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land reform

LAND SETTLEMENT AND COOPERATIVES

réforme agraire

COLONISATION ET COOPÉRATIVES AGRICOLES

reforma agraria

COLONIZACIÓN Y COOPERATIVAS



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Le présent bulletin a pour but de fournir des renseignements et de faire connaître des opinions sur la réforme agraire et les questions connexes à l'Organisation des Nations Unies, aux États Membres de la FAO, ainsi qu'aux experts et institutions nationales et internationales. Les articles paraissent dans la langue originale (en français, anglais ou espagnol).

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Preface

Land is the single greatest resource in most countries. Access to land, security of tenure, and land management all have significant implications for development. Secure access to land for the poor and vulnerable is increasingly affected by climate change, violent conflicts and natural disasters, population growth and urbanization, and demands for new energy sources such as bioenergy. Good governance in land tenure and its administration can help to reduce poverty and achieve economic development. In contrast, weak governance, has adverse consequences for society as a whole. The poor are particularly vulnerable to the effects of weak governance because they lack the resources and influence necessary to protect their rights to land. Weak governance promotes inequality between genders as poor women tend to be less literate and have fewer resources. It fosters social inequality with potentially destabilizing consequences – the rich are able to benefit from opportunities to appropriate land while the poor lose their rights to land and common property resources such as grazing lands and forests. In addition, weak governance leads to environmental degradation as corrupt officials and private interests collude to ignore controls on land use, the extraction of water and minerals, and the clearing of forests. The abuse and degradation of state land, including national parks, is a direct result of weak governance. The evasion of taxes related to property reduces the public revenues available for public services such as health care and education. The arbitrary application of the rule of law discourages investment and constrains economic development.

The increasing recognition of the importance of addressing the governance of land and natural resources has led the Land Tenure and Management Unit of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) to focus on good governance in land tenure and land administration as one of its main activities under its present work programme. Reversing weak governance requires a willingness to overcome weaknesses and opposition from those who benefit from the situation. Several countries around the world have already recognized the need to improve their governance and have started to introduce improvements. FAO has been working with generous support from the Government of Finland since 2005 on raising awareness of the importance of this issue. It has prepared technical guidelines and other materials with various partners, including the World Bank, UN-Habitat, Transparency International, and the International Federation of Surveyors.

The articles in this issue supplement the recent publication *Good governance in land tenure and administration* (Land Tenure Studies No. 9), which provides practical advice for land professionals on improving governance in a land administration system or other land tenure arrangement. This issue opens with an article contributing to the overall discussion on land tenure and good governance. The following articles explore how governance issues should be considered in land administration development projects and how governance affects state land management. They also present important lessons to be learned from two case studies (one on Georgia, and one on the reunification of Germany).

Paul Munro-Faure

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Préface

La terre est l'unique ressource dans la plupart des pays. L'accès à la terre, la sécurité de la propriété foncière et la gestion des terres ont des conséquences importantes pour le développement. Mais pour les populations pauvres et vulnérables, l'accès à la terre est de plus en plus incertain sous les effets du changement climatique, des conflits violents, des catastrophes naturelles, de la croissance démographique, de l'urbanisation et de la demande de nouvelles sources d'énergie comme la bioénergie. Une bonne gouvernance en matière de régime foncier peut contribuer à réduire la pauvreté et favoriser le développement économique. Par contre, une gouvernance déficiente a des conséquences négatives pour toute la société et vulnérabilise les pauvres qui n'ont pas les ressources et l'influence nécessaires pour protéger leurs droits à la terre. Elle accroît d'autant plus l'inégalité entre les sexes que les femmes pauvres sont généralement moins éduquées et plus démunies que les hommes. Elle est également facteur d'inégalité sociale et déstabilise la société, car les riches profitent des opportunités pour s'appropriier la terre, tandis que les pauvres perdent leurs droits à la terre et aux ressources communes que sont les pâturages et les forêts. En outre, une gouvernance déficiente accentue la dégradation de l'environnement; en effet, les fonctionnaires corrompus et les intérêts privés s'entendent pour éviter que l'utilisation des terres, l'extraction d'eau et de minéraux et le déboisement des forêts soient contrôlés. Le pillage et la dégradation des terres publiques, notamment les parcs nationaux, résultent directement d'une administration déficiente. L'évasion fiscale liée à la propriété rogne les recettes publiques disponibles pour des services publics comme la santé et l'éducation. L'application arbitraire de l'État de droit décourage l'investissement et freine le développement économique.

La reconnaissance croissante de l'importance d'une bonne gouvernance en matière d'administration foncière et des ressources naturelles a conduit l'Unité de gestion et du régime foncier de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour l'alimentation et l'agriculture (FAO) à placer ce thème au cœur des activités de son programme de travail en cours. Pour instaurer une bonne gouvernance, il faut être résolu à pallier les faiblesses constatées et éliminer les obstacles créés par ceux qui tirent profit de la situation. Plusieurs pays ont déjà reconnu qu'ils devaient améliorer leur gouvernance et ont commencé à la réformer. Depuis 2005, avec l'appui précieux du Gouvernement finlandais, la FAO s'efforce de faire mieux connaître l'importance de cette question. Elle a notamment préparé des directives techniques et d'autres prescriptions en coopération avec d'autres partenaires, dont la Banque mondiale, UN-Habitat, Transparency International et la Fédération internationale des géomètres.

Les articles de ce numéro complètent la publication récente intitulée *Administration foncière et bonne gouvernance* (Études foncières n° 9), qui donne aux professionnels du secteur de l'administration foncière des conseils sur la façon d'améliorer la gouvernance en matière d'administration foncière. Le présent numéro commence par un article qui nourrit le débat sur les questions foncières et la bonne gouvernance. Les articles suivants explorent la manière dont la gouvernance doit être prise en compte dans les projets d'administration foncière et son impact sur la gestion des terres publiques. Ils offrent également d'importants enseignements qui peuvent être tirés de deux études de cas (l'une sur la Géorgie, et l'autre sur la réunification de l'Allemagne).

Paul Munro-Faure

Chef de l'Unité de la gestion des terres et des régimes fonciers
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Prefacio

La tierra es el mayor recurso que poseen la mayoría de los países. El acceso a la tierra, la seguridad en la tenencia y la ordenación de tierras tienen consecuencias importantes para el desarrollo. La seguridad en el acceso a la tierra para las personas pobres y vulnerables se ve cada vez más afectada por el cambio climático, conflictos violentos y desastres naturales, el crecimiento demográfico y la urbanización, así como la demanda de nuevas fuentes de energía como la bioenergía. La buena gestión pública de la tenencia de la tierra y su administración puede ayudar a reducir la pobreza y lograr el desarrollo económico. Por el contrario, una gestión pública deficiente tiene consecuencias negativas para la sociedad en su conjunto. Los pobres son especialmente vulnerables a los efectos de una gestión pública deficiente, ya que carecen de los recursos y la influencia necesarios para proteger sus derechos sobre la tierra. Una gestión pública deficiente fomenta la desigualdad entre hombres y mujeres, dado que las mujeres pobres suelen ser menos instruidas y disponer de menos recursos. Contribuye a la desigualdad social con consecuencias potencialmente desestabilizadoras, pues los ricos pueden aprovecharse de las oportunidades de apropiarse de las tierras mientras los pobres pierden sus derechos sobre las mismas y los bienes comunales, como las tierras de pastoreo y los bosques. Además, una gestión pública deficiente acarrea la degradación del medio ambiente, en la medida en que funcionarios corruptos se hacen cómplices de intereses privados, con dejación de sus funciones de control del uso de la tierra, la extracción de agua y minerales, así como la tala de bosques. El abuso y la degradación de las tierras públicas, incluidos los parques nacionales, es un resultado directo de una gestión pública deficiente. La evasión de impuestos sobre bienes reduce los ingresos públicos disponibles para servicios públicos como la sanidad y la educación. La aplicación arbitraria de la ley desalienta la inversión y obstaculiza el desarrollo económico.

El creciente reconocimiento de la importancia de abordar la cuestión de la ordenación de las tierras y los recursos naturales ha llevado a la Unidad de Gestión y Tenencia de la Tierra de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Agricultura y la Alimentación (FAO) a centrarse en la buena gestión pública de la tenencia y administración de la tierra como una de las principales actividades de su actual programa de trabajo. Remediar una mala gestión pública requiere una disposición a superar las deficiencias y la oposición de quienes se benefician de la situación. Varios países de todo el mundo ya han reconocido la necesidad de mejorar su gestión pública y han empezado a introducir mejoras. La FAO lleva trabajando con el generoso apoyo del Gobierno de Finlandia desde 2005 en la sensibilización acerca de la importancia de esta cuestión y ha preparado directrices técnicas y otros materiales con varios asociados, entre ellos el Banco Mundial, Naciones Unidas-Hábitat, Transparencia Internacional y la Federación Internacional de Agrimensores.

Los artículos que figuran en este número complementan la reciente publicación *Buena gestión pública de la tenencia y administración de la tierra* (Estudio sobre tenencia de la tierra N.º 9), que da consejos prácticos a los profesionales del ámbito de la tierra sobre la mejora de la gestión pública en un sistema de administración de tierras u otros regímenes de tenencia de la tierra. Este volumen inicia con un artículo que contribuye al debate general sobre la tenencia de la tierra y la buena gestión pública. Los artículos

siguientes estudian cómo deberían considerarse las cuestiones relativas a la gestión pública de los proyectos de desarrollo en materia de la administración de la tierra y cómo afecta la gestión pública a la ordenación de las tierras demaniales. También presentan dos estudios de casos –uno sobre Georgia y otro sobre la reunificación de Alemania–, de los que se pueden extraer importantes lecciones.

Paul Munro-Faure

Jefe de la Unidad de Gestión y Tenencia de la Tierra
División de Tierras y Aguas de la FAO

Bonne gouvernance dans l'administration foncière et régime foncier

Cet article présente le cadre, les principaux axes de réflexion et les conclusions du guide de la FAO intitulé Administration foncière et bonne gouvernance (FAO, 2007a). La terre est l'unique ressource dans la plupart des pays, mais les systèmes d'administration foncière sont souvent pénalisés par une gouvernance déficiente, qui a souvent des conséquences négatives pour l'ensemble de la société. En revanche, une bonne gouvernance peut favoriser le développement économique et réduire la pauvreté. Les administrateurs fonciers peuvent faire partie du problème général de la gouvernance ou être une partie de la solution. Leur rôle est capital. Mettre en place une bonne gouvernance dans l'administration foncière est un objectif difficile, mais réalisable.

Buena gestión pública de la tenencia y administración de la tierra

En este artículo se presentan el marco, las principales ideas y las conclusiones de la guía de la FAO, recientemente publicada, sobre la Buena gestión pública de la tenencia y administración de la tierra (FAO, 2007a). La tierra es el mayor recurso de que disponen la mayoría de los países. Sin embargo, los sistemas de administración de la tierra fracasan con frecuencia debido a una gestión pública deficiente. Las deficiencias en la gestión pública tienen consecuencias negativas para la sociedad en su conjunto. Por el contrario, una buena gestión pública puede ayudar a lograr el desarrollo económico y a reducir la pobreza. Los administradores de la tierra pueden formar parte del problema general de la gestión pública, o pueden, y deberían, formar parte de la solución. Su papel es fundamental. No es fácil lograr una buena gestión pública de la tenencia y administración de la tierra, pero es posible.

Good governance in land administration and land tenure

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This article presents the framework, key thinking and conclusions of the recently published FAO guide on Good governance in land tenure and administration (FAO, 2007a). Land is the single greatest resource in most countries. However, land administration systems often fail as a result of weak governance. Failings in governance have adverse consequences for society as a whole. In contrast, good governance can help to achieve economic development and reduce poverty. Land administrators may be part of the overall problem of governance, or they can, and should, be part of the solution. Their role is critical. Achieving good governance in land tenure and administration is not easy but it is attainable.

INTRODUCTION

Land is the single greatest resource in most countries. Access to land, security of tenure, and land management have significant implications for development. Land administration provides the infrastructure for an efficient economy. This means that it touches all aspects of how people earn a living. However, land administration systems often fail as a result of weak governance. Weak governance may mean that land is not used appropriately to create wealth for the benefit of society and, in particular, it leaves the poor in a weak position – marginalized and outside the law. Lack of competence in land administration can be an important constraint on development and the eradication of poverty. For example, a study produced by staff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank (2006) describes how poor governance has a pernicious impact on the achievement of development: “In those countries where the problem is most entrenched, corruption undermines the driving forces behind reform. New firms are driven into the underground economy. Vital resources are siphoned off shore. Foreign investors

turn away in frustration. As a result, some countries risk being trapped in a vicious circle in which pervasive corruption reduces public revenues, undermines public trust, and weakens the credibility of the state, unless decisive leadership can push through the necessary reforms.”

Failings in governance have adverse consequences for society as a whole. In contrast, good governance can help to achieve economic development and reduce poverty.¹ Therefore, good governance matters. While much has been written about the importance of good governance in achieving development goals, there is comparatively little material on good governance in land tenure and administration. However, the governance of society’s greatest single resource cannot be ignored if development goals are to be achieved and if the population is to enjoy a tolerable quality of life.

Land administration may be part of the overall problem of governance. It may suffer from a lack of transparency and accountability as a result of confusing regulatory frameworks and complex

¹ There are some who argue that the relationship between governance and economic growth is not strong, e.g. Quibria (2006).

administrative processes. People who work in land administration may be exposed to the temptation of corruption (Burns and Dalrymple, 2006; Mwanza, 2005; van der Molen and Tuladhar, 2006). Land administrators have monopoly powers over certain tasks, and such powers can be abused.

Even where land administrators themselves behave relatively honestly, they might not take action to stop attacks by others on good governance. Land administrators may become aware of illegal activities by others, such as illegal logging or encroachment on forest reserves or state lands, while carrying out their normal jobs. Such activities will continue if land administrators do nothing about them. The message to land administrators is that they cannot pursue technical excellence in isolation. Their skills and techniques should serve the interests of society as a whole.

Land administrators can and should be part of the solution. Their technical skills can help tackle economic, social and environmental problems and right injustices. This is particularly the case where there are interlocking systems that relate to land. Land issues cut across society, and well-governed land administration can strengthen local institutions contributing broadly to governance. Land administrators act as guardians of the rights to land and of the people who hold those rights, in particular of those who tend to find themselves in a vulnerable position, e.g. women, children, ethnic or religious minorities, and internally displaced people and refugees. The poorest, who are usually the least educated and often illiterate, may face difficulties in understanding the processes, and they may lack the political connections and resources for hiring aid. The challenge for land administrators is whether to be part of the problem and benefit from the opportunities that corruption offers for private enrichment where governance is weak, or whether to be a strong force working towards good governance, economic development, and the reduction of poverty.

WHAT IS GOVERNANCE, AND WHEN IS IT GOOD?

The ideas underlying governance in land administration are not new or alien although the term governance has not been traditionally part of land administrators' professional vocabulary. Land administrators have long had codes of professional ethics that recognize their duty of care to clients and society even though these codes have not explicitly addressed the process of governance. The issue is what is meant by good governance, and what good governance in land administration involves.

Governance is the process of governing. It is not the same as government but it is the process by which society is managed and the competing priorities and interests of different groups are reconciled. The notion of governance is captured in the following definition put forward by UN-Habitat (2002): "(Governance is) the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the management of a country's affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences."

There are differences among those working to improve governance as to how governance should be defined. These differences have important practical policy implications for land tenure and administration. For some, authority and power in society are seen as being vested in many institutions and do not stem solely from governments. This definition of governance reflects the role of the private sector and civil society in decision-making alongside that of the government. For others, governance is more about how the state serves its citizens – how officials and public agencies acquire and exercise power and authority to determine public policy and provide public goods and services. These differences in definition are not mere matters of semantics. They lie at the heart of what type of policies should be pursued in order to achieve good governance in land

administration. They raise a core issue: should the policies aim to improve the work of the state or should they seek to influence how society as a whole manages land?

This paper argues that governance includes the formal institutions of government and also other arrangements for achieving these ends. Governance is concerned with the processes by which citizens participate in decision-making, how government is accountable to its citizens, and how society obliges its members to observe its rules and laws. Rights and responsibilities over land are administered not only by the state but also by many private, communal and public bodies. Power and authority in land tenure does not only come as a result of state recognition through, for example, land registration, but also from customary and informal tenures. Civil society, including professional bodies, plays an important role in setting technical and behavioural standards. Accommodating conflicting interests and obtaining their cooperation for the common good is a major aspect of land administration in activities as diverse as urban and rural development, and the protection of the environment.

Under what circumstances can governance be regarded as “good”? The adjective good introduces a value judgement and an element of subjectivity into the debate. The outcome of good governance is clearly important. For example, UN-Habitat (2002) has argued that good governance should result in an impact on the welfare of the citizenry so that no individuals can be denied access to the necessities of life, such as adequate shelter, security of tenure, safe water, sanitation, a clean environment, health, education and nutrition, employment, and public safety and mobility. Also important are the processes for achieving good governance. One study (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2006) identified six groups of indicators of the process of governance:

- voice and accountability, showing the extent to which citizens are able to determine how their government is selected;

- political stability and the absence of violence;
- government effectiveness;
- regulatory quality;
- the rule of law;
- the control of corruption.

The quality of governance is measured according to how well a country performs in each of these areas.

What is clear is that there is more to good governance than merely the avoidance of corruption. There is consensus that the features of good governance include accountability, political stability, the effectiveness of government, regulatory quality, and the rule of law, as well as control of corruption. Good governance means that government is well managed, inclusive, and results in desirable outcomes. The principles of good governance can be made operational through equity, efficiency, transparency and accountability, sustainability, subsidiarity, civic engagement, and security. Governance can be poor where government is incorruptible but tyrannical, or where it is democratic but incompetent and ineffective.

GOOD GOVERNANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

Ideas on good governance can be derived from human rights and fundamental freedoms. However, there may not be overall consensus on the extent to which the principles of good governance can be regarded as human rights enforceable in international law (Jokinen, 2002). Certain aspects of good governance are embedded in international human rights law and this particularly applies to property rights. For example, Article 17 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights² states that: “Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.”

The American Convention on Human Rights³, the European Convention for

² <http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html>

³ <http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/basic3.htm>

the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms⁴, and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights⁵ contain similar protections. They have resulted in case law that helps to clarify the relationship between human rights and the rights to land in areas such as unfair taxation, the deprivation of ownership rights, land registration, land-use planning, and restitution. For land tenure and administration, it is feasible to define some aspects of good governance in terms of legally-enforceable human rights although enforcement of other aspects of governance may be more problematic.

An alternative approach to governance can be derived from professional ethics concerning the relationship between professionals and their clients as put forward by bodies such as the International Federation of Surveyors (FIG, 1998) and the International Valuation Standards Committee (2003). Professionals owe a duty of care to their clients and should not exploit their relationship for their personal advantage to the detriment of their clients, for example, by exploiting their access to confidential data. The main themes incorporated in the codes are competence, integrity, confidentiality, transparency and accountability. Codes of professional ethics often argue that there are also obligations to society as a whole as well as to specific clients.

The principles incorporated in codes of professional ethics have been used to create systems of corporate governance in the private sector (MacMurray, 2006). These have been used to develop similar systems for the public sector (FAO, 2007b; Audit Commission, 2006). The principles are designed to influence the behaviour of individuals. They stem from recognition that the person who is best placed to steal from the owner or to misuse power is the person who has been placed in a position of trust, irrespective of whether that person works for an individual client, a company

or the government. There is no fundamental difference in the duty of care and its ethical basis between a person who works for a commercial property company and one who works for a state land registry or cadastre. The principles add two important dimensions to good governance. First, they are opposed to petty corruption, such as the payment of bribes for the provision of routine services. Second, professional integrity implies that a land administrator should not be a silent witness, a willing partner, or a facilitator of grand corruption where the state has been "captured" by a powerful group. The principles are important to good governance because they add the notion of personal responsibility by individual land administrators.

MEASURING GOOD GOVERNANCE

Good governance is not an absolute condition. Rather, there is a continuum between weak and good governance. This implies that it should be possible to devise ways to measure the governance of a country and to compare it with other countries or with itself over time. Benchmarking, using key indicators, can play an important role in improving performance as it can identify those areas in which a country is weak compared with others. In turn, this can help in prioritizing policies and resources in the search for improvements in governance.

Governance indices are generally compiled by taking a series of indicators and weighting their scores so as to produce an aggregate measure. Well-chosen indicators should identify causality so that a change in the indicator is related to a change in the quality of governance. Tests are usually made to check how an indicator varies compared with the index as a whole. There are a large number of potential indicators of different aspects of governance, such as corruption, elections, the functioning of the judicial system, and freedom of the press. Criteria for selecting indicators include ease of collection, universality, relevance and credibility. Additional indicators can be used to shed light on special

⁴ <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm>

⁵ <http://www.hrcr.org/docs/Banjul/afrhr.html>

group concerns, such as gender equality. Deviations from a base can be used instead of absolute numbers, particularly where the measure uses nominal, ordinal or interval data rather than ratio data. Indicators can be quantitative, such as voter turnout, or qualitative, such as perceptions of corruption. There are invariably issues that arise from the choice of specific indicators as some can be ambiguous. The problem is that the indicators tend to be proxies for a principle of good governance, such as accountability or inclusiveness. At times, a proxy may give misleading indications.

Most governance indicators are not specific to land administration and land tenure. A rare example is the Real Estate Transparency Index, produced by the international real estate adviser and broker Jones Lang LaSalle (2006). This emphasizes issues such as the quality of investment performance indices and fundamental market data, the disclosure and governance of listed investment vehicles, regulatory and legal factors with respect to private property rights, and professional and ethical standards.

Most governance indices concern governance in general although they may contain material relevant to land administration and land tenure. In a study for the World Bank, Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006) use indicators that include government effectiveness and regulatory quality, which are of relevance to land administration, and the effectiveness with which corruption is controlled and the degree of confidence in the rule of law, which have important implications for land tenure as well as land administration. The World Bank's Doing Business Index (World Bank / International Finance Corporation, 2006) examines whether public goods are provided efficiently and whether there is a favourable climate for business. Two of the ten indicators used of the ease of doing business within a country are specifically concerned with real estate. Dealing with licences examines the procedures required for a business in the construction industry to build a warehouse on a greenfield site,

including town planning and building control permits, and to have services connected. Registering property examines what is involved in a business purchasing land and a building and in transferring title from seller to buyer in a peri-urban area of the country's most populous city. The Urban Governance Index (UN-Habitat, 2004) was developed as a tool to help galvanize local action on governance so that towns and cities can benchmark their performance. It includes the publication of budgets, tenders and accounts, and independent audits as a measure of accountability, and tax collection and local revenues as measures of effectiveness. Real estate taxes play an important part in local government revenues. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2005a, 2005b) examines countries undergoing transformation. The index has two elements: the Status Index, which examines democracy and the extent to which there is a market economy; and the Management Index, which examines governance in the sense of how far a country has adopted democracy and the rule of law, the efficiency of its economy and market infrastructure, and how well the country is managed. The latter includes the protection of private property. Transparency International produces data on corruption rather than on governance in general. In its Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International, 2005), land administration is not identified as a separate element although registry and permit services and taxation are. Transparency International is organized by national chapters, and some of these produce data that provide an insight into corruption in land administration (e.g. Transparency International Kenya, 2006).

Indices of governance will incorporate implicit assumptions as to how good governance should be defined. They are liable to misclassifications when ratings are broken down into a fine scale rather than broad generalizations, and they are subject to a margin of error (Levy, 2007). However, they play a useful role in raising awareness of governance issues and can help identify

TABLE 1

Characteristics of good governance

Good governance is:	Weak governance is:
1 Efficient, effective, and competent: Formulates policy and implements it efficiently by delivering services of a high quality.	Inefficient, ineffective and incompetent: Fails to formulate policy effectively or to deliver efficiently services of adequate quality.
2 Responsive: Delivers the services that citizens want and need.	Unresponsive: Does not deliver the services that citizens want and need.
3 Legitimate: Those in power have earned the right to govern, have been endorsed by society through democratic processes, and can be replaced if the citizens are dissatisfied with them.	Illegitimate: Those in power have not been endorsed by society nor earned the right to govern, but have achieved power undemocratically and the citizens are unable to remove them from power.
4 Transparent: Open.	Opaque: Secretive.
5 Consistent, predictable and impartial: Outcomes from the governance processes are predictable and in accordance with published laws, rules and regulations. There is legal redress and enforcement of law by an impartial judiciary in the event of inconsistency.	Inconsistent, unpredictable and partial: Outcomes from the governance processes are unpredictable, do not follow discernable rules, and there is no redress from a judiciary, which behaves with partiality.
6 Accountable: Demonstrates stewardship by responding to questioning, explaining its actions, and providing evidence of how it functions.	Unaccountable: Does not account for its actions, and fails to produce evidence of its performance. There are no effective checks and balances to compel accountability.
7 Equitable: Deals fairly and impartially with individuals and groups providing non-discriminatory access to records and services.	Inequitable: Unfair and partial in dealings, favouring particular groups with access to power and discriminating against others, e.g. by gender, ethnicity or religion.
8 Sustainable: Balances the economic, social and environmental needs of present and future generations.	Unsustainable: Fails to balance the needs of future and present generations.
9 Locally responsive: Locates service provision at the closest level to citizens consistent with efficient and cost-effective delivery.	Locally unresponsive: Pays no regard to the convenience of citizens when locating services.
10 Participatory: Enables citizens to participate fully in governance through consensus building and engages with civil society without curbs on the media or on freedom of expression and association.	Exclusive: Excludes citizens from participation in governance with curbs on the media and on expression and association.
11 Provides security and stability: Provides security of livelihoods, freedom from crime and from intolerance, security from human conflicts and natural disasters, and security of tenure.	Unwilling or unable to provide security and stability: Citizens cannot look to the government for security, which may even be the source of their insecurity.
12 Integrity: Officials perform their duties diligently and objectively without seeking bribes, and give independent advice and judgements, and the government respects confidentiality. There is a clear separation between the private interests of officials and politicians and the affairs of government.	Corruption: Officials are bribed to do what citizens have a right to expect. They distort decisions in favour of those who reward them, and make use of confidential information for their own gain. Officials and politicians treat government as a vehicle with which to pursue their own private interests.

areas in which individual countries could focus their reform efforts.

DESCRIBING GOOD GOVERNANCE FOR LAND ADMINISTRATION AND LAND TENURE

Table 1 presents the characteristics of good governance derived from the literature on governance and its measurement. From this, one can draw out features of good governance in land tenure and administration, and derive policies that can promote good governance.

However, what do these ideas on good governance mean for land tenure and administration? Differences in emphasis about what good governance is have significant policy implications. A land administration system that is designed to enhance a pro-poor and gender-sensitive agenda is likely to place a high priority on areas such as achieving security of

tenure for lessees and sharecroppers, the recognition of informal and customary property rights, and the development of gender-neutral inheritance rights. A land administration system designed to promote commercial development is likely to place the priority on areas such as the speed of re-registration after sale, the speed and accuracy of searches to check for charges against properties for loan purposes, the clarity of regulations for planning and building, and the procedures for changing land use. This does not mean that a choice has to be made between eliminating corruption and improving the responsiveness and efficiency of services, or between benefiting the poor and promoting commercial development. A land administration system can be designed to serve different sectors of society. However, land administration that serves exclusively

TABLE 2

Examples of embodying good governance values

Good governance values in land tenure and administration	Examples of practice embodying good governance values	Relationship to Table 1
Land administration systems should be efficient, effective and competent.	Work is accurate and timely, with enquiries answered within a reasonable period. Work is undertaken by competent persons. Good performance is rewarded. Lazy or ineffective professionals are disciplined or dismissed.	1
Land policies that embody value judgements should be endorsed by elected politicians after consultation with interested and affected parties.	Land-use plans are approved by democratically elected politicians after effective public consultation.	2, 3, 10
Land information is freely available, subject to the protection of privacy.	Land register information can be freely accessed (subject to privacy constraints). Prices paid for properties are available from the land registry. Land tax assessments can be inspected so that taxpayers can challenge the fairness of assessments. Decisions on changes to land use are made in meetings that are open to the public, and citizens can make representations to the decision-makers.	4
Land laws and regulations should be freely available, well drafted, responsive and consistent, and able to be enforced by the government and citizens.	Citizens can bring land disputes before an independent and impartial judiciary that is supported, as appropriate, by technical experts. Laws are clear and consistent and translated into local languages. Alternative dispute resolution processes are available so that disputes can be settled by mediation and conciliation as an alternative to court actions. The decisions of the government in areas such as land-use planning, land taxation, and compulsory purchases can be challenged by citizens in the courts on points of law. Valuations used by the government in areas such as taxation and compulsory purchase can be challenged by citizens.	5
Land administration services should be independently audited, and should publish their accounts and performance indicators.	Land registration systems publish their accounts and key performance indicators, which are independently audited. Government accounts are kept on an accruals basis. Professional bodies separate their promotional and disciplinary activities.	6
Land administration services should be provided for all without discrimination, for example, on the basis of gender, ethnicity, religion, age, or political affiliation.	Inheritance laws do not discriminate by gender. Information is accessible for all, including illiterate population. The land rights of minorities are protected by land registration. Indigenous rights on land are recognized. The cost of land registration is affordable. Services do not require expensive external support (i.e. lawyers).	7
Sustainable land development should be encouraged.	Regulations to prevent unsustainable development are enforced.	8
Land services should be provided close to the user.	Land records can be accessed remotely using computer technology. Service points are accessible for remote settlements.	9
Land registration and legal systems should provide security of tenure for those with a legitimate interest in a land parcel.	Registered rights of people are legally protected against claims of others. Records can be altered only by authorized officials. Backup systems for land registration allow records to be recreated if destroyed by natural disasters or conflicts.	11
Land administration officials should behave with integrity and give independent advice based on their best professional judgement.	Policies exist to prevent and identify corrupt practices, insider trading and favouritism, and to discipline or prosecute those behaving in such ways. Policies protect "whistleblowers". Officials and politicians are required to disclose potential conflicts of interest and not to act in such cases. Government property is accounted for.	12

a limited purpose makes an equally limited contribution to overall development. It does mean that different countries may pursue different approaches to good governance in land administration because they have different priorities and values.

Achieving good governance in land administration requires a broad commitment by the people involved. A well-communicated land policy with clear objectives for legal and institutional reforms helps to establish wider ownership in the

change process by those working in land administration. Table 2 presents some examples as to how good governance values can be embodied in land administration.

WHY GOVERNANCE IN LAND ADMINISTRATION AND LAND TENURE MATTERS

Weak governance tends to flourish where the law is complex, inconsistent or obsolete. Fragmented institutional arrangements, weak institutions, ambiguous laws, and a weak judiciary create problems. Often, at

the heart of the problem is poor motivation, low pay and poor training rather than corrupt officials. Rather than being allocated on merit, jobs may be reserved for a particular ethnic or religious group, or those who support a political party or a favoured gender. Sometimes, low pay means that officials give priority to other sources of income. Land agencies are particularly vulnerable to weak governance when they are being restored after destruction caused by a violent conflict or emergency. Bad practices have the potential to spread quickly.

Weak governance is often associated with two principal types of corruption: “state capture” and “administrative corruption”, each with its own characteristic set of behaviours (World Bank, 2000):

- State capture is corruption on a grand scale. It transfers economic resources inappropriately from the state to private interests. The state can be “captured” by individuals, families, clans, groups, or commercial companies. Those who capture the state are able to direct government policy for their own benefit, which can include the passing of laws and regulations, civil and criminal court decisions, favourable tax and customs treatment, and the corrupt mishandling of funds.
- Administrative corruption is about the abuse of office by individual officials who use their power for self-enrichment rather than to execute the tasks for which they were appointed. Officials in a regime of administrative corruption seek bribes to evade controls, to speed-up administrative procedures, and to produce results that favour the bribers. Chaotic administration and unclear procedures help officials secure bribes. Administrative corruption is often downplayed as insignificant gift giving, such as “tea money” or “drinks”, but the truth is different. Gift giving is not insignificant. It makes land administration exclusive. Gifts are not a gesture of friendship but a price of service and mostly unaffordable for the weakest. Frauds are a common feature of administrative

corruption, such as false claims, invoices and valuations. Officials may also engage in extortion, requiring individuals and commercial companies to make payments in order to avoid being harassed.

The consequences of weak governance can be summarized as follows:

- Poverty and social exclusion. Weak governance hits the poor particularly badly as they lack the resources to pay the bribes to obtain services and they cannot afford legal protection, particularly to defend their rights to land.
- Constraints on economic development. Weak governance and corruption restrict development by increasing business risks, reducing incentives for investment, saving and entrepreneurship, and distorting incentives.
- Environmental degradation. People may pay corrupt officials to be exempt from controls on building or land-use planning, and over the extraction of water or minerals. Informal payments or political influence may prevent the enforcement of regulations designed to protect the environment.
- Reduced public revenues. People may evade taxes by making informal payments. Valuations of properties for tax purposes may be understated deliberately in order to lower the tax burden.
- Tenure insecurity. Illegal transfers may cause legitimate owners or occupiers to lose their rights. Informal transfers and informal ownership of properties are not protected by law, and the protection by customary tenures may not be all-inclusive, for example of newcomers. Those who capture the state may use land registration systems to reinforce their claims to land, even when the land has been acquired through “land grabbing”.
- Weak governance leads to disputes. It provides opportunities for the powerful to claim the land of others, including the state.

- Weak land and credit markets. Weak governance may encourage people to seek a higher loan-to-value ratio on land parcels offered as collateral than would be prudent for banks to grant, or a larger loan than the borrower's income would justify. Informal payments may allow people to obtain fraudulently excessive valuations of the collateral or make false statements of income, which increase the vulnerability of the banking system.
- Negative social behaviour. Corrupt behaviour has a corrosive effect on ethics and social behaviour. Observing others behaving corruptly can reduce the sense of social obligation and the willingness to conform to laws.
- Abuse of compulsory purchase. Weak governance may prevent people from receiving fair compensation. Compensation might not be paid, or it may be paid at a falsely lower or higher value, and may not reach all those who suffer losses. Compulsory purchase may be a powerful tool for self-enrichment where corruption flourishes.

IMPROVING GOVERNANCE IN LAND TENURE AND ADMINISTRATION

The methods of improving governance in land tenure and administration are rarely unique to it, and experience elsewhere can help to develop good practice. Public agencies and private companies face the same problem of ensuring that their employees do not pursue their own self-interests at the expense of the public or their stakeholders. Many of the methods used in private companies have been found to work in the public sector. The measures put forward in this article work where there is reasonable quality of governance and respect for its principles. They are likely to work best in a society in which progress is being made to improve the governance of society as a whole. In many countries, the standard of governance is so low that it is difficult to see how improvements in the governance of land tenure and administration can be made

without fundamental changes in the system of government. If the government is not committed to democracy, the rule of law and human rights, improvements in the governance of land tenure and administration will be difficult to achieve. However, working to achieve higher standards of land administration can be one of the ways in which a dysfunctional society improves its governance. Ways to improve governance are:

- Set service standards. Weak governance thrives where there are unclear service standards, such as the time that a procedure should take and what it should produce. Without enforceable service standards, inefficiency can develop unchecked, which in turn creates opportunities for bribery, corruption and favouritism. The introduction of service standards is an important part of shifting the focus from the producer to the customer. Standards have little credibility if they are not monitored and if they and the results of the monitoring are not made public.
- Improve systems and processes. The achievement of standards requires planning and implementation. The processes for which standards are required should be identified. Chaotic and unclear processes provide an environment in which bad practices can flourish and avoid detection. Simplification of processes reduces costs, improves efficiency and improves governance by reducing the opportunities for corruption.
- Build capacity. Good governance in land administration is effective, competent and sensitive. It cannot be found where there is insufficient capacity to deliver the services. Capacity building requires adequate investment in human resources through training and staff development, and in technical resources, including buildings and equipment.
- Secure finances. Capacity building requires stable finances. Money is

needed for the physical environment, staff development, and day-to-day operating expenses. Staff morale is crucial and requires that staff be paid on time and at a rate of pay that reflects the market wage. Land administration can be financed in different ways, including from state budgets, public-private partnerships, and from fees paid by users.

- Develop a human resources policy. Good governance is not achievable unless services are delivered by people who have the right skills and attitudes and are motivated to achieve it. This requires a human resources policy that embraces all aspects of employing people, including recruitment, remuneration and employee benefits, training and personal development, career progression, and disciplining those who break the rules. A key principle is that of equal opportunities.
- Establish independent auditing. Independent auditing aims to provide transparency in accounting and includes testing the systems of financial management and control, and not merely the checking of accounts. Genuinely independent auditing of the public sector requires an ability to report problems to an appropriate body with the power to take action over abuses uncovered. Auditors can also audit service standards and the systems for monitoring these
- Make effective use of information technology and communications (ITC). ITC has the potential to improve the governance of land administration by improving efficiency, consistency, accountability, transparency and accessibility. Productivity increases arise as large numbers of transactions can be carried out at lower costs. The computerization of land records means that files can no longer be the “personal” property of corrupt officials but leave audit trails.
- Support professional organizations. Professional organizations working

in land administration can provide a code of ethics for their members. Governments may decide only to employ land administrators who are members of appropriate professional bodies. This means dismissing officials who are expelled from their professional body for technical incompetence or breaching the code of behaviour.

- Strengthen customary institutions. Formal land administration is irrelevant to vast numbers of people in the world who live in informal urban settlements or where not-recognized-by-law customary tenure prevails in rural areas. Good governance in land tenure also means achieving this in informal tenures. While the rules of formal and customary tenure may differ significantly, the concept of good governance is similar, that is, the tenure institutions should be efficient, effective, competent, responsive, transparent, accountable, equitable and predictable. Customary institutions should be strengthened to improve their internal administration of land and interactions with others.

CONCLUSIONS

Governance is the process and manner of government recognizing that authority and power in society is vested in many institutions and not only in itself. Weak governance in land administration has adverse consequences for society as a whole. Good governance in land administration helps economic development and reduces poverty.

Reversing weak governance is a long-term, never-ending process rather than a short-term project. Good governance requires a willingness to overcome existing weaknesses and the opposition from people who wish to maintain the benefits they receive from corrupt activities. Good governance also requires developing the capacity that is needed in order to make change possible. Achieving good governance in land tenure and administration is not easy but it is attainable and, given the potential impact on

the social status of the poor and for economic growth, it is certainly worth trying for.

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Bonne gouvernance dans les projets d'administration foncière: préparation et mise en place des projets et renforcement des capacités

L'administration foncière est très souvent pénalisée par une gouvernance déficiente et son corollaire le plus grave: la corruption, qu'elle soit bureaucratique et/ou politique. Cette question délicate se pose à toutes les étapes des projets d'administration foncière. Pour la résoudre, les nouveaux projets doivent incorporer des mesures de bonne gouvernance dès la phase de préparation et, dans l'idéal, des discussions doivent être entamées entre le gouvernement, le secteur privé et la société civile pour fixer les objectifs en matière de gouvernance et inclure des mesures anti-corruption dans le cadre du projet. Il faut par ailleurs éviter de ne s'intéresser qu'aux aspects techniques. Les projets en cours doivent inclure progressivement des mesures favorisant la bonne gouvernance dans l'administration foncière.

Cet article présente un certain nombre de mesures qui peuvent être appliquées pendant la préparation et la mise en œuvre des projets. Cependant, pour que les mesures proposées ou introduites par un projet puissent avoir un effet durable, le personnel des institutions chargées de l'administration foncière d'un pays doit être formé aux questions de gouvernance, quel que soit le niveau administratif considéré. Il faut donc élaborer de nouveaux programmes de formation et modifier les programmes des divers enseignements existants, mais également mettre en place une nouvelle approche en matière de renforcement de capacités, axée sur l'actualisation et le perfectionnement des connaissances et des compétences en matière de bonne gouvernance.

Buena gestión pública de los proyectos de administración de la tierra: preparación y ejecución de los proyectos, y fortalecimiento de la capacidad

Dada la existencia generalizada de una gestión pública deficiente de la administración de la tierra y sus efectos potencialmente graves, la cuestión de la corrupción, tanto a nivel burocrático como político, debería abordarse en los proyectos de administración de tierras. Ello puede hacerse en cualquier etapa. Los nuevos proyectos deberían incorporar medidas de buena gestión pública en la fase de preparación y, de ser posible, deberían entablarse conversaciones entre la administración, el sector privado y la sociedad civil para ponerse de acuerdo sobre los objetivos de la gestión pública a fin de que incluyan medidas contra la corrupción al diseñar el proyecto. Deberían evitarse los enfoques centrados únicamente en los aspectos técnicos. Los proyectos en curso pueden introducir gradualmente medidas para promover la buena gestión pública de la administración de la tierra.

En este artículo se presenta una serie de medidas que se pueden aplicar durante la preparación y la ejecución del proyecto. Sin embargo, para que las medidas propuestas o introducidas por el proyecto tengan un impacto a largo plazo, debería formarse a las personas que trabajan en todas las instituciones del país relacionadas con la tierra en las cuestiones referentes a la gestión pública. Ello requiere no sólo nuevos programas de formación y cambios en los planes de estudio actuales de educación y formación, sino también un nuevo planteamiento del fortalecimiento de la capacidad que, además de centrarse en unos conocimientos teóricos y prácticos adecuados y actualizados, abarque las actitudes.

Good governance in land administration projects: project preparation, project implementation, and capacity building

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Given the widespread existence of weak governance in land administration and its potentially serious impacts, corruption – at both the bureaucratic and political levels – should be addressed by land administration projects. This can be done at any stage. New projects should incorporate good governance measures at the preparation phase and, ideally, discussions should be initiated among government, the private sector and civil society to agree on governance objectives and to include anticorruption measures in the project design. Approaches that focus entirely on technical aspects should be avoided. Ongoing projects can gradually introduce measures to promote good governance in land administration.

This article presents a number of measures that can be applied during project preparation and implementation. However, if the measures proposed or introduced by a project are to have a long-term impact, individuals in all land-related institutions in the country should be trained in governance-related matters. This requires not only new training programmes and changes to the curricula of existing education and training provision, but also a new approach to capacity building that extends its focus on updated and adequate knowledge and skills to encompass attitudes.

INTRODUCTION: STATUS QUO AND RESULTING NEEDS FOR PROJECT WORK

Land administration in developing countries is often characterized by weak governance. Apart from generally weak public-sector management, land administration is often marked by bureaucratic and political corruption. In many developing countries, land registration agencies are considered to be among the most corrupt and inefficient government agencies.

Petty or bureaucratic corruption in land administration is related mainly to land registration, surveying and property valuation. It includes all kinds of informal payments to obtain or speed up service, to receive a service that has already been paid for, to avoid inspections of a property, or to pay for illegal services (e.g. registration of fraudulent titles or the undervaluation of property to save taxes). Non-transparency –

planned or by accident – often favours petty corruption (Box 1).

Grand or political corruption (state capture) concerns mainly state land management. It includes activities such as the illegal sale and lease of state land by public officials, as well as transfers of state property to political elites. Such corruption may affect other aspects of governance, for example the impartiality of courts dealing with land conflicts and litigation.

Petty and grand corruption lead to a number of negative impacts, such as:

- insecurity of tenure;
- high transaction costs;
- informal land transactions, creating an informal property market;
- reduced private-sector investment;
- land grabbing and illegal transfers of state land;
- limited local revenues (tax);

BOX 1

The art of non-transparency: land related fees in the Lao People's Democratic Republic

The Lao People's Democratic Republic is doing well in privatizing land and securing property for individuals – for men as well as women. Land rights are comparatively secure, and urban as well as rural citizens can trade in land and mortgage their land. However, when they want to (or have to) register their land to sell or mortgage it, they have to make enormous illegal payments. Lao land administration is a typical example of non-transparency concerning land-related fees – maximizing opportunities for corruption. Fees related to land measuring, surveying and registration are regulated in no fewer than six decrees, notifications, ministerial directions, etc. In October 2006, new notary fees entered into force that give a good example of the clear and fair, however confusing, fee structure:

Value declared in the contract	Service fee per set of documents (KN)	Service fee per page
Up to 1 000 000	10 000	1 000
From 1 000 000 to less than 100 000 000:	10 000 + 0.1% of the amount exceeding 1 000 000	1 000
From 100 000 000 up to less than 1 000 000 000:	110 000 + 0.05% of the amount exceeding 100 000 000	1 000
From 1 000 000 000 and over:	610 000 + 0.02% of the amount exceeding 1 000 000 000	1 000

Note: KN10 000 = US\$1.

These fees can definitely not be calculated with the ordinary calculator available in the notary offices in the Lao People's Democratic Republic. Even if notaries manage to calculate the fees (which is doubtful), most of the clients will have problems in verifying that the amount to pay is correct. The situation is similar in land registration offices – fees are not posted up anywhere; only one poster includes another calculation (it shows how to calculate registration fees). However, nowhere can you receive an overview on clear and simple fees – in whatever form. The law includes a huge number of different cases for registration fees (at least 30). To deal with land issues in the Lao People's Democratic Republic, you have to be a good mathematician. Customers even stated in a client survey that the only reason they had to come back for was that their fees still had to be calculated. Others simply assumed that the real reason was that they did not pay enough speed-up money, such as the tuk-tuk driver who had already been to the Land Office in Vientiane 18 times for the simple purpose of transferring property.

Another example is the land registration fees, which actually are rather more like a land transfer tax. Again, they are not easy to determine: 0.5–4 percent of either the full land value before titling (and valuation), or based on 30–35 percent of the land value after titling. The rule takes into consideration the fact that people normally cheat on values as long as there is no valuation (which in the Lao People's Democratic Republic comes with the titling). However, even in remote rural areas, officers do evaluate the land in case of registration (which people therefore generally avoid).

To sum up, current transaction costs in the Lao People's Democratic Republic are high and hinder the development of a formal land market as too many transactions are done informally in order to avoid transaction costs, which can easily lead to tenure insecurity in the future.

Sources: Wehrmann, Soulivanh and Onmanivong (2006); Wehrmann, Souphida and Sithipanhya (2007).

- different sorts of land conflicts;
- landlessness and inequitable land distribution;
- social instability, social exclusion and political instability;
- erosion of ethics and standards of behaviour;
- unsustainable natural resources management.

Given the wide existence of weak governance in land administration and the immense negative impact of it, land administration projects should address both corruption in land administration as well as state capture. This can be done at any time. New projects should already include good governance measures in the project preparation phase, and, ideally, initiate discussions among government, private sector and civil society to agree on governance objectives and to include anticorruption measures in the project design – entirely technical approaches should definitely be avoided. In the case of donor assistance in land administration projects, identifying and addressing issues of governance should be widely adopted. In some countries, a governance assessment might even be recommended in order to avoid project failure. Ongoing projects can step-wise include measures to promote good governance in land administration and finally to address crucial issues such as:

- transparency,
- accountability,
- efficiency,
- effectiveness,
- equity,
- fairness,
- predictability,
- de-politicization,
- public participation,
- legal security,
- rule of law.

A monitoring framework can be set up at any time. In some regions, such as in the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), benchmarking could even be an incentive for governments to fight corruption in land administration and to demonstrate their achievements.

This article gives an overview on activities that are currently applied in different donor-supported projects – mainly in Asia and the CEEC – to improve good governance in land administration. To increase the effect of project measures, a broad range of capacity building on this issue is needed in almost all developing countries. Therefore, the article includes training needs and recommendations for capacity building concerning good governance in land administration as discussed at an expert group meeting in January 2007 in Nairobi jointly organized by International Institute for Geo-Information Science and Earth Observation (ITC) and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT).

GOOD GOVERNANCE IN LAND ADMINISTRATION DURING PROJECT PREPARATION

As most – if not all – land administration projects have to face either petty or grand corruption or both, the recommendation is to include good governance issues in the project design and to conduct a governance assessment where possible during project preparation, otherwise directly after the beginning of the project at the latest.

Governance assessment

The governance assessment or the identification of the status quo should include:

- an institutional analysis on administrative weaknesses;
- a customer and landowner survey on petty corruption;
- an analysis on state land management in order to identify grand corruption;
- a policy analysis on ongoing national activities to strengthen good governance in other sectors.

Corruption is a hot and unpleasant issue, so the question remains as to whether it should be addressed already during project preparation or whether it needs more confidence among the partners. The advantages of including a “governance check” in the preparation phase are that:

BOX 2

Governance overview note for a land administration project in Albania

During the pre-appraisal mission for a new land administration and management project in Albania, with financial support from the World Bank, a governance overview note (World Bank, 2006) had to be prepared to assess governance issues in land administration and land management.

The World Bank's 2006 country assistance strategy aims to support Albania's efforts in improving governance. It recognizes that more coherent efforts need to be made to address the challenge of poor governance. Therefore, it introduces a "governance filter" consisting of four core principles to be used to ensure that governance considerations are mainstreamed into all of the activities supported by the World Bank:

- Seek greater transparency in the use of public resources.
- Support increased autonomy and de-politicization of key public-sector counterpart organizations.
- Analyse the formal (and probable future) roles of local governments, and develop capacity – and local mechanism of accountability – to enable local governments to take these roles effectively.
- Strengthen mechanisms for advocacy and increased involvement of citizens (including non-governmental stakeholders) to encourage improved performance of public service delivery and policy-making bodies.

The governance overview note integrates these four principles (or the "governance filter") into the land administration project design. It consists of three parts:

- Summary of ongoing governance reforms in Albania concerning land management and urban development.
- Assessment of the institutional and governance perspective of the responsible national institution and municipalities (system and weaknesses).
- Measures and indicators: Based on the institutional analysis, specific measures addressing governance issues were identified and included in all components of the project.

- awareness can be raised right from the outset;
- good governance can be made a project objective;
- a baseline study for future monitoring could be prepared;
- lacking political will to address weak governance – especially state capture – could become a reason not to start a project at all.

However, it should avoid becoming just another feasibility study that increases workload during project preparation without entering seriously into the project design.

An example where a governance assessment was included in the project preparation is the land administration and management project in Albania supported by the World Bank, where a "governance overview note" was prepared in 2006 (Box 2) that led to specific measures addressing governance issues in each project component.

A governance assessment can be done in different ways. It can include a more formal approach or be based on rather informal interviews. How it should be conducted depends entirely on the specific situation. However, it should include certain key questions for analysis and evaluation (Zakout, Wehrmann and Törhönen, 2006):

- How many days/weeks/years does it take to register a property?
- How many steps are needed to register a property?
- How many informal payments have to be paid for land registration?
- Are the registered rights protected under the law?
- Are there clear and appropriate service standards?
- Are these service standards easily accessible for the public? Are they known by the clients?
- Is the application of these service standards monitored regularly?

- Are there complaints mechanisms for people not satisfied with land registration (e.g. hotline, customers' survey, and complaints box)?
- Is information on properties and land ownership available to the public?
- Do the land records cover all social groups and all geographical areas, or are certain groups or areas marginalized?
- Is there a state land inventory, and is it available to the public?
- Are there clear, fair and transparent rules for state land management (including regulations for leases, concessions, etc.), and are they applied consistently?
- Does the government have clear, transparent and well-functioning procedures of dispossession of state land, including mechanisms for control and sanctions?
- Are there public displays in case of boundary delimitation, adjudication or systematic registration?
- Is there any evidence of corruption in court decisions with respect to land disputes? If so, what is the government doing about it?
- Is there any evidence of corruption in customary land administration? If so, what is the government doing about it?
- Is there any evidence that poor people are deprived of their property rights owing to weak governance in land administration?
- Is there any evidence that legitimated landowners are deprived of their property rights owing to their customary origin (vague boundaries, oral proof only, etc.)?

Governance indicators

The discussion is still ongoing as to whether key questions are adequate to follow up on governance issues concerning land administration or whether indicators should be used instead or in addition. Indicators provide the opportunity to measure changes and to compare between different times and different places. However, there might be in-

country resistance from those parties who fear an increase in transparency. Another fear – this time rather from the side of social scientists – is that indicators often do not reflect the real situation but distort it. If indicators are considered, they should be simple, developed in cooperation with the key stakeholders, and limited in number – catching the key issues without distorting reality.

Indicators are definitely useful for monitoring and benchmarking. At international level, consideration should be given to developing about ten key indicators that could be used for country comparison. The same indicators – maybe including some additional country-specific ones – could also be used for baseline studies and monitoring of progress in land-related governance within a given country. A broad discussion should be held as to whether land-related governance indicators should be institutionalized in the form of an annual ranking – similar to the Doing Business indicators published by the World Bank.

Possible indicators could be:

- Days taken to register a property.
- Number of steps needed to register a property.
- Amount of informal payment that has to be paid for land registration (could be measured as a percentage of total registration costs or of property value).
- Clarity, appropriateness and accessibility of service standards (on a scale of 1–10).
- Availability of information on properties and landownership for the public (on a scale of 1–10).
- Inclusiveness of land records (on a scale of 1–10).
- Existence, transparency, availability and regular updating of a state land inventory.
- Existence and application of clear, fair and transparent rules for state land management (including regulations for leases, concessions, etc.).
- Existence and application of clear, transparent and well-functioning procedures of dispossession of state

land, including mechanisms for control and sanctions.

- Degree of public participation, e.g. in case of land-use zoning, boundary delimitation, adjudication or systematic registration (on a scale of 1–10).
- Number of annual cases of corruption in court decisions with respect to land disputes.
- Number of annual forced evictions.
- Number of land conflicts resulting from legal pluralism.
- Number of annual cases of embezzlement of customary land by customary chiefs.
- Number of annual cases of embezzlement of state land by state officials.

GOOD GOVERNANCE IN LAND ADMINISTRATION DURING PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

Some land administration and land policy projects supported by the World Bank or the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Development Agency – GTZ) already include a wide range of activities to improve good governance in land administration and land management; others could be added. Measures to improve good governance in the land sector are:

- introduction of counter offices (front desks);
- introduction of, or improvement in, service standards;
- reform of fee structure, including changes in regulations;
- client surveys;
- introduction of hotlines and complaints boxes;
- public access to the cadastre via the Internet;
- people's participation in adjudication and demarcation;
- participatory land-use planning and land-use zoning;
- improvements in state land management.

Additional measures dealing with informal settlements could also be considered in order to fight weak governance, such as:

- regularization, formalization and legalization of informal settlements;

- anti-eviction campaigns, moratorium, social concessions, land sharing, etc.

Finally, measures that improve recognition and transparency of customary tenure will also improve governance in the land sector:

- recognition of customary tenure by statutory law;
- demarcation of stool land boundaries (currently, some first experience from Ghana);
- provision of customary land titles (for men and women).

In the following sections, only measures of the first category are further explained, as they should be considered in any land administration project, while the others are only relevant for certain countries. More details about most of the examples referred to can be found in Zakout, Wehrmann and Törhönen (2006).

Counter offices

Counter offices are thought to bring more transparency. Land registers and cadastral offices are often a chaotic mess, with files lying around, people standing everywhere – nothing looks organized. The muddle facilitates unobserved informal payments to accelerate the service. Counter offices improve orderly interface with the client and reduce bribery (Plate 1). Well-organized front offices – so the common understanding – can therefore contribute significantly to the reduction of corruption and to an increase in the efficiency in registering transactions, and thus to customer satisfaction. Front desks have been introduced in Russia (Moscow), Albania (Tirana), the Lao People's Democratic Republic (eight provincial offices) and in many other countries all over the world. However, experience from the Lao People's Democratic Republic shows that the construction of the physical structure is definitely not sufficient. A customer survey showed that officers still demanded a lot of informal payments. Therefore, front desks can only fight corruption where they are introduced in combination with clear and short procedures as well as transparent fees



PLATE 1

**Counter office at
a provincial land
management agency in the
Lao People's Democratic
Republic.**

and a code of conduct for officers. Physical structures alone will not solve the problem.

Service standards and improved services

Where procedures are slow, unorganized, not monitored and do not follow clear standards, it is easy for corruption to occur. However, the re-organization of workflows leading to short and fast procedures that are regularly monitored and that are transparent to the public makes it difficult for corruption to occur. Therefore, service standards and improved services are key measures for any good governance approach in land administration.

Examples of good service standards are:

- clearly defined steps in the land registration procedure;
- transparent and fixed fees for registration, notaries, surveying, etc.;
- use of standard forms;
- public notice on the procedure (posters, leaflets, Web site, etc.);
- complaint mechanisms (regular surveys, hotlines, complaints boxes).

According to World Bank officers, the significant reduction in informal payments at the new desk offices in the land registration offices in Moscow is probably because of the improved workflow, which is monitored by the head of the office to ensure that customers do not wait longer than the specified time. In Thailand, a one-day standard time for land registration

has been introduced. This can work as the number of staff of each office is determined by the average number of transactions, and therefore prevents work overflow.

In addition, each land office is limited to 100 000 titles. If the number of land titles exceeds 100 000, the office will be divided and a new branch will be established (Zakout, Wehrmann and Törhönen, 2006). In the Lao People's Democratic Republic, a number of posters are used to inform people about the procedure. One of them also includes the time needed for each procedure. However, the client survey showed that this time is often exceeded. Any service standard requires monitoring and sanctions in the event of non-fulfilment. In addition, as important as, or even more important than, public displays of the duration of certain services is information on the fees. The land registration office in Tirana, Albania, provides very good information on this aspect.

Reform of fee structure

As the example from the Lao People's Democratic Republic shows (Box 1), it is highly important to reform fee structures. In some countries, either too many decrees dealing with fee and taxes exist or there are too many exceptions, special cases and categories for which special rates apply. Although the objective might have been in many cases to be fair and

BOX 3

Insights from a client survey in the Lao People's Democratic Republic

Customers of a land registration agency in the Lao People's Democratic Republic gave the following recommendations and suggestions for improvement – proving a very good understanding of what is going on and how the situation could easily be improved (Wehrmann, Soulivanh and Onmanivong, 2006):

- Provide faster services.
- Recruit more staff to serve the clients.
- Reduce too many meetings, and pay attention to the clients.
- Be more careful in handling clients' matters and documents (too many losses!).
- Provide the right comments to the right issue or problem.
- Be more punctual in starting work.
- Reduce the level of bribery.
- Do not keep the documents for months and ask extra money from us for returning our papers.
- Provide fairness to everyone equally in terms of services (not based on money in the pocket).
- Be more knowledgeable in the area that the staff are responsible for.
- Be able to inform the clients when the document is done/lost.
- Reduce the amount of fees paid by the clients.
- Reduce the number of sections where fees have to be paid / fewer steps, fewer people involved.
- Provide clear and concise instructions for paying fees / clear and transparent fees.
- Have a stricter boss and better human resources control.
- Work and responsibility should come first for all staff / code of conduct.
- Make the process easier.
- Give clear instructions on how to complete documents.
- Inform about the exact time needed and give clear appointment for the next visit (do not say "tomorrow" and then another "tomorrow").
- Give clear information/instructions on what documents are needed.
- Set up a queue clear and neatly.
- Introduce better record-keeping to allow other staff to continue the case if the person in charge is not in the office.
- Abolish parking fees.
- Staff should be more polite.
- Send documents home on request.
- The process should be done in one day, where possible.
- Dismiss staff who cannot work and hire new staff.
- Try to reduce bribery in this office at all levels, which is the main thing/activity in this office.

to recognize differences in wealth (kind of land use, and type of property), in the end it simply increases non-transparency and, thereby, allows for corruption. Land administration projects should revise fee and tax structures. Sometimes, additional confusion is created through fees that rather have the function of a tax as they simply exist to generate state revenue and not to cover government costs for a certain service. In this case, a re-organization of fees and taxes might be needed, based on a

clear cost–benefit analysis and transparent documentation on which payment is to cover costs and which one to increase the state budget (preferably, it should state for what purpose the tax money will be used).

Client survey

Client or customer surveys are becoming increasingly popular as they give a very good insight about the existence of petty corruption. Recent experience has been gained in projects supported by the World

Bank in Albania and Romania as well as in a GTZ-supported project in the Lao People's Democratic Republic. This kind of survey helps to gain insight into:

- the level of awareness and knowledge of customers regarding service standards of cadastre and land registration offices;
- the performance of the cadastre and land registration offices in delivering their services;
- the degree of client satisfaction with the operation of the system;
- stakeholders' views of shortcomings in the functioning of the system.

The survey questions generally focus on the following topics:

- waiting and turn-around time;
- official and non-official costs involved;
- clients' satisfaction with the services provided and recommendations for improvement.

Although client surveys give valuable information on effectiveness and details on corruption, they only allow comments to be obtained from those who become involved in the formal sector, i.e. those who register the land. To be able to also include those people who avoid registration, a household survey or landowner survey can be conducted. One such survey conducted in the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Box 3) gave very good additional information on why people avoid the formal system – mainly owing to weak governance.

Hotlines and complaints boxes

Hotlines (Plate 2) and complaints boxes are a good way of receiving feedback from customers at national and local level. Some people prefer complaints boxes as these are more anonymous. However, both only have a positive impact if “the person who receives the complaint changes something or explains to other people what he will do, not just keep our letter” (comment from a client survey)!

Public access to the cadastre via the Internet

In Croatia and Lithuania, the public can easily access the digital cadastre and land registry through the Internet. The benefits are that data are easy to access and people



PLATE 2

Poster informing about a customer hotline (Real Estate Cadastre and Registration Project, State Authority for Geodetic Works, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).

do not have to pay informal payments to obtain them. This system also improves transparency and saves time as people do not have to go to land registration offices for a simple data request. This reduces queuing and again gives fewer incentives to ask for speed-up money. However, when introducing e-governance to land registration, much attention has to be given to data security and data management safeguards in order to avoid misuse.

Participatory land inventory, boundary mapping and adjudication as well as participatory land-use planning or zoning

The objectives of people's participation in a land inventory, in boundary mapping, in land adjudication, and in land-use zoning or planning are to ensure transparency, to protect people's rights, and to prevent fraud and corruption. Recent examples can be taken from:

- Cambodia, where the rural population has regularly been involved in land adjudication which included a public display of the land inventory together with a map showing the parcel boundaries;
- the Lao People's Democratic Republic, where the rural population has been involved in land-use planning that was conducted in combination with land allocations owing to privatization of land);
- Indonesia, where a community land inventory and boundary mapping has been done following the tsunami.

In all three cases, people received a formal document in the end proving their legal ownership rights, ranging from temporary land-use rights in the Lao People's Democratic Republic to titles in Cambodia and in Bandah Aceh (Indonesia).

Improvements in state land management

All the above-mentioned activities address petty corruption only. To fight grand corruption, a reform in state land management is normally necessary.

Individual measures could include:

- the consolidation of all state land management under one agency;
- the preparation of an inventory of state land;
- the development of clear and transparent procedures to manage, lease and transfer state land (including model contracts);
- the recovery of state assets.

Even where – as in the case of Kenya – a comprehensive report on state capture, proposing/asking for hard measures to punish the individuals responsible and to force them to give the land back to the state did not result in the recovery of state land, it did at least change tremendously the behaviour of state officials dealing with state land. There are far fewer irregularities now compared with the past.

CAPACITY BUILDING FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE IN LAND ADMINISTRATION

All the measures proposed or introduced by a project will only have a long-term impact

if people in all land-related institutions in the country are trained in governance matters. This requires not only new training programmes and changes in the curricula of existing education and training (including new subjects such as governance or business/public administration in order to create future land administrators with management skills who can legally build better-financed institutions), it also needs a new approach to capacity building. How do you want to stop someone from abusing his/her position? How do you convince students never to take advantage of an opportunity – although this is regularly done by most officers?

This can only be achieved if capacity building offers more than knowledge and tools. Good governance-oriented training should focus on knowledge, skills and attitudes. While knowledge can be taught more or less easily, and skills can be trained, attitudes need to be addressed sensitively. Concerning the knowledge to be transferred, it should include unconventional approaches that reflect poor people's realities. Skills must fit into the country's technological setting and consider the financial limits. To achieve a change in attitudes, students and trainees have to be sensitized and have to reflect on their own attitudes. This can be achieved in the form of role-plays and partner exercises in a positive environment where confidence has been created. The way lecturers and trainers teach has to reflect the attitudes they want the participants to incorporate.

Current capacity building is often marked by outdated, conventional, expensive models taught in a rather top-down way and lacking practical application. However, the graduates of these training institutions are the ones who define the land administration procedures and form their institutions. If we want to change them, we have to start with new forms and new contents of capacity building.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

While there are many possible measures to remedy administrative weaknesses and

quite a range of measures to combat petty corruption, rather few actions have been taken so far to fight grand corruption. Consequently, more focus is needed on state land management, such as state land allocation, privatization of state land, and state land leases and concessions.

My personal impression is that sometimes governments even welcome project activities that focus on weak governance and petty corruption as it helps them to hide grand corruption. They can show that they are fighting corruption, but without losing their own additional sources of income. This can be seen as an opportunity to address petty corruption, but if project activities stop there, they would not achieve justice. Therefore, the recommendation is that land administration projects should always include a land policy component and include a governance assessment in the project preparation phase – looking at petty and grand corruption.

However, the question remains as to how to deal with grand corruption and how to address “the big five” (high-ranking

politicians [president/ministers], the military, the courts, the police, and parties).

Slowly but surely, changes can be achieved through capacity building and change management, given that these focus not only on updated and adequate knowledge and skills but also include a focus on attitudes.

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Bonne gouvernance et gestion des terres publiques

La nature des relations avec le pouvoir, notamment entre l'État et la société civile, est au cœur de la gestion des terres publiques. Il s'agit en particulier des relations, bonnes ou mauvaises, établies pendant les périodes de nationalisation, de colonisation, de restitution ou de privatisation pendant la transition politique. La mise en commun de l'expérience acquise par d'autres pays en matière de réforme du secteur foncier est une nécessité et d'un intérêt primordial.

De nombreux pays développés, en période de post-transition ou en développement, ont entamé une révision complète du rôle du gouvernement dans leurs sociétés, notamment en réformant le secteur public et les principes de délégation des pouvoirs aux autorités locales en matière de gestion des biens fonciers publics. Les principes généraux d'une «bonne» gestion des biens collectifs ayant été définis, les gouvernements se doivent de les adopter afin de renforcer leurs systèmes de gestion de la propriété publique et améliorer leur efficacité et leur transparence.

La réforme de la gestion des terres publiques doit contribuer à l'élaboration d'un ensemble de principes de développement fondamentaux, notamment la réduction de l'extrême pauvreté, la réalisation des Objectifs du Millénaire pour le développement, l'accomplissement de progrès en matière de bonne gouvernance et l'amélioration de la gestion fiscale du secteur public. Mettre en place une bonne gouvernance en matière de gestion des terres publiques impose en premier lieu d'établir une politique qui encadre l'intervention des gouvernements dans les questions foncières. Toute amélioration dans ce domaine passe inévitablement par la formulation d'une politique explicite de gestion des terres publiques conforme à la politique foncière et à une politique fiscale qui fixe des objectifs clairs en termes de croissance économique, d'équité, de développement social, de gestion durable de l'environnement et de transparence fiscale.

Buena gestión pública de tierras demaniales

La historia de las tierras de dominio público es una historia de relaciones de poder, de la relación entre el Estado y la sociedad civil así como de experiencias —tanto buenas como malas— en períodos de nacionalización, colonización, restitución o privatización durante la transición política. Existe una necesidad y un interés claros en intercambiar experiencias sobre la labor en curso de reforma del sector de las tierras demaniales en todo el mundo.

Muchos países desarrollados, países en fase de post-transición y países en desarrollo han emprendido una reevaluación a fondo de la función del gobierno en sus sociedades. Existe una tendencia a reformar el sector público y a delegar la adopción de decisiones sobre las tierras públicas en las entidades locales. Se han establecido principios generales de «buena» gestión de bienes que las administraciones deben adoptar para reforzar sus sistemas de gestión de los bienes públicos y aumentar su eficiencia y transparencia.

La reforma de la gestión de las tierras públicas debe contribuir a un conjunto básico de principios de desarrollo, a saber, la reducción de la pobreza, el logro de los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio, el progreso en la buena gestión pública y la transparencia de la gestión pública de los impuestos. La buena gestión pública de las tierras demaniales implica, en primer lugar, el establecimiento de una política adecuada con respecto a cómo debería intervenir la administración en las cuestiones relativas a la tierra. El elemento más decisivo para orientar la mejora en este ámbito es la formulación de una política explícita de gestión de las tierras públicas en consonancia con la política de tierras y la política fiscal que establezca con claridad los objetivos relacionados con el crecimiento económico, la equidad y el desarrollo social, la sostenibilidad ambiental y la transparencia de la política fiscal.

Good governance in public land management

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The story about public land is a story of power relations, the relationship between state and civil society, and experiences – both good and bad – during periods of nationalization, colonization, restitution or privatization during political transition. There is a clear need for, and interest in, sharing experiences about ongoing work on reforming the public land sector around the world.

Many developed countries, post-transition countries and developing countries have embarked on a thorough re-evaluation of the role of government in their societies. There is a trend towards public-sector reform and delegation of decision-making over public land assets to local authorities. General principles for “good” asset management have been established that governments need to adopt in order to strengthen their public property management systems and enhance their efficiency and transparency.

Reforming the management of public land must contribute to a basic set of development principles, namely, reduction of severe poverty, achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, progress in good governance and transparent fiscal management of the public sector. Good governance in managing public land first of all means establishing a sound policy regarding how government should intervene in land matters. The most critical element in guiding improvement in this area is the formulation of an explicit public land management policy in line with land policy and fiscal policy that sets out clear objectives related to economic growth, equity and social development, environmental sustainability and transparent fiscal policy.

ISSUES

Public land is land owned by the state or by local authorities. Public land accounts for a large portion of public wealth of both developed and developing countries. Yet, public property assets are often mismanaged, and nearly all countries underutilize these resources. The power to allocate public land is of great economic and political importance in most countries, and it is a common focus of corrupt practices. Public land is often treated as a “free good”, whereas “good” land in terms of location, use and service delivery is in fact scarce and valuable. This raises obvious questions:

- Why is the management of government property so badly handled across the world?
- Why do so many countries share the same symptoms regardless of their

political leanings or socio-economic status?

These questions take on added weight in the former centrally-planned economies and in post-conflict countries. Public land management is flawed and contentious because it is dominated by a top-down process that encourages favours to special interests and promotes polarization to obtain such favours. As a consequence, public land rights are often transferred through rule of power processes (Box 1) and not a transparent market mechanism. In many countries, the state itself is the primary threat to secure land tenure, especially for the poor.

Violation of good governance principles is most common in managing state property assets. Some big issues are unresolved in many countries, such as:

BOX 1 Global survey on forced evictions

The forced evictions covered in the global survey occur to a large extent on state land as a result of development projects, discrimination, urban redevelopment schemes, delineation of national parks, land alienation in both rural and urban areas, and in situations of armed conflict and ethnic cleansing, or in their aftermath. Examining the practice of forced eviction from a human rights perspective reveals that the reasons and justifications commonly provided by governments for implementing forced evictions, and the manner in which evictions are carried out, rarely meet the international standards required by human rights law and rarely correspond to basic notions of human dignity.

Source: COHRE (2006).

- the lack of policy orientation (fiscal policy and public land policy) compared with other sectors;
- the strong resistance to transparent procedures and independent audit in many countries because of vested interests of political leaders and officials at central level and in local government;
- power-related political interference in public land acquisition and public land allocation;
- the high incidence of state capture through land grabbing, illicit land swaps, and corrupted concession arrangements by powerful people;
- the low awareness of public property problems at all levels – government institutions and international development organizations;
- the lack of information on what is where and where is what;
- the weak statistical information, reliability of information, and analysis on state property, e.g. transfers to local governments, state and municipal enterprises and trusts;
- the fragmented and inefficient institutional arrangements combined with the lack of clarity of role and functions of stakeholders at central and local government level.

By its nature, the whole history of public land management has been ad hoc and opportunistic. This is because decisions about its use are power-related rather than institutional. So far, the institutions of

good governance have not matured to the point where they are capable of handling the vast amount of data needed to manage public land effectively. At present, we are conditioned by the consequences of the fact that this is what the government of the day in a particular society has at its disposal to use as an immediate tool for meeting some agreed-upon problem.

The possible impact of illicit misappropriation of state assets on development processes and poverty eradication is enormous. It has both direct and indirect negative impacts on development.

Weak governance in managing public property assets shows enormous consequences on all sectors – economic development, poverty alleviation, the environment, political legitimacy, peace and security, and development cooperation. It has both direct and indirect impacts on the security of common property rights, on access to land and on revenue generation for the state. It directly diverts public funds and assets away from the public sectors into the hands of the select few. Moreover, it directly undermines the public's trust in the ruling government and governance processes – a factor essential for good governance and lasting development reforms. Corruption and the looting of state assets at the top sends a negative signal to the other civil servants and can encourage a corrupt culture and unethical conduct throughout the civil service (Box 2). Without

BOX 2

Political corruption and the looting of state property assets is a development issue

Political corruption in the form of accumulation or extraction occurs when government officials use and abuse their hold on power to extract from government assets, from government revenues, from the private sector, and from the economy at large. Political corruption takes place at the highest levels of the political system, and can thus be distinguished from administrative or bureaucratic corruption. Bureaucratic corruption takes place at the implementation end of politics, for example in government services such as land administration and the tax department. Political corruption takes place at the formulation end of politics, where decisions are made on the distribution of the nation's wealth and assets and on the rules of the game.

Extraction takes place mainly in the form of the looting of state assets, soliciting bribes in bidding processes for concessions, procurement, in privatization processes such as the disposal of state land, and in taxation or negotiation of concession fees. Extracted resources (and public money) are used for power preservation and power extension purposes, usually taking the form of favouritism and patronage politics. It includes the politically motivated disposal of state property resources. By giving preferences to private companies for land concessions (agro-industry, forest and extractive industries), the perpetrators can obtain party and campaign funds, and by paying off the governmental institutions of checks and control they can stop investigations and state asset audits and gain judicial impunity.

Source: Adapted from Utstein Resource Center (www.u4.no).

a strong, competent and clean civil service, development reform is bound to fail.

GOOD PRACTICES

Only a few countries have tackled explicitly and comprehensively the deficiencies of their public land management systems, and only incomplete information is available on such reform processes. This makes the lessons learned from experience rather limited compared with reforming land administration systems, which many countries have embarked on with support from the international community (Table 1).

Good practices for reforming public land management are designed to regulate the topics covered in the following sections.

Public land inventory and information systems

One central point has to be made. No accountability, transparency and effective management is possible without adequate knowledge about the qualities and quantities of public land, related legislation and regulations (where is what and what is where). Many governments share a common problem. They do not know where and how much public property they own

and what rights are attached to it, where all of the existing information is located in a complex institutional environment, and how complete, accurate, reliable and relevant the information is for planning and decision-making. There is wide divergence in approaches and institutional arrangements for managing state land information. Some governments implement a central database while others opt for departmental or decentralized information systems. Ultimately, all public land should be properly registered. As an intermediate step and complementary management tool, there are good experiences with public land inventories. They contain all the information on public land for management purposes but do not replace the register. In a first approach, compromises could be accepted in terms of survey accuracy but not in terms of regulatory content. Most countries have established some sort of land information system but, perhaps surprisingly, only very few are showing good examples and functionalities of information systems for the specific requirements of public land management (Treasury Board Canada, 2000). Comprehensive, easy-to-

TABLE 1
Country cases in a learning environment

Country	Good practices
<p>Canada Monitoring guide: www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/common/us-nous_e.asp Source: DRFP: www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/dfrp-rbif</p>	<p>Overall reform of the public sector. Consequently, transparent public asset management is based on a comprehensive accountability system and has been implemented at all levels. Guiding principle is to acquire, manage and retain real federal property only to support the delivery of government programmes and in a manner that is consistent with the principle of sustainable development. The design of the Directory of Real Federal Property (DRFP) with its functionalities and standards as well as the audit guide and the monitoring guide could serve as good practice in other countries.</p>
<p>Egypt Public Land Management Strategy Draft Policy Note Source: World Bank, April 2006</p>	<p>Reform of the public sector and reform of state land management has been initiated in the last few years, and valuable material has been developed with the support of the World Bank. There is broad support for the state land reform from the highest political level. Internal and external dialogue is a strategic component of the learning process. Policy orientation within a long timeframe is defined before the legislation will be amended. Several institutional and organizational scenarios with the discussion on pros and cons are supporting the decision-making process. There are some difficulties in integrating military and security interests.</p>
<p>Cambodia Multi-donor supported Land Management and Administration Project (LMAP) Source: LMAP project documents</p>	<p>Tackling of the huge overall state land problem in a post-conflict and post-transition country by enabling legislation, land policy formulation, countrywide reform of the land sector, inter-institutional arrangements (land policy board), delegation of power to provincial committees, implementation and capacity building with international support. Nevertheless, positive impact is still limited by weak governance. State land problems reflect power relations at the highest level of the government. Tackling the problems goes far beyond project measures.</p>
<p>Ghana The first five-year Land Administration Project (LAP-1) Source: LAP Information brochure 2006</p>	<p>The overall objective of the state land audit (as a component of LAP in the central region) is to enable the Government of Ghana to formulate and implement across the board a realistic, fair, timely and comprehensive policy on State-acquired and State-occupied lands. Ascertain the stock of state or public lands, including the effective usage of such lands. These included lands that had been either compulsorily acquired or occupied by the State without formal acquisition. Determine the acquisitions for which compensation had been paid and those for which partial or no compensation had been paid. Ascertain acquisitions for which there had been change of use as against the original purpose of the acquisition. Assess the extent of encroachment. Sensitization workshops and review meetings were held in 2005 and 2006. The exercise was successful and many lessons have been learned.</p>
<p>Central European transition countries Source: Urban Institute, 2006 and Open Society Initiative, 2003</p>	<p>Political and professional debate on public-sector reform around political decentralization, re-assignment of public functions and devolution of state-owned assets. All assets connected to functions assigned to local government should be transferred. Special issues are: the legislative process; the scale, sequencing and timing of the transfer of public land; the competencies of local government for acquisition, management and disposal of public land; the related rules for financial management of public assets; and introducing standardized accounting practices, new forms of internal and external audit and transparency, and rules for minimizing conflicts of interest.</p>

access and easy-to-use systems have been established in only a few countries.

Public land policy and the regulatory framework

A public land policy provides fundamental directions. However, it has to be complemented by a law on public land management or a similar piece of legislation that should provide parameters as to what can and cannot be done with state land, and spell out the fundamental responsibilities of government and the necessary decision-making processes as well as setting general parameters for allocating public land. A guiding principle

of the government in acquiring, managing and retaining public property is that it should only do so to support the delivery of government programmes and in a manner that is consistent with the principles of sustainable development, poverty reduction and good governance. Within this context, public property must be managed to the maximum long-term economic advantage of the government, to honour social and environmental objectives, to provide adequate facilities for users, and to respect other relevant government policies.

The essential policy goal is to set forth the criteria for deciding who is to benefit from

how much of these resources, for how long and for which purposes. At the very least, the policy of public land management has to clarify:

- policy goals, especially state land policy for implementing ecological, social, economic and cultural goals;
- a clear commitment of the government and the outline of an action plan;
- a statement that the public land asset is held in trust for the people;
- principles for regularization of public land;
- how it will guarantee security of common property rights, indigenous land rights and resource rights on public land;
- the framework for the institutional jurisdiction and public use by different authorities;
- devolution of public property to local government (if needed for its portfolio);
- the framework for special-purpose cooperation, public-private partnership, and land trust;
- transparent principles for the allocation of state land, and for what purposes;
- principles of fiscal management, performance reporting and audit;
- accountability and transparency requirements for managing public land.

Reforming the management of public land must contribute to a basic set of development principles, namely reduction of severe poverty, the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and progress in good governance and transparent fiscal management of the public sector. The development objectives of growth, poverty reduction and revenue generation need to be balanced and made compatible in designing the strategy for public land management. As in many countries there is still not much awareness and interest in properly managing public land, the question will always be who will define the development objectives and guide the policy development for public land. Some good experiences have been made by nominating a high-level, interministerial board such as a national land policy board

or public land commission for overseeing the process. Examples are the Higher Committee for State Land Management (Egypt), the National Land Commission (Kenya), and the Council for Land Policy (Cambodia).

The basic regulatory framework on public property should focus on fundamentals to limit discretion and, thus, abuses. It should provide the principles and not very detailed rules or terms, which are better left to executive regulations or contracts. Land law and public land law reform need fresh attention because much legal reform is often concerned with formalization of “informal” land rights in favour of the state (Bruce *et al.*, 2006). For example, customary systems are not informal but represent an alternative formality.

A regulatory framework (land law, law on public land, by-laws or regulations) is required for the following critical public property areas, which often show weak governance realities:

- registration of public land and inventory;
- public land classification and re-classification;
- public land disposal and exchange;
- compulsory purchase, valuation of public land, and compensation;
- regularization of bundle of rights;
- resettlement;
- land concessions, leases and contracts;
- law enforcement and public land recovery (in cases of illicit allocation);
- audit and fiscal control.

Nevertheless, we do not need to wait for a comprehensive and complete regulatory framework for achieving better results towards improved public land governance. Most importantly, a public land inventory, an inter-institutional technical secretariat, and a board for overseeing the process combined with accountability and transparency are the ingredients for making a start. Law and legislation are just part of a process, not the end.

Regularization is an important good governance tool for avoiding land conflicts, human rights violations and eviction.

BOX 3

Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime, Botswana

After the enactment of the Corruption and Economic Crime Act on 19 August 1994, the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) was established on 5 September 1994. The Act sets out its functions, prescribes the powers and duties of the director, states the procedures to be followed in handling a suspect, and specifies the offences involving public officers, employees of public bodies, agents and those in the private sector. The Government of Botswana saw that significant results had been achieved by implementing what has become known as the “three-pronged attack” of detailed investigation, corruption prevention and public education.

The Corruption Prevention Group examines the practices and procedures of public bodies, and the private sector if so requested, in order to identify corrupt practices and to secure the revision of methods of work or procedures that may be conducive to corrupt practices. For example, abuse of land board procedures and allegations of corrupt allocations of state land were received by the DCEC in 2001. The DCEC conducted a detailed study of the procedures involved in the allocation of lands with a view to eliminating opportunities for corruption and making the allocation processes fully transparent. Being a scarce resource, land is a very contentious issue. Thus, one of the recommendations was to have land board members adequately trained and fully conversant with applicable policies and legislation. In a few cases, land board members and public officers were sentenced for issuing false documents involving the allocation of land.

Source: www.gov.bw/government/dcec

In many countries, there is no straightforward inventory or registration process for public land visible for many reasons. There are numerous cases of invasion, informal urban and rural settlements, appropriation of public rights of way, residual claims, and unclear overlapping or conflicting interest between communal properties and public land. Therefore, a process of regularization is recommended based on a participatory approach with transparent rules.

Legal instruments vary from country to country. They include statutes, decrees (presidential, ministerial, federal, state or provincial, and municipal), ordinances and by-laws of local governments, regulations and government contracts. These various legal instruments define who has enforcement powers, and under which legal instruments. They also establish the legal basis for sanctions or charges as well as the penalty provisions, all of which are central to the enforcement system. However, which ones are involved in any given case are usually determined in a rather ad hoc way at best and in a self-interested way at worst.

There are several important issues in the design and operation of a successful compliance and enforcement system. Enforcement involves a number of components (legislative groups, legal instruments, enforcement agencies and courts) that act independently, or are autonomously administered, yet must function together to be effective. There is also a relatively broad range of enforcement responsibilities involved in the administration and management of public lands and land resource utilization contracts. Compliance and the effectiveness of enforcement depend critically on the conditions and clarity of the legislation, on the strength and clarity of the commandments written into these laws, and on all four components working together.

Law enforcement by specialized anticorruption agencies

Anticorruption strategies will usually have to consider whether to establish a separate institution such as an anti-corruption agency (Box 3) to deal exclusively with

corruption problems, whether to modify or adapt existing institutions, or some combination of both. A number of legal, policy, resource and other factors should be considered in this regard.

The United Nations Convention against Corruption requires the establishment of such agencies. Nevertheless, anticorruption commissions are problematic when political leaders are only responding to demands from international donors. In such countries, policy-makers can ignore domestic demands for reform and enact minimal reforms to satisfy external agents. This minimum may be nothing more than the establishment of an anticorruption commission, an office of the ombudsman, or an antifraud unit without enabling legislation, competent staff, or a budget.

Devolution of public land from central institutions to local level

Decentralization reforms are one of the fundamental components of public-sector reform and democratic development. In many countries in transition, property devolution was simultaneously implemented with the dismantling of the socialist ownership model in the context of privatization and restitution. Devolution of public property was and still is discussed extensively during the political reform process, and arguments are exchanged for and against property devolution. There can be no real local autonomy without a sound economic base. Significant own resources are required for fiscal decentralization, and public land can be an important source of municipal revenue. The most common arguments against devolution were the risk of inefficient management of public land and the lack of capacities. Useful experiences for countries still facing the reform process have been made during the last two decades. The challenge of governance and accountability at local-government level is big and similar to the challenge at central government level. Basic principles and clear rules must be defined and enforced for avoiding weak governance and corruption in managing public land at

local level. At local-government level, special attention must be given to the sometimes non-transparent and non-accountable behaviour of local leaders (Open Society Initiative, 2003).

Examples can be: corrupt practices of land disposal and land conversion (less than market value and favouritism); misusing the instrument of compulsory land acquisition for undercover purposes; the shift of public ownership to municipal enterprises (where surplus public land and the revenues could disappear in a non-transparent system); and manipulating zoning combined with land conversion for private gain.

Public land and the commons

Common property regimes are management systems where resources are accessible to a group of rights holders who have the power to alienate the product of the resource but not the resource itself. Common property can be legally owned by the state, a community or an organization. Within this legal framework, a group of traditional rights holders manages the resource exclusively to preserve and enhance its long-term productive capacity for the benefit of all current and future members of the group. All members share reciprocal rights and duties that can only be amended by collectively binding decisions. It is particularly useful to look at which users have rights of access, withdrawal, exclusion, management and alienation, and for what uses. Access and withdrawal are considered use rights, while management, exclusion and alienation are rights of control over the resource. "Ownership" is often conceived as holding the full bundle of rights. From this listing of the bundle of rights, it is already apparent that state common property is much more complex than simple ownership. The concept of land resources being divided into mutually exclusive "properties" is gradually giving way to one of being a mutually inclusive set of "partial" interests. Much of the innovation is a result of the continuing evolution in managing scarce resources,

natural and human-made. It would be much more resource efficient if a number of individuals and/or enterprises could discover non-competing uses of the same resource base. Yet all too often government agencies fail to recognize community-based land and resource rights on state land. There has been the steady appropriation of many of the most valuable local common properties by the state and their re-designation as state or public lands. This has been undertaken on the assumption that the state is the only proper guardian of such properties and the rightful primary beneficiary of their values, and often on an assumption that these same properties are in any event weakly tenured at best.

Even in countries where public land is registered, there is generally no registration of partial interest and recognition of the bundle of rights. The regulatory framework must provide a clear legal base for the registration of partial interest over space and time and the recognition of the group. Comanagement models (e.g. through participatory land-use planning) for clearly defining the role of the state and the role of the local group in managing the public land resource on the ground should complement the regulatory framework.

Integrated land-use management and public land

The major objective of land management is matching the land rights with land-use rights and land-use options for achieving sustainable development objectives. International agreements are affecting national legal systems, and national and local land-use systems are paying attention to the urgings of international declarations and conventions.

In the context of managing public property it is clear that the legal status and classification of public property, present land use and the desired (best) land-use options are interlinked and should not be dealt with separately in policy discussions or in the operation and delivery of public property. Integrated land-use management and public land management are closely connected and should be seen

as complementary objectives in order to provide win-win development options. There is generally a lack of knowledge and awareness of this broader implication in rural as well as in urban land management. Examples of the linkage between legal status and land use are:

- regularization of informal settlements on public land for supporting upgrading programmes;
- providing public land for housing the poor and for rural landless;
- facilitating exchange of public land (land swap) for development or conservation purposes;
- guiding acquisition and disposal of public land for achieving broader development objectives;
- land readjustment combined with public land banking and for rural and urban development;
- land exchange for facilitating zoning and land-use regulation;
- co-land management models (state and local communities) and participatory land-use planning for securing resource rights in time and space

Accountability and transparency

Good governance and anticorruption measures in public land management can take a variety of forms, and their adequacy will depend on the prevalence of the respective types of corruption and on the political and institutional environment of the country in question. As an entry point for assessing and discussing the current state of the art of public land governance in any country, one could best check the Governance Research Indicator Country Snapshot (GRICS) rule of law dimension (WBI, 2005). The rule of law dimension reflects the power relations in a country and is directly related to the quality of managing public assets.

This is particularly important where political corruption occurs, where institutional and enforcement capacity is likely to be weak, and where, consequently, the timing, sequencing and design of reform are crucial to ensuring the feasibility and

sustainability of the reform process.

There is the need to curb high levels of administrative discretion, which, coupled with a lack of clear rules and regulations, are conducive to the persistence or facilitation of phenomena such as land capture, the corrupt allocation and management of public land, and land allocation more generally. Most of the causes and conditions contributing to weak governance and corruption in these areas are best and most sustainably addressed by comprehensive institutional reform and capacity building. They concern performance evaluation, regular auditing and reporting, service orientation, budgeting and access to information, and the nomination of an inter-institutional oversight board. Especially in countries with political corruption, the design and implementation of good governance and anticorruption strategies is a politically sensitive issue, with powerful interests standing to lose out in the process and with results manifesting themselves in the medium to long term rather than in the short term.

Some “new public management” (NPM) countries such as New Zealand, Canada and others have established legal and operational requirements for easy-to-access performance and accountability reporting on state assets, including public land. However, there is also good reason why countries in political reform processes should be careful in adapting NPM. It could lead to the fragmenting of an already weakly integrated state and/or accelerate the waste of public goods.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Even advanced economies have generally managed their public land assets very poorly in the past, and many countries are only now launching reform efforts and improvements. This new interest is mainly driven by public-sector reform and fiscal reform in some countries, or devolution of state assets from central to local government or the challenge of governance and accountability in other countries.

There are numerous good practices, but such experiences are scattered, not systematically analysed, and not easily accessible or properly documented. There is an enormous need and interest not only for sharing experiences about work in progress in all countries but also for tailored capacity-building opportunities in the effective management of public land.

Public land will continue to take on greater social and economic significance. In doing so, the related institutional, legal and operational arrangements that should secure multiple interests in specific parcels will take on additional political importance. We have not yet scratched the surface on crafting new institutional arrangements pertinent to land in this broader sense (Bromley, in press).

Reforming the management of public land must contribute to deliberate policy and development principles, namely the reduction of severe poverty, the achievement of the MDGs, and progress in good governance and transparent fiscal management of the public sector. The development objectives of growth, poverty reduction and revenue generation need to be balanced and made compatible in designing the strategy for public land management.

The following steps highlight and summarize the major points made towards reforming the management of public land:

1. Create awareness and recognition at the highest level in central and local government, development institutions and civil society: What could be the driving force for reforming public land management? (For example, public-sector reform, MDGs, poverty reduction strategy papers, governance reform, and social justice.)
2. Develop a good deliberate policy around how governments should intervene in public land management and land markets: Governance checks could be good starting points for understanding the scope of problems to be solved and discussion of principles and options on managing public land.
3. Develop the regulatory framework:

Reviewing, complementing and making the legal framework coherent, providing mechanisms for enforcement and for the right to access information.

4. Develop and apply a comprehensive accountability chain: Performance benchmarks, fiscal control, internal and external public land audit, conflict of interest rules, and interacting with anticorruption framework of the government.
5. Develop transparent fiscal management procedures: Valuation of public land and accounting (eventually accrual accounting), revenue transparency, and reporting.
6. Develop alternative institutional and organizational scenarios for the acquisition, management and disposal of public land: Broad discussion of pros and cons for centralized, decentralized, mixed custodian models or special-purpose state cooperation.
7. Nominate high-level body for overseeing the decision-making process and for control: For example, interministerial public land board with trustee function of the government.
8. Develop the regulations, technical tools and standards for the registration of public land and land inventory.
9. Design and implement a capacity-building strategy and specific training modules for professionals involved in managing public property.

The role of the international community is first of all to be aware of the importance of public land for development. There is a need to integrate public-land matters much better in the formulation of land policies, public-sector reform and fiscal reform initiatives as well as in public-good policies. There is certainly a need for more research on dealing with the recognition and registration of the bundle of rights on public land, on global analysis and on innovative institutional models for acquisition, management and disposal, for example, special-purpose agencies or public-private partnership models. Specific training modules for effective management of public

land should be designed and offered by the international community, and curricula on land administration should be updated. Global statistical information and analysis on public land at central-government and local-government levels is extremely weak compared with other relevant indicators on sustainable development. Creating a global learning network for exchanging information and developing a knowledge base for effective public land governance would certainly contribute to sustainable land management.

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Réforme du système d'enregistrement des droits de propriété en Géorgie: vers une bonne gouvernance en matière de régime foncier et d'administration des terres

Dans la décennie qui a suivi l'indépendance de la Géorgie en 1991, les réformes consistant à passer d'une économie centralisée à une économie de marché avaient essentiellement un caractère ponctuel. L'absence de base juridique solide empêchait l'administration foncière d'être réellement efficace. L'omnipotence d'une seule entité sur la gestion des terres publiques ainsi que la gouvernance défailante, tant au sommet de l'État que dans les collectivités locales, le chevauchement des activités et le manque de consensus dans le processus décisionnel et de transparence et d'information du public conjugués avec la fragilité de l'État de droit ont fait le lit de la corruption. De plus, les activités des donateurs étaient mal coordonnées, ce qui aggravait l'inefficacité du système.

Après 2003, le gouvernement a commencé à réformer l'enregistrement des droits de propriété en se fondant sur des principes de bonne gouvernance. Cette volonté politique a bénéficié de l'aide des donateurs qui se sont engagés à appuyer les processus. Les réformes ont mis principalement l'accent sur: la protection des droits de propriété et des droits fonciers; et la création d'un système d'enregistrement exempt de corruption, transparent et axé sur le client. Une approche tenant compte des besoins des parties prenantes a été élaborée en vue de garantir une indépendance financière par rapport au budget de l'État et de créer des revenus réguliers. Ces facteurs ont contribué à la mise en place d'un système national d'enregistrement des droits de propriété durable, efficace, exempt de corruption, impartial et unifié.

Reforma del sistema de registro de derechos de propiedad en Georgia: hacia una buena gestión pública de la tenencia y la administración de la tierra

En el decenio que siguió a la independencia de Georgia en 1991, las reformas dirigidas a pasar de una economía de planificación centralizada a una economía de mercado tuvieron principalmente un carácter ad hoc. La eficacia en la administración de la tierra se vio obstaculizada por una base legal deficiente. La concentración del poder sobre las cuestiones relacionadas con la tierra en una sola entidad, la mala gestión pública por parte de sus máximos dirigentes y las entidades locales, la duplicación del trabajo y la falta de decisiones adoptadas por consenso, de transparencia y de conciencia pública, todo conjugado con una aplicación escasa de la ley, creaban una base para la corrupción. Además, las actividades de los donantes estuvieron deficientemente coordinadas, lo que agravó la ineficacia del sistema.

Después de 2003, el Gobierno inició reformas en el registro de los derechos de propiedad que tuvieron en cuenta los principios de buena gestión pública y modelos logrados de países desarrollados. Esta voluntad política claramente declarada se vio reforzada por una disposición por parte de los donantes a respaldar los procesos. Los principales objetivos de las reformas eran: seguridad de los derechos de propiedad y tenencia, y la creación de un sistema de registro público unificado, orientado al cliente, transparente y libre de corrupción. El planteamiento adoptado para responder a las necesidades de las partes interesadas trataba de garantizar la independencia financiera respecto al presupuesto estatal, así como la generación de ingresos sustanciales. Estos factores contribuyeron a la creación de un sistema nacional eficaz, eficiente y sostenible para el registro unificado, imparcial y libre de corrupción de los derechos de propiedad.

Property rights registration system reform in Georgia for good governance in land tenure and administration

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In the decade following Georgia's independence in 1991, reforms aimed at moving from a centrally planned economy to a market economy were mainly ad hoc. Effective land administration was hampered by a weak legal base. The concentration of power over land issues in a single entity as well as poor governance by top management and local government, duplication of work and a lack of consensus-oriented decision-making, public awareness and transparency all combined with the weak rule of law to create a basis for corruption. Moreover, donor activities were poorly coordinated, compounding the inefficiency of the system.

After 2003, the government initiated reforms in property rights registration that took into account good governance principles. This political will was reinforced by a readiness on the part of donors to back up the processes. The main thrusts of the reforms were security of ownership and tenure rights, and the creation of a unified, customer-oriented, transparent and corruption-free public registry system. A responsive approach to the needs of stakeholders was intended to guarantee financial independence from the state budget as well as good income generation. These factors contributed to the establishment of an effective and sustainable national system for unified, impartial and corruption-free ownership rights registration.

INTRODUCTION

Georgia has two autonomous republics and it is divided into 9 regions and 67 districts (rayons). After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Georgia became an independent country in 1991.

During the first decade of independence, the country suffered from internal conflict, corruption, poor governance and high poverty levels. Georgia has also been heavily over-aided in recent years, which has led to a degree of donor fatigue. However, the change in leadership in 2003 presented a new opportunity for the government and donors to engage in a more harmonized and efficient way in order to implement reforms.

INCENTIVES AND DRIVERS FOR CHANGE IN TERMS OF GOVERNANCE ISSUES TO BE TACKLED

From 1997 to 2004, the State Department for Land Management (SDLM) was the principal autonomous land administration agency.

The chief registrar managed the land cadastre and registration. This institution consisted of a national (central) office, 67 rayon (district) offices and 7 regional offices. These offices were headed by a zone registrar, responsible for the operations and other registry activities in the zone. The SDLM supervised the work of the regional offices. However, in practice, the regional and district offices were the

subject of horizontal management from the local governments. The decision-making process of the SDLM's regional and district offices was often influenced by the local governments, and by different land committees and councils.

The responsibilities of the SDLM were wide-ranging and included legal-technical functions (land registration, cadastre, and land valuation) and functions of a more political nature (land reform, land allocation, alienation, change of land use, and state control over land use and protection).

The SDLM made some progress in the execution of first registration. Support from donor organizations contributed greatly to this progress. However, because projects were donor-driven, their implementation followed several different approaches and standards. There were no unified technical specifications or standard instructions for cadastre and registration in place. Moreover, donor coordination was very poor.

In addition, a "weak or non-existent legal base hindered land administration after independence" (UNESCO, ECE & CHS, 2001). After the adoption of the new constitution in 1995, great progress was made in the development of land-related legislation. However, much of this was very ad hoc. There were still gaps that needed to be filled, and legislation was often drafted to meet the needs of individual projects. The long term still requires a sustainable legal framework.

The situation in urban areas was very different. Systematic registration was limited to the German project in Tbilisi and little progress was made through sporadic registration. The Bureaus of Technical Inventory held ownership registrations and other records for apartments. The rights on real estate were recognized by the State only after registration in the Public Registry. However, owing to duplication of works and poor public awareness in terms of registration and titling, many people considered the technical inventory records to be sufficient to prove ownership.

Thus, a good basis for corruption was created by:

- the concentration of the whole decision-making power on land issues under the one entity;
- poor governance in terms of unclear distribution of responsibilities between the SDLM's top management and local governments;
- duplicated registration works by the Bureaus of Technical Inventory;
- a lack of consensus-oriented decisions;
- the almost non-existence of public awareness and transparency;
- the vague legal framework;
- the weak rule of law.

Moreover, the absence of a land policy, of a clear development strategy and of unified cadastral and registration standards resulted in poorly coordinated donor activities, and helped to form an ineffective and inefficient system.

After the so-called Rose Revolution (23 November 2003), the SDLM was liquidated and the National Agency of Public Registry (NAPR) was established under the Ministry of Justice. This process initiated the reforms considered necessary for the creation of an effective electronic registration system using modern technologies and the standards of good governance of developed countries.

Fundamental reforms were initiated for the registration domain for movables and real estate as there was both a clearly stated political will from the government to reorganize and the readiness of the donors to back up the processes. The reforms had to cover institutional and legislative aspects, ensure transparency, and enable participatory and consensus-oriented decision-making. A responsive approach to the needs of stakeholders and customers would guarantee financial independence from the state budget as well as good generation of income. All the above would contribute greatly to the establishment of an effective, efficient and sustainable system with a unified, impartial and non-corruptive registration of ownership rights all over the country. The reform package

was prepared and the initial steps were taken.

In the course of the structural reorganization (Parliament of Georgia, 2004a), the SDLM became subordinate to the Ministry of Justice and had to be reorganized. The NAPR was then established (Parliament of Georgia, 2004b). The NAPR is a legal entity under public law and it enjoys autonomy and financial independence in its management and decision-making. Establishment of the NAPR entailed the liquidation of the SDLM and of the Bureaus of Technical Inventory in 2004.

Currently, the land management and land administration functions are separate. The NAPR is responsible for the cadastre and for movables and real-estate right registration. Its duty is to continue the process of integrating the cadastre and registration, the two fundamental elements of ownership and parcel information. Land management issues, such as soil erosion, land protection, and land-use management, have been transferred to the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources Management, and some functions (e.g. land consolidation) have been transferred to the Ministry of Food and Agriculture.

As mentioned above, the new law determined the liquidation of the Bureaus of Technical Inventory. The information formerly kept there has been transferred to the Public Registry. The Public Registry has had to ensure the proper systemization and processing of the data obtained after the liquidation of the Bureaus of Technical Inventory.

DESCRIPTION OF THE REFORM

Major objectives

The major directions of the reform were:

- provision of security of ownership and tenure rights;
- creation of a unified, modern, customer-oriented, one-stop-shop, transparent, corruption-free public registry system through comprehensive institutional, financial, technological and legislative reform;

- capacity building of personnel;
- coordination of donor organization activities;
- computerization of the processes according to modern standards.

The task of the NAPR is state registration of ownership and other rights to real estate and movables. In view of the reform objectives, from the outset, the NAPR aimed to provide easy access to public registry information, secure ownership rights and simplify registration procedures in order to stimulate small and medium-sized business development.

Previously, the Department of Geodesy and Cartography had regulated surveying and mapping activities conducted by state organizations and the private sector. Until 2005, cadastral surveys had to be conducted by the licensed surveyors. However, the Government then abolished the licensing system for the cadastre and backed up this decision with the argument that it was a measure to remove extra barriers for private surveyors. For the NAPR, the principle objective for implementation in the course of the reform became that of defining the precisely determined standards and procedures for the cadastre and registration. A comprehensive framework of registration instructions/procedures and cadastre standards had to be prepared in order to ensure mechanisms for producing high-quality work and the elimination of corruption.

The establishment of a single Informational Cadastre Centre under the NAPR was determined in order to integrate and update systematically the geo-information handed over by the donor-financed projects. The main objective of the Informational Cadastre Centre is to establish an information service of district registries / territorial registration offices, and to digitalize all the information in each registration office, and archive it in a digital format, as well as to implement the consequent computerization of registration procedures. In addition, the Informational Cadastre Centre is also responsible for

preparing specific registration software. The main types of information are: ortho-photos, satellite images, digital maps, registration geo-information database, and cadastral database. The registration database will be systematically updated and information accumulated in the Informational Cadastre Centre.

The NAPR also has to conduct rights registration in relation to movables. However, movable property registration is a relatively new field in the country. Considering the practices and lessons learned from developed countries, the NAPR intended to establish movable property rights registration. However, there were precedents of mortgage registration, although the cases were scattered among the Chamber of Notaries and land management offices. There was neither a legal framework for movable property mortgage registration nor clear procedures to make the process transparent and customer-oriented.

One of the major aims of the reform was to improve the legislative framework, which needed updating through new laws and amendments to existing legislation, normative acts, etc. Obviously, without a comprehensive and clear legislative framework and strong monitoring, all reform efforts would be ineffective.

To ensure achievement of the defined objectives effectively and efficiently, human resources development was crucial. It was decided to prepare a capacity-building plan, which would be supported by donor projects.

However, in order to attract and retain qualified personnel and carry on operations in an effective manner, the NAPR had to ensure a stable financial and material-technical base (to provide adequate salaries and working conditions). Being a legal person under public law, the NAPR should function on a self-financing base and no longer be dependent on the deficient state budget allocations.

Besides legislative and institutional reform, the NAPR management targeted

minimization of the procedure for the registration period. Registration service fees had to be fixed and differential in terms of timing. Reasonable registration fees combined with transparent, customer-oriented, corruption-free services had to ensure good income.

Another key issue of reform was that of improving donor coordination, because “coordinating efforts taken by State Department of Land Management were going on but had to be considered as not sufficient” (Kaufmann, 2003). Improvement meant achieving consensus among the stakeholders, and exploiting the synergies of donor efforts, expertise and resources in order to establish a sustainable, effective and efficient cadastre and registration system according to the standards of developed countries.

The development strategy of the NAPR involves six main areas:

- institutional,
- legislative,
- technological,
- administrative,
- financial,
- donor coordination.

Institutional reform

Since the reform, the Public Registry has been under the Ministry of Justice, and operated by the NAPR. However, it is not part of a vertical management of the government.

The Ministry of Urban Development and Construction formerly shared responsibility with the SDLM for land-use planning and policy formulation. The Bureaus of Technical Inventory were subordinated to the above-mentioned ministry and held the records for real estate in urban areas. The Bureaus of Technical Inventory continued functioning for almost 14 years after independence. They duplicated registration work.

To achieve system unity and to improve service in terms of establishing a one-stop-shop, the Bureaus of Technical Inventory were liquidated. The information kept there was transferred to the NAPR (above).

In addition to the Bureaus of Technical Inventory and the SDLM, there was another registry – the lien registry. This registry provided access to small credits. The registry ensured rights registration on mortgaged real estate and movable property and, accordingly, issued the appropriate abstract upon request for credit unions or other interested bodies. The Georgian Chamber of Notaries operated the lien registry. In 2004, it was decided that the lien registry was also to be operated by the NAPR.

The above-mentioned steps ensured the implementation of the one-stop-shop principle for citizens. There is no longer any need to make separate enquiries at different organizations. The database of the Bureaus of Technical Inventory and lien registry operate under the same institution – the NAPR, where details on property ownership on property and any other type of rights registration are held alongside the movables charges registry. This makes it possible to conduct the process securely and conveniently for customers. The customers no longer have to go back and forth from one place to another place several times in order to collect documents according to different procedures and different fees. All the arrangements are now handled by the NAPR. The process is now much less time-consuming and rather inexpensive for customers compared with the previous system.

Administrative reform

From the SDLM to the NAPR

Owing to the lack of a comprehensive land policy, the absence of a clear development strategy and the existence of many gaps in legislation, the heads of the regional offices of the SDLM had no mechanism for ensuring a unified registration model at least on the regional level. Moreover, separate decrees or orders issued by the Central Office or the Government about land issues were not clearly explained to the staff of district offices or monitored by the regional office. “Information

exchange” was limited to the distribution of such decrees, orders, etc. Besides, the regional offices (as well as local offices) were participants in the land distribution committees, and the heads of regional offices frequently used to influence district offices in the decision-making process as they were considered higher in hierarchy. The accumulation of non-transparent, decision-making power on land issues was creating a good opportunity to smoothly adjust or re-adjust facts and processes and so cover corrupt dealings. As the regional offices did not undertake land management, registration or cadastre work, their existence, rather than facilitating communication, acted as an extra barrier to direct communication between the central and district offices. Moreover, the maintenance of the whole office was an additional financial burden.

In consideration of the above arguments, the regional offices were abolished (as they were mainly bureaucratic bodies). It was recognized that registrars were independent in their decision-making, while the Central Office needed to support them administratively in terms of providing a comprehensive legislative framework as well as explanatory seminars on every new or amended legislative or normative act. Following the reform, the registrars became solely accountable for every single registration entry provided according to the law. Their performance is monitored randomly by a special department of the Central Office of the NAPR as well as by the General Inspection Unit of the Ministry of Justice of Georgia. Independence of the registrars in their decision-making was a clear delegation not only of tasks but also of responsibilities.

Salaries were very low, with a minimum wage of lari 35 and a maximum wage of lari 150 (lari 1 = US\$1.74 in August 2006). These low salaries were necessary at the time owing to the need to make rational and effective use of human as well as financial resources. Staff numbers were optimized while implementing

administrative reform, and the number of personnel was reduced from 2 100 to 600. The overstuffed entity had been neither effective nor efficient. An important decision was that to abolish accounting departments in the territorial registration offices. It was important to eliminate the flow of cash at the registries. The NAPR now distributes staff salaries by plastic cards through bank accounts. The sole focus of the registrars has become the registration process. The Central Office of the NAPR provides management for administrative, logistical and financial issues. After implementing the administrative reforms, the average salary rose immediately from lari 57 to lari 452.

The administrative reforms also aimed to recruit highly skilled professionals for an effective and efficient operation of the NAPR. To that end, in the first phase of the reform process, qualification exams were conducted. The examination strategy and written test was prepared in consultation with donor-funded projects and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The exams were conducted by the Ministry of Justice of Georgia. In this way, the NAPR staff were recruited.

Human resources development, capacity building and training are considered essential components for the sustainable development of the institution. New opportunities have been provided by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) project. This management and training support project will greatly help the NAPR in its initial three-year period of establishment. Within this project, the main directions of capacity building are: (i) management; (ii) registration; (iii) information technologies; and (iv) geo-database development.

The service known as the “improved registration concept” has been established at the Tbilisi Registration Office in order to enhance service quality. The main principle of the concept is the focus on system safety, transparency, and ensuring adequate service. Later on, this principle will also be applied in district registries.

In accordance with the above-mentioned concept, the registration service has been reorganized to provide system transparency and adequate service. The physical and functional separation of the front-offices and back-offices of the registration service is considered a significant change in the system. This has meant the elimination of citizens’ involvement in the registration process and, therefore, the creation of an appropriate working environment for registration officers. Within this process, free legal consultancies are held at the offices. Citizens can easily find appropriate services on the clear notice boards. Moreover, the registration procedure has been simplified from 67 steps to 9. These two aspects have reduced registration times. To this end, registration software has been created, which has already been introduced at the Tbilisi Registration Office. Moreover, the database for Tbilisi has been placed on the Internet. The NAPR has a Web site, where the basic information has been placed.

An internal control and audit division has been established. It has a hotline and is charged with the following main tasks:

- Plan and conduct preventive activities for disciplinary and legislative violations by NAPR staff, and conduct internal investigation of such facts.
- Analyse the activities of the staff within the limits of its competences, and monitor the activities of the NAPR offices.
- Check applications and accusations, and respond; prepare conclusions about internal investigations and submit them to the chairperson in order to enable sound and impartial administration of the rule of law and appropriate responsiveness to claims by customers; and monitor the operations of the registration clerks.

Donor coordination

There has been a significant focus on improving donor coordination from the outset of the initial phase of establishing the NAPR as the synergy of expertise,

finances and efforts will make it possible to create the most effective and efficient system. The target for everyone has been the same, but the implementation methods, approaches and procedures have been different. It was important to make the process target-focused and consensus-oriented, with improved levels of accountability, participation and inclusiveness. With these aims in mind, working groups with representatives from all the projects were set up to address four aspects: (i) registration database and software; (ii) development of legislation; (iii) registration procedures/instructions; and (iv) administration structure and a human resource qualification improvement strategy. The World Bank expert (Sharp, 2004) evaluated the effectiveness of this synergy of efforts thus: "It should be recognized that the both the work groups and the management of the new Agency have been extremely active...and significant progress has been made." The other assessment (Danielson, 2004) on that decision stated: "The progress in general is impressive." and "The coordination between National Agency of Public Registry and the donor organizations is much better now than a year ago. The cooperation between the involved parties seems to be closer and direct treating the subjects. The Informational Technology-people showed how they care about each other's competence." When the working groups had accomplished their tasks, the Donor Coordination Council was established in early 2006.

The NAPR cooperates closely with the Chamber of Notaries of the Ministry of Justice and with the Tax Department of the Ministry of Finance on developing enterprise registration and tax lien/seizure regulations. In addition, it has broadened stakeholders' inclusiveness in the decision-making and problem-solving processes. The main stakeholders, such as NGOs, bank associations, representatives of the ministries, independent experts, etc., have been identified, and a deliberative council has been established. The council

operates in a consensus-oriented way. Within its framework, periodical meetings are arranged in order to develop common approaches to customer-oriented problem-solving.

Thus, the registration system of the public registry has become a centralized body in terms of independence, finances, functions and administration (separate from local governments/authorities) and, at the same time, a decentralized one, considering the complete delegation of tasks and responsibilities to the local district offices, which have excluded conflicts of interest with regard to public administration.

Legislative reform

Law on the State Registry

The initial formation of a new legislative framework started with the approval of the Georgian Law on the State Registry in 2004. The scope of the law is to define the type of State Registry, the State Registry system, its organizational and legal principles, and the terms of references of the registry bodies.

Law on fee for services rendered by the NAPR

The law on fee for services rendered by the NAPR was a significant innovation for Georgia (Parliament of Georgia, 2004c). It is the cornerstone for strengthening the NAPR's financial independence and has helped in combating corrupt dealings between registration staff and customers. Customers usually paid a bribe in order to speed up the registration procedure (rather than for falsification of documents). The registration procedure was time-consuming (40–45 days) and the service was frustrating because of long queues. Therefore, customers were content to pay a bribe.

The new law has established fee rates, payment procedures and terms for services. The Registry has introduced an accelerated registration service (Box 1).

This law regulates fairly the correlation of the services rendered in obligatory terms and the money paid. In short, it has set service standards. It gives possibilities

BOX 1

Key innovations of the law on service fees

The law has introduced an accelerated registration service with a fixed fee and the following terms and conditions:

- Initial registration: 1, 3 or 5 working days.
- Further registration, including registration of transfer, encumbrance, limitation or termination of property right (except mortgage): 1 or 3 working days.
- Mortgage: 1 working day.
- Movable property rights registration: 1 or 3 working days.
- For initial registration of right on real estate, including preparation of cadastral maps, completion of registration cards, and issuance of registration certificates or/and abstract, the following fee rates and terms were set:
 - registration of agricultural land: 10 working days, free of charge;
 - registration of non-agricultural land: 10 working days, lari 36;
 - accelerated registration of non-agricultural land: 1 working day – lari 150, 3 working days – lari 108, 5 working days – lari 72.
- Where an amount exceeding the fee payable under this law is paid, the difference between the paid fee and the fee rate determined by this law is to be refunded. The amount paid is to be refunded in full in the event that:
 - the NAPR refuses to render service on legal basis;
 - an interested person refuses service before commencement thereof;
 - the service is not rendered by the NAPR within the terms determined by this law.

for refunds and/or reimbursement where obligations are not met by the Registry.

The law has set strict registration terms, down from the previous 40–45 days to a maximum of 10 days for initial registration, with the possibility of registration in 1 day with equivalent payment, at five times less the normal term and fee (lari 36). The new accelerated registration service is optional for the customer, and it has contributed greatly to eliminating corrupt dealings as well as to enhancing the financial independence and strength of the NAPR.

The law on the registration of the rights on real estate

Broadly speaking, the Law of Georgia on Registration of Rights on Immovable Property (Parliament of Georgia, 2005) defines the terms more clearly, fully and structurally (Box 2). Moreover, it has considered the active development of the construction business in Georgia, which required security of rights through the registration of initial ownership and

transfers of multiapartment buildings/condominiums under construction (Article 15).

Another important provision is the registration of linear constructions (Article 16), something not envisaged previously. It allows and defines registration for oil, gas and other pipelines. The demand for registration of such objects has been increasing from various entities and/or organizations, such as railways and oil companies. The legislative gap or so-called “blank spot” was a critical impediment for investment and economic development as there was no legal stipulation to acknowledge ownership or tenure rights on such objects by the state.

The new law defines clearly and precisely for each specific case the list of registration documents to be submitted to the registration office (Article 20). It has simplified the registration procedure for when the reference notice issued by the former Bureaus of Technical Inventory has been lost or damaged beyond identification.

BOX 2

The Law on Registration of Immovable Property Rights

Complex reforms have been carried out with the aim of developing a secure, transparent and simplified registration system of real estate rights. Important innovations of the Law of Georgia on the Registration of Immovable Property Rights are:

- specification of the documents for public register;
- definition of the initial and further registration of right to multiapartment buildings under construction;
- definition of the special cases for registration of real estate having an independent property right (linear constructions, e.g. pipelines);
- prohibition imposed on the registration service to demand any documentation or information from the applicant other than that required by law;
- stipulation of the basis for the suspension, refusal or termination of the registration;
- stipulation of the basis for making changes, additions, and rectifications of the technical errors in the public register entries;
- demarcation of the rights that are subject to the compulsory registration in the public register and the rights that are subject to voluntary registration in the public register;
- lien registration establishment.

Previously, the applicant had to make a claim in the courts. Now, the applicant just has to provide a signed written statement.

In brief, the innovations of this law have improved the registration system considerably. Its definitions are in plain language, which has reduced registrars' possibilities for "interpretation" and has created a more simple and transparent system. Moreover, it clearly and impartially empowers the citizen to obtain reimbursement in the event of violation of the registration terms by registration clerks or owing to other circumstances.

Financial reform

The law on fees for services provided for the financial independence and strength of the NAPR. It represents the cornerstone for further reforms and for the sustainable maintenance of the system in terms of its material and technical basis and human resources development. Under the financial reform, an Internet banking service was introduced, and a computerized accounting system (known as Orisi) was set up and connected to the local computer network. This system has considerably facilitated accounting procedures.

To ensure proper arrangements for staff wages, the registration offices have been divided into five categories (Box 3), taking into the account the income received by nine separate district offices concerning the defined fee.

Flexibility to move from one category to another is ensured, according to the increase in income generated per registry.

As mentioned above, the decision to abolish the accounting departments in the territorial registration offices and to make fee payments through the bank was important for eliminating cash flow at the registries. The NAPR now distributes staff salaries by plastic cards through bank accounts. The sole focus of the registrars has become the registration process.

For the NAPR, the income ensured by registration service fee was lari 8 162 400 (including VAT) in 2005. Of this amount, lari 1 062 500, as VAT, was transferred to the State Budget. In the past, the State Budget allocation for the SDLM had been lari 1 200 000 – almost the same sum as that contributed by the NAPR to the State Budget as VAT.

BOX 3

Salary-scale categories for registries established according to income generation

There are five salary-scale categories:

- the first category covers 2 offices: Central and Tbilisi registration offices;
- the second category includes 4 registration offices with average monthly income exceeding lari 10 000;
- the third category includes 9 registration offices with average monthly income of lari 4 000 – 10 000;
- the fourth category includes 12 registration offices with average monthly income of lari 2 000 – 4 000;
- the fifth category includes 41 registration offices with average monthly income not exceeding lari 2 000.

Source: NAPR (2005).

Technological reform

Main goals of technological reform

The main goals of technological reform are:

- development of registration software;
- establishment of secure electronic registration – cadastre system;
- establishment of e-governance-ready system.

Technological reform has also envisaged the establishment of a unified electronic registration system with a well-protected central database. The key aspects of the technological reform are: (i) registration system networking; and (ii) information publicity.

The electronic registration system needs to encompass: (i) systematic integration; (ii) information integration; and (iii) information publicity.

The future land information system should support users at all levels and provide stakeholders with easy access to information. The Information Management Centre of the NAPR will handle the new database at national (central) level. The Information Management Centre will act as an umbrella department for the registration and dissemination of data from the NAPR systems.

Software development

The prerequisite of technological reform was registration software development. The registration software (known as NAPReg) was developed at the Information Management Centre in close cooperation

with donor projects. The main objective during the development of the software was to create a customer-oriented, transparent and secure system for the registration of ownership and other property rights. The software has simplified the registration procedure – reducing a 67-step procedure to 9 steps. It has envisaged promoting access to registration data via the Internet. The interested parties (notaries, banks, etc.) will be able to access data without leaving the offices. In addition, it is planned to establish a unified geo-database in order to enhance data security, increase accessibility, and raise publicity. The enhancement of information accessibility and publicity related to real estate will promote the development of the property market.

EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS LEARNED

The activities undertaken by the NAPR for system improvement have already generated successful outcomes.

Introduction of a framework for transparency

In order to ensure publicity for and transparency of the system, one of the main priorities of the NAPR has been to inform the mass media and the public about the ongoing reforms. Citizens have been provided with full information. A public-relations plan has been developed, press conferences and briefings are organized frequently, and media releases are prepared and disseminated. In order to ensure

transparency, the NAPR has also opened a Web site, which contains all the basic information.

Setting of service standards

The NAPR has established fixed fee rates and clear payment procedures with strictly determined times. The setting of the service standards for registration has been a key factor in combating corruption. It has also contributed significantly to financial improvements and institutional development.

Capacity building

As a result of the reforms, the registration procedure has been much simplified (from 67 to 9 steps). For monitoring performance, a hotline was set up to detect and respond immediately to any problem faced by customers of the registry. For the same reason, a glass box for complaints, claims and suggestions was installed in the Tbilisi Registration Office. This is a useful tool for fostering responsiveness, participation, equity and inclusiveness.

Improvements to systems and processes

The institutional reforms that have been implemented have supported improvements to systems and processes. The separation of functions of land management and land administration was a first step to building up an effective unified registry. The previous practices of the registration system were complicated, vague and in some cases duplicated by the Bureaus of Technical Inventory. The NAPR has developed and introduced back-offices and front-offices in order to improve the registration service. The processes have been consolidated in accordance with the one-stop-shop principle.

Capacity building and the development of a human resources policy

As a first step in administrative reform, the NAPR initiated and conducted qualification exams through massive open-vacancy announcements in order to recruit highly-

qualified staff through a transparent process. In addition, as human resources development and capacity building through training were identified as a cornerstone for effective functioning, the special Management and Training Project was developed and submitted to the SIDA for that purpose (SIDA, 2005). The project is being successfully implemented by Landmateriat. The NAPR budget envisages the updating and maintenance of the proper equipment.

Secure financing

Reforms have been made in the financial sector in order to attract and retain qualified specialists at the NAPR and at the same time to ensure a sound material and technical base (in order to provide adequate salaries and working conditions). A first step in this direction was the gaining of financial independence from the State, which has meant operating on a self-financing basis. This has provided the opportunity to establish competitive salary scales and introduce categories according to income provided per registry. Making fee payments through banks has been important in eliminating cash flow at the registries (above).

Establishing audits

In order to ensure the rule of law, responsiveness to claims by customers, and monitoring of the work done by registration clerks, the internal control and audit division has been operating successfully to detect and act against disciplinary and legislative violations by NAPR staff. It monitors and analyses the activities of the staff within the limits of its competences, checks claims and responds to them, and prepares conclusions about internal investigations and submits them to the NAPR management to aid in decision-making.

Making effective use of information technology and communications

Technological reforms have focused on the establishing of a unified electronic

registration system with a central database, registration system networking, and information publicity. To achieve these goals, the first step was the development of registration software and the computerization of land records. The development of the software has itself facilitated the simplification of the registration procedure. Reforms in technology and communication have focused on improving data accessibility via the Internet for banks and notaries.

Being effective, efficient and consensus-oriented

Improvement in donor coordination was essential as the synergy of expertise, finances and efforts would then make it possible to have the most effective and efficient system functioning. It was important to make the cooperation process target-focused and consensus-oriented, with improved levels of accountability, participation and inclusiveness. With these aims, it was good practice to have a functioning donor coordination council.

Stakeholder inclusiveness

Active cooperation with the stakeholders made it obvious that in order to achieve effective functioning of the system it was necessary to broaden stakeholder inclusiveness in the decision-making and problem-solving processes. To this end, the establishment of the Deliberative Council has proved a successful initiative.

Less positive experiences

In most cases, making clear, distinct borders between levels of subordination and independence among institutions is a delicate issue. Such sensitive issues often have an impact on good governance characteristics such as participation and accountability among the institutions, which are considered stakeholders. In this regard, some processes of the NAPR (e.g. various administrative management issues, qualification exams, and staff recruitment processes) were cumbersome or obstructive because of exaggeration by the supervising body.

The hotline shows that more questions regarding registration issues are coming from the district/rural population. This highlights the need to enhance public awareness in district areas.

Implementation by the NAPR of development plans was not always possible in the times as anticipated and scheduled originally, e.g. software development, and approval of instructions for registration procedures and cadastre standards.

In general, the registration software was developed in a very accelerated and optimal period (1.5 years). However, at the start of the process, it was estimated that it would take only 6–8 months. The implementation process showed that perfecting technical details in order to keep pace with changing legislation is rather time-consuming.

Notwithstanding the difficulties, the successes achieved through the reforms for system re-engineering are important. It is important that the above-described achievements be recognized internationally.

EPILOGUE

The application of the principles of good governance, such as participation, the rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus-oriented approach, equity, inclusiveness, and accountability¹, in reaching the overall objective of the registry (i.e. the development of a unified, simple, customer-oriented, transparent and corruption-free registration system) are essential. Therefore, it is highly recommended that they be considered during the re-engineering of a property rights registration system. Taking into the account the positive trend, the NAPR is purposefully continuing to implement strictly defined customer-oriented reform (one-stop-shop principle) in order to establish a transparent, incorrupt and effective registration system equipped with modern registration-informational technologies.

The reform strategy of the NAPR, which is the principle entity for land administration,

¹ www.unescap.org/huset/gg/governance.htm

has worked in six main areas (institutional, legislative, technological, administrative, financial, and donor coordination) in order to establish an effective and efficient system.

It is a matter of pride for us that in the World Bank / International Finance Corporation publication *Doing Business in 2006*, Georgia, as a rapidly growing country in terms of doing business and developing, obtained a positive assessment mainly for the reforms carried out in property registration. The report (World Bank / International Finance Corporation, 2006) says: “Georgia the top reformer in 2004 – made the most progress. The newly created Agency of Public Registry offers expedited registration and combines other procedures to allow entrepreneurs to obtain a registry extract, certificate of property boundaries and proof of no other claims all at the same time. Before, that took visits to 3 agencies... Georgia also cut fees and eliminated the transfer tax, reducing the costs of registration by 75%.”

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Bonne gouvernance dans la privatisation et la restitution des terres agricoles pendant le processus de réunification de l'Allemagne

L'article commence par une présentation courte de la situation et des problèmes rencontrés en 1990, dans la phase initiale du processus de transformation du paysage politique allemand. Il explique les motifs principaux de la réussite de la mise en place du programme politique relatif à la transformation de la structure de la propriété agricole et forestière et appliqué par le Gouvernement fédéral allemand dans le cadre du processus de réunification de l'Allemagne. La responsabilité de ce processus ayant été confiée à un «organisme d'État» unique, le processus de mise en œuvre a pu être incorporé dans un cadre de gouvernance public-privé, ce qui a facilité l'instauration d'une «démarche pédagogique» pour résoudre les problèmes imprévus et de réaliser le suivi des performances, de la capacité de contrôle et de l'efficacité. Des mesures organisationnelles importantes adoptées pour améliorer l'efficacité et la bonne gouvernance sont décrites, ainsi que des mesures internes visant à rendre le marché foncier plus souple et dynamique et à protéger et accroître la valeur des actifs devant être gérés et vendus.

Examen de la buena gestión pública de la privatización y la restitución de tierras agrícolas durante el proceso de la reunificación alemana

El artículo comienza con una breve descripción de la situación y los problemas a que se enfrentó Alemania en la fase inicial de su proceso de transformación en 1990. Se explican los elementos clave para el éxito de la ejecución del programa político «Transformación de la estructura de la propiedad en el ámbito de la agricultura y la silvicultura en el proceso de reunificación alemana» del Gobierno Federal de Alemania. La atribución de la responsabilidad de este proceso a un solo «organismo estatal» implicó que el proceso de ejecución pudo incorporarse a un marco de gestión a cargo de una entidad pública, lo que permitió reaccionar a los problemas imprevistos y supervisar la ejecución, la controlabilidad y la eficiencia desde una perspectiva de aprendizaje. Se describen importantes medidas de organización encaminadas a fomentar la eficiencia y la buena gestión pública, y medidas internas para apoyar la flexibilidad y el dinamismo del mercado de tierras así como para garantizar y aumentar el valor de los bienes por administrar y vender.

Addressing good governance in the process of privatization and restitution of agricultural land during the German reunification process

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The article begins with a short overview of the prevailing situation and problems faced in the initial phase of the transformation process in Germany in 1990. Key elements leading to the successful implementation of the political programme “Transformation of the ownership structure in agriculture and forestry within the German reunification process” by the Federal Government of Germany are explained. The allocation of responsibility for this process to a single “state agency” meant that the implementation process could be embedded in a public- and corporate-governance framework, which facilitated a “learning orientation” in reacting to unforeseen problems and in monitoring performance, controllability and efficiency. Important organizational measures aimed at fostering efficiency and good governance are described, as well as internal measures to support a flexible and dynamic land market and to secure and increase the value of assets to be managed and to be sold.

INITIAL SITUATION IN 1990

In a first step of the privatization process, beginning already about six months before the official *Unification Treaty* of 31 August 1990, all (formerly “state-owned”) property holdings of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), namely all companies, were converted into stock companies/legal entities. The shares were transferred to the ownership of the Trust Agency (THA), founded on 8 March 1990 (Fischer and Schröter, 1993). The legal contract privatizing all shares was stated in the *Trustee Act*. Later on, a precise date for bringing the activities of the THA to an end was set by the Federal Government of Germany (31 December 1994).

The situation in the agriculture and forestry sector was somewhat different. The agricultural business entities were organized either as socialist cooperatives

(4 500) or as state-owned companies (515) – the Socialist Agricultural Production Cooperatives (LPGs) and the so-called State-owned estates (VEGs). Forest areas were managed by state-owned forestry companies. The transfer of the agricultural cooperatives to stock companies was governed by the *Agricultural Adjustment Act*.

All cooperatives and companies farmed agricultural or forestry land on the basis of extensive use rights (more or less free of charge) by law (e.g. § 74 LPG Law). Thus, only the state-owned agricultural and forestry areas were transferred to the THA. In 1990, such State-owned land totalled 2.1 million ha of agricultural land, or 35 percent of all agricultural land, and 2.2 million ha of forestry land (90 percent). Although all other land had not been expropriated by 1989 and, therefore, was still legally owned by individuals or the

church, these properties were more or less worthless assets because of the above-mentioned use rights granted by the GDR (Willgerodt, 1993).

FOUNDING AND TASKS OF THE GERMAN AGRICULTURAL AND FORESTRY PRIVATIZATION AGENCY (BVVG)

Because of the foreseeable long-term nature of the transformation process for ownership of agricultural and forest land and to move political pressure off the Federal Government and the THA, with respect to § 1 Para. 6 of the *Trustee Act*: “For the privatization and reorganization of publicly-owned assets in agriculture and forestry, the THA is to be organized to take into consideration the particular economic, ecological, structural and property law-specific features of this area.”

The THA, in close collaboration with the Federal Government, set up the German Agricultural and Forestry Privatization Agency (BVVG) on 1 July 1992.

The BVVG was charged by the THA and the Federal Ministry of Finance with two tasks. First, it was to manage all former State-owned agricultural and forestry land until a concrete privatization decision could be made by other authorities on the basis of the most important *Property Act* (which re-privatized expropriated land to

individuals or corporations) or the *Allocation of Ownership Act* (which restored land needed for the execution of public tasks to municipalities, the Federal States or the Federation itself by “allocation”) (Fieberg and Reichenbach, 1997). Second, it was to sell all land not expected to be privatized by the above-mentioned or other laws.

External and internal measures of financial control

Choosing one-single state agency to be responsible for managing and executing the selling of all agricultural and forestry land to be privatized facilitated controllability of the business operations and monitoring of performance by the Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF) on behalf of the Federal Government. Modern management principles were able to be adopted much more easily than in a “normal state-authority”, e.g. in regard to time limits on the appointments of managing directors, annual written agreements on objectives, and monthly meetings on all current key issues between the BMF and the board of management of the state-agency responsible for implementation.

As a limited liability company (Table 1), the BVVG is embedded in the systematic monitoring and controlling instruments of the public-governance and corporate-governance frameworks.

TABLE 1
Governance frameworks and the BVVG

As a “limited liability company”	As a “state agency”
<p>The BVVG is subject to all general legal regulation mechanisms (in particular, the German Commercial Code [HGB] and all ancillary commercial and tax laws) and to the principles that apply for all “large stock companies (such as limited liability companies)”¹. Uniform provisions for the setting-up of transparent accounting apply in particular.</p> <p>Assets, financial and revenue situation must be audited by an independent and capable audit company each year on the accounting date, and a corresponding auditing report has to be published.</p>	<p>Every state/agency has to include in the “normal” auditing report a protocol, after § 53 of the Act on Budgetary Principles of the Federation (HGrG), in which detailed questions for checking the regularity of business operations, management and other public governance aspects have to be answered.</p> <p>Like all federal authorities, the BVVG is subject to external financial controlling by the government and can be audited at any time by the Federal Court of Audit (BRH), for example.</p>
<p>All commercial and tax-related offences also apply without restriction to the BVVG. As office-holders, the employees of the BVVG are subject to the offences of accepting benefits and accepting bribes (§§ 331–338 of the Criminal Code [StGB]). As a result, the public prosecutors and the police must officially investigate employees of the BVVG if they receive information.</p>	<p>The federal administration has passed a guideline for corruption prevention for its offices and authorities. Among other things, this guideline defines the legal prevention mechanisms for creating more transparency and traceability for administrative actions in areas particularly vulnerable to corruption. This prevention guideline applies directly to the BVVG.</p>

¹ According to the classification in § 267 HGB, “large stock companies” are companies with a balance sheet total of more than 21.24 million DM, sales revenue of more than 42.48 million DM and more than 250 employees.

The Federal Court of Audit (BRH), whose members are judicially independent, audits the complete accounts as well as the economic effectiveness and regularity of the Federal Government's financial and economic management, using cross-sectional audits for several government authorities and selective audits. It reports annually and directly to the Bundestag (Federal Parliament) as well as to the Federal Administration (Art. 114, Para. 2, Clauses 1 and 2 of the Basic Law). As part of this overall contract of external control of the execution of policy programmes of the Federal Government, in recent years, the teams of the BRH have repeatedly audited the way in which the BVVG conducts its tasks. Through their audit reports, the Bundestag, BMF and the BVVG have been informed of the results.

As part of the company, the Internal Audit Department is directly subordinated to the BVVG board of management and is an organ of internal financial control. It supports the board of management as well as those responsible at a divisional and branch level in fulfilling tasks by providing independent and objective assurance and consulting services. One of its tasks is to add value and improve the operations of the organization as well as to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control and governance processes. Inasmuch, the Internal Audit Department carries out a subsequent cross-checking of functional instructions and implementation.¹

Learning orientation and self-organization of the transformation process

In the early years of the transformation process (primarily from 1989 to 1992), enactment of legal regulations had to be carried out in the absence of full knowledge of all concrete problem situations, and solutions were required in order to make

¹ See the Definition of Internal Audit by the Standards of the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing; The Institute of Internal Auditors, Altamonte Springs (also available at <http://www.theiia.org/guidance/standards-and-practices/>).

the privatization process successful. Often, investment needs were pressing for fast problem-solving.

The THA and the BVVG responded to this problem with the implementation of "learning procedures" in their organizational and operational design and organizational behaviour. In order to secure investments while reorganizing ownership structures, the decentrally-organized branches were often under great pressure (often political pressure) to solve problems. Central directorates/departments at headquarters (in Berlin) supported (e.g. with legal advice) the development of new solutions to problems and communicated these best practices to all other branches as well as to the legislator and representatives concerned. Thus, the two institutions took on the often needed "transaction costs" for creating new solutions and acted as "change agents" within the transformation process (Czada, 1996).

In later reviews of the *Property Law* or the *Allocation of Ownership Act*, the Federal Government enshrined "opening clauses" to enhance the use of such consensually deviating, substatutory solutions to speed up the self-organization transformation process (and to reduce state costs by unburdening the courts).²

THE AGENT – INTERNAL PROVISIONS FOR EFFICIENT AND TRANSPARENT IMPLEMENTATION

This section describes various internal governance processes that helped to ensure transparency and high efficiency in the day-to-day operations of the implementing state agency.

Transparency here must not just be understood in the sense of corruption prevention, but also as a general requirement for traceable administrative actions, customer friendliness, and above all the fairness of access to land in the privatization process. The aim of these strategic measures has been to counteract

² § 31 Para 5 Property Law, § 2 Para 1 Clause 6 Law of Allocation of Property

accusations of systematically favouring certain groups of buyers or obstructing potential buyers (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2002).

An organizational manual, available to all employees, defines the main tasks, procedures, processes and responsibilities. The accompanying check on decisions by various organizational units is ensured through the ruling on signature and deputization authorization. This means that obligations of participation and responsibility are observed in order to prevent sealed-off, independent actions by individuals.

The principle of dual control applies for external correspondence (and not only). External correspondence is always signed by two employees. Another example of the principle of dual control is the separation of land valuation from the pressure of achieving sales – the aim is to ensure that privatization is carried out at a market price that has been determined as objectively as possible.

Staff rotation

The lowest organizational level in the BVVG's operational sale and lease business is that of regional teams. These teams usually consist of one section head and one officer, who are responsible for all sale/lease activities in a region – an administrative district. After a maximum of five years, these heads and officers must take on other administrative districts/regions, this in order to prevent the formation of non-transparent networks.

Awarding of public contracts to third parties

An area particularly vulnerable to corruption is the selection and awarding of public contracts to provide deliverables (purchasing) and services, and in particular building services. The BVVG is affected by this in the procurement of goods and services for its own work (including IT, vehicles, and office equipment), assessor services (valuations), and building services (demolition, and emergency safety measures). Even if the individual cases

regularly involve only small order sums, particular attention must always be paid to procurements in order to ensure open and transparent competition. Most important, the parts of planning, awarding and settlement within a procurement process are separated from organizational or personal measures in order to prevent price collusion or other actions that could involve corruption. The same European standards of equal opportunities for access to public orders apply to the BVVG as a state-owned agency as to all public authorities.

Staff awareness and education

The contracts of employment expressly state that every form of corruption is forbidden. All employees are informed that the *Guideline on Accepting Rewards and Gifts by Government Employees* of the Federal Government applies to them. The applicable working conditions of the BVVG include a requirement of approval by a superior for acceptance of gifts with a value of more than €10. Where prior approval is not possible, the receipt of such a gift must be reported immediately. Monetary gifts should be donated to a generally-recognized charitable institution. In addition, all BVVG employees are called on to report all cases of suspected corruption – anonymously if necessary – if there are specific indications and transparent evidence.

Internal auditing / full-time investigators

All facts that form the basis of a known suspicion of corruption are first investigated internally by the Internal Audit Department. Once the results of a process of (internal) pre-investigation are known, the BVVG board of management has to decide on further measures (possibly the involvement of the public prosecutors).

Corruption prevention

The above-mentioned sections have explained in brief the organizational standards against the background of the *Corruption Prevention Guideline of the German Federal Administration*, which was optimized and revised in

2004. It now includes the instructions and recommendations on the preventive measures of the United Nations treaty against corruption, which was signed on 9 December 2003. The prevention guideline contains binding instructions for all Government authorities and offices for identification of areas particularly vulnerable to corruption, and the minimum measures that should be taken against corruption (Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2004).

PRIVATIZATION STRATEGY AND INTERNAL MEASURES TO INCREASE ASSET VALUES AND TO SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FLEXIBLE AND DYNAMIC LAND MARKET

Flexible and dynamic land lease market

A modern and sustainable agriculture policy needs to ensure access to land in a flexible and low-cost way that protects liquidity for farms. Leasing arrangements secure income from assets for owners who are no longer engaged in agriculture as well as providing access to this land for farms. One in eight farms in Germany is a leased farm. In 2005, 63.9 percent of farmed land in Germany was secured by lease contracts, while 90 percent of the owners of leased areas do not or no longer work in agriculture. In eastern Germany, the proportion of leaseholds for farms was 81.2 percent (85.1 percent in 2003) (German Farmers Association, 2006; Federal Statistical Office of Germany).

The most important underlying conditions for this leasing of land are regulated in the §§ 585–597 of the German Civil Code (BGB). The prerequisites for concluding or changing lease contracts have not been increased unnecessarily. In contrast to the situation in some transforming economies, lease contracts are not registered in the land register – thus, the lease contracts are usually concluded between the owner and the user in a written form. German lease law does not stipulate a duration for leasehold rights either. However, a term of from 2 to 12 or 18 years is usually agreed on.

However, the landowner must report the lease contract to the Regional Offices for

Agriculture of the Federal States.³ These offices keep a record of leasehold rents and hold statistical data on the usual local (average) leasehold rents. In addition, the Federal Statistical Office collects data on the lease market from about 100 000 farms every two years. Thus, the land lease market in Germany is embedded in an institutional framework that enables market monitoring and reduces the risk of speculation or asymmetric information between landowner and tenant without interfering with the basic right of freedom of contract (FAO, 2001).

Privatization strategy

The privatization strategy chosen by THA/BVVG was implemented successfully because different instruments of privatizing State-owned land (leasing and selling) could be combined in respect to three major (overlapping) stages and there was the capability to react sensitively to several secondary conditions:

- The liquidity situation of many newly-founded farms and forestry companies did not permit the sale of areas of land in the formation period.
- The legal claims to transfer land back without payment or the assignment of real estate were specific to the areas; therefore, the sale of areas required clear clarification that these areas of land were not underlying such legal claims.
- Thus, the above-mentioned legal framework for land lease came into force with unification on 3 October 1990. The land market in the former GDR first needed to consolidate itself. Institutions had to be built up, staff had to be trained, and data on the market had to be collected.

Lease phase

The conscious prioritizing of first concluding 1–2-year lease contracts, and

³ Land Lease Transaction Act, 8 Nov. 1985 (BGBl, I, S. 2075) and Ordinance to the Land Lease Transaction Act, 6 Feb. 1995.

then 6–12-year contracts was a suitable reaction to the secondary conditions mentioned, as it was easier to revise lease contracts concluded on the basis of uncertain data than if irreversible sales decisions had been made. With extensive checking and clarification processes with the regional agricultural offices, the capability of potential lessees were proved before long-term lease contracts (> 6 years) were concluded. The lease phase gave farms the opportunity to become more stable in view of the new market conditions and to allocate liquid assets for a later purchase.

Preferential sale

In the second phase of implementation of the privatization process, the farms in eastern Germany were first to be given the opportunity to increase their property resources by purchasing formerly state-owned land at preferential conditions within a federal land-purchasing programme (referred to as land-purchasing programme within the *Indemnification and Compensation Act* [EALG] and the *Land Purchase Implementing Regulation* [FlErwV]).

Sale at the full market value on the developed land market

Coupled with the idea of increased performance and, thus, better financial resources in farms, a price increase in the agricultural land market is expected. With the prioritization of sales at the full market value as of around 2008, it should be possible to take maximum advantage of this expected price increase – in other words, the added value compared with a sale at the price level on the non-developed land market in 1998 (Klages, 2001).

Internal measures to increase asset values and to support the development of a land market

Land lease market – high leasehold rents

The conclusion of lease contracts with the THA enabled the farms in eastern Germany to manage the areas of land used by them before 1990 after the use-rights by-law lapsed with unification. However, it was extremely difficult to identify appropriate

lease prices because the regional agricultural offices responsible for issuing official lease-price statistics did not have appropriate data on which to base their information. As a result, simple valuation methods initially had to be used by way of precaution; rough figures such as euro per land point (soil quality) were used as a guideline.

With external assistance from experts, the THA drew up a guideline for determining leasehold rents in 1993. Based on recommendations from the specialist advisory board of the BVVG (an advisory committee of agriculture policy experts, valuation experts, and agricultural economists), this guideline was turned into an internal leasehold-rent framework in 1996.

As described above, the German land lease market is based on a model whereby the lease prices can develop dynamically according to the performance of the farms and the general economic situation. For broadening the data basis for the official lease-price statistics and, thus, determining realistic typical local leasehold rents as fast as possible, in addition to the concluded land lease contracts being sent to the regional agricultural offices by legal obligations, negotiated and increased lease prices were often actively communicated to the regional agricultural offices.

With the improved economic situation of the farms and, therefore, a need to increase lease prices (and to secure lease prices from inflation), negotiations were possible because a frequent (e.g. three-yearly) reciprocal option of adjusting the lease prices was formulated in the lease contracts. While the share of the BVVG in the land-lease market decreased from about 35 percent in 1990 to 11.8 percent in 2005, the “announcement effects” of the negotiated lease prices by an institutionalized lessor such as the BVVG to the market should not be underestimated. Figure 1 shows the development of lease prices in eastern Germany compared with western Germany between 1991 and 2005.




FIGURE 1

Leasing fees for agricultural land in eastern and western Germany, 1991–2005

Source: German Agriculture Publishing House (2006).

Land sales market

Because under a “good governance” perspective the aspects of transparency and flexibility are among the most desirable outcomes of state regulations on the land market, some general elements of the land market and valuation of real estates in Germany have to be explained here.

In 1960, the Federal Government enacted the Federal Building Act, which abolished a general price freeze for the real estate market of 1935. As a long-term strategy against speculation on the land market with all its side-effects, it was decided not to statically fix values/prices. Instead, instruments of a system of market monitoring were directly enshrined in §§ 193–199 of the Federal Building Code (BauGB).

The introduction of a concept and definition of the term “market value” brings the advantage that all participants in the land/real estate market have a uniform understanding of the “market value”.

The Federation has enacted the Federal States to establish committees of valuation experts (Gutachterausschüsse) charged with the task of collecting data on purchase prices and general data on the land market. Another task of these committees is to define standard ground values, which means constituting average values for a standard plot of land based on the sales prices for other comparable plots of land,


depending on the location. Standard ground values and other collected data are to be published in a suitable format (Kuse, 2006).

The *Valuation Ordinance* (WertV) contains binding rules for determining the market value using three standardized valuation methods (comparative method, income method, and depreciated reconstruction cost method), describes the necessary data, and refers to the data that were recorded by the committees of valuation experts.

In their valuations, publicly-appointed valuation experts and all other market participants refer to the methods provided by the *Valuation Ordinance* and the data provided by the committees of valuations experts in order to guarantee a level of comparability and transparency on the land market that is as high as possible (European Valuation Standards, 2003).

Selling policy of the BVVG

Because of the provisions in federal budget law, the BVVG is obliged to sell real estate at the market value unless it is transferred without payment on the basis of other laws or has to be sold preferentially as a result of the government’s land purchase programme. To identify sales prices appropriate to the market, the BVVG uses the system of market monitoring to meet its own objectives, and supports this system with own data and its selling policy.



Note: BVVG = German Agricultural and Forestry Privatization Agency
EALG = Indemnification and Compensation Act

FIGURE 2

The land market in Germany, 2003

Source: German Agriculture Publishing House (2004).

With a market share of about 60 percent of all agricultural land sold in eastern Germany, the BVVG is still the largest player in the agricultural land market (Figure 2), even though the privatization process has already been underway for 15 years.

As an element to provide fairness of access within the privatization process, the “selling policy” (i.e. the yearly amount of agricultural land being offered to the open market) must reflect the ability to provide sufficient liquidity by the farms to invest in the purchase of land. In consultation with the Ministries of Agriculture of the Federal States, the BMF and the representatives of farmers’ interests, the BVVG has recently limited the amount of land being offered to 25 000 ha/year. Single lots should be smaller than 50 ha, because the amount of money needed to bid for a lot of more than 50 ha would exceed the financial capability of many farms in eastern Germany.

Transparency in the selling process

Another element of fairness of access is to sell all areas for which there are no claims

for transfer without payment or sale within the land purchase programme in a publicly bid procedure on the open market (to anyone in Germany and also to any citizen of the European Union).

As part of the organizational manual of the BVVG, detailed guidelines for using various awarding methods and procedures depending on the market opportunities of specific groups of real estate ensure a uniform, transparent privatization process. This helps to secure equal opportunities for all prospective buyers, to achieve an optimal economic result in the selling process and to minimize the influence of manipulation or corruption.

Internal and external valuation of specific real estates or lots

A two-step valuation system with enshrined cross-checkings of results ensures a transparent valuation of land that is geared as closely as possible to the market value.

Specially-trained employees in the branches of the BVVG are allowed to value plots of land up to a probable market

value of €40 000 (or a maximum area of 10 ha) using an internal mass valuation procedure. Another employee conducts sales price negotiations and the actual sale with the buyer. Deviations from the originally determined market value must be justified and documented in a clear way. This separation of land valuation from the pressure of achieving sales aims or the expectations of a prospective buyer ensures that privatization is carried out at a market price that has been determined as objectively as possible.

For all real estate not covered by the internal mass valuation procedure (> €40 000 or > 10 ha), an assessment must be obtained from an external, specially-trained and independent publicly-appointed valuation expert (or a valuer certified according to the EN 45013 standard); the costs for this valuation are borne by the seller.

LESSONS LEARNED

Notwithstanding of all the contradictions and critical arguments, the reorganization process for the ownership structure has been relatively successful if we measure success by the support for the set-up of an effective land and forestry economy in eastern Germany after 1990 and the economic and financial success of the privatization work conducted to date by the BVVG for the government.

It is not just the task of the State to guarantee property rights and the inheritance of these. Another sign of “regulatory quality” is that the “State” defines and implements underlying legal and institutional conditions, so ensuring that the public good of “the ownership of land” can be used to the maximum possible added value for all. Therefore, German land policy is based on market transparency and flexibility. Precautions in favour of competition over use rights and against speculation and the manipulation of prices are structurally enshrined in this. This existence of a clear vision for the future land policy strategy – anchored in the “model” of existing land policy and legal

provisions from the “old Federal Republic” of Germany – has significantly eased the transformation process in eastern Germany.

The flexible lease market helped to prevent a breakdown in agricultural production and in the stabilizing and emerging of new farms after 1990. However, even in the quite strong German economic environment, the participants in the agricultural land markets – the farmers – are restricted in their ability to provide sufficient liquidity to invest in the purchase of land. In this respect, the sensitivity of agricultural land markets requires a longer-term State commitment that provides appropriate support for the process with the goal of developing a healthy ownership structure that treats all farm and property forms in the same way.

The chosen privatization strategy has met these requirements by avoiding excessive selling pressure in the land market, which would have favoured only the financially strong participants. In view of the long-term nature of a process such as this, modifications to the process goal and implementation procedure may be necessary and can be implemented with reasonable effort. The systematic incorporation of “learning cycles” of this kind can increase “government effectiveness” within a process.

At the level of organizational design for implementation, the Federal Government consciously decided to transfer responsibility for the administrative and utilization-related tasks associated with the privatization of formerly State-owned land to one single “state agency” (in the form of a limited liability company). The execution of implementation tasks by this “federal agency” has combined successfully a high degree of flexibility with “dual” control mechanisms – in addition to budget-related provisions for all government authorities, independent auditors must be used to ensure that commercial and tax reporting and auditing obligations are met.

As we have attempted to show, the control processes present at various levels can help to achieve privatization objections efficiently

as well as help to prevent corruption. The implementation of a government programme such as the “reorganization of the ownership structure in agriculture and forestry” can be organized within a good governance environment.

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