Little need be added to the points raised in the Introduction on the decisions, either at the national level (if only one country is fishing a stock), or multilaterally (for stocks fished by more than one country), on the development and management of the fisheries on each stock. It may, however, be stressed that extended jurisdiction and the increased authority of the coastal states make it possible to exert more explicit control, through international discussions and agreements, on the development of fisheries on shared stocks, than in the past, when discussions in international fishery bodies were concerned almost entirely with the possible introduction of restrictive management measures. Where two or more coastal states are exploiting the same stock to the extent that the abundance is being significantly reduced, but not as yet so intensively that no further increase in effort is desirable, then it would clearly be valuable if the coastal states concerned discussed any further increases in effort between themselves before undertaking them either directly, or by allowing additional fishing in their zones of jurisdiction by non-local fleets.
These discussions, like those on management measures, will often turn on questions of allocation, i.e. if only a moderate increase is desirable, how should this increase be shared between countries, or if management requires the restriction of total catch to a certain level, what proportions of this total should be taken by each country. Decisions on these proportions will be based partly on past, present and planned catches, and partly on the distribution of the stock; the latter aspect would properly include information, to the extent that is available, on the distribution, as between different zones of jurisdiction, of all stages in the life-history of the species concerned, and not merely the occurrence of fishable concentrations. It may be noted that while the allocations to an individual coastal state will to a large extent be based on the proportion of the total catch that can be taken in that state’s zone of jurisdiction, there is no over-riding reason why it should take its allocations solely in its own zone. Particularly for states (e.g. Gambia) with only narrow zones, the migratory pattern of most species make it operationally desirable - so that fishing can be carried on for a greater part of the year - for vessels to be able to work in other zones.
These aspects of the allocation problem make it desirable that, at the international discussions, further information on the resources (especially on their distribution) is available in addition to that relating to their state of exploitation. This information might well be supplied by the CECAF Project, through scientific working groups, or consultants.
Otherwise, as already noted, the further responsibilities of the project, once it has provided for the biological and economic studies discussed in the previous sections, are, as noted in the introduction, limited to assisting in the provision of the physical facilities for the discussions - meeting rooms, interpretation, secretarial support - to the extent that these may not be supplied by a host government.
CECAF itself provides a good formal framework for the international discussions. The Committee itself is probably too large in membership and interests for more than the most general discussions, e.g. on the principles that might be followed in setting the level of the total amount of fishing, and the allocations between participants. However its existing subsidiary bodies, particularly the committee dealing with management within the limits of national jurisdiction, or other, more ad hoc groupings, do provide the more limited participation necessary for discussions of the practical details in relation to particular stocks.
