This chapter focuses on objectives and strategies for fisheries management and development plans. The general discussion in this chapter will be supplemented in the next chapter by an examination of a selected number of fisheries management and simultaneously, development issues which have come into prominence following extension of national jurisdiction, and which may be expected to be of special concern to coastal developing countries.
The discussion is introduced by comments on sectoral plans and planning which will expand on the material already presented in Chapter 2.
4.2.1 Influence of extension of jurisdiction on scope and duration of plans
Decisions on the scope and temporal extension of the plan are among the first issues to be confronted by the planner. By limiting pre-planning research and plan preparation to the zone of additional jurisdiction controlled after institution of the EEZs time and effort might be saved. Wherever feasible, however, it is preferable to extend the scope of the planning exercise to all waters which are now under the jurisdiction of the coastal developing country, among other reasons, because some fish stocks move through the various maritime zones under the country's jurisdiction. Also, fishing in the new zone may affect the operations of small-scale fishermen fishing close to shore.
In the market sector, too, opportunities and problems are likely to change following a larger-scale expansion of domestic industrial fisheries.
Ideally, the dates of a sectoral plan should coincide with those of the economic plan so as to ensure that changes in national policy orientation will be faithfully reflected in the sectoral plan. In a period of rapid and radical changes such as that which may follow extension of national jurisdiction, plans, it might be argued, should be drawn up for shorter periods, since it may be difficult to visualize the longer-term implications of strategies and programmes. Once the plans have been adopted and are being implemented, drastic or frequent adjustments may be difficult to make.
4.2.2 Selecting a starting point for the fisheries planning exercise
Preparation of preliminary fisheries plans, as a rule, starts with determination of natural resources possibilities. Based on this determination, which is the responsibility of the fisheries scientist, a proposal for exploitation and utilization programme is submitted to the decision-makers.
Conceivably, a professional planner's approach to planning could differ from the above, inasmuch as he would want to start the exercise by reviewing national and sectoral objectives and work back from there to arrive at strategies and programmes for resources exploitation and utilization. Under any circumstances, no final decisions on the new plan should be taken until natural and other development resources opportunities and constraints had been carefully examined. Where conservation and optimum utilization of natural resources are the principal concerns, as under the philosophy of the new regime of the seas, there is no difference between the ‘traditional’ and the ‘planning’ approach. Where, however, other objectives are stressed, decision-making cannot be based solely on an appraisal of natural resources consideration. Where, for instance, maximization of supplies of fish to consumers in the immediate future is the principal objective, plans built up with a view to optimizing resources conservation and exploitation may not be acceptable to the decision-makers. Planners in some socialist countries have argued that sacrifices on the resources side may be defended for the sake of efforts to alleviate existing food supply problems and that fishing, under some circumstances, might proceed beyond biological danger points. They support their argument by stressing possibilities of shifting, once overfishing has seriously depleted traditionally exploited resources, the fishing effort to other species, either by fishing stocks of fish that are supplanting the overfished species or by transferring to other grounds.
Still, objectives and strategies, the implementation of which may seriously jeopardize the resources base of a fishery, should never be light-heartedly adopted. If, for emergency reasons, temporary overfishing is allowed, the policy should be abandoned as soon as other means of coping with the emergency have been found.
Where planners with a fisheries management background have the responsibility for the drawing up of fisheries plans, requirements of the market, it is sometimes said, may tend to be neglected. “The marketing of fish… is part of an interrelated process (and) must be taken into account when designing management measures. But there may be conflict between the needs of management and the needs of the market. Measures introduced may disrupt the flow of supply to the market throughout the year; they may also dictate the size and quality fo the fish, and these may not correspond with the standards of the market” (FAO, 1983).
Market considerations, however, should not be allowed to exclusively dominate fisheries management policy, as one may conclude from the following: “…resource management should apply somehow to an ecosystem, i.e. the complex of fish stocks in interaction among themselves and with their aquatic environment… social-benefit optimization implies ecosystem management, i.e. a properly balanced exploitation of the species stocks involved… however, exploitation rates normally are generated by product markets which transmit through the pricing mechanism intensive demands for some species and rejection of others. In other words, price signals do not ensure that selectivity in commercial fishing conforms with effective ecosystem management” (MacKenzie, 1983).
Under ideal circumstances, the planner might build up his plan by starting from an appraisal of fisheries resources potential as well as by working down from national objectives to establish what drain on development resources their achievement would imply to find an acceptable compromise between what ought to be, and what can be, done.
4.2.3 Marshalling the developing resources essential for plan implementation
A plan becomes a realistic blueprint for management and development action only if assurance has been obtained that all inputs will be available, when and where needed, for programme execution, and in the quantities and qualities they are needed.
Where, for instance, new fishing operations are to be launched, all aspects of crewing requirements must be considered: number of fishermen to operate the vessels to be created, skill requirements, home ports, housing and other amenities, time factors in marshalling human and material inputs, etc..
4.2.4 Harmony between the individual components of the plan
A plan may be said to be ‘harmonized’ when successive stages in the production and distribution chain are in balance with each other (fishing capacity with total allowable catches, landing and shore facilities with fleet and market requirements, etc.). Lack of harmony results in idle capacity or bottlenecks in production and marketing, phenomena which are frequently encountered in fisheries industries in developing countries. They tend to arise, among other reasons, because fisheries planners do not have similar opportunities to influence land operations that they have in regard to directing production efforts at sea. Not only are land operations controlled by other than fisheries authorities but regulatory action relating to plants and other land installations used by the sector, as a rule, usually are administered in conformity with standards applicable to similar facilities operated by other industries. Frequently, therefore, expansion of land installations continues for a considerable time after regulatory measures aimed at limiting fishing effort have been imposed in the interest of rational resources management. Frequently also, land installations faced with dwindling raw material supplies will do their best to defeat or circumvent fishing controls (by increasing the fishing intensity of fleets of their own or by promoting illegal fishing by others).
Where controls on operations (over sea or land operations or both) are lacking, or are existent but not effectively enforced, or where they are not applied on a timely basis, there will be overcapitalization at sea or on land. There will be consequent economic losses, either when market absorption capacity does not suffice to allow profitable utilization or when production declines, as resources are overfished and plants increasingly undersupplied.
4.2.5 Acceptance of the plan by the public
A plan may be perfect but, if it is not accepted by those whose participation in its execution is essential, the programmes will never get off the ground. The planner, therefore, must know how to sell his ideas not only to the powers that be but also to administrators, entrepreneurs, skilled staff, fishermen, plant workers, etc., since they are the people who will have to translate his blueprints into development action.
4.3.1 Directives and legal provisions limiting the discretion of the sectoral planner
Setting objectives is the point of departure for plan preparation. If objectives have not been clearly identified and defined, sooner or later questions will be raised on the purpose and results of the planning exercise.
The setting of fisheries objectives must proceed from an examination of:
tasks assigned to the sector under international and national laws and directives;
the sector's capability, in principle, of meeting the contribution expected from it to the general economy as well as to satisfying needs for development and management of fisheries; and
strictures on potential delivery imposed by existing legal and administrative constraints.
The signals conveyed by these three determinants are often confusing. Directives for the guidance of sectoral development efforts included in the general plan may be in conflict with conventions of the new regime of the seas. This may be the case where meeting plan objectives would only be possible by exceeding total allowable catch ceilings. Since the new regime of the seas does not provide penalties for non-conformance, in the case of conflict, national aspirations are likely to prevail.
Conflicts and rival claims will come to the fore also in connection with decisions on relative support to be given to various components of fisheries management and development programmes (production, utilization, marketing) as well as on who is to benefit, and in what measure, from their implementation.
A clear picture of the sector's ability to contribute to national growth cannot be obtained before restrictions imposed by the legal framework within which fisheries have to operate have been fully taken into account.
To achieve agreement on objectives and priorities for fisheries management and development, demands on - and opportunities for delivery by - the sector have to be reviewed jointly by the national and sectoral planners. The closer the sectoral are to the national planners in the administrative hierarchy, and the more efficient the liaison and consultation arrangements between them, the smoother and speedier will fisheries goals be negotiated.
4.3.2 Criteria for classifying sectoral objectives
In the literature on planning, objectives are classified variously as “general and specific”, “fundamental”, “short-term and long-term”, “high priority and low priority”.
Societal goals, as expressed in the national plan, are usually phrased in rather general terms: “Consequently, for use… (in) a specific field such as fisheries, they must be interpreted in operational terms. Even in these terms, no necessary ordering of priorities is disclosed. (Sectoral) goals frequently are in conflict one with another and some may be mutually exclusive. The pursuit of a particular goal thus imposes a constraint on the achievement of other goals and trade-offs are inescapable” (MacKenzie, 1983).
The more specific the phraseology of objectives, the closer the latter come to resembling targets. At the micro-level, a general plan objective such as ‘to increase fishermen's earnings’ may become a specific target, as follows: ‘to increase the annual earnings of shrimp fishermen in the geographic area… from … to (currently applicable)…, within a period of… years.’
Maximization of net social benefits to society from the exploitation of fishery resources is usually given as the ‘fundamental’ objective of fisheries policy.
A clear distinction between long-term objectives and short-term strategies may be necessary where the achievement of what is essentially a long-term objective might be attainable over the short run, but only at extravagant costs. This was the case, for instance, in one African developing country where expansion, over the short run, of land-based facilities for processing and distribution of fish was intended to achieve long-term objectives of earning a larger share of the export dollar and developing export markets. A review by experts of proposals along these lines prepared in the country in question concluded that implementation would have entailed substantial economic risks. The country, it was pointed out, had not yet been able to mobilize the (necessary) investment, infrastructures, expertise and experience to succeed in reaching its objective (FAO, 1981a).
4.3.3 Determination of priorities
It is hardly conceivable that a country's fisheries policy be determined on the basis of a single objective only (e.g. maximization of revenues from the sector to the national treasury). Generally, a number of objectives are being pursued simultaneously and decisions are necessary on priority rankings to be assigned to individual goals.
The fixing of priorities may involve a variety of political, scientific, technological and economic issues. In the example cited in the preceding section, the promotion of a programme from long-term to short-term status was motivated by a desire for rapid achievement of autonomy in the sector, while at the same time economic returns in the sector were to be improved.
Emergency situations (calling for rehabilitation of natural resources in the wake of a collapse of a fishery, assistance to fishermen suddenly deprived of a livelihood by natural catastrophies, etc.) are natural candidates for top-priority status. Because it is impossible to predict their occurrence, no specific plan provisions can be made, although contingency arrangements to cope with them should be considered. High priorities also may be assigned to programmes envisioning the removal, to the extent the on-going programmes are considered worth continuing, of bottlenecks holding up implementation of existing plans. Other natural choices for priority status are programmes closely linked to important development activities in other branches of the economy. On occasions, priority status is assigned on the basis of political factors and planners may have to make concessions in response to pressures from private industry, lobbyists of special interest groups, and even representatives of the public seeking personal prestige and, possibly even, financial gains for themselves.
4.3.4 Serving the ultimate beneficiary
Priorities must be fixed with a clear view to the identity of the intended beneficiaries of management and development programmes. There is usually one principal beneficiary but some aspects of a programme will, in all likelihood, also serve the interests of other beneficiaries. Basically, one may distinguish between courses of action pursued in the interest of: (1) the state (programmes for what is considered the common good, which aim, for instance, at giving support to specific underprivileged sectors of the economy or segments of the population); (2) the consumer; and (3) the producer (small-scale or industrial-scale fishermen, processors, market agents, etc.). Strategies and tactics for implementation, therefore, have to be tailored to produce revenue for serving the state, good-quality and inexpensive food supplies for the consumer, or a decent livelihood for the producer.
It is essential that programmes be designed to focus on serving the interests of intended beneficiaries. A given programme, for instance a tax or licensing system, may be designed to produce primarily revenue for the state or to limit entry into the fishery or to encourage exit of men and equipment so as to achieve resource recovery or to benefit fishermen remaining in the industry.
If the state needs funds for the development of fisheries or if revenues from fisheries are expected to support general economic development, high priority will be assigned to programmes raising income from producers and consumers through taxes, licences fees and duties. In contrast, programmes of a social character aiming, for example, to improve conditions in small-scale fisheries or to achieve nutritional objectives, may depend for implementation on sizeable contributions from the exchecquer.
4.3.5 Main and subsidiary objectives and goals
A distinction must be made between principal and subsidiary goals. When strategies or tools are being promoted to the status of goals, the tail begins to wag the dog, with the consequence that priorities may become distorted.
Even planning organisms sometimes add to the confusion, as apparent from the following listing of fishery objectives in a draft development plan of one country of the African region:
On examination of this list, one finds that development of industrial and artisanal fisheries are really subsidiary goals associated with the three principal goals of increasing revenues, creating jobs and promoting market development. Pledging support for, for instance, artisanal fisheries development, becomes a final objective only when the reason for such support is identified at the same time. Even a phrasing “to assist artisanal fishermen” would not meet the criterion of specificity, since there still would be a question whether emphasis was on income improvement or on employment creation.
4.3.6 Need to ascertain true objectives and goals where policymaker's intent not clear
Societal goals are sometimes phrased so that the true nature of objectives remains concealed. In such instances, the sectoral planner must try to obtain a clear understanding of the policymaker's intent so that he can act accordingly in drawing up his programmes. In one case, development of small-scale fisheries was strongly advocated in a zone of a developing coastal country where population density was very low and market opportunities were severely limited, and where development opportunities, as a consequence, seemed scarce. After some probing by the planners, the policymakers explained that the government's wish to build up small-scale fisheries in the zone in question was motivated by strategic concerns: the zone was to be built up militarily and economically to counter infiltration of nationals of a neighbouring country.
The sectoral planner should have a clear idea of national objectives, among other reasons, to gauge probable support for - or opposition to - his proposals in policy-making circles. Where strategic reasons of the kind described above obtain, he may expect a degree of support that could go far beyond anything justifiable from a strict cost and earnings standpoint. Budgetary generosity, though probably not in the same measure, could be counted upon also should the objective of an artisanal fisheries programme be of a socio-economic character, e.g. to help disadvantaged communities of disadvantaged fishermen.
In contrast, programme proposals for modernization of reasonably prosperous small-scale fisheries are likely to be evaluated more along regular commercial standards, with the proposed investments over the plan period being compared to prospective net economic returns.
Reference has already been made to objectives which are incompatible with each other. Preservation of the resource base clearly cannot be pursued simultaneously with maximization of resource utilization in the short run.
The “you cannot have your cake and eat it, too” situation, however, is a rather special one. The planner's problems start when he has to make decisions which will impact diversely on two groups, both slated to receive assistance under the plan. A programme designed to promote industrial fisheries may have adverse consequences on small-scale fisheries which also are to receive development support. How such support is to be given to each of the two will depend on the relative contributions they can be expected to make to the achievement of chosen objectives.
Programmes aiming at the creation of new jobs may be expected to clash with programmes seeking to increase earnings of operatives already employed in the industry as well as with programmes seeking to achieve production boosts; programmes promoting export market expansion may reduce supplies available for domestic consumers, etc.
If there is no way of avoiding damaging effects, measures to lessen the impact should be incorporated in the programmes concerned. Where, for instance, industrial fishing is being promoted, the state may bar the industrial fishermen from zones of special interest to the small-scale producers. Also, joint-venture operations in the industrial fisheries sector may be obligated to give assistance to small-scale fishermen in the spheres of technical training and economics by providing equipment, buying bait supplies from small-scale fishermen, etc.
Conflicts between objectives are usually being resolved by compromises, with support being dosaged in a manner so as to achieve the desired balance. Only rarely does support for an objective require complete disregard of other objectives.
Strategies, as stated earlier, refer to possible ways of accomplishing objectives and goals. An individual objective may be achievable by employment of more than one strategy. The planner's tasks are to identify alternative courses of action and to appraise the alternatives in terms of their contributions to the achievement of the relevant objectives. If one of the strategies is clearly superior in cost-benefits terms to the others,it will be considered a key strategy. Other strategies may be employed to strengthen its impact and to back up and to supplement the programmes selected to implement the key strategy.
To give an example: the objective of raising skill levels may be achieved by promoting on-the-job training, setting up newschools and other training facilities in the country, paying for - or relying on foreign-provided - scholarships, incorporating training clauses in joint venture agreements, etc. In lieu of relying on what might appear the long-run optimum (but perhaps the most expensive in the short run) strategy, involving the setting up of facilities, several approaches may be used simultaneously or in a given optimal sequence (e.g. by first sending staff to be eventually employed as training instructors abroad on scholarships; prevailing on joint ventures to accept trainees; lateron, as domestic operations have progressed sufficiently to accommodate trainees, proceeding with on-the-job training arrangements; and, last, by setting up schools when expansion of operations has reached the level of warranting the same).
An individual strategy, a tactic, and a tool used for execution of a strategy, may have application in the achievement of more than one objective. A strategy which makes contributions on several fronts, though perhaps not a key contribution in any individual sphere, may be given preference over one that is optimal for satisfying a single (though not a priority!) objective. An example along this line may be an agreement between a developing coastal country and a foreign fishing company which may bring in revenue to the state in exchange for granting access to the national fishing zone, create employment on-board vessels for fishermen, increase deliveries of fish to domestic markets and/or provide assistance to small-scale fisheries (by inclusion of the above-referred-to clauses in joint-venture contracts), promote use of domestic shore facilities by foreign vessels, etc. In a given instance, of course, any of the above goals may be reached more expeditiously, and sometimes with lesser political and economic risks, by other arrangements than such an agreement. The latter, however, may , in the short run, offer the best opportunity“to get things moving”.
The importance of strategic planning is emphasized in the following quote: “Strategies… provide the rules, directions or guidelines required for competent tactical planning, i.e. the design of programmes which, of course, are the end-products of the process. Neglect of strategic planning is a common fault of bureaucracies. There is an almost invincible tendency on the part of administrators to do more of what has been done before. The effect is:
to maintain or repeat programmes that are no longer pertinent, and may in fact be prejudicial, to the needs of the real world, and
to divert scarce talent and funding from the design and delivery of programmes that are really needed. Scrupulous adherence to strategic directives is recommended for the cure of this bureaucratic malady.” (MacKenzie, 1983)
The burden of identifying suitable, and choosing optimal, strategies rests entirely on the shoulders of the sectoral planner. This is in contrast to the limited discretion the latter has in selecting objectives, which are often dictated to him by international and national laws and directives.
High-level planning missions sponsored by international and national agencies, have offered useful help to developing countries in the African region in evaluating alternative strategies for fisheries development. One such mission, appraising proposals prepared in a country of the region, concluded that a strategy favoured by local planners, under which sizeable landing and processing facilities were to be established over a comparatively short time, was likely to have the following consequences: (1) a slip would have to be constructed in the fishing port for necessary ship repair facilities; (2) considerable time would be lost in spare parts procurement from abroad; (3) means of communication to export and domestic markets would have to be built up almost from scratch; (4) fishermen and plant workers would have to be trained in industrial fishery techniques and methods of handling and processing fish on land and at sea. “As a result,…plants will have to plan for a modest level of efficiency, frequent personnel turnovers, and large doses of foreign management, all factors which raise costs. Such obstacles will affect the management of fishing enterprises and plants.
The under-development of banking services and delays caused by exchange rate regulations of sales and payments also add to company costs, requiring higher working capital than is needed elsewhere for the same sales volume” (FAO, 1981a). Against such drawbacks and cost implications, advantages of, and opportunities for, creating an infrastructure for local processing, assuming that joint venture arrangements wereused, the following elements were listed in favour of the above strategy: “immediate investments of foreign capital, mobilization of indispensable foreign expertise, immediate mobilization andeventual acquisition of a fleet, creation of new jobs at sea and on land, secondary benefits to the general economy, increased association with foreign partners permitting better control of their activities, improvement in data collection, etc.” (FAO, 1981a).
The plan document should spell out, in unequivocal terms, the reasons which have prompted the adoption of a specific strategy and the rejection of other, on the surface equally acceptable, strategies.
Wherever necessary, comparisons of alternatively usable strategies should indicate when imputed values have been used in evaluation of costs and benefits as well as elements that cannot be quantified in monetary terms under any circumstances such as, for instance, economic risks and potential conflicts between national and foreign interests, as well as the flexibility inherent in each alternative.
Individual strategies, for the most part, can be implemented by resort to several tools. The skillful management of these tools to achieve the objective(s) which the strategy seeks to serve is called ‘tactics.’ The term ‘programme’, as used here, denotes a plan of procedure for ensuring optimal employment of a tool.
To illustrate the relationship between successive levels in the planning hierarchy: where rational management of fishery resources is a major objective of policy, regulation of fishery effort can be expected to be a key strategy. Such regulation can be accomplished in a variety of ways using either indirect (e.g. closed areas, mesh controls, catch limits) or direct (limited entry, licensing, financial measures such as subsidies and taxes, establishment of property rights through allocation of individual catch quotas or of territorial rights, so-called TURFs) tools or both kinds of tools. To apply the tools in practice, programmes have to be designed, e.g. application of the licence tool requires the elaboration of a detailed licensing programme.
An individual tool or programme can usually be shaped to serve more than one strategy and objective - in the case of regulatory measures, for instance, it may be shaped to not only ensure safeguarding of the resources (through control of entry into the fishery) but also to enhance economic performance (e.g. by imposing discriminatory burdens on less as against more efficient operations) or to satisfy social needs (by incorporating devices designed to protect or promote the interests of small-scale producers,and/or through application of tax and fee income to assist economically weak producers and/or consumers).
In one developing country of Asia, for example, a new licensing programme granting authorization to fish was set up to accomplish the following:
maintain the resources to achieve optimum yield;
allocate the resources between industrial, i.e. trawler and purse-seiner fishermen, and small-scale traditional fishermen and to particularly increase the income of the traditional fishermen;
reserve the inshore fishing areas to owner-operators of fishing units;
increase the percentage of units owned by artisanal fishermen (of specified origin) commensurate with their numbers in the fishing community;
encourage the growth of modern offshore and deep-sea fishing capacity directed at presently unexploited resources to meet the growing demand for fish.
In the assessment of the suitability of a tool for employment in a given situation, careful attention must be paid to potential negative impact as well as to positive results and ease of application. With regard to a tax on exports, it was pointed out, in one instance, that the state may be able to tap amajor source or revenues but possibly only at the cost of threatening the viability of the industry, depressing incomes of fishermen, reducing total catches and lowering total employment in fishing. Some people also consider it (the tax) inequitable in that other sectors of the economy are not subject tosimilar taxes.
Depending on the objective that is to be attained, the above allegations may or may not be justified. The above tax, thus, may not be considered inequitable if it is viewed as a form of rent for the use of the resource, similar to the rent paid by farmers. Also, while the tax may bring about a reduction in the number of fishermen, the reduction will tend to increase average catches and economic returns of the fishermen, remaining in the industry. On the other hand, where employment preservation or creation is a major objective, the tax may, indeed, be the wrong type of tool to be applied.
As in the case of objectives and strategies, the choice of one tool may, in some cases, preclude or make unnecessary employment of another, also potentially serviceable, tool. On the other hand, theuse of several tools for carryint out agiven strategy may not only be possible but in some cases even highly desirable.
The effective regulation of fishing effort, thus, in the opinion of the experts, requires in most cases an appropriate mix of tools, “since one tool (e.g. catch quotas) may achieve only a limited amount” (FAO, 1983). Limitations and/or unwanted effects of regulation measures may be met by choosing appropriate complementary tools.
Evaluations of tools for suitability of employment in management and development programmes may be based on the following, among other, criteria:
political feasibility (is the measure in line with policy directives, is implementation likely to lead to political complications?);
administrative feasibility (are requirements for effective administration so complicated as to lead to delays in decision-making, resentment on the part of the industry, inordinate increases in costs of administration?);
acceptability to those affected by them (what resistance might be encountered because of lack of understanding of the purposes of the measures, are the measures likely to be opposed because they are, or appear to be, inequitable?);
flexibility in management (will management have the opportunity to adjust quickly in response to new information which might necessitate a change in the programme?);
equity considerations (who can be expected to gain and who to lose from institution of the measure, can changes in existing arrangement consequent to institution of the measure be considered fair and reasonable in terms of the existing social order?);
selectivity (how finely can the measure be refined to achieve detailed objectives, e.g. provide support to groups who have been singled out for special consideration?);
versatility (how many other purposes can adoption of the measure serve in addition to the main one?);
To facilitate choice between alternatively employable tools, a simple matrix may be constructed listing in the left-hand column the various criteria under which the measures are to be evaluated, and in the two right-hand columns, for each criterion, cost and benefits estimates (including secondary benefits and aspects not translatable into monetary terms) associated with adoption. A matrix of this type, which was prepared to assist a coastal developing country of Africa in choosing between two measures under consideration in connection with the authorization of foreign fishing in the country's EEZ, is reproduced in Table 1.
As far as specific tools and programmes for promoting rational fisheries management and development are concerned, a wealth of excellent reference material is available. The sectoral planner without a scientific background, however, would be well advised to consult specialists before taking decisions on the basis of a study of these texts.
The preceding sections of this chapter have focused on the major ingredients of a sectoral plan. Any recipe for cooking up plans that will not come out half-baked, however, has to specify, in addition, how the ingredients are to be combined. The procedure for step-by-step planning detailed in the following attempts tofill this gap.
Step-by-step procedure:
plan preparation should start with an analysis of the quantitative and qualitative information assembled during the pre-planning phase, when opportunities and needs for - as well as constraints likely to impact on - fisheries management and development activities were identified;
as a next step, a realistic inventory should be prepared of development resources-including financial and other supporting services - likely to be available over the plan period;
a further working document should summarize all relevant information from Law of the Sea, national plan and fisheries law material, which will have a bearing on the choice of objectives, strategies and measures;
based on the above three briefs, a list of tentative objectives should be drawn up, with priority indications, for programmes to be implemented under the sectoral plan;
at this point the planner is advised to enter intonegotiations with the appropriate sectoral and national authorities to obtain agreement on final objectives. Among the matters discussed with these authorities should be problems connected with fulfilling expectations placed in the sector bynon-fishery interests, opportunities in fisheries overlooked by national planners, priority rankings of objectives, budgetary allocations for fisheries, administrative support services for the sector, and changes in laws and directives that might benefit fisheries and facilitate implementation of the sectoral plan. These discussions should give the planner the opportunity to finalize hisdraft on sectoral objectives and priorities and enable him to form himself an idea of the nature and amount of support that might become available during the plan period;
once priority rankings have been determined, the planner should fix targets to be attained during the plan period with an eye on the size and quality of resources available for implementation;
for each sectoral plan objective, a list detailing all strategies which might be employed for implementation (indicating for each the probable advantages and disadvantages connected with application) might be useful for the next stage. Where incompatibilities between individual strategies exist, or where certain strategies are known to have unacceptable features, or where costs connected with their employment are expected to exceed budgetary possibilities, etc., some strategies might be deleted from this list before a further evaluation is made;
in the choice of a strategy, allowance should be made for contributions to achievement of other objectives. Priority rankings of the various objectives is essential. The planner must make sure that the most important matters will be dealt with in the most efficient and least costly fashion;
policy instruments (measures) to be used in carrying out specific strategies should be analyzed in the same way as alternatively employable strategies (the principal criteria to be applied in evaluation are political and administrative feasibility, acceptability to the section of the public affected by their employment, flexibility in management, equity considerations, selectivity and versatility);
where a choice between alternatively feasible tools is to be made, cost-benefits evaluation should be drawn up to facilitate comparisons;
thought should be given at this stage to special programmes for implementation of specific measures. Attention to detail will be necessary to prevent equivocal interpretations, the phenomenon of ‘grey areas’ where nobody seems to have jurisdiction, and where overlapping may occur or where nobody wants to assume responsibilities, etc. A fishing licensing programme should specify, to cite an example, who is eligible or is obglied to be in the programme, the rights that are being granted by a coastal country for fee payment or services rendered; who may - and under what conditions - enter the programme once it has been established; whether licences are or are not transferable; whether the licence is issued to the vessel or the fishermen; how - and how frequently - fees are to be collected; purposes to which income from licence fees will be applied, etc. Additional questions to be dealt with in preparation of a licensing programme relate to the base on which fee payments are to be determined, distribution of the licence fee income between the intended beneficiaries of the programme, staffing and staff training requirements for administration of the licencing machinery, etc.;
with the preparation of costing and staffing particulars for the individual programmes, the planners will have completed a first draft of their plan document that can now be submitted to policy-makers for review;
as the latter prepare comments on the draft, the planners, too, will once more review individual programme proposals from a cost-benefits stand-point in the hope of discovering possible economies in execution, achieving an improved intra-programme balance, or of making desirable changes in phasing the workplan;
based on the above review of the workplan, and after changes ordered by the policy-makers have been taken into account, a final version of the plan document may be prepared. After programme proposals have been brought into harmony with resources at the disposal of the sector, final approval will have to be sought from the competent authorities.
| Fishing Authorization in Exchange for | ||
|---|---|---|
| Criteria | Supplying land-based plants | Fees |
| Development of national fisheries industry | active and, if successful, more rapid | passive and, in theory, more slow |
| Potential direct net revenues for the State | fishing rights and export taxes < max. economic rent-added cost processing at fishing port of the country: | fees < minimum economic rent = 000' US$ or more |
| 000'US$ (cephalopods) | ||
| 000'US$ (demersal fish) | ||
| 000' US$(mackerel and horse mackerel) | ||
| fines: comparable | fines: comparable | |
| Gross indirect | revenue from salaries: | revenue from salaries: |
| revenues for the country | • at sea: according to contract terms | at sea: according to permit conditions |
| - | on land: up to 000' US$ for processing | on land: none |
| secondary benefits | secondary economic benefits: none | |
| • a small portion of processing added cost, actually deducted from State revenues (economic rent) | ||
| Risk for country | (low profitability and production possibly not well accepted) | few (better profitability and better known costs and not involving the country |
| Potential conflicts between country and foreign interests | many (association of divergent interest) | few (independence of partners) |
| Control of joint venture balance sheets | competent personnel needed | no control |
| Management: | ||
| needs in administrative capa cities and control of enterprises | many | few |
| regulation of catch capacities | difficult | easier |
| maximization of rent | difficult | easier |
| surveillance | comparable needs | comparable needs |
