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Rattan cultivation and livelihoods: the changing scenario in Kalimantan

B. Belcher

Brian Belcher is Programme Leader,
Forest Products and People Programme,
Center for International Forestry
Research (CIFOR), Jakarta, Indonesia.

An analysis of the changing role of rattan in people's livelihoods in an area of Indonesia where it has been cultivated in a traditional rice-swidden system for more than 100 years.

Rattan, as is the case for many non-wood forest products (NWFPs), is typically produced under extensive conditions - the bulk of the world's supply still comes from wild resources - by people with relatively little economic and political power. Individual producers tend to harvest small quantities in remote and highly dispersed production areas, often under open access property regimes. Product quality varies enormously. These characteristics lead to high transaction costs for trade and relatively low bargaining power for producers, low commodity prices and low incentives for sustainable management (Belcher, 1997). As a result, resource depletion is widespread.

A 15-year-old rattan garden in Pasir district, East Kalimantan, Indonesia

- CIFOR/3096/C. GARCIA

However, rattan can also be cultivated under relatively extensive conditions. This article focuses on an area of Kalimantan, Indonesia, where rattan has been cultivated as part of a traditional rice-swidden system for more than 100 years. Swidden farmers manage "rattan gardens" over long periods: peak harvesting of rattan is 24 to 30 years after planting. Rattan has been a major source of cash income during periods of high demand (especially during a boom in the 1980s) and has had important socio-economic functions such as providing a means for saving, a tool for risk management and a marker of land-holding.

Today, however, a combination of policy and economic factors has sharply depressed demand and prices, while rapid, externally generated changes (new roads, large-scale establishment of oil-palm and pulp plantations) have created new pressures and opportunities for people living in the area. The article analyses these changes with the aim of identifying how rattan's potential for improving the livelihoods of poor people and providing jobs and valuable foreign exchange can be realized.

RATTAN CULTIVATION IN KALIMANTAN

The rattan cultivation system in Kalimantan probably dates back to the mid-nineteenth century (Van Tuil, 1929; Feaw, 1992). The details of the domestication process are not known, but the transition from wild gathering to planting within a rice-swidden system would have been a relatively small step. Rattan seeds or seedlings can be established simultaneously with the rice crop at very low extra cost. Studies carried out by the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) (Belcher et al., 2000; Garcia-Fernandez, 2001) have shown that rattan cultivation requires an extra seven or eight person-days in the first year, and small inputs for weeding and protecting the young rattan plants afterwards. Once the plants are established, they can be harvested periodically for many years using simple technology, for just the cost of the harvesting labour (cutting and carrying).

Rattan was originally used mainly for subsistence purposes. It began to be important in trade in the 1920s (Fried and Mustofa, 1992) and by the end of the 1960s it had become an important economic crop with the increased motorization of river transportation, a greater number of traders and exporters and regular increases in rattan prices. At the same time, alternative sources of income were lost as forest products that had been important, such as resins and gums, became less valuable through removal of trees and the development of synthetic substitutes. By the end of the 1970s, rattan was the main source of income for most villages of the study area, with many farmers concentrating on rattan cultivation and purchasing rice to meet their requirements.

CIFOR's Kalimantan
case study

This article is based on an ongoing study being carried out by the Forest Products and People Programme of the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR). The study focuses on the Pasir and Kutai Barat districts of the Indonesian province of East Kalimantan. The residents are mainly indigenous people (Dayak tribes) who live in scattered villages accessible by river and, increasingly, by road. They practise swidden agriculture; rice is the mainstay, with several other field crops grown, supplemented by hunting, fishing and collecting from the forest and increasing integration in the cash economy.

The study includes village- and household-level socio-economic surveys, ecological surveys, economic research, and spatial and land-cover analyses based on community mapping and time series remote sensing (optical and radar satellite) imagery (Belcher et al., 2000).

As with most CIFOR research, the project involves collaboration with local partners (in this case, the Centre for Social Forestry at the University of Mulawarman, Samarinda) and two international partners (The Centre for Earth Observation Science, University of Manitoba, Canada [with support from the Canadian International Development Agency] and the European Union-supported FORRESASIA project).

This article has been modified from Belcher et al. (2000); for more detail on the research activities described here, these papers can be requested from CIFOR.

Cultivation system

The details of the system vary from farmer to farmer and place to place, but the basic elements are consistent (Weinstock, 1983; Mayer, 1989; Godoy, 1990; Peluso, 1992; Fried and Mustofa, 1992; Belcher, 1997). Farmers plant rattan seeds, wildings or seedlings in a newly created agricultural field (or "ladang") as part of a shifting cultivation system. The main agricultural crop is upland rice, planted along with maize, cassava and banana, among other food crops. The main rattan species used is Calamus caesius (more than 90 percent of plantings), although several other species are also grown.

Farmers start the swidden cycle in May by slashing undergrowth vegetation and then felling the trees in a selected area of primary or secondary forest. In August, after a drying period of a month or so, the field is burned, and by September farmers start planting the hill rice which will be harvested in February. Rattan seeds or seedlings are planted either after slashing (before burning, as some believe that the heat from the burning improves germination) or at the same time as the rice.

The young rattan plants are protected in the ladang, and when the farmer shifts to a new swidden plot one to two years later the rattan is left to grow up with the secondary forest vegetation. The average size of a rattan garden is 1.4 ha. The density of rattan clumps ranges from about 50 to 350 plants per hectare, with a mean of around 170 (Garcia-Fernandez, 2001).

Harvesting of C. caesius typically commences eight to ten years after planting. Some of the other species mature more quickly. Most of the cultivated species (including C. caesius) have multiple stems and can sustain repeated harvests. Production peaks 24 to 30 years after planting and begins to decline after 37 to 43 years (Garcia-Fernandez, 2001).

An intermediary in the rattan trade in the Pasang district of East Kalimantan; rattan stems are sold through a network of traders, which influences both prices and benefits to the producers

- CIFOR/3064/C. GARCIA

The rattan stems are cut, cleaned and dried for sale through a network of traders. The main market for the primary cultivated species has been the lampit (rattan mat) industry in South Kalimantan (although this industry has largely collapsed, as discussed below) and the furniture and handicrafts industry, primarily in Java. A substantial portion has also been smuggled to Malaysia (Haury and Saragih, 1996; 1997) and on to other countries with large rattan furniture manufacturing industries (especially the Philippines and China).

Rattan had a boom period in the 1980s with the rapid development of the lampit (rattan mat) industry in South Kalimantan, but export restrictions led to a decline in this industry in the 1990s

- CIFOR/1856/B. BELCHER

TRADITIONAL ROLE OF RATTAN IN LOCAL LIVELIHOODS

The traditional rattan cultivation system provides a source of cash income in areas where there are few other opportunities to earn cash. Rattan gardens offer a valuable risk management tool in which the rattan is available as a long-lived, low-maintenance source of savings/income. This is especially important in systems without other well-developed risk management institutions (such as bank accounts or insurance policies). Rattan can be harvested to respond to urgent needs for cash, in reaction to medical emergencies, for example, or for ceremonial requirements.

The traditional rattan cultivation system offers the advantage of low-cost establishment and maintenance with relatively high yields. Harvesting is very flexible - the rattan continues to grow for years, so there is no penalty for delaying harvesting to coincide with labour availability or higher prices.

Rattan gardens also have an important marker function for property ownership. Within the traditional system, rattan gardens are respected as a sign of occupation. With recent large-scale state-sanctioned land appropriation by oil-palm, pulp and mining companies, rattan gardens have been used successfully to demonstrate ownership and claim financial compensation (however meagre) from usurping companies.

The rattan gardens, which are essentially secondary forests, are also a source of other valuable forest products and services, providing habitat for medicinal plants, ritual plants and plants and animals valued for food (Matius and Pilipus, 2000). They also have important cultural value: rattan gardens represent an important tradition and provide links to ancestors, and many rattan gardens have been inherited through generations.

1
Rattan matt (
lampit) industry in Amuntai, South Kalimantan, 1984 to 1993

CHANGES IN THE RATTAN INDUSTRY: BOOM AND BUST

The economic role of rattan expanded in the 1980s with the rapid development of the lampit industry in South Kalimantan. In 1984 there were just 21 lampit manufacturing enterprises in Amuntai, the centre of the industry, making 64 000 m2 of lampit. By 1987 the industry was at its peak, having swelled to 435 units producing more than 1 million square metres (Figure 1). Demand and prices for cultivated C. caesius reached unprecedented highs. Farmers report that competition among buyers was very high. Traders would come to the villages, offering advances of cash and consumer goods to secure rattan supplies.

One of the main markets for the primary cultivated species has been the furniture industry in Java

- CIFOR/1857/B. BELCHER

With the boom in the rattan sector in the 1980s, a series of regulations were swiftly put in place, ostensibly aimed at protecting the resource and encouraging the domestic processing industry (see Box on policy instruments affecting rattan in Indonesia). This was in line with a tradition in Indonesia of heavy government intervention in resource industries, often in collusion with powerful private interests (de Jong et al., 2001).

The ban on the export of unprocessed and semi-processed rattan acted as a subsidy for domestic manufacturers of rattan products by increasing domestic supply and thus reducing raw material prices (Bennet and Barichello, 1996). However, while the rattan processing industry in Indonesia has grown substantially as a result, the lowering of raw material prices has been at great cost for the people involved in raw material extraction and cultivation.

Policy instruments affecting rattan in Indonesia

  • Ban on the export of unprocessed (raw) rattan, October 1986
  • Ban on the export of semi-finished rattan, January 1989 (replaced in 1992 with a prohibitive export tax)
  • Reclassification of rattan webbing from finished product to semi-finished product,1992, further reducing demand for cultivated rattan species used for this product
  • Regulation of the rattan processing industry, with restrictions on investments in the area, e.g. closure of all foreign and domestic investment in raw rattan processing and semi-finished rattan production and of foreign investment in finished products manufacturing, 1989 (later relaxed to allow investment in rattan processing outside Java, and finally fully relaxed in 1995), which has probably kept rattan processing capacity lower than it would otherwise have been
  • Establishment of a Joint Marketing Board (ASMINDO), an approved exporters system and an export quota system for lampit, by a Ministry of Trade Decree

One of the most important changes for the rattan growers of Kalimantan was the move to establish the Joint Marketing Board, ASMINDO, "to prevent unhealthy competition" among lampit exporters (ASMINDO, 1997). The measures used were very similar to those used by the Indonesian plywood marketing board, APKINDO (see Barr, 1998). ASMINDO imposed export restrictions on its membership in order to manage supply, in an effort to control quality and increase unit prices. Individual manufacturers reported that the quota was assigned on the basis of political connections and payments.

These measures led to severe reductions in manufacturing and export of lampit. There were also large fluctuations in value added, as the unit price changed (in nominal terms) from US$6.38 to as low as US$1.22 and back up to US$8.39 per square metre in 1987, 1990 and 1995, respectively. The total number of enterprises dropped from 435 in 1987 to 20 in 1994, and now the industry is virtually moribund. There is only one factory still operating in Amuntai, and a few others in other cities make some lampit alongside other products, primarily for the domestic market.

ASMINDO officials lay the blame for this situation on changing tastes and decreased demand in the main importing country, Japan. In fact, Japanese imports of a Chinese substitute for rattan lampit, made from bamboo, expanded dramatically in 1995 to fill the gap created when the Indonesian prices increased and quantities decreased (Figure 2).

2
Japanese imports of rattan
lampit from Indonesia and bamboo mats from China, 1984 to 1999

The drastic reduction in output has likewise reduced demand, and prices, for raw material. Raw material prices have changed little in nominal terms since 1987, and have decreased in real terms. In more remote areas of Kalimantan, where transport and other transaction costs are higher, there have been no buyers for several years.

The price slump following the introduction of restrictions on exports was a hard blow to all rattan farmers, most of whom were not aware of the reasons for the slump. They had already experienced ups and downs in prices of rattan, so they were waiting for the good times to come back. As the situation has not improved, more and more farmers have begun to seek alternative sources of cash income. Farmers in villages with better access to alternative opportunities have reduced the harvesting from existing rattan gardens and, in some places, stopped planting new gardens altogether.

EXPANSION OF LARGE-SCALE PLANTATIONS

Oil-palm has been one of the most dynamic of Indonesia's agricultural subsectors, and significant expansion of oil-palm plantations has occurred in several areas, including Kalimantan. This has led in many cases to direct competition for land. Plantation concessions have been given on land that was used and managed under customary tenure ("adat") by indigenous people for swidden agriculture and rattan gardens. According to the definitions used by the Indonesian Government, rattan gardens are seen as degraded forests, and they were thus deliberately targeted for conversion to plantations (especially oil-palm or pulp plantations) (Fried, 1995).

Industrial oil-palm plantations typically cover several thousand hectares, often in rattan growing areas. By 1998, an estimated 70 000 ha were planted to oil-palm in East Kalimantan (with substantially larger areas in neighbouring provinces). Nearly 4 million hectares have been designated for conversion in East Kalimantan and, by 1999, applications had been approved for the release of more than 450 000 ha (Casson, 2000). In the study village of Modang many people were displaced and large areas of productive rattan gardens were destroyed as a result of the establishment of a large oil-palm plantation in the early 1980s. More recent attempts to establish oil-palm plantations have led to severe, sometimes armed, conflict between company employees and villagers resisting the appropriation of their land (Casson, 2000). In Lempunah village, for example, conflict has led to malicious destruction, sometimes through burning, of rattan gardens and forest by the plantation company, and burning of vehicles and buildings as well as uprooting of newly planted oil-palm plants by villagers (C. Gonner, personal communication).

However, oil-palm also has a "pull" effect. Oil-palm growing is seen as an interesting new opportunity by local people who appreciate benefits such as regular cash income (palm kernels can be harvested every week), a guaranteed market and a more modern lifestyle. Indeed, the main reasons for people's resistance seem to be the lack of adequate compensation for land that they consider theirs, and the wish to maintain a broad range of economic activities. People do not want to limit their options. The oil-palm companies, in contrast, encourage (or compel) people to concentrate their efforts on oil-palm growing, partly to ensure more efficient production and sufficient raw material to run their processing factories at capacity and partly, in all likelihood, to foster a dependence among growers.

Another significant land-use change has been the large-scale planting of pulp plantations. Many of these have been situated on lands defined as degraded, and rattan gardens fall into this category. The spatial analysis performed as part of the case study showed a very high correlation of rattan growing areas with pulp plantations.

PLANTATIONS AND FOREST FIRES USHER IN A NEW REALITY

Wildfires burned several million hectares of Kalimantan in 1997 and had a major impact on the rattan gardens. The areas hit hardest were logged-over forests and areas of new oil-palm and pulp plantations. Many of the fires were set deliberately to clear land for plantations, and fire was used as a weapon in land conflicts (as described above). In some villages, fires destroyed up to 90 percent of the rattan gardens.

Beyond the physical damage, the fires of 1997 had a very traumatic effect on local people. Rattan gardens had been seen as a source of security. While prices might fluctuate, the rattan could always be sold for cash if and when it was needed; many people regarded their rattan gardens as a kind of savings account. With the sudden widespread burning of rattan gardens, that sense of security was replaced by the recognition that rattan gardens too are vulnerable. This new reality, combined with the low prevailing prices, had a determining effect on the decision of many villages to give up rattan cultivation for other, more promising, activities. As the hardest hit villages were also coincidentally the ones with the best access to other opportunities, the trend towards change was reinforced.

Other villages, especially those dominated by Benuaq and Bentian ethnic groups, still maintain their interest in rattan gardens, even after the price slump and the destructive fires, in the hope that prices will soar again. This continued interest may be a result of their limited choice: in these remote villages rattan is the only source of cash. No other commodity is traded in the area. However, the villagers are no longer investing in establishing large rattan gardens, and only cut small amounts on a regular basis to meet their subsistence needs.

Most young people interviewed in the CIFOR surveys place their hopes on plantation crops such as oil-palm or pulpwood. They acknowledge that their low level of education and expertise prevents them from obtaining salaried positions with large companies and even from migrating. Condemned to stay in the village, they long for the regular incomes from oil-palm or rubber. Rattan, with prices currently so low, is seen as an outdated product, inherited from their forefathers. But such perceptions may quickly change if prices go up and if returns to labour again become favourable. There is evidence that people will respond quickly to rising prices for rattan; for example, increased demand for two small-diameter species stimulated farmers to plant them more abundantly. The importance of having rattan planting among the available economic options is especially great in more remote areas where there are few alternatives.

SHOULD RATTAN BE SUPPORTED?

The question arises as to whether this system should be subsidized or otherwise supported and, if so, how? Clearly, the rattan gardens are an integral part of the livelihood systems of a large number of people. For the most part, the stresses placed on the system have been generated from outside. There is therefore a strong argument in favour of countervailing measures to overcome the forces that have depressed raw material prices and undermined an integrated NWFP production system. With a more favourable policy environment the system could be economically competitive, especially in the more remote areas where there are limited (or no) alternative income-generating activities.

There is also a strong argument for removing barriers and even for actively supporting the rattan cultivation system from a national perspective, as this production supplies a valuable export industry. Exports of rattan products generated more than US$350 million in 1995 and again in 1996, then dropped during the crisis years of 1997 and 1998, recovering to almost $300 million in 1999 (Indonesia Central Board of Statistics, 1995-1999). In addition, in conservation terms, the financial value of rattan allows a long fallow period during which the forest can regenerate, providing ecological (and economic) benefits related to biodiversity, forest cover, carbon sink and climate control.

Two main sets of actions would be required to support the rattan system. First, rattan cultivation could be promoted by reducing the trade barriers that depress domestic raw material prices - including internal barriers such as the ubiquitous illegal fees charged to traders, as well as official export taxes. Industry has resisted this option, fearing that higher raw material prices would threaten its competitiveness. Additional measures would thus be needed to help the industry become more competitive - for example, research and extension to improve the cultivation system for more efficient raw material production; improved market information to enhance trade; and improved design, quality, efficiency and marketing of manufactured products.

Second, and more importantly, there is a clear need to recognize and accommodate traditional land-use systems and long-standing de facto use rights, and a need for more careful land-use planning to avoid the large-scale displacement of forest-based people.

CONCLUSION

The situation in Kalimantan illustrates the importance of considering whole systems in order to identify the real problems. While rattan resources (both wild and managed) may be diminishing, the underlying reasons for decline in the rattan sector are social, economic and political, not technical. The case in East Kalimantan is unusual in that the rattan is cultivated, but the same forces that have led people to abandon their rattan gardens have also led to unsustainable management and resource depletion elsewhere.

Sustainable management of NWFPs, generally, and rattan, specifically, will require improved institutional mechanisms: secure property rights for rattan managers or producers, transparent markets and reduced transaction costs to reduce the risk and increase the efficiency of the trade. People can only be expected to manage a resource sustainably if they are currently able to capture sufficient benefits and can reasonably expect to continue to do so in the future. The case in East Kalimantan demonstrates that even a system that can (technically) be managed sustainably may be seriously undermined by outside forces (and, not least, by misguided policies). While technical research will also be needed (on improved treatment to prevent post-harvest losses, for example), it should take place within the context of an understanding of the system and the real constraints and opportunities.

Bibliography


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