Modes de faire-valoir et moyens d'existence: comparaison entre les modes de faire-valoir communautaires et privés au Zwaziland

Le foncier au Swaziland se divise en deux catégories majeures de tenure: le domaine national (Swazi Nation Land [SNL]) et le foncier bénéficiant d'un titre de propriété (Title Deed Land [TDL]), ou propriétés foncières libres qui, pour la plupart, furent acquises par des Sud-Africains au début du siècle. Les zones SNL soutiennent une population bien plus dense et, dans la perspective d'une économie de subsistance, génèrent plus d'emplois, bien que les possibilités d'emploi formel soient plus nombreuses en zone TDL. La terre SNL est une partie inhérente de l'identité culturelle du Swaziland. Elle exerce une fonction d'équité sociale dans la mesure où elle donne aux chefs de famille le droit d'accéder à la terre. Cependant, les femmes sont généralement privées de ce droit malgré leur rôle de premier plan dans la production agricole. Des objectifs politiques multiples suggèrent de continuer la dualité de la tenure foncière au Swaziland, bien qu'il soit nécessaire de résoudre le problème de la fragmentation et de la surpopulation pour les terres du régime SNL.

Sistemas dobles de tenencia y medios de subsistencia múltiples: comparación de la tenencia comunal y privada de la tierra en Swazilandia

La tenencia en Swazilandia se divide en dos tipos principales: las tierras públicas y la propiedad de tenencia libre, en la que el titular se beneficia de un título de propiedad, en su mayor parte adquirida por los sudafricanos al comienzo del siglo. Las zonas de tierras públicas mantienen a una población mucho más densa y, en la perspectiva de una economía de subsistencia, generan más empleo, aun cuando las posibilidades de empleo oficial sean más numerosas en las zonas de tenencia libre. La tierra pública forma parte integrante de la identidad cultural de Swazilandia, y ejerce una función de equidad social en la medida en que confiere a los cabezas de familia el derecho de acceso a la tierra. Sin embargo, las mujeres carecen en general de este derecho, a pesar de su función de primer plano en la producción agrícola. De acuerdo con los objetivos políticos múltiples, parece conveniente mantener la dualidad de la tenencia de la tierra en Swazilandia, aunque sea necesario solucionar los problemas de la fragmentación y la superpoblación en las tierras del régimen público.

Dual tenure systems and multiple livelihoods: a comparison of communal and private land tenure in Swaziland

Hezekiel M. Mushala, Ackson M. Kanduza, Nomcebo O. Simelane, Juliana K. Rwelamira and Nonhlanhla F. Dlamini

University of Swaziland, Kwaluseni, Swaziland

There are two major categories of land tenure in Swaziland: Swazi Nation land (SNL) and title deed land (TDL) or freehold tenure of land, which was mostly acquired by South Africans at the beginning of the century. The SNL areas have much greater population density and, in the context of a subsistence economy, generate more employment, although there are more formal employment opportunities in the TDL areas. SNL land is an inherent part of Swaziland's cultural identity. It fulfils a function of social equity to the extent that it gives heads of families the right of access to land. However, women are generally denied this right, despite their pre-eminent role in agricultural production. Multiple policy objectives suggest that this duality of land tenure should be continued in Swaziland, although the problems of fragmentation and overpopulation of SNL lands need to be resolved.

This article analyses the different types of land tenure in Swaziland as a basis for demonstrating the viability and efficiency of promoting given developmental objectives. An examination of land tenure conditions in the country needs to take into account the general physical, socio-economic, political and cultural background of society as a whole.

The country is divided into four physiographic regions whose ecological characteristics have a profound influence on land use. The regions run almost parallel in a north-south direction.

• The Highveld, covering the western part of the country, is an upland area. Only about 3 percent of the region is good arable land, while a further 10 percent is classified as having fair potential for crop production.
• The Middleveld, to the east of the Highveld, covers almost 28 percent of the total area. The region is warmer and drier than the Highveld. Almost 20 percent of the upper Middleveld has good to fair arable soils, while in the lower Middleveld the proportion is about 10 percent. The Middleveld is the most densely populated part of the country in terms of both humans and livestock.
• The Lowveld is relatively flat and low-lying, with a marked drought hazard but with good soils. Most of the irrigated sugar and citrus estates are located here.
• The Lubombo plateau rises abruptly from the Lowveld. About 12 percent of the region has good or fair arable soils. The vegetation is mainly wooded bushland.

LAND TENURE IN SWAZILAND: ITS EVOLUTION

Swaziland is characterized by two types of land tenure: land held in customary tenure, or Swazi Nation land (SNL); and land held by freehold tenure, or title deed land (TDL). The latter is sometimes referred to as individual tenure farms (ITF). The evolution of the dual system is traced back to the early 1900s. The characteristic land use patterns in the two different tenure categories in the country are shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1
Land use in Swaziland, 1989/90

^aExcludes 11 360 ha of urban land.

Source: Government of Swaziland, 1989.

There is some ambiguity in approaches to land tenure in Swaziland. Some analyses distinguish, in addition to the two basic categories of land tenure, a third category, Crown land (Armstrong, 1988; Mushala, 1992). TDL tenure, currently accounting for 37 percent of the country, recognizes exclusive rights of access to a defined piece of land with titles held by individuals or corporate bodies. Owners of land titles can sell or use the land as collateral. The State can withdraw title in land required for national development only after making appropriate compensation. Crown land is distinguished as land owned by the government or a section of government (Mushala, 1992; Levin, 1987). Most of the urban areas of Swaziland are on Crown land for two reasons. First, urban property is predominantly government estate. Second, after the suspension of the independence constitution in 1973, all land rights were vested in the King. The Swaziland Government leases urban areas to individuals or institutions in the name of the King.

Swazi Nation land has a more complex structure which has never been defined by legislation (Rose, 1992). At present 63 percent of Swaziland is SNL (Low, 1986). This land is held by the King in trust for the nation and is allocated by chiefs to homestead heads, who under Swazi law and custom are men. Although many women are de facto heads of homestead, land is allocated to them through male proxies. Membership in a local community is the condition for the right to receive or to be allocated land. Land can also be acquired through inheritance. SNL includes land bought from TDL landowners by a reigning monarchy in trust for the Swazi Nation. Such land has been leased to private companies to attract private capital and expertise to SNL. The use of this land does not reflect the traditional and political relations between chiefs and people as provided for under Swazi law and custom. The amount of land under each of the tenure categories is shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2
Land area by district and tenure category (thousand ha)

^a Eight urban or village areas under the control of town councils or central government.

Source: Government of Swaziland, 1989.

The present land tenure of Swaziland is a product of historical forces and has been shaped especially by those of the last 100 years. Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Swazi monarchy controlled all the land through chiefs. Temporary land grants, mistakenly interpreted as permanent concessions, were first granted by Swazi rulers to South Africans during the colonial era. According to Swazi customary law, however, land could not be bought or sold by Swazi rulers (Rose, 1992). A dual land tenure structure which permeated the entire economic, political and social system arose out of this misunderstanding. In 1907, land was designated as native reserves for the exclusive use of the indigenous population. The reserves, formally known as "Swazi Areas", constituted about one-third of the country. The remaining two-thirds of the land was distributed as Crown land and concession land. The loss of land through colonial legislation not only undermined the base of the Swazi rulers, but imposed a capitalistic system of production which was supported by cheap, plentiful local labour (Rose, 1992).

Labotsibeni, the Queen Regent from 1899 to 1921, levied funds from the people for the purpose of buying land back from white settlers. King Sobhuza II revived the programme in the 1940s. It was complemented by land made available by the British administration for rural settlement and the efforts of the Swazi Government after independence. In essence, postcolonial land policy has been aimed at reconciling modern land developments with existing customary land tenure procedures.

For analytical purposes three tenure systems are recognized, but an inherent overlap exists between SNL and Crown land. SNL is held by the King in trust for the Swazi people, and rights in Crown land are also owned by the King, in whose name land is leased. Some SNL has been acquired since the 1940s from individual title deed land and allocated to corporate owners such as agricultural cooperatives. The following analysis of government policy related to the existing tenure systems highlights some of the intricacies that have sustained these systems.

Government policies and their impact on land tenure

During the period of British rule in Swaziland the sanctity of private property in land was considered the basis for improved land utilization and improved productivity. The Independent State of Swaziland embraced this policy and avoided wholesale land dispossession. It was also recognized that ITF farms were a source of local employment, having provided about 50 percent of wage labour since 1980. About 75 percent of the farmland on title deed land is under freehold title and the remainder under concessionary title. Government policies towards this sector are based on laissez-faire principles.

Policies towards Swazi Nation land are notable for their continuity. In the late 1940s the colonial government introduced settlement schemes and rural development programmes. From 1970 to the present, development planning has emphasized provision and improvement of rural infrastructure through the Rural Development Areas Programme (RDAP), rather than tenure reform. These programmes have been successful in providing and expanding infrastructure but not in increasing productivity or preventing environmental degradation. RDAP was implemented entirely on SNL.

A CONCEPTUAL COMPARISON OF COMMUNAL AND PRIVATE TENURE

Communal tenure

The rural Swazi homestead (umuti) is the basic social unit. Swazis are patrilineal. A child belongs first and foremost to its father's lineage and clan. A wife and children are treated as constituting a "house" within the homestead, a division especially relevant to the allocation and inheritance of land and livestock as well as other property. A Swazi man remains the head of the group even in his prolonged absence. A woman by consequence of marriage is guaranteed rights to the means of livelihood through the umuti of her husband, which in turn belongs to a particular chiefdom subordinate to the King.

Ostensibly, land is owned by the man, and portions of it are allocated to his sons, but since such allocations are made only on marriage, fields are tilled by wives who control the disposal of their produce. The effect in practice is that the land is owned by women, whether married to the homestead head or to his sons or brothers (Ngubane, 1983). The right to receive family land is not determined by gender per se. If the head of the family (the father) dies, his property passes on either to his sons or to his wife (or wives). Theoretically, daughters have no claim to inheritance (Dlamini, 1989). It was always assumed that women would marry and therefore obtain access to land through their husbands. In contemporary Swazi society, the issue of women's right to inheritance has become controversial, but no reforms have addressed this issue. The division of landholdings through inheritance results in fragmentation of holdings, which is an increasingly serious problem.

All SNL land belongs to the community and the chiefs have the right to allocate land in their respective areas to all members. Every chief has a responsibility to the King to ensure availability of land for cultivation to heads of all homesteads. The rights to land in the community are defined principally with respect to arable land. On the other hand, the rights to graze stock, gather fruits and hunt have traditionally been unrestricted. As a member of the community, a Swazi is entitled to the nation's resources and particularly its productive land. Thus a Swazi man technically always has a place where he can stay and he is entitled also to derive a living from the land on which he resides, both arable and pastoral. Theoretically, a chief can banish a family from his chiefdom, but such banishment is rare.

While there are some constraints with regard to the individual's right to "total" ownership of Swazi Nation land, the system does provide security for people. Every Swazi may (and some do) acquire TDL and still maintain rights to SNL, such that these two forms of tenure are not mutually exclusive. There are also transfers of income between rural and urban members of the same family.

A high proportion of rural household income does not come from the agricultural sector; de Vletter (1983) found that wage earnings and remittances accounted for 46.1 percent of income in SNL homesteads, crop sales for 12 percent and livestock sales for 26.1 percent (Table 3). These data indicate that rural Swazis straddle two systems. It is misleading to regard everyone in the countryside as a farmer. Hence, in attempts to intervene in agriculture on SNL land, it should not be taken for granted that rural homesteads are all using the land in the same way. The whole range of strategies available to villagers in pursuing a living must be considered in analysis of rural communities (Lawry, 1989).

TABLE 3
Rural homestead income sources

Source: de Vletter, 1983.

In Swaziland, reliance on communal resources is declining. Under SNL tenure, rangelands, forests and grazing lands have been subjected to high levels of overgrazing and extensive soil erosion in many areas in recent years. The apparent breakdown of local common property management arrangements on SNL, as elsewhere in Africa, has been attributed to a variety of factors, including the following (Lawry, 1989):

• fundamental changes in rural economies;
• the increasing marginality of communal resources to the economic well-being of many individual rural households;
• the considerable variation in the relative importance of communal resources to household income;
• the reduced ability of democratically constituted user groups to assert control over all users;
• the political decline of traditional authorities, in part because of their reduced economic roles;
• the erosion of social and economic bases for collective control of individual use.

The legal basis for Swazi Nation land can also be traced to the provisions of the Concession Partition Act of 1907. About one-third of Swaziland was set aside for exclusive occupation by the Swazis, under the control of the "Paramount Chief". The Swazis felt that this partition was imposed on them; it resulted in the loss of vast amounts of land, and they lodged a series of protests aimed at regaining the land. Strong opposition was directed against foreign ownership of most of the land in Swaziland and against the concept of private property, which many Swazis believed would leave a large proportion of the population landless.

When the protests over the land occupation by whites failed, Swazis directed their efforts at land recovery towards buy-back programmes. The land bought under the land transfer programme is registered in the name of the King-in-trust and is said to fall tentatively under SNL. Armstrong (1988) observed that there is a second type of SNL land, which is TDL registered in the name of the King but held in trust for the Swazi Nation. This land is administered by either Tibiyo or Tisuka, royal parastatal companies.

Individual tenure

In 1902, the British Administration began to formalize concessions which Swazi rulers had granted. The Concession Partition Act of 1907 granted freehold title to concessionaires holding title to ownership of land or leases up to 99 years. The government has the authority to sell, lease or otherwise alienate the land that it owns, commonly referred to as Crown land. Most Crown grants have involved urban land and have occurred when the government has extended the boundaries of a township (Armstrong, 1988). Ultimately, Crown land is said to be "owned" by the King by virtue of "Vesting of land in Kings" (Order 45/1973). The Deeds Registry Act of 1968 regulates the process of registration of rights of ownership and other rights in title deed land. The Deeds Registry Office also keeps a registry of land and mineral concessions and the transfers of concessions.

It has been argued that individual tenure is not consistent with some of the elements that provide cohesion in the Swazi culture - that it does not contribute to economic security for the family, that the operation of the land market generates landlessness and that Swazi culture is opposed to the concept of privatization and foreign ownership of land.

The problem of "farm dwellers", commonly known as squatters, has also been cited as an impediment to production on land under individualized tenure. A great deal of controversy has centred around the relationship of farm owners and farm squatters. Farm owners have argued that the presence of squatters has hampered development and production on their farms. On the other hand, the farm squatters feel that they have a moral right to inhabit land that belonged to their ancestors. Under common law, farm dwellers have no legal right to live on these farms; thus the farm owners could evict them whenever they deem fit. The Farm Dwellers Control Act of 1982 tried to spell out the rights of farm dwellers, including an agreement with the farm owner which outlines the conditions of the farm dweller's tenancy, limitations on eviction of farm dwellers and provision for a district tribunal to resolve disputes between farm dwellers and farm owners. There are still numerous reports of conflict between the two parties. It has been suggested that the problem is likely to worsen as a result of the government's "back to the land" policy, when there is not enough rural land for those who wish to settle there (Armstrong, 1988). The scarcity of rural land is a growing problem.

A MULTIDISCIPLINARY EVALUATION OF FREEHOLD AND COMMUNAL TENURE SYSTEMS

This section evaluates the performance of both ITF and SNL land with regard to various factors in the development of Swaziland. The objective is to compare the two major tenure categories and note which promotes the achievement of given developmental objectives.

Individual tenure farms have been commended for being generally highly productive. Arguments have been advanced for land reform, encouraging conversion from customary land tenure to individual land tenure in order to promote development. Individual tenure land in Swaziland currently consists of commercial large-scale estates, medium-sized farms and urban areas. Individual tenure is said to generate quite a substantial percentage of the country's export earnings. Roman-Dutch and statutory law regulates most of the activity under individualized tenure land. The fact that property is privately owned means that it can be developed without any external interference. In addition, loans can be obtained on the security of lands or buildings; the security of tenure is guaranteed; good farming and conservation practices and the cultivation of long-term crops are possible; and land can be fenced to obtain security from neighbours (Hughes, 1972).

Developers have criticized Swazi Nation land on the basis of production factors. They argue that only 10 percent of households produce for the market and that agricultural production on SNL, which accounts for only 12 percent of gross national product, cannot keep up with the growing population. It is argued that SNL holdings are too small and fragmented, tenure is too insecure, too much land is left fallow by migrant workers, serious erosion results from overgrazing and modern innovations such as fencing and credit are discouraged (Funnell, 1991). Most important, it is argued that Swazi attitudes against individual experimentation on land and against profiting from land inhibit efforts to effect reforms in customary tenure (Rose, 1992).

Swazi conservatives would not readily accept changes in traditional SNL tenure systems. They feel that widespread conversion to individual land tenure would result in the emergence of a landless group and a loss of power by the King and local chiefs. Evidence indicates that communal land tenure practices are changing more rapidly in Lesotho and Botswana than in Swaziland, where customary norms and practices remain relatively intact (Rose, 1992).

Agricultural productivity

Although variations over years may occur, it is estimated that individual tenure farms generate about 31 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), contribute over 70 percent of the country's export earnings and provide up to 75 percent of the employment of Swazis (Funnell, 1991). In general they are characterized by better technology utilization, larger land areas and greater output and income generation. Given the well established infrastructure, ITFs generally have fewer marketing problems.

On the other hand, SNL farmers are faced with a variety of problems resulting in poor performance. These include poor infrastructure (inferior communication networks, undeveloped feeder roads, inadequate marketing facilities) and poor production methods resulting in low-quality products and limited quantities. The picture is made more complicated in Swaziland by the existence of a parallel, small but prosperous off-farm employment sector which acts as a disincentive to agricultural production.

SNL homesteads devoted over two-thirds of their cultivated land to maize production in 1989. SNL farmers prefer to grow maize rather than other crops regardless of climate, soil type and topographical variations (Dlamini, 1989). In some areas the production of maize amounts to underutilization of SNL holdings, since other crops would have higher yields per unit area and hence be more profitable. Cotton is another major crop on Swazi Nation land. Maize and cotton are also important crops on individual tenure farms, as are sugar cane, pineapple and citrus. Average production and yield data are presented in Table 4.

TABLE 4
Major crop production on title deed land and Swazi Nation land, 1990/91

Source: Government of Swaziland, 1993.

Table 4 clearly shows the relative importance of the agricultural crops in national development. Sugar cane and citrus are the main high-value crops on ITF land. By comparison, SNL produces mainly for subsistence. Cotton is the main source of income. The value and yield of the two major crops produced on both SNL and ITF, i.e. cotton and maize, are higher on ITF than on SNL.

Farm size varies considerably between the two tenure systems. The average size of farm holdings is 2.75 ha on SNL, while on TDL the average farm size is 800 ha for the agro-industrial estates and about 25 ha for the family farm. TDL has a far better performance index than SNL for the value of production, total yields and contribution to GDP and external trade.

Income and employment

Some 73 percent of SNL farmers earn less than US$200 per caput per year, while higher incomes are earned on large estates and other privately owned farms. Most homesteads derive income from three different enterprises: off-farm employment, crop production and livestock production. These enterprises are supplemented by a variety of small-scale income-generating activities such as handcraft production, beer brewing, food preparation and sales.

About 70 percent of the rural homesteads have absentee workers. Off-farm wages constitute the staple source of income for the majority of the homesteads, but the modern sector is absorbing only a small portion of this labour. From 1985 to 1991 paid employment in the formal sector increased at relatively high rates, on average 4.3 percent per annum. The informal sector absorbs much of the remainder of the labour, but the amount is very difficult to quantify.

Flory (1987) subdivided the constraints to commercialized agriculture and agricultural income on SNL into tenure and non-tenure related categories. Non-tenure-related problems include transport and marketing, problems in the acquisition of inputs and access to extension services. Tenure-related constraints include the following.

Fragmentation. The small average size of the farm plot (less than 2 ha) constrains commercial production and is often the result of fragmentation of holdings through inheritance. The fragmentation of the plots limits viable investments on the farm such as mechanization or irrigation, resulting in low productivity. This problem is compounded by the fact that family land consists of small fields scattered throughout the cultivation area of the community, according to how chiefs and families allocate fields. Moreover, land borrowing, even though not on a large scale, is practised throughout Swaziland. Under such circumstances the dispersal of the fields reduces the efficiency of cultivation. Over time the holdings become highly fragmented because of the subdivisions among sons of a family. The daughters do not have claims to property under normal circumstances.

Security of tenure. SNL is generally regarded as lacking secure tenure. The chief has the power to allocate land, but he also has the power to take it away. The homestead members can only use the land but do not own it - they only have usufruct rights. Farmers are also occasionally resettled by the chief for various reasons. Although the chief rarely exercises the power of banishment, both banishment and the threat of resettlement can instil a sense of insecurity among community members and may act as a constraint on investments that might increase productivity.

Credit constraints. One of the most common criticisms of communal tenure is the lack of immovable assets to pledge as collateral for loans. Farmers are unable to mortgage their land by using it as collateral. This limitation may constrain access to commercial credit, and hence to investment and productivity increases, but there is no conclusive evidence that it is a binding constraint on productivity or income.

Lack of control. The literature on land use repeatedly raises the issue of constraints of farmers' ability to make fundamental decisions regarding farming practices and the use of their land, especially concerning fencing and the timing for allowing cattle in the fields. Under SNL tenure, farmers temporarily lose their right to exclude others from their fields after harvest, when livestock are allowed to roam freely through the fields to graze on the crop residues. Fencing, which would allow farmers to control cattle movement over their fields, is strongly opposed on SNL; it is viewed as a potential interference with communal use rights after harvest and is thought to make the rights of an individual over land too exclusive, thus reducing the chief's authority over land allocation.

Social justice

The aim of land legislation during the colonial era was clearly to exclude certain sections of the population of Swaziland from private ownership of land and to define clearly and limit the land to which the Swazi population was entitled. Unfortunately, this limitation on land resources was extended to the post-independence era. The Land Speculation Control Act of 1972 seeks to prevent speculation by non-Swazis but provides no regulation mechanism to prevent speculative transactions by Swazi citizens. Armstrong (1988) rightly points out that as a result of such discrimination, the long-term goal of a fair distribution of land among the population as a whole may be prevented by widespread speculation by citizens. Land prices have become so exorbitant that landownership is kept in the hands of a few persons.

On the other hand, the communal tenure system on SNL seems sufficiently observant of the ideals of social justice, insofar as access to land is concerned. As noted, the activity on Swazi Nation Land is supposed to be legally regulated by Swazi law and custom. The Swazis are a relatively homogenous group culturally, socially and linguistically. The centre of Swazi culture has been and remains the monarchy, which has provided relative political stability from colonial times until relatively recently. Swazi conservatives continue to stress that SNL land, and the power of chiefs over its allocation, serves as one pillar of Swazi social cohesion.

The underlying requirement of Swazi communal tenure is that each person is eligible to be allocated land as long as he or she is a legitimate member of the community, but two problems limit access to SNL land. One is land shortage; the other is a gender issue. Shortage of land under SNL tenure is an ongoing problem and contributes to the problem of farm squatters on ITF land.

The problem of women's access to land is equally critical. Women control much of the process of production, consumption and disposal of surplus. However, women have an inferior role in the control of land. Under Swazi customary tenure, the power of land allocation is almost always vested in males. The extent to which women have access to the land is questionable. Rose (1992) found that women have little control over the land distribution process and that the customary land tenure system has very little place for women. Where women have to make requests from the chief, they are never permitted to represent themselves before the authorities. Women have access in that they work on the land, but it is men who have the control of the land (Amoah, 1978). Under customary tenure on SNL land, men assume primary roles as members of chiefs' councils entrusted with important decision-making responsibilities regarding land, or as active participants in public debate. The only mention of women is that they can expect to receive land from their husbands and can be represented by their husbands in dispute situations.

Environmental considerations

SNL has been characterized by small fragmented farm holdings, overgrazing and low productivity. Overgrazing and poor livestock management techniques on SNL have resulted in very severe gully erosion and general deterioration of rangelands (Mushala, 1992).

SNL farmers are allocated land for cultivation and building of homesteads. Grazing land remains under communal tenure and is an open-access resource. Cattle have an important role in the Swazi society; thus there is a traditional tendency to accumulate as many cattle as possible, regardless of the environmental consequences. The situation is aggravated by the inability of residents of SNL to fence their areas to keep off some of the livestock. The fragmented nature of farm holdings on SNL limits the level of individuals' investments on them, including investments in conservation practices.

The individual tenure system is recognized for its use of good farming practices, which include the adoption of soil conservation measures. However, the system relies on the use of farm inputs, including chemical fertilizers. Recent studies have indicated a general increase in soil toxicity which is mainly a result of increased use of chemical fertilizers.

Implications

The analysis of the two tenure systems suggests that the individualized tenure system is more favourable in terms of productivity, income generation, employment and contribution to GDP and external trade. The communal tenure system, although not scoring as high in terms of economic indicators, has very positive attributes regarding community welfare, social cohesion and group solidarity. It may be difficult to draw a clear boundary between the two in terms of development.

A BETTER FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Over time, changes in land use have to be induced so as to increase productivity and enhance equitable social development. For this to happen, it is necessary to effect changes in the rules and institutional arrangements that govern existing land tenure systems.

Swazi society is very much tied to the communal tenure system. Induced changes should be gradual so that the fundamental social framework is not dismantled. Most of the problems with SNL land or communal tenure are focused on land fragmentation. To address the problem it is necessary to find means of increasing the size of the holdings and to redistribute them under a local authority (e.g. local council). Chiefs are automatically members of the council, but other members are elected. Landholdings could thus be redistributed in such a way that no areas or individuals would be favoured at the expense of others. It is assumed that such an arrangement would minimize social dislocation.

On the other hand, the adoption of an individualized tenure system would be based on the assumptions that ITFs maximize efficiency in land use and that the national economy is developing towards private enterprises. In this scenario, the terms and conditions on which land is held would have to be changed drastically so that community controls over land would be reduced or eliminated. Such a system would create private individual ownership of land whereby rights are adjudicated, fragmented holdings are consolidated, land areas are surveyed and owners are determined and registered. It would probably allow for pledging of land as collateral on loans, and it might assist land consolidation. However, such a system would eliminate use rights of other individuals, would require an economic system biased towards private enterprises and would require a dramatic change in both government policy and cultural values. It would be likely to increase landlessness and insecurity and might not create economic opportunities for the majority of the people.

A statutory alternative to ITF land may be leasehold tenure in SNL areas. In countries that have a State leasehold system, land is owned by the State and leased from the State by individual farmers. Such a system may encourage industriousness among individuals, thus increasing productivity. However, it is likely to be bogged down by bureaucracy and creates room for corruption. Another statutory alternative might be cooperative production, i.e. cooperation and mutual assistance in production under corporate or communal ownership of land or State leasehold. However, cooperative production requires a high level of organization in division of labour and ample group discipline for conformity to established regulations in production, marketing and sharing of proceeds. Cooperative production is likely to fall victim to land tenure arrangements if land rights are not clearly defined at the initial stages.

The purpose of meaningful land reform is to enhance social development through more efficient use of land, to influence anticipated patterns of land distribution and to enhance future societal ideals. There is a need for a clearer land policy in Swaziland that will ensure more equitable ownership and use of land and possibly guarantee increased productivity and production not only on ITF land, but on SNL land as well. With a forecast decline in growth rate of paid employment in the formal sector (employment is expected to grow by 5.2 percent in 1993, by 4.5 percent in 1994 and by only 1.8 percent in 1995), the need to stimulate labour-intensive investment, especially on SNL, is becoming increasingly urgent. It is therefore important to examine each of the scenarios with respect to the identified parameters.

CONCLUSIONS

Social development is a complex process which is determined by both economic and social indicators. The above analysis has shown the merits and demerits of the two systems of tenure in Swaziland. The current situation was born of historical developments that have tended to harmonize the two systems. A bold decision to discard one tenure system as opposed to the other is not likely to enhance social development in its true sense. There is a need to assess development objectives in their proper perspectives, and this is likely to result in a compromise between the existing tenure systems, or the continuation of a dual system.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Amoah, P.K.A. 1978. Some legal aspects of the customary land tenure systems of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland: a comparative study. SWADEX 14, Workshop of Rural Environment and Development Planning in Swaziland. Ezulwini, Swaziland, 1-10 May.

Armstrong, A. 1988. Legal aspects of land tenure in Swaziland. Paper prepared for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Mbabane, Swaziland.

De Vletter, F. 1983. The Swazi rural homestead. Kwaluseni, Swaziland, University of Swaziland, Social Science Research Unit.

Dlamini, P. 1989. Land rights and reforms and their impact on food production in rural Swaziland. Swaziland Journal of Science and Technology, 10(2): 1-10.

Flory, B. 1987. Constraints to communal agriculture on SNL: a survey of Swaziland's advanced farms. Mbabane, Swaziland, Research and Planning Division, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives.

Funnell, D.C. 1991. Under the shadow of apartheid: agrarian transformation in Swaziland. Aldershot, UK, Avebury.

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