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A joint FAO/WFP update for the members
of the United Nations Security Council

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Abbreviations and acronyms

CARI	Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (WFP)
CH	Cadre Harmonisé
DG ECHO	Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCT	Federal Capital Territory (Abuja, Nigeria)
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FSIN	Food Security Information Network
GNAFC	Global Network Against Food Crises
IDP	internally displaced person
IED	improvised explosive device
IHL	international humanitarian law
IHRL	international human rights law
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
JNIM	Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin
NSAG	non-state armed group
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
rCARI	remote Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (WFP)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme

Introduction

This is the twelfth update of the *Monitoring food security in food crisis countries and territories with conflict situations*, a twice-yearly report on the food crisis in countries and territories where conflict and insecurity are primary drivers of acute food insecurity. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) have jointly been producing this report for the Members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) since June 2016.

On 24 May 2018, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2417 on the link between armed conflict and food insecurity. Resolution 2417 notably calls upon all states to uphold international humanitarian law in conflict and ensure accountability for mass atrocity crimes. The Resolution also reaffirms that states bear the primary responsibility to protect the population throughout their whole territory.¹

Through this update, FAO and WFP inform the UNSC members on acute food insecurity situation, livelihood disruptions and the need for humanitarian assistance in countries and territories affected by conflict and insecurity, where access to populations in need is often challenging.

This update is prepared in the framework of the informal briefing to be held in May 2023.

As per the previous updates, Section 1 highlights the food security situation in 19 major food crisis countries and territories affected by conflict and insecurity in 2022 (Figure 1) through key messages, visual content and country snapshots, mainly based on the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)/Cadre Harmonisé (CH) data. It also includes an additional section on food security implications of the war in Ukraine.

Section 2 includes a deep dive into the humanitarian situation created by conflict in three countries and territories of concern – Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Haiti.

The international community has the capacity to remove barriers obstructing food systems, particularly human-made obstacles, and to deliver assistance where it is most needed. The role of diplomatic, political, legal and humanitarian systems for protecting civilians is paramount and can reverse rapid and dramatic deterioration in food security observed in conflict-affected settings.

Recent evolutions in conflict-affected settings, such as Yemen or northern Ethiopia are encouraging. Nevertheless, more needs to be done to restore food systems where it has been damaged by conflict and to sustainably remove the threat of famine and starvation that weighs upon civilians' lives.

An estimated 90 percent of casualties in armed conflicts are civilians, 70 percent of them women and children (Mayanja, 2023). Persistent violations of international humanitarian law impeded the ability of aid workers to operate while violence against them increased, with 98 percent of those killed working in their own countries (OCHA, 2022).

Conflict remains the main driver of food crises according to the *Global Report on Food Crises 2023* (GNAFC and FSIN, forthcoming).


¹ Security Council Resolution 2417 (2018) [on the link between armed conflict and food insecurity], S/RES/2417. Adopted on 24 May 2018.

The objective of international humanitarian and development partners working in food crisis contexts is to prevent or decrease acute food insecurity that threatens lives or livelihoods. This includes reducing the number of people facing IPC/CH Phase 5 (Catastrophe) and mitigating the high risk of groups already in IPC/CH Phase 4 (Emergency) slipping into IPC/CH Phase 5. The objective is also to reduce excess mortality and acute malnutrition to prevent further deterioration in more widespread catastrophic acute food insecurity conditions.

When in Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3), people start facing increasing malnutrition due to lack of access to food, or they are only able to access food by selling off assets or through other harmful coping strategies. People in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) face high levels of acute malnutrition and excess mortality due to lack of food, or resort to emergency coping strategies to mitigate large food consumption gaps. People in Catastrophe/Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5) do not have any means left to access food and are facing starvation and death.

Famines should be avoided at all costs. Although further deaths can and should be prevented by urgent action, it is evident that responding to famine situations will be, de facto, a late response because many will have died by the time a famine is declared. In the countries and territories where IPC/CH processes are in place, therefore, urgent action is required from Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3), and Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) is indicative of an extremely severe situation where urgent action is needed to save lives and livelihoods and the final alert to avoid extreme acute food insecurity outcomes.

Figure 1. Countries and territories (19) covered by this update



Source of map: United Nations Geospatial. 2022. *Map of the World*. United Nations. Cited 7 April 2023. un.org/geospatial/content/map-world
 Final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.

This update is prepared under the framework of the Global Network Against Food Crises, as part of a range of analytical products including notably the *Global Report on Food Crises*.

Founded by the European Union, FAO and WFP at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, the Global Network Against Food Crises is an alliance of humanitarian and development actors working together to prevent, prepare for, and respond to food crises and support the Sustainable Development Goal to End Hunger (SDG 2).

In May 2023, in collaboration with the Food Security Information Network, the Global Network Against Food Crises will release the *Global Report on Food Crises 2023*, available at fightfoodcrises.net and fsinplatform.org.

The Global Network Against Food Crises also supported the preparation of the report *Hunger Hotspots – FAO-WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity*, to be published in May 2023.

Section 1. Overview of the acute food insecurity situation

Trends in acute food insecurity (2022–2023)

- **Major increases in IPC/CH Phase 3 and above**

Between March 2022 and March 2023, 5 of the 19 countries and territories reported an increased number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above): 3.2 million additional people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above) in Nigeria (26 states and Federal Capital Territory [FCT]), 1.8 million in the Sudan, 1.3 million in Mozambique, 0.6 million in the Central African Republic and 0.4 million in Haiti (CH, 2023a; IPC, 2022a; IPC, 2022b; IPC, 2023a; IPC, 2023b).

For what concerns Nigeria and Mozambique, this increase is attributed to an increase in analysis coverage, as the share of analysed population in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above) remained unchanged, respectively at 9 percent and 10 percent (see section on methods and data sources). In the conflict-affected areas of northeastern Nigeria – for which the analysis coverage remained unchanged – an increase in the population facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above) by around 92 000 people was observed (CH, 2023a; IPC, 2023a).

In Haiti, the Sudan and Central African Republic, the share of the population analysed facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above) increased by 4 percent points, 3 points and 1 point respectively in these three countries (IPC, 2022a; IPC, 2022b; IPC, 2023a; IPC, 2023b).

- **Largest prevalence of IPC/CH Phase 3 and above**

Three countries registered the highest prevalence of acute food insecurity with around half of the population analysed in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above): Afghanistan (46 percent of the population analysed), Central African Republic (44 percent) and South Sudan (51 percent).

- **Trends in IPC/CH Phase 4 and above**

Between March 2022 and March 2023, five countries reported an increase of the population facing Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 and above): 490 000 additional people in Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 and above) in Haiti, 360 000 in Mozambique (mainly in Cabo Delgado), 256 000 in Somalia, 225 000 in the Sudan and 22 000 in the Central African Republic (IPC, 2023b; IPC, 2023a; OCHA, 2022; IPC, 2022; IPC, 2023c). In Nigeria, despite a decrease reported at the national level, the conflict-affected areas of northeast faced a slight increase in the population facing Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) by around 61 000 people (CH, 2023a).


- **Trends in IPC/CH Phase 5 (Catastrophe/Famine)**

An increase in the population facing starvation and death (IPC/CH Phase 5) were reported in Somalia (+96 000 people) and Burkina Faso (+22 500 people) between March 2022 and March 2023 (IPC, 2023c; CH, 2023b). In South Sudan, a decrease was reported, though the population facing catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 5) remained at around 33 000 people as of March 2023 (IPC, 2022c).

Available projections indicate that populations facing starvation and death (IPC/CH Phase 5) will increase in these three countries in the following months. In Somalia, 222 700 people are projected to face starvation and death (IPC/CH Phase 5) in April–June 2023 (IPC, 2023c), 42 700 in Burkina Faso (June–August 2023) (CH, 2023c), and 43 000 in South Sudan (April–June 2023)

(IPC, 2022c). For the first time in the history of the CH, the population in Mali facing catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 5) is expected to reach 2 500 people in June–August 2023, (CH, 2023c).

Figure 2. Five countries with the largest increase in the population analysed facing Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above) between early 2022 and early 2023



Source of data: CH, 2023a; IPC, 2022a; IPC, 2022b; IPC, 2023a; IPC, 2023b

Note: The CH analysis coverage in Nigeria increased from 21 states and FCT in March–May 2022 to 26 states and FCT in March–May 2023. The IPC analysis coverage in Mozambique increased from 64 districts in December 2022 to the entire country excluding 8 districts in Cabo Delgado. In the Central African Republic, the increase is also due to revised population census data from the national institute of statistics.

Regional overviews

In the Central and Southern Africa region, acute food insecurity levels remain high and of major concern – with 44 percent of the population analysed in the Central African Republic in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) and 24.5 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (IPC, 2022a; IPC, 2022b).

In the Central African Republic, the conflict in the northern part of the country continues to be the main key driver of displacements and acute food insecurity, limiting access to livelihoods and contributing to the mass displacement of people (IPC, 2022a). In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, acute food insecurity is likely to remain high in North Kivu and Ituri, as a result of the continuation of conflict and its impact on the civilian population (IPC, 2022b). An upsurge in armed conflicts and attacks by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) accentuated population movements and ongoing insecurity and displacements are expected to continue affecting agricultural activities (FAO, 2023a). In Mozambique, the northern province of Cabo Delgado comprised almost 40 percent of the total population facing Emergency

(IPC Phase 4). In the Cabo Delgado and parts of the Niassa and Nampula provinces, insecurity and violence and related population displacement were the main causes of acute food insecurity (IPC, 2023).

In East Africa, rising levels of acute food insecurity across the region have been registered over the past year. A risk of famine persists in Somalia where co-existence and severity of drivers of food insecurity are eroding livelihoods and coping capacities.

In Northern Ethiopia, the conflict has negatively affected access to most acutely food insecure people in Afar, Amhara and Tigray regions, even though access to people has improved significantly since the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) in November 2022. Ongoing conflicts in other parts of the country continue to hinder access to affected populations (OCHA, 2023a). In Somalia, while famine was avoided due to significant efforts in the scale-up of multisectoral humanitarian assistance, supported by slightly more favourable than previously foreseen rainfall performance, the situation remains extremely critical and unstable. However, a risk of famine persists. In South Sudan, conflict and insecurity have limited and disrupted humanitarian delivery to vulnerable communities leading to the elevated levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) in most counties which are also contributing to the deteriorating levels of acute malnutrition (ACAPS, 2022). In the Sudan, the acute food insecurity situation is driven by intercommunal conflicts, high prices and low purchasing power due to the plummeting economy (IPC, 2022c). Violence was expected to escalate during harvest season between November 2022 and January 2023 due to increasing disputes over access to farming lands and competition for scarce natural resources (IPC, 2022c). However, the latest available food security estimates do not yet account for the upsurge in violence that erupted in April 2023.

In Sahel and West Africa, acute food insecurity remained high in 2022 despite average agricultural campaign for the region. Projections for 2023 also indicate a persisting food crisis in the region, notably in Burkina Faso and Mali with people in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5).

In Burkina Faso, between March and May 2023, 22 500 people are estimated to be in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) (CH, 2023a), and by June–August 2023 the population in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) is expected to reach 42 700 people in the Sahel and Boucle-du-Mouhoun regions (CH, 2023b). The persisting conflict has a strong impact on the dimensions of food security. In Cameroon, the overall situation will likely remain of concern as the combination of conflict, high staple food prices and below-average harvests will continue to limit food access, particularly in conflict-affected areas (CH, 2023b). Ongoing insecurity and displacements in Extrême Nord, Nord-Ouest and Sud-Ouest regions are expected to continue affecting agricultural activities (FAO, 2023b). In Chad, persisting armed conflicts and intensified farmer-pastoralist clashes, mostly in the Lac and Tibesti regions hindered agricultural activities and restricted farmers' access to fields, limiting the area planted with cereal crops and contributing to localized production shortfalls (FAO, 2022). In Mali, Insecurity in the centre and north of the country has led to the loss of land, theft of livestock, looting or destruction of property and crops and above all unusual population movements (CH, 2023c). During the projection period from June to August 2023, a significant deterioration is expected with 2 500 people to reach Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in the Ménaka region (CH, 2023c). In the Niger, ongoing conflict is limiting humanitarian assistance and has reduced harvests and the availability of agricultural employment opportunities to prepare market gardens (FEWS NET, 2022). Persisting insecurity continues to disrupt livelihoods and displacing people, as a result of the regional crises in the Lake Chad Basin and Central Sahel. In Nigeria, insecurity, resulting from the insurgency in the northeast, kidnapping and banditry in the northwest continue impacting directly on the livelihoods of vulnerable households (CH, 2023d).

In the Asian and the Near Eastern countries and territories covered in this update, high levels of acute food insecurity persist with concerning levels of population in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in Afghanistan and Yemen.

In Afghanistan, the number of people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) by March 2023 was projected to reach 6 million people, this represents one of the highest figures worldwide. Persisting conflict in localized areas, compounded by natural disasters, the lingering effects of war, and recent large-scale conflict displacement continue to prevent people from building resilience and moving towards recovery and solutions (OCHA, 2023b). In Myanmar, main drivers of acute food insecurity were active fighting, population displacement and movement restrictions, as well as rapid currency depreciation and high fuel and fertilizer prices, severely limiting food access and availability (World Bank, 2022a). Physical access to food and delivery of humanitarian assistance was constrained in conflict-affected areas by movement restrictions (ACAPS, 2022). In Palestine, protracted conflict continued to diminish the profitability and sustainability of economic activities, including in agriculture. Restricted endowment of natural resources constrains national food production and increases reliance on food imports (OCHA, 2023c). In the Syrian Arab Republic, high levels of acute food insecurity are exacerbated by the country's deep economic crisis resulting from protracted conflict, sanctions, the COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with the macroeconomic ripple waves and depreciation of local currency (World Bank, 2022b). Additionally, the humanitarian crisis in the aftermath of the February 2023 earthquakes continues to pose a challenge to Syria's food security outlook and humanitarian access (OCHA, 2023d). In Yemen, of primary concern is the 6.1 million people classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and the 4.3 million internally displaced as a result of conflict. While this analysis update shows that Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) has been prevented, close monitoring remains essential. Compared with previous analyses, the situation improved notably due to the temporary truce, the provision of humanitarian assistance and to seasonal factors (IPC, 2022d).

The impact of the war in Ukraine on food security and agriculture

Prior to the start of the war in February 2022, acute food insecurity had been limited to the Luhanska and Donetsk oblasts for more than eight years due to conflict, high food prices, limited access to markets and basic services, as well as loss/lack of livelihood opportunities (GNAFC and FSIN, 2022).

As of late 2022, around 25 percent of households across the country were acutely food insecure, including 23 percent moderately and 2 percent severely according to WFP Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI) methodology.* The worst outcomes were recorded in the southern (31 percent) and eastern (29 percent) oblasts while the lowest levels were in central ones (19 percent) (REACH, 2023).

Ukraine's agrifood sector suffered massive losses from the war, which have had a profound impact on crop and livestock activities within the country as well as globally (FAO, 2022).

The war in Ukraine has led to unprecedented movements of people, with an estimated 6.5 million internally displaced within the first few weeks of the conflict, peaking at 8 million in early May 2022, and gradually decreasing to around 5.4 million as of January 2023. Eleven months into the war in Ukraine, protracted displacement is becoming more prevalent, with 58 percent of all internally displaced persons (IDPs) have been displaced for six months or more (IOM, 2023). Around 8.2 million refugees were also recorded across Europe (UNHCR, 2023).

The active fighting in parts of the country, lack of labour, high production costs, and low farm-gate prices led to cereal production being 30 percent lower than the five-year average in 2022. Mines and other remnants of the war in fields also constrained fertilizing and harvesting activities, leading to unharvested crops in large areas (FAO, 2022).

The war has had a significant impact on rural households with increased costs for agricultural production, reduced revenue, and limited inputs availability leading to one-fourth (25 percent) of households reporting reduced or stopped production due to the conflict. This trend is even more pronounced in front-line areas, where over one-third (38 percent) of respondents reported a decrease in production (FAO, 2022).

High energy costs, unemployment rates, and limited livelihood opportunities have also reduced purchasing power, leading to over half (55 percent) of rural households reporting a decrease in income compared with the same period in the previous year. In September 2022, consumer price inflation stood at 24.6 percent year-on-year, while the food inflation prices were a staggering 31.7 percent year-on-year (OCHA, 2023).

In March 2023, the Black Sea Grain Initiative, signed in Istanbul on 22 July 2022, has been extended. The Initiative allows for the facilitation of the safe navigation for the exports of grain and related foodstuffs and fertilizers, including ammonia, from designated Ukrainian seaports. During the first two terms, some 25 million metric tonnes of grain and foodstuffs have been moved to 45 countries, helping to bring down global food prices and stabilizing the markets (UNSG, 2023).

* Populations that are classified as moderately acute food insecure and severely acute food insecure as per WFP's CARI methodology are reported as an approximation to populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above).

Source

FAO. 2022. *Ukraine: Impact of the war on agriculture and rural livelihoods in Ukraine – Findings of a nation-wide rural household survey, December 2022*. Rome. <https://doi.org/10.4060/cc3311en>

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Snapshots

Central and Southern Africa

Central African Republic

Acute food insecurity situation

September 2022–March 2023



44% of the population
analysed in IPC 3+

CRISIS (IPC 3)	EMERGENCY (IPC 4)
2.01 million	0.64 million



+1%

COMPARED WITH SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR ALSO IN THE CONTEXT OF INCREASED POPULATION ANALYSED

Note: From 2022 onwards, the IPC took into account the revised demographic projections of the National Statistics Institute (ICASEES) with a population increasing from 4.9 million to 6 million people.

- Nearly 2.7 million people faced Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) from September 2022 to March 2023 despite the positive effect of the harvest on food security. The situation is expected to deteriorate during the lean season, from April to June 2023, with close to 3 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) – representing 49 percent of the population analysed – including 807 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) (IPC, 2022).
- Until August 2023, 298 000 children under five years of age and 140 600 breastfeeding and pregnant women will be acutely malnourished and require urgent treatment. This corresponds respectively to a 16 and 20 percent increase compared with the same period a year earlier (IPC, 2023).
- The conflict in the northern part of the country continues to be the main key driver of displacements and food insecurity, limiting access to livelihoods and contributing to the mass displacement of people (IPC, 2022). As of 31 January 2023, nearly 483 000 people were internally displaced across the country, mainly in northern and central prefectures of Ouham, Ouaka, Ombella M’Poko, Haute-Kotto and in Bangui (UNHCR, 2023). In addition, around 740 000 refugees and asylum seekers remained displaced across neighbouring countries as a result of the conflict (OCHA, 2023a).
- Food price increases, stemming from international price trends and insecurity at the national level, negatively affected food access for the most vulnerable households (FAO, 2022). Poor access to seeds and tools as well as the occurrence of crop diseases and floods negatively affect local production. In addition, the deterioration of road networks and insecurity limit the supply of markets (IPC, 2022).
- Civilians remain the first victim of the conflict and insecurity in the country. However, incidents against humanitarian workers continue unabated with 24 incidents recorded between January and February 2023 alone. The prefectures of Ouham (42 percent) and Bangui (13 percent) remain the most affected since January 2022 (OCHA, 2023b). During the first six weeks of 2023, 14 incidents involving explosive devices were recorded in the western zone of the country (OCHA, 2023c).

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Acute food insecurity situation
January–June 2023



24% of the population
analysed in IPC 3+



-1%

OR 1.4 MILLION PEOPLE LESS COMPARED TO SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR IN THE CONTEXT OF INCREASED GEOGRAPHICAL COVERAGE AND POPULATION ANALYSED

CRISIS (IPC 3)

21.71
million

EMERGENCY (IPC 4)

2.81 million

- From January to June 2023, a slight decrease in acute food insecurity is projected compared with the same period one year earlier, with 24.5 million people projected to be in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above). Acute food insecurity is likely to remain high in North Kivu and Ituri, as these areas are home to large numbers of people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), as a result of the continuation of conflict and its impact on the civilian population (IPC, 2022).
- Nearly 2.8 million children under the age of five and almost 2.2 million pregnant and lactating women are likely to suffer from acute malnutrition during 2023 (IPC, 2022).
- An upsurge in armed conflicts and attacks by NSAGs accentuated population movements in recent months in certain territories of North Kivu, Ituri, South Kivu and Maniema (FAO, 2023a).
- As of January 2023, over 6 million people were displaced within the country (OCHA, 2023), and over 1 million had crossed borders to seek asylum, mainly in Angola, Burundi, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia. In 2023, newly-displaced refugees and asylum-seekers from the country will require urgent protection and assistance, while those in long-term situations – many having been hosted in asylum countries for decades – will remain in need of durable solutions and development support (UNHCR, 2023).
- Ongoing insecurity and displacements are expected to continue affecting agricultural activities. In addition, elevated international prices of fertilizers and improved seeds, both largely imported, are constraining farmers' access to agricultural inputs, resulting in either low application rates, with negative effects on yields and/or area planted (FAO, 2023b). The cost of a standard basket of staple food increased by around 30 percent between November 2021 and November 2022 (FAO, 2023a).
- The heavy rains recorded during the season rainy season have caused floods which significantly affected livelihoods (crops and livestock) and led to losses in human lives, notably in Kinshasa, in the Equateur province as well as in South Kivu (FAO, 2023a).

Mozambique

Acute food insecurity situation
November 2022–March 2023



10% of the population
analysed in IPC 3+



-3%

COMPARED TO SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR ALSO DUE TO A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN POPULATION COVERAGE,
AS THE POPULATION IN EMERGENCY (IPC PHASE 4) INCREASED NOTABLY IN CABO DELGADO

CRISIS (IPC 3)

2.75 million

EMERGENCY (IPC 4)

0.4 million

- An estimated 3.15 million people are acutely food insecure and in need of urgent action for the period of November 2022 to March 2023, including 400 000 people facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4). The northern province of Cabo Delgado comprised almost 40 percent of the total population facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4). The internally displaced population in this province – located in Ancuabe-Chiure, Metuge and Montepuez-Mueda – were classified in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). It should be noted that 8 of the 17 districts of Cabo Delgado province, the most affected by insecurity and displacement of people and arguably among the most food insecure, were not covered by the present IPC analysis due to lack of data (IPC, 2023).
- In the Cabo Delgado and parts of the Niassa and Nampula provinces, insecurity and violence and related population displacement were the main causes of acute food insecurity. The arrival of displaced people in Pemba and Metuge has also increased job competition leading to higher unemployment rates, further exacerbating the acute food insecurity situation (IPC, 2023). As of late 2022, much higher than usual food prices were prominent across most provinces, especially in Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Zambezia (FAO, 2023a).
- In September 2022, an estimated 1.12 million people were displaced in Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Nampula, Zambézia, Inhambane, Sofala and Maputo provinces according to the National Institute for Risk and Disaster Management (IPC, 2023). Around 92 percent of these people were in Cabo Delgado, 6 percent in Nampula, and the rest of the displaced population in Zambezia, Niassa, Manica, Sofala, Inhambane and Maputo Province (IPC, 2023).
- Mozambique is also frequently affected by weather extremes, such as heavy rains and tropical storms. Moreover, Intense Tropical Cyclone Freddy – an exceptionally long-lived, powerful and deadly storm – affected the country in early 2023. (FAO, 2023). More than 1 million people across eight provinces of Mozambique – Gaza, Inhambane, Manica, Maputo, Sofala, Tete and Zambezia – are bearing the brunt of the compounding effect of cholera, floods and cyclone Freddy (OCHA, 2023).

Ethiopia

Acute food insecurity situation
In 2022



21% of the population
analysed acutely food insecure

ACUTELY FOOD INSECURE AND IN NEED OF URGENT ASSISTANCE

23.61 million

- Around 23.61 million people were estimated to be acutely food insecure in 2022. This includes a projected 10.73 million people facing survival deficits according to household economy analysis (HEA), 5.39 million people in Tigray region according to the WFP Emergency Food Security Assessment, 2.76 million IDPs and 1.67 million returnees (OCHA, 2022a).
- The number of wasted children increased by 14 percent from 4.2 million in 2021 to 4.8 million in 2022 (ENC, 2022). Increased cases of wasted children are expected in 2023, notably in the Amhara, Oromia, SNNP, Somali, and Tigray regions (OCHA, 2023a).
- Severe drought and conflict related shocks have contributed to worsening food security situation in the country including contributing to loss in income and food sources for pastoralist and agropastoral households (OCHA, 2022b).
- In northern Ethiopia, the conflict has negatively affected access to most acutely food insecure people in Afar, Amhara and Tigray regions. In northern Ethiopia, although access to people has improved significantly since the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) in November 2022, the response remains below the scale of needs and will remain a priority in 2023 (OCHA, 2022c).
- Some woredas remained inaccessible in Oromia (East and West Wollega, and Guji zones) and Benishangul regions, hindering sustained delivery of food assistance. Ongoing conflicts in other parts of the country continue to hinder access to affected populations, displaced and non-displaced alike, and will require urgent life-saving assistance during 2023 (OCHA, 2023b).
- Poor economic conditions are also driven by the continued depreciation of the Ethiopian Birr (ETB) and high inflation, which is putting pressure on markets and driving high commodity and food prices. The situation is compounded by the war in Ukraine that has affected the supply of some imported products and food items (OCHA, 2022b).

Somalia

Acute food insecurity situation
January–March 2023



30% of the population
analysed in IPC 3+

CRISIS (IPC 3)

3.53 million

EMERGENCY (IPC 4)

1.36 million

CATASTROPHE (IPC 5)

96 150



-2%

OR 0.1 MILLION PEOPLE LESS OF THE POPULATION ANALYSED COMPARED TO SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR, BUT AN INCREASE IN SEVERITY WAS REPORTED INCLUDING +96 150 PEOPLE IN CATASTROPHE (IPC PHASE 5)

- Around 5 million people were estimated to face high levels of acute food insecurity in the first quarter of 2023, including 1.4 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and over 96 000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). The population facing high levels of acute food insecurity is expected to increase to 6.5 million people by April–June 2023, including 223 000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in the most severely drought- and conflict-affected areas (IPC, 2023).
- While famine was avoided due to significant efforts in the scale-up of multisectoral humanitarian assistance, supported by slightly more favourable than previously foreseen rainfall performance, the situations remains extremely critical and not stable. However, a risk of famine persists in the agropastoral populations in Burhakaba district of Bay region and IDP settlements in Baidoa (Bay) and Mogadishu (Banadir) between April and June 2023 if (1) the April to June 2023 *Gu* season rainfall is poorer than currently forecast, leading to more crop production failures and, if (2) humanitarian assistance does not reach the country's most vulnerable populations (IPC, 2023).
- Approximately 1.8 million children are estimated to be acutely malnourished from January to December 2023, including 477 700 children who are likely to be severely malnourished (IPC, 2023).
- Conflict continues to persist as one of the main drivers of acute food insecurity. In addition, poor rainfall and persistent drought have led to poor and failed harvests. Because of conflict/insecurity and other compounding shocks including high food prices and disease outbreaks, many rural livelihoods have experienced erosion of their livelihoods and coping capacities, and face widening food consumption gaps. In Lasaanood district of Sool region, recently escalated conflict has claimed many lives, displaced tens of thousands of people, and disrupted livelihoods. As such, affected urban and displaced populations are projected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes between April and June 2023 (IPC, 2023).
- Nearly 3 million people are internally displaced in the country due to conflict, insecurity and the effects of climate change such as cyclical droughts and floods. In addition, Somalia hosts 35 000 refugees and asylum-seekers, mainly from Ethiopia and Yemen (UNHCR, 2023).
- Humanitarian access in Somalia remained challenging in 2022. Humanitarian operational partners across the country reported 656 access incidents, of which 515 (79 percent) pertained to military operations and ongoing hostilities (OCHA, 2023).

South Sudan

Acute food insecurity situation
December 2022–March 2023



51% of the population
analysed in IPC 3+



-2%

OR 0.1 MILLION PEOPLE LESS COMPARED TO SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR

CRISIS (IPC 3)

4.31 million

EMERGENCY (IPC 4)

1.97 million

CATASTROPHE (IPC 5)

33 000

- Between December 2022 and March 2023, about 6.3 million people (51 percent of the population analysed) are expected to be facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) acute food insecurity. The situation is expected to deteriorate during the lean season, from April to July 2023, as an estimated 7.76 million people (63 percent of the population) will likely face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above), with an estimated 2.9 million people likely to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 43 000 people likely to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in Akobo, Canal/Pigi and Fangak counties of Jonglei State; and Leer and Mayendit counties of Unity State (IPC, 2022).
- Between July 2022 and June 2023, an estimated 1.4 million children under five years of age are expected to suffer from acute malnutrition (IPC, 2022).
- The persisting conflict is disrupting livelihoods and leading to the loss of productive assets, and low production, compounded by climatic shocks and economic decline. Conflict and insecurity have also limited and disrupted humanitarian delivery to the vulnerable communities leading to the elevated levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) in most counties which are also contributing to the deteriorating levels of acute malnutrition (ACAPS, 2022).
- Around 2.23 million people remain internally displaced in the country and 2.22 million refugees and asylum seekers from South Sudan are displaced across the East Africa region in 2023 (UNHCR, 2023).
- Humanitarian response will continue to face major constraints in 2023. The security situation will likely remain volatile, with continued risk of attacks against humanitarian staff and looting of humanitarian warehouses. Floods increasingly occurring outside the rainy season will further limit access. Although not specific to South Sudan, much-needed humanitarian funding will be stretched due to the war in Ukraine, global food crisis and inflation, further constraining the capacity of the humanitarian community to address the most urgent needs (OCHA, 2022).

Sudan

Acute food insecurity situation
October 2022–February 2023



16% of the population
analysed in IPC 3+



+3%

OR 1.8 MILLION PEOPLE MORE COMPARED TO SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR

CRISIS (IPC 3)

6.19 million

EMERGENCY (IPC 4)

1.55 million

- In October 2022 to February 2023, nearly 7.7 million people were expected to be Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) during the post-harvest season. The acute food insecurity situation is driven by intercommunal conflicts, high prices and low purchasing power due to the plummeting economy (IPC, 2022).
- The number of wasted children under five years of age was projected to increase from 2.77 million in 2021 to around 3 million in 2023 (OCHA, 2022).
- Violence was expected to escalate during harvest season between November 2022 and January 2023 and to be at higher levels compared to 2021 due to increasing disputes over access to farming lands and competition for scarce natural resources between pastoralists and farmers (IPC, 2022). Intercommunal violence in Darfur, Kordofan and Kassala states continued through February 2023. Conflict in West Darfur and influx of refugees from South Sudan as well as internal displacement, have affected the stability in certain localities (ACAPS, 2022).
- The most affected groups are IDPs of which over 3 million people have been driven out of their homes across the Sudan, returnees, those stranded in conflict areas, refugees from South Sudan, Ethiopia and other neighbouring countries, and poor groups from agropastoral and pastoral communities in rural areas of western, eastern and northern Sudan, whose livelihoods are directly affected by the impact of lean season and macroeconomic crises (IPC, 2022).
- Between February and September 2023, large conflict-affected populations in parts of Darfur, Kordofan and Blue Nile states; and areas of marginal agricultural production in the Red Sea, North Darfur, North Kordofan, and northern Kassala states are in high concern. In Abyei Administrative Area, populations were displaced and lost livelihood and income sources as a result of increasing conflict, which in turn constrained humanitarian access (FEWS NET, 2023). In April 2023, fighting between rival military groups resulting in the death of several humanitarian staff in the country halted operations by WFP (UN, 2023).
- The depreciation of the Sudanese pound continued in 2022 following the adoption of a free float exchange rate regime. Input availability improved compared to the previous year, although input costs have increased due to inflation, leading to soaring costs of production (FAO, 2023).

Burkina Faso

Acute food insecurity situation
March–May 2023



10% of the population
analysed in CH 3+

CRISIS (CH 3)

1.88 million

EMERGENCY (CH 4)

0.29 million

CATASTROPHE (CH 5)

22 500



-1%

OR 0.17 MILLION PEOPLE LESS COMPARED TO SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR IN THE CONTEXT OF AN INCREASE IN SEVERITY, INCLUDING +22 500 PEOPLE IN CATASTROPHE (CH PHASE 5)

- Between March and May 2023, around 2.2 million people – representing 10 percent of the population analysed – are acutely food insecure and require urgent assistance (CH Phase 3 and above), including 291 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) and 22 500 people facing Catastrophe (CH Phase 5). By June–August 2023, the population facing acute food insecurity (CH Phase 3 and above) is projected to increase to 3.35 million people, with the number of people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) more than doubling to 0.6 million and the population in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) reaching 42 700 people in the Sahel and Boucle-du-Mouhoun regions (CH, 2023).
- In 31 out of 45 provinces of Burkina Faso, nearly 400 000 children under the five years of age will likely suffer from acute malnutrition between August 2022 and July 2023. Recent data was not available in 14 provinces because of limited or no humanitarian access in these areas (IPC, 2023).
- The continued deterioration of the security situation has a strong impact on the dimensions of food security. This situation causes a permanent movement of populations exacerbated by the dysfunction of basic social infrastructure (markets, health centres, schools, water points, etc.) and a disruption of households' agrosilvipastoral activities. Added to this situation are the numerous losses of human life as well as localities currently "under blockade" in regions with strong security challenges (CH, 2023).
- Burkina Faso is also among the most affected in the region by deficit in fertilizer availability to cover its needs, which is likely to negatively compound the difficult agricultural situation in the country (FAO *et al.*, 2023).
- Since the beginning of 2022, the market situation has been particularly worrying in Burkina Faso; with monthly food price increases of more than +100 percent, especially in security crisis areas. The growing insecurity continues to negatively impact people's livelihoods and market supplies, negatively affecting food security. In the East, Sahel and South-West regions, the majority of markets are in crisis, with average annual price variations of +150 percent, such as in Djibo market, under blockade and where supplies are solely dependent on irregular and reduced-capacity WFP humanitarian flights (FAO *et al.*, March 2023).
- As of December 2022, around 1.9 million people were internally displaced, including around half of them in the Sahel and Centre-Nord regions (CONASUR, 2022). IDPs represented a large proportion of the population facing high levels of acute food insecurity, including Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) (CH, 2023).

Cameroon

Acute food insecurity situation
March–May 2023



11% of the population
analysed in CH 3+

CRISIS (CH 3)

2.68 million

EMERGENCY (CH 4)

0.34 million



No change

IN SHARE OF POPULATION FACING CH 3+ COMPARED TO SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR, DESPITE INCREASE IN POPULATION ANALYSED

- Around 3 million people are expected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 and above) from March to May 2023, including almost 336 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4). The situation is expected to slightly improve in June–August 2023, with 2.4 million people in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 and above). However, the overall situation will likely remain of concern as the combination of conflict, high staple food prices and below-average harvests will continue to limit food access, particularly in conflict-affected areas (CH, 2023).
- Ongoing insecurity and displacements in Extrême Nord, Nord-Ouest and Sud-Ouest regions are expected to continue affecting agricultural activities (FAO, 2023). Insecurity in the Extrême Nord caused by repeated attacks by NSAGs persisted in the departments of Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga and Logone et Chari in the first quarter of the year (OCHA, 2023a). As of January 2023, the situation in the Nord-Ouest and Sud-Ouest regions remained tense, with continued violence and targeted attacks. Armed confrontations and the increased use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) continued leading to the death, injury and displacement of civilians (OCHA, 2023b).
- As of February 2023, there were around 1 million IDPs across the country, mainly driven by NSAGs as well as intercommunal conflict and to a lesser extent floods, drought or heavy rains. In addition, some 476 000 people are refugees and 9 400 asylum seekers (UNHCR, 2023).
- Due to high international quotations, domestic prices of imported food products, such as rice, wheat flour and vegetable oil, remained at high levels in the last quarter of 2022 compared to previous years. As of December 2022, prices of rice were on average about 15 percent higher than a year before and prices of wheat flour were up to 50 percent above their year-earlier level (FAO, 2023).

Chad

Acute food insecurity situation
March–May 2023



6% of the population
analysed in CH 3+



-2%
COMPARED TO SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR

CRISIS (CH 3) | EMERGENCY (CH 4)
1.02 million | **0.02 million**

- Approximately 1 million people are estimated to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 and above) from March to May 2023, marking an improvement compared to the same period in 2022. However, the situation is projected to deteriorate during the lean season, from June to August 2023, with close to 1.9 million people in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 and above) – including over 100 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) (CH, 2023).
- Until September 2023, it is estimated that nearly 1.8 million children under the five years of age will be acutely malnourished. Around 270 000 pregnant and lactating women are also expected to suffer from acute malnutrition during the same period (IPC, 2023).
- Persisting armed conflicts and intensified farmer-pastoralist clashes, mostly in the Lac and Tibesti regions hindered agricultural activities and restricted farmers' access to fields, limiting the area planted with cereal crops and contributing to localized production shortfalls (FAO, 2022). Eighty percent of surveyed households at the national level reported having been affected by one or more shocks in the last quarter of 2022 (up from 74 percent in the previous round). Insecurity was recurrent in the departments of Lac province, notably due to Boko Haram attacks (FAO, 2023a). In areas where Boko Haram is active, fishing and grazing are prohibited, and some markets closed to prevent armed groups from getting supplies (ACAPS, 2022).
- Conflict and insecurity, particularly in Lac region, caused displacement and restricted humanitarian access. As of February 2023, around 381 000 people were internally displaced, with the number quadrupling since 2018. In addition, Chad hosted almost 600 000 refugees and asylum-seekers, more than any other country in West Africa and the Sahel (UNHCR, 2023).
- Elevated food prices, as well as the impact of the severe floods in 2022, which affected approximately 1.5 million people and destroyed about 350 000 hectares of farmland, are compounding acute food insecurity (FAO, 2023b).

Mali

Acute food insecurity situation
March–May 2023



3% of the population
analysed in CH 3+

NO DATA AVAILABLE AT THE SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR

CRISIS (CH 3)	EMERGENCY (CH 4)
0.72 million	0.04 million

- In March–May 2023, around 761 000 people are estimated to be in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 and above) including 39 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4). In June–August 2023, a significant deterioration is expected with 2 500 people in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in the Ménaka region, over 76 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4), and 1.2 million people in Crisis (CH Phase 3) – representing overall around 6 percent of the total population of the country (CH, 2023).
- During the June 2022–May 2023 period, it is projected that nearly 1.5 million children under five years of age will suffer from acute malnutrition. This is 19 percent higher than the cases forecasted in 2021 (IPC, 2022).
- Insecurity in the centre and north of the country has led to the loss of land, theft of livestock, looting or destruction of property and crops, and above all, unusual population movements, particularly in the Ménaka region, where 37 percent of the population is displaced (CH, 2023).
- As of December 2022, around 412 000 people were internally displaced across the country. A significant proportion of IDPs were still living in urban centres in conditions of inadequate protection and assistance, with the rest of the displaced population dispersed in rural areas in families hosts or on self-installed sites. Tens of thousands of them have started to return to their homes in the centre and north, but many obstacles persist, preventing them from finding durable solutions to their displacement. Basic services remain limited and acute food insecurity threatens to be increasingly high in the Sahel (DNDS *et al.*, 2023).
- Price inflation, due to a persistently unfavourable national, subregional and international environment, will negatively affect household livelihoods especially in urban centres (CH, 2023). In 2022, national average prices for millet, maize and sorghum have soared; millet and sorghum prices were around 70 percent higher than their levels of the previous year and the five-year average, while for maize they were around 50 percent higher. The sharp increase in prices of locally-produced cereals can be attributed to conflict-related market disruptions and below-average supplies. The limited availability of fertilizers at the beginning of the agricultural season also limited cereal production (FAO *et al.*, 2023).
- Flooding due to torrential rains also caused significant material damage, loss of sown agricultural areas and livestock affecting a total of 72 025 people (CH, 2023).

Niger

Acute food insecurity situation
March–May 2023



9% of the population
analysed in CH 3+



-4%
COMPARED TO SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR

CRISIS (CH 3)

2.37 million

EMERGENCY (CH 4)

0.09 million

- Approximately 2.5 million people are estimated to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 and above) from March to May 2023. The situation is expected to deteriorate during the lean season (June to August 2023), with close to 3.3 million people in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 and above) including 150 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4). However, compared to the same period in 2022, when areas were classified in Emergency (CH Phase 4) for the first time in the history of the CH, this marks an improvement mostly reflecting the sharp upturn in crop yields following the below-average cereal output in 2021 (CH, 2023).
- Until December 2023, it is estimated that nearly 1.9 million children under five years of age will likely be acutely malnourished. Around 154 000 pregnant and lactating women are also expected to suffer from acute malnutrition during the same period, more than doubling compared to the same period in 2022 (IPC, 2023).
- In the Tillabéry region, increasing attacks by NSAGs on the Defense and Security Forces and civilians, resulted in several casualties, kidnappings, looting, abductions of livestock, and exacerbated population displacement. Ongoing conflict is limiting humanitarian assistance and has reduced harvests and the availability of agricultural employment opportunities to prepare market gardens (FEWS NET, 2022). In northern and western parts, persisting insecurity limited herds' access to pastoral resources, leading to a deterioration of livestock body conditions and increasing the likelihood of an early start of the pastoral lean season, which normally starts in April (FAO, 2023).
- Persisting insecurity continues to disrupt livelihoods and has displaced over 362 000 people, mostly in the Diffa, Tillabery and Tahoua regions, as of February 2023, as a result of the regional crises in the Lake Chad Basin and Central Sahel. In the same period, the country was hosting over 255 000 refugees, mainly from Burkina Faso, Mali and Nigeria (UNHCR, 2023).
- Despite recent harvests, food access and consumption remain limited among poor households due to high food prices (FEWS NET, 2022). In addition, floods affected about 327 000 people in 2022 and have exacerbated acute food insecurity (FAO, 2023).

Nigeria (26 states and FCT)

Acute food insecurity situation
March–May 2023



9% of the population
analysed in CH 3+

CRISIS (CH 3)

17.2 million

EMERGENCY (CH 4)

0.46 million



No change

NO CHANGE IN THE SHARE OF POPULATION FACING CH 3+ COMPARED TO SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR, DESPITE A LARGE INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN CH 3+, AS THE GEOGRAPHICAL COVERAGE OF THE CH ANALYSIS AND POPULATION ANALYSED INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY YEAR-ON-YEAR

- Around 17.7 million people are estimated to be in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 and above) in the current period (March–May 2023), and is projected to reach 24.8 million in June–August 2023. In the northeastern states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, around 4.3 million people will likely face high levels of acute food insecurity, including 522 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) in the projected period. No populations are currently or projected in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) (CH, 2023).
- Insecurity, resulting from the insurgency in the northeast, kidnapping, and banditry in the northwest continue impacting directly on the livelihoods of vulnerable households (CH, 2023). Despite a small decrease compared to July 2022, around 2.4 million people remained internally displaced in the northeast as of February 2023 (IOM, 2023a). In addition, 1.2 million people were internally displaced in northwestern and northcentral states as of March 2023, a 9 percent increase compared with October 2022 (IOM, 2023b).
- Conflict and violent incidents in the northeast region of Nigeria declined in 2022, which allowed for an increased engagement in agricultural activities. However, approximately 37 percent of surveyed households in northern states reportedly faced at least one shock in the second half of 2022, including primarily violence and insecurity, particularly for those in Zamfara (12 percent) and Borno (10 percent) and flooding, especially for those in Adamawa (21 percent) (FAO, 2022). Furthermore, with high international prices and fewer income-generating opportunities, farmers' access to fuel and fertilizers has been reduced and yields are likely to be compromised (FAO *et al.*, 2023).
- High food price levels reflect market disruptions, mainly due to insecurity in the north, high international food and fuel prices, rising production costs and the sharp depreciation of its currency (FAO *et al.*, 2023). In January 2023, staple food prices showed a substantial increase in Borno and Yobe states compared on a year-on-year basis, further limiting households' access to food and their purchasing power (WFP, 2023).
- The food inflation index increased to 24.3 percent in January 2023 from 21.3 percent in December 2022. A cash crunch in Nigeria currently affects the economy as demand for new Naira notes outweighs the supply, and the scarcity of the new Naira notes continues to disrupt economic activities for Nigerians operating cash-dependent informal businesses (WFP, 2023).

Afghanistan

Acute food insecurity situation
November 2022–March 2023



46% of the population
analysed in IPC 3+

CRISIS (IPC 3)

13.82
million

EMERGENCY (IPC 4)

6.08 million



-9%

OR 2.9 MILLION PEOPLE LESS COMPARED WITH SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR

- The number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) by March 2023 is projected to reach 19.9 million people, or 46 percent of the population analysed. Of these, 6 million people are expected to reach Emergency (IPC Phase 4), one step away from famine – and one of the highest figures worldwide. Out of the country's 34 provinces, 12 were classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), while the rest were in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) (OCHA, 2023).
- Around 4 million children and women were projected to need urgent treatment for acute malnutrition through April 2023 (IPC, 2023).
- While in previous years, humanitarian needs have been largely driven by conflict, the key drivers of humanitarian needs in 2023 are multidimensional – drought, climate change, protection threats, particularly for women and girls, and the economic crisis. Nevertheless, conflict, natural disasters, the lingering effects of war, and recent large-scale conflict displacements continue to prevent people from building resilience and moving towards recovery and solutions. Pockets of armed clashes and violence persisted, especially in Panjshir, Samangan and Sar-e-Pul provinces, affecting livelihoods and access to basic services, and undermining the coping capacities of an already vulnerable population (OCHA, 2023).
- The country enters its third consecutive year of drought-like conditions and the second year of crippling economic decline, while still reeling from the effects of 40 years of conflict and recurrent natural disasters, such as the recent earthquake affecting the Badakhshan province in March (DG ECHO, 2023). High levels of unemployment and sustained inflation of key commodity prices have caused the average household's debt to increase, challenging people's coping mechanisms and thwarting the already fragile economy's ability to adapt to shocks (OCHA, 2023).
- As of late March 2023, the prices of the main commodities are substantially high compared with the two-year average – except for cooking oil. Given that Ramadan is approaching, the prices of some staple commodities are expected to increase (WFP, 2023).

Myanmar

Acute food insecurity situation
In 2022



27% of the population
analysed acutely food insecure



+3%
COMPARED WITH 2021

ACUTELY FOOD INSECURE AND IN NEED OF URGENT ASSISTANCE

15.2 million

As per WFP rCARI methodology (OCHA, 2023).

- In 2022, 15.2 million people, or 27 percent of the population analysed, were estimated to face high levels of acute food insecurity and were in need of humanitarian assistance, based on WFP's rCARI methodology.²
- Main drivers of acute food insecurity were active fighting, population displacement and movement restrictions, as well as rapid currency depreciation and high fuel and fertilizer prices, severely limiting food access and availability (World Bank, 2022). The worst outcomes were reported in the states/region of Rakhine, Magway, Kayah, Yangon and Kayin (OCHA, 2023).
- Conflict has limited people's ability to produce food, mainly in Rakhine, Sagaing and Kayah states, through a reduction in the area planted, disruptions to value chains, soil contamination or land confiscation (OCHA, 2023). Physical access to food was constrained in conflict-affected areas by movement restrictions, which also challenged humanitarian assistance efforts as agencies were unable to access certain areas or transport supplies across state borders (ACAPS, 2022).
- Macroeconomic volatility in 2022 compounded issues of food production and access. The local currency continued to depreciate, losing nearly a quarter of its value in 2022 creating issues of food affordability for households (OCHA, 2023). Moreover, price increases for agricultural inputs (IFPRI, 2022) and limited credit availability for farmers (World Bank, 2022) negatively impacted 2022 yields, with paddy production estimated to be 10 percent below the five-year average (FAO, 2022).
- In 2022, the number of IDPs more than doubled to 1.5 million due to conflict and insecurity. Nearly 70 percent of all new IDPs were in the northwest, which included 47 200 in Chin, 124 400 in Magway, and 624 000 in Sagaing. Approximately 126 000 people, mostly Rohingya IDPs, were in camps in central Rakhine state (OCHA, 2023).

² The WFP rCARI methodology is implemented through remote surveys (phone or web-based) and rests on a reduced questionnaire adjusted for remote data collection compared to the traditional WFP CARI methodology. Comparability studies between the results of rCARI analyses and the results of traditional CARI methodology are ongoing.

Palestine

Acute food insecurity situation
In 2022



28% of the population
analysed acutely food insecure

ACUTELY FOOD INSECURE AND IN NEED OF URGENT ASSISTANCE

1.54 million

Methodology not comparable to 2021 AFI levels.

Based on Food Insecurity Experience Scale and Economic Capacity to Meet Essential Needs (OCHA, 2023).

- Nearly 1.54 million people, or 28 percent of the population, were estimated to be acutely food insecure in 2022. Of these, 1.19 million were in the Gaza Strip and 0.35 million in the West Bank. This equated to 53 percent of Gaza's population and 11 percent of the population of the West Bank. The highest number of acutely food insecure people in the West Bank were in Nablus and Hebron and the highest prevalence in Nablus and Jerusalem (OCHA, 2023).
- Protracted conflict continued to diminish the profitability and sustainability of economic activities, including in agriculture. Restricted endowment of natural resources constrains national food production and increases reliance on food imports. In Gaza, 15 years of economic blockade continued to worsen socioeconomic indicators (WFP, 2023a). Ongoing movement restrictions, limited humanitarian access and the protracted fiscal distress in the West Bank combined with a rapid increase in prices linked to the war in Ukraine hindered economic recovery from COVID-19 (OCHA, 2023).
- In the West Bank, violence, loss of land, destruction of property, and restricted access to basic services continued to undermine livelihoods (WFP, 2023a). In Gaza, the August 2022 escalation of violence increased needs for assistance (WFP, 2023a).
- With high dependence on wheat flour and sunflower oil imports, which were traditionally sourced from Ukraine and the Russian Federation, the West Bank and Gaza were highly affected by lack of trade flows from that region in early 2022, and by high international food and fuel prices. As of February 2023, the price of rice has increased by around 10 percent compared with February 2022, reaching a new highest level in the local market. This is driven by the international increase in rice price from the production countries. The Consumer Price Index increased by 4.0 percent compared with the previous year (WFP, 2023b).

Syrian Arab Republic

Acute food insecurity situation
In 2022



55% of the population
analysed acutely food insecure

ACUTELY FOOD INSECURE AND IN NEED OF URGENT ASSISTANCE

12.06 million



No change
COMPARED TO 2021

As per WFP CARI methodology (OCHA, 2022).

- Before the catastrophic earthquakes hit northwestern areas in early February 2023, the magnitude of acute food insecurity remained critical, affecting more than half (55 percent) of the total population, or 12 million people. Largely attributable to conflict and economic crisis, acute food insecurity levels were high in Idlib, as well as in Quneitra, Al-Raqqa, Aleppo, Deir-ez-Zor, Al-Hasakeh and Hama governorates as a result of poor harvest. The Syrian Arab Republic continues to have the highest internally displaced population in the world with 6.9 million IDPs, including 2 million people living in displacement camps and deemed to be acutely food insecure (OCHA, 2022).
- In 2023, it was estimated that 363 600 children under five years of age would suffer from wasting, of them 74 700 severely wasted, and 610 000 stunted. Moreover, 544 800 pregnant and lactating women were acutely malnourished, with the worst prevalence of 25 percent in the northeast (OCHA, 2022).
- After eleven years, conflict continues to drive acute food insecurity and displacements. Although the security situation improved across most of the country, hostilities increased in the northwest and northeast, especially in Idlib and Aleppo governorates (OCHA, 2022). The destruction of physical capital, forced displacements, and collapse of economic activity force the population to increasingly use negative food and livelihood coping strategies (World Bank, 2022). Conflict also hindered humanitarian assistance because of damage to infrastructure and difficulty of access to affected populations (OCHA, 2022). Additionally, the humanitarian crisis in the aftermath of the February 2023 earthquakes continues to pose a challenge to the country's food security outlook and humanitarian access (OCHA, 2023).
- High levels of acute food insecurity are exacerbated by the country's deep economic crisis resulting from protracted conflict, sanctions, the COVID-19 pandemic and the financial collapse in Lebanon, coupled with the macroeconomic ripple waves caused by the war in Ukraine and depreciation of local currency that further decrease household purchasing power (World Bank, 2022). Food price increases further undermine people's food security, with the standard reference food basket almost doubling in price compared with the same period last year (WFP, 2022). High prices for agricultural inputs in combination with weather anomalies and water scarcity drove the reduction in crop yields including livestock fodder crops, and consequently the food availability (OCHA, 2022).

Yemen

Acute food insecurity situation
October–December 2022



53% of the population
analysed in IPC 3+



-2%
COMPARED TO THE FIRST HALF OF 2022

CRISIS (IPC 3)

10.83
million

EMERGENCY (IPC 4)

6.08 million

- Nearly 17 million people, or over 53 percent of the population analysed, were estimated to experience high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) between October and December 2022. Of primary concern, is the 6.1 million people classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and the 4.3 million people who are internally displaced as a result of conflict. While this analysis update shows that Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) has been prevented, close monitoring remains essential. Compared with previous projection for this period, the situation improved notably due to the temporary truce, provision of humanitarian assistance and seasonal factors (IPC, 2022).
- The high levels of acute food insecurity are driven by the impact of Yemen's conflict on its people with long-term effects, in particular the loss of life, disruption of livelihoods and internal displacement; and the above normal rainfall and moderate-to-severe drought conditions which were coupled by an unprecedented rise in temperatures, affecting all cropped regions of Yemen. Yemen's economy also remains frail and unstable and the war in Ukraine has triggered spikes in international prices of wheat and other basic food and fuel commodities, contributing to local food inflation (IPC, 2022).
- During the last quarter of 2022, increasing clashes along the frontlines in parts of Marib, Ta'iz, Al-Jawf and Shabwa governorates resulted in the displacement of several hundreds of households. In January, the escalation in hostilities, mainly in Lahj, Abyan and Marib governorates, resulted in further displacement of families. Active frontlines and insecurity, landmine risks, lack of infrastructure, and bureaucratic requirements make most of Al Bayda and Marib's districts hard to access, creating challenges with delivering life-saving humanitarian assistance (OCHA, 2023).
- In January 2023, food imports through the southern ports of Aden and Mukalla were 79 percent higher compared with January last year. Red Sea ports, however, saw a 42 percent decrease in imported food. The total volume of food imports through all ports of Yemen was 16 percent less than the recorded levels in January 2022 (WFP, 2023).
- At the end of January 2023, the Yemeni riyal in Internationally Recognized Government (IRG)-controlled areas lost four percent of its value against the USD month-on-month while it depreciated by 14 percent year-on-year (WFP, 2023).
- Generally dry conditions dominated the whole country throughout February. Seasonal fodder shortages left livestock on the brink across much of Yemen (FAO and MoA, 2023). Farmers' access to inputs remains constrained by the lack of liquidity and high prices of generally imported inputs (FAO, 2023).

Haiti

Acute food insecurity situation
March–June 2023



49% of the population
analysed in IPC 3+

CRISIS (IPC 3)	EMERGENCY (IPC 4)
3.08 million	1.81 million



+4%
OR 0.4 MILLION PEOPLE MORE COMPARED WITH SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR

- Nearly half of the population analysed is projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) from March to June 2023, or 4.9 million people. This is an increase from the already high magnitude of the previous estimate from March–June 2022, with 394 000 more people affected by high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC, 2023). The increased humanitarian food assistance reaching almost a third of the target population has effectively reduced the number of people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) that was as high as 19 200 people (IPC, 2022). However, 1.81 million people remain in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), and in a structural context of vulnerability (IPC, 2023; OCHA, 2023).
- Regarding nutrition, the most affected areas are Ville de Jérémie and Cité Soleil, where one in five children under five years of age suffering from wasting and stunting affected one in four children in April 2022 (UNICEF, 2022).
- The worsening sociopolitical and economic situation remains the key driver of acute food insecurity. Generalized violence and insecurity stemming from the armed groups is specifically affecting Port-au-Prince. Sexual violence against women on large scale is rampant, contributing to the displacement of over 155 000 people in the metropolitan area. The armed groups control the strategic infrastructure of the city, disrupting food and agricultural distribution chains, market supply and humanitarian access (OCHA, 2023).
- Amidst an economic recession, soaring inflation sees the national currency depreciate even further against the United States Dollar, making the country especially vulnerable to rising food and fuel prices. Haiti is among the top ten countries most affected by the global food price inflation, reaching 53 percent compared with last year (World Bank, 2023). As a result, the cost of the food basket increased at an average 98 percent compared with 2021, due to the price increase of all basket products. Affected by the soaring agricultural input and fuel prices, coupled with the high rate of poverty, 71 percent of producers reported not having resources to prepare for the winter season (CNSA, 2022).
- Haiti is one of the three countries most affected by extreme weather events in the world, and it is structurally vulnerable to extreme weather events such as hurricanes, floods or droughts (UNDP, 2023), including rainfall shortages in the past 6 months in the southern peninsula (WFP, 2023).

Section 2. Highlighted countries of concern

Conflict and insecurity triggered severe deteriorations in acute food insecurity during 2022 and into 2023, with populations facing Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 and above) significantly increasing in certain countries. In particular Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Haiti are expected to face increases of populations facing acute food insecurity during this period.³

In Burkina Faso, the food security crisis is the worst on record as per available data. Catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 5) has been on the rise with almost 42 700 people projected to face starvation and death by August 2023. Around 2.2 million people are currently in high levels of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 3 and above), and this is projected to increase by approximately 50 percent in the coming months.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the two provinces of North Kivu and Ituri have over 4.3 million Congolese in high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above), with almost 30 percent in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) of the analysed population in the country living in these areas.

In Haiti, almost 1 million more people have fallen into high levels of acute food insecurity since 2020, reaching the unprecedented level of nearly 5 million people – one in two Haitians – projected to be in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) between March and June 2023. Of these, 1.8 million are estimated to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

There has been a sharp conflict-related deterioration in food insecurity in these three countries, documented humanitarian access constraints in reaching food insecure populations and evidence of conflict-specific food system damage. UNSC Resolution 2417 condemns both the starving of civilians as a method of warfare and the unlawful denial of humanitarian access to civilian populations in need of urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance. The Resolution calls on parties to conflicts to grant humanitarian access and provides the UNSC with options for responding to situations in which access is denied. It also reminds all parties to armed conflict to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law regarding the protection of civilians, highlighting that armed conflict, violations of international law and related food insecurity can also be drivers of displacement.

Resolution 2417 stresses that “...objects necessary for food production and distribution, such as farms, markets, water systems, mills, food processing and storage sites” must not be attacked and that “...objects that are indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, crops, livestock, agricultural assets...and irrigation works”,⁴ must not be destroyed, targeted or rendered useless.

³ In Haiti, the population facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) increased by 490 000 people (37 percent) between March–June 2022 and early 2023. For the Democratic Republic of the Congo, despite an observed decrease at country level in the population facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) between the first half of 2022 and 2023, some local conflict-affected areas faced increases in the population facing critical levels of acute food insecurity, such as Nord-Kivu, where 631 000 people are expected to face such levels of acute food insecurity up to June 2023 compared to 546 000 people a year earlier. In Burkina Faso, despite a slight decrease in the population in Emergency (CH Phase 4) between March–May 2022 and early 2023, the population in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) increased from 0 to 22 000 people. Also, a significant increase – by 106 percent – in the population facing CH Phase 4 and above is projected between March–May 2023 and June–August 2023.

⁴ UNSC Resolution 2417 (2018), adopted by the Security Council on 24 May 2018 (S/RES/2417), para. 1.

The recent evolution of the situations in Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Haiti is particularly worrying. This section seeks to contribute to the monitoring of the implementation of Resolution 2417 in these three countries. It explores some of the impacts of armed conflict on food security from the perspective of protecting civilians and objects indispensable for their survival that represent essential components of food systems, as well as the challenges of securing safe, timely and unimpeded humanitarian access, both of which are addressed by Resolution 2417.

Conflict-related impacts referenced in Resolution 2417

For each of these countries of concern – Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Haiti – three distinct conflict-related impacts referenced in Resolution 2417 are examined:

1. Impact of conflict on population movement

Mass-displacement due to conflict and conflict-induced hunger continues to proliferate in crises around the world. New and existing displacement remains a major concern in Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, to a lesser degree, Haiti. Although population movement is primarily linked to violence, the inability to provide food for family members is also a clear factor in displacement. Fighting has cut off many communities from infrastructure, transport routes and markets, leaving people food insecure, particularly during lean seasons. This phenomenon has accelerated population movements in all three countries of concern.

2. Impact of conflict on food systems

One of the most worrying aspects of contemporary conflicts is their impact on essential food systems and objects indispensable to the survival⁵ of civilian populations. Farms, crops, grazing pastures, fisheries, irrigation systems, livestock, mills and food processing and storage sites are all targeted with alarming regularity. Such actions are specifically referenced in Resolution 2417 and continue to be encountered by United Nations agencies in crises around the world, including in all three countries of concern.

3. Impact of conflict on humanitarian access and humanitarians' ability to work


Humanitarian access remains one of the most critical issues affecting aid agencies operating in complex emergencies and underpins Resolution 2417. As in so many other contexts, obstacles to reaching people in need are significant and contribute directly to food insecurity in each of the three countries examined in this section. Furthermore, constantly shifting political and security landscapes are a major source of disruption for humanitarians in protracted conflicts. There is compelling evidence of interference and disruption faced by humanitarians in all three countries of concern.

⁵ Objects indispensable to survival are non-exhaustively defined in article 54 of Additional Protocol I (applicable in international armed conflicts) and article 14 of Additional Protocol II (applicable in non-international armed conflicts) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 as "...foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works."


Burkina Faso

Acute food insecurity situation

Current | March–May 2023



Projected | June–August 2023



Map key – CH acute food insecurity phase classification

1 – Minimal 2 – Stressed 3 – Crisis 4 – Emergency 5 – Famine □ Not analysed

Source: CH. 2023. *Fiche de communication du Cadre Harmonisé de mars 2023*. Rome. <https://fsccluster.org/burkina-faso/document/fiche-de-communication-du-cadre-0>

This analysis provides an overview of how conflict and violence contributed to further increase of food insecurity between April 2021 and February 2023. This represents an update from the April 2021 edition of this report, in which Burkina Faso was raised.

Acute food insecurity situation

- By 2023, the food security crisis in Burkina Faso has reached the most alarming level on record, according to available data. Over the past year, the number of people in catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 5) has been on the rise with almost 2 000 people between October–December 2022 (FSC, 2022a), almost 22 500 people in CH Phase 5 between March–May 2023, and almost 42 700 people projected to be in these conditions by August 2023 (CH, 2023). They are mostly located in the four provinces of the Sahel region, the most difficult area to reach with humanitarian assistance due to conflict.

- Overall, acute food insecurity has increased across the country. Currently (March–May 2023), nearly 2.2 million people are in acute food insecurity Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 and above), while almost 3.4 million people (or 15 percent of the population) are expected to be acutely food insecure and in need of urgent assistance during the lean season between June–August 2023 (CH, 2023).
- The situation is particularly acute in the most conflict-affected regions of Burkina Faso (Sahel, Est, Boucle du Mouhoun, Centre-Nord and Nord), where almost 605 000 people are projected to be in Emergency (CH Phase 4) between June–August 2023 (CH, 2023).
- Across these regions, people are driven into acute food insecurity rampant insecurity, violence and conflict-induced displacement. The disruption of markets and basic social services in addition to inflation of food prices further exacerbate this already grave situation.

Overview of conflict impact on food security

Over recent years, Burkina Faso's food crisis escalated due to increasing armed conflicts and violence in the northern and eastern regions (GNAFC and FSIN, 2022). NSAGs continued to operate across most of the country – particularly in border areas – carrying out attacks that destroyed lives and livelihoods, constrained alternative income-generating opportunities and forcibly displacing populations, rendering people more vulnerable to food insecurity.

Since 2021, the worsening violence in Burkina Faso has been largely driven by the Al Qaeda-affiliated Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), which increased activity across several regions in the country. The group's violence — including attacks on both civilians and state forces — increased over 200 percent in 2021 compared with 2020 (ACLED, 2022). Throughout 2022, previously safe areas – especially in the south and the west – have become insecure under heavy pressure from JNIM and from the Islamic State Sahel Province. The Islamic State Sahel Province is the second most active armed actor in the Sahel regional conflict and has returned to areas where they had been largely absent after being pushed out by JNIM during 2020 intra-NSAGs fighting in 2020 (ACLED, 2023a).

Since 2022, 40 percent of the country's territory remains outside government control (ACAPS, 2022a). Violence and insecurity now affect 13 out of 15 regions of Burkina Faso (International Crisis Group, 2022). Fifteen cities are under blockade in the Nord, Sahel and Est regions, and in 59 districts access is constrained, with up to 1.4 million people limited in their freedom of movement, socioeconomic activities and livelihoods (FSC, 2022a). Insecurity has resulted in large-scale population displacement (WFP, 2022), with nearly 1.9 million people internally displaced (Government of Burkina Faso and OCHA, 2023) as compared with 1.2 million in April 2021 (FEWS NET, 2021).

In a stark departure from the April 2021 report to the UNSC, nearly 3.4 million people are now projected to face high acute food insecurity (CH Phase 3 and above) in June–August 2023 (CH, 2022; WFP, 2023), representing a nearly 20 percent increase as compared with the same period in 2021. Similarly, during the 2022 June–August lean season, 3.4 million people were projected to be in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 and above). This included around 630 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) – the highest number recorded in the history of the CH (CH, 2022). The unprecedented levels of acute hunger is the consequence of decreasing availability and access to food, high food prices, population displacement, and loss of livelihoods, particularly in the regions most affected by insecurity (the northern provinces of Soum, Yagha and Oudalan in the Sahel region, all heavily impacted by the armed conflict) (FEWS NET, 2022a). By June–August 2023, almost 42 700 people are expected to face catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 5) including 27 800 of them among the IDP population of Soum and Oudalan in the Sahel region.

Humanitarian access has continued to deteriorate as NSAGs expanded and consolidated presence over the territory, as testified by shifting Burkina Faso from the “high access constraints” category in 2021 to the “very high access constraints” category in 2022 (ACAPS, 2021; ACAPS, 2022a).

Impact of conflict on population movement

Since 2021, Burkina has replaced Mali as the epicentre of the regional conflict. The deterioration of violence against civilians across most of the country has been amongst the main causes for a marked increase in forced displacement registered in the past few years. In 2022, around 300 000 new IDPs were registered, and 300 000 additional people are forecast to be displaced by the end of 2024 (DRC, 2023).

Driven by the increase of insecurity in the Boucle de Mouhoun, Nord, Centre-Nord and Est regions, population movements have increased towards bigger urban centres and the south. Trend analysis shows that a stark increase in forced displacement – mostly concentrated in the Sahel region with almost 0.5 million IDPs (FSC, 2023) – has gone hand in hand with increasing levels of violence and food insecurity.

The number of IDPs has more than doubled over three years, rising from 766 000 in February 2020 to approximately 1.1 million by February 2021, increasing again to almost 2 million people by February 2023 (UNHCR, 2023), in parallel with the rise of the jihadist insurgency in the country.

Violence against civilians alone almost doubled in three years, rising from 708 events in 2019 to 1 314 in 2021 and 1 272 in 2022 (ACLEd, 2023b),⁶ causing a significant increase in the number of civilian fatalities which almost doubled in 2022 compared with 2021, spiking from 600 in 2021 to 1 000 in 2022 (INSO, 2022). Available information shows a weakening security environment, where armed groups' attacks are more violent and more impactful. Between January–March 2023, over 300 violent incidents attributed to NSAGs, resulting in over 1 100 deaths including civilians. Compared with the same period in 2022, data shows an almost 50 percent increase in casualties, especially in the Sahel, Nord, Centre-Nord and Est regions, leading to displacement of populations (ACLEd, 2023c).

The increasing toll on civilians is also shown by UN-recorded violations and abuses that almost doubled between October and December 2022 compared with previous months. Armed groups are responsible for most of these incidents (OHCHR, 2023). NSAG attacks – in addition to those against the armed forces – mostly target local communities perceived to be siding with state authorities.

Military operations have also taken a toll on civilians and on the Fulani community in particular, accused of displaying loyalty or sympathy for jihadist groups (OHCHR, 2023). Actions by all parties to the conflict underpin reasons for civilian populations to decide to move, increasing forced internal displacement.

⁶ This refers to battles, remote violence and violence against civilians, which spiked from 2 632 events throughout 2021, to 3 278 in 2022, as compared to 1 234 events in 2019 and 1 312 events in 2020 (ACLEd, 2023b).

Impact of the conflict on food systems

NSAGs groups have encircled, besieged, or partially besieged a number of cities across the country, controlling access routes, limiting or preventing entry and exit of people and goods as well as access by humanitarian organizations. This has hampered local populations' access to food and basic services, reduced agricultural activity, increasing their vulnerability and hunger, and pushing some people to the brink of famine. The town of Djibo in Soum province, surrounded by NSAGs since February 2022, is one of the areas of major concern. NSAGs have placed a blockade on the city, controlling access routes (FEWS NET, 2023). Already 12 months into the blockade, thousands of people have become acutely food insecure (ACAPS, 2022b). NSAGs have severely disrupted markets constraining households' access to food and incomes, leading to consumption deficits as households spent days without eating food, with resulting signs of wasting and highly likely to experience catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 5) (FEWS NET, 2023). Local food production has considerably dropped given the water deficit and abandonment of agricultural and pastoral activities (ACAPS, 2022b).

NSAGs have imposed blockades also on Pama, Mansila, Tankoualou, Sebba, Arbinda, Kelbo, Titao and Solle where thousands of people, confined to increasingly tighter spaces and unable to flee, are facing a major food crisis (ICRC, 2022a). In some cities, once national military forces left, local communities abandoned their town out of fear of encirclement. This was the case in Madjoari in the eastern Komienga region and Foubé in the Centre-Nord. Other cities are partly or totally besieged by NSAGs, including Tin-Ediar, Tin-Akoff in Oudalan, and, more recently Partiaga in eastern Tapoa province (FEWS NET, 2022a). Finally, Dori, an important commercial crossroads in the north, is increasingly deprived of basic commodities and difficult to reach (International Crisis Group, 2022).

Parties to the conflict have reportedly targeted objects indispensable for the survival of the civilian population, contributing to increasing vulnerabilities. The increased territorial control of NSAGs has led to a water crisis, with water points specifically targeted and destroyed by NSAGs (ICRC, 2022a). As a result, over 470 000 people have lost access to water – especially in the Sahel and in the east (UNICEF, 2023) – which is exacerbated by a dramatic increase of pressure on water resources due to the massive influx of displaced people.

Insecurity has also significantly affected agricultural productivity, with the 2021 growing season being one of the worst in recent years. While this was also caused by extremely sparse rainfall, more than 450 000 hectares of arable land lay inaccessible in 2021 due to rising levels of violence (ICRC, 2022b). In northern regions, between 30 to 50 percent of land under cultivation has been lost due to insecurity (ICRC, 2022a), while remote sensing data indicates pockets of below-average vegetation conditions also in Centre-Est and Est regions, mostly due to restricted farmers' access to the fields (FAO, 2022). Moreover, increasing insecurity and blockades have disrupted pastoralism and cattle raising which represented the main sources of income in provinces such as Djibo (FSC, 2022b), Titao (FSC, 2022c) and Sebba (FSC, 2022d) with increasing losses of cattle due to looting, disease (made worse due to lack of veterinary access), and corruption due to the displacement of pastoralists to zones with limited access to water and food sources. Surveyed households reported losses of their livestock of about 80 to 100 percent in 2022 due to the blockade (FSC, 2022b).

Conflict impacted national cereal production in 2022, reducing it by 10 percent below the near-average level, leading to forecasted production at 4.3 million tonnes and this despite general conducive weather conditions, reflecting the adverse effects of conflict on cropping activities and low application of fertilizers (FAO, 2022).

The impact of security deterioration reverberated also on food access, as the price of cereals in December 2022 was 37 percent above 2021 prices and 78 percent above the five-year average (WFP and SONAGESS, 2022), significantly reducing purchasing power (FSC, 2023). As of September 2022, prices of sorghum and millet were 43 and 44 percent, respectively, higher than one year before, reflecting tight market availabilities due to the severe deterioration of security conditions in the conflict-affected areas (FAO, 2022). The Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) reached a record high of 24.5 percent in May 2022, with a five-year change in staple cereal prices of 70 to 80 percent and double this in blockaded areas (FEWS NET, 2022b).

Impact on humanitarian access and humanitarians' ability to work

In 2022, Burkina Faso ranked amongst the 17 countries worldwide where the level of humanitarian access constraints is identified as “very high”. While humanitarian access in the country remained stable in 2021 (ACAPS, 2021), it deteriorated in 2022 (ACAPS, 2022) moving from a ranking of high to very high access constraints. Access worsened in the second half of 2022 as NSAGs expanded and consolidated their presence over an estimated 40 percent of the territory. The multiplication of areas controlled by armed groups in East, Nord, and Sahel regions has directly reduced humanitarian space for civilians and humanitarians (ACAPS, 2022). Humanitarian space has significantly contracted with up to one million people completely isolated and unable to access social services, markets or essential supplies (UNICEF, 2023). The hardest to reach areas are those where food insecurity is highest, for instance the Sahel region in the north.

In order to assist populations in areas outside government control, air delivery assistance remains the last resort. However, humanitarian flights remain irregular, often suspended due to security concerns, insufficient in terms of magnitude (FSC, 2023) and constrained by bureaucratic requests from the Government of Burkina Faso – including the August 2022 request to have military escorts for transport in areas under NSAG threat and the request to have personnel of the Council for Emergency Relief and Rehabilitation (CONASUR) on board of UNHAS flights.

The most prominent example of a city besieged is Djibo, in the province of Soum, hosting a population of 89 000 people and 285 000 IDPs, where, since January 2022, JNIM has prevented entry and exit for the local population and where the few convoys that bring supplies in are faced with attacks from NSAGs who have planted IEDs along the main routes (DRC, 2023).


Access constraints also result from tactics used by NSAGs that use IEDs to isolate certain areas from the rest of the country. This is the case in Est, Centre-Nord, Nord, and Sahel regions. IEDs are increasingly used to control territories and access. As of 30 August 2022, United Nations Mine Action Service Data pointed out that the average number of IEDs increased from 6 per month in 2020, to 8.8 in 2021 and 20.3 in 2022 (DRC, 2023).

A fast-shrinking humanitarian space is also testified by the increase of attacks against NGOs, which in 2022 reported 64 incidents, a 20 percent increase from 2021, the majority perpetrated by NSAGs (INSO, 2022).


Democratic Republic of the Congo

Acute food insecurity situation

Current | July–December 2022



Projected | January–June 2023



Map key – IPC acute food insecurity phase classification

1 – Minimal 2 – Stressed 3 – Crisis 4 – Emergency 5 – Famine Not analysed

Source: IPC. 2022. *Democratic Republic of the Congo: Acute Insecurity Situation July - December 2022 and Projection for January - June 2023*. Rome. ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155972/?iso3=COD

This analysis provides an overview of how conflict and violence contributed to critical food insecurity levels in the provinces of North Kivu and Ituri, with a specific focus on the impact of conflict from January 2021 to February 2023.

Acute food insecurity situation

- The two conflict-affected provinces of North Kivu and Ituri include around 4.3 million acutely food insecure Congolese in need of urgent assistance. North Kivu and Ituri concentrate a significant portion (almost 30 percent) of the country's population facing critical Emergency levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase) (IPC, 2022). Additionally, the two provinces both have higher prevalence

compared with the national average of people in Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above): in North Kivu 36 percent of the population (11 percent higher than the national average) was estimated to be acutely food insecure and in need of urgent assistance (IPC Phase 3 and above); in Ituri 31 percent of the population (7 percent higher than the national average) (IPC, 2022).

- North Kivu and Ituri have had consistently staggering numbers of people in Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) in the last years. Protracted conflict and varying levels of armed violence feature as one they key drivers of these high levels of acute hunger (IPC, 2023).
- The country overall reached 27.3 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) in 2021, the highest recorded worldwide. These staggering levels have continued. Between July and December 2022, a total of 26.4 million people – 26 percent of the population analysed – were estimated in Crisis or worse acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) including 3.8 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) (IPC, 2022). A total of 24.5 million people are projected to be in Crisis or worse food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) between January and June 2023 (IPC, 2022).
- The intensification of existing conflicts since 2021 is a primary driver of acute food insecurity in the provinces of North Kivu and Ituri (WFP and FAO, 2022). National macroeconomic crisis, structurally poor investment in basic services and agriculture and below-average rainfall, as well as epidemics, have exerted additional pressure on households across the country, compounding the primary impact of conflict on hunger.

Overview of conflict and impact on food security

Since the early months of 2021, the security situation in the North Kivu and Ituri provinces, affected by two-decades long armed conflict, started further deteriorating amid increasing armed groups' activities (UNSC, 2021). In 2022, despite a state of siege that has effectively been in force in the two provinces since May 2021 and the deployment of foreign forces, security significantly deteriorated, and violence continues to exact a significant toll on the population (UNSC, 2022a; UNSC, 2022b).

Protracted armed conflicts and pervasive insecurity have been major contributors to acute food insecurity in North Kivu and Ituri (IPC, 2022), as staggering levels of violence have gone hand in hand with massive levels of forced displacement, disrupting not only people's livelihood, but reducing food production and access to food as land was left uncultivated and markets disrupted. In just the second half of 2022, the re-emergence of armed clashes linked to the expansion of NSAGs such as the March 23 Movement (M23), the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Cooperative for Development of the Congo (CODECO) caused a 49 percent increase in displacement (FEWS NET, 2023a; UNSC, 2022b). Overall, in a region with vast tracts of fertile land, agricultural production and domestic food consumption have been significantly impacted by displacement, while conflicts have caused severe market access challenges and transportation disruptions.

Conflicts also constrained access to humanitarian assistance. In North Kivu and Ituri, insecurity and targeted violence have represented persistent obstacles for humanitarian agencies. Around 60 percent of incidents affecting humanitarian access were reported in these two provinces. Reported bureaucratic impediments and movement restrictions have also been hindering the ability of agencies to provide basic services.

Impact of conflict on population movement

Significant levels of conflict-induced displacements have occurred in the provinces of North Kivu and Ituri, reducing people's access to food, disrupting food value chains, and impacting agricultural activity. Displaced populations are particularly vulnerable to food insecurity.

The two provinces of North Kivu and Ituri host more than 50 percent of all displaced people in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with 2.3 million and 1.5 million per province respectively out of 6 million nationally (OCHA, 2023a). Comparing data on forced displacement and food insecurity, the link becomes evident: North Kivu and Ituri are two out of the five provinces in the entire country that have the highest prevalence of people in Crisis or worse food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above).

The vast majority of people, around 86 percent, who were forcibly displaced as of January 2023 – estimated at over 6 million – have fled violence and conflict. One-third, around 2.1 million people, fled in 2022 alone (OCHA, 2022a).

Violence and displacement levels in North Kivu and Ituri have gone hand in hand, following an upward curve. The expansion of NSAGs resulted in an increase in violence and conflict since 2021, with peaks from November 2021 to January 2022, and from June 2022 onwards. In North Kivu, the number of political violence-related events in 2022 grew by 7 percent compared with 2021: the province accounted for the highest number of political violence events across the country in 2022 (ACLEDD, 2023). Increased attacks against civilians were reported both in North Kivu and Ituri provinces and were mostly attributed to the March 23 Movement (M23), Cooperative for Development of the Congo (CODECO), Nyatura factions and Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) (UNSC, 2022b). At least 1 137 violent deaths were reported in 2022 in North Kivu and Ituri, compared with 741 in 2021 and 729 in 2020 (Kivu Security Tracker, 2023). In 2022, the UN Joint Human Rights Office also reported an increase in extrajudicial executions compared with 2021, owing to an increase in attacks on civilians in the two provinces (UNJHRO, 2022). In January 2023 only, at least 49 civilians were allegedly executed by the Cooperative for Development of the Congo (CODECO) armed group in the Djugu territory (OSAPG, 2023). Moreover, throughout 2021 and 2022, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) were reported to specifically target civilians in urban areas using IEDs, putting further pressure on displacement (UNSC, 2022b).

In parallel to this increased violence, forcibly displaced people rose from around 1 million in 2021 to 1.8 million in 2022 in North Kivu and from 1.4 million to 1.5 million in Ituri (IOM, 2023). In the second half of 2022, a 49 percent increase in displacement was observed across the provinces (FEWS NET, 2023b). Attacks in the territories of Rutshuru, Nyiragongo, Masisi, Walikale, Lubero and Goma in North Kivu displaced at least 602 000 people between March 2022 and January 2023 (OCHA, 2023b). A July 2022 survey found that 92 percent of displacements in North Kivu were caused by armed groups attacks (IOM, 2022). In Ituri, at least 245 000 people have been displaced in the Mahagi territory since November 2022, while the security situation continues to deteriorate in the Djugu territory, more particularly in Drodo, Bukachele and Nyamaba (OCHA, 2023c). Moreover, escalating fighting forced the population to also flee to neighbouring countries, more particularly to Uganda, Burundi, the United Republic of Tanzania and Rwanda (UNHCR, 2023a).⁷

⁷ UNHCR counts over 1 million refugees and asylum seekers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo as of 31 March 2023, with close to 50 percent in Uganda, followed by Burundi, the United Republic of Tanzania, Kenya and Rwanda (UNHCR, 2023a).

This trend has continued into 2023 as the conflict has intensified and the March 23 Movement (M23) made major territorial gains, following a first rapid expansion towards Goma at the end of 2022 (International Crisis Group, 2023). In February 2023, some 300 000 people were reported to have fled Rutshuru and Masisi territories in North Kivu province (UNHCR, 2023b).

Impact of the conflict on food systems

Violence and armed conflict have had a serious impact on the agriculture sector and contributed to poor harvests over recent years, affecting availability and access to food. In 2021, conflict-related violence and displacement caused severe disruptions of agricultural activities with an impact on local food production, reflected in a below-normal main season cereal harvest across the east of the country. Households were forced to deplete stocks earlier than normal (GNAFC and FSIN, 2022a). This trend continued into early 2022, with an impact on secondary season maize crops harvesting and land preparation for the main season (GNAFC and FSIN, 2022b). The stark increase in conflict driven displacements in late 2022 and early 2023, which have prevented significant parts of the population to engage in agricultural activities, has curbed food availability even further. Reduced harvesting in the context of renewed hostilities during the main season has already translated into the season's harvests being below the five-year average and is likely to continue impacting food availability also in the months to come (FEWS NET, 2023a; FEWS NET, 2023b).

The escalating conflict exacerbates an already critical situation of increasing prices of basic staples, driven by the compounded effect of a global increase in fuel and food prices, depreciation of local currency, high transport costs and insecurity (FEWS NET, 2023b). The Minimum Expenditure Basket had increased by 27 percent between January and October 2022, mainly driven by the food basket (+47 percent) (OCHA, 2023d). Food prices in Goma registered an even more significant spike in February 2023, with the price of key staples rising around 100 percent compared with the same time the previous year (USAID, 2023).⁸

Fuel prices have increased due to limited imports due to worsening security, causing high transportation costs. Since April 2022, fuel prices across the country have risen by between 10 and 30 percent. This has had an impact on the prices of goods and services, and therefore on poor households' access to foods that form an important part of their food basket (FEWS NET, 2022a).

Conflict-driven population displacement also often implies that economic actors move away from occupied areas, as is demonstrated by a significant decline in economic activity on the Uganda-Democratic Republic of the Congo border in Rutshuru territory after the March 23 Movement (M23) takeover (UNSC, 2022a). Producers and traders encounter market access and input replenishment challenges, with 43 percent of traders having witnessed security incidents directly or indirectly in September 2022 (OCHA, 2023d). Traders are often forced to find alternative routes to avoid insecurity hotspots and sell their goods, such as by passing through Uganda/Rwanda to reach the Goma market from Rutshuru territory (FEWS NET, 2023b). Both North Kivu and Ituri have further seen a deteriorating trend in market access for their population, with 3.4 million people facing constraints accessing markets in Ituri, and 7.34 million in North Kivu (WFP, 2023a).

Insecurity, extended road blockades and reduced access to strategic roads by parties to the conflict disrupted flows of commercial goods, including agricultural inputs, tools and equipment, with repercussions on food availability due to shortages and rising prices. Some examples include the repeated closure to traffic of all major axes leading to Goma by North Kivu provincial authorities due

⁸ February 2023 compared to February 2022: beans +107 percent, corn flour +95 percent and rice +89 percent (USAID, 2023).

to insecurity,⁹ the closure of all land borders with Rwanda from 15.00 to 18.00 since June 2022 (Crisis 24, 2022), as well as systematic road blockades by the March 23 Movement (M23) in its rapid expansion into Masisi and Rutshuru territories in late 2022 and early 2023 (UNSC, 2022a).¹⁰ Several months of reduced passage and disrupted supply chains for both local and imported food produce via the key transit point of Rutshuru area have reduced availability of essential goods and impacted prices of various basic staples, with 10 to 67 percent increases recorded in the autumn of 2022 (FEWS NET, 2022b). Territorial expansion by NSAGs is commonly associated with an expansion of the tax base of these groups and a decrease in funding for the Congolese treasury. In areas controlled by the March 23 Movement (M23), goods are reportedly regularly taxed both at border crossings and in the occupied territories, including households, cattle and agricultural crops (UNSC, 2022a).

Since 2021, an increase in targeting of infrastructure and objects of civilian nature has also been recorded (OCHA, 2023e). All parties to the conflict have reportedly engaged with impunity in indiscriminate attacks, resulting in civilian casualties and destruction of civilian infrastructure (UNHRC, 2022). A total of 32 779 incidents violating property rights, including looting, extortion or destruction of goods or homes, were reported between January and September 2022, with North Kivu and Ituri being among the most affected provinces. Key infrastructure indispensable for survival, such as water points, are regularly targeted (OCHA, 2023d). In March 23 Movement (M23)-controlled areas in North Kivu combatants reportedly also systematically looted crops from fields and transported them to their camps, in addition to forcing civilians to work in the fields (UNSC, 2022a).¹¹ The Beni-Butembo region in North Kivu has been particularly targeted by attacks with IEDs, with near to daily bomb alerts and frequent high casualty incidents in markets, schools or churches, mostly attributed to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) (Okala, 2023). An increased use of landmines by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) has been reported not only in urban settings, but also in rural areas, often on roads leading to fields (Global Protection Cluster, 2022). Displacement camps and health services have also become frequent targets in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with the majority of these incidents taking place in North Kivu and Ituri (UNHC, 2022; WHO, 2023).¹²

Impact on humanitarian access and humanitarianists' ability to work

Throughout 2021 and 2022, the Democratic Republic of the Congo continued to be ranked among the 17 countries worldwide where humanitarian access constraints are classified as “very high”. The most significant challenges for humanitarian access are due to ongoing insecurity or hostilities affecting humanitarian assistance, and targeted violence against humanitarian personnel, facilities, and assets. An increase in restrictions and obstruction of people’s access to assistance, as well as in interference to humanitarian activities, was also registered in 2022 (ACAPS, 2021; ACAPS, 2022a).¹³

North Kivu and Ituri were among the provinces where most access-related incidents took place both in 2021 and 2022. Out of the 666 incidents affecting humanitarian access in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2022, 60 percent were recorded in North Kivu (240) and Ituri (155). These incidents range from bureaucratic impediments to violence against humanitarian personnel or assets and had a

⁹ In early March 2023, authorities ordered the closure of the Goma-Rutshuru-Kanyabayonga, Goma-Sake-Kitchanga-Pinga, and Goma-Sake-Mushaki-Masisi-Walikale roads, after only 24h from their reopening since a long period of closure (Actualité CD, 2023).

¹⁰ For more details see Annex 16 of UNSC, 2022a.

¹¹ For more details see Annex 16 of UNSC, 2022a.

¹² Between June 2021 and May 2022, 17 attacks against IDP centres have been perpetrated by members of NSAGs.

At least 151 civilians were killed by CODECO combatants only (UNHC, 2022).

Between January 2021 and March 2023, WHO recorded 48 attacks on health care (WHO, 2023).

¹³ In 2022, there were 17 countries assessed as having very high humanitarian access constraints, up from 11 in 2021 (ACAPS, 2021; ACAPS, 2022b).

significant impact on people in need. Access to humanitarian assistance was impeded or delayed for long periods for more than 2 million beneficiaries in Ituri and 1.65 million beneficiaries in North Kivu over the course of 2022, leading to a further aggravation of already high humanitarian needs, including those associated with critical levels of food insecurity (OCHA, 2022b; OCHA, 2022c; OCHA, 2022d; OCHA, 2023f).

The expansion of NSAGs into new territories in 2021 and 2022, coupled with an increase in active operations by armed forces, made humanitarian operations increasingly challenging (ACAPS, 2022b). This trend continues into 2023, with fighting in new areas in Masisi and Rutshuru territories (North Kivu province) between 23–27 January 2023 alone impacting the access of 300 000 people to humanitarian assistance (OCHA, 2023g). Humanitarian organizations are frequently forced to (re)-negotiate access with various actors, some of which impose conditions on aid delivery (ACAPS, 2021). Various humanitarian organizations had to temporarily suspend their activities in various territories in North Kivu and Ituri provinces over recent years (UNSC, 2022b). In early 2023, WFP had to significantly adjust its operations in light of major access and supply arteries in North Kivu being affected by insecurity and road blockades, forcing it to re-route supplies through Rwanda and Uganda, delaying distributions. The attack against an UN Humanitarian Air Service helicopter on 24 February further forced WFP to suspend flights in North Kivu and Ituri (WFP, 2023b).

Frequent movement restrictions, notably the enforcement of curfews, the suspension of road traffic on major axes and checkpoints by parties to the conflict, also hamper aid delivery and prevent communities from accessing assistance.

Bureaucratic impediments, such as delays or refusals in procedures for obtaining visas or official administrative documents necessary to operate in the country, continue to be regularly reported by international and national NGOs (OCHA, 2022e). Impediments lead to programme interruptions, increased cost and reduced staff time.


Insecurity linked to robberies, intimidation, killings and other acts of violence by armed and criminal groups has continued to impact humanitarian operations both indirectly and directly. Besides armed violence driving population displacement or confinement, resulting in challenges in access to aid, humanitarian assistance operations also represent a frequent target. In 2022, 293 incidents directly targeting humanitarian personnel or assets were recorded in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with North Kivu and Ituri being the most affected provinces. Nine humanitarian workers were killed, 21 kidnapped and 23 injured during 2022. These figures are in line with the 2021 trend, when 292 attacks to humanitarian personnel or goods were recorded (OCHA, 2023e). These incidents usually carry high levels of impunity. An incident that attracted international attention is the ambushing of a WFP convoy on the Goma-Kibumba Road in North Kivu on 22 February 2021, in which the Italian Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, his bodyguard and a WFP driver were executed (UNSC, 2022b).

The presence of land mines, IEDs and explosive remnants of war limit the ability of displaced populations to access humanitarian aid as well as the capacity of humanitarian organizations to reach those in need. Between January and September 2022, OCHA recorded 56 civilian deaths caused by IEDs, taking place mostly in North Kivu and Ituri (OCHA, 2023h).




Haiti

Acute food insecurity situation

Current | September 2022–February 2023



Projected | March–June 2023



Map key – IPC acute food insecurity phase classification

■ 1 – Minimal	■ 4 – Emergency	At least 25 percent of households meet 25–50 percent of caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance	At least 25 percent of households meet over 50 percent of caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance
■ 2 – Stressed	■ 5 – Famine	 Not analysed	
■ 3 – Crisis			

Source: IPC. 2022. *Haiti: Acute Food Insecurity Situation September 2022 - February 2023 and Projection for March - June 2023*. Rome. ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155963; IPC. 2023. *Haiti: Acute Food Insecurity Projection Update for March - June 2023*. Rome. ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156263

This analysis provides an overview of how armed violence has contributed to rising food insecurity since 2021.

Acute food insecurity situation

- The severity of the hunger crisis in Haiti has rapidly deteriorated over the last two years. Almost one million more people have fallen into high levels of acute food insecurity since 2020, reaching the unprecedented level of nearly 5 million people – one in two Haitians – projected in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) between March and June 2023. The population facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) increased by 490 000 people (equivalent to 37 percent) between March–June 2022 and early 2023 (IPC, 2023a; IPC, 2023b).

- According to an updated projection analysis conducted in March 2023, there is an increase of 200 000 people compared with the previous analysis published in October 2022, confirming that acute food insecurity remains extremely worrying in Haiti. Of the total 4.9 million people, 1.8 million are estimated to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), with the remainder in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). In 2023, Haiti is among the five countries with more than 10 percent of the population analysed facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity (IPC, 2023b).
- In Cité Soleil, one of the areas most affected by violence, the severity of hunger has deepened so dramatically that households in critical levels of acute food insecurity more than doubled between 2020 and 2022, rising from 57 000 to almost 135 000 (IPC Phase 4). Currently, 65 percent of the analysed population in Cité Soleil is in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above). In September 2022, for the first time ever in the history of IPC in Haiti, around 20 000 people were classified as facing starvation and death (IPC Phase 5) up to February 2023 (IPC, 2023c). However, more recent analysis concluded that increased humanitarian food assistance in recent months reached around 30 percent of the targeted population and reduced the most vulnerable people from Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) into lower IPC phases (IPC, 2023b).
- Violence, insecurity and access constraints have been consistently identified amongst the key drivers of food insecurity in the country (IPC, 2023b). Armed groups have strengthened territorial foothold in strategic areas in and around Port-au-Prince controlling the country's main supply routes, fuel terminals and driving displacement. Additionally, they have taken control of major agricultural production areas in the Artibonite department, Haiti's breadbasket, leading to rural displacement, alongside and systematic stealing of crops and livestock.

Overview of conflict impact on food security

Haiti's prolonged security crisis has taken an alarming turn for the worse since 2021. Even before the assassination of former President Moïse in July 2021, Haiti's cities and towns registered deteriorating economic and food security conditions, rising social unrest, and the growing menace of heavily armed groups and organized criminal organizations (UNODC, 2021). Political instability triggered by the political transition further exacerbated inter-armed group disputes, while also providing an opening for these groups to align themselves with political objectives and enabling opportunities for instrumentalization.

As a result, in recent years, armed groups have strengthened their territorial and political foothold in strategic areas in and around Port-au-Prince, which effectively empowers them to obstruct the country's main supply routes, fuel terminals and ports at will (UNSC, 2022a). This has brought about severe repercussions for the population, and directly contributed to rising levels of food insecurity. Armed groups' control over and related insecurity on the main transportation arteries in and out of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area disrupted the supply of markets throughout the country, with effects on availability of goods and inflation. Armed groups' blockade of main roads connecting vulnerable and remote neighbourhoods to the capital prevented the local population from accessing local markets and stopped smallholder farmers from selling their goods in the area. The blockade in late 2022 of the Varreux port (Port-au-Prince), Haiti's main fuel storage terminal, led to fuel shortages that seriously impacted economic activity and households' income, forcing essential businesses and services to close or limit their operations, significantly reducing income-generating activities.

As of early 2023, armed groups control territories in the Sud, Nord Ouest and Artibonite departments affecting economic activities, mainly linked to food systems, and the supply of markets, causing internal displacement impacting the agriculture sector and reducing food physical access to households (CNSA, 2022a). Armed groups are controlling large areas of Lower Artibonite, the breadbasket of Haiti. This is cutting off producers from markets and is having an impact on food availability across the country. A study by FAO and WFP indicates that armed group violence has directly targeted food-related infrastructure, such as irrigation canals, markets and warehouses in Artibonite and in urban areas (FAO and WFP, forthcoming).

Rising violence and insecurity linked to armed groups' clashes and territorial control in addition to the direct targeting of civilians have forced the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. For example, between August and November 2022, the UN recorded a 77 percent increase in forced displacement in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince – for a total of 155 139 IDPs (UNSC, 2023).

Violence and armed groups' activities limit humanitarian access and operations in a variety of ways. Increasing territorial control by armed groups and inter-armed group fighting, confrontations with police and violence have affected the ability of humanitarian organizations to implement their activities, particularly in Port-au-Prince (OCHA, 2022). Armed groups are now estimated to have control or influence over 80 percent of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. Some operations have closed or have been temporarily suspended, preventing delivery to populations in need. The insecurity of humanitarian personnel has become increasingly an issue (ACAPS, 2022).

Impact of conflict on population movement

Over the last two years, the number of people forcibly displaced by violence and insecurity mostly linked to attacks and armed groups' activities has skyrocketed, reaching unprecedented levels in the history of the country, and surpassing by far the numbers displaced by natural disasters. The drivers for internal population displacement are outlined below.

From 2020 until the end of 2022, recorded incidents of violence against civilians, including kidnapping and fatalities, mostly occurring in the metropolitan area of Port au Prince, almost doubled, rising from over 600 in 2020 to over 1 100 in 2022 (ACLED, 2023).

UN reports indicate that over the past few years, armed groups increasingly targeted local populations, deliberately killing, injuring and committing acts of sexual violence during coordinated armed attacks to expand their territorial control. As reported to the UNSC in January 2023, police officers were also reportedly involved in incidents of excessive use of force, leading to casualties (UNSC, 2023).

An Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) report assessed that during the July 2022 confrontations between armed groups in Cité Soleil, members deliberately targeted the local population living under the control of rival armed groups. This mostly occurred in the Brooklyn neighbourhood. Additionally, OHCHR concluded that targeting of the local population has become a major characteristic of the modus operandi of many armed groups operating in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area (OHCHR, 2023). Moreover, multiple UN reports detail how armed groups continued to use sexual violence, including rape, as a strategy to instil fear in communities, with the ultimate goal of extending their control. During armed group clashes in Croix-des-Bouquets in October 2022, at least 40 women were subjected to rape, including collective rape, by heavily armed elements. Women were deliberately targeted because they lived in an area controlled by a rival group. In addition, at least 71 people were killed, and dozens of homes were looted and destroyed. Turf battles also caused multiple casualties and other human rights abuses in the areas of

Savane Pistache (Port-au-Prince) and Laboule 12 (Pétionville), where rival coalitions clashed for control of key arteries connecting the capital to the southern part of the country (UNSC, 2023).

Kidnaps for ransom have continued to rise steadily over the last years, affecting civilians' security. Between 2019 and 2020, kidnaps increased by 200 percent (UNSC, 2021). In 2021, with 664 victims reported compared with 234 in 2020 (UNSC, 2021). In 2022, there was a further increase of 105 percent, with 1 359 victims (UNSC, 2023).

Displaced people doubled between 2020 and 2021, rising from almost 8 000 to over 16 000 (iDMC, 2023). In 2022, this trend reached new peaks: as of August 2022, over 87 000 new individuals were displaced in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince by armed group violence, while over 9 000 others fled to the southern regions (IOM, 2022a). Between August and November 2022, the UN recorded a 77 percent increase in forced displacements in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, for a total of 155 139 IDPs (UNSC, 2023). In the Artibonite and Centre departments displacement due to armed attacks totalled more than 3 000 individuals since February 2022 (DG ECHO, 2023). As of March 2023, new displacements amounted to over 8 400 people (IOM, 2023).

Impact of conflict on food systems

Armed groups have increasingly targeted critical infrastructure, including access to seaports, fuel terminals, airports and key roads in and out of major cities. Throughout 2022 and early 2023, armed groups have steadily expanded their control over key access points to cities, including the capital Port-au-Prince. Some have also focused on controlling key supply lines connected to public and private ports and international border crossings with the Dominican Republic (UNODC, 2023). This has brought about severe repercussions for the population on different fronts, directly contributed to rising levels of food insecurity, particularly inside the capital.

Throughout 2022, armed groups blocked the main roads connecting the Brooklyn neighbourhood of Cité Soleil with the rest of the capital, both to prevent the local population from accessing local markets and to stop goods from entering the area. The UN considered this as a deliberate attempt to cause food insecurity and limit access to water to control more territory, with a view to coercing the local population to confront a rival coalition controlling the area where they lived and help remove the rival armed groups from the territory (UNSC, 2022b).

A widely reported example is the blockade between September and November 2022 of the main fuel storage terminal Varreux in Port-au-Prince by armed groups associated with the G-9 coalition. The terminal has a strategic importance as it stores more than 70 percent of Haiti's total fuel supply. The blockade led to fuel shortages that contributed to the official price of gasoline doubling overnight in September 2022 to 570 Haitian Gourdes (HTG) per gallon. On the black market a gallon of gasoline was 4 000 Haitian Gourdes (HTG) a gallon in October 2022 (FEWS NET, 2022). The impact on economic activity and household incomes, already under pressure due to violence and insecurity and inflation, have been considerable, forcing essential businesses and services (such as banks and hospitals) to close or limit their operations, significantly reducing income-generating activities. Additionally, impacts on market supplies exacerbated the upward trend in staple food prices, which ranged from 55 percent to more than 100 percent above the five-year average (FEWS NET, 2022). The supply system of water and telecommunications, dependent on the provision of fuel, was severely compromised with a direct impact on the most vulnerable people, affecting their access to basic services (IPC, 2022a).

Several armed groups presently control key access points to Haiti's primary road's network, from where they can control territory, conduct kidnapping operations and extort money from passing motorists. The principal road corridors consist of the RN1 running north-south from Cap-Haïtien to Port-au-Prince; the RN2 that connects Port-au-Prince to Les Cayes in the south of the country; and the RN3 that stretches west to east from Port-au-Prince through Mirebalais and Hinche to the frontier with the Dominican Republic (UNODC, 2023).

Armed group's control and related insecurity on the road network has important repercussions on the supply of markets throughout the country, with effects on availability of goods and inflation. The control of routes into the capital by armed groups has resulted in a reduction of goods to urban markets, translating into higher prices in a context where food represents a significant portion of the expenses of families – reaching around 75 percent in Cité Soleil (IPC, 2022b). The RN2 has been blocked by armed groups since June 2021, cutting off at least 3 million people from Port-au-Prince, the country's economic hub. The blockade not only undermines freedom of movement but further contributes to inflation and jeopardizes livelihoods (UNSC, 2023). Insecurity on major roads is forcing the supply of markets in the country's interior by sea, particularly for imported products, which increases the cost of transportation (FEWS NET, 2022). This is particularly problematic since every facet of the country's formal and informal economy is connected to goods imported from abroad. Approximately 80 percent of all rice and cooking oil and roughly 50 percent of all food products consumed by Haitians on a daily basis are imported (UNDOC, 2023).

In Cité Soleil, market supply has been irregular. Key income-generating activities for very poor households, including petty trade and casual labour, remain severely disrupted due to reduced mobility and limited economic activity. In 2022, data showed that a growing percentage of the population was resorting to negative coping mechanisms, such as begging and sending their children elsewhere to eat to reduce consumption gaps. In other areas in Port-au-Prince, access to markets has been disrupted by the widespread impact of insecurity and increased commodity price hikes (FEWS NET, 2022).

Throughout 2022, the purchasing power of vulnerable households has continued to deteriorate due to increasing food prices and the reduction of employment opportunities in the agriculture sector and small businesses due to the insecurity (CNSA, 2022b).

Increasing conflict in the country's main food production areas, such as Artibonite department, has disrupted and strained the food system even further. In a March 2023 report, DG ECHO highlighted that armed groups gaining territory threatens agricultural production, with farmers unable to sell their crops, or buy seeds and other agricultural inputs for the next agricultural season (DG ECHO, 2023). In Artibonite department, armed groups have taken over several irrigation canals, stopping water supplies and preventing the cultivation of around 5 000 hectares of land. The groups have also hampered the operations of the Office for the Development of the Artibonite Valley (ODVA), a government agency providing agricultural extension and support services. The office closed after staff extortion and threats of attack (FAO and WFP, forthcoming).

According to local stakeholders interviewed by FAO, up to half of irrigated plots are no longer cultivated in Artibonite Valley. Thousands of farmers have left their farms for fear of violence. Huge crop losses of rice and vegetables are expected. Irrigation canals are no longer managed, and water shortages are now noted. Farmers' livelihoods are affected, and food has become scarce.¹⁴ In other parts of Artibonite department, armed groups hold control of the NR1 road at Canaan.

¹⁴ FAO staff field reports and interviews conducted by FAO staff with local stakeholders. Field reports from the WFP suboffice in Artibonite also suggest that many irrigated plots are no longer cultivated in the Artibonite Valley.

As such, farmers and traders of the Plaine des Gonaïves and other communes can no longer access the market of Port-au-Prince. Insecurity and fuel shortages have greatly reduced the activities and movements of traders, who play a major role in supplying urban markets with local products. Generally, these traders are the main intermediary between farmers and wholesalers, retailers and ultimately the consumers. The disruption of the main access routes to farming areas and urban markets drastically reduces the flow of products from this group of traders. The increased cost of transportation, insecurity on national roads and the blocking of major routes such as Martissant (Sud) and Canaan (Nord and Centre) significantly hinder these activities (FEWS NET, 2022).

Overall, increased violence has led to significant reductions in fuel availability, disruptions in agricultural production, market functionality and supplies, and lowered families' income opportunities, resulting in a decrease in access to food.

Impact on humanitarian access and humanitarians' ability to work

Violence and armed groups' activities limit humanitarian access and operations in a variety of ways. Since 2021, Haiti is amongst those countries worldwide where constraints to access are ranked as "high". Prior to 2021 when violence was not as pronounced, Haiti ranked lower (ACAPS, 2021; ACAPS, 2022).

Constraints in humanitarian access contributed to deteriorating acute food insecurity levels. In 2022, several violence-affected neighbourhoods in the municipality of Port-au-Prince and of Cité Soleil¹⁵ reported no or limited access conditions most weeks (IOM, 2022b) and are amongst the areas where the prevalence of people in Emergency levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 4) is the highest. By September 2022, for the first time in Haiti's history and in the geographic region, around 20 000 people were assessed as facing catastrophic levels of hunger (IPC Phase 5) in Cité Soleil up to February 2023 (IPC, 2023c). However, more recent analysis concluded that sustained humanitarian food assistance from the end of 2022 to the beginning of 2023 reached around 30 percent of the targeted population and pulled the most vulnerable people from Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) down into lower IPC phases (IPC, 2023b).

Increasing territorial control, inter-armed group fighting and violence have impacted humanitarian organizations' ability to implement their activities, particularly in Port-au-Prince (OCHA, 2022). During fighting between armed groups in July 2022 access roads in Cité Soleil were blocked, impeding humanitarian organizations from reaching the area (UNSC, 2022b). Insecurity and violence have led to the closure or temporary suspension of humanitarian operations, preventing aid delivery to the most vulnerable people. As a most recent example, in March 2023 Médecins Sans Frontières temporarily closed their hospital in Cité Soleil due to a resurgence of fighting (MSF, 2023). Since mid-2022, WFP has been compelled to temporarily suspend distributions numerous times due to access issues and armed group violence (WFP, 2022a; WFP, 2022b; WFP, 2023a; WFP, 2023b).

The insecurity of humanitarian personnel has become increasingly an issue (ACAPS, 2022). For example, in early April 2022, an international NGO team was held at gunpoint while delivering school kits and equipment in downtown Port-au-Prince. Implementing partners and contractors of UN agencies have been held at gunpoint and seen their deliveries of humanitarian goods hijacked (OCHA, 2022). In May 2022, two WFP contractors were seized at gunpoint in Titanyen, an area north of the capital. Some 44 tonnes of rice were looted in the incident. These commodities were en-route

¹⁵ The neighbourhoods are: Bas Martissant, Martissant - Bréard - Sainte-Bernadette, and Habitation Leclerc, Wharf Jérémie, Boston.

to Gonaïves as part of the contingency stock prepositioning exercise (WFP, 2022c). Kidnappings now also target, directly or indirectly, UN personnel and foreigners (OCHA, 2022).

Armed group-related violence and their control hamper access and operations not only inside the capital but also to the southern and northern areas of the country (OCHA, 2022). Several armed groups presently control key access points to the main national roads (RN1, RN2 and RN3), from where they control territory, conduct kidnapping operations and extort money from motorists (UNODC, 2023). Armed groups prevented the movements of humanitarian personnel and convoys through the Martissant corridor on RN2 for over a year, completely cutting off the four southern departments that were affected by earthquake in August 2021, thus delaying life-saving humanitarian and reconstruction efforts.

Emergency agriculture assistance was also affected. FAO faced agriculture inputs supply disruption as suppliers refused to deliver seeds to the Great South because of the risk of being looted while transiting in Port-au-Prince. The targeted beneficiaries did not receive these inputs, critical for the planting season.¹⁶

In February 2023, after over a year, WFP was able to organize a convoy through the Martissant corridor (WFP, 2023c). WFP has since organized a further six convoys through the corridor. For most of 2022, irregular street blockades, exchange of gunfire and multiple kidnappings have complicated access to the five departments north of the capital (OCHA, 2022). Access to the south and north of the country out of Port-au-Prince remains challenging. The armed group blockade at the country's main fuel terminal in the capital in 2022 has led to severe fuel shortages, suspending, delaying and/or increasing the cost of humanitarian operations (ACAPS, 2022).

¹⁶ FAO staff updates and interviews conducted by FAO Haiti with local stakeholders.

Recommendations valid for all countries

To facilitate a range of preventive and accountability-oriented tools available under UNSC Resolution 2417, as well as other relevant UNSC Resolutions,¹⁷ the UNSC may consider the following recommendations:

1. Strongly condemn once again the unlawful denial of humanitarian access by certain parties to the conflict, including wilfully impeding relief supplies and responses to conflict-induced food insecurity in situations of armed conflict.
2. Continue calling on parties to the conflict to comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL), including by refraining from depriving civilians of objects indispensable to their survival including targeting, destroying or rendering useless foodstuffs, crops, livestock, agricultural assets, drinking water installations and irrigation works.
3. Urge those with influence over parties to armed conflict to remind the latter of their obligation in relation to humanitarian access.
4. Call on all parties to the conflict to facilitate improved access to operational and technical humanitarian organizations to ensure enhanced transparency about the humanitarian situation and ensure people in need are located and services provided.
5. Call on parties to the conflict to take measures to stop the indiscriminate use of landmines and record their placement and remove existing landmines, unexploded explosive ordnance and explosive remnants of war, from civilian areas under their control.
6. Call for, and provide support to, independent, impartial, full, prompt and effective investigations into alleged violations and abuses of IHL and IHRL by all parties to the conflict, as well as those providing support to such parties, pursuant to international standards. This includes by considering the establishment of a new, dedicated United Nations Commission of Inquiry or continuing support to existing one. Where appropriate, call on states to take action against those responsible in accordance with domestic and international law, with a view to reinforcing preventive measures, ensuring accountability and addressing the grievances of victims.
7. Continue to use regular Arrria-formula meetings to discuss critical and deteriorating conflict-induced hunger and risk of famine.
8. Establish an independent body of experts to collect and channel critical information, to equip and enable the UNSC and the UN Secretary-General to take preventive action.

¹⁷ UNSC Resolution 2573, “*Protection of Objects Indispensable to the Survival of the Civilian Population*”, 27 April 2021, un.org/press/en/2021/sc14506.doc.htm

Methods and data sources

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification and Cadre Harmonisé

The acute food insecurity estimates provided in this update are mainly based on the IPC and CH scales.¹⁸ These estimates indicate populations in need of urgent assistance to save lives, protect livelihoods, reduce food consumption gaps and acute malnutrition, which are classified into the three most severe phases of acute food insecurity according to the IPC/CH classification – Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3), Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5).

When in Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3), people start facing increasing acute malnutrition due to lack of access to food, or they are only able to access food by selling off assets or through other harmful coping strategies. People in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) face high levels of acute malnutrition and excess mortality due to lack of food, or resort to emergency coping strategies to mitigate large food consumption gaps. People in Catastrophe/Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5) do not have any means left to access food and are facing starvation and death.

Famines should be avoided at all costs. Although further deaths can and should be prevented by urgent action, it is evident that responding to famine situations will be, de facto, a late response because many will have died by the time a famine is declared. In the countries where IPC/CH processes are in place, therefore, Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) is already to be taken as indicative of an extremely severe situation where urgent action is needed to save lives and livelihoods.

Population estimates indicating Stressed conditions (IPC/CH Phase 2) are also reported where relevant, although this would require a more diverse set of actions than emergency response – ideally longer-term resilience-building and disaster risk reduction to protect livelihoods.

While the annual *Global Report on Food Crises* provides the highest number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above) every year, this six-month update reports on the latest figure available – in this issue, estimates are reported as of the first quarter of 2023, when available.

The report prioritizes the use of IPC and CH as data sources on Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above). When recent IPC/CH is not available, alternative sources have been considered such as the WFP Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI), including its application to remotely collected data (rCARI), or Humanitarian Needs Overviews (HNOs) and Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs).¹⁹ Populations that are classified as moderately

¹⁸ IPC provided estimates for nine countries (Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Mozambique, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan and Yemen). CH estimates produced in March 2023 were used for six countries (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Niger and Nigeria – 26 states and FCT).

¹⁹ For five countries and territories covered in this report – Ethiopia, Myanmar, Palestine, the Syrian Arab Republic and Ukraine – IPC/CH food security estimates are not available. Therefore, WFP provided estimates covering 2022 for the Syrian Arab Republic and Ukraine based on CARI methodology and for Myanmar based on rCARI. The rCARI methodology is implemented through remote surveys (phone or web-based) and rests on a reduced questionnaire adjusted for remote data collection compared to the traditional WFP CARI methodology. Comparability studies between the results of rCARI analyses and the results of traditional CARI methodology are ongoing. The 2022 estimates reported for Palestine are based on the Food Insecurity Experience Scale and Economic Capacity to Meet Essential Needs. Estimates for Ethiopia are based on the Humanitarian Response Plan 2022 mid-year review. All these estimates are also reported in the forthcoming *Global Report on Food Crises 2023*.

acute food insecure and severely acute food insecure as per WFP's CARI methodology are reported as an approximation to populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above).

In Section 1 the analysis builds on the latest IPC/CH acute food insecurity estimates available for 19 countries and territories considered as major food crises in the *Global Report on Food Crises 2022*,²⁰ where conflict/insecurity are among the primary drivers, and which had data available as of the first quarter of 2023. Comparability issues exist for Yemen as no IPC analysis was available to cover 2023 (in Section 1, the latest estimates as of 2022 Q4 are provided).

Trends in acute food insecurity are established using comparable estimates from the same period of analysis a year earlier to take into account seasonal factors of food insecurity. The 2023 peak numbers reported in the forthcoming *Global Report on Food Crises 2023* are in line with the estimates provided for all countries and territories, except for CH countries, for which the CH March 2023 analysis is taking into account in this report.

The analysis contains concise information on the main drivers of the acute food insecurity situation in these countries and territories in 2022–2023 based on a review of relevant sources, with a particular focus on conflict and insecurity.

For the analysis of drivers of food insecurity in each of the countries and territories covered in the update, a wide range of secondary data sources was used to offer more details on the information provided in the IPC/CH analyses themselves, which already collate information from these various sources. These include qualitative information extracted from the key global and national early warning information systems, such as WFP's Vulnerability Analysis and Monitoring, FAO's Global Information and Early Warning System and FAO's Data in Emergencies Monitoring (DIEM). Data on displacement and additional information on conflicts was provided by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) as well as by government agencies in some countries.

Section 2 provides a more in-depth analysis of the impact of conflict on food security for four countries of particular concern.

²⁰ Major food crises are defined in the *Global Report on Food Crises 2022 (GNAFC and FSIN, 2022)*, based on meeting one or more of the following criteria: (i) at least 20 percent of the country population in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above) or equivalent; (ii) at least 1 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above) or equivalent; (iii) any area in Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 and above); (iv) included in the IASC humanitarian system-wide emergency response-level 3.

Figure 3. IPC/CH acute food insecurity phase description and response objectives

Phase	Phase description and priority response objectives
Phase 1 None/Minimal	Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income. Action required to build resilience and for disaster risk reduction.
Phase 2 Stressed	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies. Action required for disaster risk reduction and to protect livelihoods.
Phase 3 Crisis	Households either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; or • Are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies. URGENT ACTION required to protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps.
Phase 4 Emergency	Households either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; or • Are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation. URGENT ACTION required to save lives and livelihoods.
Phase 5 Catastrophe/ Famine	Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. (For Famine classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality). ¹ URGENT ACTION required to revert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods.

¹ A Famine classification requires evidence on food security, nutrition and mortality at or above IPC Phase 5 thresholds. If there is insufficient data for Famine classification but the available information indicates that Famine is likely occurring or will occur, then the famine classification is called 'Famine Likely'. It is important to note that Famine and Famine Likely are equally severe.

Source: GNAFC and FSIN, 2022. *Global Report on Food Crises 2022*. Rome. [fao.org/3/cb9997en/cb9997en.pdf](https://www.fao.org/3/cb9997en/cb9997en.pdf)

Food security terms

The following glossary provides the definitions of the food security terms used in the update. The terms and definitions in this glossary have been compiled from existing glossaries and other reference material available to the public.

The Cadre Harmonisé (CH) is a unifying tool that allows for a relevant consensual, rigorous and transparent analysis of the current and projected food and nutrition situation in West Africa and the Sahel. It allows to classify the severity of food and nutrition insecurity according to the international classification scale through an approach referring to well-defined functions and protocols.

The CH and the IPC have the same analytical framework for analysing acute food insecurity and share the same core functions that form the fundamental bases of the analytical process.

The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is a common global scale for classifying the severity and magnitude of food insecurity and malnutrition. It is the result of a partnership of various organizations at global, regional and country levels dedicated to developing and maintaining the highest possible quality in food security and nutrition analysis. Increasingly, the IPC is the international standard for classifying food insecurity and malnutrition in the context of emergency assessments.

This report uses mainly the IPC acute food insecurity phase classification scale, which identifies populations and areas with food deprivation that threatens lives or livelihoods, regardless of the causes, context or duration, as well as the need for urgent action to decrease food gaps and protect lives and livelihoods.

IPC/CH classification terms and definitions

Populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above) are considered as facing high levels of acute food insecurity and requiring urgent action to save lives, protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps and acute malnutrition.

- **None/Minimal (IPC/CH Phase 1)**

People have stable access to food. Action is required to reduce people's vulnerability to disasters/shocks and to build resilience, so they can stay food secure.

- **Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2)**

People have erratic economic access to food and are vulnerable to disasters/shocks. Action is required to improve people's stability of access to food and to reduce their vulnerability to disasters/shocks.

- **Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3)**

People are malnourished due to inadequate access to food or they only have enough food by selling off their assets or through other harmful coping strategies. Urgent action is required to protect livelihoods and increase access to food to avoid a food emergency.

- **Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4)**

People are malnourished due to lack of food or mitigate large food consumption gaps by selling off their assets or through other emergency coping strategies. Urgent action is needed to save lives. If nothing is done, people could face extreme hunger or death.

- **Catastrophe/Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5)**

People are malnourished due to lack of food and do not have any means left to access food. At area level, the population is in a situation of Famine (see definition below). Urgent action is needed to stop widespread starvation and death.

- **Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5)**

Famine is the most severe phase of the IPC. It exists in areas where at least one in five households has or is most likely to experience an extreme deprivation of food. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical levels of acute malnutrition are or will likely be evident. Significant mortality, directly attributable to outright starvation or to the interaction of malnutrition and disease, is occurring or is likely to be occurring. The IPC only permits classification of Famine when all regular IPC protocols and special Famine protocols are met. The special protocols are the following:

- The requirement of reliable evidence on three outcomes – food consumption or livelihood change, global acute malnutrition and crude death rate – all of which are either currently above or projected to be above Famine thresholds (> 20 percent of households with extreme food gaps, >30 percent of children acutely malnourished and crude death rate > 2/10 000/day).
- Undergoing a famine review process to validate the classification.
- Development of IPC Famine Alert adhering to pre-determined standards.

- **Famine-likely (IPC/CH Phase 5)**

The IPC permits the classification of Famine-likely when all regular and special protocols are met, except for the existence of reliable evidence for the three outcomes. Areas can be classified as Famine-likely if minimally adequate evidence available indicates that Famine may be occurring or will occur. When an area is classified as Famine-likely, it should trigger prompt action by decision-makers to address the situation while calling for urgent efforts to collect more evidence.

- **Risk of Famine**

Risk of Famine refers to the reasonable probability of an area going into Famine in the projected period. While this is not perceived necessarily as the most likely scenario, it is a scenario that generally has a realistic chance of occurring. It complements the Famine and Famine-likely projections of the most likely scenario by providing insights of potential Famine if prospects evolve in a manner worse than anticipated.

More information on the IPC Famine classification available at the following link:
ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Famine_Factsheet_2020.pdf

WFP Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security

The WFP CARI methodology is used to classify individual households according to their level of acute food insecurity. All four indicators included within the CARI approach (Food Consumption Score, reduced Coping Strategies Index, Food Expenditure Share, Livelihood Coping Strategies – Food Security) can be incorporated within IPC analysis. The IPC technical manual provides guidance on where each indicator fits within the IPC analytical framework. The CARI is an analytical method designed to be an input to the IPC process. While the CARI approach is implemented through a single household survey intended to accurately measure household level food insecurity, the IPC approach builds on the technical consensus among key stakeholders and consolidates wide-ranging evidence to classify severity and magnitude of food insecurity and malnutrition.

More information available at the following link:

wfp.org/publications/consolidated-approach-reporting-indicators-food-security-cari-guidelines

The WFP rCARI methodology is implemented through remote surveys (phone or web-based) and rests on a reduced questionnaire adjusted for remote data collection compared with the traditional WFP CARI methodology. Comparability studies between the results of rCARI analyses and the results of traditional CARI methodology are ongoing.

Comparability issues of acute food insecurity estimates 2022–2023

This section aims to highlight where the population coverage increased or decreased by more than one million people between early 2022 and early 2023.

The CH analysis coverage in Nigeria increased from 21 states and FCT (representing 72 percent of the country population) in March–May 2022 to 26 states and FCT in March–May 2023 – or 86 percent of the country population. The IPC analysis coverage in Mozambique increased from 64 districts in December 2022 (representing 47 percent of the total country population) to the entire country excluding 8 districts in Cabo Delgado in the November 2022 analysis –or around 100 percent of the country population. In the Central African Republic, the IPC used the revised population census data from the national institute of statistics, indicating an increase from 4.9 million people to 6 million people in population analysed between the September 2021 and September 2022 analyses. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the analysis coverage increased from 96.0 million people or 91 percent of the country population (representing 133 territories and 37 urban areas) in February 2021 to 103.0 million people or 94 percent of the population (representing 138 rural areas and 47 urban areas) in July 2022. In Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Somalia and the Sudan, although the acute food insecurity estimates are comparable year-on-year (covering nearly 100 percent of the country population in both years), there is an increase in the population analysed by around one million people between early 2022 and early 2023 mainly due to revised official estimates of the country total population.

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Section 1

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