

Agenda Item 5.3	Conference Room Document 13 English only

second fao/who global forum of food safety regulators

Bangkok, Thailand, 12-14 October 2004

Consumer Organizations' Experiences with Genetically Modified Foods in Some Developing Countries of Africa

(Prepared by Consumers International)

Introduction

Consumers International (CI) has surveyed its members regarding food-related concerns, and the safety/acceptability of genetically modified (GM) foods and genetically modified organisms (GMOs, generally when introduced as food crop plants) has consistently been the top-ranking concern among CI's 250 member consumer organizations, world-wide. The same is true for the approximately 120 consumer NGOs in 45 African countries with whom CI's Regional Office for Africa is in contact.

Africa's debate on GMOs climaxed during the 2002/2003 season when some countries in Southern Africa voiced concern over the presence of GMOs in the food aid destined for the region, where several countries faced widespread food shortages. It was estimated that at least 13 million people in the region would face starvation by the end of the year, unless food aid worth over U.S. $507 million was distributed. The affected countries were Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. (Zimbabwe was once the bread-basket of the region). When it became clear that much of the donated grain was GM maize from the U.S., several governments of the affected region resisted accepting the donated GM grain. A vigorous and protracted debate ensued, in which a number of consumer organizations (members of CI) were involved. The debate was resolved successfully, in the end: National governments chose their own (different) policies to accept or not accept GM maize, and the predicted mass starvation did not occur.

The intense debate proved to be an effective learning experience, bringing into sharp focus many issues that are sure to arise when an effort is made to introduce GM foods into the food supply, or GMO crops into agriculture, in developing countries. CI here shares with the Second Global Forum some of the lessons we learned from this food-aid crisis.

Consumer Experiences with the GM Debate in Africa

Most affected governments were under pressure from the World Food Programme (WFP) to accept GM foods, especially corn (maize) from the United States of America. While some governments conceded, others adopted the precautionary approach as they were concerned about the potential for long-term effects of GM foods on human health and the environment and about possible implications for national trade interests (e.g., grain exports). A multitude of complex reasons thus underlay the African reluctance to simply accept GM maize imports, and tended to offset the some of the serious concerns about hunger.

National governments were “caught in between a rock and a hard place.” Authorities in Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland accepted the GM food aid, and distributed un-milled GM corn in some parts of their countries. Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Zambia each resisted acceptance, at least initially. While calling for caution on GM foods, Mozambique and Zimbabwe eventually accepted the food-aid corn, provided that it was milled, to reduce the chances of plantings, which would release GMO crops into the agro-ecosystem.

In Zambia, the government carried out an intensive investigation, which included sending an expert delegation to the U.S. and the E.U. on a fact-finding mission, where they met with the biotechnology industry, government food safety officials, academic scientists and NGOs with an interest in and expertise on GM food safety issues. Ultimately, Zambia rejected GM food aid, having established to its satisfaction that such food aid was not essential to meet the needs of Zambia's population, and that any risks associated with the GM maize were greater than Zambia was willing to accept. Tremendous pressure was exerted to coerce the Zambian government to accept genetically modified grain, which was portrayed in much of the international debate as the only available solution to the hunger problem. As a result of the pressure campaign directed against Zambia, several Zambian and regional non-governmental organisations rallied behind the Zambian government, and mounted a campaign to press for alternative food supplies to be made available to the country.

Consumers International and the Zambian Consumer Association (ZACA, a member of CI) were among the NGOs defending Zambia's position. In its campaign, CI lobbied the World Food Programme to explore options for supplying Zambia with non-GM grain from countries where such grain was available. The campaign also revealed that the Zambian Government was receiving a loan to buy GM grain, not a grant.

In a letter, CI supported the government of Zambia's position that consumers had the right to know what they were consuming in all foods, and in particular, in GM food aid. CI called for labelling of all genetically modified foods introduced into African food supplies.

CI also called for:

Adequate studies to establish the possible long-term effects of GM foods on humans and the environment before the products were marketed;
Mandatory labelling of GM foods and feeds (for all purposes);
Post-marketing environmental impact assessments to be conducted.

Meanwhile, consumer organisations in the region were being called upon to advise their governments on whether or not they should accept GM foods in the face of hunger. In Zambia, ZACA advised the government to take a precautionary approach. Other CI members in the region, including the Consumer Council of Zimbabwe (CCZ), Pro-Consumers, in Mozambique, and the Consumers Association of Malawi (CAM), all took the position that GM corn should be milled to eliminate the risk that it might be planted.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Different African developing countries confronted with the food crisis of 2002-2003 responded in different manners to the availability of GM maize as food aid. Some countries (e.g., Malawi) elected simply to accept the GM grain, judging that the need to alleviate hunger outweighed other concerns. Other countries, recognizing a potential for long-term risk to the health of their population, the integrity of their agro-ecosystem, and their future prospects as grain exporters, sought to balance benefits and risks. The countries attempting this “balancing act” found different balance points. Zimbabwe and Mozambique reduced the risk of ecological spread of GM crops by requiring that GM food-aid grain be milled. Zambia took a more cautious approach and secured the needed food aid as non-GM grains from other sources, enabling it to refuse to accept knowingly any GM grain shipments.

CI member consumer organizations participated actively in the national debates in several countries and at the regional level. CI's members were among the stakeholders involved in forging different national consensus policy choices in different countries. Neither the governments of the involved countries nor the consumer movements in those countries were monolithic; both government and consumer sectors showed flexibility and weighed a number of options, before choosing the one that seemed best for a given country under the specific circumstances.

Decisions about GM food aid precipitated by the food crisis of 2002-2003 in southern Africa provided several good models of sound risk analysis, properly applied. The governments collected the best scientific data available and weighed the known scientific facts and uncertainties and other legitimate factors thoughtfully, selecting their preferred risk-management options in an open, transparent process with affected stakeholders, such as consumer organizations, playing significant roles.

Considering the likelihood that similar emergencies may arise in the future, Consumers International recommends:

That the World Food Programme (WFP) and all donors must respect international law, regional guidelines and national regulations and restrictions imposed on GM food. The WFP and donors should not question sovereign decisions to impose restrictions on GM food aid.
That the WFP and the U.S. Agency for International Development should immediately stop exerting pressure on affected developing country governments and presenting these countries with a misleading scenario of 'No Choice.'
That the WFP and all donors should provide real choices (i.e., sources of non-GM food aid) to any country that rejects or restricts GM food aid. Failure to do so renders the WFP's long-standing recognition of the "the right to choose" meaningless. The WFP has a duty to actively seek options for providing non-GM foods that are in fact available to countries that prefer the non-GM alternative.
The WFP should put in place additional mechanisms that enable it to respond appropriately to situations where recipient countries impose restrictions on the acceptance of GM food aid. For example, the preferences of recipient countries should be ascertained in advance of a crisis, so that planning could emphasize making the supply of food sources with different characteristics (e.g., GM/non-GM) roughly match the expected demand.
The WFP should encourage donors – particularly the US – to provide cash instead of in-kind (grain) contributions, so that recipient countries can purchase foods that meet their national needs and preferences, on the global market.
The WFP and all donors should seek to guarantee and support local purchases of staple foods in recipient countries. Traditional crops such as cassava, groundnuts and beans should be included within food deficit calculations and surpluses available at the local and regional level should also be used as food aid.
When confronted with possible shipments of GM grains that may help alleviate hunger but may also pose risks, governments should conduct a sound risk analysis, as completely and expertly as their capacities permit, as was carried out in some of the African examples discussed here. Open, transparent decision-making including appropriate participation by consumers and other stakeholders, as also occurred in these examples, is an essential part of sound risk analysis.
Consumer organizations in developing countries should inform themselves on the scientific, economic, trade, ethical and other aspects of the debate over GM foods and crops, so that they may constructively engage with their governments when a national risk analysis on this issue is required.

At other sessions of this Global Forum, CI will present information about some of its efforts to inform its member consumer organisations, as well as other interested parties, on these issues.

In conclusion, as heated as the 2002-2003 debate over GM food aid in Africa became at times, the results generally were sound national decisions based on effective risk analysis, and a great deal can be learned from experience with that crisis, so that we may all be better equipped to handle the next such crisis.