'One of the most attractive features is that the farmer is the central character in the radio programme, and the entire programme is built around him.' (Focus group participant, Vose, April 2001)
'Farmer to Farmer informs us about agriculture in the republic, and in it we can talk about our problems.' (Focus group participant, Gissar, May 2001)
Farmers in Tajikistan have only recently begun to farm with a measure of independence from the state and collective farms of the Soviet era. They face enormous challenges: breakdown of the rural Soviet infrastructure, lack of effective structures to support private farming, lack of finance, endemic corruption, poor rule of law, and during 2000 and 2001 very severe drought. Moreover, there has been almost no discussion in the media of the real problems they face. Farmers do not have reliable sources of information, even on the most basic, uncontroversial, technical aspects of farming.
The radio series Farmer to Farmer aims, despite the very considerable constraints, to respond to the concerns and questions of private farmers through interviews with farmers and a range of agricultural experts. It is broadcast once a week as part of Tajik Radio's lunchtime programme for rural listeners, and then repeated in the evening. Initially, programmes were fifteen minutes in length, but programmes now run for twenty to twenty-five minutes.
With support from the Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation (SDC), the local office of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) manages the production of the radio series. This is part of a larger project, based in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, which trains veterinarians, supports veterinary services, and distributes seeds. The Project Co-ordinator and national staff have close links with the Ministry of Agriculture, which supports the project.
The series is transmitted throughout the country by Tajik Radio. It is a significant departure for Tajik Radio, which has never broadcast an independently produced radio series before.
The target group of private farmers refers to 'dekhon farmers' - those that have a measure of leasehold security - and to small-scale and subsistence farmers who farm household plots, some of which were increased in size through the Presidential land programme. It was also intended that programmes would benefit a wider group of agricultural workers who rent land from collective and state farms, some of which have been privatised, and those who continue to work within state farming. It was further conceived that occasional programme materials might be included on issues of importance to the rural population as a whole, such as health issues.
The World Bank Poverty Assessment, locates Tajikistan at a very early stage of transition from the Soviet economic model, with much of the economy still controlled by the state and most farmland under a high degree of state influence. Between 1995 and 1999, 120 (out of 600) state controlled farms were privatised, mainly into lease farms, joint stock companies and some private peasant 'dekhon' farms.
A 'dekhon farm' is generally either a small to medium-size family farm (2-50 hectares), or a large 'collective dekhon farm' or 'dekhon association' (50 to 500 hectares). Dekhon farms are created with a lifelong inheritable dekhon lease. From June 1999 land privatisation was accelerated, with a target of a further 160 collective farms to be converted into private dekhon farms through the issue of land share certificates to collective farm employees. By November 1999 there were 13,000 dekhon farms.
The process of obtaining dekhon land rights is described in the World Bank Poverty Assessment as 'exclusive, complicated and expensive', relying as it does on access to information, insider contacts and resources. Most of the new dekhon farmers are apparently former collective farm administrators and specialists, local government officials, businessmen, or relatives of people in these elite categories.
The main priority for the Ministry of Agriculture is the revenue from the cotton crop, and it is almost entirely taken up with administering the production and delivery of cotton from large state farms through a modified form of central planning. Some of these farms have been nominally privatised, but in reality they are not free to make their own decisions: they must sell to the state at prices determined by the state.
The World Bank Poverty Assessment states that this 'involves an opaque entanglement of producer payments with government taxation, farm indebtedness and commercial and shadow interests'[1]. Cotton comprises 30 percent of exports and 30 percent of total state tax revenues, but the actual returns paid to producers, and the wages of much of the rural population working on the cotton-producing state farms, are close to zero.
In lieu of unpaid wages, farms commonly 'rent out' land to their workers on short-term informal leasing arrangements. These are sometimes organised on a sharecropping basis. The World Bank Poverty Assessment estimates that perhaps 20-25 percent of the 600,000 rural households have been involved in small-scale informal leasing without written agreements. Inevitably the lack of security prevents investment and leaves farm workers vulnerable.
Most of the rural population relies for its basic livelihood on self-production on household plots of land. According to the Tajikistan Living Standards Survey (TLSS), 92 percent of rural households have a household plot[2]. These provide 45 percent of the total consumption of rural households. Households implement a complex form of integrated agriculture and land productivity is high. Vegetables are grown for market and for the household's own consumption, and crop residues from the plots partially sustain small and large livestock. According to the TLSS, conducted before two years of drought, over half of all households own cattle and 34 percent own chickens. When asked about survival strategies, participants put their household plot and livestock at the top of their lists, ahead of migration, trade, humanitarian assistance, wages and pensions.
Between 1996 and 1998, 75,000 hectares in small lots were distributed by Presidential decree to supplement existing household plots. The World Bank Poverty Assessment notes that the impact on the livelihoods of those who received such extensions seems to have been highly positive. According to the report, the experience of household and Presidential plot farming in Tajikistan suggests that 'small-scale, labour-intensive farming in transitional economies can be scale and resource appropriate, economically viable, employment generating and independent of subsidy'.
Upon independence from the former Soviet Union, Tajikistan descended into a civil war that claimed some 60,000 lives out of a population of 6.7 million. A power-sharing agreement concluded between the warring parties in 1997 established an uneasy peace. Although civil unrest had subsided by the time the project commenced, the political atmosphere was (and still is) fragile.
The short period of relative openness subsequent to independence from the Soviet Union is popularly believed to have been a major contributing factor in the outbreak of the civil war. The Minister of Agriculture expressed the opinion that giving information to farmers was a very dangerous thing to do, and that freedom of information was one of the causes of the war. Oleg Panfilov, a Moscow-based Tajik writer, has described how the media are viewed by the political establishment as a dangerous weapon, rather than as a public space for debate or information[3].
This perception, that openness is dangerous, is not the only constraining factor for broadcast journalists. It is estimated that at least fifty, and perhaps as many as eighty, journalists and senior media figures were killed during the civil war and continuing civil unrest, often subsequently to reporting on sensitive issues or making allegations of illegality against political groups. The power-sharing agreement that ended the war did not make substantial changes to the political establishment, and there have been no official attempts to establish responsibility for the violence against journalists.
At present, there are no independent national television or radio stations in Tajikistan. There have been several attempts to gain licences for independent broadcasting projects, but no licences have been granted to transmit nationally. This is not surprising as the right to award licences rests with the monopoly broadcaster of the Soviet era, the State Committee for TV and Radio. Although freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Constitution, one clause prevents the broadcasting or publishing of any information that defames the President or the country.
Tajik Radio is essentially an arm of the state, with no public service responsibility. There is no commitment to programmes that honestly reflect the preoccupations or concerns of audiences. The role of programme managers is to control programme content, while programme quality, especially in terms of relevance to audience concerns, is not considered important.
In this kind of atmosphere, censorship does not have to be systematically organised. Journalists exercise significant self-censorship, as indeed they did in the Soviet era. They know that they take a very considerable personal risk if they broadcast sensitive information or take a critical position on government policy.
Self-censorship is so effective that the people of Tajikistan survive with almost no detailed information beyond what government wants them to know. The impact of this is very deep: this is a society that does not have a dialogue with itself. As in Soviet times, the very act of asking questions becomes uncomfortable, even on the most uncontroversial themes. Problem areas are avoided or sanitised. A small example of this is that the civil war is never described as such, but referred to as 'the events'.
Journalists and programme producers are fearful of, and isolated from, good journalistic practice. With no solid journalistic tradition prior to independence, there has been very little exposure to democratic concepts of journalism. Radio producers in such conditions have little understanding of the need for programme research, no real experience of establishing facts or analysing issues objectively, and have not been trained to write effectively for radio audiences.
The concept for the radio series built on an agricultural strategy and planning project supported by the European Union Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (EU TACIS) programme. This provided Tajik Radio with uncut radio materials for broadcast. From the project materials, a fifteen-minute programme was broadcast once a week with a repeat as part of Tajik Radio's daily hour-long programme for rural audiences.
The brief for the programmes was that they should contain: 'relevant legal information, relevant Presidential and Government decrees with appropriate commentary; information on the work of agencies supporting the development of agriculture; advice on farming techniques and environmental issues, information on livestock epidemics, pests, etc.
Most of the materials provided to Tajik Radio were in the form of interviews with consultants from international agencies and speeches given by agricultural specialists at seminars. An attempt was made in one or two programmes to involve farmers more directly, with experts answering questions on aspects of managing a small farm. The programme also transmitted price fluctuations in four regional markets and ran advertisements for farmers seeking an outlet for their produce.
Apart from the question-and-answer programmes on farm management, there was little emphasis on making the programmes relevant and accessible to farmers. No attempt was made to report on the position of farmers through the stories and experience of farmers themselves. This is not surprising given that journalists in Tajikistan have not been trained or expected to produce materials substantially different to those they produced before the break-up of the Soviet Union.
As a result of serious security problems all EC international consultants were withdrawn from Tajikistan, one week after the programmes commenced, including those who might have helped develop these skills.
Tajik Radio transmits on three channels. Channel One broadcasts throughout the country via seven transmitters on medium, long, and short wave and on FM. Sadoi Dushanbe, the third channel, transmits within a sixty-kilometre radius of Dushanbe on FM, and via two transmitters to the area surrounding the two regional centres of Leninabad and Khatlon.
The programme for rural listeners, transmitted on each weekday at 2 p.m. and repeated at 8 p.m., mainly contains light entertainment and music. It has a rural focus, but according to Tajik radio managers, they do not have the resources to record reports outside the capital, or to research themes in any depth.
Data from the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Survey on Media Use in Tajikistan, conducted in 2000, was provided to FAO by Intermedia. A breakdown of the survey data showed that significant numbers of farmers and women farmers listen to Tajik Radio channels. Twenty-three percent of all farmers and 29 percent of women farmers listen to Tajik Radio channels on a daily basis. Most listening, however, takes place in the morning from 6 to 7 a.m. Twenty per cent of all farmers listen to Tajik Radio channels at 6 a.m.
The audiences for Tajik radio channels at the times that the programme for rural listeners is transmitted are smaller, but they are distinctly larger than for other daytime programmes transmitted. About 8 percent of all farmers tune in at 2 p.m. and about 12 percent at 8 p.m.. Fewer women farmers listen at these times.
As listeners in Dushanbe region can also listen to Sadoi Dushanbe, it is likely that audiences to Channel One in this area are smaller. The preferred radio station of the farmers who participated in a pilot focus group drawn from the Dushanbe area is Sadoi Dushanbe.
The FAO project required attention to four areas in order to be effective: a workable degree of control over production, participatory audience research, journalism training for the radio producers, and, at a later stage, a campaign to promote the series.
A consultant was recruited for an initial two-week mission to Dushanbe in August 2000 to set up the project, after which it was agreed that there would be a second, longer, mission in December 2000, with a subsequent seven days of support via e-mail to allow the consultant to review radio scripts and feed back suggestions to the producers. It was important to the success of the project to develop mechanisms that would allow programmes to be produced and audience research carried out without the support of an external consultant.
It was essential both to recognise the very real limits on the editorial independence of the radio programmes and to attempt to ensure that the project had as much influence as possible over the production of programmes. Given the circumstances, a significant degree of programme control was negotiated.
It was agreed that the radio producers recruited to the project would plan, record and script materials under the supervision of the FAO Project Coordinator, and then edit and mix the final programme at Tajik Radio. An Editorial Committee, chaired by the Project Coordinator and comprising representatives of Tajik Radio, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Swiss Development Agency, would oversee the programme production process. Inevitably, Tajik Radio managers would have an ultimate veto over programme content.
To meet the information needs of the target audience, to ensure the credibility and reputation of the programmes among farmers, and to stimulate and encourage farmers to work together to find solutions to their problems, it was essential to build the project on a solid basis of effective, participatory, audience research.
Radio programmes work best when they are authentic and relevant to their listeners' lives, and when the real concerns and issues of the audience are at the heart of the programmes. If participatory audience research is implemented successfully, it ensures that the information needs of the intended audience determine programme content .
Radio is a very powerful medium, both in providing the vital information that farmers need to do their work effectively and in stimulating communities to be proactive about the wider problems they face. It is potentially a very strong force in breaking through the isolation that many rural communities experience. In Tajikistan, however, it was clear from the outset that compromises would have to be made in order to protect both the programme producers and the project.
It was decided that radio programmes should initially concentrate on non-controversial technical questions, and that gradually the programme producers would feel their way towards covering more difficult areas. Audiences which have grown up in Soviet and post-communist societies are often skilled at navigating the maze of self-censorship and are able to decipher carefully worded materials. They would be likely to notice and appreciate that their issues are being reflected subtly, even if this is not done explicitly.
A classic means for learning the perceptions and concerns of communities is through focus groups. A pilot focus group was held during the consultant's initial mission and a series of groups organised subsequently.
Apart from informing and mediating the agenda for the programmes, the groups were intended to fulfil two other invaluable functions. Firstly, they were planned to provide an objective process for evaluating the success of the programmes - an opportunity to test the extent to which farmers understood, liked and made use of the material. Feedback from focus groups is a very useful tool for participatory development. As the results come directly from the intended national audience, it is much harder to dismiss them than the advice of a foreign consultant.
Secondly, the focus groups were intended as a powerful force to re-orientate the radio producers to a new view of their role. Programme producers in the former Soviet Union did not solicit the needs and concerns of their audiences and were not expected to take them into account. Their key function was not to ask questions but to give their audiences an officially sanctioned view. A focus group approach was seen as a tool that could be used to break down the traditional, authoritarian mode of radio programme production.
A local firm, Sharq Centre, with previous experience in conducting participatory research, was commissioned to run a pilot focus group session. This session was skilfully moderated and the analysis provided by the firm was of a high quality. Sharq Centre was subsequently commissioned to conduct a series of focus groups to underpin the production of programmes.
Eleven male farmers were invited from four areas in the vicinity of Dushanbe to the pilot focus group. These were 'dekhon' farmers - farmers who rented land and farmers of household plots. Four interviewers used snowball sampling and the advice of farmers to find participants, and a standard questionnaire to filter out inappropriate candidates. Eleven participants were invited on the assumption that some would not attend. After some discussion of confidentiality issues, it was decided that the two radio producers could observe the focus group, but were seated in a separate area of the room used for the group. They were introduced as radio producers who wanted to learn how to prepare radio programmes that would be useful for farmers.
A discussion guide was prepared for the group covering the form and quality of farmers' sources of information, the issues that farmers would like information on, their media habits, and their response to a number of possible titles for the programme and different music options to develop a brand for the series.The design of the first phase of the focus group research proposed two groups in the south of Tajikistan and a group for women farmers to be held in the Regions of Republican Subordination (RRS), not far from Dushanbe, to complement the pilot group. A second phase of two pairs of two groups was planned for two other diverse regions of the country, once the success of the first phase had been analysed and discussed. The groups were to be recruited similarly to the pilot group, with help from the regional farmers' associations.
The group for women farmers was planned to follow a similar protocol to the pilot group, with particular emphasis on the need to ensure adequate reflection in the programmes of the issues of women farmers. A development worker with appropriate skills in gender issues and group-work was identified and it was agreed that Sharq Centre would provide training.
All groups would seek to understand the media use of participants and their concerns and information needs. They would also test completed radio packages produced by the radio producers to obtain feedback on how well participants understood and liked the information and the extent to which they found it useful.
A senior radio producer from Tajik Radio was recruited to work with the project, along with a former TV journalist with English language ability. With very limited experience of journalism outside the former Soviet Union, it was clear that they both needed training to produce attractive, clear materials that would meet reasonable journalistic standards.
Much of the work during the consultant's second mission focused on the details of programme production. Extensive production guidelines and notes on planning and producing radio packages were drawn up with the radio producers. These set an expectation of the radio programmes that could be monitored by the Project Co-ordinator.
Tajikistan is a traditional society, but in the Soviet era women had a sometimes token, but nevertheless distinct presence in public life. With two male radio producers, recruited from an all-male short-list, concerns arose about the inclusion of women farmers in the programmes and ensuring that their needs were also at the heart of the programmes.
Women's development organisations in Dushanbe substantiated that there are significant numbers of female-headed households since the war, often subsisting with some difficulty on their household plots. Furthermore, in other households women sometimes take significant responsibility for the farm while male family members spend large parts of the year working as migrant labourers in Russia. These women are an important target group for the programmes.
It was clear that the radio project was a valuable opportunity to support the general development of good journalism practice in Tajikistan, in a relatively uncontroversial subject area. It was also felt that there was a level of risk involved in relying on just two programme producers, and that it would be valuable to extend the skill base of the project. An informal press meeting was set up to explain and promote the project, and to recruit interested parties to attend training seminars on journalistic research. This had the benefit of drawing two women reporters into the project, and a basis was established for them to contribute as researchers on a freelance basis.
As the audience for Tajik Radio's programme for rural listeners is very small, it was evident that some effort would be needed to promote the radio series once it had achieved an acceptable standard. The consultant advised that a campaign should be designed to implement this, exploiting both the media and the FAO project infrastructure, for instance through advertisements on seed packets or vehicles.
At project inception, it was requested that Tajik Radio run a brief advertisement for the programme at peak listening times but this was declined. Part of the purpose for the focus groups was to research participants' media use in order to find the most effective ways to promote the programmes.
«FARMER TO FARMER» promotional flyer, announcing broadcasting dates and frequences
|
[1] World Bank Poverty
Assessment, April 2000 (report 20285, Human Sector Development Unit, Europe and
Central Asia Region). [2] Tajikistan Living Standards Survey, UNDP, May 1999 [3] Report on the Media Situation in Tajikistan, Cimera, Geneva, Oct 2000 |
