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COMMITTEE ON COMMODITY PROBLEMS

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SPECIAL PRODUCTS FOR DEVELOPMENT

I. Introduction

1. The 2001 Doha mandate, the 2004 July Framework Agreement and the December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration all agreed that addressing development concerns is central to a conclusion of the Doha Round. One important such measure in the July Framework and the Hong Kong Declaration was policy flexibility for developing countries through the identification and treatment of Special Products (SP).

2. This paper presents background and essential points concerning the debate on SP in the WTO. It outlines an approach and proposals made for identifying SP, and summarizes results from an effort to identify SP through a number of case studies in developing countries.

A. SPECIAL PRODUCTS MODALITY

3. The modalities related to SP fall under the Market Access pillar have evolved as follows:

- July Framework Agreement, 2004, paragraph 4: "Developing country Members will have the flexibility to designate an appropriate number of products as Special Products, based on criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development needs. These products will be eligible for more flexible treatment. The criteria and treatment of these products will be further specified during the negotiation phase and will recognize the fundamental importance of Special Products to developing countries."
- Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, December 2005, (paragraph 7): "Developing country Members will have the flexibility to self-designate an appropriate number of tariff lines as Special Products guided by indicators based on criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development".

4. The main differences between the two documents are the greater flexibility (self-designation), specificity (number of tariff lines) and reference to indicators for the stated

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criteria in the later document. In both documents, it is clear that the main criteria agreed relate to development goals.

B. THE DEBATE ON SPECIAL PRODUCTS IN THE WTO NEGOTIATIONS

5. The two sides of the SP debate in the WTO can be characterized as those who embrace increased liberalization for almost all products as the route to increased growth and reduced poverty, and those who embrace increased liberalization for the majority of products but a slower pace of liberalization for products that are linked directly to food security, livelihood security and rural development. All members have agreed on flexibility for developing countries through a SP modality but differences on identification and treatment procedures exist.

6. The arguments by those WTO members that favour more flexibility are essentially three: first, these countries have seen no gains after the Uruguay Round and its attendant liberalization; secondly, the levels of liberalization expected for certain critical products (among them being rice, sugar, milk and maize) from developed countries have not been achieved; and thirdly, domestic and regional markets in developing countries are critical initial outlets for products produced by poor small farmers. These countries argue for flexibility to establish appropriate policies to improve agricultural sector production capacity and competitiveness.

7. Countries that favour a more restrictive approach to SP have three major concerns: first, that extensive SP designation will lead to lower ambition in terms of reducing tariff barriers; secondly, that higher tariffs on imports undermine the food security of poor consumers; and thirdly, that rural area public investment with liberalization has the potential to increase development more than without liberalization as it is complemented by increased private investment.

8. The controversy surrounds the fundamental issue of the path of development and how protection affects it, as well as the issue of what tariff lines can qualify as SP.

II. Identification of Special Products

9. The point of departure for identifying SP is to address the aspects detailed in the agreed modalities and their interpretation as reflected in the proposals by different negotiating groups and countries. This section provides an overview of these proposals and describes an approach for identifying SP.

A. PROPOSALS

10. The proposals made for identifying and treating SP can be divided into two categories, both linked to development and trade. One proposed by the G33 emphasizes development related indicators and the others proposed by Malaysia, Thailand and the United States emphasizing trade related indicators.

11. The G33 proposal recommends that there be no *a priori* exclusion of any agricultural product and that developing countries should be able to designate at least 20 percent of their agricultural tariff lines as SP guided by a non-exhaustive list of indicators reflecting the three development criteria and based on at least one indicator at national, regional or household level.[1] Traded products receiving subsidies should be permitted to be SP and all SP should have access to the Special Safeguard mechanism. SP should be subjected to smaller tariff cuts.

[1] G33 proposal on the modalities for the designation and treatment of any agricultural product as a Special Product by any developing country member. WTO JOB (05)/304, 22 November 2005. An illustrative list of indicators for designation of Special Products is attached to the G33 proposal.

12. Under the United States proposal SP should be “no more than five tariff lines” at the detailed duty level (i.e. the level actually applied in a Member's schedule). Further, they should be products that are produced domestically or are close substitutes of products produced domestically; should not be a product that is exported from a country on a most-favoured nation (MFN) basis; and should not be a net exported product [2]. SP should have increased market access and smaller tariff cuts.

13. The main concern in the Malaysian proposal is how SP might impact exports and producers dependent on exports from developing countries. Its main proposal is that a product for which more than 75 percent of world trade is accounted for by developing country exports should not be designated as a SP[3]. Further, SP should be a limited number of lines specified at the eight-digit harmonized system (HS) level, or the maximum level of individual member's schedules. All SP should have smaller tariff cuts and should not have a permanent status in the WTO.

14. Thailand’s proposal builds on the Malaysian proposal by strengthening its main requirement for SP. It lowers the threshold for excluding a product from being a SP to 50 percent of world trade. It thus shortens the list of products that can be designated as SP. Further, it suggests as an alternative that if more than 50 percent of the importing country’s imports of a product come from developing countries, then the product should not be designated as SP. Finally, SP status should end at the conclusion of the Doha Round implementation period.

B. AN APPROACH TO IDENTIFYING SPECIAL PRODUCTS

15. A comprehensive approach to the identification of SP would take into consideration both the development and trade concerns of different countries. Further, SP would be conceived in a dynamic development context that includes flexibility and opportunities linked to rural area transformation and growth.

16. Within the multilateral negotiations arena there are at least two aspects that could be changed as revived negotiations determine final SP modalities. First, SP could be recognized as requiring flexibility in more areas of the WTO agreement than just in market access. Reducing tariffs over a longer period has not by itself proved beneficial in achieving competitiveness or facilitating successful transition to new areas of production. Hence countries designating SP should be able to provide additional support to these selected commodities. Secondly, a comprehensive approach should highlight the role of commodities for rural area transformation. This approach could for instance link the role of SP to paragraph 55 (Commodities), paragraph 41(Small Economies), and even more importantly, paragraph 48 (Integrated Framework) and paragraph 57 (Aid for Trade) of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration.

17. In the application illustrated here of the development and trade measurement criteria at the national level the identification of SP comprises two stages. The first stage identifies possible SP through a mechanical approach that directly relates products to the three criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development. Table 1 provides a summary of the nine indicators across which data (based on FAOSTAT) were collected for the analysis in several test countries. The second stage reduces the preliminary list of possible SP identified in the first stage by examining the current trade and trade policy situation for the products listed to identify those that require increased flexibility and what special treatment might be appropriate. The resulting “shortlist” of possible SP would then need to be discussed bilaterally with trading partners and multilaterally since the final list of SP will have to take the interests of other countries into consideration.

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[2] United States Communication on Special Products. JOB(06)/137, 3 May 2006.

[3] Discussion paper on Special Products, Contribution by Malaysia, 23 March 2006.

III. Case Study Experience on Special Products Identification

18. The two-stage approach described above was applied with some variations in the number of indicators used (determined largely by national relevance and data availability) and nature of stakeholder involvement in the different case study countries. Given the increasing importance of regional trade agreements (RTAs) and intra-regional trade in the global trading framework the results presented here draw specifically on case studies from two regional groupings, CARICOM in the Caribbean and SACU/SADC in Southern Africa.

A. CARICOM[4]

19. The four case study countries in the CARICOM region are: Belize, St. Kitts and Nevis, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. Table 2 shows the number of products evaluated, number of tariff lines identified as possible SP and the percentage of total tariff lines, using 705 tariff lines as the standard number of total tariff lines at the six-digit level.

20. Table 3 shows the products, tariff lines, and basis for qualification according to the agreed criteria. The importance of fruits and vegetables in all the countries is clearly evident and the same products qualified against different criteria in different countries depending on the role they played in terms of the three criteria or trade considerations. Vegetables were generally more important to food security and fruits to livelihood security.

21. Some products had a lot of flexibility in terms of scope for varying tariff rates because of high bound tariffs (220 percent for fruits in St. Kitts and Nevis) or low applied rates (0 percent for milk powder in Belize). Table 4 presents the ranges on bound and applied tariffs for the possible SP tariff lines. The anomaly of Suriname is apparent as many applied rates are higher than bound rates and all products are bound at 20 percent. The considerable consistency between the results of the SP criteria analysis and the sensitive product lists of the countries (in the context of their RTA schedules) points to the fact that even before the concept of SP, countries were expressing their food security goals through their trade policies.

22. There are obvious reasons for countries such as those in this study that have a common external tariff (CET) in the context of an RTA to consider SP in a regional context. As national and regional markets become more important in a global trading environment where traditional preferential markets are being eroded, SP in a regional context are attractive if they create market opportunities for RTA partners. Further, if individual countries name a product as SP and their RTA partner does not, it could undermine the CET if their bound rate is cut and falls below the CET agreed to in the RTA. This would imply the need for a decrease in the CET, which would affect all the RTA members. Clearly, a regional SP list would have to be negotiated among the RTA membership.

23. Table 5 presents a short list of products and corresponding tariff lines that could serve as possible regional SP for the Caribbean region. It is based on three considerations. First, it considers products identified as being important for food security, livelihood security and rural development objectives. Secondly, it includes products that some Caribbean countries are producing or can produce competitively and supply to the region. Thirdly, it considers products which can be produced in reasonable quantities within the region but need protective tariffs to prevent dumping from extra-regional sources. Products which are part of the "ineligible for duty exemption list" in the CET were also considered in this analysis.[5]

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[4] CARICOM is comprised of the following countries: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago.

[5] Under the revised treaty of Chaguaramas a CARICOM member state may suspend the import duty on an agricultural product, coming from outside the Common Market, with the exception of the products described under the *"List of Commodities Ineligible for Conditional Duty Exemption."*

24. The analysis reveals that the United States, Thailand and Malaysia proposals would greatly limit the number of tariff lines that might be designated as SP. A limit of five tariff lines (United States proposal) can be inadequate if a single product is to be designated as special, because a “product” may involve more than five tariff lines at the HS six-digit level. Further, the restriction that the tariff line product must be produced domestically would limit infant industry protection for future new and value-added product development possibilities for countries. The restrictions, that a product could not be designated as special if developing countries account for more than 50 or 75 percent of the product’s exports (Thailand and Malaysian proposals, respectively) or if 50 percent of the country imports come from a developing country (Thailand), would eliminate a high percentage of any country’s possible SP.[6] Table 6 shows these results for the Caribbean case study countries. More importantly, these proposals do not pay sufficient attention to level of development and geographical location of countries. Where a developing country is located in proximity to both a developing and a developed country it is possible that the proposal can promote developed country exports more than developing country exports as a developing country that imports 50 percent of its imports from a developed country can declare it as a SP, but not so if its imports are from a developing country.

B. SACU/SADC[7]

25. The three case study countries in the SACU/SADC region, Botswana, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, are even more instructive than the case of the Caribbean in terms of how difficult it is for countries that are members of RTAs to make autonomous decisions in the context of SP. South Africa, Swaziland, Botswana, and Namibia are members of two of the regional agreements in southern Africa (SACU and SADC). Zimbabwe, Mauritius, and Swaziland are members of both COMESA[8] and SADC. The overlapping commitments, as in the case of Swaziland that belongs to all three RTAs, are indicative of this complexity. The three countries studied highlight the challenges.

26. Using the FAOSTAT database, product groups were evaluated where information was available against SP criteria. Table 7 shows the number of products evaluated and the resulting number of tariff lines as possible SP. Table 8 shows the product groups, associated HS codes and main qualifying criteria for product groups.

27. In the Uruguay Round, SACU members bound almost all their agricultural tariffs and South Africa on behalf of SACU countries committed to applying tariff quotas to a range of agricultural products, under the minimum market access commitments, at a maximum tariff of 20 percent of the bound rates. There was a high level of correspondence between these sensitive list products and the products identified as SP in Table 8. Fruits, poultry, pork, other grains, vegetables, tobacco and beverages show up prominently among the SP tariff lines.

28. Applied and bound tariffs for Botswana and Swaziland are very similar, reflecting their common SACU membership. However, high bound rates are the exception as the majority of products on the list of possible SP have much lower bound and applied rates and much less tariff policy flexibility than might be imagined. Table 9 shows these rates for a selection of the tariff lines of possible SP. This lack of flexibility does not currently apply to Zimbabwe. One implication of the ongoing discussions for SACU and SADC to converge into one RTA is that SADC would limit their current flexibility by adopting the SACU regime.

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[6] The analysis here is mainly at the six-digit level and the Thailand proposal suggests analysis at the eight-digit level.

[7] Members of SACU are: Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland. Members of SADC are – SACU plus Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar,Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

[8] Members of COMESA are: Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

29. In terms of the proposals tabled in the WTO restricting SP identification, the situation in Africa is similar to the Caribbean. Table 10 shows how the Thailand and Malaysia proposals would affect the Africa case study countries. Location and classification of a country's trading partner as either a developed or a developing country is important. Swaziland imports almost all (97 percent) of its agricultural imports from South Africa, while Zimbabwe has a more diversified import structure. Applying the country trade source threshold, namely that if more than 50 percent of the imports come from a developing country the product should be excluded from being a SP, shows that Zimbabwe would be more affected than Swaziland if South Africa were classified as a developed country.

30. Tables 11 and 12 broaden the analysis of the Thailand and Malaysia proposals showing how restrictive these proposals would be. Using the FAOSTAT database and its list of 512 products, Table 11 shows the number of lines that would be excluded for different threshold levels, between the range represented by the more restrictive (50 percent) Thailand proposal to the less restrictive (75 percent) Malaysia proposal. Table 12 shows the 20 most valuable agricultural products in terms of the value of trade that would be excluded if the threshold of more than 50 percent share in world exports by developing countries is implemented. These 20 products account for 36 percent of total developing country trade and represent 4 percent of the tariff lines. One would conclude that if the level of developing country trade is to be a factor influencing designation of SP, the importance of the value of that trade should be taken into account.

IV. Conclusions

31. The following conclusions, in the context of multilateral negotiations, underline the importance of SP flexibility and the need for the approach to this modality to be more comprehensive if the development objectives committed to in the Doha Round are to be achieved.

1. Developed and developing countries, in the past and currently, continue to identify agricultural products for special treatment. The SP identified as a result of the analysis in this paper overlap considerably with the products identified by countries on their sensitive lists. Thus, the SP modality seeks to ensure continuation of what countries consider a logical and useful policy.
2. The analysis shows that a rigorous criteria-based SP analysis is useful in liberalizing trade as it would assist countries in self designating fewer products than generally appear on existing Sensitive Product lists, and that are truly tied to national objectives for special treatment.
3. The results show that countries supporting the SP modality could live with a restriction of not more than 20 percent of tariff lines to be named as SP. This is further supported by the high bound rates that generally exist for developing countries and the fact that proposed cuts would cause only a few lines to fall below current applied rates.
4. The United States, Thailand and Malaysia SP proposals would considerably restrict the policy flexibility sought generally under the SP modality and allowed for by the G33 proposal. While the concern that developing country exports be not undermined by SP is legitimate, policy flexibility for development may be needed especially by smaller and poorer developing countries.
5. Given the increase in the number of RTAs and, in the case of custom unions, common external tariffs, it appears that a regional approach to identifying SP needs to be considered. With tariff reductions, individual country bound rates may fall below and put downward pressure on the CET.
6. Agricultural trade negotiations could recognize the development purposes of SP and therefore the need for policy flexibility for SP under all three pillars of the Agreement on Agriculture.
7. SP should be defined in a dynamic development context, namely a strategy that anticipates and promotes product development, facilitating countries to diversify and expand their product base. Thus, the option to designate SP should include flexibility for reviews and changes over time based on the agreed criteria.

Table 1: Summary of indicators used in Special Products identification

Criteria	Indicator Name	Measure
Food Security	Product share in calorie consumption	Daily per caput calorie intake from product as a share of daily per caput calorie intake from all products
	Product import as a share of domestic consumption	Volume of product imported as a share of volume of product consumed
	Ratio of domestic consumption of Product in domestic production of Product	Volume of product consumed as a share of volume of product produced
	Co-efficient of variation of domestic production	Co-efficient of variation of domestic production of product
Livelihood Security	Import growth rate	Exponential growth rate of product import volume
	Share in area harvested	Land area utilized for cultivation of crop as share of total land area under cultivation for all crops
	Co-efficient of correlation of production and import	Co-efficient of correlation between product production and product import volumes
Rural Development	Share in production (volume)	Volume of product produced as share of total volume of all products produced
	Production (volume) growth rate	Exponential growth rate of product production volume

Table 2: Caribbean Special Products assessment summary

Country	Total products evaluated	Possible SP tariff lines	Percent of total tariff lines
Belize	250	131	18.58
St. Kitts and Nevis	170	83	11.77
Suriname	125	60	8.51
Trinidad and Tobago	350	115	16.31

Table 3: Possible Special Products, number of tariff lines – selected Caribbean countries and region

HS Code	Products	Belize*	St. Kitts and Nevis*	Suriname*	Trinidad and Tobago*	Caribbean Region
0201,0202	Bovine meat including processed	7 {RD}	7{FS}	2{RD}	4 {RD}	
0203	Pigmeat including processed	6 {RD}	9{FS}	1{RD}	4{FS}	
0204	Mutton and Lamb		9{LS}	1{RD}	8 {RD}	
0207	Poultry meat ((and eggs))	12 ((2)) {FS}	((1)) {LS}	3{FS} {LS}	5{FS}	
04	Dairy products	8 {FS}		6{RD}	1 {LS}	7
07	Vegetables and root tubers	17 {LS}	27{LS}	20{FS} {LS}	18{FS} {LS}	25
08	Fruits and Nuts	19 {LS}	15{LS}	10{RD} {LS}	11 {RD}	15
09	Coffee	6 {LS}			4{LS}	
1006	Rice	11{FS} {LS}		1{FS} {LS}	2{FS} {LS}	4
1005	Maize	1{FS} {LS}				
12	Oilseeds		4			
1201	Soybeans	3{RD}				
15	Vegetable oils and fats				6 {LS}	10
16	Meat Preparations	4 {LS}				
17	Sugar and molasses	2{FS} {LS}			5{FS} {LS}	6
18	Cocoa and products	1			5 {LS}	
19	Cereal Preparations	3{RD}	1{RD}	2{RD}	8 {RD}	10
20	Preparations of vegetables, fruits and nuts (food preparation)	{RD}	3{RD}	4{RD}	14 {RD}	32
22	Beverages	13{RD}	2{RD}	5{RD}	3 {RD}	9
0409	Honey	1 {LS}	1{LS}			
1511	Palm Oil			1{RD}		
24	Tobacco Products			2{RD}		
09	Spices	3 {LS}				9
15	Oil Seeds/Meal					8
23	Food Residue				6	6
	Others	9	4	2	11	
	No. of tariff Lines	131	83	60	115	166
	Percent of HS 6 Lines	18.6	11.8	8.5	16.3	23.5

* Number of SP tariff lines and main qualifying criteria, FS = food security, LS = livelihood security and RD = rural development

Table 4: Caribbean Special Products – Trade and tariffs assessment outcome

Country	Possible SP tariff lines range of bound rates	Possible SP tariff lines applied rate range	Percent of possible SP tariff lines on sensitive list
Belize	70% - 110 %	5% - 91%	85%
St. Kitts and Nevis	100% - 250%	5% - 40%	88%
Suriname	20%	7% - 50%	84%
Trinidad and Tobago	50%-128%	0% - 43%	75%

Table 5: Caribbean – Possible regional Special Products categories and number of tariff lines

Product categories	Number of tariff lines
Meat and parts thereof (bovine, pig, lamb and mutton, poultry)	25
Dairy products (milk fresh and powdered and yoghurt)	7
Vegetables, roots and tubers	25
Fruits and nuts	15
Spices	9
Rice	4
Oilseeds and flour/meal of oilseeds	8
Vegetable oils, vegetable and animal fats	10
Sausages and other similar meat products	7
Sugar and sugar confectionery	6
Cereal preparations	10
Preparations of vegetables, fruits and nuts	32
Food preparations	5
Beverages (alcoholic and non-alcoholic)	9
Food residues, including for feed	6

Table 6: Caribbean – Percentage of Special Products not allowed under different proposals

	Number of possible SPs	Total eliminated (percent)	Share of developing country exports		Imports from developing countries (percent) - more than 50 percent (Thailand Proposal)
			50 percent (Thailand proposal)	75 percent (Malaysia proposal)	
Belize	131	38	28	17	10
St Kitts	83	27	18	6	8
Suriname	60	22	18	7	3
Trinidad and Tobago	115	40	17	9	23

Table 7: Africa – Special Products product evaluation results

Country	Total products evaluated	Possible SP tariff lines	Percent of total tariff lines
Botswana	111	129	18.3
Swaziland	106	148	21.1
Zimbabwe	234	185	26.3

Table 8: Africa – Possible Special Products groups, main qualifying criteria and total number of tariff lines

HS Code	Products	Botswana	Swaziland	Zimbabwe
0201	Bovine meat	RD	FS	FS
0203	Pig meat	FS	RD	FS
0204	Mutton and lamb	FS	FS	FS
0204.50	Goat meat	FS	LS	FS
0206	Offals of cattle	LS	FS	FS
0207	Poultry meat	RD	FS	LS
04	Dairy products	FS	FS	FS
07	Vegetables and tubers	FS	FS	LS
08	Fruits and nuts	RD	FS	RD
0902	Tea			LS
1001	Wheat		LS	RD
1003	Barley	RD	RD	FS
1006	Rice	FS	FS	FS
1005	Maize	FS	FS	FS
1007	Sorghum	RD	LS	LS
11	Milling products	FS	FS	FS
12	Oilseeds	LS		LS
15	Animal and vegetable fats and oils	LS	FS	RD
17	Sugar	LS	RD	LS
19	Prepared cereals	RD	RD	RD
20	Prepared fruits	FS	LS	RD
22	Beverages	RD	RD	RD
23	Food wastes	RD	RD	RD
24	Tobacco and products	RD	RD	RD
	Beans	LS	LS	FS
	Number of tariff lines	129	148	185
	Percent of HS 6 lines	18.3	21.1	26.3

Table 9: Africa – Current tariff rates on selected possible Special Products

	Botswana/Swaziland		Zimbabwe	
	Applied percent)	Bound (percent)	Applied (percent)	Bound (percent)
Pigmeat	15	37	40	150
Vegetables and tubers	4	37	40	150
Maize	0	20	25	150
Milling products	0	20	25	150
Sugar	15	105	25	150
Beverages	5	8.5	100	150

Table 10: Percentage of possible Special Products not allowed under different proposals

Country	Number of possible SPs	Eliminated based on		Total eliminated (percent)
		Share of developing country exports (percent)	Imports from developing countries (percent) - more than 50 percent (Thailand proposal)	
		(1)	(2)	(1) + (2)
Botswana	129	21.0	17.1	38.1
Swaziland	148	46.0	0	46.0
Zimbabwe	185	44.4	25.4	69.8

Table 11: Developing country exports and different threshold levels for 512 products

Threshold level (percent)	Number of Products Excluded	Percent of products not eligible to be SPs
> 50 (Thailand)	179	35
> 60	154	30
> 70	127	25
> 75 (Malaysia)	108	21

Table 12: Twenty most valuable products excluded on 50 percent threshold

HS Code	Product	Exports (US$ billion) (average for 2001–2003)		Developing countries' share in world exports (percent)
		Developing	World	
1511	Oil of palm	6.4	6.8	94
2304	Cake of soya beans	6.0	8.8	69
0901.11,12	Coffee, green	4.9	5.4	89
1006.30ex	Milled paddy rice	4.4	5.4	82
4001.21,22,29	Rubber natural dry	3.9	4.1	97
1701.11ex,12ex	Sugar (centrifugal, raw)	3.8	4.7	81
1801	Cocoa beans	3.2	3.6	88
0803ex	Bananas	3.0	4.4	69
1507	Oil of soya beans	2.8	4.1	68
902	Tea	2.2	2.8	80
2009.11ex,19ex	Orange juice concentrated	1.0	1.5	63
0713.31,32,	Beans, dry	0.9	1.3	67
0801.30ex	Cashew nuts shelled	0.7	0.8	90
1513.11,19	Oil of coconuts	0.7	0.8	87
1513.21,29	Oil of palm kernels	0.6	0.6	98
1602.5	Beef preparations	0.5	1.0	53
4001.1	Natural rubber	0.5	0.6	89
200820	Pineapples, canned	0.5	0.6	86
1202.2	Groundnuts shelled	0.5	0.7	70
0904.11,12	Pepper, white/long/black	0.4	0.5	85