The four countries covered in this study can be regarded as having similar development objectives and have, in varying degrees, tried similar subsidy mechanisms to achieve their goals. But both objectives and the mechanism of their achievement are not mechanical devices, nor can they be conceived in isolation of the overall development of the economy. Furthermore, the rate of and the wherewithal of economic development are both subject to state policy and especially the interests of the ruling powers.
The study of the subsidy scheme presents a number of common trends. First, only a small proportion of small-scale fishermen to which the subsidy is mostly directed could benefit from the scheme. This in some cases is due to insufficiency of funds especially the foreign exchange to import the necessary complement of inputs. Second, in cases where there is a downward trend in the level of subsidy, a general decline in output of artisanal fishermen occurred.
In others such as Senegal the subsidy appears to have reached an optimum point beyond which the transfer could be counterproductive. In Côte d'Ivoire for example the subsidy scheme appears negligible in relation to the contribution of the fisheries in that country. The industrial sector benefits more from the fuel subsidy in comparison to small-scale fisheries.
In all the four countries studied the subsidy scheme proved positive in increasing the level of output and national income. Except in The Gambia, where subsidized fishing materials were not subjected to any import tax, all other countries recorded substantial income through import duties on the materials used by the artisanal fishermen. To the extent that the subsidy scheme increases fishing effort, there is no evidence from the study that overall fishery resources endowment was being depleted. Specific fishing areas may be affected, but the impact of this is relatively insignificant.
Within the last six or seven years it has been fashionable to argue about the negative effects of subsidy. According to this group, subsidy transfers resources from the most productive to the least productive sector of the economy. Subsidy, it is also argued, leads to inefficiency, affects the distribution of income and distorts market signals. According to these supply-side economists, all markets are assumed to be fully developed and monetized and there are abundant entrepreneurs who, without any incentive, will direct resources to the most profitable venture. To them, all resources, including human beings, are mobile and malleable. These theorists unfortunately cannot differentiate between issues involved in developing an economy and those involved in managing a developed economy. Developing a developing economy requires the marshalling of resources, the activation of the population either through coercion, incentives, etc., in an attempt to direct resources to the most profitable but hitherto unknown or underutilized resources. This is where subsidy to the fishery sector comes in. Fishery is a specialized activity which requires training in special skills, information about market conditions and the identification of the most cost-effective method to supply. Commercial fishing on a large scale has never been regarded as a profitable activity in Africa until less than two decades ago. Artisanal fishery was most primitive and limited to activities along the shoreline, in the lagoons and estuarine waters.
Without technical know-how and with limited knowledge about resource endowment, it would have been a hopeless venture to risk the unknown. But with government assistance, however meagre, the knowledge and technical knowhow to commercialize the sector became possible. If commercial fishing is still in its infancy in West Africa, the extent to which fishing effort can be accelerated through the subsidy scheme will be determined by the resource potential. It is emphasized that, there is yet no evidence that subsidy alone has been able to achieve this, given its present scale.
In general, subsidy - its rate and utilization - in the final analysis is a political issue. Unfortunately however, small-scale fishermen who ought to benefit from the scheme are the least articulate, the least organized and have no means of influencing political decisions. Large-scale industrial fishing concerns, though few in number, often play a dominant role in influencing government actions. In both Senegal and Nigeria these groups have reached a maturity where they should be exposed to market forces rather than depend on a paternalistic government. Thus while it may be necessary to continue the assistance to small-scale fisheries, subsidy to industrial fishing can be phased out without serious repercussion to the economy.
Lastly, it is necessary to note that this study and its findings are tentative in nature. Studies on country specific micro-macro impact of the scheme have to be carried out before a different approach to the subsidy can be identified. An abrupt end to the subsidy scheme may do much more than a permanent damage to the fisheries sector; its repercussion may be felt all over the country in terms of rising food prices, rising unemployment, colossal waste of investment on already implemented projects and a downward trend in the overall performance of the economy.
