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Preface

The present volume includes a geographically and technically diverse range of papers covering Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, the Near East and Central Europe. The technical areas covered reflect the experience of FAO and others in the practical issues of land reform, from broad questions of how to promote and deal with land markets in the Czech Republic, to specific project interventions in support of implementing land policy in Mozambique.

Land Reform, Land Settlement and Cooperatives is planning a special volume during 2002 to look at issues relating to conflict management and land, an area in which FAO has undertaken a substantial amount of work and which is a critical issue in both national and international priorities. This volume will include papers developing the conceptual analysis of conflict management and how it is dealt with, and will include detailed case study papers from different regions of the world. Addressing a specific topical theme is, of course, a long-established approach of the journal. In addition to welcoming potential contributions of papers, the editor invites readers' comments and suggestions for appropriate themes for future volumes.

Paul Munro-Faure
Chief, Land Tenure Service
FAO

Préface

Le présent numéro comprend toute une série d'articles divers sur le plan géographique et technique, portant sur l'Amérique latine et les Caraïbes, l'Afrique, le Proche-Orient et l'Europe centrale. Les domaines techniques abordés sont fonction des données d'expérience de la FAO et des autres intervenants sur les problèmes pratiques de la réforme agraire; ils vont des questions générales concernant les moyens de promouvoir et d'appréhender les marchés fonciers en République tchèque aux interventions spécifiques, au titre de projets, visant à mettre en œuvre les politiques agraires au Mozambique.

Réforme agraire, colonisation et coopératives agricoles prévoit de publier un numéro spécial en 2002 afin d'examiner les questions relatives à la gestion des conflits et à la terre, domaine dans lequel la FAO a mené de multiples travaux, et qui est un élément essentiel des priorités nationales et internationales. Ce numéro comprendra des articles développant l'analyse conceptuelle de la gestion des conflits et la manière de les traiter, et présentera des exposés détaillés d'études de cas venant de diverses régions du monde. Il va de soi que cette revue a pour principe, depuis longtemps, de traiter de questions d'actualité spécifiques. Non seulement le rédacteur accueille favorablement l'envoi éventuel d'articles, mais il invite également les lecteurs à formuler des observations ainsi que des suggestions concernant des thèmes pertinents pour les futurs numéros.

Paul Munro-Faure
Chef, Service des régimes fonciers
FAO

Prefacio

El presente número de *Reforma agraria, colonización y cooperativas* incluye una serie de artículos distintos desde el punto de vista geográfico y técnico sobre América Latina y el Caribe, África, el Cercano Oriente y Europa central. Los sectores técnicos tratados reflejan la experiencia de la FAO en cuestiones prácticas relativas a la reforma agraria: desde temas generales sobre cómo fomentar y gestionar los mercados de tierras en la República Checa, hasta intervenciones específicas de proyectos en apoyo de la aplicación de la política agraria en Mozambique.

La redacción de *Reforma agraria, colonización y cooperativas* va a preparar un volumen especial durante 2002 para tratar las cuestiones relativas a la actuación ante los conflictos y en relación con la tierra, un sector en el que la FAO ha realizado una labor notable y que constituye un punto crítico dentro de las prioridades tanto nacionales como internacionales. El citado volumen incluirá artículos en los que se expone el análisis conceptual de la actuación ante los conflictos y el modo en que se afrontan, y contendrá reseñas detalladas de estudios monográficos procedentes de distintas regiones del mundo. Abordar un tema actual forma parte, por supuesto, de la filosofía tradicional de la publicación. Además de dar la bienvenida a los posibles autores de artículos, el editor agradece las observaciones y sugerencias de los lectores sobre qué temas podrían ser apropiados para próximos volúmenes.

Paul Munro-Faure
Jefe del Servicio de
Tenencia de la Tierra de la FAO

Réforme et application de la politique d'aménagement du territoire au Mozambique – aide de la FAO: étude de cas

Le présent article a pour objet l'étude du rôle de soutien de la FAO vis-à-vis de la «Commission foncière» du Mozambique depuis 1995, dans le cadre de trois projets consécutifs. Bien que d'une durée relativement courte, chacun de ces projets a été planifié et mis en œuvre au sein d'un cadre théorique unique ayant un objectif à beaucoup plus long terme, ce qui a permis de développer et d'étoffer progressivement la question, difficile et complexe, dans un délai réaliste, tout en assurant une participation nationale réelle au fil du processus.

Les auteurs constatent que le soutien de la FAO a été fondamental, car il a permis d'ouvrir le débat à des idées nouvelles, à une époque où les réflexions portant sur les questions foncières avaient grandement besoin d'un nouvel élan. Ce soutien a également permis de garantir la participation exhaustive de ministères nationaux d'autres domaines que l'agriculture, d'ONG nationales et internationales et d'universitaires à l'élaboration des législations et à leur exécution. Ces efforts conjugués se sont traduits par un cadre politique et législatif novateur et progressif appuyé par un vaste éventail de groupes présentant souvent des intérêts opposés en ce qui concerne l'accès aux terres et leur utilisation.

La reforma y la aplicación de la política agraria en Mozambique: estudio monográfico sobre el apoyo de la FAO

En este artículo se examina la función del apoyo de la FAO a la Comisión de Tierras del Gobierno de Mozambique desde 1995, a través de tres proyectos consecutivos. Aunque todos ellos han tenido una duración relativamente corta, se han planificado y ejecutado dentro de un marco conceptual único con una perspectiva cronológica mucho más amplia. Esto ha permitido resolver progresivamente una cuestión compleja en un plazo realista, a la vez que a lo largo del proceso se ha ido consolidando un fuerte sentimiento de propiedad nacional.

En el artículo se mantiene que el apoyo de la FAO ha desempeñado un papel decisivo para abrir el debate a nuevas ideas, en un momento en que la reflexión sobre cuestiones relacionadas con la tierra necesitaba un impulso radical. También contribuyó a la plena integración de los departamentos gubernamentales no agrícolas, las ONG nacionales e internacionales y los especialistas universitarios en los programas legislativos y de ejecución. El resultado de este esfuerzo combinado es una política innovadora y progresista así como un marco legislativo apoyado por una amplia gama de grupos que suelen tener intereses contrapuestos cuando se trata del acceso y del uso de la tierra.

The reform and implementation of land policy in Mozambique – a case study of FAO support

C. Tanner

Christopher Tanner Ph.D. is a land tenure systems specialist and FAO consultant.¹

This paper discusses the role of FAO support to the Government of Mozambique's Land Commission since 1995, through three consecutive projects. While each has had a relatively short duration, all have been planned and implemented within a single conceptual framework with a much longer time horizon. This has allowed a difficult and complex issue to be progressively developed and nurtured within a realistic time scale, while building up a strong sense of national ownership of the process.

The paper argues that FAO support has played a pivotal role in opening up debate to new ideas, at a time when thinking about land issues needed a radical stimulus. It was also instrumental in bringing non-agricultural government departments, national and international non-governmental organizations and academic specialists fully into the legislative and implementation programmes. The result of this combined effort is an innovative and progressive policy and legislative framework supported by a wide range of groups that often have conflicting interests when it comes to land access and use.

INTRODUCTION: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

By the 1960s, when the liberation struggle began in earnest, Mozambique was a patchwork of large foreign estates, smaller Portuguese commercial enterprises and many thousands of small farms adhering to African customary practices of land management and use. All of these enterprises were enmeshed in a single agrarian economy with one overriding aim – producing surplus for the colonial State and its allies. All were engaged in market production, as tiny surpluses were sold to intermediaries to provide for family needs,

or large-volume cash crops were produced directly for urban and export markets.

More importantly, all were interdependent, with the plantations and larger commercial farms relying upon complex patterns of wage labour provided by the thousands of “family farms” in the weakest part of the economy.² Yet the “weakest” members of this system in terms of capital and power were in fact extremely important. Not only did the thousands of small producers account for a very high proportion of national food needs and even export production, but they also supplied labour to the bigger enterprises and plantations. Moreover, because they supported a large part of their own household reproduction

¹ Christopher Tanner was chief technical assistant for FAO support to the Mozambican Land Commission from 1995 to 1997, when the current Land Policy and new Land Law were developed and approved, and subsequently one of a core team of three FAO consultants supporting the development of supplementary instruments to implement the new law, including methodologies and training programmes for community land delimitation.

² See Negrão (1996) for an excellent account of the relationships between small indigenous farm systems and the nearby sugar-cane plantations.

costs, the larger farms were able to keep wage costs to a low minimum.

The role of small farmers changed after Independence and the advent of the socialist agrarian model. All land resources were nationalized and the large estates and colonial properties became State farms, singularly responsible for meeting national development needs. Local farmers were still denied access to the lands from which they had been expelled by the Portuguese and had either to move to more marginal areas or stay on as workers for the new State enterprises. The many thousands who existed in more marginal areas were categorized as the “family sector”, seen by policy-makers in Maputo as being purely interested in subsistence agriculture. The result was the substitution of the more complex integrated agrarian system of pre-Independence times with a classic dualist model, at least in the minds of policy-makers and urban elites.

With the official focus on State farms, family farms were denied access to modern inputs and technical assistance, and had little or no access to transport services as these were all State-run and served only the State farms. Indeed, in the decade after Independence most small family-run farms became increasingly subsistence-oriented, with production geared principally to meeting household food needs. This “involution” was basically a survival response to policy changes going on around them, exacerbated by the rigours of a civil war that was crippling the rural economy. Whether mainly due to policy or war, the subsistence character and absolute poverty of small farm agriculture was *not* a reflection of its inherent backwardness or lack of market awareness and skills. Yet this rural “reality” did reinforce the view of urban-based policy-makers that the “family sector” *was* mainly subsistence-oriented, and that “development” had to rely upon other, better endowed and more capable elements of society.

Empirical research since the mid-1980s, however, has again revealed the important contribution that the thousands of small

farms have been making to national production and exports. With the collapse of the State farms and the progressive handing over of these estates not to their original Mozambican occupants but to private capital interests, the agrarian economy of Mozambique is again beginning to resemble physically the pre-Independence situation – thousands of small family farms on their own *machambas* (ostensibly producing only for household subsistence), large enterprises based on old colonial estates and State farms, and a growing “private sector” of larger, commercially focused farms operated by a newly emerging national middle class.

This *de facto* replication of the pre-Independence situation also echoes the underlying logic of surplus extraction, including cheap wage labour imperatives for the newly emergent private sector. Small farmers find it hard to escape this effective poverty trap. They are seriously under-capitalized after years of war and climatic catastrophes, and suffer labour shortages as both men and women look outside the farm for wage labour elsewhere. Moreover, because they do not formally own their land and cannot rent or lease it, they cannot use it either as collateral for bank credits or as a capital “stake” in dealings with outsiders who want access to underused resources.³

This is where the new land policy and law come in, providing small farmers for the first time with the possibility of using their land and other natural resources to generate new capital and income *in collaboration with outside interests, as opposed to being in opposition to them*. This is the fundamental point that is proving so difficult to get across at the present moment.

Meanwhile, in the absence of effective implementation backed up by appropriate support programmes, national development imperatives remain and must be addressed. For a State that is desperately short of

³ This point mirrors the argument of De Soto (2000), in which a failure to provide a secure framework that enables the poor to use their real assets is given as a basic underlying cause of persistent poverty.

capital and technical skills the solution is obvious and echoes older colonial and post-Independence policy responses: allocate the most productive resources to outsiders who do have the capital and technology to raise national production to new levels in as short a time as possible.

Another process has been evolving alongside this focus on external investment. With the shift to a market economy and the end of the civil war in 1992, land also suddenly acquired real value as a productive asset.⁴ The basic principle of State ownership has meant that access to land (or, more correctly, new land use rights) is managed through centrally directed State administrative structures. As market-based mechanisms and local land management capacity play no formal role, gaining access to land has become a very low-cost exercise in real terms, bearing in mind the real asset value of the resource and the *de facto* secure rights (renewable and inheritable long leases) that are attributed by the State to successful applicants.

Pressure and competition over land has therefore been steadily mounting since 1992, leading to the conflicts and problems that persuaded the Government of Mozambique to embark upon the 1995 policy and legislative reform process. Large areas have been allocated to private sector interests – national as well as foreign – to the detriment of local producers.

Overall, this situation leaves small farmers unable to use their major capital resource effectively, and exposes them to the serious risk of losing this resource in any case. The new policy and law were developed precisely to address these two aspects of a complex situation, and to promote a consensual process whereby private interests and local people would both benefit from the development of the countryside with outside capital and skills. Deeply rooted conservative thinking on how

best to respond to evidently urgent national development needs now threatens to undermine this strategy, precisely at the moment when it is poised and ready for full-scale implementation.

Were the more conservative approach to gain the upper hand in this context, the potential for a rural–urban shift and entrenched absolute poverty in the cities could be catastrophic. Once again, however, it is important not to be conveniently cynical; it is clear that many senior politicians and technical managers genuinely believe in the ideas they are advocating. The alternative – presently represented by the effective implementation of the new Land Policy and Land Law – does indeed involve a leap of faith and a lot of hard work. To make it work, the policy-makers of today need to overcome convictions that are deeply rooted in the history of their country and:

- have confidence in the inherent abilities and capacity of the many thousands of small farmers who already account for a large share of national production;
- give them the support they need – credit and technical assistance – to become more productive and deal effectively with new investors;
- promote and facilitate transparent and equitable negotiations between local people and outside interests, based upon the recognition that local people have rights over their resources *and over the capital value that is locked up in them.*

FAO support to the Government of Mozambique Land Commission⁵ and its Technical Secretariat (TS) dates back to the early 1990s, when a group of national consultants was contracted to trace out the underlying issues and present guidelines for proceeding towards a reform agenda. This exercise was followed by three successive projects that began in January 1995: two FAO Technical Cooperation Programme

⁴ See Tanner (1991) and Bruce and Tanner (1993) for a discussion of a similar process in Guinea-Bissau, which, as another ex-colony of Portugal, shares many postwar development and inherited legal and policy characteristics with Mozambique.

⁵ This is the popular name. The formal title – the Inter-ministerial Commission for the Revision of Land Legislation – reveals that the mandate of the Commission is in fact limited to legislative and related tasks rather than being a kind of supervisory body for land issues.

(TCP) projects and a third, Netherlands-funded, Government Cooperation Programme (GCP) project that ended in December 2000. Broadly speaking, the TCP projects supported the Land Policy and Law development phase, while the third project focused more upon the need to prepare regulations and other legal instruments to implement the law in practice.

The support provided by these projects is highly regarded by the Government of Mozambique and international observers alike, and is a notable achievement for FAO in Mozambique. The “land question” is, by definition, highly political and very complex, and a great deal has been achieved by a small FAO team supporting an equally small but dedicated national counterpart team. Moreover, this success has been at relatively low cost – the total budget for the three projects was less than US\$2 million, with around three-quarters of this covering the GCP project with its considerably higher equipment, materials and training costs as well as consultant inputs.

While the initial TCP project was planned as a one-year, short-term project to provide immediate technical assistance to one government sector (the Ministry of Agriculture, responsible at the time for the then “Ad Hoc” Land Commission), it was clear at the outset that: a) the land question would take far longer than one year to deal with; b) the resources provided by the first TCP were inadequate on their own for dealing with the overall question; and c) the issue required the involvement of a far wider range of both government departments and non-governmental groups.

PROGRAMME METHODOLOGY

A “micro-programme” approach

Early in the process the FAO team traced out a potential ten-year horizon during which all the key steps could be realized: policy development; legislative reform; institutional strengthening and capacity building; implementation in practice; feedback and refinements. Work was initiated on this basis, but in the full knowledge that immediate resources were restricted to only

the one year. Success in the first year – policy and a first draft of the law – secured approval for a follow-on TCP project, which in turn led to support from the Government of the Netherlands for a GCP project lasting three years, focusing on capacity building and start-up implementation of the policy-legislative package.

Along the way, the FAO team also saw its role as one of mobilizing additional resources around a common set of objectives and within a single programmatic framework within which each donor/agency played a specific and mutually reinforcing role. Early budget proposals for the Commission/TS programme were developed on this basis, and in the first two years it was possible to mobilize approximately an additional quarter of a million dollars – from the Ford Foundation, bilateral donors in Maputo, and the Norwegian Refugee Council – for specific aspects of the programme that TCP resources were unable to cover.

This strategy has continued to a greater or lesser extent since then, although in the last three years there has been far greater reliance on a single donor, the Netherlands, for most aspects of Land Policy and Land Law implementation. Nevertheless, donors with an established interest and history of past support have provided key support at critical moments (for example, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency [SIDA], the Lutheran World Federation, and the Danish International Development Agency [DANIDA]), while national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have provided field support resources at critical points in the training programmes on a joint-venture basis.

This approach is essential in the case of an issue as complex as land, and has helped to generate good debate and consensus over key issues along the way. It is also *realistic* – with an issue such as land, or indeed many other complex development activities – to adopt from the outset a far longer-term programme horizon than is usually the case. This allows a good

base to be set, people to be trained, and complex activities to be planned and carried out in an appropriate time frame and without the sudden ruptures caused by the ending of short-term projects before things are really complete.

Consistent and regular technical assistance

The other features of this series of projects are: a) the use of practically the same core team of consultants over the entire six-year period and b) the use of these resources in short-term visits but planned according to the overall longer-term programme. In this way, it has been possible to achieve several important objectives from the FAO point of view, namely, to:

- build up a strong technical programme in which all involved are not constantly having to get up to speed and familiarize themselves with the programme;
- build up strong and constructive relationships with a wide range of national counterparts and colleagues;
- ensure that consultancy resources are timed and have terms of reference to match activities underway and planned for in the overall programme;
- provide *de facto* long-term assistance without the high costs of maintaining several expatriates in-country over long periods.

From the national side, this process has also had clear benefits:

- It has helped to create a sustainable national capacity to analyse and deal with land issues (particularly where the impact on *people* is concerned – the institutional impact has been less certain).
- It has fostered a strong sense of national ownership of the process, which is essential for any policy and legislative programme, but especially in the case of one relating to as sensitive an issue as land.
- It has also contributed indirectly towards capacity building in programme management planning and management, although here the impact is less visible and is best seen as a “seed” planted for the future.

This approach is well suited to the kind of activity undertaken over the last six years, especially the earlier policy and legislative stages. However, it became apparent during the third, GCP, project, that, as implementation and other training activities took on a stronger role, the dependence upon short-term inputs did raise problems. With several complex sets of activities underway, it became evident that having at least one or two people in-country would have been useful. This issue is also linked to that of the longer-term institutional capacity, which now presents itself as a major challenge in the next phase of land programme activities.

THE RESULTS OF FAO SUPPORT

The policy and legal frameworks have been complete since December 1999, when all necessary legal instruments were approved and ready for full implementation. These instruments include the Land Law itself (Law No. 19/97, approved in July 1997), the Regulations for the Land Law (approved in December 1998) and a Technical Annex to the Regulations approved in December 1999. This alone represents a major achievement given the complexity of the issue and potential for disagreement and competing interests to undermine the work of the TS/FAO team.

Together, these instruments provide a flexible framework based upon clear basic principles that should allow implementation in practice to be adaptive and responsive to specific local conditions and opportunities. The Technical Annex in particular is a very practical document that sets out a single, legally prescribed methodology for identifying where community land rights exist and how these should be delimited through a strong community-based participatory process facilitated by trained teams.

Since 1998, however, the TS and FAO have also moved forward into what is best seen as a type of pilot implementation process, although the immediate objectives were more to complete the legislation and develop adequate instruments for dealing with the community land issue.

The new policy and legal framework

The analytical underpinnings of the policy and the new law are explained elsewhere.⁶ In very brief terms, however, the basic approach has been to promote an integrated development strategy that brings local communities and private investors together, making the best use of national land and other resources in the most equitable way possible. Neither group is excluded from the benefits of the wider development process (especially important for the communities) or from the land they need (important for investors).

This strategy is achieved in several steps:

- *Identify and protect existing rights* acquired by local people through customary and historical forms of land occupation.
- *Involve local people in the management of land resources* and in the process of allocating land to investors, so that local interests are not prejudiced by the large-scale land occupations that have taken place in recent years.
- Through a wide-ranging programme of education and technical support, *promote partnerships and agreements between local people and investors* through which both sides benefit from the use of local resources by new projects.

The first thing needed was a strong policy platform. This was developed by the Land Commission/FAO team in 1995 and approved by the Government of Mozambique in September of that year. The central declaration of the National Land Policy is clear in its intention to protect existing rights whilst promoting inward investment:

Assure the diverse rights of the Mozambican people over land and other natural resources, while promoting new investment and the sustainable and equitable use of these resources.

(Government of Mozambique, 1995)

Attention then shifted to developing a new land law that would permit this kind of

strategy. This law was developed through a highly participatory process that involved many different sectors of government apart from agriculture (traditionally seen as *the* sector in charge of land affairs), national NGOs, academics, and other specialists.

The Project Law (draft Bill) was in turn subject to intensive debate at a national conference in June 1996. Once again, all the different sectors and interest groups above actively participated and gave *de facto* democratic legitimacy to the final draft. While subsequent internal discussions by FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front) sought to change some basic features of the Bill (the concept of “local communities” discussed below was an immediate focus of concern), later debate in the National Assembly and consistent and well-presented *technical* justification on the part of the TS and its support team meant that the Bill was approved by the Assembly in July 1997 with most of its major and more radical principles intact. These are as follows:

- Land-use rights (*uso e aproveitamento*) can be acquired in three ways: through customary occupation, through “good faith” occupation (unquestioned use of an area for ten years or more), or through a formal request to the State for *new rights* to be allocated.
- Existing rights acquired through the customary channel are fully recognized by the new law and enjoy its full protection, *without the need to formally identify them or register them.*
- *The right involved in each of these three cases is the same* (having paper documentation for a right acquired through a request to the State does not outweigh a right acquired through customary occupation, even if in the latter case there is no documentation available).
- Proof of customary occupation can be verbal testimony or other forms of evidence of long-term occupation that are agreed to by the parties concerned.
- A new legal and juridical entity – the “local community” – was created by the Land Law as a customary landholding

⁶ See Tanner (2000a,b). Also, De Wit (another consultant on the FAO team) discusses the approach adopted in FAO (2000).

and land management unit within which customary land law is applied without need for registration etc. by State cadastral services.

- The validity of customary land management practices and laws is recognized within “local communities”, provided that these do not contradict basic Constitutional principles (important in the case of safeguarding the rights of women, for example).
- Through the concept of “local community” it is possible to avoid the need to classify and codify the many different types of customary land law and practices that exist in Mozambique, and leave it up to each community to manage its affairs in line with its own norms and practices.
- In recognition of the validity and relevance of customary land management institutions and their great (and low-cost) usefulness to the State, local communities are given a strong role in the management of land and other resources, including being consulted and participating in the allocation of land to new investors from outside the community.

The Land Law Regulations give more practical details for implementing the law, such as specific provisions for the procedures to be followed in the case of new requests for land (often called “concessions” by many English-speakers). The Regulations also bring in new ideas, such as rights of way and common resource use – protecting, for example, access to water points and long-distance grazing routes that might otherwise be cut off by new private sector land occupation.

The “local community” concept has generated much debate, with many people asking how it can be defined in a way that is relevant to the many different cultural and socio-economic contexts of Mozambique. The Regulations left this question open, to be decided in a Technical Annex that would be based upon a process of empirical research and testing of appropriate methodologies.

The Annex approach was debated at

national seminar in Beira in August 1998. A basic methodology – community-based participatory diagnosis – was proposed by the FAO team and accepted subject to field testing and refinements if necessary (see Tanner, De Wit and Madureira, 1998). The seminar also endorsed the concept of “open borders” for communities. This allows private investors access to land “owned” by community residents, and the possibility of agreements and partnerships with local people. Subsequent training exercises by the TS/FAO team included 21 pilot cases to test the methodology. The results were scrutinized in three national-level workshops, and a draft for the new Annex was prepared including the recommendations of a final national seminar in July 1999.

The Annex itself was approved in December 1999. It is important in relation to the first principle of the Land Policy Declaration, for it establishes the method through which the “existing rights” of the Mozambican people are “assured” and subsequently – where necessary – delimited. Instead of a single definition – indeed this is impossible in the Mozambican context – the law now prescribes a *single methodology* that, if properly applied, will result in a specific “local community” reflecting the ethnic, cultural and agro-ecological circumstances of the location in question.

The Annex details the steps and content of the “participatory diagnosis”, including “participatory mapping” carried out by the communities themselves. It sets out when a delimitation should be carried out and who should pay for it in each case. It also provides for the community to elect representatives who will sign the forms – also contained in the Annex – that show the delimitation process being correctly carried out and agreed to not only by the community in question, but by its neighbours as well.

This work was followed by more training to create a core of national field staff in both the public and NGO sectors, to carry out the delimitation process as part of their wider activities (some are cadastral

workers; others are extensionists or forest and wildlife staff, for example). These exercises resulted in the final output of the third, GCP, project, a training package for trainers to use in future training exercises (Government of Mozambique, 2001). This package includes a course book for the trainer, a field manual for the participants that they take away with them after the course and a video filmed during a delimitation exercise in Maputo Province.⁷

Capacity building and institutional development

Capacity-building has been relatively successful. On the one hand there has been a major shift in the general understanding of land issues and how to deal with them. The process of policy and legislative development brought together a wide range of skills and technical disciplines around the common objective of producing a policy and a new law that had widespread support, and created an atmosphere of collaboration amongst officials and technical staff who would not normally work together. Work on the Annex in particular also improved relations between the NGOs and government departments. Many Mozambicans in different government sectors and in civil society have acquired new understanding of the land issue and have been exposed to new thinking and approaches.

This group – which today must number in the hundreds – now constitutes a significant national capacity to deal with land issues as they evolve in the future. Moreover, some 150 field technicians from government departments and NGOs working on rural development and land issues have been trained, creating a core of staff already prepared to take the implementation of the Land Policy and Law into the countryside and test it in practice.

On the other hand, many politicians and public officials responsible for implementing the new policy and law have had little real exposure to these documents, and very few

have actually had them fully explained to them by technically competent people. The result is that it is quite possible to find situations where technical staff are convinced of the approach and are keen to implement it, while their directors and local administrators or political leaders are reluctant to press on with full implementation. Cases have, for example, been observed of District Administrators who are applying the old law and Regulations in the absence of any training or instruction in the new approach.

A lack of real progress on the institutional front exacerbates this situation, and is impeding effective implementation. Institutional leadership is still fragmented between key public bodies, notably the Land Commission TS (which has been responsible for the development of policy and legislation) and the National Directorate for Geography and Cadastre (DINAGECA). The TS as a mechanism has acquired a good reputation for its coordinating role and capacity to promote dialogue between interests that in the past have often been in opposition. Yet as an institution it is still weak, with a core staff of two and a very limited budget. It can count upon more than 30 colleagues from other ministries who participate in the TS meetings and who have some knowledge of the new policy and legal framework. It has a limited mandate, however, due to expire once it submits a proposal to government for the long-term institutional structure for land issues. The TS therefore lacks real authority as an institution capable of directing the effective and coordinated implementation of the Land Policy and Law across the country.

By comparison, DINAGECA is far stronger as a permanent institution with more staff and provincial delegations, and even a district-level presence in some areas. For those who still see the resolution of land issues as essentially a technical challenge – having adequate cadastral staff and resources to map everything – DINAGECA is the natural entity for assuming control of the implementation process. Yet the work of

⁷ Available from the Technical Secretariat of the Land Commission, in Portuguese and English: comterra@tropical.co.mz.

the TS since 1995 has exposed the flaw in this approach, and demonstrated beyond doubt that the land question is first and foremost a socio-economic and juridical issue that involves interests far beyond the narrower confines of the cadastral services and even the Ministry of Agriculture.

In this context, and especially once the market economy takes full hold in rural areas, DINAGECA and its delegations will have a central and important task, recording not just present land access but also tracking and legally verifying land transactions, partnerships, etc. It will have scant time left over for policy and wider land-use questions. The reality is that, in the meantime, even DINAGECA and the provincial services are very poorly resourced in real terms, and are unable to deal efficiently with the volume of cadastral work currently facing them.

The role of other important public institutions such as the National Institute for Agronomic Research (INIA) has also not been clearly defined, and there are several areas of overlap between all of these bodies. In addition, the Ministries of Planning and Finance, and of Environmental Coordination, also have programmes that touch directly on resource issues.

Finally, since the late 1990s the “land question” has also been inexorably brought back into the context of the agricultural programme by being included in the so-called “land component” of the government agricultural sector programme PROAGRI. The wider “National Land Programme” concept espoused by the TS/FAO team has been difficult to keep afloat in this context, but is still extremely relevant. Full implementation of the Land Policy and Law requires the engagement of other ministries with no role in PROAGRI, notably State Administration and Justice. A new project with the Supreme Court, training judges and advocates in the Land Law and also the new Forestry – Wildlife and Environment Laws also underlines the point.⁸

⁸ This is also an FAO project supported by the Netherlands: GCP/MOZ/069/NET.

To sum up, while considerable national capacity has been created to deal with land issues in a wider, “less cadastral” setting, the institutional context is making it difficult to programme and use these new skills and resources in a coordinated and mutually reinforcing way. Institutions almost appear to be working against another at times, or are intent upon replicating work already done. Inconsistent messages arrive at provincial and district levels from different bodies. Practical field activities are then held up or simply not implemented. The goodwill of most of those involved is not in question. However, until some institutional clarity and lines of authority and accountability are established, implementation of the policy and legislative package will face difficulties that reduce the effective impact of the scarce resources so far available.

THE CURRENT SITUATION: PARTIAL IMPLEMENTATION

If adequately implemented, the new policy and laws will promote investment and the best use of underused resources, while also protecting local interests and bringing real development benefits to local people. At the time of writing, however, progress has been slow and there are real signs that many people are beginning to question the whole approach or become disillusioned. There is also evidence that even where it *is* being implemented, the underlying principles are poorly understood and instruments like the Annex are being correctly interpreted and applied.⁹

Longstanding proposals to provide information and training for public administration and other senior government officials have also not yet materialized. Many District Administrators – key figures in the day-to-day resolution of land conflicts and related matters – remain ignorant of the underlying principles and content of the

⁹ This is one conclusion from a recent mid-term evaluation of the UK Department for International Development (DFID) support to the Zambezia Provincial Service for Geography and Cadastre, provided through personal communication with the evaluation team members.

policy and the law, and have yet to receive clear and adequate orientation from their superiors in provincial capitals and in Maputo. The result is slow and haphazard implementation that is causing doubts even among supporters of the approach.

Delays and uneven implementation are also fostering a climate in which more unscrupulous investors and interests groups, inside and outside Mozambique, are bypassing or paying minimal attention to legally prescribed procedures in order to secure access to resources. Community participation is treated cursorily if at all, and the longer-term participation of local people as stakeholders in development initiatives is still viewed solely in terms of (low-paid) employment creation and fringe benefits.

It is also convenient to see more sinister motives, or just plain greed, in conservative reactions to the TS/FAO approach. Yet the overview of the historical context show that is perhaps even more important to understand the deep roots of conservative thinking about land issues in Mozambique. Ideas that were in circulation in 1995 still exert considerable influence, but they have a much longer history in earlier strategies adopted by both colonial and post-Independence governments that were short of capital and human resources.

Conservative thinking also reflects a deep and persistent view, among urban elites especially, that small farmers are purely subsistence oriented, and unable to assume responsibility for reaching the development objectives that are so important for the country. In this context, implementation of the new policy and legal framework is as much about changing deeply ingrained attitudes, or in effect a cultural view of small farmers and the role of the State in development. In the meantime, the constellation of forces driving the surplus extraction process of colonial times is again increasingly evident in Mozambique, albeit with a different ideological justification – national development.

Against this is the positive impact of the TS/FAO approach in areas where it has been implemented on a trial basis. Much of

this success has also been built upon working alliances with the NGO sector, which itself has done a great deal to spread the news about the Land Policy and Law through its Land Campaign. Field visits confirm how local people have been empowered and stimulated to reassess and value their natural resources, and explore new ways to use them. Their ability to comprehend the new law and understand its implications for their present and future lives is startling, and lays to rest any assertion that they are somehow unable to make the most of new opportunities and rise to the development challenge.

It is also clear that serious private investors *are* willing to do business with local people, based upon a recognition that local rights over land and other resources give local people a directly related right to participate as stakeholders in new development initiatives. Serious investors do not necessarily want the cheapest access to resources – they also want assurance about the conditions surrounding their investment. The one thing they do *not* want is conflict with local people. Better to negotiate so that all concerned get something out of the projected investment, than to press ahead without adequate local-level consultation or involvement.

These lessons are gradually being recorded and brought together by researchers and field workers. They provide an important justification for pressing ahead with the TS/FAO approach, and the full-scale implementation of the Land Policy and Land Law package that has been so carefully put together since 1995.

THE ROLE OF FAO

FAO support has played an important role since the start of the TCP projects in early 1995. It has been a key factor in bringing new ideas to the table, especially in a context where “solutions” were all coming out of the same historical tool box and at a time when thinking about land issues needed a radical stimulus. FAO support was also directly instrumental in opening up debate and getting other interests –

other government sectors, NGOs, academics, etc – involved in a genuinely participatory way. The result of this combined effort is an innovative and progressive policy and legislative framework supported by a wide range of groups that often have quite conflicting interests when it comes to land access and use.

This “integrationist” strategy is a significant departure from earlier government policies that have tended towards a “dualist” view of the agrarian economy and the respective roles of small and larger farmers. FAO today can continue to play the role it has been playing since 1995 – as honest broker, as a provider of high-level technical assistance, as the promoter of dialogue and innovation and as an advocate for now pressing ahead fully and with confidence with the implementation of the new policy and legal package.

The programme approach developed in the mid-1990s is also still directly relevant to a land programme that has many facets and many needs. PROAGRI responds to some of these needs, but others can only be met by other sectoral programmes. It is essential that all these activities are not only well coordinated, but planned from the outset within a single conceptual and programmatic vision of what the “land question” needs and, behind this, what the people of Mozambique need.

The role of external support is perhaps even more critical today in another sense. As opposing interest groups seek to gain advantage and use or circumvent the new legislation in pursuit of their specific interests, it is essential that good technical arguments are put forward to justify the bolder alternative on offer after many years of hard work, not just by FAO, but many hundreds, even thousands of Mozambicans since 1995.

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Social and geographical diversity in Chile's agriculture

Recent information on the geographic distribution of agricultural, livestock and forestry activities in Chile, which are distinctive because of the size of holdings and the unequal access of small producers to capital and technology, sheds light on a number of areas of special relevance to the design of sectoral policies. Using as its reference the producer classification proposed by the Agrarian Research and Policy Office (ODEPA), this article examines agricultural, livestock and forestry production activities according to their national geographic distribution.

Hétérogénéité sociale et géographique de l'agriculture chilienne

Les informations récentes sur la distribution géographique des activités liées à l'agriculture, la foresterie et l'élevage au Chili, qui varient selon la taille des exploitations et selon l'accès des petits producteurs aux capitaux et aux techniques, permettant de dégager une série de questions particulièrement importantes pour les politiques de ces secteurs.

Le présent article a pour objectif de cibler les différentes productions du secteur de l'agriculture, de la foresterie et de l'élevage, en ce qui concerne leur répartition au sein du contexte géographique national, en prenant comme référence les différents types de producteurs définis récemment par l'ODEPA.

Heterogeneidad social y geográfica de la agricultura chilena

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La información reciente sobre la distribución geográfica de las actividades agrícolas, silvícolas y pecuarias en Chile, que se diferencian tanto por el tamaño de las explotaciones como por el desigual acceso de los pequeños productores al capital y a la tecnología, permite responder a diversas interrogantes de gran importancia para el diseño de las políticas sectoriales. Este artículo tiene como objeto analizar, según su distribución geográfica nacional, las actividades productivas del sector silvoagropecuario, tomando como referencia las tipologías de productores propuestas por la Oficina de Estudios y Políticas Agrarias (ODEPA).

INTRODUCCIÓN

Los datos estadísticos recientes permiten inferir algunos de los patrones socioproductivos que definen las particularidades de los diversos paisajes agrícolas que se han ido conformando en el territorio chileno a lo largo la historia. Chile es un país que se caracteriza por agudos contrastes sociales y ambientales. El conocimiento de estos contrastes, y de variables como la distribución geográfica de los productores, el tamaño promedio de sus explotaciones, y la asociación de cultivos con masa ganadera en zonas especializadas, permite afinar el diagnóstico así como el enfoque de las políticas sectoriales en función de las opciones que las instancias responsables de la toma de decisiones escojan entre eventuales prioridades².

¹ El autor agradece la valiosa colaboración de Gabriela Guevara, Viviana Solivelles, Bernabé Tapia y José Ramírez en la elaboración de este artículo.

² Para mayores detalles acerca de la metodología, y de la información de base, se remite a la Clasificación de las explotaciones agrícolas del VI Censo Nacional Agropecuario según tipo de productor y localización geográfica. Documento de Trabajo N° 5. ODEPA, abril de 2000.

TIPOLOGÍA DE LOS PRODUCTORES Y CONTROL DEL USO DEL SUELO

Según la ODEPA, la agricultura chilena no constituye un conjunto homogéneo de productores: existen diferencias en el acceso a la propiedad del «recurso suelo», en los rasgos productivos y en el nivel de cobertura territorial de las explotaciones. Si se toma como referencia la diferenciación tradicional de los productores silvoagropecuarios en función del tamaño de sus explotaciones, los datos socioproductivos no sólo arrojan disparidades sustanciales en términos agregados, sino que además varían según el territorio en que se desarrollan las actividades productivas. Incluso en el segmento de los pequeños productores, que se suelen considerar como una sola gran unidad, es posible encontrar diferencias significativas debidas a un desigual acceso al capital productivo y a la tecnología utilizada en las actividades sectoriales.

La pequeña agricultura chilena: dos caras de una misma moneda

Como resultado una metodología destinada a definir con mayor precisión la función

CUADRO 1

Número de explotaciones, superficie agrícola utilizada y cabezas de ganado por tipo de productor

Variable	Tipo de productor										Total general	%		
	De subsistencia	%	Pequeño productor empresarial	%	Mediano	%	Grande	%	Sin actividad	%			Sin clasificar	%
Número de explotaciones	102 766	31,2	176 074	53,4	17 005	5,2	9 399	2,9	11 062	3,4	13 399	4,1	329 705	100,0
Superficie de las explotaciones (ha)	1 186 316,0	2,3	8 061 328,3	15,7	6 095 948,4	11,9	15 423 345,6	30,1	100 534,6	0,2	20 432 840,9	39,8	51 300 313,8	100,0
Superficie agrícola utilizada (ha)	537 819,7	3,0	3 472 276,1	19,6	3 909 808,4	22,1	9 691 475,3	54,8	49 406,0	0,3	19 453,9	0,1	17 680 239,3	100,0
Cultivos anuales	31 359,5	3,3	386 409,7	40,5	158 753,1	16,6	376 442,3	39,4	0,0	0,0	2 196,6	0,2	955 161,2	100,0
Hortalizas	5 914,1	4,6	51 123,5	40,2	26 008,8	20,4	43 642,2	34,3	0,0	0,0	6 16,5	0,5	127 305,0	100,0
Barbecho	37 059,4	8,3	151 246,3	34,0	69 053,3	15,5	137 615,5	30,9	49 406,0	11,1	926,7	0,2	445 307,2	100,0
Viñas	1 346,9	1,6	32 075,1	39,0	12 610,0	15,3	36 071,3	43,9	0,0	0,0	70,4	0,1	82 173,7	100,0
Plantaciones frutales	8 096,6	3,4	61 555,1	25,9	48 780,0	20,6	118 532,5	49,9	0,0	0,0	398,8	0,2	237 363,0	100,0
Plantaciones forestales	41 404,0	1,9	319 130,0	14,0	249 843,0	11,0	1 620 625,0	73,0	0,0	0,0	1 797,0	0,1	2 232 798,0	100,0
Praderas naturales	379 266,5	3,1	2 080 373,4	17,1	3 004 910,0	24,7	6 666 503,1	54,9	0,0	0,0	12 769,2	0,1	12 143 822,1	100,0
Praderas sembradas	5 225,7	1,2	104 402,0	23,0	89 346,5	19,7	254 977,3	56,1	0,0	0,0	218,4	0,0	454 169,8	100,0
Praderas mejoradas	28 246,3	2,8	290 349,4	28,5	254 106,7	24,9	445 417,8	43,7	0,0	0,0	466,1	0,0	1 018 586,4	100,0
Cabezas de ganado														
Bovinos	202 098	4,9	1 552 598	37,5	778 825	18,8	1 573 883	38,0	224	0,0	32 619	0,8	4 140 247	100,0
Vacas lecheras	17 180	2,8	244 650	39,6	120 933	19,6	232 404	37,6	25	0,0	2 420	0,4	617 612	100,0
Ovinos	225 766	6,1	999 127	26,9	1 617 989	43,6	823 980	22,2	320	0,0	43 277	1,2	3 710 459	100,0
Caprinos	160 948	12,8	622 698	49,7	80 011	6,4	175 373	14,0	703	0,1	213 841	17,1	1 253 574	100,0
Cerdos	98 211	5,7	726 567	42,2	213 783	12,4	593 918	34,5	315	0,0	89 613	5,2	1 722 407	100,0
Camélidos	4 597	3,7	28 811	23,1	12 437	10,0	14 793	11,9	0	0,0	64 016	51,4	124 654	100,0

Fuente: Elaborado por la ODEPA a partir de la información del VI Censo Nacional Agropecuario, Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (INE), 1997.

socioproductiva de los pequeños productores, éstos se han diferenciado según la incorporación en las explotaciones del capital y la tecnología.

La diferenciación según el nivel de capitalización y el acceso a la tecnología del conjunto de los pequeños productores «sectoriales», que agrupa al 84,6 por ciento de los registrados en el país, es bastante manifiesta. En cuanto a sus características estrictamente productivas, fue posible identificar un primer segmento compuesto por 102 766 productores «de subsistencia». Según el patrón productivo tradicional dominante en el sector en que se localizan las explotaciones, el tamaño de las propiedades de los productores de subsistencia resulta menor que el necesario para producir una cantidad de bienes cuyo valor de venta anual estimado sea superior al del ingreso mínimo mensual. Estos productores carecen además del capital y la tecnología necesarios para un uso más intensivo de la explotación. En estas condiciones se encontraba, a la fecha del VI Censo Nacional Agropecuario (1997), el 31,2 por ciento de los productores del país.

Por otra parte, se ha estimado que existen 176 074 pequeños productores «empresariales», que son aquellos que poseen determinados «atributos» asociados a mayores niveles de capitalización relativa dentro de la explotación; dichos atributos les permiten conseguir una producción más intensiva, y obtener beneficios superiores a los de los productores de subsistencia. Estos resultados fueron alcanzados independientemente de los límites de tamaño de la explotación señalados para el primer grupo de productores. En lo sustantivo, estas variables comprenden aspectos tales como inversiones en maquinaria agrícola; superación de los umbrales mínimos para cultivos específicos, plantaciones frutales y forestales o número de cabezas de ganado; y utilización de mano de obra contratada de forma permanente. Estas condiciones regían para el 53,4 por ciento de los productores a la fecha del Censo.

Sobre la base de las cifras del Cuadro 1

es posible afirmar que la pequeña agricultura de subsistencia «controla» un total de 1 186 316 hectáreas (el 2,3 por ciento del total nacional), de las cuales 537 820 ha están bajo producción efectiva (el 3,0 por ciento del total nacional). Por su parte, los pequeños productores empresariales controlan un total de 8 061 328 ha (el 15,7 por ciento de la superficie de las explotaciones totales), de las que 3 472 276 ha eran objeto de uso efectivo en 1997 (el 19,6 por ciento de la superficie nacional).

Productores, superficie predial y volumen de producción

Una vez definido un sector importante de las tipologías del proceso productivo, es posible expresar su peso relativo en las distintas agrupaciones territoriales disponibles para el análisis.


En cuanto al acceso al recurso suelo, el Cuadro 1 señala una relación inversa entre el número de productores, según el tamaño de sus explotaciones, y la superficie agrícola de que disponen. En efecto, mientras el total de los pequeños productores agrupa el 84,6 por ciento de las explotaciones registradas, su superficie predial no supera el 18 por ciento del total nacional, alcanzando el 22,6 por ciento del conjunto de la superficie efectivamente utilizada. El 8,1 por ciento de las explotaciones restante se distribuye entre los medianos y grandes productores, los cuales concentran respectivamente el 5,2 y el 2,9 por ciento de las explotaciones, y poseen el 11,9 y el 30,1 por ciento de la superficie predial, y el 22,1 y el 54,8 por ciento de la tierra bajo utilización silvoagropecuaria efectiva.

DISTRIBUCIÓN TERRITORIAL DE LOS PRODUCTORES: REGIONES ADMINISTRATIVAS Y ÁREAS AMBIENTALES HOMOGÉNEAS

Un aspecto interesante es el nivel de concentración en el país de los productores de acuerdo con sus «estratos» de tamaño. A este respecto, se ofrecen dos tipos de análisis: una elaboración de la información por unidades regionales administrativas

Mapa 1

Regiones administrativas de Chile



CUADRO 2

Regiones con el mayor número de productores por tipología

Productores de subsistencia			Pequeños productores empresariales		
Porcentaje	Número de explotaciones	Región	Porcentaje	Número de explotaciones	Región
25,0	25 648	X	23,5	41 412	IX
17,7	18 165	VIII	18,9	33 255	VIII
16,0	16 455	IX	15,6	27 472	X
12,7	9 696	VII	13,8	24 294	VII
Productores de subsistencia medianos			Grandes productores empresariales		
Porcentaje	Número de explotaciones	Región	Porcentaje	Número de explotaciones	Región
19,9	3 386	VIII	16,2	1 522	VII
15,4	2 611	RM ¹	15,5	1 455	VIII
13,5	2 294	VII	14,3	1 347	IX
11,2	1 906	V	13,1	1 232	X

¹RM = Región Metropolitana de Santiago.

Fuente: Elaborado por la ODEPA a partir de la información del VI Censo Nacional Agropecuario, INE, 1997.

(Mapa 1), y otra por las áreas ambientales homogéneas (Mapa 2) definidas por la ODEPA en el estudio mencionado.

En cuanto a la distribución interregional de los productores, en el Cuadro 2 se señala una concentración regional significativa y progresiva conforme disminuye el tamaño de sus explotaciones. Así, cabe poner de relieve la asociación entre la X Región de Los Lagos y los productores de subsistencia, de los cuales el 25 por ciento se encuentra en dicha unidad administrativa, mientras que otro 45 por ciento se distribuye en la VII, VIII y IX Regiones. Bastante similar es el patrón de distribución de los pequeños

productores empresariales, cuyo mayor número –equivalente al 23,5 por ciento– se encuentra en la vecina Región IX de La Araucanía; en importancia decreciente figuran la VIII, X y VII Regiones, con poco más del 45 por ciento de los pequeños productores empresariales. Cerca del 70 por ciento de los productores de ambas formas de pequeña agricultura se concentran respectivamente en las cuatro regiones mencionadas. La diferencia está, sin embargo, en que el contingente absoluto de la pequeña agricultura empresarial, con poco más de 126 000 explotaciones, duplica prácticamente el número de las explotaciones de subsistencia, que son cerca de 70 000.

En el otro extremo de las tipologías de tamaño, los grandes productores también se encuentran localizados en casi un 70 por ciento en las cinco regiones de mayor peso agrícola del país (VI, VII, VIII, IX y X Regiones). Si se toma como referencia el caso anterior, su distribución dentro del territorio es menos concentrada. Finalmente, la mediana agricultura también aparece con menores niveles de concentración relativa; sin embargo, su presencia es mayor en la zona central del país (Región Metropolitana de Santiago y V Región de Valparaíso).

Tamaño productivo de las explotaciones por región

Otra variable que refleja una interesante variabilidad geográfica es el tamaño promedio de las explotaciones. Los Cuadros 3a y 3b ilustran la heterogeneidad que caracteriza a este sector productivo dentro del país.

La diferenciación por estratos de tamaño, incluido el segmento de los pequeños productores, tiene una justificación estadística adecuada. Dado que el criterio base de este estudio es el tamaño productivo real, que se considera más significativo que el tamaño de la propiedad, los datos contenidos en el Cuadro 3b reflejan los márgenes promedios dentro de los que se inscriben las diversas tipologías de productores, e indican inclusive claros

CUADRO 3a
Diferenciación regional según el tamaño promedio de la explotación

Región	Tipo de productor					
	De subsistencia	Pequeño productor empresarial	Mediano	Grande	Sin actividad	Sin clasificar
<i>(Hectáreas)</i>						
I	12,0	28,3	246,6	4 007,2	20,6	393,9
II	0,8	2,1	26,1	5 067,6	5,4	6 439,0
III	58,0	257,0	1 059,5	7 953,3	10,4	284,6
IV	4,9	23,9	364,5	4 724,4	5,8	4,7
V	5,5	25,7	163,9	1 979,1	4,1	43,2
RM ¹	11,9	46,2	69,7	775,9	4,6	86,1
VI	6,0	26,8	201,2	572,7	3,3	85,9
VII	10,5	37,9	177,9	846,1	27,9	75,1
VIII	11,4	34,4	124,6	1 108,6	5,4	68,2
IX	11,2	23,8	194,7	979,5	6,3	278,1
X	14,7	78,2	317,2	1 234,6	0,0	1 643,7
XI	150,6	360,5	910,5	3 119,2	0,0	11 396,4
XII	88,4	906,8	8 372,6	66 031,6	0,0	34 924,5
Total general	11,5	45,8	358,5	1 641,0	9,1	1 525,0

¹ RM = Región Metropolitana de Santiago.

Fuente: Elaborado por la ODEPA a partir de la información del VI Censo Nacional Agropecuario, INE, 1997.

CUADRO 3b
Diferenciación regional según el tamaño promedio de la superficie agrícola utilizada por explotación

Región	Tipo de productor					
	De subsistencia	Pequeño productor empresarial	Mediano	Grande	Sin actividad	Sin clasificar
<i>(Hectáreas)</i>						
I*	0,5	1,4	6,7	23,2	0,2	0,11
II*	0,7	1,8	8,4	74,2	3,0	0,03
III*	1,3	4,7	17,3	94,5	9,2	0,01
IV*	2,1	6,0	25,8	160,4	4,6	0,05
V*	1,1	5,7	35,3	182,7	2,2	1,5
RM* ¹	0,6	3,9	19,9	113,5	4,2	0,2
VI	3,8	14,3	129,6	385,0	3,1	1,7
VII	5,3	21,2	126,0	542,8	8,8	1,5
VIII	5,7	19,1	83,6	754,7	5,2	1,5
IX	5,8	15,4	125,6	678,3	6,2	0,4
X	5,7	22,9	149,6	549,3	0,0	0,5
XI	41,7	123,8	444,4	1 944,2	0,0	0,2
XII	17,4	314,6	5 957,0	39 724,8	0,0	0,1
Total general	5,2	19,7	229,9	1 031,1	4,5	1,5

¹ RM = Región Metropolitana de Santiago.


* Las praderas naturales se han excluido de la superficie bajo producción.

Fuente: Elaborado por la ODEPA a partir de la información del VI Censo Nacional Agropecuario, INE, 1997.

contrastes dentro del grupo de los pequeños productores. El límite superior de la pequeña agricultura empresarial arroja valores coherentes con los utilizados por el

Mapa 2

Áreas ambientales homogéneas del sur de Chile VIII a X Regiones



Instituto de Desarrollo Agropecuario (INDAP) para definir el conjunto de sus potenciales beneficiarios, mientras que los productores de subsistencia presentan un tamaño productivo bastante menor, equivalente en promedio a prácticamente un cuarto del de los empresariales. Si se considera además que el segmento de los productores de subsistencia no dispone en sus explotaciones ni de capital ni de tecnología, su actual nivel de competitividad, especialmente en términos de escala de producción, resulta bastante escaso en sentido relativo.

El Cuadro 3a señala también el mayor tamaño de las explotaciones de los grandes productores; dicho tamaño se destaca de manera clara dentro del total, por ejemplo en las regiones extremas del país y en las zonas semiáridas de la III y IV Regiones. Sin embargo, el Cuadro 3b refleja una importante diferencia entre el tamaño de la explotación y la superficie bajo uso silvoagropecuario efectivo, la cual sólo se hace perceptible al excluir de esta última el conjunto de las praderas naturales. El alto porcentaje que este uso del suelo representa en el total del uso agrícola efectivo en la I Región y en la Región Metropolitana de Santiago (Cuadro 4) tiende a distorsionar el tamaño productivo real de las explotaciones, debido al escaso aporte efectivo de las praderas naturales a la actividad pecuaria en las zonas desértica y semidesértica³.

La exclusión de las praderas naturales de las seis regiones mencionadas en el Cuadro 4 permite apreciar el tamaño productivo real del suelo en uso. En orden de importancia, se encuentran, de norte a sur, las plantaciones frutales, las viñas, las hortalizas, los cereales y las praderas mejoradas y artificiales⁴. Teniendo en cuenta la información referente al tamaño de la propiedad o a la superficie utilizada, el promedio de las explotaciones medianas se

³ Esta corrección no se realizó en las zonas sur y centro-sur del país, debido al mayor rendimiento productivo de las praderas naturales en su asociación con la ganadería.

⁴ Para mayores detalles acerca del uso específico del suelo por región, véase ODEPA, *op. cit.*

CUADRO 4

Superficie de praderas naturales en relación con el total de la superficie en uso agrícola por región

Región	Superficie agrícola utilizada (Hectáreas)	Superficie de praderas naturales	Praderas naturales (Porcentaje)
I	486 792	475 781	97,7
II	30 882	24 808	80,3
III	448 947	418 854	93,3
IV	3 269 485	3 070 917	93,9
V	1 001 722	785 293	78,4
RM	462 705	269 880	58,3
Total	5 700 533	5 045 533	88,5

Fuente: Elaborado por la ODEPA a partir de la información del VI Censo Nacional Agropecuario, INE, 1997.

diferencia claramente de las grandes, como de las explotaciones de escala productiva menor.

Distribución de la superficie agrícola por áreas ambientales homogéneas

El uso de áreas ambientales homogéneas como unidad de referencia pone de manifiesto una asociación más estrecha entre los tipos de productores y las actividades agrícolas que se llevan a cabo en zonas muy similares desde el punto de vista ambiental y socioproductivo. Un ejemplo de la cobertura geográfica de dichas unidades se ofrece en el Mapa 2.

De acuerdo con este criterio de clasificación, las 17 680 239 ha bajo uso agrícola registradas por el VI Censo Nacional Agropecuario no se distribuyen según un nivel de concentración particularmente elevado en ninguna de las áreas ambientales homogéneas del país. En la precordillera, unidad con mayor superficie bajo uso efectivo, no se registra más del 12,9 por ciento de ese total (Cuadro 5).

Si se considera la concentración relativa de la superficie agrícola utilizada dentro de las áreas homogéneas, se deducen algunos patrones bastantes claros. El suelo bajo uso por los pequeños productores de subsistencia (537 820 ha) se localiza principalmente en el secano costero, pero representa sólo el 5,0 por ciento del suelo actualmente en uso en dicho sector. Algo similar ocurre con la superficie de los suelos en el resto de las áreas homogéneas.

CUADRO 5

Superficie agrícola utilizada por área ambiental homogénea

Área ambiental homogénea	Tipo de productor						Total general
	De subsistencia	Pequeño productor empresarial	Mediano	Grande	Sin actividad	Sin clasificar	
	(Hectáreas)						
Desierto	259	1 268	3 537	111 894	623	75	117 658
Secano del Norte Chico	20 548	56 734	112 254	1 503 787	4 563	65	1 697 951
Valle transversal	5 572	64 781	125 057	209 448	4 475	466	409 798
Secano costero	112 932	606 635	430 503	1 100 526	5 916	3 130	2 259 644
Secano interior	93 272	553 773	207 614	923 542	8 539	2 204	1 788 944
Depresión intermedia	42 201	422 164	265 313	833 816	11 534	2 043	1 577 070
Cerro o cordón isla	7 602	60 395	11 668	14 795	101	108	94 669
Valle seco	42 975	457 418	194 342	651 297	4 405	305	1 350 742
Ñadis	21 529	112 837	51 743	43 954	0	35	230 097
Precordillera	50 263	298 742	165 386	1 756 952	5 318	857	2 277 518
Cordillera	69 684	371 080	225 786	1 508 209	3 932	294	2 178 985
Chiloé insular	53 303	97 850	13 302	23 041	0	246	187 743
Chiloé occidental	2 882	9 914	0	0	0	27	12 823
Bosque lluvioso	10 810	243 342	327 602	212 788	0	70	794 611
Precordillera transandina	1 633	19 469	24 650	374 617	0	92	420 462
De transición	828	8 568	191 139	32 333	0	0	232 868
Coironal	1 525	87 305	1 559 913	390 475	0	3	2 039 221
Territorio insular occidental*	0	0	0	0	0	9 435	9 435
Total general	537 820	3 472 276	3 909 808	9 691 475	49 406	19 454	17 680 239

* Corresponde a las explotaciones de la Isla de Pascua y del archipiélago de Juan Fernández.

Fuente: Elaborado por la ODEPA a partir de la información del VI Censo Nacional Agropecuario, INE, 1997.

Ésta se distribuye secuencialmente en las unidades de secano interior, cordillera, Chiloé insular, precordillera, valle seco y depresión intermedia. En todas ellas el peso relativo de los pequeños productores de subsistencia es muy escaso. Con la sola excepción de Chiloé insular, donde se explota el 28,4 por ciento de la superficie, la presencia relativa de los pequeños productores no supera el 5,2 por ciento en cada una de las unidades.

En cuanto a los pequeños productores empresariales (cuyas explotaciones comprenden 3 472 276 ha), su mayor cobertura productiva se da, en orden de importancia, en el secano costero, secano interior, valle seco y depresión intermedia. Su peso relativo es mayor con respecto al total del suelo bajo uso por los pequeños productores de subsistencia en las unidades en que éstos se concentran, si bien no supera el 33,9 por ciento del total

en la unidad valle seco; este valor relativo es más alto en las otras tres unidades mencionadas. A pesar de que las superficies absolutas bajo uso son bastante más reducidas, los pequeños productores empresariales dominan en términos relativos del uso efectivo en el área homogénea en Chiloé occidental (77,3 por ciento), cerro isla (63,8 por ciento), Chiloé insular (52,1 por ciento) y en los ñadis (49 por ciento).

La superficie utilizada por los medianos productores (3 909 808 ha) tiene una importancia absoluta en el coironal, donde corresponde al 76,5 por ciento del uso. Es también significativa en el secano costero, donde representa el 19,1 por ciento de la superficie bajo producción. Los medianos productores cultivan una gran superficie en el bosque lluvioso, y son mayoritarios en la depresión intermedia y en la cordillera, abarcando en estas zonas el 16,8 y el 10,4

por ciento de la superficie respectivamente. La superficie bajo uso por los medianos productores en el valle transversal, una de las áreas homogéneas de mayor productividad en el país, comprende el 30,5 por ciento de la superficie total, y equivale prácticamente al doble de la superficie utilizada por los pequeños productores.

Los grandes productores dominan, en términos relativos, en el desierto (95,1 por ciento), en la precordillera transandina (89,1 por ciento), en el secano del Norte Chico (88,6 por ciento), en la precordillera (77,1 por ciento), en el secano costero (51,8 por ciento), en la depresión intermedia (52,9 por ciento) y en la cordillera (69,2 por ciento). La superficie efectiva en manos de los grandes productores supera el 50 por ciento de la superficie total utilizada en todas las áreas homogéneas mencionadas. Este patrón también se observa en el valle transversal y en el secano interior⁵.

Tamaño de las explotaciones por área ambiental homogénea

Siguiendo un criterio metodológico similar al utilizado en el análisis regional, en los Cuadros 6a y 6b se ofrecen el tamaño promedio de las explotaciones y la superficie bajo uso efectivo del suelo⁶ para las áreas homogéneas definidas por la ODEPA. A partir del análisis combinado de ambas variables, se observa un fuerte contraste entre los tamaños de las explotaciones, tanto dentro de las áreas homogéneas como entre tipologías de productores.

Se constata que los pequeños productores, y especialmente el segmento de los de subsistencia, disponen en general de explotaciones cuya superficie productiva es escasa. No se ha considerado el uso asociado de las praderas naturales, que puede ser un factor explicativo para los productores del sector desértico y semiárido, como también para el resto de

⁵ Para los valores absolutos, véase ODEPA, *op. cit.*

⁶ En este caso se realizó la misma corrección que para el Cuadro 3b: se excluyó de los promedios la superficie de las praderas naturales de las regiones y áreas homogéneas correspondientes.

los productores, pero no para los de la macrozona que se extiende al sur de la Región Metropolitana de Santiago. En este sector se concentran los pequeños productores, y el uso de la pradera natural presenta una mayor importancia tanto absoluta como relativa en todos los segmentos de tamaño productivo. En esta amplia porción del territorio, donde se concentra la mayor producción por sectores, se observan muy claramente las diferencias en el tamaño productivo por tipo de productor.

PRODUCCIÓN Y RENDIMIENTOS SEGÚN EL TAMAÑO DE LOS PRODUCTORES

El aporte productivo sectorial de cada una de las tipologías de tamaño de los productores se indicó Cuadro 1. La alta proporción de actividades productivas concentradas en las explotaciones de tamaño pequeño es un rasgo sobresaliente, a pesar del bajo «peso» relativo que este segmento presenta en el «control» tanto de la superficie de las explotaciones como de la superficie bajo uso efectivo en el total nacional. En efecto, con un control no superior al 22,6 por ciento de la tierra utilizada en el país, el segmento de los pequeños productores aporta el 44,8 por ciento del uso del suelo destinado a hortalizas, el 43,8 por ciento de los cultivos anuales y el 40,6 por ciento de las viñas. Similar es la situación de la producción pecuaria: la masa ganadera caprina, bovina (de carne y leche) y porcina⁷ se concentra principalmente en este estrato (con el 62,5, el 42,4 y el 47,9 por ciento de la producción, respectivamente). Sin embargo, como se observa en el Cuadro 1, las diferencias entre los pequeños productores de subsistencia y los productores empresariales son manifiestas y confirman los rasgos contrastantes mencionados en las variables analizadas.

⁷ Debido a que la cría de porcinos se realiza en forma intensiva y bajo estabulación permanente, la ubicación geográfica de la mayor parte de las explotaciones de porcicultura dentro del segmento de los pequeños productores puede conducir a equívocos, si se considera el carácter eminentemente empresarial de este sector.

CUADRO 6a

Tamaño promedio de las explotaciones en las áreas ambientales homogéneas por tipo de productor

Área ambiental homogénea	Tipo de productor					
	De subsistencia	Pequeño productor empresarial	Mediano	Grande	Sin actividad	Sin clasificar
(Hectáreas)						
Desierto	1,0	4,7	17,2	3 391,9	24,3	220,6
Secano del Norte Chico	4,3	20,6	326,3	4 136,0	5,6	0,4
Valle transversal	2,6	11,4	44,8	334,9	5,9	47,2
Secano costero	11,1	46,8	569,0	3 375,4	5,7	146,5
Secano interior	10,9	36,5	202,2	1 353,2	8,4	43,7
Depresión intermedia	3,2	11,7	55,4	316,4	5,2	20,5
Cerro o cordón isla	8,9	41,1	665,4	1 238,9	2,4	26,0
Valle seco	5,1	17,4	148,6	567,6	4,0	23,8
Ñadis	11,6	51,7	290,5	605,0	0,0	49,9
Precordillera	13,8	52,3	327,9	4 138,7	17,7	166,1
Cordillera	46,5	358,0	1 575,6	12 549,1	17,5	2 851,3
Chiloé insular	11,5	48,2	275,8	3 406,9	0,0	650,4
Chiloé occidental	32,2	134,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	1 874,5
Bosque lluvioso	264,7	783,0	17 596,0	148 968,3	0,0	22 343,9
Precordillera transandina	57,7	151,4	511,0	3 049,7	0,0	4 031,2
De transición	18,2	374,5	6 539,4	26 892,1	0,0	9 050,6
Coironal	16,1	528,6	7 382,0	40 684,9	0,0	6 752,5
Territorio insular occidental*	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	355,8
Total general	11,5	45,8	358,5	1 641,0	9,1	1 525,0

* Corresponde a las explotaciones de la Isla de Pascua y del archipiélago de Juan Fernández.

Fuente: Elaborado por la ODEPA a partir de la información del VI Censo Nacional Agropecuario, INE, 1997.

CUADRO 6b

Tamaño promedio de la superficie agrícola utilizada en las áreas ambientales homogéneas por tipo de productor

Área homogénea	Tipo de productor					
	De subsistencia	Pequeño productor empresarial	Mediano	Grande	Sin actividad	Sin clasificar
(Hectáreas)						
Desierto*	0,7	1,4	9,3	99,2	0,7	0,1
Secano del Norte Chico*	2,3	6,0	24,9	158,6	4,4	0,1
Valle transversal*	0,5	3,0	16,4	102,6	3,4	0,3
Secano costero*	0,4	1,8	40,0	154,0	1,7	0,1
Secano interior*	0,1	0,6	7,7	23,2	0,8	0,1
Depresión intermedia	2,4	9,6	47,6	242,5	4,3	0,9
Cerro o cordón isla	6,2	28,7	388,9	739,8	2,2	0,5
Valle seco	4,1	14,2	119,7	442,2	3,9	0,8
Ñadis	5,3	29,1	205,3	462,7	0,0	0,4
Precordillera*	0,3	1,0	23,1	61,6	1,0	0,1
Cordillera*	0,2	1,6	4,2	20,7	6,4	0,01
Chiloé insular	5,3	16,8	114,7	622,7	0,0	0,9
Chiloé occidental	8,1	25,4	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,4
Bosque lluvioso	75,1	289,7	8 400,0	53 197,0	0,0	0,1
Precordillera transandina	16,3	43,6	220,1	1 911,3	0,0	0,5
De transición	11,2	39,3	3 033,9	16 166,6	0,0	0,0
Coironal	14,7	236,0	6 315,4	39 047,5	0,0	0,1
Territorio insular occidental**	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	147,4
Total general	5,2	19,7	229,2	1 031,1	4,5	1,5

* La superficie utilizada en las praderas naturales de la I, II, III, IV, y V Regiones y Región Metropolitana de Santiago se ha sustraído de los valores correspondientes a estas áreas homogéneas.

** Corresponde a las explotaciones de la Isla de Pascua y del archipiélago de Juan Fernández.

Fuente: Elaborado por la ODEPA a partir de la información del VI Censo Nacional Agropecuario, INE, 1997.

CUADRO 7

Cultivos anuales: productores, superficie y rendimiento por tipología de tamaño

Cultivo	Tipo de productor					Total general
	De subsistencia	Pequeño productor empresarial	Mediano	Grande	Sin clasificar	
Número de explotaciones						
Arroz	64	1 907	351	209	7	2 538
Avena (grano seco)	4 764	28 180	2 037	1 472	110	36 563
Cebada cervecera	45	623	261	299	3	1 231
Maíz (grano seco)	4 575	17 689	2 156	1 195	713	26 328
Girasol	8	154	26	14	1	203
Papa	26 080	59 483	3 872	1 546	1 013	91 994
Poroto de consumo interno	4 044	17 586	1 980	631	530	24 771
Poroto de exportación	475	3 052	584	258	52	4 421
Raps	22	120	70	137	1	350
Remolacha azucarera	143	5 783	1 289	660	17	7 892
Tabaco	22	933	126	45		1 126
Trigo blanco	10 842	70 303	5 073	2 776	717	89 711
Total general	51 084	205 813	17 825	9 242	3 164	287 128
Superficie (hectáreas)						
Arroz	188,2	10 353,9	5 352,5	9 839,8	27,4	25 761,8
Avena (grano seco)	3 001,0	40 216,5	16 122,6	45 076,0	83,0	104 499,1
Cebada cervecera	73,2	2 756,0	3 948,9	9 459,7	1,3	16 239,1
Maíz (grano seco)	1 969,4	33 430,6	13 742,3	37 273,1	328,8	86 744,3
Girasol	2,6	396,2	186,9	198,8	0,5	785,0
Papa	8 573,8	45 605,9	10 845,2	15 617,9	334,7	80 977,4
Poroto de consumo interno	1 597,2	14 383,2	3 593,0	2 525,5	210,1	22 309,0
Poroto de exportación	258,3	4 125,8	1 722,5	1 932,2	28,1	8 066,9
Raps	57,0	1 299,3	1 510,3	8 394,2	2,0	11 262,8
Remolacha azucarera	167,5	17 141,1	9 321,8	15 068,1	19,9	41 718,4
Tabaco	39,8	2 771,4	550,0	293,4		3 654,6
Trigo blanco	11 300,3	164 535,7	62 174,0	131 656,6	1 018,3	370 684,8
Total general	27 228,3	337 015,5	129 070,0	277 335,3	2 054,1	772 703,2
Rendimiento (quintales/hectárea)						
Arroz (con cascara)	39,0	38,8	41,1	45,2	45,7	41,7
Avena (grano seco)	15,9	23,3	33,8	40,6	18,2	32,2
Cebada cervecera	24,7	36,4	36,4	43,2	33,1	40,3
Maíz (grano seco)	37,0	77,7	85,1	107,0	58,7	90,5
Girasol	13,1	20,6	16,5	20,2	10,0	19,5
Papa	120,4	145,5	182,7	217,1	101,2	161,5
Poroto de consumo interno	8,0	10,9	11,8	15,6	11,5	11,4
Poroto de exportación	10,1	12,6	12,8	15,6	13,6	13,3
Raps	24,1	24,7	26,7	26,6	23,0	26,4
Remolacha azucarera	544,8	554,6	573,3	604,6	566,6	576,8
Tabaco	28,5	30,9	29,9	34,2	0,0	31,0
Trigo blanco	15,8	27,2	41,2	51,2	25,0	37,8

Fuente: Elaborado por la ODEPA a partir de la información del VI Censo Nacional Agropecuario, INE, 1997.

En el otro extremo de la tipología, los grandes productores, que controlan el 54 por ciento de la superficie bajo producción efectiva, son mayoritarios y poseen el 72,6 por ciento de las plantaciones forestales del país. Si se considera la actividad empresarial en su conjunto, excluyendo sin embargo a los pequeños productores, se observa un claro predominio de los medianos y grandes en las plantaciones forestales (83,8 por ciento); en las praderas naturales, artificiales y mejoradas (79,6 por ciento, 75,8 por ciento y 68,6 por ciento, respectivamente), así como en los frutales (70,5 por ciento). Dentro de la actividad pecuaria, ambos estratos dominan a su vez en la actividad ovina (65,8 por ciento de la masa nacional),

mientras que en la ganadería porcina agrupan el 46,9 por ciento de la masa total, compartiendo prácticamente este lugar con los pequeños productores en conjunto.

Otra variable interesante es la productividad promedio de la producción de cultivos anuales⁸, según la importancia de los productores. En el Cuadro 7 se indican los valores promedios contrastados del rendimiento por hectárea para distintos cultivos. Aun teniendo en consideración las significativas variaciones en los

⁸ La información proporcionada por el VI Censo Agropecuario sólo permite el cálculo del rendimiento de los cultivos anuales. Tan sólo en este caso se disponía de información sobre superficie y producción.

rendimientos logrados en cada estrato⁹, y sin entrar en explicaciones detalladas acerca de los valores alcanzados, la información muestra dos tendencias bastante definidas.

Por una parte, existen diferencias importantes en la productividad por unidad de superficie entre los estratos –en particular en los cultivos tradicionales–, que confirman las tendencias de diferenciación observadas en las variables analizadas anteriormente. El caso del poroto de consumo interno, del maíz, de la papa y del trigo ilustra las diferencias sustantivas observadas tanto entre los pequeños productores como entre los medianos y grandes productores empresariales. En el caso del trigo y del maíz, el acceso al capital y tecnología por los pequeños productores se traduce en diferencias de rendimiento cercanas al 100 por ciento. Estos rendimientos, en conjunto, resultan a su vez notoriamente inferiores al rendimiento obtenido por los productores de tamaño relativo mayor.

Por otra parte, se observan pequeñas diferencias relativas de productividad por hectárea de los cultivos que realizan por contrato los cuatro tipos de productores. Los ejemplos de la remolacha azucarera y del raps resultan ilustrativos: estos cultivos se llevan a cabo prácticamente en su totalidad por un contrato estipulado antes de la siembra. En los casos del tabaco y el arroz¹⁰ ocurre algo similar. Si bien se observan algunas variaciones en las cifras, la tendencia es más semejante a de los cultivos mencionados anteriormente, pero difiere de la de los cultivos tradicionales. La asistencia técnica y el apoyo en materia de créditos por las empresas contratantes pueden ser considerados como los principales factores que explican la marcada homogeneidad de los rendimientos que se ofrecen en el Cuadro 7. Los productores

de subsistencia pueden alcanzar altos valores relativos en el rendimiento, aun mediante el uso de tecnologías no mecanizadas o el tiro animal, por ejemplo en el cultivo de la remolacha¹¹.

CONCLUSIONES

El acceso a una información por sectores, diferenciada por tipología y por zonas geográficas de distribución de los productores dentro del país, permite saber cuáles son los agentes del proceso de producción silvoagropecuaria e identificar los lugares donde se desarrolla su producción. El aporte que al sector realizan los productores, según su escala y disponibilidad de tecnología y capital, y el conocimiento de los niveles de dispersión o concentración de los productores en las diferentes regiones y en las áreas ambientales homogéneas permite afinar la interpretación de los principales rasgos socioproductivos de una agricultura chilena heterogénea.

La diferenciación del diagnóstico sobre la base de regiones administrativas arroja una información valiosa para el diseño de las medidas de gestión regional. Esta orientación concuerda con los esfuerzos de descentralización y desconcentración realizados en el país desde hace ya casi tres decenios. El significativo nivel de similitud o de diferenciación socioproductiva que se observa tanto dentro de las áreas ambientales homogéneas como entre ellas permite identificar los mecanismos de gestión más acordes con las nuevas necesidades de modernización del sector silvoagropecuaria nacional. Por ejemplo, el secano del Norte Chico, el secano costero o el secano del interior, o las zonas productivas bajo riego presentan tanto restricciones como potencialidades que trascienden claramente las esferas de gestión de un gobierno regional en particular. Por lo tanto, resulta necesario establecer alianzas de gestión que vayan

⁹ A modo de ejemplo, los altos rendimientos en arroz, trigo y cebada, cercanos a los 90, 100 y 65 quintales por hectárea respectivamente, demuestran la dispersión de los valores que conforman los promedios indicados.

¹⁰ Prácticamente el 60 por ciento de la producción de arroz se realiza por contrato.

¹¹ La mecanización del proceso productivo es un factor de movilidad que permite a los pequeños productores acceder al segmento empresarial.

más allá del simple ejercicio de los proyectos específicos, y puedan ser potenciadas gracias a la tecnología y a los recursos de inversión propios de cada una de las unidades administrativas. Los proyectos de mejoramiento y habilitación de riego, de inversión en caminos o infraestructura social en beneficio de las poblaciones rurales, y de fomento y transferencia de tecnología para tipologías de productores específicos pueden ser citados a modo de ejemplo.

Por otra parte, el efecto de diferenciación que motiva el acceso a la tecnología y al capital por los pequeños productores debe conducir a una reflexión más amplia que el simple diagnóstico descriptivo acerca de los pequeños productores de subsistencia o de los productores empresariales. Si bien ambos segmentos contrastan en cuanto a las variables asociadas a sus características socioproductivas –especialmente en aspectos como el tamaño productivo y los rendimientos–, el acceso relativamente

exitoso de los pequeños productores de subsistencia a la agricultura por contrato permite contemplar con bastante optimismo eventuales políticas de apoyo para una futura producción más vinculada al mercado. Las restricciones en materia de capacitación, tradiciones culturales, condiciones ambientales y de mercados pueden ejercer efectos significativos a corto plazo, y el acceso al capital de inversión o de riesgo, así como a diversas tecnologías de apoyo a la producción, han demostrado ser un importante factor de movilidad social hacia prácticas empresariales. Estas prácticas tienden a neutralizar considerablemente las limitaciones físicas propias de los predios de pequeño tamaño relativo. La relación entre el tamaño del predio y la superficie efectivamente bajo uso puede ser un argumento para aumentar aún más las escalas productivas, sobre todo de los productores que sufren limitaciones impuestas por el tamaño de sus explotaciones.

Terres désertes et peuplées: les Bédouins de Syrie, entre «développement» et «État»

La façon dont les relations entre l'homme et son environnement ont été décrites dans les articles sur le développement est fondée sur des hypothèses spécifiques concernant l'existence d'une nature humaine universelle. Dans cet article, l'auteur étudie tout d'abord des hypothèses allant au-delà de «la tragédie des terrains communaux», du «paradigme de la conservation» et de la notion, plus récente, «d'approche axée sur la communauté» en matière de gestion des ressources naturelles. L'auteur analyse ensuite les images utilisées pour décrire les relations entre les Bédouins de Syrie et la Badia (steppe syrienne) et leurs répercussions sur les pratiques en matière de politiques dans le cas spécifique de la conservation des espèces sauvages et des programmes de remise en état. En restituant le projet dans son contexte historique et politique, l'auteur montre comment les images produites sont construites par rapport à ce cadre, et présente un avis critique sur les techniques participatives utilisées, soulignant comment celles-ci peuvent se solder par une centralisation des pouvoirs au nom du transfert des responsabilités.

Paisajes despoblados y poblados: los beduinos de la República Árabe Siria entre «desarrollo» y «Estado»

La manera en que se ha descrito la relación entre las personas y su entorno en la bibliografía sobre el desarrollo se basa en supuestos específicos relativos a la existencia de una naturaleza humana universalmente compartida. El presente artículo examina en primer lugar los supuestos en que se fundamenta la «tragedia de los bienes comunes», el «paradigma de la conservación» y el más reciente «enfoque basado en la comunidad» para la ordenación de los recursos naturales. En segundo lugar, estudia las imágenes utilizadas para describir la relación entre los beduinos de la República Árabe Siria y la badia (estepa siria), y su repercusión sobre las políticas aplicadas en el caso específico de un plan de conservación y rehabilitación de la fauna y flora silvestres. Al integrar el proyecto en el contexto de su marco histórico y político, este artículo esboza el modo en que se construyen las imágenes producidas en relación con él. Por último, se adopta una posición crítica respecto de las técnicas participativas utilizadas para destacar la forma en que pueden producir el efecto de centralizar el poder en nombre de la transferencia de competencias.

Empty and populated landscapes: the Bedouin of the Syrian Arab Republic between “development” and “State”

L. Triulzi

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The way in which the relationship between people and their environment has been portrayed in development literature is based on specific assumptions regarding the existence of a shared universal human nature. This article first examines the assumptions behind the “tragedy of the commons”, the “conservation paradigm” and the more recent “community-based approach” to natural resource management. Secondly, it explores the images used to describe the relationship between the Bedouin of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Badia (Syrian steppe) and their effects on policy practice in the specific case of a wildlife conservation and rehabilitation scheme. By placing the project in the context of its historical and political framework, this article outlines how the images produced are constructed in relation to it. Finally, it takes a critical view of the participatory techniques used, to highlight the way in which they can produce the effect of centralizing power in the name of devolution.

INTRODUCTION

This article stems from an interest in researching the representation of landscapes elaborated by the development discourse. The way in which the relationship between people and their environment has been portrayed in development literature has produced specific effects in development practice.

The analysis carried out in this article is based on current tendencies in anthropology of development and on Michel Foucault’s (1980) contribution to understanding the relationships between power and knowledge and between discursive and non-discursive practices. His influence produced a widespread academic interest in these themes, and anthropologists in particular became concerned with the discourses made by Western countries about the Third World and their implications as a means of domination during colonial and post-colonial times (Said, 1978).

Following these trends, some critics denounced a continuity between these representations and those elaborated by the development discourse. According to them, these representations acted as a powerful mechanism for the construction of the “other” as underdeveloped and in need of foreign aid, and as a justification of political and economic intervention (Escobar, 1991; Hobart, 1993). At the same time, anthropologists became more conscious of the political effects that “representations of others” can have, and of the risks and responsibilities that these entail (Clifford and Marcus, 1986).

A more recent anthropological understanding of “development” as a process in which power is multcentred (Mosse, 2000) enables us today to shift out of a perception that has seen development as an encounter between the “all-powerful” aid industry on one side and a “powerless” indigenous reality on the other.

Development programmes can rather be seen as a site of encounter and struggle between multiple and unequal voices.

The first part of this article outlines two closely interlinked debates that have informed natural resource development programmes over the past 40 years. The policy advice derived from the “conservation paradigm” and the “tragedy of the commons” has been to centralize the control and regulation of rangelands and of intervention programmes. While identifying specific images of indigenous populations found in this literature and their effects “in practice”, the interest will be in observing to what extent the underlying assumptions that inform them are radically different from the more recent “community-based” ones. As we will see, the way in which the relationship between people and their environment has been portrayed is based on identifiable assumptions regarding the existence of a shared universal human nature.

The second part of this article will attempt a reading of specific “project literature” based on the theoretical insights referred to above. Documentation produced around a project is here understood on the one hand as a space devoted to the production of development discourse, and on the other as a site where cues of conflicting discourses can surface. To this end, we will first concentrate on highlighting the persistent use of images associated with the “tragedy of the commons” in a context of participatory development. We will explain the peculiar combination of formulas such as “open access” in a “community development” approach by analysing the project from a historical perspective.

Further on, we will attempt to take the project reports as an entry point to observe not only the realities they choose to describe, but also more hidden or silent ones that can be discerned. Cues of a divergent use made of the project by the different stakeholders involved shed light on the nature of development programmes as a process. It will also be underlined how the use of an extensive participatory framework,

while enabling divergent voices to be recorded, can often produce the effect of centralizing control in the name of devolution if it is not coupled with an effective shift of power (Nelson and Wright, 1995).

IMAGES AND ASSUMPTIONS

In this section the representations of indigenous populations and the related representations of the environment found in the “conservation paradigm” and the “tragedy of the commons” theories will be outlined.

The “conservation paradigm”

During the late nineteenth century and throughout the first half of the twentieth century, wildlife conservation schemes meant the exclusion of the local population from a chosen area in order to “preserve” the environment. Significant areas of land were set aside as “wilderness”, to be preserved “untouched by humans”. Problems such as soil erosion, degradation of rangelands and desertification were viewed as principally due to local, indigenous, misuse of resources. State and international conservation policies consequently aimed to exclude the local population in order to preserve flora and fauna and to create wildlife parks or “natural” reserves.

The images of indigenous groups and populations developed in this context were those of “backward” and “primitive” locals, viewed as an impediment to the State’s conservation policies and its general desire to modernize (Chatty, 1996b; Agrawal, 1997). Programmes went ahead on the assumption that the range was previously unoccupied. The pastoral population was often forced off its grazing land by the attempts of colonial and early independent governments to assert some form of State control over land. The negative consideration of indigenous knowledge and of indigenous social/political structures justified the need to exclude local groups from development efforts.

The “conservation paradigm” that views the relationship between the local population and the environment as a negative one, when applied to pastoralism

and rangeland management, focused its concerns on livestock and animal production. According to this view, the major concern of pastoral regions of the developing world was overstocking and its negative consequences on the environment: the problem (too many livestock) had a technical solution (de-stocking).

The basic assumptions underlying this tradition of range management – that pastoral ecosystems are potentially stable and balanced – have recently been challenged. Behnke, Scoones and Kerven (1993) have shown how pastoral environments are often “non-equilibrium environments”, continuously adapting to changeable conditions. These are generally found in arid and semi-arid areas with unpredictable rainfall. In these areas, annual rainfall and other external events such as drought or disease are the most important factors, rather than grazing density and time spent on a given pasture, in determining the production potential of livestock and annual pasture grass. In non-equilibrium environments permanent land degradation through overgrazing is not a major risk (Hesse and Trench, 2000: 9).

In addition to this, recent studies have produced evidence from many parts of the world that local people do value, utilize and efficiently manage their environment. The new perspectives declare how nearly every part of the world has been inhabited and modified by people in the past and underlines how the mythical pristine environment exists only in our imagination (Chatty, 1996). The conventional assumption that human interference caused depletion of biological diversity justified in the past the removal of people from national parks and reserves.¹

¹ While *disequilibrium* models have indeed enabled a new understanding of dryland ecosystems, the reoriented focus on degraded vegetation is to be seen also as a reaction to the shortcomings of the mid-1970s to late 1980s “people-oriented approach”. In this sense, recent programmes that target pastoralists have gradually shifted again from people to the environment with the effect of ignoring the political issue of land rights and the discussion on the degree to which national governments and international agencies actually recognize local knowledge and social and political structures.

The “tragedy of the commons”

The “conservation paradigm” outlined above finds a close correspondence in another body of developmental knowledge. The “tragedy of the commons” image and its effects on development policy took shape at the end of the 1960s when Hardin’s phrase (1968) came to symbolize the expected degradation of the environment when individuals use a scarce resource in common. The model that illustrates this logic is the image of an “open access” pasture. In this model, individual herders receive a direct benefit from their own animals although they also suffer delayed costs in the deterioration of common resources when their own and other cattle overgraze. Since they bear only a share of the costs resulting from overgrazing, each herder is motivated, from the perspective of a rational individual, to add more animals so as to reap more short-term benefits.

The image of the “tragedy of the commons” found an echo in M. Olsen’s (1971) “logic of collective action”. Olsen’s theory postulated that a rational self-interested individual would act as an individual utility-seeker and would not exercise restraint in the use of common resources unless coerced by an external agent. According to this position, individuals have an incentive to ignore the social cost of their behaviour for fear that others will exploit resources before they do.

The “conservation paradigm” and the “tragedy of the commons” approaches coincided in the idea that the relationship between people and the environment was one of “open access”. Conservation, therefore, required the protection of threatened resources that could easily be overused because they were open to all. Both the “tragedy of the commons” and the logic of collective action imagined landscapes *empty* of any form of communal organization (an absence of community), justifying external intervention in these open spaces. These images dominated the natural resource development discourse coinciding with highly centralized State development channelled through highly

interventionist programmes. A deeply rooted pessimism about the possibility of preserving natural resources other than through centralized State control lay behind policy recommendations.

By the mid-1980s, the critiques of the modernizing development strategies of the centralized State and the dominance of Western technical knowledge over indigenous community perspectives emerging from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and environmentalist circles produced a policy shift (Mosse, 1997: 468). At the same time, anthropological evidence on the widespread existence of successful indigenous community management systems supported the development of community management programmes.

The World Bank's 1989 discussion paper (Bromley and Cernea, 1989) on the management of common property natural resources can be considered as having institutionalized this policy shift. Landscapes previously imagined (or made to be) *empty* of any positive form of indigenous social life became *populated* by communities.

Intending finally to invalidate the Olsen–Hardin stereotype of authority, Bromley and Cernea's paper established an interpretation that sees a phased progression: from efficient “traditional” common property regimes – then eroded by the intervention of national and regional government – to open access and resource degradation. The paper called for the need to *restore* common property regimes. “Resource degradation in the developing countries while incorrectly attributed to ‘common property systems’ intrinsically actually originates in the *dissolution* of local level institutional arrangements whose very purpose was to give rise to resource patterns that were sustainable” (Bromley and Cernea, 1989: iii, my emphasis).

According to this view, local-level institutional arrangements were undermined and destroyed by the intervention of national governments that “in most developing countries [has] not adequately substituted for these former

resource management regimes”. Since “the notion that national (or even regional) governments in the developing countries can effectively manage local natural resources is largely without empirical support”, then “common property regimes must be *restored* by establishing and strengthening institutional arrangements ... thus protecting the effectiveness of development interventions and their stream of benefits” (Bromley and Cernea, 1989: iii, 3).

To the unharnessed individualism of the “tragedy of the commons”, this perspective opposes a vision of what Agrawal (1997: vii) defines as the “mythical community”: small homogenous groups using locally evolved norms to live with nature harmoniously, managing their resources sustainably and equitably.

Images and representations of communities in policy are directly linked to prescriptions for intervention. The “way ahead” in natural resource management sustained itself on an interpretation of the past. According to the World Bank paper, “traditional” systems of common resource use existed in the past and had been eroded by State (or market) intervention.² A phased progression that went from efficient common property regime to open access and resource degradation by hand of State intervention was hence established (Bromley and Cernea, 1989: iii).

A closely related outcome of the reoriented focus on communities is the production of another body of development knowledge that also originated in the critical reaction to the Hardin–Olsen paradigm. It focuses on cooperative mechanisms and aims to demonstrate the possibility of cooperative outcomes from

² In this position State (and private) control and local institutions are in strong opposition to each other: it is in this sense in continuity with the Olsen–Hardin tradition it intends to react to. The Bromley and Cernea approach is today widespread and implies the existence of neatly ordered and well-functioning local institutions eroded and weakened by a monolithic bureaucratic State (see, for example, Bardhan, 1993: 87). More recent approaches underline how nation states have rarely in practice detained a monopoly of coercion and should not be viewed as monolithic and unitary compounds (Mosse, 1997).

competitive games. Drawing on an “institutional-economic analysis” of local forms of common management it aims to prove the economic rationality of cooperative mechanisms. It argues, using models derived from “theory of repeated games” such as the “prisoner’s dilemma”, that cooperative behaviour can grow out of the long-run interests of foresighted self-interested individuals (Bardhan, 1993; Ostrom, 1990; Seabright, 1993).

Despite a reoriented focus on community management in development policy, the shift attempted by the first critics of the Hardin–Olsen paradigm does not seem to have occurred at a deeper level. The assumptions about human nature underlying the old visions of local communities remain fundamentally unchallenged. The criteria for comprehension of the “other” is the idea that all individuals share a common and universal nature.

The modernist perception of indigenous people viewed individuals on an evolutionist scale of progress from “primitive” to “modern”. The underlying idea was that human beings all over the world share the same nature but are distributed on a scale that goes from “backwardness” to “modernity” and “progress”. The “tragedy of the commons” and the “conservation paradigm” – as we have seen – share these assumptions, which are expressed in the opposition between indigenous realities and State/private control of resources and in the pessimistic view of indigenous peoples’ capacity to organize themselves.

In a similar fashion, the “mythical communities”, although acknowledged in the policy debate as endorsing the local community with authority, are thought of as being regulated by norms, tradition and values devised by universal human mechanisms. These are seen as functions of society that can be modelled and understood as general mechanisms. At the same time, the institutions viewed as “equilibrium outcomes of a structure of individual incentives” that institutional economics searches to understand and

model also rely fundamentally on a universalistic perception of humanity, applicable worldwide.

The humanitarian assumptions on which the representation produced in development discourse is based do not enable the effective shift of power required by participatory development. A shift of power would entail the development process being understood by all stakeholders involved as an encounter between equal diversities.

CONSTRUCTING A “PROJECT GENEALOGY”

This section begins by highlighting the use made throughout a specific project literature (FAO/Government of the Syrian Arab Republic: “Rangeland Rehabilitation and Establishment of a Wildlife Reserve in the Syrian Steppe”) of the image of open access to describe the relationship between the Bedouin of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Syrian Badia. In common with the narrative established in the 1989 World Bank discussion paper, in this programme open access comes with its corollary of State intervention, erosion of a precedent traditional system and land degradation.

We will then follow the construction of a “project genealogy” elaborated by the use of the above rhetoric. An interpretation of the past supports specific intervention in the present. References to the “traditional Bedouin *hema* system”, its erosion and the need for it to be restored are a call for action. The intervention proposed by the project in the present is in fact the formation of a “new civil society” portrayed as if in continuity with the past. We will therefore look at the current development programme in the light of a history of development interventions in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Finally, the historical perspective adopted will enable us to highlight how a fictitious genealogy renders silent effective continuities with the precedent internationally funded development programmes in the country. Two aims seem to be reached by the project’s rhetorical history: to support intervention and the

form it assumes in the present, and to depoliticize intervention by portraying the changes it intends to produce as if in continuity with the past.

Open access in the Badia

Defining the Syrian Badia as being in a situation similar to that of open access seems to be common in the context of the Rangeland Development Project. In project documents the Badia is – as defined by Syrian law – State-owned and therefore accessible to and open to use by all. According to this perspective, resource management under public ownership invariably results in resource degradation. An issue that needs urgently to be addressed, therefore, is that of free access to land for all – defined as a *quasi open access regime*.

According to Syrian law the Badia is indeed defined as “open to all Syrian nationals” (Agrarian Reform Law No. 161, 1958). This normative and juridical definition of the Badia can be read as declaring State ownership equivalent to open access. Placing the Land Reform Law in its historical context will, on the contrary, reveal how no system of open access existed before it and no open access was inaugurated by it.

The wider political environment in which this law is set is the process of nationalization and redistribution of land that took place in the Syrian Arab Republic during the 1950s and 1960s (Rae *et al.*, 1997). Ownership of land in the steppe had been defined in part during the 1930s by the French Mandate’s policy, whereby extensions of “tribal” land were assigned to a few tribal *sheikhs* – those who could demonstrate claims to it. Tribal settlement was also an important part of the independent national government’s programme, and the land previously assigned to the *sheikhs* was confiscated and redistributed by the State to tribespeople. The assimilation of the Bedouin was envisioned by means of settlement, redistribution of land and extension of cultivation into the steppe.

The Land Reform policy was established immediately after an indirect recognition of the political reality of the tribes. At the 1956 Tribal Conference of Damascus, the Syrian Government assumed a mediating role and worked for the solutions of *dira* (territorial disputes on rights of access to pasture) between the *Hadidiyin*, the *Sba’a*, the *Mawali* and the *Gayyar* tribes.³ The government’s interest as mediator was to redistribute land so as to facilitate the settlement of all tribal members and to expand agriculture. The *Ba’ath* Socialist Revolution Party, which implemented the law after its rise to power in 1963, intended thereby to weaken the power of the great landlords by confiscating their land, to build a base of peasant support by redistributing it and to shape a new, productive, rural social order. Land in the Badia was therefore redistributed to tribespeople who generally continued to perceive it as tribal property, to make annual contributions to their *sheikh*, and to rely on him for the resolution of internal disputes and land allocation (Chatty, 1986: 68-75).

It becomes clear that no situation of open access existed before the Land Reform Law and no open access was inaugurated by it. The tribes the State was called upon to mediate between were clearly organized in the Badia in tribal *diras* (territories) according to customary law (*’urf*). “Opening to all nationals” in practice had meant an expansion of agriculture into the steppe, the inception of a programme of State

³ Contrary to the opinions that view tribes and nation states as being in conflict and opposition, tribes in the Syrian Arab Republic have historically called upon government assistance in resolving resource disputes. Historic precedents of the 1956 conference are the 1927 “Assembly of *Sheikhs*”, convened by the French authorities in Hama, and the 1930 Conference in Palmyra, aimed at resolving hostilities between the *Shammar* and the *Aneza* confederations (Chatty, 1986). J. Rae calls attention to the government role in tribal affairs today (Rae *et al.*, 1997: 24). R. Tapper (1983) shows how tribes can also be “constructed” by government, as in the case of the *Shahsevan* of Iran. Tribes can also be allied to national governments as in the case of the *Al-Murrah* servicing as the Saudi National Guard, or be totally dominated by the state, as E. Marx shows for the Bedouin of the Negev and T. Asad (1970) for the *Kabish* of Northern Sudan.

cooperatives over the whole territory, the varied adjustment of the Bedouin to the changing landscape and to the new possibilities of improving income through cultivation and livestock production.

The specific definition used in the Land Reform Law (“opening the steppe to all national Syrians”) probably intended to include and encompass within it the Bedouin tribes of the Badia. By doing so, the Bedouin of the Badia were nominally “transformed” into Syrian citizens and, at the same time, national authority was declared over the entire steppe. It is also an expression of Arab socialism that looked to strengthening its authority with respect to the entire population. It did so by expressing its intention to exercise control over the Badia in terms by which, in Islam, power detained is legitimated: common lands had always been considered in Islamic terms “of the *umma*” (Muslim community). More precisely, the ownership of natural resources remains ultimately with Allah, and the resource use is common to the *umma*.⁴ By “opening the steppe to all national Syrians” the government simply made itself guarantor of a pre-existing right in Islamic terms. The specific *umma* in this case is that of “all national Syrians”, although it is also always, by extension, that of all Muslims.

TRADITION “REINVENTED”

Open access is therefore a metaphor, used in the project literature in a similar way to that used in the narrative we saw institutionalized by the 1989 World Bank discussion paper: erosion of traditional systems of resource management by hand of State intervention followed by the need to *restore* them by establishing *new institutional arrangements*. Project

⁴ Arab socialism is itself an indigenous political-economic system. The roots of Arab socialism are found in Islam and traditional Arab society rather than in European concepts and ideologies. Michael Aflaq, founder of the Ba’ath party, “does not wish to erase the state of tradition in Rousseau-like or communist fashion, instead he celebrates the Arab cultural heritage and calls for its renaissance (*ba’ath*)” (Shoup, 1990: 213).

documents refer to a traditional system of resource management, the “traditional *hema* system”, being replaced by the introduction of a system of State cooperatives. As a result, according to this view, the forms of communal grazing practised in the rangelands today are based on traditional systems of migration and correspond to a “quasi” open access regime. Serious range-management practices must therefore be *revived* and this must be done by setting up *new* local organizations in a participatory way.

Let us take a step back to understand what the *hema* system is. The *hema* system referred to in the documents is a concept, well known in Arab culture, of communal property. *Hema* is given authority by the *Kuran*, is supported by the *Shari’ah* (Islamic law), by the *Hadith* (sayings of the Prophet) and the *Sunnah* (traditions of the Prophet). It is therefore accepted and legitimated by the whole body of Islamic law. The historical origin of *hema* is unknown, but pastoral nomads in the Arabian Peninsula practised it in pre-Islamic times. The concept probably developed as a means of conserving and protecting limited and valuable natural resources of pasture and water in the desert regions of the Arabian Peninsula, and extended to non-pastoralists as well (Shoup, 1990: 195). *Hema* (from the Arabic word for “reserve” or “preserve”) seems to have been a system by which lands were held in reserve and protected by customary law (*’urf*).

According to the project documents, this traditional system was abolished by State intervention and by the establishment throughout the steppe of a network of cooperatives for the regulation and productive organization of the land. Historically contextualizing the concept of *hema* as used here will show that, rather than being eroded by the State cooperatives, the *hema* system was “reinvented” in the process of establishing them.

In 1966 in the Syrian Arab Republic the young rural members of the Ba’ath Party took power in the so-called Neo-Ba’ath Revolution.

In 1967, 'Omar Draz, who had conducted a study on the tribal *hema* in Saudi Arabia between 1961 and 1967, was asked to study the pastoral sector in the Syrian Arab Republic. The poor results of the large State-planned Asyra Project implemented with FAO assistance since 1963⁵ and the entry to power of a new group had stimulated the search for a new direction for development programmes.

The purpose of the Asyra Project was to revitalize the pastoral sector of the Syrian economy, which had been hit particularly hard by the 1958-61 droughts in which the country's sheep population was halved (Leybourne, Jaubert and Tutwiler, 1993: 1). A system of supplementary feeding for livestock was introduced; efforts were made to regulate the rangelands by instituting controlled grazing areas; and forage shrub plantation was inaugurated. The programme invested strongly in technology import and development (especially shrub seeding) and its philosophy was founded on the modernist approach of the emergent nation state's elite (Rae *et al.*, 1997).

The Asyra Project's attempt to control and regulate access to and use of rangelands failed. The project area was in fact home to the three largest tribes in the Syrian Arab Republic: the *Sba'a* of the Aneza Confederation, the *Hadidiyin* and the *Mawali*. Although the project's approach was to downplay tribal affiliation, the 1975 termination report was compelled to recognize its lack of control over the Bedouin movements in the area.

The activities and technology introduced by the Asyra Project into the Syrian landscape (shrub plantations, supplementary feeding of livestock, mixed farming/livestock) have remained as features of the landscape in the Badia. Where the project was unsuccessful was in

establishing a centralized system of regulating the rangelands that would control and monitor tribal migration and use of the steppe. Following this, in 1967 'Omar Draz launched a campaign to convince the agencies concerned with rangelands of the importance of studying the human factor (Chatty, 1986: 21).

Draz argued that the best way to improve the Bedouin economy and protect the rangelands would be to "return" the control of range management and conservation back to the Bedouin and "revive" the Bedouin tradition of *hema*. The recommendation for a return to a system of communal ownership appealed to the government's orientation and was an example of Arab socialism. The Arab character of *hema* overshadowed its tribal connection.⁶ By reviving the *hema*, the government by no means intended to strengthen the tribal structures in which *hema* was embedded.

As Shoup (1990) makes clear, traditional *hema* was closely tied to the tribal structure and to the concept of '*asabiyah* (group solidarity). It was part of a larger system of rangeland allocation and use. *Hema* areas seemed to be set aside by a *khamsah* group within a tribe. A *khamsah* group was the smallest political unit within a tribe and claimed a territorial area, a *wajahat*. The *wajahat* of a *khamsah* consisted of land and resources used by the group during the course of the year to the general exclusion of other *khamsah* of the same tribe. Specific pastures were open to use by any member of the tribe: they were *mudarib*. The *khamsah* group took first responsibility for protecting its *wajahat*, *mudarib* and *hema*. If members of other tribes tried to use their areas without proper permission, each *khamsah* could rely on the assistance of all other *khamsah* of the same tribe.

⁵FAO has in fact been present in the country since 1961, when a range specialist was positioned in Wadi al 'Azib, a site disputed between the two tribes of the *Sba'a* and the *Hadidiyin*, and appropriated by the new government for the establishment of a research centre (Rae *et al.*, 1997). The Directorate of the Steppe, based in Palmyra, was also established in 1961 to administer the steppe lands.

⁶The *Shari'ah* accords an ambiguous status to tribal *hema* lands. The Prophet Muhammad shows a diplomatic attitude towards the tightly structured tribes of his time and is known to have recognized pre-existing tribal *hema* areas and confirmed tribal ownership, thus establishing the legality of tribal *hema* in the *Sunnah*. But a *Hadith* could be interpreted as contradicting this. It is perhaps for this reason that Islamic law remains vague about the issue of tribal *hema* lands (Shoup, 1990: 198).

Traditional *hema* land was, therefore, protected by the *'asabiyah* of the tribe. Individuals from other tribes were allowed to graze their flocks on tribal rangeland with permission from the *majlis* (tribal council) administered by *'urf* (customary law). Customary law regulated the usufructuary rights to *hema* lands. The *majlis* also discussed punishments of infractions on *hema* restrictions. The strength of group solidarity was demonstrated in times of crisis and the *hema* system was upheld by the group's willingness to defend *hema* areas and the constraints that *'urf* placed on their use. The respect for the constraints put on the individual by *'asabiyah* was the fundamental aspect of the institutionalization of the *hema* system among the Bedouin tribes.

It was clearly therefore not the traditional tribal structure but rather a generalized "idea of *hema*" that appealed to the government. Following FAO recommendations, a system of so-called "*hema* cooperatives" was put in place. This is the form in which the "traditional *hema*" was revived.

A shadow of doubt is cast by Rae *et al.*'s study on whether the practice of *hema* ever existed in the project area. The examples cited by Draz of *hema* that had survived the nationalization of the steppe in the Arabian Peninsula and in the Syrian Arab Republic were all located in the precipitation band with 300-500 mm average annual rainfall. In the Syrian steppe under the 200 mm isohyets (where the project was planned to be implemented), his study documents the existence of "controlled grazing", either through a permit system or less formally through tribal membership (Draz, 1969: 1-5, cited in J. Rae *et al.*, 1997: 11).

In 1969, the "Syrian National Programme for Rangeland and Steppe Development" was implemented and the Wadi al 'Azib centre for consultation was selected as the programme's centre of operation.⁷

⁷An FAO range specialist had been positioned at this centre since 1961.

Cooperatives were spread over most of the Syrian Badia, especially in the areas that were the traditional pasture lands of the most powerful Bedouin tribes (*Ruwalla*, *Sbaa'*, *Mawali*, *Hadidiyin*). A devolved system based on the existence of tribal areas couched within the cooperative framework was established. A "traditional" system, the *hema* system, was therefore "invented" for the introduction of the "cooperative *hema* system".

Ruptures and continuities in discourse

The devolved system of the cooperative programme presented itself as a rupture with the centralizing approach of the Asyra Project, but in practice it developed in continuity with it.

According to the definition proposed by the 1969 "Programme for Rangeland and Steppe Development", each cooperative was to be formed voluntarily by means of a petition from tribal subgroups. The government would not impose the organization on the cooperatives. To form a *hema* cooperative, a detailed description of the area's boundaries, the main vegetative cover, available water sources, grazing capacity (determined by a government livestock expert), season of use and a proposed grazing system were required, along with the identification of present and possible future members who would claim traditional grazing rights on the area.

The cooperatives thus formed were to be managed by a board of directors elected by the members. The board would be responsible for the operations of the cooperative: they would regulate the use of the land, license and monitor the numbers of livestock owned by each member, tax excess numbers and punish transgressors. Members would have exclusive use of the water resources within the boundaries of the cooperative *hema* lands, and individual herd owners would retain ownership of their livestock (Shoup, 1990: 200-201; Chatty, 1986: 21).

Encouraged by the government, throughout the 1970s and the early 1980s the cooperatives spread over the majority of

the steppe. Interest-free revolving funds were established; extension services were fielded and supplementary fodder was distributed.

The network of cooperatives on the territory changed the landscape of the Badia, and the Bedouin moulded their rapidly changing livelihoods through and around the cooperative system. All the cooperatives were closely tied to the national livestock marketing system through connections with sheep-fattening cooperatives (*tasmin*). The cooperative system encouraged a quicker off-take of animals from the rangeland annually, which was instrumental in intensifying production. The “Cooperative Project” therefore shared the aim with the precedent Asyra Project of stabilizing livestock production. It attempted to do so by linking the area to the markets and establishing an extensive network of cooperatives over the steppe.

The institution of the *hema* cooperatives can also be seen in a wider political context. For the government, it also represented a method of spreading Arab socialism throughout the steppe, creating a base of rural support, and a renewed attempt to expand centralized control over the Badia. For the “development experts”, it satisfied the attempt to push in the direction of a “people-oriented approach”. For the herders, it was perhaps seen as yet another element in their diverse economy – a source of funds and subsidized feed. Thus, each party with an interest in the cooperatives had their own objectives and these objectives were divergent.

By enclosing areas, creating reserves, systemizing the distribution of subsidized feed and supporting shrub production the *hema* cooperative programme developed in continuity with the precedent government/FAO interventions in the area. Its innovative aspect, expressed by Draz’s (1969) “participatory approach”, was the recognition of tribal society and the need to work in harmony with it. Nonetheless, a previous existence of a *hema system* has not been documented but rather a “hema cooperative system” was rhetorically constructed as if it were identical to the traditional *hema* concept.

The ongoing development programme in the Badia does recognize that traditional migration practices are alive in the steppe, although to a certain extent overlaid by the current cooperative system. Clear evidence from the field shows that the cooperatives do not enjoy exclusive management and user rights on the lands allocated to them.⁸ Project surveys indicate that only a small percentage of range users during the winter season seem to be cooperative members. Non-cooperative members, in fact, claim seasonal rights and use of areas of “cooperative lands” that traditionally belong to their tribes. As part of this system of migration patterns, mobile herders who belong to the cooperatives involved in the project move to other areas during both winter and summer seasons, paying fees for stubble grazing.

Having said this, there is a concurrent insistence in the project literature that: a) there was once a *hema* system that has now disappeared; b) no clear land tenure arrangement exists; and c) there is now an organizational gap that must be filled. The mechanisms of resource use that are in use today are not a focus of attention and therefore become invisible or are perceived as “unclear”. If equal dignity were to be given to the mechanisms used by the Bedouin today as is given to the traditional *hema* system of the past, an already existing organizational system might appear.

In the previous development programme we saw how the introduction of a cooperative system to manage the Badia became the (cooperative) *hema* system. It

⁸ Documents of the ongoing FAO project clearly reveal that the main reason for being part of a cooperative is to obtain supplementary feed at subsidized prices and for the “possibility to acquire land” (FAO, 1998a: 11; 1998b: 26). Interviews by J. Rae in the northwest of the Syrian Arab Republic also found that cooperative members and administrative staff had little or no knowledge of the rangeland regulatory role they were supposed to fulfil. Not once was it suggested by interviews that the cooperatives provided a mechanism for rangeland regulation. On the contrary, 96 percent said they had joined the cooperatives for the subsidized feed on offer, and 4 percent said they did so because their *sheikh* had asked them to (Rae *et al.*, 1997: 12).

could be said that the *hema* system was in someway “reinvented” in this context. Draz’s innovative attempt to make the cooperatives and the traditional *hema* coincide, in practice translated into establishing a governmental system of resource management in the Badia parallel to an existing one. The “organizational gap” identified by the project narrative today supposes a *dissolution of tradition*, and prepares empty spaces for intervention. According to this view, the open land, no longer empty of people, is still empty of well functioning rules.

At the same time, there is a twofold use of “tradition” in the project literature: the term is always positive when it is placed in the past, as in the case of the *hema* tradition of the past, but it becomes “negative tradition” when referring to the ongoing system. The project narrative entangles two discourses within each other: one in which tradition is positive (i.e. “absence of tradition is responsible for land degradation”) and another in which tradition is negative (i.e. “indigenous tradition is responsible for land degradation”). There seems to be a reluctance to recognize the existing reality of tribes and what this entails in terms of land ownership, resource use and access mechanisms, and customary law. The lack of an in-depth analysis and recognition of local-level mechanisms and systems establishes a continuity between this “participatory” approach and Draz’s people-oriented one, and carries similar risks.

While in the past, landscapes were imagined to be empty of any positive form of indigenous social life, they have today become populated by communities but seem to remain empty of well-functioning ways of management of the environment they depend upon and are part of. Project planning seems to need “closed” systems of range management for them to become visible and useful in a project context. For local institutions to be viewed as being effective and accountable they must be defined as discrete and clearly bound units – systems governed by equilibrium and fixed rules.

Finally, the project literature actively proposes a “project genealogy” using the “mythical community narrative”. At the same time, it seems unaware of the risk of continuity with the previous programmes and the attempts to centralize control over natural resource management, while using the language of participation. As we have seen, the practical effects of past programmes have been to institutionalize a system that runs parallel to an existing one, where each is scarcely accountable to the other. As we will see, the use of decontextualized images has the effect of depoliticizing interventions that are highly political.

FOLLOWING THE CUES: THE BEDOUIN IN THE BADIA

In the next section, we will pick up from the project literature those cues that hint of alternative representations of Bedouin life in the Badia. We will briefly refer to remarks made during the project’s participatory assessments that indicate how, throughout the project and in relation to it, competition has arisen over access to resources. These are the cues of divergent discourses spoken throughout the project process that indicate how the language of participation is “as much co-opted from below as imposed from above” (Mosse, 2000).

The Bedouin of the Badia in a regional perspective

Over the past 40 years of development intervention in the Syrian Arab Republic a more complex understanding of the local population involved in projects has been gained. From the Asyra Project to today’s, the most innovative change has been the “official” recognition of a communal grazing system based on migration patterns that follow tribal affiliation. At the same time, however, the existence of tribes in the Badia has been increasingly downplayed as the project progresses.

While the project advances in terms of the Bedouin groups that are members of the local cooperatives, the “tribes” slowly disappear from project documents. A first survey carried out in January 1997

targeted all the herders found to be grazing the areas at that time of the year: 73 percent were not members of the three cooperatives of the area. The majority of Bedouins using Arak and Al-Abbasiya's cooperative areas declared themselves to be of the *Mawali* tribe, while in Munbath they were *Al-Unaza* and *Hadidiyin*.

Indeed, the assessments carried out from then on have exclusively taken "cooperative membership" as the departure point from which to identify range users, and have no longer targeted the effective users of the area. *Mawali*, *Hadidiyin*, *Al-Unaza* transform themselves throughout the documents into "neighbouring communities", "user households", "mobile, settled and semi-settled communities" and are in general grouped together in the concept of "Bedouins".

In this way, the possibility of following common tribal affiliation among cooperative members and other Bedouin groups using the range is lost. Dawn Chatty shows how the *hema* system established over the 1970s was seized as an opportunity for some tribes to re-establish distinctions with others. Once sheep-raising became widespread at the expense of camel-raising, the distinction between the "noble-patron" tribes (traditionally the camel-raisers) and the "common-client" tribes (the sheep-raisers) became blurred and could no longer be upheld on this basis. To re-establish this distinction, members of the "patron" tribes (such as the *Al-Ruwalla* and *Sbaa'* in the project areas) did not join the cooperatives; thus the government-sponsored *hema* cooperatives were composed mainly of "client" tribal groups such as the *Mawali*, *Hadidiyin* and some *Al-Hassanna* (Chatty, 1986: 146-147). Tribal affiliation among the cooperative members and the users of the range today could shed light on migration patterns and range-use regulation systems.

The extensive use in project assessments of participatory rural appraisal (PRA) and different socio-economic surveys document the composite reality of Bedouin activities in the Badia, but the information obtained seems to have been left unread, scattered.

The information provided could shed light on the relationship within the same group, for example, between land use for cultivation of barley and land use for livestock herding. The cultivation of barley, use of supplementary feed for animals, migration patterns, and relationship with the cooperatives all form part of the wider system of production and resources management inscribed in the social environment of the Badia today.

The pastoral system of the Near East has, since its inception, and increasingly, been in close touch with the settled segment of the population.⁹ Over the past 50 years, there seem to have been constant changes in the pastoral means of livelihood, and Bedouin semi-nomadic pastoralism today comprises a variety of patterns. These depend on the transient equilibrium each group finds between available pasture, stubble-grazing on harvested crops and the increased dependence on supplementary hand-fed feed. The study by Leybourne, Jaubert and Tutwiler (1993), carried out in the northern Syrian steppe, describes Bedouin groups who are today either tending to settle in a mixed livestock/agriculture system or becoming increasingly migrant.

It can be said in general that land is sought for barley cultivation and/or to graze herds on standing crops between May and June or to graze them on cereal stubble between June and September. Herders may graze their animals on territory belonging to another tribe by paying a fee, but they may not cultivate the land. Grazing fees are also paid for the use of pasture land owned by a government cooperative and to graze stubble on farmer plots.

⁹There is widespread agreement that pastoralism has never been a subsistence economy but has always interacted with agriculture and the settled population, adapting to ecological variations and reacting to the rise and fall of trade centres, to the development of new trade routes and to the political actions of urban-based states (Chatty, 1986; Rae *et al.*, 1997). Whether this may be a characteristic specific to the Near East, where herders have for centuries shared land with urban and agricultural others, is a matter for debate. A. Agrawal's (1999) study on the migrant *raika* pastoralists of western Rajasthan also describes the ongoing changing relations with the settled agricultural population.

On tribal pasture land grazing fees are paid for access to water, which usually implies access to the pasture in the water-fed area. The increased mobility determined by the use of trucks to transport water, feed and sheep has led to a variety of solutions. The individual's own non-cultivated tribal land remains the preferential land and the most accessible grazing area. Patterns of migration develop according to these lines and following the agreements made from year to year for access to stubble and water points in cultivated areas, and pasture and water points in non-cultivated areas.

The possibility of "following these tribal lines" is opened by the words given in the project assessments. The documents, in different ways, tend to create dichotomies between, for example, settled and migrant herders. Contradictory voices that tell about complexity are often left silent in favour of proposing a generalized idea of "the Bedouins". In so doing, foreseeable problems in project implementation are attributed to "internal conflict" between Bedouin groups.

Throughout the project literature, the issue of land tenure is singled out as the major factor of insecurity that can affect project outcome, the one over which the project has no control. Portraying conflict and land issues as something "outside" the project actually conceals the fact that the project is fully involved in a political process. The project (FAO and the Steppe Directorate) in the field is working towards the creation of grazing committees that will manage clearly defined territory. Nationally, it is acting as a pressure group on government in this direction. As we will see, access to land (and water) is very much the issue at stake for the local Bedouins who are participating in the project.

Local systems of range management

As soon as migration patterns are recognized in the project literature they are described in the terms of the "open access" metaphor, incapable of seriously regulating rangeland use: this highlights the need for *new* institutions.

A different reading of project documents will highlight that indications on range use given by the Bedouin are – if underlined – numerous and quite detailed.

Settled groups of Bedouins claim traditional rights to specific land. In the perception of the Bedouins interviewed, rights to land are distinct from the existing cooperative system of range management and there is no conflict between the two regarding, for example, the subsidized feed distributed by the cooperatives.

Cooperative membership is not used as a criteria for exclusion from the benefits gained by their presence in the area, such as from the distribution of subsidized feed. On the contrary, membership is used as an officially accepted way to defend the members' prerogatives of access to the new resource: the renewed pasture land created in the area by project activities. At the same time, a mechanism to regulate "outsiders" access is proposed by the Bedouins interviewed and seems to be accepted both by "insiders" and "outsiders": one specific group has priority of access and "right to land", and "users" external to the group can access the resource under payment of a fee.

Interestingly, some Bedouin groups today seem finally to be calling for a coincidence between tribal and cooperative areas: it would be the realization of Draz's dream! This coincidence needs to be understood and supported. Proposing grazing fees to access both one's "own" (tribal) land and land belonging to others is not a complete novelty, and similar mechanisms have been recently documented for other areas in the Syrian Arab Republic.

In the project area, PRA exercises certainly provide some indications of Bedouin views of acceptable mechanisms to regulate range use. It is also possible, however, that the call for the coincidence with the cooperative system of range management represents the interests of one specific group that is trying, through the project, to strengthen its claims to pasture and water to the detriment of others.

The project is establishing a grazing committee that it is hoped will manage

successfully the relationship with the tribal element in the Al-Talila Wildlife Reserve. It is envisioned that, this “pilot grazing committee/cooperative system” will subsequently expand to the rest of the area and be legally and officially recognized by the government. For a coincidence between the two existing systems to be sustained today and to be sustainable over time, the mechanisms that enable such a coincidence must be more deeply understood.

The grazing committee formed for the Al-Talila Reserve is a newly established “Camel Cooperative”. The formation of this new cooperative of camel-herders does suggest that a specific group indeed seems to be moving towards an exclusive right of access to the rehabilitated pasture land. The project literature also, in this case, tends to idealize the image of these herders: presenting the image of the “pure” camel-herder that is needed for integration into the wildlife reserve and the “eco-tourism” project activities. It must be underlined, however, that these camel-herders are, outside the reserve, sheep-herders as well. In stressing an opposition between camel-herders and sheep-herders the documents overlook the fact that the majority of camel-herders are in fact also sheep-herders.

What appears more clearly is that for the herders involved the issue at stake is land use, and that through the project they access more feed, water and rehabilitated pasture. While the FAO/Steppe Directorate project has “adopted” the Camel Cooperative to constitute the grazing committee in Al-Talila, it appears that these herders’ interests also lie elsewhere. Through the project, some Bedouin groups have gained an exclusive access to the new resource, and the project has created its first “grazing committee”.

The results of participatory assessments point to the way in which the new resources created by project intervention are being integrated into the existing system, and at the same time in some way are changing it. The herders of this new cooperative seem to be part of a group of four “tribes” (possibly sub-tribes of the same tribe). There appears

to be two “core units” (*Danah* and *Baggali*) who own land and wells outside the project area and rarely come to Al-Talila, and two “peripheral” groups (*Mlahid Abu Juma*) who have been using al-Talila for pasture in spring, winter and autumn since the mid-1980s and migrating during the summer. A significant proportion also cultivate barley in the core group’s area and feed their camels on subsidized feed. As observed previously, these camel- (and sheep-) herding tribes live the complex system of cultivation and migration.

It is clear that the regulatory system that actually exists in the steppe today is a tribal system. A few indications of how this system might work in managing natural resources have been referred to above. Throughout the transformations that have taken place in the Syrian Arab Republic over the past 50 years, a corporate sense of identity and common interests seems firmly alive in tribal structures that have themselves undergone numerous transformations over time. It is important to underline again how, today, some Bedouin groups seem to be calling for a coincidence between a tribal system and the cooperative-user group system sponsored jointly by FAO and the Steppe Directorate.

Finally, the extensive use of participatory techniques, unlike earlier development efforts, has enabled the Bedouin (but more directly one specific group) to become active stakeholders of this development process. Groups that become part of the development programme “acquire and learn to manipulate the forms of planning knowledge” and to make their knowledge available in forms that are compatible with bureaucratic planning (Mosse, 2000).

In conclusion, the intention in proposing this reading of a specific project literature was to hint at the complex ways in which different voices find an encounter in development programmes. The representations of “indigenous people and environment” outlined above are rhetorical images of this encounter that satisfy the conceptual demands of donors and agencies. Proposing a critical stance

towards the persistence of images such as “open access” in development discourse intends to shift the negative presuppositions on indigenous realities that lie behind them. Presenting a critical view of the use made of participatory tools intends to push in the direction of a more effective shift of power in a context of “community development” and to shed light on development as a multicentred process.

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Principaux aspects des politiques foncières concernant les petites exploitations: tendances passées et pratiques actuelles au Kenya

Au Kenya, la stratégie officielle du gouvernement en matière de politique foncière a pour objectif une utilisation optimale et une répartition équitable des terres, au bénéfice d'une population en forte croissance. Cette stratégie est mise en œuvre grâce à des programmes visant à transformer les structures foncières coutumières en régimes fonciers de libre propriété, par l'adjudication de terres et la délivrance de titres de propriété individuels.

Dans cet article, l'auteur étudie les régimes fonciers des petits exploitants au Kenya et analyse l'acquisition, la détention et le transfert des terres dans les zones concernées. Selon l'auteur, au Kenya, le régime foncier des petits exploitants est encore largement axé sur le droit coutumier. Les dispositions légales sont en grande partie ignorées, étant considérées comme bureaucratiques et non pertinentes. Pour une mise en œuvre adéquate de toute politique foncière fondée sur des statuts légaux, il est nécessaire d'analyser et de bien comprendre la situation socioéconomique des petits exploitants, afin que la législation réponde à leurs aspirations, telles qu'ils les perçoivent eux-mêmes.

Cuestiones principales de la política para los pequeños agricultores: tendencias pasadas y prácticas actuales en Kenya

La estrategia oficial del Gobierno en cuanto a la política agraria en Kenya tiene por objeto conseguir un aprovechamiento óptimo y una distribución equitativa de la tierra para su población, en rápido crecimiento. Se ha adoptado esta estrategia mediante programas orientados a transformar las estructuras tradicionales de tenencia en una propiedad de libre disposición a través de la adjudicación y el registro de las tierras con miras a la concesión de títulos individuales de propiedad.

En el presente artículo se examina la estructura de posesión de tierras entre los pequeños agricultores de Kenya. También se analiza cómo se adquieren, poseen y transfieren los intereses relativos a las tierras en estas zonas. Se sostiene que, entre los pequeños agricultores de Kenya, el sistema de posesión de la tierra sigue dependiendo en gran parte de la tradición. Las estipulaciones legales no suelen tenerse en cuenta porque se consideran improcedentes y burocráticas. Las circunstancias socioeconómicas de los pequeños agricultores han de analizarse y comprenderse bien para la aplicación correcta de cualquier política agraria basada en disposiciones legales si se quiere que la ley responda a sus aspiraciones como ellos las perciben.

Major issues of smallholder land policy: past trends and current practices in Kenya

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The official government strategy on land policy in Kenya aims to achieve optimum utilization and equitable distribution of land for the country's rapidly increasing population. This strategy has been pursued with programmes to transform customary tenure structures to statutory freehold through land adjudication and registration for the issuance of individual titles.

This article examines the landholding structure in the smallholder sector in Kenya. It analyses how interests in land in those areas are acquired, held and transferred.

Among the smallholders in Kenya, the landholding system is still largely custom driven. Statutory stipulations are largely ignored as being irrelevant and bureaucratic. For the proper implementation of any land policy based on statutes, the socio-economic circumstances of smallholders must first be analysed and understood in order to make the law responsive to their aspirations.

INTRODUCTION

The importance of land in an agricultural economy needs no emphasis. It constitutes the primary form of wealth and source of political power. In Kenya, where the majority of people obtain their livelihood directly from agriculture, land ownership and use have always been sensitive issues. The first president of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, noted in 1964 that "Our greatest asset in Kenya is our land. This is the heritage we received from our forefathers. In land lies our salvation and survival" (Harbeson, 1971).

Kenyans have therefore maintained a great emotional and psychological attachment to land; it represents their link with the past, the present and the future in addition to being their most important tangible asset. Thus it is considered to be the responsibility of the present generation to conserve and use land wisely, holding it in trust for future generations.

Out of the 576 700 km² of Kenya's total

land surface, 80 percent is categorized as arid and semi-arid, while 2 percent is covered by inland water. Only 18 percent is considered to have high or medium agricultural potential, and these areas support approximately two-thirds of the country's population, (Development Plan, 1994-96).

The ownership, distribution and use of land in these high- and medium-potential areas (where smallholdings and relatively large holdings coexist) have been a matter of great national interest since the colonial period. This is due to the fact that any group controlling land policy is able to control not only the use and allocation of this scarce economic resource but also the authoritative allocation of social values for the society in general (Harbeson, 1971). Land policy has therefore always been at the centre of national politics, especially in regions that experienced colonial settlement in the early years of the twentieth century.

This article identifies and discusses some

of the major policy issues in smallholder areas in Kenya with a view to determining the direction of policy strategy and change.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SMALLHOLDINGS IN KENYA

Smallholdings in Kenya are mainly family farms, comprising both the main production and consumption unit. They are worked chiefly by family labour (with occasional and probably seasonal hiring of labour, as resources permit). Subsistence crops and some cash crops are grown. In many areas large farms have been subdivided into individual smallholdings averaging between 0.2 and 12 ha (Statistical Abstract, 1996) with, in some cases, individual title documents.

The continued importance of smallholdings in agricultural production in Kenya is reflected in Table 1, which indicates that over the five-year period 1995-99 smallholdings accounted for an average of 69.54 percent of general crop commodity sales to marketing boards, with the large farms contributing only 30.46 per cent. This large percentage share on the part of smallholdings has been achieved despite the fact that storage, transportation and service facilities are generally of lower quality in areas characterized by small farms.

THE CURRENT LAND TENURE SYSTEM

Although Kenya was one of the first African countries to undertake a major land reform programme, it still maintains a bimodal land tenure system whereby individual ownership of land based on the Western model involving adjudication, consolidation and registration of individual titles exists alongside the communal land tenure system. This coexistence is particularly prevalent in Trust (tribal) Land areas and among the pastoral communities.

Currently, some 80 percent of the total land area in Kenya comprises Trust Land awaiting adjudication and registration to be used by smallholders for cash crops and for peasant farming. These Trust Lands are managed by the appropriate local authorities (county councils) and the

TABLE 1
Sale to marketing boards from large farms and smallholdings, 1995-99

Year	Large farms (K £m) ¹	Smallholdings (K £m) ¹	Total (K £m) ¹	Percentage share of smallholdings
1995	961.43	2 081.07	3 042.50	68.40
1996	1 014.72	2 237.58	3 552.30	68.80
1997	1 073.41	2 483.29	3 556.70	69.82
1998	1 278.81	2 961.29	4 240.10	69.84
1999	1 105.19	2 560.44	3 665.63	69.85

¹ 1K £ = 20 shillings (K Sh).

Commissioner of Lands under the Trust Land Act.

Only 6 percent of the total land area in Kenya has so far been registered under individual titles (Development Plan 1997-2001).

Areas that were designated as Crown Land during the colonial period (1895-1963) have become government land, while the former indigenous reserves have become Trust Land. Freehold land mainly comprises former scheduled land, some of which has been subdivided into African Smallholder Schemes. Other smallholders' interests arise from the adjudication and registration of land in Trust Land areas.

GOVERNMENT POLICY ON LAND

In Kenya, government land policy has in most cases been linked with agricultural development policies, which include land settlement, land adjudication and registration, marketing, pricing support and credit provision (Peterson, 1986). In virtually all its development plans the government has been concerned with land-use policy that relates to a system of laws, rules, regulations and practices that govern the rights and obligations of land owners, especially family smallholdings, together with appropriate guidelines to ensure the optimum utilization of available land in both rural and urban areas (Agricultural Act).

The government's long-term strategy on land has been to ensure that all land is planned, surveyed, adjudicated and registered with a view to issuing individual titles. By 31 December 1992, 2 127 968 titles had been issued under the Registered Lands Acts, 90 percent of which were

issued in medium and high potential areas (Development Plan, 1994-96).

The land consolidation programme, initiated in 1956 and aimed at gathering land fragments into sizeable and shapely plots, has been completed only in Central Province; work is in progress in Baringo, Meru and Taita Taveta Districts while in some districts its implementation has been prevented by customary practices in those areas. The government intends to continue the programme only in areas where its implementation has reached an advanced stage during the current plan period. The programme was initiated during the colonial period and was continued by the independent African government despite the fact that some communities did not favour land consolidation – arguing that fragmented holdings were useful for the cultivation of different crops that need varying soil types. Research undertaken in countries where such a programme has succeeded (for example Japan, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China) indicate that a suspension of the normal political process – either by direct intervention by an external political or military power or by a strong monarch or military ruler, as in Iran and Peru, or by a socialist revolution or the explosion of peasant unrest threatening the political and social order, as in Bolivia and Mexico (Cummings, 1978) – was necessary for it to be fully implemented.

The land adjudication programme has been ongoing in Nyanza, Western, Rift Valley, Eastern, Northeastern and Coast Provinces. By 1991, 6 885 329 ha of land comprising 1 318 988 parcels had been subdivided, adjudicated and registered nationwide. During the 1994-96 plan period, some 9 719 621 ha had been registered. In Kajiado and Narok Districts, 369 group ranches comprising 304 575 ha and 63 189 members were registered (Development Plan 1994-96).

Other major land reforms undertaken by the government after political independence in 1963 were the land transfer and settlement schemes. The most popular

programme was the Million-Acre settlement scheme introduced in 1961 by the colonial government and continued by the independent government.

Key issues relating to these land tenure changes include their failure to alter significantly the pattern of land resource distribution; instead they helped maintain the large farm sector and increased the number of smallholdings with very limited sizes. This is because the policies continue to be implemented within a tribal framework; they are thus juxtaposed between those who wish to push them through their logical economic, non-tribal conclusion and those who fear that their own people cannot compete in a non-tribal society based on individual land ownership (King, 1977) and encouraging individualized land transactions.

The land policies have ignored the issue of the recent high population increase in certain tribal areas, for example Kikuyu, Luhya and Luo regions. They have continued to preserve the old ethnic boundaries and social units and have therefore given rise to a skewed population distribution, with some areas experiencing population density as high as 380 people/km² while in some it is as low as 15 people/km² (Development Plan, 1989-93). The economic problems caused by this imbalance include reduced agricultural production per capita because in the highly populated areas there is insufficient farmland to engage fully the families who live there.

There is also the practical issue of refragmentation of smallholder lands in areas where consolidation had been completed or adjudication and registration of title have taken place. According to a survey conducted in 1971 (in Nyeri District where consolidation was completed in 1962), it was found that refragmentation has begun to occur such that some progressive farmers once again have more than one non-contiguous pieces of land in the same area. There is fear that land consolidation is unlikely to be permanent. In other instances, siblings without off-farm incomes insist on subdividing their

TABLE 2
Land Adjudication Board cases, 1992

Cases	Brought forward from 1991	Filed (first-time cases)	Heard (but not necessarily determined)	Pending first hearing or final determination
Committee	2 402	803	1 983	2 206
Arbitration Board	3 356	1 982	545	3 703
Objection	17 897	5 418	10 947	11 870
Appeal	4 201	841	16	5 026
Total	27 856	8 956	13 491	22 805

Source: Development Plan, 1994-96.

father's land – officially or unofficially – to obtain a portion to farm so that they can feed their families.

Land ownership and use have been complicated by numerous pieces of legislation and complex procedures relating to subdivisions and registrations. Boundary disputes over already adjudicated and registered lands are registered at the rate of about 900 per year under the Registered Land Act. By 31 December 1992 there were 8 844 unsettled cases under the Land Titles Act in Coast Province alone. Unsettled disputes before the arbitration boards and appeal courts continue to grow (Development Plan 1994-96). Table 2 shows some of the cases handled in 1992 by the Land Adjudication Board.

There are numerous cases of land succession and sales cases that go unregistered because they are not reported to Land Control Boards and Land Registrars. This happens because in many communities people still regard land adjudication largely as a means of securing boundaries and continue to deal with their land according to customary principles and not according to statutory procedures. Most smallholders see the statutory procedures for determining heirs as expensive and bureaucratic, particularly when the land is to be divided between two or more beneficiaries. Large numbers of subdivisions, sales and successions have already occurred that have not been registered and this implies continued disputes over land (Coldham, 1979). What this means is that the law in the statutes does not necessarily correspond with the practice on the ground.

Government policy on land has not

therefore been adequately comprehensive or practical. Little attention has been paid to smallholder lands, which constitute about 75 percent of the total land area and account for a large proportion of agricultural production. Credit and extension services have mostly been targeted at the few remaining large holdings and ranches (Heyer, 1981).

ACCESS TO LAND

Access to smallholder land in Kenya is mainly through inheritance, purchase, government alienation and gift. The Constitution of Kenya recognizes the importance of customary laws regarding rights in land and therefore embraces these laws within its framework. Section 115 of the Kenyan Constitution states that: "Each county council shall hold in trust the land vested in it for the benefit of the persons ordinarily resident on that land and shall give effect to such rights, interests or other benefit in respect of the land as may, under the African customary law for the time being in force and applicable thereto be vested in any tribe, group, family or individuals."

Customary land tenure is defined as the rights in land of any Kenyan citizen using or occupying land in accordance with the custom or practice of the area that is not repugnant to any written law. The county council can also appoint land-allocating committees with the approval of the district commissioner.

Customary land rights are exercised in the country in varying degrees, depending on the tribe. In pastoral communities land inheritance occurs on a clan or lineage basis within a given territorial region. Land is owned communally and individual rights of ownership are very limited, although individuals can exercise full right of use. This practice is still common among the Maasai, Samburu, Turkana and Pokot peoples despite the introduction of group ranches under the Land (Group) Representatives Act.

Among the agricultural communities, even where registration of individual titles

has taken place, access to land rights is still being exercised according to customary principles – with inheritance and gifts being the most common. According to a study carried out by Jean Davidson in 1985 in Mathira (Central Province) and Chwele (Western Province), there is gender bias in access to land in these regions of Kenya, typical of practices among other tribes where customary land tenure systems operate. Among many of the Kenyan ethnic communities, women are assigned pieces of land for their use by their husbands. Thus, they acquire the right of access to land through marriage. Women do not customarily inherit land from their parents and therefore divorced or unmarried women may only secure temporary rights of use on a portion of their father's land; ultimately they are at the mercy of legitimate customary claimants – often their brothers or cousins. Government land policies have not fully acknowledged the fact that it is women who are mostly involved in the production of cash crops and subsistence crops in the smallholdings. Land policies since 1963 have mainly favoured men (Barber, 1970), although the Law of Succession Act does not bar women from inheriting land from their relatives.

In most Kenyan communities, male siblings are allocated plots of land for their use when they marry, as a gift from their fathers. They do not, however, have an automatic right to dispose of these plots if the legal ownership rights continue to be held by the father. They subsequently inherit the plots when the father dies and thereafter may have the right to dispose of them. The same practice of giving land as a gift exists even where registration of individual titles has taken place. For example, a person may subdivide his registered portion to give land to a brother who was absent during the time of adjudication and registration. A study carried out by Okoth-Ogendo in 1974 on the occupation of land registered in other peoples' names in South Nyanza and Kisii Districts revealed that the individuals occupying the land felt that they had the

right to do so by virtue of the fact that the land belonged to the lineage or family of which they were members and claimed that even those properties that had been registered had been received by inheritance or family partition and not through purchase or gift and therefore the holders had no moral right to exclude others from it if those others were part of the recognized lineage (Okoth-Ogendo, 1976).

Although the customary land tenure system is still recognized in a number of communities, it currently faces problems brought about by social change; for example, the increase in population has led to a decline in community control over the allocation of land because there are not enough cultivable vacant plots to allocate. Socio-economic changes will inevitably lead to some breakdown of lineage or clan control over individuals and their activities in lending or selling land to outsiders. The cultivation of valuable cash crops and more expensive forms of investment in land that require the supervision and protection of land as private property has led in some areas to real feelings of individual ownership of the land because the user has to exclude other members of the society from the land in order to realize the benefits of his investment.

The lack of written wills or sworn statements in the customary laws of inheritance makes it difficult for the subdivisions to be relatively equal in size and economic viability. Among many tribal communities, division of land among sons is based on birth right: the eldest son receives his share first and the youngest receives his last, which means that younger sons sometimes go without land in cases where the family is polygamous and the land held is insufficient, or they may receive only an unproductive piece. This system of right of access to land can be a source of conflict among family members.

THE NATURE OF LAND RIGHTS HELD BY SMALLHOLDERS

The legal conception of land ownership includes all things that are permanently

attached to the land and all things that are found under the soil.

In Kenya smallholders hold both customary rights and statutory rights. The Constitution recognizes both types of land rights, thus Section 115 of the Kenya Constitution (1963) vests all rights under the customary land tenure system in the county councils. Any Kenyan citizen using or occupying land in accordance with the customs or law of the area enjoys the following rights:

1. rights of use, i.e. to build upon it, to grow and harvest crops;
2. the right to allocate it;
3. the right to dispose of, sell and alienate it;
4. the right to determine the inheritance and succession procedure.

Rights 2–4 above are subject to the provisions of the Land Control Act of the laws of Kenya.

Under the statutory provisions, smallholders are issued with individual titles to their land after adjudication and registration has taken place and every detail relating to the ownership has been entered into the land register. The land then ceases to be subject to customary law and is governed instead by the complete code of substantive law – as contained in the Registered Land Act.

This system of registration was designed to put an end to boundary disputes, to make titles secure and to introduce safe, simple and cheap systems of conveyancing. It was also hoped that it would encourage farmers to invest labour and capital in their holdings and enable them to offer registered titles as security for credit (Coldham, 1979).

This bimodal land tenure system has resulted in much of the confusion over the nature of individual rights in customary land that can be witnessed in Kenya today.

There are three criteria that a land tenure structure must meet in order for it to allocate land efficiently. These are:

1. Land rights must be clearly defined and have legal and tenure certainty.
2. Benefits and costs must be internalized in order to prevent

divergence between private and social costs.

3. Individuals must be free to enter into contracts that are enforced by an efficient legal system (Ault and Rutman, 1979).

The major problem that occurs when both the customary rights and statutory rights are applied is when land transfer or disposition of interests in land is due to be undertaken by an individual. In such cases customary law is given preference under the Land Control Act. The individual has to consult with his or her relatives when contemplating disposing of an interest in land and seek their consent under customary rules. According to the statutory provision, the title of the registered proprietor is paramount – a person with such a title needs no further proof of their ownership. This is a policy issue that has not been addressed fully.

METHODS OF DISPOSING INTERESTS IN LAND

Given the bimodal nature of the land tenure system in Kenya, disposing of an interest in land is at times regulated by both statutory provisions and customary principles. The methods of disposal include inheritance, sale, gift, exchange, alienation, lease and subdivision.

Under the statutory provisions, an individual with a registered title has exclusive control over the disposition of his plot of land, including the right to transfer the land to another person at his own discretion. Any transactions or transfer of land must be submitted to the Land Control Board (under the Land Control Act) for its consent and to be registered. This does not always occur as most dispositions are still arranged informally. The inheritance of land continues to be determined under customary principles. A father subdivides among his adult sons a single piece of land of which he is the registered proprietor, without submitting the details of the transfer to the Land Control Board for its consideration and approval. For instance, among the Luo and the Kikuyu, when a man marries or reaches

adulthood he is allocated a piece of land to cultivate or on which to build his house. While in practice this transfer is seldom revoked, the son's statutory power of subsequently transferring the land is very restricted. The procedure of succession as laid down by the 1963 Registered Land Act for the ascertainment of heirs and registration of succession is both expensive and legally complicated and therefore most people tend to avoid the procedures as required by the statutory law and instead resort to customary rules. If such land disposals continue to take place without the knowledge of the Land Control Board then the courts will increasingly be called upon to settle disputes about the ownership of registered land. In effect, the courts will be readjudicating land titles (Coldham, 1979).

As noted above, statutory provisions concerning sales of land require that the parties to the transaction go to the local land registry to fill in forms applying for the respective Land Control Board's consent. Their application is entered into a presentation book and they are asked to attend the following board meeting (meetings are held once a month). The Land Control Board may approve the sale after considering the views of the seller's next of kin and especially if he has another piece of land for subsistence. This procedure of land sale is bureaucratic and costly and therefore discourages the parties concerned; sales are normally carried out without seeking the consent of the Land Control Board. These unregistered sales are unfortunately devoid of legal effect and have the potential to create problems because a dishonest person could sell the same piece of land to a third party and if this second sale is registered then the first (unregistered) buyer stands to lose out.

The exchange of land is not very common, although a person may seek to exchange land to obtain land that is more appropriate for its intended use; for instance, if he has land in a valley that sometimes becomes swampy during the rainy season and he would like to build a home he may look for a neighbour who has land on hilly ground

and is willing to exchange. In most communities land exchange is carried out on the basis of a mutual understanding and is rarely reported to the Land Control Board for approval as is required by section 6 of the Land Control Act.

CONCLUSION

Land policy is a very important determinant of land distribution, allocation and use in any country. The realization of the objectives of land policy is dependent on the response and cooperation of those involved – thus both the government and the smallholders (whom the land policy is supposed to guide so that they can gain optimal benefits from the land) should cooperate in order to ensure that the policy is properly implemented. The nature of tenure rights should be well defined within a particular land tenure system. In the case of land policy in Kenya, there are anomalies that need to be addressed. This is because despite the attempts to bring customary land rights within a new statutory tenure system based on the registration of individual titles and therefore limiting the effectiveness of applying customary laws in land ownership and transfer, smallholder behaviour on the ground has not changed so as to incorporate the new statutory system.

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Agriculture in Cuba and the land reform of 1993

The land tenure and land use reform of 1993 was a central component of the policy of adjustment and reform of Cuba's economic model in the 1990s. Land reform promoted the cooperative use of land formerly held by state agricultural enterprises, drawing its inspiration from the cooperative experiences of 1959-62 and from the successful rural cooperative movement of the immediate preceding period. This work examines the nature and objectives of the reform in the context of global economic crisis and of Cuba's policy of adjustment and reform. It analyses the new agricultural structure and the process of agricultural recovery that has been under way since 1995.

La réforme agraire de 1993 et la nouvelle agriculture cubaine

La réforme du régime foncier et de l'exploitation des terres de 1993 représente l'un des principaux maillons de la politique d'ajustement et de réforme relevant du modèle économique national mis en œuvre dans les années 90. L'élément le plus marquant de cette réforme agraire est la promotion du mouvement coopératif pour les terres des anciennes entreprises agricoles nationales, qui s'appuie intégralement sur l'expérience des coopératives entre 1959 et 1962 et tire les leçons du rôle fructueux du mouvement coopératif paysan lors de la période précédant 1959. Dans cet article, les auteurs étudient la nature et les objectifs de la réforme agraire de 1993 dans le contexte global de la crise économique et des politiques d'ajustement et de réforme mises en œuvre à Cuba, procèdent notamment à une analyse de la nouvelle structure du secteur agricole, et présentent dans ses grandes lignes le processus encourageant de reprise agricole enclenché en 1995.

La agricultura cubana y la reforma agraria de 1993

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La reforma de la tenencia y explotación del suelo de 1993 constituye uno de los eslabones más importantes de la política de ajuste y reforma del modelo económico nacional cubano de la década de los noventa. Esta reforma agraria consiste en la promoción del cooperativismo en las tierras de las antiguas empresas estatales agropecuarias, y se inspira en las experiencias cooperativistas de los años 1959-62 y en el desempeño exitoso del cooperativismo campesino durante el período inmediatamente precedente. En el presente trabajo se estudian las características y objetivos de la reforma en el contexto global de la crisis económica y de las políticas de ajuste y reforma que se llevan a cabo en Cuba, y se analiza la nueva estructura del sector agropecuario y el proceso de recuperación agrícola que ha tenido lugar desde 1995.

FUNDAMENTOS GENERALES DE LA REFORMA DEL SISTEMA AGRARIO

Las causas generales y los fundamentos político-jurídicos de la reforma agraria coinciden con la reforma del modelo económico de Cuba: la crisis económica y agroalimentaria que tuvo lugar luego del derrumbe de las economías de Europa del este, y los ajustes necesarios para la reinserción del país en las corrientes del mercado mundializado.

Describir la trayectoria integral del sector agropecuario sería una tarea que rebasaría los límites del presente trabajo; aquí se esbozarán solamente algunos de los momentos esenciales del desarrollo rural, y las contradicciones del sistema agrario que dieron pie a la reforma.

La revolución agraria en Cuba promovió desde 1959 el desarrollo rural con una visión integradora: transformación radical de las relaciones de propiedad de la tierra y

relaciones distributivas a favor de los trabajadores rurales y del campesinado; apoyo financiero, técnico y comercial de los nuevos productores; creación de industrias y servicios productivos; modernización de la infraestructura productiva; desarrollo científico, técnico y social en materia de salud, educación y relaciones comunitarias.

La solución de los problemas de la tierra y de los problemas rurales tuvo siempre como referencia las características históricas de la economía nacional, el sistema agrario y sus articulaciones intereconómicas y clasistas y las demandas asociadas a los cambios en el modelo económico-social. En el desarrollo histórico del sector agrario se manifestaron elementos del modelo soviético, especialmente en el sistema de administración agrícola.

La característica fundamental del sector agrario cubano, desde el triunfo de la

Revolución y hasta 1993, consistió en el predominio de la fórmula estatal¹. Esta tendencia comenzó con la aplicación de la I Ley de Reforma Agraria (1959) y se consolidó a partir de la II Ley de Reforma Agraria (1963). La tendencia estadista del modelo agrícola tuvo su origen, entre otras razones, en el hecho de que aunque Cuba es un país pequeño y en desarrollo, no era estrictamente un país agrario ni campesino, sino más bien un país agroindustrial exportador de una agricultura de plantaciones en gran escala.

Paralelamente a la política estadista quedó, hasta 1977, un pequeño remanente de una economía campesina que abarcaba alrededor del 20 por ciento de la tierra; de esa economía emergería un sector cooperativo de origen campesino –refrendado por la I Ley de Reforma Agraria–, con poco más de la mitad de las tierras, organizado en latifundios cañeros expropiados donde quedaban antiguos jornaleros agrícolas permanentes y temporales.

En la década de los sesenta, el cooperativismo campesino resultaba una necesidad debido a la transición al socialismo. En 1959, más de 100 000 productores habían recibido gratuitamente tierras que trabajaban como propiedad privada; sin embargo estas entregas tuvieron un apoyo político, material y financiero discreto. Entre 1966 y 1974, con el paso a la política de estatización voluntaria del campesinado, el cooperativismo fue literalmente suprimido con el objeto de completar lo más rápidamente posible la construcción socialista en el medio rural y establecer los grandes planes agropecuarios estatales. Este enfoque multiplicó al mismo tiempo el número de fincas de autoconsumo muy pequeñas y el *conuquismo*² entre los obreros agrícolas estatales³. Las Sociedades agropecuarias (SA), que aparecieron en 1961, fueron las primeras cooperativas de

producción de origen campesino; a partir de 1964 dichas cooperativas se debilitaron hasta casi desaparecer⁴.

El cooperativismo campesino fue relanzado⁵ en los años setenta bajo el principio de la voluntariedad; el objetivo de tecnificar y humanizar el trabajo agrícola y la construcción de modernas comunidades electrificadas atrajo a gran parte del campesinado, especialmente a las mujeres. Casi un tercio de las fincas, que comprendían el 51,3 por ciento de las tierras campesinas, se integraron a las Cooperativas de producción agropecuaria (CPA) entre 1977 y 1987⁶. Con la socialización de la mayoría de las fincas «grandes» (de 30 a 67 ha), se amplió la minifundización. Las CPA adoptaron el modelo de las SA y se reforzaron gracias al apoyo de las Cooperativas de crédito y servicios (CCS)⁷.

En razón de su estrecha conexión con la economía nacional, la evolución del cooperativismo puede enmarcarse en tres etapas⁸:

² El conuco es una parcela de tierra de dimensión variable cuya finalidad es la producción de subsistencia para la familia, sobre todo durante el período de desempleo estacional, llamado «tiempo muerto». Los conucos fueron reivindicados, desde la década de 1940, por los jornaleros agrícolas bajo la conducción de los sindicatos ante los grandes patrones latifundistas.

³ Véase V. Figueroa. 1998. La economía campesina en la transición socialista antes de la reforma agraria de 1993. En *Campesinado y participación*. Ed. Universidad de La Habana y ONG Acción Popular Noruega. La Habana.

⁴ Solo 43 Sociedades agropecuarias sobrevivieron hasta 1977, transformándose en Cooperativas de producción agropecuaria.

⁵ La vía cooperativa del desarrollo rural constituyó una parte importante del paquete global de medidas de rectificación económica que se llevaron a cabo en esos años, y contó con condiciones macroeconómicas y sociales favorables.

⁶ Más de 44 000 fincas campesinas de una superficie total de alrededor de 1 049 000 ha existían en 1978.

⁷ Informe al I Congreso del PCC, 17-18 de diciembre de 1975. En *El militante comunista de Cuba*, enero-febrero de 1976. Discurso de Fidel Castro, Primer Secretario del CC del PCC en el VI Congreso de la ANAP. En *Discursos en tres Congresos*. Ed. Política. La Habana, 1982.

⁸ Véase S. Alemán, V. Figueroa et al. 1985. *Bosquejo histórico del proceso de cooperación socialista de la agricultura cubana*. Premio Ensayo. Concurso de Historia «Primero de Enero 1983». Ed. Política. La Habana; D. Deere et al. 1991. *Hacia una periodización del proceso de colectivización cubano: incentivos y respuestas campesinas*. MIMO. La Habana y Massachusetts.

¹ Hasta agosto de 1962, el sistema agrario estuvo compuesto por cuatro sectores: el estatal, el cooperativo, el privado capitalista y el campesino. En agosto del 1962 se estatizó el sector cooperativo, y con la II Ley de Reforma Agraria se expropió y estatizó el capital privado agrícola remanente.

- *De 1977 a 1983:* multiplicación acelerada del número de cooperativas y de campesinos asociados durante una época de crecimiento económico nacional, y predominio de las pequeñas cooperativas de gestión muy eficiente. Desde 1981 la política de agrandamiento de las CPA tuvo efectos negativos, que se hicieron patentes a partir de 1983.
- *De 1984 a 1987:* disminución creciente de la integración a las cooperativas de nuevos campesinos; gigantismo cada vez más acentuado de estas entidades; disminución de la rentabilidad y aumento del número de cooperativas no rentables, con un período crítico entre 1986 y 1987 coincidente con la fase recesiva de la economía nacional.
- *De 1988-1993:* agotamiento y parálisis del movimiento de transformación cooperativa del campesinado. El apoyo estatal se concentró en el fortalecimiento del sector de las CPA y no en la expansión del movimiento cooperativo. Si bien la crisis económica de 1991-93 afectó a las CPA, su repercusión fue menor que en 1986-87. Más del 70 por ciento del total de las CPA y el 90 por ciento de las cooperativas cañeras fueron rentables entre 1991 y 1993. En la práctica, el modelo cooperativo reveló sus ventajas frente al modelo estatal, aunque no logró un éxito semejante entre los pequeños productores.

El modelo estatal agropecuario identificó en un solo elemento la propiedad, la gestión y la administración directa por el Estado de las explotaciones agropecuarias a través de un sistema empresarial con poca o casi ninguna autonomía. Una densa red institucional de administración centralizada implantó delegaciones territoriales del sector cañero y no cañero y dos ministerios que cerraban la pirámide superestructural. El predominio de los métodos y mecanismos de dirección del sector estatal terminó modificando los modelos cooperativo y campesino, integrándolos a sistemas no mercantiles. La tendencia al gigantismo de las entidades agrícolas estatales no siempre respondía al concepto de economías de

escala y a una base material y técnica de sustentación; igual fenómeno se observó en el sector cooperativo.

La pérdida de eficiencia e integridad del desarrollo rural se hizo manifiesta a finales de los años ochenta y más aún en 1993 y 1994. La tecnificación «fordista» derivada de una tecnología soviética importada; la asimilación del modelo eurosoviético de dirección de la agricultura, y ciertos elementos de la integración progresiva al Consejo de Ayuda Mutua Económica (CAME) obraron en direcciones que fueron alejando progresivamente el desarrollo rural de las normas de la eficiencia.

En el Programa Alimentario Nacional (PAL), aprobado por la Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular en 1990, fueron a parar las deficiencias acumuladas y las principales soluciones que debían adoptarse lo más rápidamente posible en virtud del agravamiento de las condiciones internacionales, pero sin cambios en el régimen de tenencia ni en el mecanismo económico. Apenas un año después, se desintegró la Unión Soviética, y Cuba perdió unos vínculos comerciales, financieros y tecnológicos forjados a lo largo de más de 30 años.

Este conjunto de fenómenos internos y externos daría paso a las políticas económicas específicas de ajuste y reforma en el primer tercio de los años noventa, y especialmente a la reforma agraria; en 1994 abriría sus puertas el mercado agropecuario de libre oferta y demanda, y a finales del decenio se pondrían en marcha otra serie de transformaciones relativas al funcionamiento económico y al redimensionamiento de la superestructura de dirección de la agricultura.

BASES POLÍTICO-JURÍDICAS

La reforma del régimen de tenencia y explotación de la tierra tuvo su base jurídica en la Constitución de la República de 1992⁹. La Constitución reconoce la posibilidad de enajenación de una parte de

⁹ La Constitución de 1992 sustituyó a la Constitución de 1976, y dio lugar a ajustes y aperturas económicos.

la propiedad estatal socialista al transferir su propiedad o administración a colectivos y personas naturales o jurídicas nacionales y extranjeras. El Estado deja de ser a la vez propietario y productor directo, y actúa como propietario en nombre de la sociedad; los productores se ocupan de la administración de los bienes públicos. La lógica de esta política consiste en que el Estado centra su atención en el manejo del excedente económico y ejecuta, como todo propietario, una labor de control y fiscalización.

La dirección política máxima del país estableció, el 10 de septiembre de 1993, el principio de los cambios en el régimen agrario; seguidamente, ese mismo mes, el Comité Ejecutivo del Consejo de Ministros dictó los Decretos-Ley 142 y 2 708, que definen el carácter y alcance de la apertura en materia de tenencia del suelo y los principios del funcionamiento de las nuevas cooperativas agropecuarias y de otros productores¹⁰. Los Reglamentos Generales de las Unidades básicas de producción cooperativa (UBPC) fueron dictados por los ministerios correspondientes; y el Reglamento Interno, democráticamente consensuado y aprobado por los colectivos de las UBPC, cerró la lógica institucional del sistema.

CONTENIDO DE LA REFORMA AGRARIA DE 1993

La reforma de la tenencia de la tierra de 1993 difiere de las reformas de 1959 y 1963 y de la política agrocampesina de 1966-74 porque si éstas propugnaron la socialización de la gran propiedad privada agrícola y del campesinado, la presente reforma llevó a cabo un ajuste estructural de la propiedad estatal mediante la parcelación de la tierra bajo diferentes regímenes: en régimen cooperativo (fórmula dominante); en régimen de autogestión participativa¹¹ en

¹⁰ Posteriormente se dictaron las Resoluciones N° 354 y N° 60 de 1993 del Ministerio de la Agricultura (MINAG) y del Ministerio de la Industria Azucarera (MINAZ), respectivamente, que concretizaron etapas y fórmulas organizativas y otras mediaciones del proceso de cambio.

¹¹ Las entidades de autogestión participativa operan en forma descentralizada y sufragan sus propios costos; sus beneficios, una vez pagados los impuestos, los destinan a la inversión y a reservas. Los beneficios restantes pueden ser repartidos entre los trabajadores según sus aportes laborales.

las granjas no cooperativizadas; en régimen individual a favor de personas y familias; y en régimen privado empresarial de parcelación. A continuación se hace un análisis de la reforma de 1993 tomando en cuenta diversos aspectos analíticos¹².

Objetivo de la reforma

El enfrentamiento a la crisis agroalimentaria fue el objetivo más inmediato de una nueva reforma agraria que debía crear las condiciones que reactivaran la producción agropecuaria y agroindustrial. Era indispensable lograr un ajuste del conflicto entre fuerzas productivas, formas de explotación del suelo y funcionamiento del sistema agropecuario, es decir una fórmula de desestatización de la agricultura. Los cambios se efectuaron en medio de la crisis económica y de la ruptura del patrón de la agricultura convencional, en una época en que se imponía una intensificación del trabajo manual para garantizar la supervivencia y superar la crisis agroalimentaria. La promoción del cambio fue el resultado de una iniciativa de la dirección política central del país, y no el producto de imperativos políticos, o de reivindicaciones de trabajadores y demás productores agrícolas.

Beneficiarios de la parcelación de la tierra

Los beneficiarios de la parcelación de la tierra fueron:

- los colectivos de cooperativistas integrados por ex trabajadores agrícolas estatales;
- los colectivos agrícolas autogestionados de las granjas estatales agropecuarias;
- los campesinos y parceleros usufructuarios que se beneficiaron de la repartición de las tierras estatales. Bajo régimen de usufructo gratuito se produjeron productos de subsistencia y comerciales (café, tabaco, etc.). Esta repartición persiguió, además, la «reruralización» y un nuevo desarrollo campesino;

¹² Véase V. Figueroa. 1997. *El modelo cooperativo en la reforma del modelo económico de la transición al socialismo en Cuba*. Biblioteca Central de la UCLV. Santa Clara.

- los colectivos laborales de las empresas mixtas dotadas de capital extranjero destinado a actividades agropecuarias;
- los colectivos laborales de carácter extraordinario y temporal que comprendían miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas y del Ministerio del Interior, y entidades no agrícolas dedicadas a la producción comercial y de autoconsumo. Una finalidad implícita de estos colectivos era la asimilación laboral de una parte de los trabajadores en paro forzoso a causa de la crisis.

La reestructuración del sistema agrario dio lugar a un modelo de economía agraria heterogénea (mixta) compuesta por una diversidad de agentes económicos. Las nuevas formas económico-organizativas encerraban incentivos potenciales superiores, y posibilitaron una articulación más eficiente del sistema agrario con la agroindustria, el ámbito del consumo interno y el comercio exterior.

Parcelación y propiedad de la tierra

La parcelación de la tierra del Estado se realizó en régimen de usufructo gratuito y por tiempo indefinido. La intangibilidad del monopolio estatal de la tierra como objeto de propiedad se mantuvo en la mayor parte del suelo nacional. (El resto de las tierras era propiedad colectiva de las cooperativas campesinas o propiedad u objeto de usufructo de campesinos y parceleros.) La renta del suelo y la valorización de la tierra siguieron siendo conceptos excluidos de la práctica económica.

Activos y financiamiento

La enajenación de los activos fijos (excluida la tierra) y circulantes de las empresas estatales agropecuarias y de los complejos agroindustriales azucareros (CAI) en beneficio de las nuevas cooperativas se realizó mediante su venta; y, en el caso de las granjas «de nuevo tipo» (en autogestión participativa) «en administración», con la excepción de los activos circulantes, que les fueron vendidos. En ambos casos, el financiamiento de la inversión inicial se garantizó mediante un crédito bancario

blando que contemplaba un período de gracia de 3 a 5 años. En situaciones especiales, las inversiones productivas corrientes contaron con un apoyo financiero presupuestario. En ningún caso se admitió la individualización del patrimonio colectivo con sus efectos correspondientes.

Reforma y superestructura

En 1993, durante el proceso de cambio, tuvo lugar una asincronía entre la reestructuración de la base productiva y la reestructuración del aparato superestructural nacional y provincial de la agricultura cañera y no cañera, que incluyó la reorganización indispensable del sistema empresarial estatal. Este último debió monitorear la repartición de las tierras y asumir funciones de control y fiscalización. La reestructuración comenzó en 1998 y aún no ha concluido.

Reforma y mecanismo económico

La nueva economía agropecuaria implicó una modificación sustancial del mecanismo de planificación, que ahora debía orientarse hacia el mercado. La apertura del mercado libre agropecuario en 1994 fue seguida de otras medidas como los esquemas de financiamiento y estímulos en divisas para determinados sectores relacionados con las exportaciones; la reducción de las importaciones de alimentos; y las aportaciones de capital extranjero para reactivar la producción nacional, estabilizar y ulteriormente ampliar la fuerza de trabajo ocupada en la agricultura.

Otros cambios paralelos

El ajuste estructural se vinculó también a otro conjunto de acciones y cambios, entre los que cabe destacar los siguientes:

- El desarrollo de la agricultura urbana mediante organopónicos y huertos integrales urbanos destinados a la producción de hortalizas, arroz y otros cultivos en el interior y en los alrededores de ciudades y pueblos.
- La introducción de sistemas tecnológico-productivos de bajos insumos y alta densidad de mano de obra, con el

CUADRO 1

Distribución de la superficie agrícola según las formas de tenencia

Forma de tenencia	1992		1995		1998	
	(Hectáreas)	(Porcentaje)	(Hectáreas)	(Porcentaje)	(Hectáreas)	(Porcentaje)
Total	6 774 900	100,0	6 602 200	100,0	6 686 700	100,0
Estatad	5 097 700	75,2	1 778 100	27,0	2 234 500	33,4
Cooperativa	690 300	10,2	3 819 000	58,0	3 370 200	50,4
UBPC	-	-	3 161 000	48,0	2 756 000	41,2
CPA	690 300	10,2	658 000	10,0	614 200	9,2
Sector privado	986 900	14,6	1 005 100	15,0	1 082 000	16,2
CCS	752 700	11,1	772 8	11,6	779 700	11,7
Otros productores ¹	234 200	3,5	232 3	3,4	236 200	3,5
Usufructuarios en 1993 ²	-	-	-	-	66 000	1,0
Total no estatal	1 677 200	24,8	4 824 100	73,0	4 452 200	66,6

¹ Incluidos los campesinos no asociados a CCS y parceleros.

² Beneficiarios individuales de la reforma a partir de 1993.

propósito de combinar más racionalmente el modelo productivo convencional o clásico con un modelo de producción sostenible.

- El fortalecimiento de los centros de investigación agropecuaria con el objeto de introducir nuevas tecnologías sustitutivas de los insumos agroquímicos y de la mecanización.

CAMBIOS ESTRUCTURALES INTRODUCIDOS EN EL SISTEMA AGRARIO

La reforma agraria ha modificado sustancialmente la estructura de la tenencia del suelo existente hasta finales de 1992 (Cuadro 1). En poco menos de tres años, a partir de finales de 1993, se parcelaron más de 3,3 millones de hectáreas de superficie agrícola estatal a favor de colectivos y trabajadores. Los cambios han sido considerables: en septiembre de 1993, el sector estatal agropecuario comprendía unas 400 grandes empresas que reunían 735 granjas cañeras¹³ y 835 explotaciones agropecuarias; sus dimensiones promedio eran de 5 796 ha respecto a una superficie total de 9,1 millones de hectáreas de las cuales 5,1 millones de hectáreas eran de suelos cultivables. El sector estatal disponía por sí solo de más de 75 000 tractores con un potencial energético de 5,9 millones de caballos, y de una superficie bajo riego de 870 000 ha. El capital fijo acumulado se estimaba en 7,356 millones de pesos en

¹³ Las granjas cañeras fueron el producto de subdivisiones administrativas en el interior de las empresas, y aparecieron apenas un año antes de la reforma.

1988. Había alrededor de 587 000 trabajadores ocupados, en su mayoría jóvenes e instruidos¹⁴; uno de cada 5 trabajadores era técnico de nivel intermedio y tenía formación universitaria¹⁵.

La reforma privilegió la repartición de la tierra estatal en favor de las Unidades básicas de producción cooperativa (UBPC), que recibieron en usufructo gratuito alrededor de 3,1 millones de hectáreas de superficie agrícola hasta 1995. Por otro lado, algo más de 125 700 ha se distribuyeron a pequeños productores (este proceso aún no ha concluido). Al mismo tiempo se amplió el fondo de tierra en explotación extraordinaria en manos de las granjas militares y del Ministerio del Interior, hasta alcanzar unas 219 000 ha.

En 1998, algo más del 50 por ciento del fondo agrícola nacional correspondía al sector cooperativo, mientras que el Estado disponía de un tercio de dicho fondo: una parte era explotada según el esquema tradicional, y otra se encontraba en transición a granjas integrales de nuevo tipo. El resto de la tierra era explotado por las granjas militares, los colectivos de contingentistas, las entidades del Poder Popular, instituciones científicas y otras instituciones. Finalmente, el sector privado campesino y parcelero disponía de algo más del 16 por ciento de la superficie agrícola nacional (el 72,1 por ciento del fondo de

¹⁴ En 1986, el 58 por ciento de los trabajadores tenía una edad promedio de 25 a 44 años, y el 60 por ciento superaba el nivel primario de enseñanza.

¹⁵ La revolución educacional no se detuvo en los años subsiguientes, y este indicador siguió creciendo.

tierra privada en CCS, equivalente a un 12 por ciento de la tierra agrícola nacional). Los agricultores privados restantes eran campesinos no asociados a CCS y la casi totalidad de los parceleros o conuqueros (Cuadro 1).

En el año 2000, el número de agentes agrícolas consistía en más de 4 300 entidades estatales, cooperativas y asociaciones económicas, y 2 709 CCS con alrededor de 90 000 asociados; el resto del sector privado incluía unos 118 000 a 125 000 productores campesinos, parceleros y *patieros*¹⁶ independientes. La nueva estructura de la tenencia de la tierra –en una época en que la reforma aún no ha concluido– responde a una economía agraria heterogénea debido a la diversidad de los actores agrarios. En las distintas provincias del país la estructura agraria es semejante a la ya descrita.

La composición de la tenencia de la tierra por sectores principales agrícolas revela que el cooperativismo es absolutamente dominante en el sector cañero; que su presencia es fuerte en el sector no cañero; y que su función es importante en el sector campesino-parcelero de la agricultura no cañera, donde su peso relativo equivale a casi 2,8 veces la tierra de la agricultura cañera. Por su parte, la función del Estado es importante en el sector no cañero, aunque es predominante solo en el sector arrocero. En general, la presencia de las granjas integrales es importante en los sectores forestal, arrocero, cítrico y en la ganadería de ceba.

COOPERATIVIZACIÓN DE LA AGRICULTURA ESTATAL

Las Unidades básicas de producción cooperativa son cooperativas de tipo empresarial, y están integradas por granjeros estatales asalariados procedentes de las empresas estatales agropecuarias. La formación del sector de las UBPC representa un proceso singular de desestatización de la posesión de la tierra y

¹⁶ Trabajadores en patios de menos de 2 000 m², generalmente aledaños a casas de zonas urbanas y rurales.

de los activos estatales. Desde un punto de vista social, las UBPC han producido el «desclasamiento» de los asalariados estatales, que se convirtieron en trabajadores-propietarios colectivos, con intereses propios de tal categoría.

Las UBPC son algo más que empresas: constituyen una comunidad económico-social integrada en el medio rural. Se distinguen de las empresas mercantiles convencionales –subordinadas a la maximización de la tasa de beneficio– en que, sin dejar de perseguir un afán de beneficio, están obligadas a tener otros objetivos de índole social-comunitaria. La satisfacción de ambos aspectos es un concepto básico para entender su racionalidad.

En los documentos fundacionales de las UBPC se definen los principios generales, las finalidades y la misión fundamental de estas entidades; y en su formulación se refleja la urgencia de un proceso funcional y utilitario¹⁷:

- la vinculación directa del hombre a la explotación agrícola como forma de estimular su interés por el trabajo y el sentido de una responsabilidad individual y colectiva directa;
- el autoabastecimiento del colectivo de obreros y sus familias mediante un esfuerzo cooperativo, así como el mejoramiento progresivo de las condiciones de vivienda y otros aspectos relacionados con la atención a las personas;
- la asociación rigurosa de los ingresos de los trabajadores a la producción alcanzada;
- un amplio desarrollo de la autonomía de gestión;
- la administración por las nuevas entidades de sus propios recursos, y la autosuficiencia en el orden productivo.

A continuación se ofrecen algunas características que ilustran el proceso de cooperativización proletaria, sobre todo para establecer las diferencias con la cooperativización que tuvo lugar entre los campesinos en los años setenta.

¹⁷ Véase el Decreto-Ley 142 de septiembre de 1993.

CUADRO 2

El sector de las UBPC en la agricultura no cañera de Cuba

Productos	1998 (al 30/6)			1999 (al 31/3)			2000 (al 15/1)		
	UBPC	Miembros ¹	Superficie (ha)	UBPC	Miembros	Superficie (ha)	UBPC	Miembros	Superficie (ha)
Total	1 562	129 519	1 501 100	1 587	119 453	1 459 500	1 709	115 118	1 459 600
Cultivos varios	337	34 113	127 400	312	29 381	117 400	451	30 651	122 300
Ganadería	726	65 957	1 128 400	719	57 695	1 099 700	679	53 324	1 041 600
Cítricos y frutas	112	7 922	73 100	119	8 142	77 100	120	7 755	71 100
Café y cacao	237	14 789	84 400	289	17 417	84 800	292	17 145	82 800
Tabaco	48	3 741	12 200	52	3 934	13 000	47	3 060	10 100
Arroz	15	2 362	75 500	11	2 276	69 500	11	2 276	69 500
Apicultura	87	636		84	601		84	627	
Flores				1	7		1	7	
Porcinocultura							9	111	400
Otros ²							15	162	61 700

¹ Los «miembros» son «socios» de las UBPC.

² Incluye las UBPC dedicadas a la producción de posturas, materia orgánica, plantas ornamentales y la pequeña industria conservera.

Fuente: Ministerio de la Agricultura. La Habana (sin fecha).

- La transformación de los granjeros estatales en cooperativistas no resultó de una reivindicación formulada por éstos, sino de un cambio introducido por la dirección central del país; dicho cambio fue consensuado luego por los granjeros en las asambleas constitutivas.
- La transformación estuvo bajo regulación y control estatal, y en ella intervinieron los ministerios, las delegaciones provinciales y finalmente las empresas, con la participación activa de las organizaciones sociales. Las relaciones agrícolas productivas, económicas y sociales conservaron, a pesar de la rapidez del cambio, su unidad y disciplina.
- La integración de los trabajadores a las cooperativas se guió por el principio de voluntariedad (solicitud individual de ingreso) y por el ejercicio democrático en la selección de la membresía. Los equipos de dirección y el tamaño de las UBPC resultaron mucho más pequeños que las empresas y granjas precedentes.
- Las nuevas entidades contaron con la ayuda del sistema financiero nacional. La relativa conservación de la superestructura que dirigió la cooperativización y el control y fiscalización se tradujo en muchos casos en actitudes paternalistas o abiertamente intervencionistas que limitaron, y aún limitan, la autonomía de las UBPC.

La formación de las UBPC en la agricultura estatal no cañera fue más lenta¹⁸

que en el sector cañero. La reestructuración de la agricultura preveía la organización de un total de 2 654 UBPC¹⁹: a fines de 1994 había 958, y a fines de 2000, 1 709. En 1996, ocupaban una superficie de 1 512 200 ha, equivalente al 42 por ciento de la tierra, y daban empleo al 33 por ciento de los trabajadores, que dependían del Ministerio de la Agricultura. A principios de 2001 su superficie total era de 1 457 000 ha. La inmensa mayoría de los trabajadores agropecuarios estatales se integró a las UBPC: un 95-96 por ciento de los granjeros de las empresas del Ministerio de la Agricultura (MINAG); solo un 2,5 por ciento de los solicitantes fueron rechazados por las Asambleas constitutivas y un 2,8 por ciento no manifestó interés por el cooperativismo. Las mujeres representaron entre el 16 y el 21 por ciento de los ubepecistas. Características de la colectivización fueron el número de entidades creadas, la tierra colectivizada y el número de trabajadores integrados (Cuadro 2)²⁰.

¹⁸ Las primeras UBPC fueron «La Miriam» (La Palma, Pinar del Río), creada el 28 de septiembre de 1993; y la «Simón Rodríguez» (Melena del Sur, La Habana), creada el 29 de septiembre de 1993.

¹⁹ Las UBPC eran 559 en 1994, 246 en 1995, 103 en 1996 y apenas 9 en 1997.

²⁰ La colectivización más intensa se observó en los sectores cañero, tabacalero y cafetalero, con más del 85, 76 y 85 por ciento de la tierra, respectivamente. En marzo de 1995, en el sector de los cultivos varios, se colectivizó el 54 por ciento de la tierra; en el cítrico el 45 por ciento, y en el del arroz el 48 por ciento.

El proceso de cooperativización no ha concluido aún en la agricultura no cañera debido a la aguda escasez de mano de obra en muchas empresas agropecuarias, a la repartición con carácter extraordinario de tierras a familias y colectivos de otras instituciones, y a la introducción de un esquema autogestionado participativo en la avicultura, porcicultura, ganadería de ceiba, acuicultura, servicios agropecuarios e incluso en el sector de los cultivos varios. La disminución del número de UBPC respecto al plan original se debe a que su tamaño resultó siendo mayor que el se había concebido inicialmente.

La cooperativización en el sector cañero tuvo lugar en apenas un mes antes del inicio de la zafra de 1993-94, cuando alrededor del 87,3 por ciento de la tierra y el 88,5 por ciento de la superficie cultivable de los complejos agroindustriales azucareros (CAI) se organizaron en 1 561 UBPC, con algo más de 153 000 asociados. Al final del siglo el número de UBPC había quedado reducido a 955, con unos 137 000 miembros.

La tendencia general del sector de las UBPC cañeras a la concentración por fusiones sucesivas, o su conversión en granjas estatales a causa de dificultades económicas y organizativas, ha sido un factor desestabilizador que ha afectado al sentido de pertenencia de los ubepecistas. No debe sorprender que las UBPC hayan perdido alrededor de 15 800 asociados en los últimos 6 años, a pesar de que se observa un incremento apreciable del número promedio de ubepecistas por cooperativa.

La creación del sector de las UBPC ha reducido el tamaño de las explotaciones agrícolas; por ejemplo, en 1993, las cooperativas cañeras y ganaderas equivalían, respectivamente, a 1/7 y 1/15 de las antiguas empresas estatales. Esta tendencia positiva comenzó a revertirse con las fusiones y disoluciones de las UBPC, y tuvo múltiples efectos que dañaron el sentido de pertenencia y de propiedad de la membresía. La superficie de tierras por ubepecista era relativamente grande: en 1993 era de 11,1 ha, y siguió

CUADRO 3

Tamaño de las UBPC según su superficie

UBPC	1998	2000 (Hectáreas)
Total de las UBPC no cañeras	11,6	12,7
Dedicadas a cultivos varios	3,7	4,0
Dedicadas a la ganadería	17,1	19,5
Dedicadas a la producción de cítricos y frutas	9,2	9,2
Dedicadas a la producción de café y cacao	5,7	4,8
Dedicadas a la producción de tabaco	3,3	3,3
Dedicadas a la producción de arroz	32,0	30,6
Dedicadas a la producción de flores		2,5
Dedicadas a la porcicultura		3,6
Otras ¹		380,6
Cañeras	11,4	11,5

¹ Incluye las UBPC dedicadas a la producción de posturas, fabricación de materia orgánica, producción de plantas ornamentales y la pequeña industria conservera.

incrementándose ulteriormente. En 2000 era de 12,7 ha en las UBPC no cañeras y de 11,5 ha en las cañeras. En la situación actual, caracterizada por la escasez de mecanización y de insumos agroquímicos, estas cifras no pueden considerarse accidentales (Cuadro 3).

La compra de los activos fijos²¹ y circulantes fue financiada mediante créditos de la banca estatal a una tasa de interés baja y con un período de gracia de tres años, prorrogables excepcionalmente hasta cinco. Los activos fijos no incluían la tierra. El presupuesto nacional de 1994 ingresó por ventas de activos 843,5 millones de pesos²². En el marco de los programas de recuperación, se creó un fondo de ayuda económica gratuita en apoyo de las UBPC, y se destinaron a éstas 67,8 millones de pesos en 1994; 319 millones en 1995; 541 millones en 1996; 480 millones en 1997; 399 millones en 1998, y 199,5 millones en 1999. En definitiva, la ayuda económica representó una mínima parte del subsidio multimillonario estatal que recibían las empresas estatales agropecuarias en el período anterior a la reforma²³.

²¹ El valor de los activos fijos se estimó según el valor en libros y el estado técnico de los medios de producción. Este valor era muy inferior a los costos reales de producción y se tradujo en una «descapitalización» de unos 250-300 millones de pesos del sector estatizado.

²² CEPAL. 2000. *La economía cubana: reformas estructurales y desempeño en los noventa*. México. El 30 de septiembre de 1996, el MINAG, había vendido activos por 742 millones de pesos, con un valor en libros de 1 300 millones.

²³ Los subsidios a las empresas agropecuarias y a la agroindustria en 1992-93 se estimaron en alrededor de 1 800 millones de pesos.

CUADRO 4

Uso del suelo y participación relativa de los distintos tipos de productores (1997)

Cultivos seleccionados	Total nacional		Estatal	Sector cooperativo			Sector privado			
	Uso (%)	Total (%)		Total	UBPC	CPA	Total	Cooperativas de créditos y servicios	Organizaciones campesinas	Otros ¹
			Porcentaje de participación de los agentes productivos							
Superficie cultivada	100,0	100	24,4	57,0	47,0	10,0	18,6	12,8	4,4	1,3
Cultivos permanentes	70,4	100	21,6	70,2	59,5	10,7	8,2	6,3	1,4	0,5
Caña de azúcar	47,8	100	24,4	57,0	47,0	10,0	18,6	12,8	4,4	1,3
Café	3,8	100	24,3	36,0	21,8	14,2	39,7	28,0	4,8	6,8
Cítricos	2,5	100	24,4	57,0	47,0	10,0	18,6	12,8	4,4	1,3
Pastos	9,9	100	24,4	57,0	47,0	10,0	18,6	12,8	4,4	1,3
Cultivos temporales	29,4	100	24,4	57,0	47,0	10,0	18,6	12,8	4,4	1,3
Arroz	6,1	100	52,5	35,6	29,0	6,6	11,9	7,9	2,9	1,1
Cultivos varios	18,6	100	24,4	57,0	47,0	10,0	18,6	12,8	4,4	1,3
Tabaco	1,0	100	12,0	22,8	7,6	15,1	65,3	47,2	2,8	5,3

¹ Fundamentalmente antiguos parceleros y parceleros usufructuarios de la reforma.

Fuente: CEPAL. 2000. *La economía cubana: reformas estructurales y desempeño en los noventa*, Cuadro A-73. México.

FUNCIÓN DE LA PRODUCCIÓN AGRÍCOLA GLOBAL

La estructura productiva por rubros del sector agropecuario nacional se ha mantenido prácticamente inalterable a lo largo del tiempo. En 1997, el 57 por ciento del fondo agrícola nacional se encontraba cultivado, y un 35 por ciento se encontraba cubierto de pastos naturales. Los cultivos permanentes siguen siendo la ocupación fundamental de la agricultura, con alrededor del 70 por ciento de la superficie cultivada. La caña de azúcar ocupa el primer lugar, con el 48 por ciento de la superficie cultivada, y los pastos y forrajes el segundo lugar, con el 10,2 por ciento. Las plantaciones de café, cacao y cítricos cubren el 7 por ciento (Cuadro 4). En general, la ganadería se practica en una superficie total de casi 2,8 millones de hectáreas, equivalente al 49,4 por ciento de toda la superficie agrícola del país, aunque se trata en la mayoría de los casos de tierras marginales, poco apropiadas a la agricultura.

A los cultivos temporales –fundamentales en la dieta del cubano–, se dedican unas 995 000 ha, que equivalen al 29,4 por ciento de la superficie cultivada, es decir 0,09 ha (900 m²) per cápita, extensión que resulta muy insuficiente respecto a los niveles de productividad actuales.

El sector cooperativo (constituido por las UBPC más las CPA) ocupa el primer lugar por superficie cultivada, y está encabezado casi sin excepción por las UBPC; siguen de

cerca productores estatales, y luego los campesinos pequeños y medios. Los productores privados de la agricultura de plantaciones ocupan un lugar muy menor, excepto en el caso del café.

La función agregada de la producción agrícola por tipos y formas de economía agraria es muy variada (Cuadro 5). El sector cooperativo se caracteriza por un alto nivel de especialización en cultivos permanentes. Las UBPC dedican el 89,2 por ciento de la superficie cultivada a la caña de azúcar; el subsector de las CPA posee una economía más diversificada. En la agricultura estatal se ha producido un cambio importante debido a que en la actualidad hay un mayor equilibrio entre la proporción de cultivos de plantaciones y de cultivos temporales. Por su parte, la economía campesina y parcelera reproduce el modelo clásico de una función productiva altamente diversificada, centrada en la producción de alimentos (con el 70 por ciento de la superficie cultivada).

A diferencia de la agricultura precedente y del cooperativismo, el sistema agrario actual –eje central de la agricultura cubana– es heterogéneo; dicha heterogeneidad se debe a la coexistencia de diversos patrones económico-sociales. En la recomposición del medio rural es aún necesario:

- acabar de generalizar el modelo de autogestión participativa en las granjas estatales;

CUADRO 5

Función de la producción por tipo de agentes agrícolas (1997)

Cultivos seleccionados	Total	Sector estatal	Sector cooperativo			Sector privado			
			Total	UBPC	CPA	Total	CCS	Organizaciones campesinas	Otros
(Porcentaje)									
Superficie cultivada	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
Cultivos permanentes	70,4	62,4	86,7	89,2	75,1	30,9	34,7	21,8	25,1
Caña de azúcar	47,8	21,9	71,3	74,0	58,7	9,7	12,2	5,4	0,2
Café	3,8	3,8	2,4	1,8	5,4	8,1	8,3	4,1	19,6
Cacao	0,2	0,1	0,2	0,1	0,3	0,7	0,8	0,1	0,8
Plátano	3,3	6,3	2,0	1,7	3,5	3,5	3,5	4,3	1,6
Cítricos	2,5	4,6	2,0	2,2	1,0	1,4	1,6	0,9	0,6
Frutales	2,3	3,3	1,2	1,0	2,4	4,2	4,8	3,5	1,0
Pastos y forrajes	9,9	20,9	7,5	8,3	3,6	2,7	2,9	2,9	0,6
Cultivos temporales	29,4	37,1	13,2	10,8	24,8	69,0	65,3	78,2	74,9
Arroz	6,1	13,1	3,8	3,7	4,0	3,9	3,7	4,0	4,9
Cultivos varios	18,6	20,9	7,9	6,0	17,1	48,3	47,7	51,2	45,1
Tabaco	1,8	0,9	0,7	0,3	2,7	6,3	6,6	1,2	20,8
Forrajes	0,3	0,5	0,2	0,3	0,1	0,2	0,2	0,1	0,0

Fuente: CEPAL. 2000. *La economía cubana: reformas estructurales y desempeño en los noventa*, Cuadro A-73. México.

- continuar la parcelación privada hasta límites razonables;
- crear progresivamente nuevas asociaciones económicas con el capital extranjero convenientes para Cuba.

La futura ampliación de la agricultura privada campesina y parcelera plantea interrogantes acerca de la posibilidad de reducir la conflictividad de la recomposición económica y social que tiene lugar en el campo, y de la factibilidad y oportunidad de relanzar el cooperativismo. Este último factor dependerá de la capacidad de recuperación y de la competitividad del sector cooperativo.

RECUPERACIÓN DE LA PRODUCCIÓN AGROPECUARIA DESPUÉS DE LA REFORMA

El sector cooperativo, vinculado con la agroindustria de exportación y el mercado interno, se ha convertido en el elemento principal de la recuperación agroalimentaria y, por consiguiente, de la reactivación económica y del desarrollo rural en sentido amplio. En 1996 las UBPC producían productos tan esenciales como la caña de azúcar, la leche y el arroz húmedo (Cuadro 6) en proporciones que se han mantenido sin cambios sustanciales en los años siguientes.

En el contexto de una economía agraria heterogénea, las UBPC han debido enfrentar grandes dificultades para llevar adelante la recuperación económica, porque su modelo

productivo surgió tiempos en que la agricultura estaba en quiebra, y la crisis económica y agroalimentaria había registrado su punto más agudo. El reto histórico de estas cooperativas consistió en la promoción de la agricultura y en la reactivación de la economía nacional en su conjunto.

El repunte económico de Cuba –y el de su agricultura– no es una tarea del corto ni del mediano plazo. Las condiciones creadas por la crisis económica, el cambio tecnológico, los ajustes y los conocimientos que exigen las nuevas organizaciones agropecuarias, agroindustriales y otras organizaciones vinculadas con el sector agropecuario, amén de la implementación de los cambios económicos, son factores que actúan con mayor o menor intensidad e influyen en el proceso de recuperación agrícola y en particular el funcionamiento de las UBPC.

La reducción de la producción agropecuaria en los años 1993-94 respecto

CUADRO 6

Participación del sector de las UBPC en la producción nacional (1994-97)

Productos seleccionados	1994	1995	1996	1997
(Porcentaje)				
Caña de azúcar	80,0	80,0	80,0	80,0
Leche	39,6	47,8	45,3	42,8
Viandas	31,0	32,8	30,2	27,4
Hortalizas	14,8	16,0	12,9	11,8
Cítricos	18,3	25,6		
Frutales	18,5	22,5	22,3	14,8
Arroz húmedo	41,6	44,8	40,9	36,2
Cereales	24,9	17,9	15,4	14,6
Café			24	
Tabaco			8	

CUADRO 7

Variación de la producción agrícola promedio de cultivos seleccionados (1990-98)

Cultivos seleccionados	Producción promedio (toneladas)			Variación porcentual		
	1990-92	1993-94	1995-98	1993-94/1990-92	1995-98/1993-94	1995-98/1990-92
Caña de azúcar	74 900 000	29 000 000	36 700 000	38,7	126,5	48,9
Viandas	1 114 200	604 600	1 106 200	54,3	183,0	99,3
Hortalizas	496 200	238 500	502 700	48,1	210,7	101,3
Arroz	419 900	134 300	322 700	32,0	240,2	76,8
Maíz	59 600	41 000	105 500	68,8	257,4	177,1
Frijol	11 200	6 500	15 000	58,5	228,8	133,9
Tabaco	30 500	12 300	31 300	40,4	254,0	102,6
Cítricos	896 300	383 200	686 900	42,7	179,3	76,6
Frutales	201 300	52 500	117 300	26,1	223,5	58,2
Carne vacuna	202 300	83 800	135 100	41,4	161,1	66,8
Carne porcina	99 900	54 900	100 700	55,0	183,2	100,8
Carne de ave	116 500	55 900	94 600	48,0	169,4	81,2
Huevos (unidades)	2 641 500	1 024 400	1 338 200	38,8	130,6	50,7

Fuente: CEPAL. 2000. *La economía cubana: reformas estructurales y desempeño en los noventa*, Cuadros A-78 a A-81. México.

a la media del trienio 1990-92 fue considerable: la producción de la mayoría de los sectores fue inferior al 40 o al 50 por ciento. No es casual que los sectores que mejor soportaron la crisis fueran los que se asocian tradicionalmente al consumo popular: los del maíz, frijol, viandas y carne porcina (Cuadro 7).

La agricultura en su conjunto se ha recuperado progresivamente a partir de 1995, e incluso ha habido algunos sectores que han logrado superar sus niveles históricos de producción, aunque con un comportamiento inestable en los últimos años noventa; ello se refleja en las tasas de crecimiento comparadas de la agricultura y del producto interno bruto. Un papel destacado en este proceso corresponde a las UBPC, así como a la agricultura urbana y suburbana (organopónicos y huertos suburbanos). Otros sectores se han mantenido en una situación de crisis –por ejemplo el de la caña de azúcar–, con una producción promedio de 1995-98 que fue un 51,1 por ciento inferior a la de 1990-92. La ganadería también sufrió pérdidas: el rebaño bovino disminuyó a una tasa media anual del 1,4 por ciento entre 1967 y 1998²⁴.

En el cuatrienio 1995-98, la recuperación indicaba que todos los sectores habían superado los bajos niveles de producción de los dos años más críticos; sin embargo,

salvo para cinco bienes agregados, la producción todavía estaba lejos de volver a alcanzar los niveles medios de 1990-92, con la excepción del maíz, frijoles, tabaco y carne porcina, productos que superaron los picos históricos de producción.

La disminución de la producción cañera de las UBPC ha sido una constante en las últimas siete zafras, salvo en la última del siglo pasado cuando se registró una leve recuperación; pero la producción aún distaba un 19 por ciento de la que se había alcanzado en 1993-94. La caída de los rendimientos cañeros desde 1993, hasta llegar a unas 39 200 arrobas²⁵ por caballería, significó un rudo golpe para la economía azucarera del país; en las dos últimas zafras del siglo pasado se logró una leve recuperación con un incremento de apenas unas 1 300 arrobas por caballería respecto a 1993-94 (Cuadro 8).

Entre 1995 y 2000 la agricultura se recuperó paulatinamente, aunque todavía a un nivel insuficiente y sin que se consiguiera un mejoramiento en cantidad y calidad de una canasta racionada, o reducir los precios de los productos en los mercados liberados e incrementar el suministro de materias primas a la industria alimentaria. La producción tampoco ha alcanzado a satisfacer adecuadamente la demanda del sector turístico. Las importaciones de alimentos

²⁴ En 1967 en el hato de bovinos de Cuba había 7 172 000 cabezas; en 1998 había sólo 4 643 000 cabezas.

²⁵ 1 arroba = 11,5 kg aproximadamente.

CUADRO 8

Variación promedio anual de los indicadores de la producción cañera de las UBPC

	1993-94	1994-95	1995-96	1996-97	1997-98	1998-99	1999-00	1999-00/ 1993-94
Producción de caña (<i>millones de arrobas</i>)	100,0	64,5	143,7	93,2	83,4	103,5	108,5	81,0
Superficie cosechada (<i>miles de ha</i>)	100,0	72,1	133,1	98,4	84,1	93,8	104,9	78,3
Rendimiento (<i>miles de arrobas</i>)	100,0	77,8	123,9	94,7	99,2	110,4	103,3	103,3
Producción promedio por UBPC (<i>millones de arrobas</i>)	100,0	71,2	158,1	106,3	90,4	107,5	113,8	132,3

Fuente: F. Sulroca, E. Lamadrid, O. López y L. García. Sin fecha. *Las Unidades básicas de producción cooperativa y las granjas cañeras entre 1993 y el 2000*. Centro de Estudios de la Economía Cubana (CEEC). La Habana.

resultan excesivas y deprimen las exportaciones. Los sectores agropecuario y agroindustrial exportador están llamados a dar una mayor contribución al proceso de recuperación de la economía, sobre todo al reducir las tensiones en la balanza en cuenta corriente.

Hay que considerar dos circunstancias que dificultan la comprensión del crecimiento acumulado en el sector agropecuario. Por una parte, Cuba no puede dejar de importar determinados alimentos y materias primas necesarios para la producción interna de calorías y, sobre todo, de proteínas. El país no ha sido ni será plenamente autosuficiente en la esfera alimentaria, y debe soportar tensiones financieras agravadas por el alza de los precios de los alimentos en el mercado internacional, que limitan los volúmenes de importación.

Por otra parte, la expansión creciente del turismo eleva necesariamente la demanda interna de alimentos, y ejerce una presión sobre los suministros disponibles para la población. Esta demanda también ejerce una presión sobre la balanza en cuenta corriente de importaciones indispensables, a pesar de que el sector turístico contribuye a su financiamiento. Resulta paradójico que el sector turístico se haya convertido en un factor clave del despegue agropecuario debido a que el mercado interior de divisas contribuye en numerosos aspectos a su financiamiento.

Al hacer una evaluación general de la reforma agraria desde 1993, se puede afirmar que a pesar de la aguda carencia de insumos y equipos en que ésta ha debido desarrollarse, existen signos alentadores de un repunte de los sistemas productivos, de

la producción de bienes de consumo directo y de materias primas destinadas a la agroindustria, y del mercado interno y externo. La reforma ha contribuido además al incremento y a la estabilización de la mano de obra rural.

CONTRADICCIONES Y DESAFÍOS DE UNA AGRICULTURA HETEROGÉNEA

La estructura de la base económica de la nueva agricultura nacional cubana representa un modelo de economía agraria heterogénea. El cooperativismo de origen proletario se desarrolló en una economía que reunía distintas formas –contradictorias y en cierta medida antagónicas– de producción e intercambio. Junto al capitalismo de Estado, diversas clases y grupos sociales manifestaron intereses económicos específicos y diferenciados: agentes socializadores, individuos privados, y segmentos de campesinos ricos.

Antes de 1992, el desarrollo rural integral había traído consigo una diversificación de la composición social en las zonas agrícolas. La tecnificación, la industrialización, la urbanización y la implantación de los servicios productivos y sociales modificaron mucho la estructura social tradicional, el empleo, la cultura y el modo de vida rural. El campesinado se redujo numéricamente al tiempo que cobraba peso su homogeneidad económica. Los cooperativistas surgieron como un nuevo grupo social; y aumentó el número de trabajadores agrícolas y no agrícolas en las empresas estatales. Hacia finales de los años ochenta se produjeron fisuras en la composición social del medio rural debido a la expansión del conuquismo entre las filas de los trabajadores agrícolas. A causa del

desarrollo del mercado y de la agudización de la escasez de alimentos durante los años siguientes, tuvo lugar un proceso creciente de diferenciación económico-social de los campesinos pequeños y medios. Las diferencias antes apenas perceptibles de tamaño, localización y especialización de las fincas obraron con mayor fuerza.

Los cambios estructurales en la explotación del suelo durante los años noventa han recompuesto el espectro social en el medio rural. Este fenómeno está en proceso de maduración conforme se consolidan nuevas formas de producción y se producen cambios en la estructura económico-social y en la economía en su conjunto. El cooperativismo está en vías de autoafirmación como actividad de un grupo social consciente, dotado de identidad propia y diferenciado. Los campesinos privados y los usufructuarios tienden, bajo la influencia de las leyes del mercado, a la diferenciación, y en no pocos casos acceden, unos a la asalarización –sobre todo los pequeños y muy pequeños propietarios de tierras–, y otros a la capitalización. Se ha ampliado el estrato de los campesinos medios. El mercado y la intermediación han reforzado estas tendencias.

Sin embargo, en el cooperativismo se encuentra una doble orientación: por una parte, una creciente asalarización sustitutiva o complementaria y, por otra, la mezcla de asociados finqueros privados con asociados usufructuarios de parcelas. Los trabajadores del sector del capital extranjero agrícola presentan un implícito dualismo social-productivo. Por último, los granjeros de nuevo tipo de un sector estatal en proceso de reforma presentan una cierta semejanza con los cooperativistas, y conforman otro grupo social en transición que difiere del de los obreros agrícolas de las granjas estatales tradicionales.

La nueva agricultura ha cambiado un modo de hegemonía social que antes descansaba en el predominio del Estado como propietario y productor directo. Esta agricultura presupone un sistema técnico-productivo, económico y social que se proyecta a distintos niveles estructurales y

funcionales dentro del sistema agrario y de sus relaciones con la economía nacional.

El carácter mercantil de la producción y del intercambio –y de la regulación planificada– es inherente a la economía agraria y a cada uno de sus componentes. Por consiguiente, la planificación y el mercado están indisolublemente ligados a una contradicción que es la forma en que se realiza la producción y se distribuyen los factores de producción, las actividades mercantiles y los ingresos agropecuarios.

La ley de los precios es un atributo común a todas las formas de economía agraria existentes. La forma mercantil de realización de la totalidad del producto agrícola expresa la necesidad de una articulación de los productores –de diversa naturaleza social– aislados e independientes en el marco de una única economía nacional. El valor (precio) asume precisamente esa función homogeneizadora de los gastos individuales del trabajo.

Por su parte, la regulación social se impone como una necesidad objetiva a causa del predominio de la socialización socialista de las fuerzas productivas en el sector agrícola. Dicha regulación, que asegura el decurso socialista, también es necesaria para garantizar un equilibrio dinámico y una proporcionalidad en las esferas productiva, económica, social y política en función del desarrollo eficiente de la agricultura. La planificación del desarrollo es el instrumento fundamental mediante el cual la sociedad puede ordenar y dominar las tendencias contradictorias que se gestan en la nueva economía agraria.

En consecuencia, la planificación y el mercado coexisten obligatoriamente, sin excluirse absolutamente, en una contradicción permanente de negación recíproca. Es necesario perfeccionar la planificación, abandonando lo más rápidamente posible el modelo de balances materiales para dar paso a una regulación financiera del libre juego de las relaciones económicas agrícolas con los demás componentes de la economía nacional.

La eficiencia económica y social es el factor determinante de la viabilidad de unas

y otras formas agrarias de producción. Existe una relación competitiva entre la tendencia a regular el movimiento económico –sin excluir el mercado– y a colocar en primer lugar el bien colectivo y social de la producción y de los servicios, y aquellas corrientes económicas que tienden a la anarquía, a la espontaneidad y a la capitalización.

La autogestión y el autofinanciamiento son la forma general de gestión de todos los sujetos agrarios. La maximización de la rentabilidad requiere como nunca antes la armonización de los intereses de los productores con los de la sociedad. La acumulación se fragmenta debido a la intervención de todos los productores, y por consiguiente deja de ser una función exclusiva del Estado; sin embargo este último no abandona su papel protagónico en el desarrollo de la agricultura nacional. En esta esfera se requieren nuevos instrumentos que estimulen el ahorro y la inversión, al tiempo que orientan y controlan la reproducción y la actuación de los agentes económicos.

En Cuba existen las siguientes condiciones que aseguran la hegemonía de los intereses sociales y el curso socialista de la agricultura:

- El Estado es propietario, en nombre de la sociedad, del 80 por ciento del suelo nacional, y participa activamente en inversiones en proyectos de infraestructura, agroindustriales, medioambientales y en otras esferas decisivas del desarrollo agropecuario y rural.
- Las entidades socializadas tienen una función predominante en el régimen cooperativo y autogestionario-participativo de las granjas agrarias de nuevo tipo.
- Las empresas agroindustriales socializadas y el sector de las exportaciones (que están en proceso de perfeccionamiento empresarial) son los instrumentos para mantener el desempeño adecuado y el control social sobre el mercado principal agrícola nacional, y sobre los vínculos comerciales externos.

- La planificación sigue permitiendo regular, en función de los intereses y necesidades de la sociedad –aunque todavía de forma insuficiente–, una parte significativa de la producción agropecuaria en los sectores socializado y privado.
- Una política flexible y unitaria en el sector cooperativo, y la extensión del cooperativismo entre los campesinos a partir de las CCS –incluyendo los pequeños productores urbanos– responde a las fuerzas contradictorias que actúan en el medio rural y en las ciudades y realzan las fuerzas socializadoras.
- El robustecimiento del control político y jurídico de la sociedad en materia de desarrollo agrario; y el refuerzo, mediante un enfoque clasista renovado, de la alianza política de un proletariado urbano y rural y del campesinado, son elementos fundamentales de la nueva etapa histórica cubana.

La reforma agraria de 1993 ha renovado las bases de una economía agraria heterogénea, y ha correspondido a las fuerzas productivas propias de un país pequeño en desarrollo en transición al socialismo. La reforma ha creado las premisas objetivas necesarias para dar eficiencia a las fuerzas productivas, a los rendimientos y a la producción; ha mejorado la alimentación y el bienestar popular, y ha permitido que existan, al mismo tiempo, impulsos socializadores indispensables que sustentan el decurso socialista en el medio rural.

Économie institutionnelle du marché foncier dans deux anciens pays communistes: la République tchèque et la Pologne

Le présent article présente une évaluation du marché foncier en République tchèque et en Pologne après la chute du communisme. L'efficacité du marché foncier est indispensable au bon fonctionnement du secteur agricole. Dans le cas contraire, le marché est grevé par l'inefficacité de certaines unités. Il ressort des analyses que l'état antérieur du secteur agricole détermine très nettement la situation foncière dans ces deux pays. La République tchèque, où le marché foncier est particulièrement rigide, est caractérisée par: des exploitations de grande taille; l'absence d'exploitations agricoles privées pendant la période communiste; des coûts de transaction élevés; et, enfin, une demande et des prix faibles pour les terres après la chute du communisme. En Pologne, où il existait des exploitations agricoles privées pendant la période communiste, le fonctionnement du marché foncier est plus adéquat, et le comportement des agents privés est plus favorable que celui auquel on peut s'attendre dans une économie de marché.

L'article est articulé comme suit: une première section d'introduction, une deuxième et troisième sections traitant du marché foncier dans ces deux pays, et une dernière section présentant des évaluations d'ordre général.

La economía institucional del mercado de tierras en dos antiguos países comunistas: la República Checa y Polonia

En presente artículo se evalúa el mercado de tierras en la República Checa y en Polonia en el período que siguió a la caída del comunismo. Un funcionamiento eficaz del mercado de tierras es importante para que el sector agrícola funcione de forma apropiada. De otro modo, en el mercado existirán unidades ineficaces. De los análisis se deduce claramente que las condiciones iniciales del sector agrícola determinan en gran parte la situación del mercado de tierras en los dos países. En la República Checa, donde durante el comunismo había explotaciones agrícolas enormes pero no privadas, el rígido mercado de tierras posterior al comunismo se caracterizó por costos de transacción elevados, y una demanda y precios de la tierra bajos. En lo que respecta a Polonia, donde ya existían explotaciones agrícolas privadas durante el comunismo, el mercado de tierras funciona de manera más satisfactoria, y el comportamiento de los agentes privados es más favorable a lo que cabría esperar en una economía de mercado. El artículo se presenta del modo siguiente: en la primera sección se ofrece una introducción al problema; las secciones segunda y tercera se ocupan por separado del mercado de tierras en los dos países, y la última sección incluye una evaluación común.

The institutional economics of land market in two former communist countries: the Czech Republic and Poland¹

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This paper assesses the land market in the Czech Republic and Poland in the period after the fall of communism. The efficient functionality of the land market is relevant for a properly functioning agriculture sector. Otherwise, inefficient units will exist in the market. From the analyses it is evident that, in each country, the condition of the agriculture sector under communism largely determined the subsequent land market situation. In the Czech Republic, which had large cooperative farms and no private farms during the communist era and experienced high transaction costs with low demand and low land prices afterwards, the land market is very rigid. In Poland, however, which had already experienced private farms under communism, the land market works more efficiently and the behaviour of private agents is more in line with what one would expect in a market economy.

The article is set out as follows: the first section provides an introduction to the problem; the second and third sections deal separately with the land market in each of the two countries; and the final section presents a common evaluation.

INTRODUCTION

During the communist period agricultural land in the Czech Republic and Poland was subject to State control, and property rights were not respected. The private sector did not have the power to make decisions regarding the use, acquisition and disposition of property. Even in Poland, where private farming remained predominant under communism, the Polish communist regime never permitted the land market to operate freely and used a variety of measures to exercise tight control over individual farmers. In the case of

cooperative farms also, where the land ownership was usually known, the owners had virtually no authority over the use of the land.

During this period Czech agriculture was dominated by large cooperative farms averaging more than 2 000 ha of agricultural land per farm. In contrast, Poland was characterized by small private farms, which averaged 6 ha of agricultural land per farm (Mathijs, 1997).

The fall of communism and the resulting privatization and transition of the Czech and Polish economies to market-oriented economies and the abolition of property right restrictions brought the expectation that large inefficient farms would collapse and emerge as smaller family farms similar to those seen in Western Europe. There was

¹This research was undertaken with support from the European Union's Phare ACE Programme 1998. The content of the publication is the sole responsibility of the author and in no way represents the views of the Commission or its services.

also an expectation that a large number of small private farms in Poland would accumulate more land and become larger, or that farms would converge to an optimal size. Also, according to the Coase Theorem, when all rights are freely transferable and transaction costs are zero, then initial portioning of property rights does not matter and through voluntary transactions on the part of individual owners the rights will cluster in such way that the total value of resources will be maximized (Coase, 1960). A prerequisite for this to happen, however, is the existence of a land market, in which farmers who wish to enlarge their holdings can freely buy or rent land and, vice versa, the owners of land or of a large farm with extra land can freely sell or rent out their land.

A functioning land market can be said to exist when land is transferred from less efficient individuals to more efficient ones. The final farm structure will then be composed of only the best-performing units with the optimal holding size. Where this does not occur, the constraints faced by the sector lead to inefficiencies.

The objective of this article is to explore the land markets in the Czech Republic and Poland, identifying factors that have contributed to the post-communism situation. Each country is discussed separately, followed by a summary of the land market situation in both countries.

THE LAND MARKET IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC

In order to have a functioning agricultural land market there is a need for somebody to demand land as well as for somebody to supply it. The interaction between both sides will then determine the price of the land or the rent. This section examines both sides of the agricultural land market, that is demand side and supply side, respectively, taking into account aspects such as the potential participants, incentives for agricultural agents to participate, and factors influencing the land market. The interaction between supply and demand is then assessed.

Supply side

Prior to 1989, around 61 percent of Czech agricultural land was organized under cooperatives, 25 percent under State farms, 13 percent under other forms of production organization and only 0.4 percent of land was in private usage (Table 1). All land rights with the exception of ownership rights in cooperative farms were controlled by the State and individuals did not have the power to make decisions concerning the usage, transfer or other rights related to land. After the fall of communism in 1989 and the transformation of the Czech economy to a market-oriented economy, agricultural land was privatized and all property and the majority of ownership rights were transferred to private agents. The privatization process is nearing completion, with around 96.3 percent of all claims settled as of 1999. As a result of this process, the owners to whom the land was resituated during privatization represent the supply side of the land market. Consequently, the supply side is high since, contrary to expectations, the majority of new owners, after receiving their property rights, were not interested in starting farming. Most of them have leased their land back to cooperatives or to other agents. This fact has served to boost land supply. According to VÚZE (1998: 1), individual farmers leased around 60 to 80 percent of the land and cooperatives and other business entities have leased almost 100 percent of the land. In general, the land leasing contracts are short-to-medium term (1-4 years) and the rent is negotiated on a case-by-case basis. This behaviour on the part of the owners can be explained by the following factors:

- Many new owners were not involved in agriculture, but in other sectors of the economy with higher profit margins. They were therefore not motivated to start businesses in agriculture where profitability is very low or negative (Table 2).
- The owners did not have the required skills for agriculture, since the majority of them were not involved in this sector.

TABLE 1

Evaluation of the structure of agricultural enterprises in the Czech Republic

Form and size of enterprise	1989		1991		1994		1999	
	Share of TAA ¹ (%)	Average area (ha)	Share of TAA ¹ (%)	Average area (ha)	Share of TAA ¹ (%)	Average area (ha)	Share of TAA ¹ (%)	Average area (ha)
Individual farms	0.4	4	3.3	10	23.2	16	23.5	25
Cooperatives	61.4	2 561	61.1	2 191	47.7	1 430	32.2	1 394
Other business entities	-	-	0.1	266	25.7	827	43.3	618
State farms	25.3	6 261	25.7	3 558	2.7	498	-	-
Other enterprises	12.9	-	9.8	-	0.7	267	1.0	86

¹TAA = total agricultural area.

Source: OECD (1995a) and Zelena zprava (2000).

TABLE 2

Financial results of the agriculture sector over the period 1993-98 (billion CK¹)

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	Cumulative 1993-98
Profit (+), Loss (-)	-9.7	-4.1	+0.5	-0.5	-1.3	-0.4	-15.5

¹CK = koruna.

Source: VÚZE (1998).

- As managers of the collective farms had significant power in influencing the reform process and also tended to have an interest in maintaining their own positions, they made it difficult for owners who showed an interest in withdrawing their land for private usage.
- Finally, the high level of security the former cooperative farms were able to offer their members made the continuation of cooperatives seem more attractive.

With regard to size, the cooperatives are considered too large and unsustainable in a competitive environment, especially when the Czech Republic joins the European Union (EU) (see Sarris, Doucha and Mathijs, 1999). It is therefore expected that these large farms will split into smaller units, sell their surplus land or, as the majority of land in their usage is leased, rent less land. Overall, these developments will result in negligible change or an increase in the supply of land over the period of convergence resulting in an optimal farm size. Table 1 shows that the average size of cooperatives has already been reduced from 2 561 ha in 1989 to 1 394 ha in 1999.

Consequently, the analyses of the supply of agricultural land lead to the observation that *there is relatively high supply of land for renting or selling in the Czech Republic.*

Demand side

The agents who are interested in doing business in agriculture represent the demand side of the land market. The relevant incentive factor for attracting businesses in this sector is profitability; otherwise there is no gain. As indicated in Table 2, the agriculture sector has been unprofitable, which has contributed significantly to low demand for agricultural land.

The cooperatives, represented by their managers and workers, are one of the groups of agents who are the land demanders. In general, they demonstrate a conservative and reluctant attitude to further restructuring and to a large extent still operate as they did during the pre-transition days. One of their objectives during the transition period has been to keep their positions. This stance has sometimes been in conflict with the owners' interests, especially when the owner had intended to withdraw the land from the cooperative. These conflicts of interest have made negotiations regarding land withdrawals more difficult, often leading to an inefficient outcome. In many cases not only has withdrawal not taken place, the negative experience has served as a disincentive to other owners considering withdrawing their land from a cooperative. Consequently, more land has remained in the control of inefficient organizations than

might otherwise have been the case and the situation as a whole has contributed to land market rigidity. Overall, the cooperatives will add little to the demand side of the land market; rather, it is expected that they will reduce it, as their size is considered to be too large and therefore unsustainable.

The second group of agents who enter the demand side are other businesses entities. These comprise the joint stock and limited liability companies that have been created from the former State farms or emerged from the former cooperatives. Their effect on the land market is similar to that of cooperatives.

The most desirable agents, in terms of dominating the agriculture sector, are private individual farms rather than transformed cooperatives or other business entities. Their share of total agricultural land grew from 0.4 percent in 1989 to around 23 percent in 1994 and remained at this level in 1999 (Table 1). This share is still small compared with those of the cooperatives and other business entities, which still dominate the sector with a combined share of around 75 percent of total agricultural land. The main reasons for the low interest of individuals in starting farming and hence the low demand for land are the following:

- There is a high opportunity cost as the Czech Republic is relatively highly industrialized: the share of agriculture as a proportion of gross domestic product declined from about 6.3 percent in 1990 to 1.8 percent in 1998. In addition, the unemployment rate was relatively low during the transition process (3.1 percent in 1992, 3.0 percent in 1995 and 9.4 percent in 1999) (OECD, 2000).
- The agriculture sector has low profit margins and during the transition period the profits were negative (Table 2).
- Individuals may have insufficient capital to start farming.
- There are no available credits for land purchases.
- The equipment of the former cooperatives was designed for large-scale

farming and is not suitable for smaller-scale individual farming.

Summing up the demand-side analyses, it can be observed that there is relatively low demand for agricultural land in the Czech Republic.

Interaction between supply and demand

The above analyses indicate that the land supply highly exceeds the demand for land. Table 3 shows the land bought and sold over the period 1993-99. On average, only around 0.21 percent of total agricultural land is bought and sold each year, which is a small volume compared to around 1.0 percent in EU countries (VÚZE, 1998: 1; Zelena zprava, 2000: 80). Although these figures may give some indication of the land market's functionality, they can be considered as irrelevant as indicators of the existence of an agricultural land market. In the majority of cases agricultural land attracts buyers only when there is a possibility of capital gain by converting its use to non-agricultural purposes (e.g. construction) or when there is a possibility of using it for a small family garden. The value of these transactions, therefore, can hardly be used as a reference for agricultural land market prices. The only land prices available are administratively fixed and are also used for land taxation. They are calculated by taking into consideration land quality, fertility and topography and range from 5 000 kovuny (CK) (145 euro) to CK 135 500 (3 928 euro) per hectare.

With regard to rents, the low demand for agricultural land gives current land users relatively strong powers of negotiation. In the knowledge that the owners would experience difficulty finding a new user and that it would be almost impossible to find a buyer, they therefore offer very low rents. In some situations the rent for low-fertility land only just covers the land tax. In regions where the farms are large (mainly cooperatives), some farmers exploit even further their monopoly position as a single demander for land and therefore the rent they pay is very low or uncertain. Rents in

TABLE 3

Agricultural land bought and sold, 1993-98

Land market	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Cumulative 1993-98
Share of TAA ¹	0.17	0.22	0.2	0.2	0.29	0.21	0.20	1.49

¹TAA = total agricultural area.

Source: VÚZE, 1998; Zelená zpráva, 2000.

the Czech Republic range from 0.07 percent to 1.8 percent and exceptionally 4 percent of the administrative land price (68-1 330 CK [2-37 euro] per hectare). Act no. 229/1991 determines the minimum level of rent at 1 percent of the sale price of land if the contracting parties do not agree otherwise.

In a world with rational agents, perfect information and zero transaction costs, as neoclassical theory assumes, the land market functions perfectly. This means that the land is transferred from a less efficient farmer to a more efficient one. The transfer is executed without “friction” in a very short time, since everybody knows everything and there are no administrative procedures or other requirements involved in transferring the land. The final market structure eventually consists of only efficient farms. This is because more productive farms can always make a profit by offering a higher price than less productive farms would be able to earn. Therefore all parties will voluntarily agree to make the transaction and the less efficient farms immediately disappear from the market. In this way, even when there is a high supply of and low demand for land, as in the Czech Republic, we still should see the same effect. The land price would stabilize at a low level and the gain from the transfer will still exist. Similarly, all inefficient farms (cooperatives) would leave the market. Consequently, a good indicator of land market functionality is the extent to which the real situation differs from the situation when the market works perfectly. If too many inefficient farms continue to operate, then many imperfections in the market can be expected.

It seems that these are the sorts of problem faced by the Czech Republic since inefficient farms, such as cooperatives and other business entities, operate on around

75 percent of the agricultural land. The issue of transaction costs is relevant in explaining this fact. No information system for land prices exists and the potential buyer or seller of land does not have a reference for agricultural land prices, or there may be uncertainty that the rent is going to be paid, as has already been mentioned above. Therefore an owner has to be prepared to spend time and money searching for a suitable party with whom to deal, gathering the necessary information on land prices, all the legal procedures needed to complete a contract and then enforcing the subsequent user of land to pay the rent. Moreover, specifically in transition countries, owners face additional expenses when they wish to withdraw land from the cooperatives: these relate to the cost of all the legal procedures and also the costs incurred during negotiations with the managers of the cooperatives, who in some situations oppose withdrawals.

The combination of high transaction costs on the one hand and the low probability of finding a buyer or tenant, uncertain and low rents, the non-existence of agricultural land prices and the low profitability of the agriculture sector on the other hand make land transactions unprofitable and lead to land market failure. Arrow (1969: 48) pointed this out very clearly: “Market failure is not absolute. It is better to consider a broader category, that of transaction costs, which in general impede and in particular cases completely block the formation of markets.” The consequence of this situation is that owners are not interested transferring land from inefficient farms to more efficient ones, since the rent or sale price would not cover the costs incurred (transaction costs). Therefore the land remains under the usage of inefficient production units such as cooperatives.

TABLE 4

Evaluation of the structure of agricultural enterprises in Poland

	Private farms	State farms	Cooperatives
1990			
Share of TAA ¹ (%)	76	20	4
Average area (ha)	6.3	2 924	311
Number of farms	2 138 000	1 112	2 240
1992			
Share of TAA ¹ (%)	78	18	4
Average area (ha)	6.3	1 786.0	310.0
Number of farms	2 144 000	1 752	2 186
1998			
Share of TAA ¹ (%)	82	7	3
Average area (ha)	7	636	203
Number of farms	2 041 380	1 953	2 467
1999			
Share of TAA ¹ (%)	84	–	–
Average area (ha)	–	–	–
Number of farms	–	–	–

¹TAA = total agricultural area.

Source: OECD, 1995b, PSI, 2000, PMAD, 2001.

THE LAND MARKET IN POLAND

The Polish agriculture sector differs significantly from that of the Czech Republic in terms of the share of private farms and average farm size. Already during the communist period the sector was dominated by private farmers, with around 76 percent of total agricultural land being under private usage. This share increased to 84 percent in 1999 (Table 4). The private farms are small, averaging 6.3 hectares per holding in 1990 increasing slightly to 7 hectares in 1998.

An agricultural land market that is functioning efficiently is expected to facilitate the transaction of land from less efficient farmers to more efficient ones. Consequently, in the Polish case it is both desirable and expected that private farms will grow in size if the market is working, since the huge numbers of small farms are considered highly inefficient. First, however, the following question might be asked: Why did farm size not increase to an optimal size during the communist period, when private farming was predominant and the market should have been working properly? This can be explained by the fact that property rights were significantly restricted and farmers could not appropriate all the benefits arising from land ownership. The policy towards private farmers was discriminatory¹ and they faced an uncertain future with the risk of

collectivization. This situation significantly diminished the incentive for farmers to build up a prosperous farm. Moreover, the lack of a competitive market meant that farmers were not subject to pressure to achieve higher efficiency, for instance by growing in size and benefiting from economies of scale. The Polish agriculture market was closed to outside competitors and there were shortages of agricultural products, which made it easy for farmers to sell their products with little effort. The shortages of agricultural products had a further impact on the land market: they stimulated families to own land and to produce for their own consumption in order to avoid being dependent on the uncertain procurement of food products on the market. In this way, land transfers of a smaller size for this purpose were stimulated. In summary, the institutional endowment of the communist period served to make the land market rigid and inefficient, which has stimulated the fragmentation of land rather than its concentration into larger and more efficient units.

After 1989, when the Polish economy was transformed into a market economy, almost all property right restrictions were abolished, and owners could make decisions regarding the use, acquisition and disposition of property.

Supply side

For reasons of efficiency, the land owned or rented by less efficient farmers is one key source of the land market supply in an economy in transition. Obviously, this is dependent on the performance of the economy as a whole, because farmers who withdraw from the agriculture sector have to be integrated into other sectors of the economy. In Poland, the opposite situation has developed. During the transition period the unemployment rate increased sharply and has stayed at a relatively high level

¹ Because State farms and cooperatives were favoured as agricultural production units, private farmers were discriminated against in terms of input supply shortages, higher input prices, higher taxes and compulsory delivery of output, among others.

(13 percent in 1999) leading to the situation whereby agriculture is the sector that has absorbed the spare labour force. As a result, the sector is overcrowded, with around 4.3 million people working in agriculture, accounting for almost 27.4 percent of total employment.

In October 1991, the Agricultural Property Agency of the State Treasury (APAST) was established, which has responsibility for privatizing the State farms, mainly through sale or leasing. In total, the Agency took over a total of 3.5 million ha, which represents the potential for the supply side of the land market. Up to the end of 1999, the Agency had sold around 854 400 ha of land. More frequently, the Agency used leasing agreements. These agreements were usually long term and in most cases with the possibility of extension. The average plot size of the leased land and sold land in 1999 was 10.7 ha and 7.6 ha, respectively.

A further source of the land supply is motivated by other factors, not necessarily related to efficiency. Land may become available because the preferences of farmers have changed or unexpected circumstances have occurred. For instance, a farmer may decide he is no longer interested in farming and would prefer to move out of agriculture. He will therefore sell or rent out his land. Alternatively, some unexpected situation may arise in a landowner's family that may force him to sell some or all of his plots.

Demand side

The demand side of the land market consists of private individuals who buy or rent land with an expectation of gaining from it. However, low profitability and expensive credits make it difficult for interested buyers to find the necessary financial resources for land acquisition or payment of rent. For this reason smaller plots are usually preferred. In terms of credits, according to the Institute of Agricultural and Food Economics (IAFE) (2000: 2), rent contracts with APAST were cancelled for around 297 000 ha in 1999 –

representing an increase with regard to the previous year. The main reason for the cancellations was considered to be the difficulties farmers were experiencing in paying their debts. In theory, the primary and most desirable group that is supposed to demand land comprises the best-performing farms interested in enlarging their holdings, followed by new entrants. Another relatively important group of buyers comprises individuals seeking to use the land to produce food for their own consumption. According to the Polish Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (PMAD) (2000: 14-15) 12.7 percent of private owners produce only for their own consumption and 37.4 percent produce mainly for their own consumption and only occasionally sell any surplus. They are induced by the facts that per capita income is still relatively low in Poland and the share of food expenditure as a proportion of total expenditure is high – 28 percent² compared with the EU level of 14 percent over the period 1992-94.

The relatively low level of education in rural areas also contributes to demand for land.³ Farmers with little education have highly specific human capital and would not be expected to withdraw from agriculture because the value of their labour is low in the general labour market and especially so in the market for skilled labour. It is therefore expected that they will buy or rent additional land.

Interaction between supply and demand

The amount of land subject to market turnover is relatively high. It increased from 515 400 ha in 1991 to a peak of 1 186 300 ha in 1995 before returning to lower levels of 780 000 ha in 1999 (Figure 1). This pattern was mainly affected by the creation of APAST, which led to a 350 percent

² The actual share will be even higher because it is extremely unlikely that production for own consumption is reported.

³ More than a half of the population (54 percent) have completed only basic or primary education, and only 1.9 percent progressed to tertiary education (these indicators for urban districts are 31.4 percent and 9.8 percent, respectively) (PMAD, 2000: 11).




FIGURE 1
Land transacted between 1991 and 1999

TABLE 5
Land transacted between 1991 and 1999 ('000 ha)

Type of transaction	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
1 Bought/sold land									
Total	249.9	241.2	213.2	216.4	248.5	367.7	307.9	314.9	268
Transaction between farmers	170	210	166.6	151.1	169.3	179.5	160	167.9	150
From APAST ¹	79.9	31.2	46.6	65.3	79.2	183.2	109.2	141.8	118
2 Newly leased land									
Total	265.5	352.4	386.1	730	937.8	779	553.7	526.1	512
Transaction between farmers	200	280.5	295.5	320	350	375	360.4	350	330
From APAST ¹	65.5	71.9	90.6	410	587.8	404	193.3	176.1	182
3 Non-market transactions of land	627	476.3	404.9	406.7	368.1	387	432.7	339.3	350
Total market transactions (1+2)	515.4	593.6	599.3	946.4	1 186.3	1 146.7	861.6	841	780
Total transactions (1+2+3)	1 142.4	1 069.9	1 004.2	1 353.1	1 554.4	1 533.7	1 294.3	1 180.3	1 130

¹APAST =Agricultural Property Agency of the State Treasury.
Source: IAFE (2000).

increase in newly leased land in 1994 and an increase in land sold – with the highest increase (around 130 percent) in 1997. The average plot size of sold or leased land per transaction is higher for APAST transactions (7.6 ha and 10.7 ha respectively) than for transactions between farmers (3 ha and 4.7 ha respectively).

A significant proportion (ranging from 24 percent to 55 percent during the period 1991-99) of total land transactions were non-market (e.g. transfers due to inheritance). These transactions are not economically motivated but can have a substantial effect on the land market; for instance, the inheritance custom of dividing land among all sons significantly

contributes to ownership fragmentation.

The price of land has increased sharply, from 790 zlotys (Zl) in 1991 to 4 390 Zl in 1999. However, when these prices are adjusted to take inflation into account they have been relatively stable. The only major change was observed in 1994 and 1995 when land prices decreased substantially in comparison with the previous years, by 10 percent and 7 percent, respectively. This occurrence, however, coincided with the increase in newly leased land by APAST.

Total land market turnover as a proportion of total agricultural land over the period 1991-99 stood at 4.47 percent. That this is significantly higher than EU level of around 1 percent can be explained




FIGURE 2
Average arable land market prices, 1991-99

by the fact that the Polish agriculture sector is in transition. Moreover, if the land market works properly, we should see that farms will grow in size to become more efficient and larger units. If the land market does not work properly, farmers will face constraints contributing to land market rigidity, which will not allow them to expand. Table 4 shows that the average amount of land per private farm has not changed significantly. It was 7 ha in 1998 – just slightly higher than the 1990 figure of 6.3 ha. This obviously indicates that relevant constraints are present in the market, causing inefficiencies.

As already mentioned above, the lack of jobs in other sectors of the economy seems to be the major constraint. Also, the low level of education of the rural population causes additional difficulties for farmers in adjusting to the employment market, by increasing human asset specificity. The imperfect credit market⁴ and the low profitability of the agriculture sector made

⁴ Preferential credits are available for farmers in Poland, including those for land acquisitions, but because banks consider agriculture to be very risky they require high guarantees. In addition, Polish farmers traditionally use their own funds to finance investments – a practice that is against profit maximization behaviour.

it risky for farmers to invest in additional land – contributing to rigidity or favouring transactions of smaller plots.

With regard to the supply of State land available through APAST, even though it represented a considerable source of land for farmers who might wish to increase the size of their holdings there was relatively little interest in it, mainly because most of the State land is situated in the north and west of Poland while private farms dominate in the other regions. This regional separation of demand and supply, coupled with the low profitability of the agriculture sector, stifled potential interest on the part of both private farmers and new entrants.

Another obstacle to an efficient land market in Poland is the high fragmentation of farms into small plots. Some 43 percent of farms are split into four or more plots and on 45 percent of farms the furthest plot was more than 2 km away from the site of the farm (European Commission, 1998: 51). This causes difficulties when negotiating the leasing or selling contract: for instance, if an owner intends to sell or rent land consisting of more than one plot, the plot dispersion may not fit into the buyer's existing land structure. The seller will therefore be forced to search for other

potential buyers, incurring an increase in transaction costs.

CONCLUSIONS

Comparing the land market situation in the Czech Republic and Poland, it seems that the initial conditions play an important role in explaining the differences in the period after the fall of communism.

In Poland, which had experienced private farming already during the communist period, the land market works much better. An indicative land price does exist, and the behaviour of agricultural agents is more in line with what one would expect in a market economy. However, several constraints are still in place, such as an imperfect credit market, low profitability of the agriculture sector, high unemployment and the low level of education in rural areas, which restrict the market's ability to work more efficiently. Furthermore, additional inefficiencies result from the strong cultural attachment to small-scale farming in many areas in Poland, predominantly in the southeast.

In the Czech Republic the agricultural land market is much more rigid. Agriculture in the pre-transition period was dominated by cooperatives and State farms, with the result that former farmers have lost touch with the farming way of life; moreover, a new generation of farmers, which could form the new farmer class, does not exist. The high costs of transferring land, low demand, low land prices and uncertain rents impede the efficient functioning of the land market. The consequence is a very rigid market with no indicative land price, few land transactions and land remaining under the usage of inefficient units.

Of particular importance in the Czech Republic and in Poland, as former communist countries, is the *credible commitment of the State to respecting property rights*. If farmers believe that the State will restrict their rights sometime in the future, then they will take this into consideration when making decisions. Therefore they may have less incentive to

buy land or they will offer a lower price since they expect that in future they will not be able to appropriate all the benefits from the land. Related to this, Riker and Weimer (1995: 94) point out that: "the post-communist countries face severe problems in establishing the credibility of their systems of property rights for several reasons. First their governments have yet to achieve levels of stability that makes policy at least somewhat predictable. ... Second, ... there does not seem to be a broad and deep understanding of the role of private property in market economies." Also Mason (1992) found that "majorities of residents of the post-communist countries supported values and policies associated with the socialist system, even though large majorities also expressed disfavour toward socialism. ... Third, both historical and current experience of these countries undermines credibility". Consequently, the problems with credibility and non-market behaviour of the agents might be additional factors leading to the inefficient land market observed in both countries.

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Implications économiques des droits de propriété sur l'utilisation de pesticides par les petits exploitants dans le sud-ouest du Nigéria

Le droit de propriété et son évolution représentent l'un des principaux facteurs incitant les agriculteurs à adopter des techniques d'amélioration des terres. Cet article examine les implications économiques des droits de propriété sur l'adoption et l'application de techniques d'apport d'engrais dans deux types d'environnement écologique de l'État d'Osun, au Nigéria.

Des données ont été recueillies sur la base d'un questionnaire structuré et de débats de groupes. Elles ont été analysées à l'aide de statistiques descriptives et une analyse des coûts et des retombées économiques a été effectuée. L'accès primaire est le régime foncier prédominant, 57 pour cent des terres étant acquises par héritage. La taille moyenne des exploitations est de 0,58 ha, et les terres sont cultivées sans interruption en moyenne pendant 13 ans, avec une jachère d'environ deux ans. Le revenu net moyen varie selon le type de droit de propriété. Les prix d'héritage partagé/non partagé et d'accès secondaire sont enregistrés. Les utilisateurs d'engrais bénéficient d'un revenu net annuel moyen supérieur à celui de ceux qui n'en utilisent pas. On a observé une différence considérable entre les utilisateurs selon les zones écologiques. Les débats ont montré que les agriculteurs privilégiaient les engrais, même si leur utilisation est rare et inadéquate. En d'autres termes, l'utilisation d'engrais a des répercussions sur les revenus d'une exploitation, quel que soit le type de droit de propriété. L'augmentation des subventions aux agriculteurs et leur sensibilisation à l'emploi approprié des engrais les aideront à mieux les utiliser pour améliorer la qualité des terres.

Consecuencias económicas de los derechos de propiedad para la utilización de fertilizantes por los pequeños agricultores de Nigeria sudoccidental

Los derechos de propiedad y sus diversas modalidades constituyen uno de los principales factores que influyen en la adopción de técnicas de mejora de la tierra entre los agricultores. En el presente artículo se estudia la repercusión económica de la situación de los derechos de propiedad en la adopción y utilización de fertilizantes por los agricultores en dos ecologías del estado de Osun en Nigeria.

Los datos se recogieron utilizando un cuestionario estructurado y debates de grupo. Los datos se analizaron mediante estadísticas descriptivas y análisis de costos y beneficios. El acceso primario constituía el régimen predominante de derechos de propiedad, adquiriéndose el 57 por ciento de las tierras mediante herencia. El tamaño medio de las explotaciones agrícolas era de 0,58 ha, y la tierra se cultivaba de forma continua durante un promedio de 13 años con un barbecho medio de dos años. Los ingresos netos medios variaban según la situación de los derechos de propiedad. Los encuestados que utilizaban fertilizantes disfrutaban de ingresos netos medios anuales mayores que quienes no los utilizaban, aunque existía una diferencia ecorregional significativa entre los usuarios. Los debates de grupo revelaron la preferencia de los encuestados por los fertilizantes, aunque éstos se utilizaran escasamente y de modo inapropiado. Esto parece indicar que la utilización de fertilizantes influye en los rendimientos agrícolas en diversos regímenes de derechos de propiedad. Una mayor transferencia de tecnología y la capacitación de los agricultores en su uso adecuado contribuirá a su adopción y empleo para mejorar la calidad de la tierra.

Economic implications of property rights on smallholder use of fertilizer in southwest Nigeria

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Property rights and their changing pattern constitute one of the principal factors that influence the adoption of land improvement techniques among farm operators. This paper examines the economic implication of property rights status on farmers' adoption and use of fertilizer technology in two ecologies of Osun State of Nigeria.

Data were collected using a structured questionnaire and focused group discussions. Data were analysed with descriptive statistics and costs and returns analysis. Primary access was the predominant property rights regime, with 57 percent of land being acquired through inheritance. Mean farm size was 0.58 ha, and land was continuously cropped for an average of 13 years with a mean fallow of two years. Mean net income varied according to property rights status. Purchase, divided/undivided inheritance and secondary access were recorded. Fertilizer-using respondents earned higher annual mean net income than non-users, while significant ecoregional differences existed among users. FGDs revealed respondents' preference for the use of fertilizer, although it was scarce and inappropriately used.

This implies that the use of fertilizer affects farm returns in different property rights regimes. Increased allocation of fertilizers to farmers and educating them on adequate use of the technology will aid its adoption and use for improved land quality.

INTRODUCTION

The property rights upon which land is held defines the use-relations of the farmland, as an economic unit, and also defines the price or performance required for the use of the land (Parsons, 1970; Fabiyi, 1976, 1984). During the last three decades, property rights or land tenure systems have been confronted with problems of population explosion, rising inflation and unemployment leading to the rising rural-urban drift of young people (Adesina, Chianu and Mbila, 1997; Manyong and Houndekon, 1997). As a result there is a need to modify the existing tenure systems in order to solve the complex and dynamic sets of problems affecting resource

management, the adoption of new technologies, and farm income levels.

Property rights system in the southwest of Nigeria

There is no homogenous property rights system in Nigeria owing to local autonomy in land matters. However, there are many common elements in the property rights systems of both the southwestern and southeastern parts of Nigeria as these areas have not been subject to alien conquest, as occurred in the northern states in the early nineteenth century (FAO, 1975, 1997a; Fabiyi, 1984). Apart from the community control of distant fields in the southeast, the two areas share many similar characteristics in terms of use and reallocation.

Among the Yoruba (the inhabitants of southwestern Nigeria), land is the property of the extended family or the community and it is corporately owned. Generally, the group manages the family land and allocates this to members according to needs. The individual does not possess absolute title to the land but his right is co-equal to that of the other members of the community into which he was born or adopted (Oluwasanmi, 1966). Individual use rights are established by initial clearance and use of land – by mixing his labour with the soil and appropriating the land from its natural state. The use rights of individuals in the land are protected as long as that individual continues to make beneficial use of the land; the right to use also can also be transferred temporarily to a pledge creditor (pledgee) should the original user pledge the land to another person as security for debt. The occurrence of distant plots in the southeast, with their management and use under the full control of the community, means that such lands are not subject to the above conditions. Individual use rights are heritable, becoming family property to be shared out among the heirs according to the rules of inheritance honoured when the initial user dies. This right to use the land remains with the initial user of the land and his heirs, who also become part owners until the land is abandoned. When this occurs the residual interest of the community in the land is reasserted and the land reverts to the community to be held until another member of the group requires it. It may also be allocated to any stranger who “begs” for it. The holder of usufruct rights lacks the capacity to sell or dispose of the land.

In its pristine form, the customary system that prohibits the sale of common land in southern Nigeria evolved in response to the welfare needs of an entirely agricultural society, i.e. the social security requirements of a system in which land is the basis for survival. However, customary tenure systems are presently under stress in Nigeria from two major sources: the growth of population and the advances being made

or sought towards the modernization of agriculture through investment, market orientation, technology and attempts to increase size in order to achieve economies of scale (Parsons, 1970). Nwosu (1991) notes that customary land tenure systems are breaking down under the impact of cash cropping, population pressure and non-agricultural enterprises.

These factors appear to have enhanced the growing individualization of land tenure (Famoriyo, 1973; FAO, 1997b). Where the individual owner has the sole right to use a piece of land, it is widely believed that this is highly desirable, and an essential component of any agricultural development programme (FAO, 1975, 1997a; Fabiyi, 1976; Feder *et al.*, 1987). The pride of ownership and the security offered to the farm family by this form of tenure are thought to encourage long-term improvements to and conservation of the land.

In southwest Nigeria, individual ownership of land is on the increase as the traditional land tenure system discourages the cultivator from investing in land improvement owing to the lack of assurance against various rights of other members of the society to the piece of land in question. Thus, there exists a positive relationship between individual ownership and the use of intensification technologies. In southern Nigeria, the rapid population growth with an already large base engaged in agricultural pursuits, the deterioration of the quality of cropped land due to shortening of the fallow period, and access to markets for cash crops have combined to make agricultural land scarce and therefore more valuable. Where cash crops such as cocoa, oil palm, cola nut and coffee are grown, property rights in trees have acquired an independent status from that of ownership rights in land, since anyone permitted to plant tree crops is allowed to harvest the product throughout the life of the tree (Parsons, 1970). Thus, “strangers” are not allowed to plant tree crops without explicit consent. The planted trees can be pledged to secure a loan and there have been instances in which trees (especially

cocoa) have been sold (Fabiya and Adegboye, 1977). However, a stranger who is permitted to grow crops (again, especially cocoa) is expected to make an annual tribute payment (*Isakole*) to the landowners in recognition of the rights of the owners. The amount paid depends on the personal relationship with, and the mood of, the landowners.

Intensification technologies and changing property rights status

In an attempt to improve land quality and integrate crops and livestock more effectively under the changing property rights systems, various intensification technologies have been adopted and used by farm operators (Matlon, 1989; IITA, 1992; Nwosu, 1995; IFPRI, 1995). These include alley farming, tree planting and the application of organic manure and inorganic fertilizer. Fertilizer helps maintain and enhance soil fertility and thereby sustains crop production. Okorie (1984), Ogunfowora (1993), Adebayo (1997) and Awe (1997) assert that inorganic fertilizer is agronomically the most important land improvement input for increasing crop yields and accounts for more than 80 percent of the total farm input use in Nigeria. Given the current worldwide concern for increased agricultural production in the face of continuous land degradation, it is important to examine the economic effect of changing property rights on farm operators' use of inorganic fertilizer as an intensification technology.

This is necessary because the development and adoption of technologies appropriate to farmers' conditions would considerably increase farmers' productivity and income levels, increase aggregate production and help maintain the potential of the land resource base. This article therefore evaluates the effect of property rights regimes on farmers' income levels among fertilizer-using respondents in two ecologies of southwest Nigeria. Specifically, the objectives are to: a) examine land tenure factors affecting fertilizer use in the study area, b) compare the costs and returns of fertilizer use by property rights regimes in the two agroclimatic zones and

c) derive policy implications from the study. The main hypothesis is that there is no significant difference in the net benefits derived by tenure status on fertilizer use in the agro-ecological zones.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

The study was conducted in two main ecologies, rain forest and derived savannah, in Osun State of Nigeria. Data were collected from 300 respondents using a structured survey questionnaire and focused group discussions (FGDs). Secondary data were also obtained from the state's Ministry of Agriculture. Information sought included farmers' socio-economic characteristics (literacy level, age and gender) and property rights factors (security of tenure and duration of fallow). Information on farm inputs and outputs on farmers' maize plots were also obtained. A multistage sampling technique was employed in selecting respondents for the study. The two main agroclimatic zones in the state were distinguished using a geographical map of the area. Ten local government areas (LGAs) were then purposively selected on the basis of the extent of their soil degradation problems. Five villages and between 3 and 11 respondents were then randomly selected in each village. The actual field survey lasted four months, from August to November 1997. The data were analysed using descriptive statistics and a partial budget approach to costs and returns analysis in order to achieve the study objectives.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

A larger proportion of respondents in the study area acquired their farmland through primary access. Primary access to farmland comprises purchase and inheritance, while secondary access includes gift, borrowing, pledging, leasing and clearing of unallocated land (Table 1).

A large proportion of the fertilizer-using respondents in both agroclimatic zones perceived their farmland to be adequately secure. The survey questionnaire and

TABLE 1

Property rights regimes and land acquisition pattern

	Primary access			Borrow	Secondary access		Unauthorized land
	Purchase	Inheritance	Gift		Pledge	Lease	
Rain forest							
Users	12	91	02	06	0	05	–
Non-users	07	05	05	14	1	12	–
Derived savannah							
Users	14	79	01	02	0	01	–
Non-users	02	23	02	10	0	03	3
Overall							
Users	26	170	03	08	0	06	–
Non-users	09	28	07	24	01	15	3

Source: Field survey, 1998.

TABLE 2

Respondents' mean net income per annum according to farm size

Farm size (ha)	Net farm income (N ¹)			
	Rain forest zone		Derived savannah zone	
	Users	Non-users	Users	Non-users
0.01-0.50	10 944	9 178	11 114	5 990
0.51-1.00	27 955	19 379	27 490	16 352
1.01-1.50	41 947	33 258	51 593	27 010
1.51-2.00	88 676	–	93 330	52 288
Above 2.00	–	–	–	58 675

¹N = naira.

Source: Field survey, 1998.

FGDs, however, revealed that the quantity of inorganic fertilizer used by farmers in the study area was not adequate, being about three times short of the recommended dosage of 300-400 kg/ha⁻¹ (OSSADEP, 1996). The results may therefore not reveal the full economic benefits that can be derived by the farmers from inorganic fertilizer use in the agroclimatic zones and property rights regimes surveyed. Nonetheless, it is pertinent to note that while the use of fertilizer enhanced farm income levels, its excessive use can have adverse environmental consequences and possibly lead to negative net returns arising from low crop yields (Awe, 1997).

Farmlands were intensively used for 13 years. This has implications for the need for soil improvement techniques and the adoption of yield-increasing technologies in order to ensure continuous farm production over time.

When respondents' annual net incomes were categorized according to farm size in order to test for scale effects, it was found that fertilizer users earned higher mean net income than non-users in the two agroclimatic zones as farm size increased

and for every category of farm size (Table 2).

However, higher marginal increases were obtained for the net income earned by users and non-users of the technology in the savannah zone. Although farmers' tenure status is related to several other variables that may affect income earned from a particular field, these estimates provide an insight into the relationship between property rights status and farmers' income levels with respect to fertilizer use. Historically, the evolution of individual land rights and enforcement mechanisms to protect such rights followed increases in the density of the rural population relative to land availability. Consequently, the pressure for shorter fallow periods brought investment in land improvement to retain soil fertility and in capital to expedite land preparation and to increase land productivity and farm income levels. According to FAO (1975, 1997a) and Feder *et al.* (1987), ownership security affects both investment incentives and the availability of resources to finance investment. Under insecure tenure, a farmer is tempted to exhaust the soil in order to reduce production costs, while the landlord and the community bear the final costs. Thus, the incentive to undertake land improvement investments to retain soil fertility and increase land productivity and farm income levels may be based in part on secured future access to the land. Farmers whose property rights regime was purchase or "divided" inheritance earned higher mean net incomes than those with secondary access or "undivided" inheritance (Table 3).

TABLE 3

Respondents' mean net income (N)¹ per annum according to property rights regime

Property rights regime	Agroclimatic zone			
	Rain forest		Derived savannah	
	Users	Non-users	Users	Non-users
Purchased	16 950	9 650	18 350	12 820
Divided inheritance ²	14 800	6 180	15 140	10 900
Undivided inheritance ³	6 370	3 520	9 262	5 770
Secondary access	4 260	1 255	3 130	2 575
Total	42 380	20 605	45 880	32 065

¹N = naira.²Refers to farmers who have inherited full rights to the land.³Refers to land inherited by the farmer with some extended family control.

Source: Field survey, 1998.

This finding implies that security of tenure affects farm income levels. Moreover, the results show that farmers in the study area could be encouraged to use fertilizer if the current land-use pattern persists, as it is capable of enhancing yield and income levels while improving land quality.

CONCLUSION

With increasing pressure on land use as a result of population growth, the inheritance rules accompanying customary tenure allow for fragmentation of farm plots with a more intensive use of the land for agricultural practice. Depletion of soil fertility and reduced production levels invariably result. Thus, as farmland becomes increasingly overused, the traditional practice of leaving land fallow to maintain fertility is eroded and the use of inorganic fertilizer and other intensification technologies must therefore assume greater significance in the future in order to respond to intensification pressures and to meet the consequent increasing demand for food.

In view of the inadequate quantity of fertilizer currently used by farmers in the study area, as well as the variations existing in the annual net benefits obtained for each agroclimatic zone and property rights status, there is considerable potential for increasing fertilizer use in the study area without having adverse consequences. Farmers therefore need be trained in the appropriate agronomic requirements and application of these technologies in order to prevent negative socio-economic and environmental consequences that may result

from its inappropriate use. Variations in net income and yield levels between the rain forest and derived savannah zones also strengthen the need for targeting the scarce supply of fertilizer to areas of high-use potential. Future research efforts should investigate further how property rights regimes could enhance farm returns from alternative technologies *vis-à-vis* fertilizer and aim to establish an adequate combination of technologies that would improve land quality and facilitate improved farm production.

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