Map 1. SARS-CoV-2 and MERS-CoV events^* in animals published or reported at national level, as of 18 December 2025

^* Events include animal cases officially reported by national authorities and the WOAH, or positive virological findings referred to in scientific publications.

Notes: Refer to the disclaimer available on this webpage for the names and boundaries in this map. Final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Source: United Nations Geospatial. 2020. Map of the World. [Cited September 2025]. Modified with data from WOAH and scientific publications, 2025.

Recent publications

Asokan, S., Isiaka, I. D., Jacob, T., Vijayan, S., & Rajeswary, D. 2026. Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS‑CoV): An underestimated betacoronavirus with pandemic potential. Diagnostic Microbiology and Infectious Disease. 115(3), 117367. [reference]

Berglund, A., Averhed, G., Neimanis, A., & Spörndly‑Nees, E. 2026. Screening of wild roe deer populations in Sweden 2016–2022 for SARS‑CoV‑2. One Health, 22, 101370. [reference]

Bevins, S. N., Chipman, R. B., Beckerman, S. F., […], & Shriner, S. 2026. SARS‑CoV‑2 occurrence in cervids in the United States and US territories. Scientific Reports, 16, 5285. [reference]

Dempsey, R., Goldswain, H., Newman, J., Thakur, N., MacGill, T., Meyers, T., Orr, R., et al. 2026. Characterisation of naturally occurring MERS-CoV spike mutations and their impact on fusion and neutralisation. Viruses, 18(3), 377. [reference]

Faraone, J. N., Li, P., Hong, J., Zang, J., Liu, Y., Xu, Y., QU, P., Evans, J., et al. 2026. Spike destabilization attenuates Mink Cluster 5 SARS‑CoV‑2. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 123(10), e2528367123. [reference]

Fusco, G., Picazio, G., Martinis, C., Cardillo, L., Brandi, S., Martucciello, A., Barca, L., et al. 2026. Bovine coronavirus and SARS‑CoV‑2 seroprevalence in livestock: Marked host‑species differences and insights from the first large‑scale neutralization survey. Scientific Reports. 16: 8431. [reference]

Güvendi, M., Can, H., Kandemir, Ç., Koçkaya, E. S., Sürgeç, E., Erkunt Alak, S., Dülek, Ö.,  et al. 2025. Screening for SARS‑CoV‑2 in different sheep and goat breeds in Türkiye using in‑house ELISAs and real‑time PCR. Tropical Animal Health and Production, 58(1), 14. [reference]

Idoudi, F., Wang, R., Tian, L., Yang, Z., Chik, K. K.‑H., Chen, P., Benabderrazek, R., et al. 2026. Decoding antibody response to MERS‑CoV in wild dromedary camels. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 123(7), e2513716123. [reference]

Kwon, T., Carossino, M., Morozov, I., Bold, D., Gaudreault, N. N., Trujillo, J., Cool. K., et al. 2026. Influenza‑infected pigs are not susceptible to SARS‑CoV‑2 infection. Pathogens, 15(2), 134. [reference]

Mayer, L., Fathi, A., Weichel, H.-M., Raadsen, M. P., Dahlke, C., Mykytyn, A., Rodon, J., et al. 2026. Two‑year persistence of MERS‑CoV‑specific antibody and T cell responses after MVA‑MERS‑S vaccination in healthy adults. Nature Communications, 17, 480. [reference]

Mok, C. K. P., Zhu, A., Oladipo, J. O., Bai, H., Cheng, S. M. S., Kuranga SA, Lv H,  et al. 2026. Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus–specific T‑cell responses in dromedary camel abattoir workers in Nigeria suggests frequent zoonotic spillover. The Journal of Infectious Diseases.  3:jiag095. [reference]

Pauvolid‑Corrêa, A., Davila, E., Auckland, L. D., Zecca, I. B., Busselman, R. E., Tang, W., Roundy, C., et al. 2026. Active surveillance reveals common SARS‑CoV‑2 infections among cats and dogs from households with human COVID‑19 cases in Texas, USA. One Health, 22, 101377. [reference]

Riva, H. G., Arrieta‑Rangel, L., Dueñas, M. F., Gómez‑Montoya, J., Henao, L. M., Bello-Lemus, Y., Sbriller,  et al. 2026. First report of SARS‑CoV‑2 co‑infection with chronic dermatophytosis in a lion (Panthera leo) ex situ at Colombia. BMC Veterinary Research. 10;22(1):170. [reference]

Smith D. 2026. Will animal reservoirs give us the next SARS-CoV-2 variant? PLoS Pathog 22(3): e1014008. [reference]

Subissi, L., Otieno, J. R., Shah, A. A. M., Abu-Raddad, L., Agrawal, A.,  Al Mehairi, A.,  Albarraq, A., et al. 2026.  Human MERS‑CoV cases are falling but pose an ongoing pandemic threat. Nature Health. Advance online publication. [reference]

Tervo, S., Zalewski, A., Vauhkonen, H., Nieoczym, M., Kołodziej‑Sobocińska, Lehikoinen S, Aaltonen K, et al. 2026. Virus circulation in native, introduced, and farmed mustelids in Poland. Virology, 615, 110771. [reference]

Turlewicz‑Podbielska, H., Czyżewska‑Dors, E., Adaszek, Ł., Ruszkowski, J. J., Pomorska‑Mól, M. 2026. Detection of SARS‑CoV‑2 antibodies in companion animals in Poland during the post‑pandemic period (2022–2025). BMC Veterinary Research, 22, 37. [reference]

Vreman, S., Giglia, G., Molenaar, R.‑J., Hakze‑van der Honing, R., Delemarre, E., Nierkens, S., Wiese, K., et al. 2026. Natural SARS‑CoV‑2 infection in farmed minks causes lung pathology, systemic viral spread, and transmission risk, even in asymptomatic animals. Frontiers in Veterinary Science. Advance online publication. [reference]

Wang, L., Kayastha, S., Burgdorf‑Moisuk, A., Deng, X., Allender, M., & Terio, K. 2026. Detection, follow‑up testing, and genomic characterization of SARS‑CoV‑2 Omicron in tigers and gorillas. COVID, 6(3), 37. [reference]

Wangila, R. S., Nyariki, T., Nyaguthii, D. M., Wachira, T. M., Kimutai, J., Azegele A, Ndanyi R, Ngoci J, et al. 2026. Antibody kinetics and shedding dynamics of MERS‑CoV in dromedary camels from different production systems in Kenya: A longitudinal cohort study. Tropical Animal Health and Production, 58(2), 169. [reference]

FAO actions

• FAO, in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), organized a two-day workshop on 18-19 November 2025 entitled Use-case workshop for Middle East Coronavirus Vaccines. The workshop included a One Health session to explore the cost-benefits of using MERS vaccines in camels to protect public health.
• FAO, in collaboration with WHO organized a webinar through the MERS Global Community - KAP Study on camel respiratory diseases & conditions in Kenya, on Dec 11, 2025.
• FAO, WHO, and WOAH hosted two webinars through the Global MERS community on 18 and 25 March 2025. FAO experts presented the FAO recommendations for camel sampling, the investigation of MERS-CoV, SARS-CoV-2 and other coronavirus recombination in camels, along with the results of the work conducted in Ethiopia, Kenya and Oman.
• FAO, WHO and the University of Calgary launched the MERS-Tracker: An interactive dashboard to support evidence-based decision making. It consists of a data tracking platform and a dashboard displaying published MERS-CoV serosurveys, viral testing, and genomic sequencing studies in animals and humans. The dashboard was launched during a WHO EPI-WIN webinar and is accessible here: MERS-Tracker.
• In April 2024, FAO published a highlight paper for the International Year of Camelids 2024 entitled “Dromedary camels and MERS-CoV: filling knowledge gaps”.
• The coronavirus network (COVINET) meeting was held from 26 to 27 March 2024 in Geneva, Switzerland. FAO and representatives from the reference centers on zoonotic coronaviruses attended the meeting.
• FAO, WHO, WOAH and UNDP have organized the Quadripartite Global Technical Meeting on MERS-CoV and Other Emerging Zoonotic Coronaviruses, held from 27-29 November 2023 in Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
• FAO takes part in regular WHO virus evolution group meetings to discuss latest findings on SARS-CoV-2 variants of interest and variants of concern.
• FAO has designated FAO Reference Centres for Zoonotic Coronaviruses. To date, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venezie (IZSVe) and Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale dell'Abruzzo e del Molise Giuseppe Caporale (IZSAM), Italy (joint center), the Federal State-Financed Institution “The Federal Center for Animal Health” (FSVPS-FGBI ARRIAH), Russian Federation , CSIRO Australian Centre for Diseases Preparedness (ACDP), Australia, and Ohio State University Infectious Diseases Institute (OSU-IDI), USA, Institut de recherche pour le développement (IRD) and Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour le développement (CIRAD) of France (joint center), and Ministry for Primary Industries, New Zealand have been appointed. Furthermore, Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut (FLI), Germany designated as Reference Centre for Emerging Zoonotic Pathogens and High Biosecurity/ Biocontainment Facilities.
• The Joint FAO/IAEA Centre (Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture) (CJN) is working, through its veterinary laboratory network in 69 countries, to support diagnosis of SARS-CoV-2 in animals and monitoring.

FAO publications

• GLEWS+ Risk Assessment entitled SARS-CoV-2 in animals used for fur farming published on 20 January 2021. This Tripartite Risk Assessment evaluates the risk of introduction and spread of SARS-CoV-2 within fur farming systems as well as whether farmed fur animals could play a significant role in the spread of SARS-CoV-2 to humans via spillover. The publication has been translated in other UN languages (Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian, Spanish).
• COVID-19 and animals: Information on risk mitigation measures for livestock and agricultural professionals published on 08 January 2021. In response to the growing concern caused by the new SARS-CoV-2 variant strain related to minks, the guidelines raise awareness amongst livestock professionals about highly susceptible captive farmed wild or domestic species and provide practical guidelines on how to prevent the infection of animals or get infected.
• Supplementary tables which summarize the predicted susceptibility of ~500 animal species to SARS-CoV-2, based on the available studies on ACE2. This have been included in the publication Exposure of humans or animals to SARS-CoV-2 from wild, livestock, companion and aquatic animals published in July 2020 and its summary.
• Recommendations for the epidemiological investigation of SARS-CoV-2 in exposed animals, with a supplementary document Investigating potential recombination of MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2 or other coronaviruses in camels, both published in November 2021. 
• Guidelines to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on livestock production and animal health published in 2020: Describe the impact of COVID-19 on livestock production and animal disease prevention and control and provide practical recommendations for actors along value chains to reduce this impact and ensure continuity of the livestock supply chain and animal health.
• Impact of COVID-19 on the delivery of veterinary services and animal disease reporting published in 2021: Survey to understand how the COVID-19 pandemic may have affected the routine activities of animal disease reporting and surveillance for early detection in the countries using EMA-i (Event Mobile Application).

Important links

SARS-CoV-2

• FAO COVID-19 Response and Recovery Programme - Preventing the next zoonotic pandemic
• FAO resources on COVID-19
• WOAH COVID-19 portal
• WHO COVID-19 dashboard
• UN COVID-19 portal
• UNEP COVID-19 materials
• CDC COVID-19 and animals
• NCBI SARS-CoV-2 resources
• Tracking SARS-CoV-2 variants

MERS-CoV

• WHO MERS-CoV Dashboard
• MERS-CoV serotracker
• Recommendations for the investigating potential recombination of MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2 or other coronaviruses in camels
• FAO illustrative guideline: Swab and tissue sample collection procedures enhancing MERS-CoV detection in camels
• Doha Declaration FAO, 29 April 2015 and Muscat Declaration FAO, 21 May 2014
• MERS-CoV case definition for reporting to WOAH
• WHO’s MERS-CoV information page
• WHO roadmap for research and product development against MERS-CoV
• Human exposure to Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus from livestock or wildlife species FAO, 2017 WHO MERS-CoV Investigations and studies
• WHO Strategic plan for coronavirus disease threat management: advancing integration, sustainability, and equity, 2025–2030
• WHO MERS Global Summary and Assessment of Risk
• WHO automated MERS-CoV genomic analysis pipeline

Disclaimer

Information provided herein is current as of the date of issue. Information added or changed since the last SARS-COV-2 animal situation update appears in orange. Human cases are depicted in the geographic location of their report. For some cases, exposure may have occurred in one geographic location but reported in another. For cases with unknown onset date, reporting date was used instead. FAO compiles information drawn from multiple national (Ministries of Agriculture or Livestock, Ministries of Health; Centers for Disease Prevention and Control [CDC]) and international sources (World Health Organization [WHO], World Organisation for Animal Health [WOAH]) as well as peer-reviewed scientific articles nd preprints. FAO makes every effort to ensure, but does not guarantee, accuracy, completeness or authenticity of the information. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these map(s) do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of FAO concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers and boundaries. Dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.