IGAD/FAO partnership in the Karamoja region supporting pastoralists and transhumance across borders with livelihood support, while also emphasising conflict and early warning analysis. FAO and IGAD partnership have been extended to cover issues related to animal feed inventory and feed balance; the two institutions developed an action plan involving all IGAD member states, NGOs, development partners, private sector and the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI). Feed inventory and balance is under implementation jointly with IGAD in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Most recently in the desert locust response FAO and IGAD are working in close partnership to promote a regional approach. While this strategic partnership between FAO and IGAD is not without its practical challenges (e.g. related to contracting), it is a good demonstration of the HDP nexus in practice, ranging from preparedness and response to humanitarian crises, addressing longer-term systemic challenges to pastoralist systems of production while at the same time engaging with the political dimension of cross-border movement and conflict early warning at both local, national and regional level.

111. FAO’s collaboration with SADC was important in the El Niño response in 2016/17, ensuring agriculture and food security needs were well-prioritised in the SADC appeal and in the respective national responses (FAO, 2020c). As the FAO evaluation demonstrated, it made practical contributions in terms of support to early warning and preparedness, coordination, and through a secondment to the El Niño Logistics and Coordination Response team. This kind of institutional support is important to the humanitarian-development components of the nexus, but is often constrained by FAO’s dependence on short-term project funding.

112. Private Sector: Despite the 2013 FAO Strategy for Partnerships with the Private Sector there is little evidence of FAO developing partnerships with private sector actors that contribute to HDP nexus way of working. Indeed, two recent evaluations have concluded that FAO has made very limited progress in exploring and engaging in strategic collaborations with the private sector more generally. Both make recommendations for stepping this up in pursuit of Agenda 2030 and the SDGs (FAO, 2019a; 2019b). FAO’s Corporate Framework on Supporting Sustainable Peace also highlights the need for FAO to explore private sector approaches to supporting livelihoods in conflict. One of the most relevant recommendations for the HDP nexus from the private sector strategy evaluation relates to the ‘Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems’ and encouragement to build those into strategic private sector partnerships, for example in the development of agribusinesses and value chains through investment projects funded by IFIs (FAO, 2019b). This could play an important role in fragile states, especially if guided by a political economy analysis that explores how private sector development and investment in human capital can contribute to sustaining peace, for example by training and employing youth that may otherwise join militias. This will also be key to operationalizing the GNFC’s second pillar on leveraging strategic investment in food security and nutrition. As FAO gains experience from implementing programmes in fragile contexts under the GAFSP, this could inform future strategic engagement with the private sector in such contexts.

113. With academia and think-tanks: There are few examples of FAO developing strategic partnerships with academia and think-tanks, for example with the Feinstein International Centre of Tufts University on Anticipatory Action. These can play an important role in supporting FAO’s analytical work, and in developing an independent evidence base to support components of FAO’s work that contribute to the HDP nexus, but are still few and far between, especially at regional level.
NGOs: Interviews and a review of past evaluations (FAO, n.d.h.; 2019c; 2017b; 2016b) highlight FAO’s tendency to collaborate with larger NGOs in partnerships dominated by letters of agreement (LOAs) that set up a contractual arrangement heavily driven by service delivery. FAO has not yet developed any strategic partnerships with international NGOs with a strong context/conflict analysis and peace dimension, although this deserves greater attention as FAO seeks ways to build its capacity and mindset to be conflict-sensitive at a minimum, and more ambitiously to contribute to sustaining peace. The power asymmetry in FAO’s contractual partnership agreements mean that it often misses out on the opportunity to benefit from the comparative advantage of its implementing partners, for example their understanding and analysis of relationships and conflict dynamics at community level (Buchanan-Smith and Longley, 2020). The case of Yemen highlighted in a recent evaluation illustrates the benefits of strengthening partnerships with local NGOs as this is a way for FAO to gain a better understanding of the local context and conflict dynamics in an area (FAO, n.d.h.). But this is an exception rather than the norm. In Zimbabwe, spurred and imposed by the donor, national NGOs were organized into a consortium and a partnership created based on FAO’s first Operational Partners Implementation Modality (OPIM).

The COVID-19 response has amplified the importance of the localisation agenda and the need to partner more closely with local NGOs and civil society organizations. However, to be effective, FAO must confront the asymmetric power dynamics inherent in such partnerships between local NGOs/civil society organizations with a UN agency, to ensure it is a partnership of mutual benefit, respect and exchange. Only then can FAO benefit from the local knowledge and relational networks of a local actor.

Finding 12. Collective outcomes are the way forward at country level and aligned to SDGs and HDP nexus ways of working. FAO has to acknowledge this and invest in its capacity to be an active member, shaping key discussions at country level, as well as influencing global level discussions.

Finding 13. At country level, collective outcomes need to guide future partnerships in line with the HDP nexus. These cannot be developed in an ad hoc manner or based solely on projects as has been the pattern so far through letters of Agreement (LOAs) which limit NGOs to the role of service provider rather than a true partnership where FAO could benefit from their understanding of the local context and needs. FAO’s Operational Partners Implementation Modality (OPIM) is a positive development although it requires a lot of investment upfront.

The 2020 IASC Light Guidance on Collective Outcomes details how collective outcomes can be an important entry point for collaboration and for contributions to sustaining peace: “Humanitarian assistance, development cooperation and peacebuilding are not serial processes: They are all needed at the same time in order to reduce needs, risks and vulnerability. Collaboration can be achieved by working towards collective outcomes, over multiple years, based on the comparative advantage of a diverse range of actors. Collective outcomes have emerged as a strategic tool for humanitarians, development and peace actors to agree on a concrete and measurable result that they will jointly achieve in a country with the overall aim of reducing people’s needs, risks and vulnerability.”

The concept of collective outcomes was first presented in the Secretary-General’s 2016 report for the World Humanitarian Summit: One Humanity, Shared Responsibility. The IASC paper defines collective outcomes as follows: “A collective outcome is a jointly envisioned result with the aim of addressing and reducing needs, risks and vulnerabilities, requiring the combined effort of humanitarian, development and peace communities and other actors as appropriate. To be effective, the collective outcome should be context specific, engage the comparative advantage of all actors and draw on multi-year timeframes. They should be developed through joint (or joined-up) analysis, complementary planning and programming, effective leadership/coordination, refined financing beyond project-based funding and sequencing in formulation and implementation.”
117. The evaluation found a few examples of countries where FAO has started to engage in the process of collective outcomes. The process is broader and more inclusive than the UNSDCF and UN-only exercises, and it reaches out to institutional counterparts as well as to a broad range of stakeholders, such as resource partners, civil society and NGOs, the private sector and academia and other think tanks. In the examples of Sudan and Burkina Faso, FAO’s engagement was led by the FAO Representative under the over-arching leadership of the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator and in both cases FAO played an active role in contributing to the acceleration of joined-up planning and implementation processes. In Chad, the FAO Representative assumed, as is common for FAO, the coordination of the technical working group on agriculture with resource partners and government counterparts which in turn strengthened the visibility and positioning of the Organization. In Kyrgyzstan, Conflict and Peace Unit personnel were supporting the FAO office to ensure FAO’s role in the country’s UN Peace and Development Dialogue Group. FAO needs to continue being an active member in these processes and strengthen its capacity to do so in countries where collective outcome processes will be rolled out.

118. But collective outcomes are not the only entry point. For example, FAO has been a key actor in the Platform for Recovery and Resilience in South Sudan that brings different actors together committed to promoting local ownership and working together to reduce vulnerability, increase resilience of people, communities and institutions in South Sudan on their way to achieving the SDGs. Under the Platform for Recovery and Resilience, the successful collaboration between FAO’s Sustainable Agriculture for Economic Resiliency (SAFER) project and WFP’s Small Agriculture Market Support (SAMS) provides a good example of a coordinated approach to co-location, making a constructive connection between humanitarian assistance and resilience-oriented development support. The Platform for Recovery and Resilience also promotes a conflict-sensitive approach to area-based programming. It is this kind of partnership that FAO needs to foster.

**Finding 14.** FAO plays a coordination role in a plethora of different working groups and these vary greatly from country to country and are very context-specific. Most coordination is led from the humanitarian side, with limited engagement with the development or peace pillars.

119. Coordination across the nexus is one of the three main pillars (coordination, programming and financing) of the OECD-DAC Recommendation on the HDP nexus, and adherents should: i) undertake joint risk-informed, gender sensitive analysis of root causes and structural drivers of conflict, as well as positive factors of resilience and the identification of collective outcomes incorporating HDP actions; ii) provide appropriate resourcing to empower leadership for cost-effective coordination across the HDP architecture; and iii) utilize political engagement and other tools, instruments and approaches at all levels to prevent crises, resolve conflicts and build peace.

120. FAO is involved in a plethora of different groups in which it plays a coordination role or is an active participant, but few seemed to cut across the HDP nexus. FAO plays a significant role in coordinating technical work in areas of expertise in close partnership with ministerial technical departments and other stakeholders especially for food security monitoring, early warning, livestock health and policy work. Coordination on food security is FAO’s ‘bread and butter’, especially with FAO’s key role in the food security cluster. While resilience activities are increasingly included, there is very limited coverage of conflict and peace issues in these coordination fora. A context analysis approach is currently developed in collaboration with the Global Network against Food crisis in a few pilot countries.

121. The general trend is that most coordination FAO is involved in is more humanitarian–development based, and with a few occasions involving peace actors. It is also often lead from the humanitarian side that in general has more incentives to invest in coordination than development actors (FAO,
NRC & UNDP, 2019). In Latin America, the cases of coordination across the HDP nexus were when engaging on the migration response in the region and individual countries. When elements of the peace component were incorporated in coordination mechanisms these were very project-specific, such as the case of Bangladesh on Safe+ issues with the Technical Working Group on Forest Resources or PBF funding in Chad on cross-border transhumance. FAO’s work co-chairing the DRR working group with IGAD in Ethiopia was mentioned as a positive example of coordination across institutions and issues, as was the locust response in the East Africa region or the SDG 2 Coordination Mechanism in Chad. It was not possible for the evaluation to fully assess whether they covered all of the OECD-DAC suggested criteria for coordinating across the HDP nexus. There were no examples of FAO coordinating with peacekeeping missions, with the exception of FAO Sudan working with UNAMID and FAO Mali with MINUSMA, mentioned above. In Sierra Leone, the implementation of the VGGT proved to be a successful entry point for coordinating the catalytic efforts of government, NGOs and civil society, encompassing policy and institutional strengthening work as well as community level engagement and conflict resolution mechanisms on land tenure (FAO, 2021a).

Overall, the evaluation found that the peace component is missing in most coordination fora and that FAO through the food security cluster could play a stronger role in strengthening coordination across the HDP nexus between humanitarian and development actors and with ‘big’ peace actors like the peacekeeping missions.
5. Results of FAO’s programme contribution

123. FAO has many examples of positive results across a broad range of programmatic interventions, but these do not yet constitute a coherent whole on how FAO contributes to sustaining peace objectives or even greater coherence and complementarities between the humanitarian and development dimensions of its work. By piecing together evidence from evaluations, results derived from interviews or secondary documents, the chapter looks into three areas of results: i) the recent development of impact pathways for FAO’s work on sustaining peace; ii) the key components in the programme cycle that are vital for an HDP nexus approach and NWOW; and iii) results and gaps in the thematic areas selected.

124. Most of the evidence is presented in section 2 with a view to analyse how the HDP nexus can be mainstreamed across the programme cycle. The section is further divided in the following programme components: i) context, conflict and information analysis; ii) putting people at the centre of programming, tackling exclusion and promoting gender equality; iii) joined up planning; iv) approaches to targeting; v) flexibility and adaptiveness; and vi) monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning.

125. The chapter outlines key components that FAO’s programmatic approach needs to include in its programme cycle to promote an HDP nexus approach. It provides a number of examples of how and where FAO appears to be following this approach, thus illustrating what the HDP nexus looks like in practice and how it can be further promoted. Based on this suggested programmatic approach, the chapter ends with an analysis of key issues that relate to the nexus in the thematic areas explored in this evaluation.

5.1 Development of an HDP impact pathway

126. As detailed in the FAO contribution to the 2020 Report of the Secretary General on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (FAO and Interpeace, 2020), the Conflict and Peace Unit, in collaboration with Interpeace, has recently outlined a series of primary and contributory pathways, linked to the technical competencies of FAO, for potentially contributing to sustaining peace, see Appendix 5. These pathways are based on theories of change (TOC) that help define long-term goals and then map backward how those goals will be achieved and the assumptions made to reach them. Pathways (or TOCs) are an important tool to support programme design and facilitate analysis of existing FAO interventions. The pathways focus on the contributions FAO can make in its programmes at the local/community level (the small p) with the awareness and acknowledgement that “contributing to peace at the local level often implies working with state institutions at sub-national and national levels – in particular in relation to policies, legislation and capacities.” (FAO and Interpeace, 2020). Big P aspects of FAO’s potential work are therefore not necessarily captured. Nevertheless, they are an excellent development that will help assess whether and to what extent FAO programmes are contributing to sustaining peace. It is also positively noted how underlying the pathways is the inclusion of women and youth, and their contribution and role to sustaining peace.

127. To date, these have been used so far as the basis for FAO’s PBF programming and the upcoming PBF evaluation to be carried out by OED in 2021 will shed light on the effectiveness of their use in PBF projects. In other programmes or projects, TOCs in general have been weak (or non-
existent) and have almost always made just implicit (or assumed) references to FAO’s contribution to sustaining peace. Building on the peace impact pathways, greater investment in developing TOCs that capture the HDP nexus, to underpin future programming, will be a key building block in promoting HDP nexus ways of working.

128. A main challenge for this evaluation to carry out a systematic or comprehensive assessment of results from an HDP lens, has therefore been that the HDP has not been addressed to date as an explicit dimension or objective in programmes or project design, and progress made has not been captured by either monitoring or evaluative evidence in an explicit way. The development and use of these (expanded) pathways will therefore be key for future programme development, as well as for the assessments and evaluations on FAO’s work across the HDP nexus. This evaluation has started to map, analyse and organize what may constitute good examples or practices to sustain peace but most of the work to verify, test and organize these in a way that can be used for scaling-up or sideways, lies ahead.

5.2 The HDP nexus across the programme cycle

5.2.1 Context, conflict and information analysis for the HDP nexus

129. According to the three documents on the HDP nexus that informed the framework for this evaluation, HDP nexus ways of working in relation to data, analysis and information are as follows: i) joint analysis, pooling and combining data and information; ii) regular context, conflict and risk analysis (again with an emphasis on joint analysis); iii) risk-informed and gender sensitive analysis of root causes and structural drivers of conflict; and iv) investment in learning and evidence across HDP actions, for example through M&E and through action research. This section uses these four reference points for evaluating FAO’s data collection, analysis and information functions, with one addition: v) analysis of drivers of food insecurity (including conflict), and of linkages between data and analysis to inform humanitarian programming and data and analysis to inform longer-term development, particularly where this can deepen understanding and better inform both types of response.

130. The section principally focuses on FAO’s seminal role in food security analysis, including its role in EWEA, resilience measurement, context/conflict analysis, and evidence-based learning. Between 2015 and 2019 a large proportion of FAO’s information-related work has been funded by the European Union through the INFORMED programme (‘Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making’). The latter part of this section draws heavily on the findings of the recently completed INFORMED evaluation (FAO, 2021b).

Finding 15. FAO’s capacity for carrying out context/conflict analysis has been strengthened but there is still a long way to go to build and embed this capacity further and more uniformly at all levels, especially at regional- and country-levels. Context/conflict analysis tends to be done as a one-off rather than as a dynamic ongoing process. It is not yet adequately informing programming. Ongoing conflict and contextual analysis, as well as risk analysis, is essential to equipping and informing senior FAO leadership in-country. While countries in conflict tend to be prioritized, there is evidence that this is useful to inform programming in a variety of contexts where tensions may arise over access to natural resources or other socio-economic factors.

131. FAO is not a newcomer to conflict analysis. Guidance documents on conflict management and mediation around NRM and community forestry date back to the early 2000s. But higher-level contextual analysis, including analysis of conflict and power dynamics, was identified by the crisis transition evaluation as a major gap, inadequately informing Country Programming Frameworks

30 Around EUR 33.5 million.
Results of FAO's programme contribution

(CPFs). ‘FAO appears to be lacking in the relevant technical qualifications for conflict analysis and conflict-sensitive programming in spite of its mandate in such key conflict-related areas such as tenure of land and other resources’ (FAO, 2014). The Conflict and Peace Unit, has made a considerable impact despite its limited resources. It has produced two important resource documents (FAO, 2019d; 2019j), and now has a small sub-regional presence in Amman, Dakar and Nairobi.

132. Context/conflict analysis is now more widely acknowledged as relevant and necessary to FAO’s work, although some are still sceptical, emphasising the neutrality of FAO’s work. As described above, many of the drivers of conflict relate directly to FAO’s mandate. FAO should be conducting this kind of work. Indeed, if it does not, there is a danger that apparently technical programming that is implemented without an awareness of the wider political economy, can actually exacerbate grievances and the perceived neutrality of FAO’s work, as has happened in some countries.

133. The evaluation reviewed several examples of conflict analysis that offer valuable learning and two of them are presented in Boxes 5 and 6 below, one at regional level and one at country level. However, these are still the exception and conflict analysis within FAO tends to be treated as a one-off. The skills internally for doing them are limited.

**Box 5. Context analysis in Somalia**

The European Union funded PROACT project provides a good example of how conducting a coherent context analysis in a fragile context such as Somalia is critical. The project centres on water – water access, water management and efficient water use. The project aims to rehabilitate 246 km of irrigation canals along the Shebelle River, serving over thirty thousand hectares of agricultural land. The area was partly controlled by the non-state armed group, Al Shabaab.

During the inception phase of the project, FAO conducted a ‘context analysis’ in partnership with Interpeace in order to better understand the potential impact the irrigation canals would have on the different livelihood groups in the area: pastoralists, agro pastoralists and agriculturalists. Before the context analysis was completed, the main beneficiary group planned for the project was agriculturalists. However, during community level consultations, the importance of this area for pastoralists and agro-pastoralists was highlighted. Discussions revealed that establishing water points for livestock owners and crossing points for livestock would be a key component to prevent tension escalating between different livelihood groups. Through these community-based consultations, FAO also identified the need to set up formalized agreements between different livelihood groups governing the establishment and use of livestock crossing points.

As a result of the context analysis, the construction of water points through cash for work was incorporated into the project, and work is progressing with local authorities to agree on livestock routes and crossing points. FAO revised the workplan, the M&E plan and project target population. In the words of one FAO employee, ‘Without the context analysis, these changes would not have happened. Tensions between groups may well have been exacerbated.’
Box 6. Conflict analysis in the Sahel

As part of FAO’s project to strengthen resilience of cross border agro-pastoral populations to food crises in the Sahel, FAO conducted conflict analyses in the Liptako – Gourma region of the Sahel which straddles Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger (see map). Conflict analyses aimed to inform the choice of project activities, access, targeting and adaptive planning through the use of scenario planning. It also aimed to develop a shared understanding of the context across the three FAO country offices.

Under the leadership of a highly knowledgeable West African academic, and with the support of FAO’s Conflict and Peace Unit at headquarters, FAO worked with national level experts to conduct national conflict analyses in Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger. Under the guidance of a national expert, FAO assembled national working groups to contribute to the analysis. Working group participants came from a variety of stakeholders – government institutions, research centres, development organizations and civil society – all with an understanding of different aspects of conflict dynamics. FAO developed conflict scenarios; planning was based on multiple scenarios and trajectory analysis. This provided a basis on which to start building an anticipatory programming approach which would use this analysis as well as rapid information on displacement from external actors to allow flexible and rapid livelihood support before new crisis hotspots emerge.

FAO held national workshops to disseminate findings even if work was still in early stages. These were then drawn upon for the development of a regional synthesis and a regional workshop was held in Dakar in March 2020.

The conflict analysis found a complex web of structural causes and conflict drivers in the Sahel. Focusing on five main factors causing conflict around natural resources, this enabled priorities to be identified for FAO programming, including strengthening governance structures to manage access to natural resources through a more inclusive approach. It also highlighted the importance of understanding local power dynamics.

A number of interviewees expressed their concern that the conflict analyses that have been carried out are not yet adequately informing project/programme design or influencing implementation and access considerations. This was the case for the Syrian conflict analysis that was requested by a donor during implementation but the extent to which it was possible to translate it into programmatic activities remains weak (FAO, 2020d). There is also a tendency to look at current dynamics without paying sufficient attention to long-term trends and historical grievances and fault lines that may be critical to understanding current tensions. So far there are no mechanisms to update conflict analyses periodically and on a systematic basis, so the results are conveyed through a one-off report or time-bound workshops, weakening their effectiveness in informing activities throughout programmatic cycles. An interesting comparison is with WFP that conducts
Results of FAO’s programme contribution

periodic conflict analyses, even though they are mainly carried out to inform access considerations and the operational and logistics capacity of operations.

135. So, while progress has been made in strengthening conflict analysis since the crisis transition evaluation in 2014, FAO still has a distance to travel to build this capacity and this way of thinking to the level required. This is acknowledged in consultations for the new OER where participants suggested regular six-monthly conflict analyses at country level.

Finding 16. There are a number of examples of how FAO has promoted and fostered joint analysis of food security, from country to global levels, based on pooled data and information from different agencies and different sources, e.g. the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), Global Report on Food Crisis. But within FAO there are weak linkages between data collection and analysis efforts relating to short-term acute food insecurity, and data collection and analysis efforts related to longer-term chronic food insecurity, with the following consequences: i) the underlying structural causes of food insecurity are often missed and not well understood; ii) IPC-based analysis of acute food insecurity tends to be weak on drivers, and especially conflict as a driver; iii) there are major data collection gaps on food security; and iv) incorporation of context/conflict analysis in FAO’s food security analysis work is very weak, often mentioned as a cause of acute food insecurity without any in-depth or granular analysis.

136. Food security and nutrition data collection, analysis and information: There are numerous different approaches to data collection for, and analysis of acute food insecurity across the humanitarian sector, with an edge of competition and jostling between different UN agencies as they each champion their own particular methodology. But there are also examples of agencies pooling their data and carrying out joint analysis – namely through the highly influential IPC process in which FAO has played a leading role. Indeed, the 2019 evaluation of the IPC Global Strategic Programme found that: ‘The collective and consensus-based nature of the AFI (acute food insecurity scale) is regarded by users as its greatest added value. This, combined with the systematic structured IPC analysis process, gives it both authority and credibility’ (FAO, 2019d).

137. More recently, the GNFC has promoted joint analysis to produce the annual Global Report on Food Crisis (both initiatives are mentioned in section 4.5 above). Another of FAO’s flagship reports, the ‘State of Food Insecurity’ (SOFI), is now published by five UN agencies: FAO, IFAD, WFP, UNICEF and WHO. Combining food security and nutrition analysis, it reports on progress towards ending hunger, achieving food security and improving nutrition, and thus the SDG 2 target.

138. Where these efforts fall short of nexus ways of working are two-fold. First, there are weak linkages between data collection and analysis for short-term acute food insecurity, and data collection and analysis for longer-term chronic food insecurity. Although SOFI reports on food security trends over time, analysis and understanding of the underlying structural causes of food insecurity are generally weak. The shortcomings in explaining the structural causes and drivers of hunger and food insecurity are acknowledged at a senior level. The 2020 Global Report on Food Crises has also drawn attention to this: ‘Much more analysis... needed at the country level to gain better understanding of how development assistance is best allocated in support of lasting food security and nutrition and resilient agriculture and food supply chains, and how it could be better aligned and coordinated with the humanitarian efforts, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected contexts...’ (and) ‘The humanitarian and development community need to come together to better

31 The IPC Global Strategic Programme evaluation found that the Chronic Food Insecurity Scale, still being developed and rolled out, did not yet meet the information needs of decision-makers such as government and donors to better understand structural causes of food insecurity either (FAO, 2019e).

32 In the words of one senior staff member: ‘Most of the food crisis countries (the crisis) is not once but repeats and repeats and repeats. We are a knowledge entity and we need to focus on understanding the why’s better’.
address the gaps in existing data collection systems, identify data and analysis standards where they don’t exist, engage with countries where there is limited data or consistent divergences in their interpretation’ (GNFC, 2020).

139. Much of the analysis of acute food insecurity to inform humanitarian programming is designed to provide a snapshot of the current situation. This is a general problem related to the IPC and Cadre Harmonisé, highlighted by Maxwell and Hailey (2020: 22) who point out that the emphasis on outcome indicator data such as food security status, malnutrition, and mortality for current-status assessment has relegated data on causal factors to ‘a secondary (and sometimes quite diminished) place in the analysis’.

140. Second, the incorporation of conflict analysis in FAO’s food security analysis work is weak or non-existent. This, too, is picked up by Maxwell and Hailey in relation to the IPC and Cadre Harmonisé: ‘A major constraint to good analysis is the absence of good information on conflict and conflict dynamics... often conflict is simply mentioned as a “contributing factor” and not much more is said’ (Maxwell and Hailey, 2020: 22), despite this being a major driver of food insecurity and poor nutritional status in most of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. This is a particular constraint for projections and early warning, discussed below.

141. The well-established and highly influential Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU), run by FAO for Somalia, demonstrates both of these limitations. Although it has, on occasion, successfully advocated for longer-term solutions to reduce the humanitarian caseload, it has also failed to fully exploit the richness of its database, now spanning a couple of decades. This was a recurring theme in interviews, that an opportunity is being missed to carry out trend analysis of vulnerability data on Somalia, which could be overlaid with existing data on livelihood zones, maps of conflict lines and natural resource conflict to provide a deeper analysis that would enable FAO to take more of a strategic approach in line with the nexus, for example that would contribute to addressing longer-term development and conflict issues as well as humanitarian. This is not a new idea – indeed, it was a recommendation in the 2013 FAO Somalia Country Programme Evaluation, but has never been acted upon. Although FSNAU does incorporate some conflict data, according to some FSNAU users (including donors), it is seen to be lacking political economy and conflict analysis in its work.

142. While FAO’s analytical capacity and outputs are strong at the headquarters level, institutionally there has been little interaction between those engaged in acute food insecurity monitoring in SP5, and those engaged in longer-term trend analysis in the FAO Statistics Division (ESS) and the Corporate Database for Substantive Statistical Data (FAOSTAT). Even within the INFORMED programme there has been relatively little connection and synergy between the different strands of analysis it funds, although this is key to understanding the multi-sectoral nature of food insecurity and malnutrition to inform both national and regional policies (FAO, 2021b).

143. FAO has an opportunity, indeed a responsibility, through the Food Security Information Network (FSIN) and the GNFC to address this state of affairs through the GNFC alliance. The recent consultation for the new OER office identified some of the factors that need to be addressed

33 In 2018, for example, an FSNAU bulletin drew attention to the need to rehabilitated irrigation infrastructure to address one of the underlying causes of vulnerability and thus to reduce the humanitarian. Information and analysis from both FSNAU and SWALIM enabled FAO to tell the story, which led to funding for large scale rehabilitation.

34 There needs to be greater investment in trend analysis, drawing on FSNAU and SWALIM data. FAO Somalia is uniquely placed to carry out such trend analysis to contribute to a deeper understanding of how livelihoods, the economy, and in turn poverty and vulnerability have been affected by years of conflict and displacement. This should inform FAO’s strategic programme choices and decisions... and will be a key resource for national and international actors in Somalia. It may also provide insights into the causes of chronic food insecurity in Somalia’ (FAO, 2015).
within FAO, particularly at country level: i) ensuring adequate and standardized capacity at all levels, especially at country level, to scale up data collection and analysis, for example the creation of analytical units with increased technical capacities and strengthened communication skills, working to a common conceptual framework; ii) promoting greater coherence and linkages between FAO’s available tools; iii) investing substantially in technology and innovation, with a view to increasing the efficiency and quality of data sharing and analysis, from the perspective of providing a ‘public good’; and iv) mobilizing and dedicating additional resources for regular data collection, and for strengthened analysis. Stronger analysis at national and sub-national levels are essential to guide contextualized programming and policy responses.

Finally, it needs to be highlighted that initially there was little collaboration between the GNFC and FAO’s FIRST programme designed to support national governments’ policy and institutional environments for food security, nutrition and sustainable agriculture. This could have been a missed opportunity, but reorientation of the FIRST programme to conflict/fragile contexts has resulted in a plan of collaboration, particularly focused on ten countries targeted by both FIRST and the GNFC, around analysis, policy and eventually investment.

**Finding 17.** FAO’s pilot work on anticipatory action (previously early warning early action) makes an important contribution to strengthening predictive capacity and risk analysis but is weak on conflict early warning and identifying early action to mitigate conflict and social tensions, although there are some positive examples to learn from.

EWEA/anticipatory action and food security: Strong predictive capacity and risk analysis are essential to a more coherent HDP approach. As mentioned above, in section 4.4, this is a new area of FAO investment and leadership where it has made promising progress in the pilot stage and is an important advance over the IPC which is seen to be weak in predictive capacity. The INFORMED evaluation reports that the quarterly EWEA reports brought together disparate early warning systems within FAO into a common, consolidated analytical product, have encouraged investment in EWEA and have served as an important coordination tool at global and regional levels. The process of compiling the EWEA report has been helpful in supporting programming decisions (rather than the report itself given limitations of timeliness). FAO’s Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities (SFERA) has provided essential funding at country level for early action through a dedicated EWEA funding window (FAO, 2021b).

The INFORMED evaluation concluded that while conflict is a driver of food security, FAO lacked the mandate and skills to engage in conflict early warning, leaving this to other agencies. The same evaluation draws attention to the role of early action in preventing and mitigating conflict and social tensions and identifies this as an unmet need. Maxwell and Hailey’s (2020) work on anticipatory information systems and action recommends that conflict early warning be more systematically incorporated into humanitarian early warning, and into humanitarian scenarios and contingency plans. Even though this may not currently be an FAO strength, this evaluation is aware of two examples of EWEA paying specific attention to conflict and social dynamics and triggering appropriate anticipatory action, in the Philippines and Colombia respectively. These examples are captured in Box 7. Both of these illustrate how FAO can and should take greater account of tension and conflict. Strengthening this area of work will ensure that FAO’s early warning and anticipatory action is as relevant and influential as possible. The INFORMED evaluation also notes the essential role of SFERA in enabling FAO to pilot anticipatory action, albeit on a small scale so far.
Box 7. Early warning early action in the Philippines and in Colombia

Farmers in the Philippines live in the shadow of climatic shocks, including intense droughts caused by El Niño, floods and cyclones. Mindanao Island also experiences regular outbreaks of violent conflicts between government and various non-state armed groups. FAO has set up an anticipatory action system in Mindanao to help farmers mitigate the adverse effects of climatic shocks. Using a combination of historical information highlighting previous impact and response to droughts combined with seasonality information, FAO was able to identify a window of opportunity to mitigate the impact of droughts - between November and March. By November 2018, the early warning system signaled warnings to trigger anticipatory action. Droughts were expected to adversely affect rice harvests. Working in partnership with government and humanitarian partners, FAO managed to start drought mitigation activities four and a half months earlier than usual, in 2018/19, allowing the livelihoods of vulnerable communities in Mindanao to be preserved. Importantly, FAO also factored in growing tension across Maguindanao province, recognizing that violence could cut off farmers’ access to their rice fields at any time.

The Venezuelan refugee and migrant crisis is one of the largest external displacement crises in the world, and Colombia has been the country most affected by the crisis, having received over 1.8 million refugees and migrants as of February 2020. The crisis has coincided with a time of transition in Colombia, which ended a more than 50-year conflict with one of the main and largest armed groups in 2016. EWEA in Colombia grew out of a joint mission/assessment conducted by FAO, WFP and UNICEF of areas affected by Venezuelan migration in June 2018. Data collected through this exercise showed a marked deterioration in food security in rural border areas and predicted large numbers of migrant arrivals into host communities in the coming 6-12 months, which would further threaten household food security in rural areas. Responding to the findings of the assessment, FAO provided 600 households with livelihood assistance (eventually 1,000, with support from the European Union) in an effort to rapidly boost local food production and protect households’ assets, and to contribute to addressing issues of social cohesion. The approach followed the rapid recovery model for agricultural production, an area-based strategy that FAO devised together with the Ministry of Agriculture and the National Disaster Risk Management Unit. Following the intervention, FAO was able to demonstrate that EWEA paid economic dividends and that the action was associated with improvements in social cohesion in terms of relationships between host and migrant beneficiaries.

An impact analysis found that tensions between different groups had begun to rise because of competition over scarce resources, with migrants being blamed for taking livelihood opportunities. Community production centres appeared to reduce tensions, however, and 74 percent of beneficiaries said that relations with other groups had improved over the last year, versus 39 percent of non-beneficiaries.

147. So far, however, FAO’s EWEA has predominantly engaged humanitarian actors. Now more clearly positioned as ‘anticipatory action’ rather than early response, the challenge is to engage development actors and to ensure that early warning and risk analysis is firmly on their agenda as well, for example through budget lines in development programmes for ‘anticipatory action’, which will also facilitate a longer-term perspective in designing anticipatory action that is in line with long-term development processes.

Finding 18. Resilience measurement is a potentially important tool to the HDP nexus, but requires adaptation to fulfil this potential, including more collaborative and participatory approaches that take greater account of local people’s perspectives.

148. Resilience measurement: FAO has put considerable efforts into developing RIMA, a primarily quantitative tool based on statistical modelling. In principle, FAO’s work on resilience has much to contribute to the HDP nexus, with the aim of addressing the root causes of food insecurity and reducing the need for regular humanitarian assistance. However, RIMA is yet to fulfil this potential, for the following reasons (drawing on the INFORMED evaluation) (FAO, 2021b):

i. Like much resilience work, it has been driven more from the humanitarian perspective, from SP5, with weak links to development. The INFORMED evaluation points out that greater interaction with SP1 and SP3 could have brought the three Strategic Programmes...
together ‘under a resilience-food security-poverty nexus to identify policy and programmatic options to address poverty and resilience that integrate risk management into development plans’. This has been promoted by the Programme Lead of SP3.36

ii. RIMA has remained largely an FAO tool with very limited uptake by any UN agencies or international NGOs, constrained by the heavy data demands and high level of technical capacity required to run it. Thus, although it has been developed in close consultation with the FSIN Technical Working Group on resilience measurement, it has not contributed to joint analysis.

iii. More recently a short conflict module was developed with the Conflict and Peace Unit reflecting the importance of conflict as a driver of food security, but this cannot be a substitute for a qualitative context/conflict analysis. As reported in the INFORMED evaluation, this is a work in progress, no reports are yet available, and the benefits to users are yet to be determined.

149. The INFORMED evaluation concludes that ‘resilience is best understood by drawing on a diverse range of methodologies – including qualitative and participatory approaches’ (pp. 40). This echoes the findings of the mid-term evaluation of the large resilience SAFER project in South Sudan. The project had not explored in any depth what resilience capacity meant to the target population. Instead, an externally-defined resilience capacity index was applied through RIMA II. Adopting approaches that have a stronger consultative and grass-root dimension and put people at the centre of programming implies investing much more in consultations with local people and community institutions.

150. Hand-in-Hand: The new Hand-in-Hand initiative, with its geospatial modelling using different datasets, has the potential to contribute to integrated, joint, multi-sectoral analysis on a territorial basis. It adopts a market-oriented food systems approach, bringing together the RBAs and the IFIs. Still at the roll-out stage, key to its success will be its ability to incorporate dynamic conflict/political economy analysis, and to incorporate the perspectives and experience of local people and communities, as per the people-centred approach described below.

5.2.2 Putting people at the centre of programming

151. One of the challenges of the 2030 Agenda is how to make SDGs relevant at the local level. What has been defined as a ‘Plan of Action for People, Planet and Prosperity’ (UN, n.d.c), calls for participation of all members of society, with a focus on how to engage and empower local actors, marginalized and disadvantaged groups to make their voices heard to inform and influence policy and action on the goals. This is mirrored in the Grand Bargain work-stream that calls for a participation revolution to enhance the effectiveness and quality of aid through the inclusion of people and communities affected by crises in decision-making processes. Much of the guidance and analysis on the HDP nexus points to the fact that to achieve transformational and sustainable change it is necessary to include people, communities and their institutions as the starting point. Furthermore, aid should be delivered with and by local actors and first responders, in close partnership with international agencies. This localization agenda, outlined as one of the commitments of the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS), has become of extreme importance as the most effective delivery modality during the COVID-19 crisis. In conflict contexts, where access

36 See ‘Note Prepared By Benjamin Davis SP3, Strengthening resilience analysis for food security and poverty reduction, September 12, 2018’.
and dynamics on the ground may be a particular challenge, including local actors in decision-making processes and as primary agents for delivering programming, it is key.

Finding 19. FAO has a long and substantive history of developing, promoting and using participatory approaches, including in conflict management processes, in ways that put people at the centre, key to HDP nexus ways of working. But the experience and work carried out to date remains fragmented and on a small scale as it was never institutionalized and raised as ‘THE FAO’ approach to programming. Some approaches, such as farmer field schools are better known, more broadly used both in FAO and by other development actors, while others remain limited in terms of uptake and have not been systematically evaluated in terms of results and learning. All of these people-centred approaches originate from the development work of FAO and over time, a number of them have been adapted and used in humanitarian and fragile contexts. Many of them potentially lend themselves to supporting the conflict and peace dimensions of the HDP nexus but have not yet been applied at scale or integrated into broader interventions.

152. An HDP approach to programming in FAO should be first and foremost centred on people and on an understanding of their needs, their rights and the dynamic context in which they live, following the OECD-DAC Recommendation, and as reflected in the evaluation framework.

153. For all of the above, it is key to have a ‘good enough’ understanding of: i) needs: based on the long-term underlying causes of vulnerability as well as on the short-term or immediate needs derived from exposure to and impact of risks and hazards; ii) rights-base: what are the entitlements (as well as the aspirations) in terms of access and rights to food, to natural resources and to socio-economic assets, livelihoods, institutions and services; and iii) context: what are the socio-economic, political economy and agro-ecological contexts within which programmes operate, what are the risk factors and what are the potential sources of conflict and/or cohesion. It is also important to understand what changes in coping strategies and agricultural practices are adopted as a result of conflict and risk exposure. All of the above, but particularly needs and context, need to be understood and monitored as they change over time.

154. The evaluation found three broad categories of people-centred approaches being used in FAO:

i. Approaches/formats with a primarily technical entry point and participatory implementation (such as farmer field schools, community-based forestry management, small-scale fisheries management, participatory land mappings, community DRR plans).

ii. Approaches/formats with a participatory entry point intended to promote social cohesion and empowerment of marginalized groups, which may or may not encompass technical and/or financial areas of work (such as Dimitra Clubs, Caisses de resilience, village savings groups and junior life and farmer field schools).

iii. Territorial and area-based approaches which include a strong participatory element (negotiated territorial development, watershed management), like the Green Negotiated Territorial Development in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FAO, 2016c).

155. These people-centred approaches are key to be able to maximise the peace-contributing potential of FAO’s interventions. Paying attention to processes allows for what would be standard technical interventions of FAO’s work, to have the possibility to contribute to sustaining peace. For example, in a programme dealing with NRM, facilitating and increasing dialogue between

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37 By the term people, it is important to look at (and understand) the following: i) individuals (and their characteristics such as gender, age, (dis)ability, identity and capacities in terms of beliefs, aspirations, assets and livelihoods); ii) households and their composition, capacities and dynamics; iii) communities and their composition, dynamics and resources; iv) groups such as local associations, user groups and livelihoods; v) local and sub-national institutions and governance mechanisms; vi) intra-community dynamics, inclusion and exclusion; and vii) inter- community and inter-group dynamics, inclusion and exclusion.
communities or population groups that may be in competition over those scarce natural resources can complement the work being carried out to restore or maintain those natural resources. The programme in this way makes what would be a purely technical intervention, into one that can contribute to peace. People-centred approaches will therefore facilitate and define how to complement or adapt the technical interventions planned.

156. In FAO evaluations so far, no systematic comparative analysis of the strengths, weaknesses and results of the range of participatory and people-centred approaches developed and used by FAO and its partners has been carried out, so it is difficult to fully assess their effectiveness in terms of ensuring broad inclusivity and gender-sensitivity. As many of these approaches, save farmer field schools, have not been mainstreamed or institutionalized, there has been little collective learning leading or understanding of impact in terms of resilience, livelihoods and social cohesion. There is evidence from evaluations of individual cases and a range of key informants presented some success stories with positive results, but the evidence base remains thin.

The centrality of gender

157. As highlighted in section 2, attention is needed on how to implement an HDP nexus approach at a programmatic level that could support transformational change in gender equality in both immediate responses and longer-term outcomes. UN SCR 1325 urges all actors to increase the participation of women and incorporate gender perspective in all UN sustaining peace efforts. In the years since the adoption of UN SCR 1325, the UN Security Council has adopted nine more resolutions on women, peace and security, in order to provide more detailed guidance on specific aspects of war and its impact on women, addressing such issues as sexual and gender-based violence, human trafficking and the gendered aspects of peacekeeping efforts.

158. The issue of systematically incorporating a gender dimension into FAO strategies and programmes as well as ensuring that it translates into tangible and sustainable results on the ground is an issue that is both a pre-condition but also goes beyond the immediate scope of this evaluation. So, as a starting point, the current evaluation refers to the analysis, conclusions and recommendations from the Evaluation of FAO’s Work on Gender (FAO, 2019h). Building on this, it is also important to sharpen the focus and the systematic attention of FAO on the linkages between gender, peace and security both as fundamental issues to be addressed as well as areas for sustaining peace at the programmatic level.

159. The evaluation focused on two key dimensions of FAO’s work on gender and peace at the programme level: the extent to which gender is incorporated in ongoing conflict and context analysis work and some examples on how women’s protection and their empowerment has been directly linked to sustaining peace.

Finding 20. The evaluation found insufficient articulation on gender in the guidance materials on context/conflict analysis. This was similarly repeated in the country conflict analysis reports. On the other hand, the 54 Country Gender Assessments reported in the 2019 Evaluation of FAO’s work on gender, were by and large peace and conflict blind. In addition, the evaluation found a large range of guidance and tools on integrating gender through rights-based approaches (such as Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests (VGGTs), the gender and land portal, the right to food and the older but still extremely valid Social, Economic and Gender Analysis Toolkit that could be integrated to support mainstreaming a gender and peace dimension into FAO’s programmes.

160. The FAO conflict analysis studies reviewed have focused on gender, but overall the focus has been on sexual and gender-based violence, primarily seeing women as victims of violence and not
necessarily as active participants in promoting peace. In the FAO guidance to conduct context analysis and programme clinics, the evaluation acknowledges that the questions guiding the exercises and handouts cover thoroughly different aspects of gender, allowing participants to collect information about women, men and gender relations. What however was missing from the documents was to explore and provoke the users of the guides to think through the process of how they can generate information from women and men separately, and how these distinct perceptions can help nuance understandings of social, economic, political and environmental factors in the conflict dynamics. This would strengthen the understanding of the gendered nature of the causes and impacts of conflict, as well as the structural issues affecting it all. The importance of gender disaggregated data in the analysis conducted at country level was not always sufficient.

In addition, as highlighted above, developing a protection policy for FAO will be key to adequately address these issues.

Finding 21. The evaluation has found few examples of where there has been an explicit focus on women and peace. Those available show positive outcomes on the ground, both in terms of protection as well as of empowerment. The cases found highlight the importance of including women in participatory processes and putting them at the centre of programming, not just as victims of violence, but as active actors and contributors of sustaining peace at all levels. This needs to be explicit in the pathway - theory of change and programme logic of future FAO programmes, making a stronger link to the UN SCR 1325.

161. The evaluation has found examples of programmes where an explicit focus on women and peace has resulted into positive outcomes on the ground, both on protection and empowerment. A number of evaluations have picked up on the protection dimension of certain interventions and their design. Good practices identified included the distribution of livelihoods packages with vegetable crops to women in South Sudan, that allowed them to operate close to the homestead and reduced the need for them to travel longer distances for staple crops cultivation, thus reducing their exposure to violent attacks. Similarly, the distribution of fuel-efficient stoves in South Sudanese protection of civilians sites has reduced the need to collect fuel wood and the exposure to gender-based violence. This practice has been adopted by FAO in a number of projects and locations with refugee populations in other countries.

162. In asset replacement/distribution activities, issues around gender-based differences in access, exposure and capacities, while sometimes still overlooked, are gradually being corrected. The Lesotho case study of the El Niño evaluation highlighted the issues that women-headed extremely vulnerable households had in terms of distance of collection points for livelihoods packages as well as in terms of weight. The evaluative case study of the Syrian refugees in Jordan, noted how low literacy rates amongst women participating in a food transformation vocational training programme where partly addressed by using voice messaging through WhatsApp groups. Issues around additional labour burdens, possible negative effects on child-rearing and household nutrition as well as increased exposure to risks and violence in programmes using cash for work and cash plus modalities are being more systematically addressed in programme design and through monitoring. A number of livelihoods project documents designed for conflict and fragile contexts, propose explicit causal linkages between improved livelihoods and positive effects in the reduction of gender-based negative coping strategies such as early marriages or use of sexual exploitation for accessing basic commodities and services. These issues are also addressed in FAO’s recent policies on the protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (PSEA) covering interactions between FAO personnel, implementing partners and affected population. While this is a key positive step, the guidance and measures in place focus on safeguards and mechanisms to report misconduct and do not extend to guidance on how to sustain and promote protection-sensitive activities in the design of FAO’s technical and programmatic interventions.
Results of FAO’s programme contribution

163. More articulated evidence was found in terms of FAO’s efforts to promote women’s active roles and empowerment as contributions to peace and sustainability. Below are three examples:

i. Dimitra Clubs – Democratic Republic of the Congo: Food insecurity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been driven by conflict, weather extremes, crop pests and economic shocks. Women, and especially young girls, have been disproportionately affected by the conflict and insecurity, and face not only displacement and gender-based violence, but limited access to income-generating opportunities and services. As part of a joint programme between FAO and WFP, FAO has supported the development of Dimitra Clubs, self-organized community groups dedicated to promoting change in the communities through approaches that are rooted in dialogue, knowledge exchange and gender equality. In total, 173 clubs were formed in Tanganyika Province in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, which is one of the locations most affected by food insecurity and malnutrition as well as by worsening intercommunal rivalries between the Twa and Bantu ethnic groups. Dimitra Clubs in Tanganyika Province engage both women and men as well as Twa and Bantu groups, encouraging members to resolve community challenges through dialogue while building social cohesion. Half of Dimitra Club members in Tanganyika are women, and the clubs have played an important role in women’s community participation and leadership while improving overall equity in gender roles. As detailed by the Knowledge Sharing Platform on Resilience (KORE) good practice (FAO, 2020g), Dimitra Clubs have contributed to improving prospects for local peace, reducing violence and curbing localized conflict. They have played a role in improving agricultural practices, improving community social infrastructure and providing economic opportunities to youth.

ii. Women as mediators for water conflicts in Yemen: Years of conflict, economic decline and strain on natural resources have had far-reaching humanitarian effects in Yemen. As part of the current crisis, much of the country’s water, sanitation and hygiene infrastructure has been damaged, deepening humanitarian needs while encouraging conflicts around increasingly scarce water resources. Partnering with IOM and funded by the PBF, FAO implemented the project “Strengthening the Role of Women in Peacebuilding Through Natural Resources Management at the Community Level in the Rural Areas of the Governorates of Sana’a and Lahaj in Yemen,” between January 2018 and June 2019. The project sought to institutionalize the role that women have traditionally played in water conflict resolution in rural areas. The project supported the formation of water user associations (WUAs) so women’s roles in resolving conflict would find acceptance and official recognition within their communities. This was achieved through the formation of women water user groups, quotas of 30 percent of women on the WUA boards, and the selection of two women and two men to be part of the Conflict Resolution Committee in every WUA. As a result, women take an active role in addressing community conflicts, and conflict resolution mechanisms better reflect the gender-specific challenges related to the conflict and water scarcity (FAO, n.d.f.).

iii. Raising the visibility of rural women in the Colombian peace process debates: In Colombia, FAO Colombia has adopted a gender lens through all of its programmes and for example has been working with women in Cauca, an area of Colombia heavily affected by armed conflict, on encouraging entrepreneurship among women through the NGO ASOMUCADI (Asociación de Mujeres Agroindustriales, Pecuarias y Ambientales del Corregimiento de El Diviso) as a way to rethink gender roles but to also encourage women’s participation in
decision-making assemblies. At the national level, and in a more tacit manner, FAO Colombia was instrumental in supporting and encouraging the debate of the vice presidential candidates (most of them females and in the midst of the Colombian peace process implementation) to focus and discuss on the situation of women in rural areas during a public debate hosted by one of the main national newspapers (FAO, 2021c).

164. The three cases highlight, the importance of including women in the participatory processes and putting them at the centre of programming, not just as victims of violence, but as active actors and contributors of sustaining peace at all levels. This needs to be explicit in the programme logic of future FAO programmes, making a stronger link to the UN SCR 1325. These experiences need to be used as a basis to draw lessons and ensure a sharper and more explicit focus on gender and peace across programmes.

5.2.3 Joined-up programming for the HDP nexus

Finding 22. There are a number of internal and external drivers that are encouraging FAO to take steps towards more joined-up programming and increased engagement in multi-partner country processes. These are resulting in a more proactive approach with increased teamwork across levels in support of a more cohesive corporate dimension. The challenge is turning this into the dominant way of working.

165. Joined-up planning and implementation as a preferred modality is gaining momentum both in the global context and within FAO. For FAO this has been brought about by a combination of external and internal drivers, briefly listed below.

166. In terms of external drivers, the reform of the UN system and the efforts to align and coordinate all actors to deliver on the SDGs has brought about a significant acceleration, especially at the national level. The adoption of the new UNSDCFs, the need to actively contribute to the Common Context Analysis that is a pre-requisite to the UNSDCFs, and the fact that the new guidance for FAO CPFs high-level outcomes are derived directly from the UNSDCF have made a significant change. In the majority of countries, FAO co-leads one or more UNSDCF pillars with other agencies while also contributing to other pillars. One of the UNSDCF guidance companion documents focuses specifically on the HDP nexus and how to engage in multi-stakeholder planning and programming through this approach. This entails the adoption of multi-dimensional and integrated vertical and horizontal dimensions through joined efforts.

167. An additional, but by no means less significant, external driver, is that an increasing number of donors are requiring UN agencies and other development and humanitarian actors to work in close collaboration. The evaluation found a large portfolio of programmes and projects where resource partners made this a conditionality for funding. The most active resource partners in driving this trend are the European Union, the (former) Department for International Development (DFID), PBF, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Netherlands, Germany and Canada. The increase in multi-agency programmes is confirmed by the fact that current funding to FAO from the UN is currently 20 percent of the extra-budgetary funds and this captures only the pass-through agreements. Last but not least, the Governing Bodies of the RBAs have been pushing for the three agencies to improve and increase their levels of collaboration. FAO’s commitment to strengthen joined-up planning and programming is noted in the fact that FAO, together with Action Against Hunger and the Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, has led the system-wide reporting on the WHS commitment to deliver collective

38 Interviews and FAO (n.d.d.).
168. There are also significant number of drivers internal to FAO. One of them is linked to many years of repeated recommendations from evaluations on how FAO should shift from a project to a programme approach and build this around complementary mandates in partnership with other agencies. A more joined-up programmatic approach, both internally to FAO as well as in partnership programmes is conducive to increasing coverage, capacity and results while at the same time optimizing some of the functions and systems while ideally reducing some of the operational costs.

169. FAO has so far engaged in a number of joint resilience strategies and plans. These cover a broad range of countries as well as some regions. The most common partners in terms of planning, have been WFP and UNICEF, as well as IFAD. Nevertheless, evaluations provide evidence that joint strategies and planning do not always result in joint or complementary implementation but rather in parallel ones. This was the case for the Joint Resilience Strategy with WFP and UNICEF in Somalia. On the other hand, the Canadian funded 5-year Joint Resilience Initiative, to strengthen resilience in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Niger and Somalia shows high levels of joint implementation, that in the Democratic Republic of the Congo goes as far as having a single inter-agency implementation team. This programme is using a participatory and inclusive approach, and is combining and sequencing the short-, medium- and long-term analytical, planning, programmatic and operational tools and approaches for resilience of the three agencies.

170. The majority of respondents in this evaluation argued that joined-up planning and programming, despite some initial higher transaction costs, are the best way to achieve results and impact at scale across the HDP nexus. The evaluation notes though that at the moment there is no proof of the impact of results and a comparative analysis as to whether joined up programming delivers better results for people and institutions at the national level compared to single agency interventions. As there are a number of evaluations either on-going or planned, it is hoped that they will be able to confirm the common sense belief that joined-up programming provides better coverage and results than single agency, uncoordinated interventions.

171. Two further dimensions need to be touched upon as they are significant to the HDP nexus: the regional and global dimension of some of the on-going programmes and how they fit with the HDP approach: i) regional strategies and programmes; and ii) global programmes.

**Regional strategies and programmes**

Finding 23. Regional approaches are key to realizing an HDP nexus approach, but FAO is not set up to manage them easily. FAO needs to formalize and prioritize its work on the regional dimension of conflict that is cross-border and multi-country. This needs to become more systematic.

172. FAO has to sharpen its focus and scale-up support on the regional (trans-boundary, cross-border, multi-country) dimension of its work, especially in crises contexts. Following recent and current efforts to coordinate regionally on the Sahel, through the RBA Sahel strategy and the Lake Chad crisis, as well as the desert locust response which spans the Horn of Africa to Central and West

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39 The Joint Evaluation of RBA collaboration (2021); the evaluation of the PBF projects and synthesis of lessons (2021).
Africa on one side and Asia on the other, FAO needs to fully acknowledge that the regional and multi-dimension of crisis is part of its organizational DNA.

173. Through a comparison of three evaluations on regional crises response (Lake Chad, El Niño in southern Africa and the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey) it is possible to draw lessons on some key aspects:

i. The Lake Chad strategy was a highly articulate and well-argued document, but the strategy failed to get the original support it was counting on, from the World Bank, as the consultative process to design the strategy was not sufficiently inclusive of country teams and institutional counterparts at the national level, resulting in low engagement and ownership.

ii. The El Niño response and action plan for drought management in southern Africa, was closely coordinated and aligned with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) response plan through the joint UN Regional Inter-agency Standing Committee (RIASCO) action plan. The high levels of involvement and consultation with ministries and national authorities, the support from the UN and the coordination by SADC, resulted in a stronger (if not perfect) capacity for joined planning and coordinated action. The sets of coordinated strategies and action plans were not as polished as the one developed for Lake Chad but constituted a well-used framework by all stakeholders.

iii. Despite the development of a resilience strategy for the Syrian regional crisis in 2015 (commissioned by the Regional Office for the Near East and North Africa - RNE), the document remained unused and no further efforts to tackle the regional dimension of the refugee crisis were undertaken. The evaluative case study of the refugee programmes in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, carried out in conjunction with the Country Programme Evaluation of the Syrian Arab Republic, found strong synergies and a huge potential for FAO to strategize and work on the regional dimension of the crisis but so far this has not been picked up. This is a major missed opportunity. Some initial exchanges on sharing experiences around technical and vocational trainings for refugees and IDPs have recently started to happen but these are not sufficient to fulfil the needs and opportunities that would be within easy reach for FAO to make a major contribution.

Global programmes

Finding 24. The evaluation identified four global programmes so far that incorporate to some extent HDP nexus elements or approaches to varying degrees. The evaluation found no systematic approach to learning, knowledge management and sharing of lessons and experiences across these programmes on how to embed an HDP approach - with the exception of efforts by the KORE platform of the Global Network against Food Crises.

174. The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (14 country projects with FAO as lead agency). This has been driving FAO through a set of multi-agency project interventions at country level, with an explicit peace focus. The projects are small in size, but they have potential to drive bigger investments and follow-up programmes, by providing learning and experience from the ground. The programme was not set up to share lessons across countries but, through the upcoming evaluations at country level, the FAO Office of Evaluations is taking on the responsibility, in

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40 See FAO, 2020c; 2021d; 2021e.
agreement with the PBSO secretariat and evaluation function, to facilitate and provide opportunities for shared learning.

175. Global Network against Food Crises (GNFC) and ProAct country investments (9 country investments). The programme is focusing on resilience in food crises countries, most of which have either national or local conflict dimensions interacting with food security and resilience. The programme has recently funded the multi-stakeholder led conflict analysis exercise, led by national experts, for the region of Liptako Gourma across Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger. The analysis is being used by FAO as well as by other stakeholders to design interventions as well as identify indicators for context monitoring and results (see Box 6 above).

176. Global Environment Facility (GEF): The progress and uptake of the GEF in aligning with an HDP approach is analysed in the section on climate change programmes below.

177. The Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) opened a special call for fragile and conflict-affected states in 2019. FAO, through the Investment Centre and PSE (now OER) were asked to provide support via the FAO country offices to national stakeholders in order to design proposals for further funding. Grants were provided for a six-month period to support design. One of the criteria was to analyse how the proposed actions would address fragility, conflict and/or violence. Support was provided to 17 countries but only a few of them have had confirmation of success, with a number of others still pending at the time of writing. An internal learning document on this exercise recommends the development of a concept note and guidance on how to engage in contexts with lower governmental capacities for implementation and governance as well as weak private and civil society sectors. The call was also to strengthen risk analysis and mitigation strategies in the proposals.

5.2.4 Targeting and its importance for the HDP nexus

Finding 25. If FAO wants to put people at the centre of its work, in line with HDP nexus ways of working, it is vital to understand whom to reach, why and with what interventions. So far, targeting in FAO has been left to the preferred approach of individual teams, sometimes with a narrow project focus, and against the requirements of the operating context. Evaluations have found that FAO targeting has been based mainly on vulnerability criteria and has not sufficiently supported households with production potential beyond immediate needs. Analysis across evaluations shows that in order to incorporate an understanding of conflict and peace dynamics, it is better to use an area-based approach as a first point of entry, and then apply differentiated targeting according to the dynamics of different livelihoods groups and households in and across communities. The use and integration of social registries (when existing) or social protection programmes targeting databases is also an important option that can support building (and re-building) trust with the government.

178. Evidence from evaluations shows that, with the exception of the first phases of an emergency response, targeting is more effective when it is differentiated as well as inclusive and there are different levels of activities for different profiles of households (on a vulnerability versus capacity scale). It also shows that whenever groups (pre-existing or newly formed) are included in the targeting of activities as well as in decision-making, the results are more sustainable in the long term. This can be supported by progressive targeting (pathways for building resilience, or out of poverty). Interactions with and presence of social protection schemes and cash-based programming is also a key indicator. Some activities directed at wealthier farmers and/or production groups have mechanisms of social spill-over of benefits, i.e. the farmers who have been supported by FAO and have improved their income/livelihoods then give back to the community and/or vulnerable households.
179. Evaluations have evidenced that FAO’s programmatic interventions are stronger when they are based on a contextual analysis examining that relationship in each case. Interventions and support designed keeping in mind the positive impact they could potentially have on conflict reduction through hunger reduction and support to economic activity have stronger sustainability.

180. Both Yemen and Palestine have sophisticated approaches to targeting. In Yemen, conflict analysis is integrated in targeting approaches, and in Palestine there is an innovative approach to targeting which includes local committees, implementing partners, Ministry of Agriculture representatives and representatives of the community who undertake initial beneficiary selection at the local or community level (FAO, 2020d). In the Syrian Arab Republic, FAO has not sufficiently articulated its approach to targeting: it is dictated by access issues and generic livelihood or agro-ecology profiling. Targeting was done at a higher sub-national level and was often conditioned by security considerations and government priorities rather than vulnerabilities and needs (FAO, 2020d).

181. Evaluations have pointed out how the lack of consultations with implementing partners and local communities have resulted in weaker targeting approaches than those that build on local knowledge and expertise (FAO, 2016d; 2020c; 2020d; 2021d). Evaluations have also shown that joint resilience strategies (FAO-WFP-UNICEF) have often ended up with each agency targeting different areas and communities, while a joint targeting strategy based on complementarities may have been more appropriate (FAO, 2016e). Despite difficult choices between broader coverage versus more targeted multiple support, the latter may result in more sustainable results. In South Sudan, however, the evaluation of the SAFER resilience programme found that the lack of a joint targeting strategy between humanitarian and resilience programming implemented in the same geographical areas and even in the same communities, causes major challenges. For example, WFP’s cash-for-assets programme, which gave farmers cash to farm their own land or to manage their fish ponds, caused friction with SAFER development activities where producer groups were expected to provide their own time and labour without payment while the project provided other inputs, including training. An implementing partner personnel member described how ‘emergency and development projects (implemented alongside each other) are tearing communities apart’. This illustrates the potential divisive impact of poorly designed targeting.

182. The recommendation on targeting from the Country Programme Evaluation of the Syrian Arab Republic (2020) provides a comprehensive compendium of lessons learned that were found on this topic in a number of other evaluations. Box 8 is presented as a synthesis of lessons learned on how ‘good targeting’ for the HDP nexus looks like to achieve longer-term results that are inclusive and supportive of peace-sustaining dynamics.
Box 8. Targeting recommendations from the Syrian Arab Republic to support an HDP approach

In order to improve the sustainability of results at the household level in all governorates, FAO needs to increase the flexibility and layering of beneficiary selection criteria, whenever possible involving implementing partners and local communities in the selection process. FAO should consider adopting a hybrid approach, using a combination of vulnerability-based and area-based approaches, combining agro-ecological and socio-economic dimensions. FAO Syria should also reflect on whether an exclusive focus on the most vulnerable groups excludes other categories of crisis affected people (who may have been better able to capitalise on what they were given). There is a need to strengthen contextual understanding, particularly in relation to the conflict economy. There are a number of elements to be considered that could improve sustainability and inclusiveness.

i. Extend the targeting approach to encompass both the most vulnerable and small holder productive farmers who are able to generate surplus; make the two complementary using group formation, access to credit and cost recovery combined with social spill over incentives (productive farmers with a surplus ‘giving back’ to the community or vulnerable neighboring households).

ii. Analyse and weigh the benefits and the negatives of providing longer-term graduation support to the same households and/or communities versus expanding geographical coverage with one-off interventions. FAO should think about a minimum package that is effective (composition, quantity, coverage, scale, varieties selected).

iii. A nuanced understanding of the extent to which gender roles have been transformed in different parts of the country (from governorate to governorate as well as urban/rural differences) is critical for all stakeholders working to rebuild livelihoods. FAO needs to think strategically how it will engage rural women at scale.

iv. Strengthen checks and balances to minimise the risk of elite capture. Strengthening understanding of unequal local and national power dynamics through regularly updated political economy analysis is a step in this direction. Investing in third party monitoring across all projects in opposition held areas is also recommended.

v. Follow up regularly with implementing partners, to ensure that there is clear communication between implementing partners and households and communities taking part in FAO activities with explanation of projects’ objectives and the logic behind the targeting criteria.

vi. Strengthen accountability to affected populations. This can be done by establishing more formal feedback mechanisms for beneficiaries, via WhatsApp or other platforms. Informally beneficiaries noted they could contact the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform extension office if a problem arose, but beyond that, there is no formalised system for feedback.

vii. Develop strategies to engage young people in agriculture. This may include options for accessing rural finance, opportunities for agri-business, or engaging in the rural-urban interface.

Source: FAO, 2020d.

5.2.5 Flexibility and adaptiveness

In order to manage and mitigate the impacts of crisis events on development projects as well as safeguard humanitarian action from the volatility of the operating environment, it is important to have in-built flexibility and capacity to adapt programmatic interventions. While this is the case for all programming, it becomes even more important when programming across the HDP nexus, as indicated in the NWOW. In the past, FAO development programmes were frozen when there was a sudden onset or intensified humanitarian crisis, as in South Sudan in 2013 when major conflict broke out (FAO, 2016d). Many development activities in countries like the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen and regions like the Sahel were suspended or cancelled because of the outbreak of conflict events.
Finding 26. In order to avoid the suspension or cancellation of development activities and programmes because of the outbreak of conflict, FAO has been putting in place mechanisms to ensure the continuation and re-focusing of its development activities and operations when a humanitarian crisis intensifies. This works best if combined with anticipatory analysis, scenario planning and risk analysis. The evaluation found some good examples of adaptive programming but these were not systematically present across countries. Some of the examples were found in fragile and conflict contexts (Palestine and South Sudan) while others were found in natural disaster settings (Zimbabwe, Malawi and Mozambique).

184. Below is a summary derived from findings that brings together all the elements found across different evaluations. Key elements of flexibility were found to be dependent on both internal and external factors:

i. Anticipatory risk analysis and planning carried out at the CPF or resilience strategy level and translated systematically into programmes and project agreements (Palestine and South Sudan).

ii. Acceptance and sign-off of flexibility clauses and strategies by donors, in humanitarian and development settings, with additional requirements of multi-year predictable funding for the humanitarian side (SIDA in the Sahel, DFID in Zimbabwe, various donors in South Sudan).

iii. Capacity to monitor changes in the context and identify alternative/improved actions for both development and crises settings (Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, South Sudan).

iv. Adaptive management capacity and mind-sets, supported by internal systems and with the involvement of implementing partners (evaluation key informant interviews).

v. Increased effectiveness if context monitoring and anticipatory action is carried out in partnerships with other agencies and at system-wide/sectoral level (evaluation evidence from food security cluster coverage and key informant interviews).

185. Below are some of the more specific examples identified through the analysis of evaluation findings. FAO’s progress in this area is based on an initial experience in Palestine, where the Representative office developed a comprehensive risk analysis to support the CPF. This was a light document that analysed different types of natural, food chain and conflict risks, their likelihood of occurrence and level of impact based on the exposure and vulnerability of communities that would be covered by FAO interventions. This document that was periodically updated, was also used to negotiate ex-ante flexibility and adaptive strategies with resource partners. In turn, this experience has been used to develop guidelines to carry out similar exercises in a number of other countries.

186. In South Sudan, evaluations documented a case of learning from experience. After having large projects frozen as a result of the 2014 outbreak of civil war in the country, FAO has subsequently built-in flexibility through the Emergency Livelihood Response Programme, which is a (largely) un-earmarked multi-donor mechanism that allows FAO to shift and re-programme some of its activities in line with the shifting and unpredictable conflict lines and dynamics, and therefore needs.

187. In the case of individual projects, a number of resource partners have started to provide contingency funds for unpredictable crisis events, but this is still not widespread practice. The evaluation also found that SFERA funds were in some cases complemented by funds from resource partners who were flexible and allowed country offices, such as FAO Malawi and FAO

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41 See FAO, 2016d; 2017b; 2018b; 2020c; EU, FAO, IFAD & WFP, 2020 & FAO, n.d.i.
Zimbabwe, to realign the project funds by reprogramming or by retargeting the funds allocated for ongoing projects.

188. In particular, the evaluation highlighted cases where programmatic flexibility and adaptiveness led to better results or even avoided failure. This is demonstrated in the following examples (FAO, 2017d):

i. Reprogramming linked to seasonality: In Zimbabwe, the slow provision of funds was going to result in the late delivery of seeds for the planting season and stock-feed. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) project was initially earmarked for provision of subsidized stock-feed and agricultural inputs. However, when the funds arrived late, they were redirected to rehabilitate water facilities, mainly boreholes (solar, bush and hand-pumps), and complemented with communal vegetable gardens. This was in line with the priorities outlined in the FAO Zimbabwe 2016/17 El Niño response; rehabilitation of water facilities was one of the four priority areas (entry points).

ii. Adapting geographic and targeting coverage: In Malawi, a Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) project originally intended for flood response was modified at the time of the El Niño alert, to review specific project activities and redirect some of the funds to cover two additional districts in the south through the provision of irrigation equipment. These two districts were particularly vulnerable to droughts and required some assistance with irrigation. FAO requested a three-month no-cost extension and redirected the distribution of irrigation equipment to different communities or farmers who were not participating in the input trade fairs according to the original plan. For example, FAO in Malawi adapted the activities of a CERF-funded project in response to the evolving needs of the most affected communities and households.

iii. Modifiers linked to crisis occurrence: In Zimbabwe, the evaluation found that a four-year project included crisis modifiers which were activated for the El Niño response. The project entitled “Zimbabwe Livelihoods and Food Security Programme (LFSP)” is a DFID-funded project. Climate-smart subsidies were successfully introduced as a way to protect gains from longer term development processes and activities.

189. In Mozambique, an e-voucher system covering two categories of farmers (vulnerable and productive) that had been successfully implemented by FAO under the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 1c Programme for Reducing Hunger in Mozambique (funded by the European Union and implemented by the RBAs and the Government of Mozambique) was exceptionally reopened in May 2019 for 45 days to reach affected beneficiaries of package A (subsistence farmers) who had been affected by cyclone Idai in March of that year. The intervention was aimed at supporting the recovery of some of the beneficiaries assisted under the MDG 1c Programme, testing the flexibility of the e-voucher under an emergency situation, avoiding overlapping with other agriculture assistance interventions. The successful introduction and operationalization of the system for emergency purposes showed its relative ease of operation and robustness of the system (EU, FAO, IFAD & WFP, 2020).

5.2.6 Monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning to guide and inform HDP nexus programming

190. Over the last few years, evaluations have been repeatedly pointing to FAO’s lack of attention to monitoring and the weak and/or absent systems and capacity in the majority of countries. While progress has been made in ‘food crises’ countries through the establishment of a monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning support team in Rome, the situation in country offices not
supported by the GNFC programme remains patchy. The capacity to build an adequate monitoring function seems to be closely linked with the size of the country portfolio and its attaining certain levels of resource mobilization. While this issue is clearly much broader than the HDP nexus dimension, the evaluation picked up a number of issues of specific relevance for nexus aspects. These are: i) the difficulties in carrying out light monitoring of the evolution of conflict, needs, context and dynamics along with data collection on outputs and results; ii) the need to apply monitoring evidence to support flexibility and adaptiveness and trace progress along the pathways for peace described in the section on TOC; and iii) the need to provide better understanding of the possible conflict dynamics linked to parallel or complementary humanitarian and development activities, including across agencies.

Finding 27. Interventions tend to be designed through discrete projects and are not necessarily part of a broader and more coherent programmatic approach. As a result, the underpinning log-frames and results chain are not sufficiently focused and specific in terms of impact pathways and theories of change that could promote HDP nexus ways of thinking. This weakness is compounded by the fact that log-frames and theories of change are seldom developed through multi-stakeholder participatory dialogues and thus are not a useful supporting management and implementation tool that brings a clear line of sight to results.

191. The FAO personnel interviewed recognized that participatory design processes do lead to more concrete and holistic identification of desired results and a clearer, more effective and sustainable design, in line with the HDP nexus. But the converging evidence from their experience indicates that in most design exercises there is neither time nor space to consult and have more inclusive identification of impact pathways.

192. In addition, the evaluation found a number of projects and programmes where there was a mid-process realization of the importance of peace and conflict dynamics during implementation. This could be defined as a ‘learning by doing’ approach. One FAOR related how monitoring data had revealed the unintended and initially invisible contribution to social cohesion of involving farmers in climate-sensitive practices through communal extension services. This fostered dialogue and created bonds between people belonging to different religious faiths in a country where faith-related violence and conflict has been a long-standing issue. As a result of this experience, he is addressing these issues in a systematic and explicit way in the development of subsequent programmes.

Finding 28. Investment in learning and evidence across HDP approaches (as promoted in the NWOW) is held back by FAO’s fragmented and compliance-oriented M&E systems, lack of analytical capacity, and a poor track record in action research inhibited by limited strategic partnerships with research institutions.

193. From data collection to analysis, evidence and investment in learning: A recurring theme in FAO evaluations is the weakness and fragmentation of its monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning function. As mentioned above M&E tends to be compliance-driven and mechanistic rather than strategic. This holds back an analytical approach to gathering evidence that could strengthen learning as well as FAO’s ability to play an evidence-based leadership role in a number of areas, including resilience. A number of interviewees commented upon the imbalance between FAO’s ability to collect data and its analytical capacity. In the words of one: ‘there is a general problem of data being collected but not analysed (because) there is no time. If we had more systematic and structured engagement with research institutions, we could take it forward... There are numerous missed opportunities.’
194. On a similar theme, FAO’s track record in carrying out action research to contribute to learning is weak. The experience of the SAFER resilience project in South Sudan is an example. The mid-term evaluation concluded that: “there have... been missed partnership opportunities, with some operational agencies and especially with researchers and academia. Any future large-scale resilience programme should consider including an operational research component that is firmly linked to operational programming, drawing on experience elsewhere, that can advance understanding of resilience programming in a context of protracted crisis” (Buchanan-Smith and Longley, 2020).

195. This is where strategic partnerships with research institutions could play a significant role, not only in helping to design and implement action research, but if done with the involvement of FAO personnel at country office level, this could contribute to developing and deepening their research and analytical skills.

196. A KORE was established in 2016 as part of the INFORMED programme. Although credited with producing a range of outputs from documenting good practices to webinars and a quarterly newsletter, it falls short of the benchmarks for nexus ways of working. For example, as noted in the INFORMED evaluation, it missed an opportunity to collaborate with others, such as IGAD and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) that were considering doing the same thing.

5.3 The HDP dimension in thematic areas of FAO’s programmes

197. Through the analysis of thematic areas, the evaluation probed how, and to what extent the humanitarian and development approaches as well as the conflict/peace dimension, have been incorporated in both traditional and more recent programme areas of work in FAO. See section 3 for a description of thematic areas selected for this evaluation. What follows is a short summary of key elements, results and gaps.

198. Natural Resource Management (NRM): FAO has recognized the centrality of conflict management to its work on NRM since the late 1990s. A series of guidance documents, case studies and handbooks focusing on managing conflicts in forestry projects date back 20 years and focus on ‘low intensity’ conflicts between user groups and entities, legal frameworks and entitlements and the link to structural issues that can lead to an escalation of violence and increased vulnerability. This area of work is embedded in the range of rights-based approaches and voluntary legal instruments that FAO has developed over the years, such as the CCRF and the VGGT. To highlight two amongst numerous examples identified by the evaluation:

i. FAO has been working on livelihood diversification to mitigate the effects of declining fishery resources in Lake Chad which are being informally ‘taxed’ by local armed non-state armed groups. Activities to support fish-drying or drying of peppers and tomatoes increases the value-addition of the products and provides more options for sales in different periods, possibly reducing the need to ‘sell’ to non-state armed groups.42

ii. FAO carried out participatory land mappings at the local chiefdom level in Sierra Leone, to empower women’s access and tenure of land, strengthen the rights of women to land tenure and diffuse land disputes, which has been identified as a significant source of conflict.43 The evaluation has shown that not only women, but also men and local leaders (paramount chiefs) came to a better understanding of the importance of including women

42 Interviews with FAO personnel and highlighted in FAO, 2021d.
43 This was the main focus of the PBF project in Sierra Leone (currently under evaluation) and documented in FAO, 2021a.
in tenure rights, leading to more consensual and equitable decision-making on land use (FAO, 2021a).

199. The evaluation found that, despite the multiple examples and significant experience of FAO in this domain, programmes are specialized and with a narrow focus and scale. The experience, skills and lessons from these projects and areas of work are not ‘socialized’ across other areas or embedded in larger programmes. There is some initial evidence that the experience gained in promoting women’s role as negotiators over water disputes and management in Yemen through a small PBF project, will be scaled-up through World Bank investments.

200. FAO is currently managing programmes and activities on displacement and refugees in all five regions and over a significant number of countries. FAO was an active participant of the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees, but this area has never been prioritised by the Organization, despite the growing portfolio. It is also deprioritized by FAORs and senior management, as it is seen as a politically sensitive matter or to be an issue outside of FAO’s mandate. A positive step however is the two personnel members that joined the Conflict and Peace Unit in 2019/20 and the FAO–UNHCR officer in Nairobi who are supporting a number of country programmes. Nevertheless, the result is that FAO’s growing work is done with no proper strategy, in limited coordination or partnership. The peace/conflict dimension and the search for durable solutions for displaced people is central to this area of work. FAO frequently works in areas where there are significant numbers of internally displaced people and migrants. Evaluations show that the majority of FAO projects make efforts to not exacerbate conflict drivers by putting in place inclusive targeting, encompassing both the more vulnerable displaced households as well as host communities. The increased demands on food security are addressed by distribution of agricultural inputs for micro-gardening or horticulture as well as support to infrastructure rehabilitation and value chain support to offset the stress of increased food insecurity. Depending on the context, poultry and livestock distribution has also been used. In contexts where displaced people are in camps or camp-like settings, FAO supports the production and marketing activities of host communities to use opportunities deriving from increased demand for agricultural produce as a way to increase incomes. In urban and peri-urban settings, FAO has been intervening with technical and vocational training programmes as well as food transformation activities, often supported through cash transfer programmes. In many locations, FAO uses WFP and UNICEF’s lists of vulnerable IDPs and refugees as a basis for targeting. The same three agencies collaborate on education and school feeding programmes, with FAO providing training and additional nutrients for school meals through school gardens. To reduce the exploitation of natural resources, especially where large refugee camps are present, FAO has engaged in access to safe energy and fuel activities, ranging from fuel-efficient stoves (South Sudan) to forestry and watershed management in Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh, to rehabilitating water supplies in conflict-affected communities in north-eastern Nigeria. A recent portfolio analysis of FAO’s work on forced displacement (2020) highlighted that only 26 out of 116 projects on forced displacement had carried out a conflict analysis or identified explicit social cohesion and contributions to sustaining peace targets.

201. While there are increasing discussions focusing on the links between climate change and peace in the global arena, some respondents pointed to the fact that there has been insufficient evidence to provide a solid basis for programming climate change work with an HDP or conflict-sensitive lens. The institutionalization of climate change as an important area of work in FAO is relatively recent (with the establishment of a climate change division) and so far, most of the efforts have been geared to including agriculture in international policy debates. This has resulted
in fragmented assessments of country contexts and programmatic implementation at the national level, despite progress being made with the accreditation of FAO as an implementing agency for GEF and GCF. The GEF projects make systematic use of participatory approaches such as farmer field schools. Interviews highlighted that they are increasingly realizing the importance of the HDP nexus dimension during implementation in refugee contexts, linking it with natural resources degradation, and promoting social cohesion with local communities, but so far this is not a fully recognized issue. The work on climate change also suffers from the lingering division between longer-term development interventions and ones focusing on DRR, under the resilience portfolio.

Positive progress has been made with the streamlining and systematization of FAO’s environmental and social safeguard, (through the establishment of a dedicated team in headquarters as well as of guidance materials) that are also starting to consider conflict as an additional dimension that could be more systematically addressed. This is likely to be accelerated by the GEF plans to develop a strategy addressing peace and conflict in its work. A recent independent GEF evaluation, focusing specifically on GEF support in fragile and conflict-affected situations, found that there is an increasing need to recognize and provide guidance and support on work in these areas. Recommendations included the need to develop a screening mechanism to identify conflict- and fragility-related risks and improve conflict-sensitive programming. The evaluation also recommends the adoption of conflict safeguards (in addition to those mentioned above), which FAO may also consider adopting across all programmes. While FAO has so far not engaged in climate justice, this has been identified by personnel working on climate change in FAO as a possible area for future work.

There is a close inter-relationship between food chain crises and conflict. Animal, plant pests and diseases are multi-country and transboundary in nature and require an integrated approach from up-stream policies, standard settings and agreements, through building the capacities, regulatory frameworks and early warning and prevention systems of national institutions, down to activities and support at community level. Pest and disease outbreaks are worsened and compounded in fragile contexts where there is breakdown of surveillance and quarantine systems. This affects checks and coordination across countries. People and animals, as well as pests and livestock disease, cross borders without checks because of forced displacement in a wide range of contexts from the Syrian Arab Republic, Palestine, Myanmar, the Sahel, East Africa, the Caucasus, India and Pakistan. The spread of the COVID-19 pandemic has further increased attention on zoonotic diseases, a dimension already heightened by the avian influenza and Ebola in the past decades. All of these factors act as stressors on both the political and the local dimensions of conflict, adding a layer to pre-existing conflict dynamics. For example, the 2019–2020 invasion of desert locusts in over ten countries was partly due to the break-down of the surveillance systems in Yemen as a result of the conflict.

FAO is the lead (in the case of locusts the sole) agency for these areas of work and past evaluations have documented the integration of FAO’s work across the development and humanitarian components, with efforts to bring together the policy, regulatory and capacity development work, with the early warning and response dimensions. Nevertheless, evaluations argue that FAO needs to do more to tie all the different technical sectors (plants, pests, animal health and food safety), levels (from up-stream regulatory and standard setting work, to early warning and emergency response, to downstream surveillance, extension and livelihoods protection) and partnerships (technical and non) for the food chain work into a unique package for advocacy and strategic positioning. Similarly, the early warning systems need to be better connected and integrated with over-arching FAO work on early warning. This evaluation has further documented a number of examples where FAO has been proactive in dealing with the transboundary

46 See FAO, 2018c; 2017c.
dimension that has implications for international relations: these range from managing technical cooperation on the desert locust response between India and Pakistan locust authorities, to designing and managing a response to invasive forest pests in other regions or conducting coordinated vaccination campaigns across conflict lines in the Syrian Arab Republic, South Sudan and Somalia. Even during conflict, there is a recognition among parties to the conflict of the importance of maintaining animal health and containing and controlling the spread of pests and diseases. And, as evidenced in multiple evaluations and interviews, FAO is considered as a natural and impartial partner to coordinate and support the interventions which are viewed as win-win for all. Nevertheless, the technical personnel who manage this brokering of technical activities are not provided with guidance on how to negotiate the conflict/transboundary dimension, as analysed in the relevance section. In the words of a respondent: “Working to address conflict situation is something that is done because it is needed – there is an artistry in design to address conflict situation. No guidance is given from FAO on how to work in these areas – it comes with the job”. At the community level, the role and support to paraprofessionals such as community-based animal health workers (CAHWs) or extension personnel is also critical to support households in mitigating and managing risks. These figures are key in conflict situations which require more actors involved who are likely to remain close to communities.

204. Over the past few years there has been greater acknowledgement of how well adapted pastoral systems are to environmental variability and to climate change. At the same time, insecurity in the Sahel and in the Horn of Africa has increased exponentially and has brought greater attention of the international community to pastoralism and its links with peace/conflict issues, and therefore the desire to support it. Climate-related shocks and conflict overlap, exacerbating each other and pushing pastoralist communities to change the duration and the location of their migration routes, often creating local level conflicts over the management of key natural resources such as water and pasture. At times this has resulted in an oversimplification of the links between pastoralism and conflict, with pastoralists seen as part of the problem and not part of the solution. The most repeated cause of setback in pastoral development remains poor understanding of pastoralism, often resulting in maladaptive practices that in a vicious circle create further misunderstandings (FAO, 2020h). Using a more people-centred approach to understanding these communities is therefore vital, especially as they have often been marginalized by government.

205. FAO has a long track record of working on pastoralism. It is very relevant to the achievement of the SDGs and to FAO’s mandate on food security, equity in economic and social progress and NRM. Work on pastoralism initially was embedded in FAO’s Animal Production and Health Division, but with time a wide range of other divisions have started working on pastoralism when dealing with issues related to land tenure, forestry, indigenous rights or climate change. At an institutional level, current efforts within FAO to institutionalize a more nuanced and rich understanding of pastoralism has many parallels to the challenges FAO will face to institutionalize the HDP. “Pastoralism by its very nature is an integrative issue, requiring social, economic, political and environmental sectors to work together.” (FAO, 2020h). How do you create a network of people working in both development and humanitarian fields, to have a more nuanced understanding of an issue, and to collaborate to bring in different technical lenses and new ways of working? FAO’s recent document on “Making Variability Work: The institutionalization of pastoralism in FAO” asks itself this and advocates for a ‘dialogic’ approach in order to reach a critical mass of sufficiently sophisticated understanding of pastoralism within FAO, and to create opportunities to explore different perspectives, support cross-learning and critical reflection between teams (FAO, 2020h).

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47 See FAO, 2013a; 2016d; 2017d; 2018d; 2018e; 2021a.
206. In risk-sensitive social protection evidence suggests that the deepest linkage between humanitarian and development occurs when government is in the lead. Furthermore, the use of local systems is the biggest enabler of collaboration between humanitarian and development actors (NYU/CIC, 2019). FAO’s work strengthening governments’ social protection systems is therefore contributing towards an enabling environment for HDP nexus way of working.

207. FAO’s work focuses on linking social protection and agricultural livelihoods. Shock responsive social protection is seen as an entry point bringing together humanitarian and development activities operationally. While a relatively new area for FAO, it has significant potential. FAO appears to be stepping-up its work in this area in the south-east Asia region, developing guidelines on disaster responsive social protection to increase resilience and preparing road maps for developing risk informed shock responsive social protection systems in Cambodia, Myanmar, the Philippines and Viet Nam. Social protection is also a right which is supposed to cover most pillars of the social contract between the citizens and the state, and therefore long term solutions are essential to consolidate the HDP nexus.

208. Cash programming is helping forge links between humanitarian programming and public safety nets. Indeed, harmonising cash programmes and aligning with national systems and standards where possible has been described as ‘transformative’ (NYU/CIC, 2019). If FAO is to really be part of this transformative trend, strategic investment combined with top level leadership and commitment is needed.
6. Organizational performance across the nexus

6.1 The HDP nexus and its organizational enabling and disenabling factors

209. This chapter analyses the enabling and disenabling factors that facilitate or impede FAO’s effectiveness in delivering across the HDP nexus. As in the case of section 5, there are a number of issues in FAO’s business model that are more generic and encompassing than the nexus dimension of this evaluation. The basis of this current section is an acknowledgement and recognition that there are a number of organizational issues around operations, administrative procedures, systems, management capacities and working culture that evaluations have repeatedly identified as slowing down the Organization. To summarize it in a few lines, FAO is procedure heavy (MOPAN, 2018), risk averse to the extent of impeding new process and limiting ways of addressing challenges on the ground (FAO, 2013b), and is considered expensive and/or not good value for money by some resource partners and IFIs (FAO, 2019i, p.10, 23, 36).

210. The HDP guidance documents used as reference points for the current evaluation all highlight leadership, multi-year predictable financing and adaptiveness/flexibility of programming as key enablers for the nexus. In addition, this evaluation has identified mind-sets and working culture, as key enablers, highly relevant to FAO’s way of working. These are the four main areas this chapter will cover.

6.2 Effective and empowered leadership: brokering and consensus-building

Finding 29. FAO’s mandate means that it is uniquely placed, and expected, to play a leadership role at country level in its areas of technical expertise. However, FAO’s senior leadership in country is inadequately supported by the wider organization, especially in conflict and fragile contexts. Too much is left to the skills and expertise of individual FAORs, who must carry much of the risk, yet with insufficient organizational backing, guidance or delegation of authority, further constrained by an organizational culture of risk aversion. In this respect, FAO compares poorly with the support provided by its sister UN agencies to their in-country leadership.

211. The United Nations System Leadership Framework defines eight characteristics of UN leadership (UN, n.d.d.). This should be: norm-based, principled, inclusive, accountable, multi-dimensional, transformational, collaborative and self-applied. It should focus on impact, driving transformational change, systems thinking and co-creation (UN, n.d.d.). Two interesting aspects of the framework are: i) its inspiring tone, the framework is both a call to action and a call for change, that repeatedly focuses on values inherent in the UN Charter; and ii) its understanding of leadership not as a competency solely of senior management, but as occurring in ‘many contexts and at all levels’ (UN, n.d.d.).

212. The skillset of an FAOR (or any UN representative) in conflict or fragile countries requires what is termed in the United Nations leadership framework as “principled leadership” (UN, n.d.d.) emphasizing transparency, accountability, as well as transformative and creative thinking in order to effect positive change. Such leadership, however, cannot exist in a vacuum and requires the appropriate support and guidance in order to achieve impact and results.

213. A recurring theme emerging from the interviews and background information reviewed by the evaluation team was the lack of appropriate, consistent, and measured support to FAORs working in conflict and fragile contexts. Navigating the political landscape is left to the skill and expertise of the individual, with little or no support from headquarters. If problems or issues of a political nature arise, FAORs may inform headquarters. However, the expectation is that the FAOR will
resolve the issues on their own. One FAOR commented: ‘headquarters doesn’t have an understanding of the challenges of working in such environments’. FAORs described the additional hurdles and difficulties in the lack of flexibility in administrative processes and procedures, with insufficient authority or control given to country offices. An additional obstacle is the high level of risk aversion and low ability to make accurate analysis of likelihoods and impact of risks from teams in headquarters. For example, one respondent pointed to the higher and more far-reaching damage in terms of reputational risk if the Organization is perceived as slow and inefficient in operations as compared to taking risks in terms of lighter control of procurement or implementing partners’ profiles. One personnel member commented: ‘FAO management needs to be aware that [working in conflict environments] requires changing organizational attitude to risk’. The picture repeats itself whether in low-intensity or high-intensity conflict contexts, regardless of the type of programming or interventions being introduced.

214. The absence of conflict analysis not only hinders programmatic implementation, but also strategic decisions of the FAO Representations. FAORs and their senior management team, particularly those in politicized conflict contexts, are left exposed and having to make their own arrangements to keep updated with political/conflict dynamics, often having to identify alternative sources of guidance and support, via peers in other agencies. This has included obtaining briefs or updates from other agencies on the changing political landscape and political developments, including updates on UN Security Council discussions. These sources of information, readily available to representatives from sister UN agencies, were found to be invaluable to FAORs to help navigate and negotiate a challenging and dynamic political environment.

215. At corporate level FAO has not developed policies nor practical guidance for FAORs working in such contexts. The support received was often on problem shooting day-to-day operational issues, such as UN vehicle registrations, paying traffic fines or general building and staffing issues with the host government, but this was limited and at times even counterproductive without adequate awareness of the realities on the ground. Interviews with personnel of other UN agencies provided a stark contrast in terms of the thinking, guidance and support their organizations offer their senior leadership in such contexts that is simply not available to FAORs.

216. FAO’s competency framework details as its leadership competencies: i) results focus; ii) leading, engaging and empowering others; iii) communication; iv) partnering and advocating; v) knowledge sharing; and vi) continuous improvement and strategic thinking. It also details its first competency as a commitment to FAO and the Organization. When compared this with the competencies of the United Nations System Leadership Framework, the FAO focus is more internal and institutional and less outward looking and inspiring. It is interesting for example, that there is no mention of the UN family overall and the shared values of the Charter. This begs as to whether FAO values differ from those of the UN values.

217. Currently there is insufficient recognition amongst FAO senior managers that the HDP nexus is a corporate dimension, and it should be the shared as well as the individual responsibility of all personnel. This is due to lack of training, knowledge sharing, support, incentives and guidance. Supported by the UN leadership framework, it is important that FAO builds its HDP leadership profiles and capacities at all levels. It can build on a number of elements of its work that are already taking place.

i. At the global level, FAO is recognized as a technical broker and host of platforms for global dialogue, standard setting and agreements. FAO is expected to provide impartial advice based on evidence and science. As analyzed in previous chapters, this positive reputational profile can be used to bring parties in conflicts to the table around the resolution of
technical issues, for the mutual benefit of all parties and in a win-win model. This capacity for technical diplomacy is currently used on an ad hoc basis and depends on the decisions of individual managers.

ii. The evaluation interviewed a number of partners (including resident and humanitarian coordinators) requesting FAO to take a more active leadership role at the country level on the coordination and co-creation of knowledge and programmes in the areas of food security and nutrition and NRM across the HDP nexus.

6.3 Funding mechanisms and flows

218. As part of the World Humanitarian Summit Grand Bargain commitments, one of the most significant calls was for enhanced quality funding, through an increase in collaborative humanitarian multi-year funding and a reduction in the earmarking of contributions, with streamlined reporting requirements. The HDP reference documents, in particular the UNSDCF Companion Piece for Humanitarian Development Peace Collaboration (IASC, 2020c) builds on this, by promoting the development of country-based multi-partner financial strategies against collective outcomes, the use of pooled funds, regional facilities, global mechanisms and other innovative forms of finance inclusive of the private sector as well as of local actors and organizations and with a strong attention to gender equality and women’s empowerment.

Finding 30. The current internal funding model in FAO, despite having made progress in certain areas, is still not fit to support the integration of FAO in this new financing landscape. The impermeable divisions between Regular Programme (RP) and extra-budgetary resources, the short-term emergency and longer-term development funding, the earmarking and fixed allocations to the national level do not allow for, nor incentivize up-front and no regrets investments by country offices. These are all setbacks for FAO to become an agile and effective player promoting HDP ways of working.

Finding 31. FAO can build on some promising practices and experiences that promote HDP ways of working, highlighted in this evaluation, with a view of bringing them to scale and institutionalizing them at the corporate level. However, the low number of personnel with strong resource mobilization experience as well as perceptions from some resource partners that FAO is not very cost-effective can be constraining factors to making this happen.

219. In 2019, FAO led (jointly with UNDP and NRC) a study for the IASC on Financing the Nexus (FAO, NRC & UNDP, 2019). This important study sets out some of the current weaknesses in the financial drivers, the disincentives amongst humanitarian partners, as well as the difficulties in coordinating financial strategies across humanitarian and development actors. Key points from this study are:

i. There are major gaps in coordination and disincentives to coordinate across the nexus. This is particularly true for development partners who have limited incentives to allocate resources to support a collectively agreed plan, which is not clearly endorsed by the partner government.

ii. Humanitarian coordination is broadly accepted as a public good that is worth the cost. There are also financial incentives to participate in coordination. Projects are more likely to be funded through country-based pooled funds and by certain bilateral donors if visible in the humanitarian response plan.

iii. Recovery and resilience often fall between coordination systems. Humanitarian clusters often end up coordinating some of these activities even if they are not included in humanitarian response plans, because they are frequently the best platforms for information sharing and joint planning. Some United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks have included recovery, resilience and social cohesion activities, but in practice a large proportion of such activities take place outside the UN system.
The increased focus on countries as the entry point for funding strategies and resource mobilization needs to be seen by FAO as an opportunity. Internally it can bring together its development and humanitarian arms around the development of blended and integrated HDP financing. This would entail overcoming the internal division of funding streams and roles. The evaluation has picked up some positive progress in this respect from country offices such as Somalia, South Sudan, Afghanistan and Pakistan but it was not possible to assess the extent and effectiveness of these. In Yemen, OCHA will no longer allocate pooled funds to FAO as they do not trust them to deliver on time (FAO, n.d., footnote 60 page 26). In cases where FAO manages to have a more coherent advocacy and communication strategy, the Organization is also well placed to lead on the financing of the entire sector or area of work. This seems to be the case for the desert locust response, where FAO’s advocacy and fund-raising strategy have benefited the collaborative action across a number of partners.

Other positive examples that can be considered as advancing FAO towards a more coherent and flexible financing model are:

i. Programmes or mechanisms which make available funds for preparatory and design phases, such as the GAFSP or the GEF.

ii. Global, regional and national multi-donor funding facilities (such as the GNFC, the Madad Fund, the UN Peacebuilding Support Office) and country-based UN pooled funds, that encourage multi-partner alliances and coordination based on comparative advantages.

iii. Funding streams, tools and mechanisms for funding anticipatory action and early warning (e.g. emergency Technical Cooperation Programmes) as well as no-regrets up-front investments for crisis response (SFERA, CERF).

iv. Multi-year predictable funding for resilience (CIDA, SIDA, the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development [DG DEVCO]).

v. Converging funding flows for thematic areas such as climate change, food chain crises, resilience, migration and displacement.

vi. Support to the delivery of national programmes under the national implementation modalities and support to IFIs investments and loans to governments and regional ones with the RECs.

vii. Rationalization and more equitable balance in utilization of funds and cost-saving strategies through stronger partnership arrangements (OPIM, use of RBA shared services, use of WFP/UNICEF platforms for cash transfer modalities).

viii. Financing alliances with the private sector, foundations, research entities, South-South cooperation, stand-by partnerships and other forms of innovative modalities.

Many of the examples above are broader than the nexus approach but the requirements to deliver across the HDP nexus can provide a useful entry point to ensure that the strategic direction drives the investment and financing (and not the other way around); that there is a more systematic shift to programmatic approaches and mechanisms; and that FAO manages to supersede the current financial business model, to be less risk-averse and to reach impact and results at scale.

### Flexibility and adaptiveness

The programmatic aspects of flexibility and adaptiveness have been covered in section 5. This section provides a brief analysis of some of the factors identified as significant to support flexibility and adaptiveness to address the HDP nexus:

i. What the Organization currently puts in place as surge capacity in countries covered by system-wide scale up declarations, is not sufficient to support the operational and management needs of crisis response, especially in conflict areas as evidenced by the OER vision document (Towards a new OER – June 2020). Fast-track procedures are how all
organizational performance across the nexus

procedures for all projects and programmes (whether emergency or development) should be handled. In a number of countries, surge has been used to fill minimum gaps in programming and operational capacity that should already be in place. Some critical functions such as monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning, advocacy and programme development are put in place only after funding is secured rather than upfront. These are needed at the start and should be part of recurrent costs of FAO’s operations at country level in order to strengthen the strategic positioning of FAO and the closely connected aspects of resource mobilization.

ii. Risk assessment and risk management are a fundamental requirement for all aspects of FAO’s work, not just in fragile and conflict contexts. If used well and managed at the team level, sound risk management approaches enable flexibility, mitigate risks at various levels, support duty of care and ultimately allow nimble and agile re-programming to safeguard development gains as well as to ensure more tailored humanitarian action. The evaluation found a number of country representatives and personnel sharing their experience and knowledge in this domain but all this wealth of experience is not widely shared or turned into explicit and systematic practice. The current systems in place are based on ex-ante controls that make processes slow and heavy, rather than based on trust and accountability, with ex-post controls. One case in point which is of key importance for the HDP, are the current tools for partnership with NGOs and civil society on the ground (LOAs and OPIM) which make it difficult to operationalize equitable and balanced partnership agreements.

iii. The emergency division has put in place the FAO Emergency Response Preparedness Plan (FERPP) assessments in a number of countries but taking action and finding solutions to increase capacities is a constant challenge, also due to the reluctance of many donors to put in place the necessary flexibility. Guidance has also been produced on external risk assessments to support the CPFs as well as on tools and processes to design flexible programmes, with the agreement of resource partners. While some progress has been made in this area, it is still far from being fully institutionalized.

iv. Many respondents pointed to the dominant culture in FAO of administrative and operational support which tend to react with red lines and vetoes to innovative ways of working. Many pointed to the fact that when presenting innovative activities or partnership modalities to units in charge of common services, the initial reaction is how it can’t be done as opposed to searching for a solution. FAO does not have the ‘can do’ attitude that is needed for HDP approach. This situation is compounded by a fair degree of headquarters-centric culture that does not fully capture or understand the full nature of the challenges faced by field offices.

6.5 Mindsets and working cultures

Finding 32. Working across the HDP nexus requires an enabling environment, where the corporate working culture of the Organization and personnel mindsets and skillsets are key. The evaluation identified a number of recurrent issues that were flagged as constraints, as well as a number of team and individual profiles that were considered as having the right mindsets to support the HDP nexus. Key informants repeatedly pointed to the need to have an explicit reflection and formalization process on what is required to deliver on the HDP nexus at the corporate level.

224. The greatest frustration amongst FAO personnel interviewed pinpointed lack of collaboration and information sharing as one of the main issues constraining ways of working. In addition, there is still a lingering dualistic vision of the humanitarian and development mandates of the

48 A number of evaluations have evidenced this point, especially for a number of innovative designs around durable solutions and safe energy for refugees.
Organization that does not always facilitate joined vision, strategies and corporate efforts. Across these two domains, the peace and conflict components of the work are seen as belonging more to the humanitarian and resilience teams, while personnel working on development programmes are more reluctant in recognizing their actual or potential contributions. As one deputy FAOR put it: “We do HDP nexus intuitively. It is not very well known in the UN and/or FAO. We don’t have a full understanding of the concept, even though we do apply it throughout our projects and activities.”

225. This internal feature of the FAO working culture is compounded by similar characteristics of the UN and aid sector in general, where the humanitarian, the development and the peace architectures remain by and large distinct and, despite the systems’ efforts to coordinate across the HDP nexus, there is still a significant degree of competition between actors, levels and modalities.

226. The evaluation found a number of personnel, working in a range of capacities, who were regarded as ‘trilingual’, i.e. familiar with the three pillars of the humanitarian, development and peace components across aid. But by and large, these are a minority in the Organization and their skillsets in this domain are not explicitly recognized. The evaluation also found some examples of high capacity in terms of systems thinking, but these are not widespread and are more common in FAO’s analytical, policy and upstream work rather than on the programmatic side.

227. In general, FAO personnel are required to be more oriented towards compliance rather than encouraged to analyse, test, pilot and reflect both at an individual level and in teams around what is working and what is not and thus encouraging innovation and flexibility to achieve better results. Belonging to a specific team, especially for young employees and national personnel, entails not being given the opportunity to interact, contribute and share with others and to strengthen corporate reflection and learning. The focus remains on delivery rather than on results and what it takes to make them sustainable and inclusive.

228. The knowledge management and learning initiatives, despite their efforts, have not managed to tip the balance in favour of a more dynamic and learning Organization. The HDP approach requires all of the elements analysed in this chapter to be in place. It needs to transcend technical or operational expertise, to combine them with soft skills in terms of understanding the context, ensuring inclusion and participation and managing dialogue and negotiations around sometimes complex or potentially politically risky areas of work.

229. The points above can be illustrated by the experience of the team in the Philippines regarding the hiring of national personnel. They described an explicit decision by the senior managers of the country office to hire personnel originating from different parts of the country. Having personnel originally from Mindanao, who understood the context and could use this to navigate the complexities of the context, was described as fundamental to be able to operate successful programmes in this area. Similar observations were found in Somalia and the Syrian Arab Republic. By contrast, interviews highlighted a number of country offices in conflict areas, where the homogeneity of national personnel composition and the absence of sub-national offices and permanent personnel in certain geographic areas were found to limit the capacities of coverage of the Organization as well as adding a possible bias to programmatic decisions.

49 The definition of trilingualism is borrowed from Rachel Scott, UNDP HDP advisor and used during her presentation in the P2P Webinar “IASC Light Guidance on Collective Outcomes: Humanitarian – Development – Peace Collaboration in the Context of Protracted Crises”:

50 While some of the evidence for this statement cannot be referred to explicitly, this was a finding in FAO, n.d.h.
230. While this is a delicate and complex area to address explicitly, it explains well how the ‘soft’ components of the corporate working culture and mind-sets are critical to navigate the political economy of the contexts in which FAO is working, and may be key in navigating the nexus and its conflict/peace dimension. To conclude, reform requires changes in mindsets and a new value system demonstrated in new ways of working to foster a more consistent corporate culture around the nexus.

231. While the HDP was not framed as a priority area for FAO at the higher and cross-cutting corporate levels during the 2013–2020 Strategic Framework cycle, the evaluation notes that the current Director General and the preliminary proposals on the New Strategic Framework intend to project this as a key dimension of FAO’s corporate vision and commitments, relevant to, and an area of corporate responsibility, not just for the humanitarian teams in FAO but for the entire Organization and its leadership at the global, regional and national levels. This is an opportunity to address some of the constraints described above.
7. Conclusions and recommendations

7.1 Conclusions

232. There is currently little shared understanding amongst FAO personnel of what the broad-ranging HDP nexus means, nor of its implications for the Organization. The completion of this evaluation is an opportunity to clarify what the HDP nexus means to FAO, and to reiterate its relevance to FAO. There are many different dimensions to the HDP nexus as revealed in the burgeoning literature on the topic. What it means for an individual UN agency, like FAO, has to be unpacked, and to some extent customized. The evaluation reveals widely varying understanding of the HDP nexus and perceptions of its relevance amongst FAO personnel, including senior management. However, the commitment of FAO’s most senior leadership to all three components of the HDP nexus, and to connecting them, is clear and has gained momentum in 2019–2020. The range of different interpretations of FAO’s mandate does however point to the need for a clear corporate statement on the HDP nexus, emphasizing that this is about ways of working with examples of what that looks like for FAO programming drawing on some of the examples quoted in this evaluation, while also clarifying what it is definitely not, i.e. a new brand of projects or programmes labelled as ‘HDP’.

Conclusion 1. The evaluation concludes that the HDP nexus is highly relevant to FAO in its drive to end hunger, recognising that development is not a purely technical process, and common drivers of conflict relate directly to FAO’s mandate, particularly around natural resource management, land and water. FAO has an important role to play in what this evaluation terms ‘technical diplomacy’ and in promoting a rights-based approach to development.

233. It has a comparative advantage in bringing governments and their technical institutions to the table, using its technical mandate as an entry point, to address common technical challenges such as pest infestation and livestock disease and food security analysis where conflict is a key driver of chronic and acute food insecurity. This is relevant in both fragile states and in more stable contexts. There are a number of positive examples of FAO playing this role, most recently in the desert locust response. This role of technical diplomacy is particularly important where governments may be otherwise hostile to each other. The significance of this role needs to be more fully acknowledged, and regional and country-level leadership better supported to fulfil it. FAO also has a key role in ensuring the systematic use of existing rights-based tools and instruments that relate to its mandate, e.g. Right to Food, VGGT and CCRF, further indication that development is more than a purely technical process.

Conclusion 2. Although there is evidence of more systemic thinking in FAO, there is scope for greater linking of the humanitarian and development components of the HDP nexus, and the need for greater commitment and consistency in FAO’s humanitarian offer and programming between countries. FAO’s corporate commitment to sustaining peace is relatively recent, although the contribution of FAO’s rights-based legal instruments, such as the VGGT, are an important precursor. There are positive examples of the difference the corporate framework has made, e.g. in carrying out context/conflict analysis, but much work is still to be done to embed this commitment within the Organization and to move beyond one-off good practice examples.

234. Taking the institutional dimension of the HDP nexus, there is evidence that FAO, which has had a long history of a somewhat siloed way of working, has made some progress in breaking down those siloes, especially on the development side. There are stronger connections between different technical areas, evidence of greater inter-disciplinarity, and examples of more systemic ways of thinking. Although the Organization has made some progress in strengthening linkages...
between the humanitarian and development components of its work, it still has a long way to go despite this having been a long-term ambition encouraged by the 2014 crisis transition evaluation. FAO’s resilience programming has played a part, but the Organization’s high-level ambivalence to the emergency response component of the resilience programme, until recently, has held it back. This has also resulted in inconsistent programming at country level in terms of the scale of its humanitarian programming. The lack of connection between the humanitarian component and the development component of the nexus is evident on the information side, for example, where there are weak linkages between data collection and analysis of short-term acute food insecurity, and data collection and analysis of trends for longer-term chronic food insecurity analysis.

235. An explicit commitment to the peace component of the HDP nexus is new for FAO, with the publication of the ‘Corporate Framework to support sustainable peace in the context of Agenda 2030’ in 2018. Although FAO has a long experience in working on conflict management at local level around NRM and has made an important contribution to policy and legal frameworks through the rights-based voluntary instruments it has developed (on land, fisheries and forestry), the Corporate Framework to support sustainable peace in the Context of Agenda 2030 makes a clear case for FAO to engage more fully with conflict in order to contribute to peace. Much work is still to be done, however, to ensure this commitment is embedded in the Organization, that all FAO personnel buy into it, and that they have the knowledge and skills to make it a reality in terms of programming and policy level work. The Conflict and Peace Unit has played an important role in helping to position FAO globally in some key conversations, for example within the IASC, but the positioning and engagement of FAO country offices is much weaker; they require substantial support. There are now some strong examples of conflict and context analysis carried out by FAO, but these tend to be one-offs. The Conflict and Peace Unit does not have sufficient resources to cover the needs despite having made very significant progress with what it had. Conflict and context analyses are not yet happening as a regular and frequent process, nor adequately informing programming on an ongoing basis.

Conclusion 3. FAO’s presence and strategic positioning on the HDP nexus at the New York City and Geneva levels has been undervalued and must be stepped up. At the global level, FAO has broadened its partnerships in ways that contribute to the HDP nexus, through multi-stakeholder initiatives and with other UN agencies, for example the Global Network against Food Crises, but often these do not translate into strategic partnerships at regional and country levels. At the regional and country levels, HDP ways of working mean extending FAO’s relationship with government beyond the ministries of agriculture, and more strategic partnerships with the RECs. At country level, collective outcomes are key to operationalising the HDP nexus, aligned to the SDGs; FAO’s engagement must be stepped up.

236. At global level, FAO’s presence and influence in high-level discussions and debates around the HDP nexus is inconsistent and not commensurate with the scale, scope and relevance of the Organization. The informal briefings by FAO’s Director General to the UN Secretariat and thereby the UN Security Council on food security in crisis has given FAO’s work visibility. It now needs to build on this to more fully and strategically engage in wider debates, particularly at the New York City and Geneva levels, bringing its knowledge and evidence base on agricultural livelihoods and the agriculture sector. Achieving the latter requires a strengthened and more learning-oriented approach to M&E across all countries and with greater investment in action research, to better inform programming as well as policy debates.

237. Aligning to the HDP nexus means working in partnership, across the humanitarian, development, peace spectrum. FAO’s record of strategic partnerships that contribute to HDP nexus ways of
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working are strongest at the global level, particularly around food security analysis, for example the GNFC. So far this is mostly with the ‘usual suspects’, with UN and other agencies engaged in food security monitoring and programming. Expanding these strategic partnerships, i) to ensure existing partnerships and networks are more inclusive and encompass a range of voices, and ii) reaching out to more ‘unusual’ partners, particularly peace actors, will be important for FAO to fully engage with the HDP nexus. The partnership with Interpeace is a good example of how partnerships can strengthen FAO’s capability to engage with conflict/peace dynamics. Replicating this kind of partnership at regional and country levels could accelerate FAO’s ability to engage with the peace component of the nexus where increasing capability is a priority.

238. FAO’s partnerships at regional and country level in support of HDP nexus ways of working are generally weaker, with some exceptions. Indeed, strategic partnerships forged at the global level often do not translate into country level. In countries, partnerships tend to be more ad hoc and project-driven. The last Strategic Framework encouraged FAO to engage with government beyond the ministries of agriculture: this is essential to pursue nexus ways of working. FAO’s relationship with RECs is critical to regional transboundary work but is too often driven by individual projects than by strategy. Opportunities to forge strategic partnerships with international and national NGOs and civil society organizations are severely constrained by the dominance of the contractual service provision arrangement that FAO has with these actors.

239. In a few countries, FAO is actively engaging in collective outcome processes. This needs to be stepped up, recognising the contribution FAO has to make on agriculture, food security and livelihoods. As far as possible, FAO’s new Strategic Framework and its CPFs must complement and be coherent with collective outcomes. If not, as is currently the case, country offices end up working to parallel frameworks that are not necessarily consistent.

Conclusion 4. If FAO is to fulfil its corporate commitment to sustain peace and work in challenging conflict environments it must be better equipped to do so. The evaluation has exposed fundamental weaknesses in the Organization’s fitness-for-purpose to work in challenging and highly politicized conflict environments and fragile states.

240. FAO’s senior leadership in-country in contentious conflict contexts is inadequately supported, not least in managing the relationship with government which may be party to the conflict, in day-to-day decision-making, and in ongoing analysis of the political economy and conflict dynamics. FAO’s support systems for in-country leadership are poor in comparison with those of its sister UN agencies where there is a much stronger sense that ‘the agency has your back’. Further evidence of FAO’s weakness in this area is the absence of a protection policy and the absence of a corporate statement of FAO’s commitment to humanitarian principles. Strengthening FAO’s positioning and presence at the New York City and Geneva levels, as described above, is also important: to promote the two-way flow of information and analysis between this level and country offices.

Conclusion 5. The inclusive ‘putting local people and actors at the centre’ dimension of the HDP nexus is an opportunity for FAO to re-evaluate and promote its participatory approaches, not only to development but also in its humanitarian and conflict management work. The HDP nexus offers an opportunity for transformational work on gender equity, but this requires mainstreaming gender in FAO’s context/conflict analysis work.

241. FAO’s participatory approaches originate from the development side of its work, and range from farmer field schools, Dimitra Clubs and participatory area-based approaches. To some extent, these approaches have been picked up in its humanitarian work and its programming in fragile states and provided positive results. They are highly relevant to HDP nexus ways of working in
terms of understanding, systemically, the needs and rights of local people and communities and the context in which they are living. However, such participatory approaches tend to be fragmented and on a small-scale. If they were to be promoted consistently and scaled up and integrated into broader interventions, they could play an important role in operationalising the HDP nexus at programming level, including supporting the conflict and peace component. This would require engaging local people and local actors in the design phase as well as implementation. It would also require a more systemic and strategic approach to targeting that takes the whole community into account, no longer driven by narrow project objectives but by the wider dynamics within and among communities. This is critical to avoid narrow targeting criteria that, if poorly thought through, can fuel grievances and tension within and between communities.

242. Connected HDP nexus programming could play a transformational role in delivering gender equality and empowerment, especially if a sufficiently long-term perspective is adopted. FAO’s record in this respect appears mixed. While some short-term PBF projects have particularly targeted women in an effort to strengthen their role in peacebuilding, FAO’s guidance materials on context/conflict analysis tend to approach gender through the lens of gender-based violence rather than also promoting the role of women as active agents of peace. In turn, FAO’s country gender assessments are mostly conflict-blind. FAO has a rich seam of guidance and tools on integrating gender through rights-based approaches, such as VGGTs and the gender and land portal that could be drawn upon to support mainstreaming a gender and peace dimension in FAO’s programmes. Other aspects of intersectionality, for example age, must be better covered. This and other issues should be addressed through FAO’s forthcoming Protection Policy.

Conclusion 6. Addressing some of FAO’s well-known organizational constraints, of being procedure-heavy and risk averse are critical to creating an enabling environment for HDP nexus ways of working. In addition, there is important work to be done empowering and fostering effective leadership, especially at country level; promoting more flexible programmatic funding models over short-term projects; building flexibility and adaptiveness into programming; and addressing the organizational culture in FAO, encouraging and incentivising dialogue across disciplines, breaking down silos and encouraging broad systems-thinking mindsets.

243. Some of FAO’s organizational constraints are repeatedly highlighted in evaluations, and fundamentally affect its ability to operationalise the HDP nexus. Addressing these constraints will enhance its appeal and performance as a strategic partner. In addition, the evaluation draws attention to four specific areas to be addressed to ensure FAO is fit for purpose to play a leadership role and to be a committed partner in delivering the SDGs in ways that are aligned to the HDP nexus.

244. The first is effective and empowered leadership. The UN leadership framework calls for principled and visionary leadership. This requires clarification within FAO, particularly in conflict environments in terms of adherence to humanitarian principles while working closely with government, and in terms of clarifying FAO’s corporate commitment to the HDP nexus. Empowering leadership at country level to promote an HDP way of working also means strengthening brokering and consensus-building skills, for example to effectively play a technical diplomacy role. Hiring leaders with the necessary skillset and vision is critical.

245. Second, flexible and adaptive management and programming are essential to HDP ways of working. This requires regular risk scanning and monitoring at country level and designing projects and programmes so that flexibility and adaptiveness are built in and agreed in advance with donors. Fast-track procedures should become the norm rather than the exception,
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incentivising innovation, adaptability and a ‘can do’ attitude. There are examples of such ways of working within FAO, that offer valuable learning, but once again, these are the exception rather than the norm. At a minimum, FAO must mirror the agility of its sister UN agencies.

246. Third, FAO’s funding models with impermeable divisions between different types of funding for different programming purposes (for example, short-term emergency versus longer-term development funding) are currently barriers to more flexible, agile and integrated ways of programming. There are a number of examples within FAO of more flexible funding models, particularly where these represent a shift from the project to programme approach and funding. These must become the norm rather than the exception.

247. Fourth, HDP ways of working require systems-oriented ways of thinking, an ability to navigate complex ideas, and spaces and dialogue that brings colleagues together across disciplines and across the aid architecture. While there are pockets of such ways of thinking and working within FAO, the dominant working culture and mindset does not meet these requirements. It tends to be more driven by FAO’s internal procedures and compliance-oriented, than by curiosity and a hunger for knowledge about the context and for evidence of what is working and what is not. While there has been some breaking down of silos, there is still a long way to go.

7.2 Recommendations

Recommendation 1. The HDP nexus must be ‘institutionally anchored’ in FAO so that it becomes a well understood and used approach at the corporate level in all locations, both fragile states and more stable contexts. This will require an acceleration and change in the organizational culture and acquired knowledge of the Organization so as not to remain the limited remit of a few dedicated units and country teams in crises contexts. Such a change will need to happen through clear leadership, support and messaging from senior managers complemented by a number of practical actions, as follows:

i. Ensuring the HDP approach is well reflected across the relevant areas of the new Strategic Framework, currently under development. This should be embedded across outcomes and programmatic components and not ‘isolated’ as the sole remit of resilience and emergency domains, making the case that this is relevant for stable contexts as well.

ii. Joining other UN agencies in signing up to the OECD-DAC Recommendation on the nexus. Although this is not legally binding, it is a clear statement of intent, and provides a useful set of standards for HDP nexus ways of working against which FAO can continue to monitor its progress, and be peer-reviewed, and a platform for discussion between donor governments and UN agencies on the HDP nexus.

iii. With a corporate position paper that clearly states this is an organizational commitment, setting out what HDP nexus ways of working mean to FAO (and what the nexus is not, i.e. not a new brand of projects or programmes), peppered with illustrations from lessons across countries and regions of what HDP nexus ways of working look like in practice.

iv. Restate FAO’s commitment to humanitarian action as part of its mandate, ensuring that this is well understood by all personnel and clarifying FAO’s commitment to humanitarian principles, accompanied by guidance for programme personnel on how to manage this while working in partnership with national governments.

v. Creating space for discussion and dialogue to bring together FAO colleagues working on the humanitarian, development and peace components of the nexus, to explore how their work can be more complementary. These could be organized around particular thematic areas for which an HDP nexus lens is particularly relevant to keep it grounded, such as social protection, food security monitoring and natural resource management.
vi. A Director General bulletin or internal guidance outlining responsibilities, authority and commitments in terms of both strategic positioning and programmatic work at country level and the necessary support requirements for all the other subsidiary levels.

vii. Developing and implementing a communication strategy for FAO personnel, based on the position paper and Director General bulletin, to support their understanding of the HDP nexus and its relevance to FAO, for example through webinars, learning from its work so far and building expertise to do so.

**Recommendation 2. As a matter of priority, FAO must take urgent steps to become truly ‘fit for purpose’ to work in challenging and highly politicized conflict environments and fragile states.** This includes:

i. Stepping up, prioritizing and institutionalizing support to senior leadership at country level. This must be provided at a high-level (e.g. Assistant Director-General/Deputy Director-General level), fully conversant with the context, and readily available.

ii. Learning more systematically from FAO’s experiences (positive and negative) of navigating its relationship with government in such contexts, developing guidance for in-country senior leadership.

iii. Increasing FAO’s capacity to carry out regular context/conflict and risk analysis to support senior leadership in-country (see also recommendation 4).

iv. Formulating and rolling out a protection policy to guide FAO’s work, especially in conflict environments and fragile states.

v. Strengthening FAO’s presence and engagement in high-level discussions and decision-making at the New York City and Geneva levels, with increased resourcing and personnel experienced in working across the HDP nexus, contributing evidence on the linkages between food security, NRM, livelihoods and peace. This can foster a systematic two-way flow of information, from country level to feed FAO experience and knowledge into high-level debates and decision-making, and from New York and Geneva back to country level to ensure FAO country offices are fully informed of decisions and analysis that relate to the contexts in which they are working.

vi. Supporting country offices to engage in their areas of technical expertise (e.g. land rights) with the big ‘P’ actors, such as UN peacebuilding missions by sharing guidance derived from FAO’s participation in the UNSDG Task Team on Transitions and Peacebuilding and the Peacebuilding Contact Group as well as additional guidance that could be derived from examples from other UN Agencies, and learning from examples of FAO’s successful engagement with big ‘P’ actors.

**Recommendation 3. FAO must strengthen its partnerships at all levels – global, regional and country levels – so it is better able to engage in HDP nexus ways of working with humanitarian, development and peace actors.** In particular:

i. Broadening its partnerships on food security monitoring, resilience measurement, early warning/risk analysis and anticipatory action, to include a more diverse range of actors that ensure the analysis includes perspectives of affected people as well as more quantitative measurements, and explore underlying structural causes.

ii. With the private sector such as national and international companies investing and engaged in agriculture, especially in fragile states. promoting ‘Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems’ in ways that reduce conflict and contribute to peace.

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iii. Stepping up strategic partnerships with academic and research institutes at global, regional and country levels, to strengthen action research in order to build a credible and rigorous evidence base, for internal FAO learning and to feed into and inform higher level discussions and debate.

iv. With RECs, guided by longer-term partnership strategies that promote linkages across the nexus, from programming to policy levels.

v. Exploring more ‘unusual’ partnerships at regional and country levels that can support and strengthen FAO’s engagement with the peace component, in the way that Interpeace has done at the global level. FAO should map civil society organizations and networks engaged in contributing to peace (such as the Comités Locaux de Paix in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders or West Africa Network for Peacebuilding).

**Recommendation 4.** In order to ensure that FAO’s work at country level matches its global ambitions, the Organization must strengthen its understanding of, and ability to engage in context/conflict analysis and conflict-sensitive programming, paying attention to intersectionality and including risk and food insecurity analysis beyond (but including) conflict analysis. This means:

i. Adapting FAO’s guidance materials on context/conflict analysis to promote intersectional analysis and a more holistic understanding of the gendered dimension.

ii. Building capacity on context/conflict analysis (see recommendation 3 above), investment to build capacity in conflict sensitive programming, and programming to manage conflict and sustain peace, especially at country and regional levels. This should be supported through strategic partnerships, as recommended above.

iii. Strengthening the linkages between data collection and analysis of short-term acute food insecurity with data collection and analysis of longer-term chronic food insecurity, deepening understanding of the structural causes of food insecurity, and analysis of conflict as a major driver of food insecurity.

iv. Strengthening and mainstreaming context/conflict analysis in its anticipatory action work.

v. Creating a cross-cutting group as a community of practice, to pull together the different initiatives within FAO that explicitly address conflict, the different resources available, and to promote networking between them.

vi. FAO needs to move beyond the ‘proof of concept’ phase found in many of its conflict-sensitive projects to substantially scale up, built on solid reflection and learning.

**Recommendation 5.** FAO needs to promote and incentivize people-centred approaches as a critical way of linking its humanitarian and development programmatic work, ensuring that the technical entry points of its interventions are conflict-sensitive and where relevant contribute to sustaining peace. These need to be reflected from strategy frameworks through programme approaches and design to the end results. How to strengthen the HDP dimension in strategies and information analysis have been addressed in Recommendation 3. FAO must strengthen HDP ways of working across the programme cycle in the following ways:

i. Ensure that conflict, context and food security and resilience analysis and data are systematically used not just at the design stage of programmes but throughout implementation of activities on the ground.

ii. Ensure that the design of interventions is conducted in consultation with local actors and partners and that it is underpinned by a collaboratively generated theory of change and identification of shared objectives.

iii. Re-think targeting approaches to make them more inclusive as well as diversified, reconsidering the narrow focus on vulnerability in favor of a more strategic approach that includes activities that may contribute to strengthening all aspects of food systems at the local level.
iv. Conduct a review of FAO’s range of participatory approaches across regions and countries, sharing experiences and the factors that contribute to good practice, to systematize approaches and to facilitate scale-up.

v. Ensure that programme cycles are supported by learning and outcome monitoring that are proactively used to flexibly manage and adapt activities to ensure optimal results, react to new risks and crises and protect development gains.

vi. Strengthen the design and implementation of regional and cross-border programmes by better supporting coordination and collaborative work across country offices and with regional partners.

In addition, the technical/sectoral areas of FAO’s programmes should identify and develop guidance on the progressive levels of addressing the peace dimension, across humanitarian and development interventions. These should range from a minimum ‘do no harm’ and conflict sensitivity requirements to proactive and explicit activities focused on contributing to sustaining peace. Some examples include:

i. Develop a companion conflict safeguard to the environmental and social safeguards.

ii. Systematize conflict-sensitivity as well as contributions to sustaining peace in GEF and other climate-related programmes to address climate justice issues.

iii. Stress social cohesion as an important element/entry point in working with social protection programming.

iv. Develop lessons-based practical HDP guidance for pastoralism, animal health, fisheries, water, forced displacement, crops and other sectoral interventions.

v. Promote the role of women and youth as peacebuilders whenever possible, developing their potential as positive agents of change, not just as victims of violence.

**Recommendation 6. Creating an enabling organizational environment for HDP nexus ways of working.** This includes:

i. Clarifying what principled leadership means to FAO, fostering and empowering leadership at country level, that is sufficiently externally-focused to develop strategic partnerships across the HDP nexus, and that is well-skilled to engage in technical diplomacy.

ii. Shifting from a project to a programme approach, with adaptiveness and flexibility built in from the design stage, supported by informed risk assessments, and flexible financing negotiated with donors.

iii. Engaging with UN-wide initiatives that encourage HDP ways of working, for example, common guidance on resilience and collective outcomes. FAO could also learn from the experience of some of its sister UN agencies, such as WFP or UNICEF, as they promote and adopt nexus ways of working.

iv. Promoting a working culture that incentivizes and rewards innovative and reflective programming, and a ‘can do’ attitude, re-balancing the current default of compliance.

v. Carrying out a light skills assessment to inform a skills-building programme that fosters systems-thinking, inter-disciplinarity, consensus building and partnership-brokering, to promote nexus ways of working.
References


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Bibliography


## Appendix 1. People interviewed

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### FAO country and regional offices

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**External stakeholders**

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<td>Marjolaine</td>
<td>UN Humanitarian Coordinator’s Office – Iraq</td>
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<td>Caroline</td>
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<td>Iris</td>
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Appendix 2: Summary of the HDP nexus, as presented in the three reference documents used for this evaluation

Appendix Table 1. Evaluation framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme and relevant evaluation question</th>
<th>Evaluation sub-questions the theme relates to (see Appendix 4)</th>
<th>Way of working</th>
<th>Type of evaluation that theme is relevant to</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Conceptual, policy, strategy and planning frameworks EQs 1 &amp; 2 below</td>
<td>EQs 1.1.1 &amp; 1.1.2</td>
<td>1.1 Integration and alignment of frameworks across the HDP nexus</td>
<td>Global, thematic, country</td>
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<td>1.2 Policy and normative guidance that addresses HDP nexus</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Data collection, analysis &amp; information EQs 3 &amp; 4 below</td>
<td>EQ 2.1.1</td>
<td>2.1 Regular context, conflict &amp; risk analysis</td>
<td>All</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.2 Investing in learning and evidence across HDP actions: i) through M&amp;E ii) through action research</td>
<td>Thematic, country, programme</td>
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<td>3. Coordination EQs 3 &amp; 4 below</td>
<td>EQs 2.1.5 &amp; 1.1.3</td>
<td>3.1 Leadership and advocacy to promote the nexus</td>
<td>Thematic, country</td>
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<td>4. Programme EQs 3 &amp; 4 below</td>
<td>EQ 2.1.2</td>
<td>4.1 Joined-up planning and programming: i) at country level ii) at project and programme level</td>
<td>Country, programme</td>
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<td></td>
<td>EQs 2.1.4 &amp; 1.1.4</td>
<td>4.2 Partnerships across the HDP nexus</td>
<td>Global, country, thematic, programme</td>
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<td>EQ 2.1.3</td>
<td>4.3 Putting people and local actors at the centre</td>
<td>Country, programme</td>
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<td>5. Organizational enabling &amp; constraining factors EQs 5 &amp; 6 below</td>
<td>EQ 3.1.1</td>
<td>5.1 Leadership within FAO promoting the nexus</td>
<td>All</td>
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<td>EQ 3.1.2</td>
<td>5.2 Adaptive and flexible programme management</td>
<td>Country, programme</td>
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<td>EQ 3.1.3</td>
<td>5.3 Finance and funding flows</td>
<td>All</td>
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<td></td>
<td>EQ 3.1.4</td>
<td>5.4 Mindset and working culture</td>
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NB EQ 2.1.6 - identifying good practice, is relevant across all the ways of working in the evaluation framework, especially (4) Programme.
### Appendix Table 2. Mini case studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case study</th>
<th>Geographical region</th>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Relevant themes (with reference to eight thematic areas selected for the evaluation)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>• Recurrent natural disasters, exacerbated by climate change&lt;br&gt;• Conflict (Mindanao)&lt;br&gt;• Strong government</td>
<td>• Resilience&lt;br&gt;• Climate change&lt;br&gt;• Food security&lt;br&gt;• Social protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>• Protracted conflict crisis&lt;br&gt;• Recurrent natural disasters&lt;br&gt;• Fragile state</td>
<td>• Resilience&lt;br&gt;• Food security&lt;br&gt;• Pastoralism&lt;br&gt;• Food chain crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>• Protracted conflict crisis now in post-conflict transition&lt;br&gt;• Strong government</td>
<td>• Resilience&lt;br&gt;• Forced migration&lt;br&gt;• Social protection&lt;br&gt;• Land &amp; NRM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bangladesh (focus on Cox’s Bazar)</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>• Refugee crisis</td>
<td>• Resilience&lt;br&gt;• Forced migration&lt;br&gt;• Land &amp; NRM</td>
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Appendix 3: Summary of the HDP nexus, as presented in the three reference documents used for this evaluation

Appendix Table 3. Priority areas for operationalizing the nexus – NWOW and UN/IASC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NWOW – priority area</th>
<th>UN Sustainable Development Group &amp; IASC key messages</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pool and combine data, analysis and information</td>
<td>Invest in consistent and sound joint context and risk analysis:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• On a regular basis</td>
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<td>• Led by the UN RC/HC</td>
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<td>• Identifying areas &amp; population groups of greatest need</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Identifying risks &amp; vulnerabilities, including drivers and root causes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Join-up planning and programming processes</td>
<td>Incentivise better joined-up planning and programming processes:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Minimizing gaps in the response, towards shared goals</td>
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<tr>
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<td>• Planning in conjunction and consistent with priorities of national authorities, as long as not at odds with humanitarian principles</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Ensuring nimbleness to react to early warning and forecast-based analysis</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• With common multi-year targets that are realistic, quantitative, concrete and relevant to support collective outcomes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Optimise leadership</td>
<td>• Through governments and appropriate international leadership at country level</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>• Through clearly identified coordination structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pursue financing modalities to support collective outcomes</td>
<td>• With flexible multi-year, public, private and innovative financing to provide more sustainable solutions and reduce vulnerabilities over time</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• At the same time maintaining humanitarian funding streams that are more risk-tolerant, releasing funds with quicker timeframes</td>
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</table>

Sources: NWOW, Agenda for Humanity (n.d); UNSDG & IASC (2019).

Appendix Table 4. OECD-DAC recommendation on the HDP nexus

<table>
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<tr>
<th>THEME</th>
<th>ACTION (bold as in original)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Coordinate</td>
<td>Undertake <strong>joint risk-informed, gender-sensitive analysis of root causes and structural drivers of conflict</strong> as well as positive factors of resilience and the identification of collective outcomes incorporating HDP actions.</td>
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<td>Provide <strong>appropriate resources to empower leadership</strong> for cost-effective coordination across the humanitarian, development and peace architecture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Utilise <strong>political engagement and other tools, instruments and approaches</strong> at all levels to prevent crises, resolve conflicts and build peace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme</td>
<td>Prioritise <strong>prevention, mediation and peacebuilding, investing in development wherever possible</strong>, while ensuring immediate humanitarian needs continue to be met.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Put people at the centre</strong>, tackling exclusion and promoting gender equality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure that activities <strong>do no harm, are conflict sensitive</strong> to avoid unintended negative consequences and maximise positive effects across humanitarian, development and peace actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Align <strong>joined-up programming with the risk environment</strong>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthen <strong>national and local capacities</strong>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Invest in learning and evidence</strong> across humanitarian, development and peace actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing</td>
<td><strong>Develop evidence-based humanitarian, development and peace financing strategies</strong> at global, regional, national and local levels, with effective layering and sequencing of the most appropriate financing flows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Use predictable, flexible, multi-year financing</strong> wherever possible.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3. Summary of the HDP nexus, as presented in the three reference documents used for this evaluation

Source: OECD (2019).

A number of ways of working are similar across the three documents, for example joint analysis, joined up programming and leadership. Some are specific to one document, for example the OECD-DAC emphasis on putting people at the centre, and investing in learning and evidence.

Fanning and Fullwood-Thomas (2019) identify specific behaviors that need to be encouraged at an agency level to develop a way of working that promotes the HDP nexus. These are a useful point of reference for some of the soft skills implicit in HDP nexus ways of working. These include:

i. consensus-building, brokering and the formation of (unusual) partnerships;
ii. navigating and communicating complex ideas;
iii. systems-thinking;
iv. facilitating co-creation spaces and dialogue that brings colleagues together; and
v. a shift in culture and mindsets.

The UN Sustainable Development Group & IASC identify what the nexus should look like at country level, again providing a useful benchmark (see Appendix Box 1).

Appendix Box 1. Implications of the nexus for country strategies

- Protection should be central in all contexts.
- ‘Development action will need to be more responsive, more risk focused, and more flexible through context-adaptable programming, including a stronger focus on presence and impact in communities and a flexible approach in terms of working with fragile/transitional institutions.
- Wherever relevant, peacebuilding efforts will need to be more preventively focused on engaging national stakeholders and more risk tolerant, in support to addressing root causes of conflicts and crises.
- At the same time, humanitarian action should be placed within the broader context of aid: while protecting the humanitarian space, humanitarian actors must clearly indicate what needs they strive to address, and the actions required by relevant stakeholders to support a phase-out of humanitarian aid. Key considerations will be how people can gain sustainable access to services and protection and how to transfer service delivery activities to non-humanitarian assistance providers and/or institutions over time’.

Source: UNSDG and IASC (2019).
### Appendix 4: Evaluation matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues/Questions</th>
<th>Criteria of judgement/indicators</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EQ 1 (RELEVANCE AND STRATEGIC POSITIONING):</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 1.1 What is the relevance of the HDP nexus to FAO’s mandate and work?</td>
<td>Review of findings of SO and SDG evaluations, and review of FAO policies, strategies and planning frameworks for the themes selected for this evaluation, against key reference documents on HDP nexus (e.g. evidence of joined-up, systems thinking).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 1.2 How effective is FAO’s strategic positioning for addressing the HDP nexus, and how could its strategic positioning be strengthened?</td>
<td>Identification of areas of FAO work where HDP nexus way of thinking &amp; working is not appropriate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.1 (Relevance): What are the implications of the HDP nexus for FAO’s policies, strategies and planning frameworks, and to what extent do FAO’s policies, strategies and planning frameworks currently incorporate the nexus way of thinking (double and triple)? <em>(NB this to be explored principally for the particular themes covered by this evaluation, e.g. resilience, climate change, etc.)</em></td>
<td>Review of findings of SO and SDG evaluations, and review of FAO policies, strategies and planning frameworks for the themes selected for this evaluation, against key reference documents on HDP nexus (e.g. evidence of joined-up, systems thinking).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.2 (Alignment and coherence): How aligned and coherent are FAO’s policies, strategies and programme initiatives, with respect to the HDP nexus, and how could this be strengthened? What about coherence with key international partners of the international community working on the HDP nexus?</td>
<td>Following the review of FAO policies, strategies and planning frameworks for question 1.1.1 above, assessment of coherence and alignment in coverage of the HDP nexus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.3 (Strategic positioning): In which areas is FAO providing leadership, coordination and guidance, internationally, on aspects of the HDP nexus, and in which areas could it be playing a more strategic role internationally?</td>
<td>Review of findings of SO and SDG evaluations, and review of FAO normative policy and guidance materials, for evidence of HDP nexus ways of working.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.4 (Partnership): To what extent is FAO working in partnership with international and national actors, to the comparative advantage of each, to strengthen the HDP nexus thinking and approach at global level?</td>
<td>Review of findings of SO and SDG evaluations, and mapping of FAO’s strategic partnerships at global level.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 4. Evaluation matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues/Questions</th>
<th>Criteria of judgement/indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EQ 2 (PROGRAMME CONTRIBUTION AND RESULTS):</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 2.1 What have been the results (positive and negative, intended and unintended), at all levels and for different population groups (e.g. women, men, youth, displaced), of FAO’s efforts to address the interface between humanitarian and development interventions, of beginning to address the HDP nexus, and what is the learning for applying the nexus in the future?</td>
<td>• Review of findings of evaluations relating to FAO data collection functions.  &lt;br&gt;• Evidence of sound contextual and risk analyses being carried out on a regular basis.  &lt;br&gt;• Evidence of sound conflict and political analyses having been carried out on a regular basis.  &lt;br&gt;• Evidence of appropriate collaboration between FAO and other humanitarian, development and peace actors.  &lt;br&gt;• Evidence of investment in learning across HDP actions that is evidence-based.  &lt;br&gt;• Assessment of scope of early warning work by FAO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 2.2 What can be learned from FAO’s programming experience related to conflict and peace, for addressing the triple nexus, with particular reference to the peace dimension?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.1 (Data, analysis and information) To what extent and how has FAO managed to address the humanitarian-development interface in its data collection, analysis and information functions, and to what extent has it integrated conflict and political analysis in ways that contribute to the HDP nexus, including through collaboration with other actors?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.2 (Programming results): To what extent has FAO implemented joined-up planning and programming across the nexus, and what have been the results, positive and negative, intended and unintended, for different population groups (taking gender, generation, displacement, etc. into account)?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.3 (Programming approach): To what extent has FAO put people &amp; local actors at the centre of their programming, taking account of their perspectives, priorities, immediate and longer-term needs?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.4 (Partnership): To what extent is FAO working in partnership with international and national actors in its programming, to the comparative advantage of each, across the HDP nexus? (To collective outcomes and with multi-year targets).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.5 (Coordination): To what extent has FAO promoted HDP nexus ways of working through its role and leadership in coordination?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues/Questions</td>
<td>Criteria of judgement/indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.6 (Good practice): What can be learned from good practice examples of</td>
<td>• Review of findings of country and programme evaluations (both development and humanitarian programme evaluations), for evidence of FAO programming that meets HDP ways of working, and that demonstrates incorporation of the HDP nexus with particular reference to sustainable peace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO programming that address (implicitly or explicitly) the HDP nexus?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 3 (ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 3.1 What organizational factors have facilitated or constrained FAO in working</td>
<td>EQ 3.2 How can FAO create a more enabling environment to promote the nexus in its ways of working in the future?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in an integrated way in line with the HDP nexus?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1 (Leadership): To what extent is there effective and empowered leadership</td>
<td>• Evidence from evaluations and key informant interviews of leadership promoting the nexus and collaborative ways of working within FAO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>within FAO, at all levels, to promote the HDP nexus?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.2 (Adaptive programme management): How flexible and adaptive has FAO</td>
<td>• Evidence from evaluations and key informant interviews that FAO development programming is flexible and adaptable to future risks, taking preventive measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>development and humanitarian programming been, to the short and longer term,</td>
<td>• Evidence that humanitarian assistance is adaptive and contributes, where appropriate, to conditions suitable for development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and to conflict sensitivity?</td>
<td>• Evidence of conflict sensitivity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.3 (Finance and funding flows): To what extent have FAO’s funding mechanisms</td>
<td>• Extent to which FAO’s funding flows are predictable, flexible and multi-year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and flows facilitated or constrained HDP nexus ways of working?</td>
<td>• Review of FAO resource mobilisation strategies to achieve the above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.4 (Mindset and working culture): To what extent have mindsets and working</td>
<td>• Evidence of working collectively, breaking down silos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cultures within FAO facilitated or constrained nexus ways of working?</td>
<td>• Evidence of systems thinking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Evidence of consensus-building and brokering.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 5: Key pathways through which FAO can contribute to sustaining peace

FAO contributions to sustaining peace reduce potential for violent conflict and increase prospects for peace

**Principal Pathway**
- Improved social capital (horizontal and vertical)
- Strengthening local conflict management capacities, including over natural resources
- Increasing opportunity cost of engaging in violence
- Horizontal inequality and grievances are reduced
- Competition over natural resources is reduced

**Contributory Pathway**
- (collaborative capacity increased within and between communities)
- Constructive engagement between communities and local institutions increased and decision-making is more inclusive
- Conflict management mechanisms function more effectively (formal and/or informal)
- Regulatory frameworks are strengthened and institutions more effectively regulate the use and rights to natural resources
- Household resilience to shocks is increased
- Natural resources are used more equitably across community members and social groups
- Productivity of and access to natural resources is increased and scarcity reduced

Inclusion of women and youth in activities, capacity development and collaborative inter and intra-community activities.