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## Annex I

### Angola – Support to a Decentralized Land Management Programme by Frédéric Dévé<sup>1</sup>

#### 1. Introduction

Two thirds of Angola's population depends on agriculture for food, income and employment, and women provide the larger share of the agricultural labour force. It is estimated that 80 percent of farmers are smallholders, generally producing little or no surplus, with very low productivity. The average area cultivated annually by a family – using manual soil preparation methods – normally ranges between one and three hectares.

The State is the owner of rural land. Agricultural rural land use is granted by concessions. These concessions, the related titles and cadastre are currently handled by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MINADER) and in the process to be gradually transferred to the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization (with a persisting lead role of MINADER regarding rural land policy). In 2005, the tenure situation was the following:

- The total area cultivated by the peasant sector was at least 3.2 million ha, and involved 2.2 million poor peasant families. Average area per family: 1.4 ha. Titling exists in MINADER for only three percent of the area concerned.
- The total area effectively cultivated/controlled by the entrepreneurial sector is poorly known, but it is at least a rough 2.2 million ha for a few thousands commercial farms (4300 being registered). Average area per enterprise is in the range of 515 ha.

*De facto*, almost all the currently titled area is in the hands of the commercial sector.

There is thus a dramatic lack of tenure security for the peasant sector, which has only three percent of its cultivated land officially registered. The sector is exposed to uncertainties and potential land use conflicts: a) among communities, b) between peasant communities and the commercial agricultural sector, or c) with other land concessions (mining, forests, etc.).

#### 2. Context

The peace accord of April 2002 started a new era for Angola. The country has become a presidential Republic, with a multi-party political system in place. Priority tasks identified by the Government are to reconstruct the economic and social infrastructures, re-launch the national economy, and combat poverty. A new Land Law for both urban and rural land was approved in August 2004, and a Territorial Management Law was voted by Parliament that same year. Aiming at rural food security and poverty reduction and simultaneously seeking to reinforce the commercial agricultural enterprises, the Government has intended since the late 1990s - and today with even more strength - to establish a decentralized system of rural land administration using the principle of the recognition of the peasantry's historical land rights, and based since 2002 on the objective of promoting for a dynamic development of entrepreneurial agriculture.

Angola has considerable agricultural potential and very substantial forest resources. Agriculture is a priority sector not only for food security and poverty reduction, but also for the diversification of the oil-and-diamonds dominated national economy. Since 2000, Angola has undertaken a process of macroeconomic stabilization, focusing predominantly on monetary and exchange rate policies, which have improved the functioning of the money market, reduced inflation and unified the formal and informal foreign exchange markets. However, the overvaluation of the national currency constitutes a risk for agricultural development as it is detrimental to the competitiveness of agriculture and constrains the reestablishment of a strong agricultural export sector ("*Dutch disease*" syndrome). In

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<sup>1</sup> By **Frédéric Dévé**, FAO Consultant, based on **Dévé, F.**, Lesson learning in policy assistance - Angola Case study - Support to a Decentralized Land Management Programme, January 2007.

addition, State budget allocations for the agricultural sector are low (2.5 percent of the national budget expenditure in 2006 and 2007).

The 2004 Land Law recognizes rural communities' historical rights on their communal land. However, there is still widespread ignorance of the Law and its regulation in the field, and there are a number of issues concerning the interpretation of the Law at provincial and community level. The land policy challenge in Angola is to foster a regulated, balanced, equitable and viable access to land and to set the base for a sustainable management of land and other natural resources linked to land use. It is to secure land tenure in an equitable manner for: i) rural communities (their "commons"); ii) individuals, women, peasant families and individual farmers using communal land; and iii) commercial farmers and other private land holders, so that their livelihoods and investments are secured, that land is used in a productive and sustainable manner, and that they are interested in the sustainable management of the existing natural resources.

### 3. Policy Assistance Process

During the national policy dialogue and process that took place since the late 1990s, the policy message of FAO can be summarized as follows:

*"Central and Provincial Governments, and other actors, principally the Municipalities, communities, civil society organizations and donor community should secure peasant communities land tenure through communal land demarcation and titling. This process is not only a matter of tenure security (for land users, be they peasant communities or private farms), it is also a needed path to ensure poverty reduction and rural food security (right to food). It is also a critical requirement and pre-condition for viable rural economic development and for sustainable management of natural resources. This process should take place through the establishment of a decentralized land administration and management capacity, and it should be based on participation and capacity development of all actors concerned by rural communities land rights."*

This policy message can be summarized in turn into four major policy recommendations:

- Create the conditions for community land delimitation and titling.
- Develop of a reliable cadastre.
- Establish a new legal regulatory framework.
- Prepare a national land policy.

The FAO policy assistance process has unfolded based on these premises. After preliminary interventions in land conflicts since 1999, FAO has implemented a series of projects addressing the issue of land tenure and aiming at the establishment of an institutional capacity for land management. These projects were supported by a series of Donors and by national and international NGOs. Pilot field work undertaken focused in a four provinces (Bengo, Benguela, Huambo and Huila) and it has significantly accompanied and influenced an intense and dramatic policy debate on land at national level.

The project analysed here - "Strengthening a decentralized administration intervention to promote equitable rural development in Huila Province- MTF/ANG/031/NET" is thus part of a bundle of technical assistance projects. Rather than focusing exclusively on this project and on its recommendations, the case study examines these projects as a whole – as a "policy assistance process" – over the period 2002-2006.

After the experience gained in 1999 in the Bengo Province with conflicts resolution, a seminal project (TCP/ANG/0168) was launched in September 2001 with the basic objective to:

- Create a minimal national capacity to implement land delimitation and to ensure more secure land tenure, especially for internally displaced persons.
- Promote and assist in the preparation of a Land Law and legal framework.
- Prepare a follow-up project and attract Donor's interest.

A third project was then funded as a follow-up targeting the province of Huila. The objective was to launch an initial programme for decentralized land management, as a pilot. A series of new projects were later formulated and funded by other donors (The Netherlands, Sweden, the USA, and Italy) with similar objectives covering Benguela, Huambo and again Huila provinces. Ultimately, a major FAO project funded by the European Commission (approximately Euro 3 000 000) is starting in January 2007 for a duration of three years with the objective to draw on the experience gained so far in these four provinces and to:

- Carry out land administration experiences at municipal level in three provinces.
- Implement a natural resources management system in selected pilot areas.
- Develop a land studies centre to supply decision makers with information, analysis and decision support concerning land policy, land management, family farming, and other land tenure related issues.

#### **4. Expertise**

The legal assistance and expertise provided by FAO was able to support concretely the Law formulation process, especially in the final phase of its preparation by taking into consideration experts' views and the stakeholders' views expressed at a national consultation. It was thus a key contribution to the national policy and legal debate concerning rural land and land use.

The technical expertise provided by FAO offered well appreciated training in delimitation and titling of community land, and it has build a critical mass of national capacity to conduct such kind of work.

As a whole, the policy assistance process was based on a strong expertise support and personal commitment from the responsible FAO technical officer, who was able to establish very close working relationship with national project staff, MINADER, NGOs and Donors. The expertise provided was able to mobilize the Donor community interest on land tenure issues in Angola through regular meetings with Ambassadors and other Donors representatives. This helped to ensure continuity in funding field projects. The expert was also and above all able to identify and use the proper entry points to address the policy issue.

He also focused in a participatory and decentralized manner on aspects such as:

- Sensitization to farmers rights to land in the existing legal context.
- Mobilization and training of NGOs.
- Encouraging participation at NGO and at grassroots and community level in the national consultation on the Land Law.
- Mobilization of relevant administrations (Provincial, Municipal, Communal) and of traditional community authorities.
- Assistance to all concerned actors by demonstrating the paths and steps to be followed technically and administratively for land delimitation and titling in the existing legal context.
- Assistance in specific cases of conflicts resolution.

#### **5. Management**

The overall management of the policy assistance process combined effectiveness and significant results with some weaknesses.

Most positive features include:

- The organization of an open debate through in particular a high level seminar with participation of ministers, members Parliament, governors of Provinces, CSO/NGOs, donor representatives and all key institutional stakeholders concerned. This has allowed sharing the legal and policy experiences gained from other developing countries, a feature which contributed to enhance FAO's reputation.
- The comparative advantages of FAO have been fully and operationally used in this connection: i) its international and legal experience was at the service of the legal and national

policy debate, and provided recommendations whose neutrality and professionalism were highly appreciated; and ii) its capacity to convene major debate and dialogue with all stakeholders concerned, so as to facilitate the policy making process.

- The continuity of the assistance provided over years through a series of FAO projects, because of a strong fund raising capacity from a variety of donors, proper choice of the right entry points at provincial level (actors, etc.) and at thematic levels (land delimitation). The assistance provided was also given in a timely manner and in partnership with other organizations, in particular the alliance of NGOs (Rede Terra) who played a key role in stakeholder information.

On the other hand, some weaknesses were recorded:

- The FAO decision making and assistance process was perceived at Provincial level and by the FAO Representative in Angola as excessively centralized in FAO Headquarters hands. The FAO technical officer took most of the initiatives, responsibilities, decisions and held the institutional memory in his hands. The FAO Representative did take some key decisions concerning Provincial branches of MINADER while Angolan decision-makers would have preferred a more participative role and enhanced decision power.
- There was a lack of clarity in the FAO recommendations *per se* concerning the promotion and contents of land policy statements. The FAO's policy message was only made implicitly clear, i.e. through field action, but was not sufficiently explicitly worded in terms of direct recommendations to the Government of Angola.
- The lack of institutional clarity (some key regulations had not been published on time) and of national capacity (partly still a consequence of the past conflicts that have affected the country, constituted a constraint for rapid progress with project implementation. Related to that, the insufficient capacity of the Ministry of Urban and Environment Affairs (MINUA) to break the resistance of sectoral ministries to accept to merge their cadastres into one unique national cadastre managed by it contributed to a delayed implementation of this recommendation.

## 6. Conclusion

Land registration, expropriation, concession granting, concession auctions and community demarcation, among others, are topics that still need rules and procedures. Until they are created, there is still uncertainty concerning enforcement of the Law's tenure regulations.

The case of Angola provides some good hints on how a good link can be created between field level processes and national policy formation:

- Based on empirical experience and knowledge development at the local level, certain "models" of action (in this case community land delimitation and titling, and development of decentralized land use rights definition capacities) can be developed with credibility. These pilots can also serve to create a critical mass of skills and experience, networks of stakeholders, and awareness concerning the policy issue at stake.
- Accompanying the national policy process and dialogue requires in depth collaboration within the Ministry of Agriculture (in the case of Angola: MINADER), but and also outside the Ministry of Agriculture with Parliament, provincial authorities, NGO networks, and the public media TV/radio/press, and by mobilizing strong donor's interest and commitments.
- The role of FAO in such a policy process is eminently that of a *super partes* facilitator and catalyst, at the service of important international policy principles (human rights, poverty reduction and food security). FAO in this type of context may on occasions be driven to support actors at national level that best serve these principles, thus conducting to what can be perceived as a "lack of neutrality" or "ingerence". This may lead to tensions, but it might also be a cost involved in effective policy advice.

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## Annex II

### Argentina – Strengthening of the National CODEX Committee by George Kerrigan<sup>1</sup>

#### 1. Introduction

The significance of the *Codex Alimentarius*, or Food Code, for consumer health protection was underscored in 1985 by the United Nations Resolution 39/248, in which guidelines were adopted for drafting and reinforcing consumer protection policies. The guidelines advised, "When formulating national policies and plans with regard to food, Governments should take into account the need of all consumers for food safety and should support and, as far as possible, adopt standards from the *Codex Alimentarius* or, in their absence, other generally accepted international food standards."

In the mid-1990s Argentina sought to improve its economy through greater food exports. Such expansion required knowledge of and adherence to agreements regarding the application of "Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures" (SPS) for food, originating in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Knowledge of and adherence to the Codex standards would facilitate compliance with SPS. It would also provide access to international markets, since it has become an essential element for attaining a dual objective: opening up markets and ensuring a high level of consumer health safety. The Government of Argentina, as a MERCOSUR Member State, also requested FAO's technical support to strengthen internal legislation with respect to food container standards.

Unfortunately at the peak of the financial crisis between the end of 2001 and mid 2002, the process of extending its reach was interrupted by the greatest institutional and economic crisis in the nation's modern history. By the end of 2002, Argentina had accumulated in four years a Gross Domestic Product reduction of 20 percent, leaving more than half the population below the poverty line.

At the time the project started in 1997 until its end in 2000, the economic and policy environment was not conducive to FAO policy assistance for a number of reasons. Levels of food production and income had deteriorated acutely, and the government prioritized aspects related to food availability and food distribution programmes as an immediate response, while FAO assistance was geared toward long-term aspects such as food quality and safety. In addition, there was no medium-term political agenda with respect to food safety and international standards, which limited the financial capacity and the ability to govern the institutions responsible for official certification. Moreover, a fiscal policy of public spending oriented to reducing job creation in the public sector took hold, which negatively affected the creation of the National Unit for CODEX Coordination.

Once economic stability was restored and governance improved, FAO policy assistance picked up momentum. There was a renewed focus on agricultural exports that coincided with the development objectives proposed by the project. Integration with MERCOSUR meant combining different national standards related to labelling and definitions of contents and food quality. Moreover, the post-crisis dynamism of the agricultural and agro-industrial sectors required adapting of national standards to those of the buyer countries (European Union, United States, Japan, etc.). Therefore, there was a need to create an official agency that would guarantee food quality control and restore credibility in the Argentinean institutional system, as proposed by the project.

In this regard, *The Codex Alimentarius* represented a point of reference and was perceived by most actors as a favourable forum for the ratification of norms and standards at regional and international levels. Taking on the leadership of the Codex Regional Commission, Argentina could project a regional and international image of a country complying with international standards in terms of food safety and quality. The participation of Argentina in the Codex regional Fora pushed forward the need to advance in the national adoption of Codex standards.

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<sup>1</sup> By **George Kerrigan Richard** and **Jean Balié**, based on **G. Kerrigan Richard**, *Fortalecimiento del Comité Nacional del Codex y Aplicación de la Normativa Codex en Argentina*, February 2007.

The adoption of the Food Code of Argentina became an important antecedent for the buy-in of the project recommendations. Concerns over the adequate safety of raw materials led to the drafting of several legislative projects with respect to the reformulation of certain agencies that make up the *Sistema Nacional de Control Alimentos* (National Food Control System). However the most important aspects were to improve the way the health of consumers was protected as well as a higher consideration for the changes in demand in foreign markets.

## 2. Policy Assistance Process

The main player involved in the policy assistance process was the *Comisión Nacional de Alimentos* (CNA), which is the highest political authority with respect to food quality and safety issues. The leadership of the CNA alternates every two years between the Ministry of Agriculture and the Secretariat of Health Policies of the Ministry of Public Health. The other important actors were the medium producers represented by the *Confederaciones Rurales Argentinas*; the food processing industry represented by the *Coordinadora de la Industria de Productos Alimenticios* and the *Cámara de Industriales de Productos Alimenticios*; and the food product export companies, represented by the *Asociación de Productores Exportadores Argentinos*.

The policy dialogue among these actors was of rather low intensity and did not cover the entire spectrum of interested parties. For example, at the time, there was no association to represent consumer interests. The policy dialogue of the different actors was mainly centred on solving acute macro-economic problems.

The conflict of interests between public institutions, which fight among themselves for leadership in certain areas of intervention, impeded the sound implementation of the policy recommendations. The focal point moved from the Secretary of Industry and Trade to the Secretary of Agriculture (SENASA), which eventually found itself publicly discredited for repeated crises with respect to food quality certification and controls. The Under Secretariat for Food and Farming Policy then attempted to create a new official model for the certification of official controls.

FAO had a weak historical institutional presence in the country, and at the time of the request for assistance (and even when the project was implemented), there was no FAO Representation in Argentina. This made interactions with national counterparts very difficult. Additionally, FAO decision-making bodies seem to have had recurrent doubts about the pertinence of implementing such a project in Argentina. Moreover, Argentina considered itself to be a developed country and thus not in need of international technical cooperation by FAO.

## 3. Expertise

At the outset, the government did not perceive FAO as having the reputation and credibility to ensure that issues related to food safety and quality would be adequately addressed and introduced into the national policy and political agenda.

However, the good level of experience demonstrated by the FAO Regional Office staff responsible for technical supervision had a high positive impact on the pertinence of the proposed activities and contributed to the adoption or the partial adoption of some recommendations.

FAO's presence in the execution of the project was of low intensity since the modality of FAO's Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) considers only short-term FAO experts and mainly the use of national consultants to implement the required assistance. This characteristic of the TCP was a clear limitation on the policy assistance, given the long-term needs and the capacities available in Argentina at the time. This factor clearly contributed to the non-adoption or the partial adoption of the some recommendations.

Experts from different fields were called to express their views about specific standards that would give better satisfaction to consumer associations, and especially to international buyers. Overall, the experts had vast experience in subjects related to Codex technical standards, but they lacked experience in decentralization and management of the provincial governments, where action is important for sustainability.



## 4. Management

The project adhered to its original work plan.

However, the objectives assigned to the project were very ambitious and not commensurate with the level of financial resources that FAO could actually mobilize through a TCP. The adoption of policy recommendations is generally a more complicated process than what is considered in the design of a TCP. Technical, economic, cultural, social and political dimensions are involved, with many parties having vested interests. As such, the project focus was felt to be not only ambitious but also rigid. A move towards a more facilitated process of assistance, with multiple objectives rather than narrowly focused assistance on specific issues would be more appropriate. Such a project of assistance should be more flexible in terms of interventions and focus more on the outcome of the policy assistance.

## 5. Lessons learned

The project resulted in a set of well implemented policy recommendations in key areas of economic activity in the food/farming sector of Argentina. However, many factors related to expertise selection, process design and project management resulted in sub-optimal policy assistance. A number of useful findings and lessons were identified:

- **Linking-up policy assistance and national policy processes.** It is important to explicitly specify (i.e. to incorporate into the project design) how the policy assistance activities interrelate with the national decision-making process within the project intervention area, with a view to identifying what the results of the assistance project will be in policy and political terms. Moreover, FAO should, to the extent possible, be a *super partes*, avoiding involvement in conflicts between public institutions based on power or the control of certain areas of public intervention.
- **Strengthening capacity of local agencies.** Institutional capacities need to be strengthened, particularly on policy formulation and implementation. To this end, it helps to identify a location for the project, preferably in an existing institution, as one key objective was to strengthen local institutional capacity in formulation and implementation of the policy.
- **Dedicating more attention to information, communication strategy and impact analysis.** One of the keys to adopting recommendations is the effort made to sensitize and train grassroots and other stakeholders about the contents of the proposed policies. In most cases, when the subject is highly politicized or the climate very unstable, the mass media can become allies and foster public support. It is also important to anticipate potential winners and losers in policy shifts so as to avoid major opposition or deadlocks.
- **Establishing strategic alliances with other international cooperation agencies active in the country.** Activities implemented by other agencies could provide opportunities for strengthening the project and creating synergies. An analysis should be made to avoid incongruence with other projects or compromise expected project results. It is also important to establish linkages with initiatives at regional level that may support the adoption of the recommendations at national level. This is especially important in countries involved in regional integration processes.
- **Ensuring the necessary policy coherence of the objectives pursued by the assistance.** It is important to have the capacity to analyse the coherence of sectoral or cross-sectoral policies. This could help build strong and realistic scenarios, including the expected effects of global trends and external pressures on national policies (e.g. in the definition of internal standards).

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## Annex III

### Bangladesh – Developing a Plan of Action for Implementation of the National Agriculture Policy

by K.C. Lai<sup>1</sup>

#### 1. Introduction

FAO has been providing policy assistance to Bangladesh over a considerable period. Over the past, such assistance included agriculture sector reviews (from 1994), food security policy development (1997), formulating a national action plan for nutrition (1994-1997), and preparing a master plan for the forestry sector (1996-1999). Financial support had come mainly from UNDP's Support Services for Policy and Programme Development (TSS1-SPPD) facility as well as from FAO's own Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP).

The FAO Representation had engaged in discussions with the Bangladeshi government during formulation of the country's 1999 National Agriculture Policy (NAP) on the crops sector and had provided small amounts of FAO resources towards its preparation. The project "Developing Plan of Action for Implementation of the National Agriculture Policy" (BGD/00/006) follows on from this and the earlier policy assistance initiatives. It was formulated in response to a request from the Bangladeshi government. Approved in December 2000, with funding (USD 146 000) by UNDP, this project was executed by FAO through its Asia and Pacific Regional Office, RAP in Bangkok. The implementation period was from August 2001 to March 2003.

#### 2. Policy Context

**Development Imperatives.** Bangladesh, with a population currently in excess of 140 million and an area of less than 148 000 sq km, is one of the most densely populated areas of the world. Some 80 percent of the population live in rural areas, while more than 60 percent of the labour force are currently employed in agriculture. The country's location and natural physical features render it highly vulnerable to climatic shocks (in particular floods), which have from time to time disrupted agricultural production, food supply and livelihoods.

Despite these constraints, the country had shown an improving economic performance over time, with annual growth in GDP reaching over 5 percent in the 1990s. It has also moved from being an aid-dependent to a trade-dependent economy (ODA<sup>2</sup> less than 2 percent in 2002). Nonetheless, development aid is still substantial, at some USD 1.2 billion per annum in the mid 2000s.

The NAP (1999) was the country's first comprehensive and self-contained statement of policy in the crops sector. Its overall objective was "to make the nation self-sufficient in food through increasing production of all crops including cereals". It was however only one of a plethora of national policies and action plans formulated during the 1990s that sought to provide development focus to specific sectors/ sub-sectors, and across sectors such as in the area of food security<sup>3</sup>.

Preparation of the Plan of Action (PoA) for the NAP was grounded not only in NAP objectives *per se* but also the wider development context inclusive of other policy initiatives and imperatives. These were meant to help consolidate gains made over the past decades in poverty reduction and contribute towards attainment of the MDGs. Key policy objectives revolved around achievement of:

- Productivity enhancements, to reduce the gap between potential and actual yields of major crops and between regions and districts of the country.

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<sup>1</sup> By **K.C. Lai**, FAO Consultant, based on **Lai, K.C.**, Report of FNPP lesson learning exercise – Bangladesh Case study, November 2006.

<sup>2</sup> ODA: Official Development Assistance.

<sup>3</sup> Food Policy (1988); National Food & Nutrition policy (1997); National Plan of Action for Nutrition (1997); Policies for Fisheries (1998), Water (1999), and Land Use (2001); Industrial Policy (1999), Comprehensive Food and Nutrition Policy (2000), National Rural Development Policy (2001). An updated National Food Policy (2006) has also been recently been prepared.

- Crop diversification, taking into account principles of comparative advantage, farming systems concepts, natural resource scarcity, market opportunities including external trade, and strategic considerations for food security.
- A revitalised agricultural technology system and advisory/extension services that was demand driven and client oriented, with the capacity to better exploit technology, including biotechnology opportunities, and their safe use.
- Agricultural marketing development to ensure fair prices to farmers, support the domestic industrial sector and avail of opportunities for agricultural export.
- Dependable and sustained food security in terms of adequate and stable supply of safe and nutritious food; improved food accessibility through enhanced purchasing power; and adequate nutrition for all, in particular women and children.

**Policy Processes.** Bangladesh has a fairly comprehensive range of agricultural, crop sector/sub-sector policies. It had participated in and signed commitments to various international and/or regional conventions and agreements, in such areas as trade, food security, nutrition and food safety. Structural changes in its agricultural economy also provided important dynamics for a range of national policy initiatives. Policy implementation in the food and agricultural sectors has however generally been weak, due in part to weak national institutional capacities.

Policies varied in analytical content and the extent of participation in their formulation. The NAP on which the PoA was based was largely a MOA internal effort. It contained some important weaknesses and gaps, reflecting the limited capacity in policy design within the MOA. The government had, since the mid 1990s, sought and received policy assistance from FAO on various occasions. FAO's assistance for the PoA follows from these earlier activities, which included some material support to MOA during the latter's preparation of the 1999 NAP<sup>4</sup>.

By 2000, reduction of poverty had become the main thrust of the country's development policy. A follow-up to the PoA, after its approval by the government, was the Development Partners Workshop (May 2003) held under the aegis of the Local Consultative Group (LCG) to discuss the PRSP process and the PoA. It was indicated that the Policy and Planning Support Unit of the MOA, with DANIDA support, had endorsed the PoA, and started using it for programme planning. This included a proposed Integrated Agricultural Development Plan (IADP) consisting of a comprehensive set of crop sector programmes that was to provide an implementation vehicle for the PoA.

**Main Players** The IADP initiative was supported by DANIDA but not by other donors. DANIDA had in recent years been perceived by some in government as confrontational on governance issues. The counterpart agency was the MOA's Planning Wing, which had limited influence within the ministry. Change management requisites for MOA and its 15 agencies were daunting. Complexities involved and unclear implications on jobs, power structures and political patronage possibly weakened support for the IADP within MOA. Agreed actions at the workshop were not followed through by the LCG, donors or the government. The IADP and PoA had difficulty forging strategic partnerships in implementation, and both processes were not pursued by MOA by early 2004.

There was moreover a new agriculture minister in late 2003. Increasing costs of agricultural inputs exerted political pressure on the government for more immediate and tangible support to farmers. The bureaucratic policy process was overtaken by more immediate and pragmatic considerations for accessing development funding in priority areas. This led to a new initiative for an agricultural sector review and the Actionable Policy Brief (APB) process, which commenced in early 2004, with FAO/UNDP assistance, superseding the PoA.

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<sup>4</sup> Bangladesh has in recent years received from FAO technical assistance in various areas ranging from biotechnology, food quality control and safety, to livelihood adaptation to climate change. FAO in 2004/05 assisted the government initiate an agricultural sector review exercise, leading to the preparation of a set of Agricultural Policy Briefs, including an Action Plan.

### **3. Policy Assistance Process**

The PoA was prepared based on the existing 1999 NAP. Some inherent weaknesses and gaps were partially addressed by the FAO project team. However the original long list of 18 NAP programme areas were treated largely as a 'given' and used as the main organisational basis for action planning, without strategic prioritisation, at cost to analytical depth and practicality. The resultant 330 recommended actions in the PoA were akin to a wish list, with limited operational value as a planning and programming tool. Six 'strategic themes' were mentioned in the PoA. But logical links to programme areas and actions were not shown - various parts of the PoA appeared to have been written by different individuals without adequate team interaction and integration into the Plan.

The PoA team nonetheless identified important gaps in the NAP. They added food safety and agro-processing to the programme areas in recognition of the broader range of stakeholders in the transition from subsistence to commercial agriculture. But interactions with important stakeholders (including agro-processors, agri-businesses, exporters, and government agencies/ministries) were minimal and largely top-down. Careful targeting of key players was not evident. Lacking was the systematic identification and analysis of stakeholders. Consultation processes were poor in timing, scope and purpose. A Participatory Rural Appraisal was carried out but this was not well integrated into the planning process. The APB avoided some of the pitfalls of the PoA exercise in terms of stakeholder consultations and participation.

Subsequent to the PoA, a TCP project to assist the country in strengthening food quality control and comply with international standards, had attempted to facilitate the national policy dialogue on food safety. But the counterpart agency had a limited mandate for decisions on regulatory, standard setting, and legislative instruments, and failed to secure cooperation of other ministries/agencies at the appropriate level of decision making.

### **4. Expertise**

The SPPD project document had originally envisaged a project team of four international and eight national professionals. This was changed during implementation to fourteen national professionals, including a Principal National Consultant (PNC), one international consultant (Policy and Strategy Specialist) plus the RAP team leader. The PNC was a recently retired Secretary of MOA. The Participatory Rural Appraisal, sub-contracted to a local consultancy, was carried out in late 2001 in 18 locations.

There was an attempt to provide subject matter specialist coverage over the 18 programme areas. With a limited project budget, this led to a vast increase in the number of national and commensurate reduction in the number of international consultants fielded. Terms of Reference of individual team members were however not specific enough towards identifying priority actions and assigning lead responsibilities for implementation.

Quality of the national consultants employed varied considerably. Despite the size of the team, there were gaps, such as in nutrition and food safety, and marketing of high value products, and inadequacies in technical expertise for the type of policy assistance required. Missing in the team were key inputs on institutional and stakeholder analysis and for action planning, monitoring and evaluation. A smaller team of carefully selected individuals, and a better balance of experienced national and international consultants, would have been preferable under the circumstances.

Appointment of a former senior government official as the PNC provided important inputs in terms of experience and familiarity with administrative norms/modalities. But there were also potential risks of carry over of bureaucratic approaches and mindsets; there appeared to have been insufficient provision for checks and balances in the team structure with regard to country experience and technical quality.

### **5. Management**

The PoA process was handicapped by the large and unwieldy team structure and inadequate provision for a team leader's input in-country. The inputs of the PoA team leader and international

consultant in the country were provided on intermittent basis. These consisted of short visits to the country and, in the case of the team leader (operating from Bangkok), combined with other backstopping duties.

Although the writing and editing of the final PoA document rested with the team leader, the PNC and a senior national consultant (another former staff of the Ministry of Agriculture) were responsible for much of day-to-day operations of the project. This included supervising inputs of other consultants and initial drafting of the PoA. Personality differences between the PNC and the main international consultant arose but were not resolved, affecting team work and integration of consultants inputs at conceptual and practical levels. A more desirable arrangement would be for a project team leader to have overall responsibility for coordination, integration and gate-keeping roles in the team, and initial and final drafting of the PoA document; advisory and quality control roles ought to be retained as a RAP responsibility.

## 6. Conclusion

FAO regional office and the FAO Representative have played important roles in the PoA initiative and other policy assistance processes in the country, a fact well recognised by government and donors. Such assistance had nonetheless been through stand-alone projects that did not provide for a sustained process of policy dialogue and support. Although the PoA outputs demonstrated the responsiveness of FAO policy assistance to country requests, this was more re-active than pro-active. Lacking was a more holistic approach towards developing viable strategies and policies encompassing the wider agricultural sector and overall rural space. Structural changes, evolving roles of the agricultural sector and the importance of the rural-urban interface limit the usefulness of assistance provided on a narrow sub-sector basis.

Various recommended actions of the PoA incur a range of legislative, regulatory and institutional/capacity development instruments. A multiplicity of players, varying in power and influence, were implicated in these actions. Fragmented roles and responsibilities, especially in such areas as nutrition, food safety, high value crops and agricultural trade render difficult the securing of cooperation/ collaboration within and among sectors by individual government ministries/agencies and non-governmental stakeholders. Getting around this problem would require engaging the government at a high enough level (i.e. supra-ministerial), and ensuring the required degree of commitment, coordination and cooperation across sectors and sub-sectors.

Country requirements in policy support in the area of food and agriculture at sector/ sub-sector and cross-sector levels span a range of technical expertise, much of which FAO has strong capacity in, in RAP and in Headquarters. This was drawn upon during the PoA and other country assistance activities; however fuller use is not facilitated by existing operating modalities. Technical support on crosscutting policy issues poses special challenges for FAO.

In terms of lessons learned, the following are some good practices which would merit future consideration:

- Maintain an ongoing policy dialogue at country level with national and international development partners, especially the main players in the PRSP process (including Ministry of Finance or Planning), through a strategic and programmatic approach in policy assistance, instead of responding through one-off and poorly connected projects. This would help clarify country priorities, link policy assistance to a medium term priority framework for the country and harmonise with initiatives of other development partners and ensure more consistent follow-up to policy advice (implementation).
- Be more pro-active in policy assistance and adopt a holistic approach in advocacy towards developing national strategies and policies that encompass the wider agricultural sector and rural space, with particular attention on environmental threats to sustainable development, using MDGs as a reference and benchmark.
- Seek higher FAO visibility and its substantive participation in the PRSP Implementation Forum, thereby contributing technically to the policy process at the highest level.

- Include capacity development on policy design, implementation and the monitoring and evaluation of national policies for the agriculture ministry and related institutions as an integral part of policy assistance initiatives.

FAO's current arrangements for policy assistance would benefit from adjustment and further enhancement, through:

- Reconfiguring the human resource levels in the country office, whilst revising Terms of Reference of the FAO Representative to include regular policy monitoring support and maintaining systematic and up-to-date country database on related policies and programmes.
- Greater proactivity of the FAO Representative in technical interaction with international/national development partners. Focus should be on developing national strategies and policies that give particular attention to the rural-urban interface, inclusive of consumer rights to safe and nutritious food, and being forward looking in such areas as environmental threats and climate change mitigation, consistent with FAO's own strategic framework and Medium Term Plan and that of other development partners.
- Undertaking further methodological and capacity development at headquarters and regional office in the area of policy cycle monitoring and evaluation, including preparation of technical guidelines for adaptation and communication/outreach to countries.
- Strengthening FAO's in-house capacity and institutional arrangements for policy assistance in regional offices and headquarters (including technical divisions) for better country specialisation and focus. This entails identifying country-specific focal points in various technical divisions/units.
- A critical re-examination of operational procedures and modalities for inter-departmental work on policy support, including the working of the Headquarter Policy Task Force and other relevant cross-departmental mechanisms will also be necessary to permit better policy and technical subject matter inter-face at various levels of the organisation.

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## Annex IV

### Burundi – Defining a Rural Credit Policy by Frédéric Dévé<sup>1</sup>

#### 1. Policy context

Until the 1993 socio-political crisis and 12-year civil war, Burundi's rural and agricultural credit system and policy exhibited many of the "conventional" features of agricultural and rural credit practices in place in Africa at that time. These credit practices were centered on a National Development Bank; a dense network of rural savings and credit cooperatives; formal commercial bank services for agricultural and agri-business production units with entrepreneurship capacity; credit in kind (e.g. for inputs or seeds) from boards ("offices") in charge of export commodities for small producers; and traditional informal credit practices.

During the conflict, most of the systems collapsed or all but collapsed. The major financial institutions targeting rural areas continued to exist, but their activities were severely contracted. The export boards also suffered from disruptions in input supply and international trade circuits, while production was dramatically reduced.

In 2000-2001, the transitory government felt the need for assistance to improve agricultural and rural credit as well as microfinance. Both were seen as potentially contributing to the revitalization and reconstruction of the economy in general and of the agricultural sector in particular. A request for assistance was addressed to FAO. FAO's policy assistance was provided in the framework of the Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) project "*Définition d'une politique de crédit rural*" during 2000-2001.

During the project period, a World Bank (WB) interim reconstruction strategy was being implemented. The Government of Burundi was giving high priority to microfinance. This resulted in microfinance receiving more attention compared to rural credit in the agenda of Burundi's policy makers and may have delayed the effective policy action that was needed in the area of rural and agricultural finance. FAO had identified a number of essential prerequisites as necessary for any sustainable development of rural credit activities. These prerequisites are now in place, but the flows of rural and productive agricultural credit have remained "ridiculous," as the Ministry of Agriculture states in its 2006 Sectoral Policy.

During the project period, the two prominent players for rural and agricultural credit in Burundi were the *Banque nationale de développement économique* (created by the government in 1966 as the National Development Bank) and the *Coopératives d'épargne et de crédit*. The latter, and their national federation did (and continue to) represent the major decentralized financial system ("*système financier décentralisé*" - SFD) or microfinance institution ("*Institution de Microfinance*" - IMF) network in Burundi.

A number of microfinance operators – often but not always linked to reconstruction projects funded by multilateral or bilateral agencies – were launching new credit activities in the context of the Arusha negotiations for peace. The profile and philosophy of these activities were often inspired by the microfinance approach resulting from the Grameen Bank experience.

By 2000, Burundi's social instability, residual conflicts and mistrust were still affecting credit practices and inducing SFDs to limit their credit services to agriculture, while developing them in other activities (small trade in particular). In addition, the development of microcredit activity was facing a number of serious handicaps: absence of common regulation and a legal and prudential framework (that would have protected client deposits and imposed management and performance norms); and low institutional and individual staff professional capacity aggravated by the "brain drain".

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<sup>1</sup> By Frédéric Dévé, FAO Consultant, based on Dévé, F., Lesson learning in policy assistance: Burundi Case study – "*Définition d'une politique de crédit rural*", October 2006.

## **2. FAO and the policy assistance process**

The ultimate objective of the assistance was to formulate an agricultural and rural credit policy, and a strategy and action plan to implement it. The expected result was a “document containing the required detailed elements for the formulation of a policy concerning the development of financial services in rural areas”. These elements were expected to include relevant components and policy instruments, and their implementation process and control mechanisms. Project operations included three phases:

- A review of the situation, the preparation of terms of reference for national consultants and their recruitment, and the selection of countries where study tours were to be organized.
- Analysis and study tours by national consultants, and three provincial seminars were to be organized.
- Preparation of documents – background and reference reports – for a national roundtable concluding the project’s field activities.

The process had an inherent capacity-building function, which resulted in the following:

- Exposure of key national consultants to rural credit experiences in foreign countries. Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali and Senegal were visited and their experience analysed, with lessons drawn based on comparisons with the Burundi situation. The final roundtable did allow for a substantial international exchange of ideas and experiences.
- Experience of a bottom-up policy dialogue and process. Three regional seminars with local stakeholders were organized in Bujumbura, Gitega and Ngoz to discuss credit policy issues and formulate recommendations.
- These seminars, the selection process of national consultants and their contributions to the debate, the various consultations undertaken by the international consultant with national stakeholders, donors and decision makers, culminated in the project’s final roundtable. In the latter, key actors of the financial and credit system were invited to make presentations and share their views with all other participants, who included key donors. This procedure exposed stakeholders to a participatory policy analysis and process.

The approach chosen by FAO was to promote a bottom–up process that led to the formulation of a transitory policy by the Government of Burundi itself (rather than substituting for the government and having the policy drafted by FAO experts). This can be viewed in part as FAO’s “philosophy” and “line of action” regarding ownership of policy initiatives, capacity building and policy assistance in general. However, this line also prevented FAO from adopting a sufficiently “proactive” attitude, in circumstances where rapid action was needed. Since national institutional capacity was weak in Burundi, consideration should have been given to substituting government staff in critical situations where action was deemed necessary in order to achieve more rapid results.

It is worth noting that while the project was being implemented, WB was conducting a study and the African Development Bank was working in the same area. Very limited interaction took place between FAO and these two initiatives. Thus, separate reports and recommendations were submitted almost at the same time to the Council of Ministers, which claimed that better coordination should have occurred.

The process also made it clear that the Ministry of Finance and Central Bank should be formally and actively involved as counterpart institutions for similar exercises.

## **3. Expertise mobilized by the policy assistance process**

In terms of expertise mobilized in the project, one shortcoming was that it did not include specific technical assistance for the design of a legal and prudential framework. The international consultant was a lawyer, with broad international experience in this field, but his terms of reference did not envisage the provision of support for drafting a legal and prudential framework. This suggests that in many occurrences, within FAO it may be desirable to associate the Legal Service of FAO as a member of the group of that is providing particular policy assistance.



Moreover, FAO could have mobilized the expertise at country level to convene fora and meetings and to facilitate the national policy dialogue in an effective manner. This potential was repeatedly used at the level of the FAO Representative and by experts for several activities.

#### 4. FAO's policy assistance management

The expertise potential could be tapped in a more systematic and proactive manner by strengthening the role of country offices in the technical management of policy assistance projects. To this end, the mandate, resources and competences of FAO representations should be re-visited.

The request of assistance for this Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) project came from the Ministry of Agriculture. However, FAO should have supported and guided the Ministry in establishing the required level of dialogue with other ministries such as Finance, Education and Health. For example, through sensitization, advocacy, and coalition building, it could have helped convince the Ministry of Finance to increase the resources allocated to agriculture development, as stated in regional/international declarations (e.g. Maputo Declaration for Africa).

In Burundi, there is considerable a lack of access to documentation, including existing FAO training, information and extension material. For example, FAO's on-line training and publications on rural credit are not well disseminated in the country. Promises were made during the concluding roundtable that FAO literature (e.g. publications on *Best practices*) would be distributed, but six years later this has not occurred. The FAO Micro-banking software was also recommended during the roundtable, but this software has still not been disseminated. This is regrettable as it limits the usefulness of the materials and tools developed by FAO. It appears that the role of widespread and systematic dissemination should be played by the FAO country office.

#### 5. Lessons learned

##### Some of the major lessons learned are as follows:

- Policy processes take time before they result in action. A time lag of one to two years was necessary before preliminary adoption of several recommendations took place. Six years elapsed before the most crucial recommendations were adopted (legal and prudential framework).
- In a post-conflict situation, decision makers may be more concerned about reconstruction, demobilization, national reconciliation and macroeconomic stabilization than about sectoral policies. In the absence of a clear economic policy framework, issues risk being addressed in an *ad-hoc* fashion at sector level.
- Dialogue with other partners in the international community must be considered seriously and at an early stage as it can influence many national policy choices. Most international financial institutions (IFIs) and major donors have become very influential on government policies through the leverage of conditionality. This places FAO in a special and recognized position of "impartial" and "honest" facilitator, "experienced and competent" adviser. However, this position is often insufficiently influential to quickly generate outcomes and impact. For this reason, FAO can be precursor, pioneer and catalyst among other aid agencies, but considerable delays may occur before the advice actually leads to policy change. Enhancing policy dialogue with IFIs and other UN agencies is indispensable to making FAO's policy advice more effective and preventing conflicting views from reaching decision makers at the same time.
- Some possible approaches to better fine-tune FAO's policy assistance to exogenous factors, and to enhance the chances of recommendations being implemented, include:
  - Stronger relationships and collaboration between FAO and Ministries of Finance and Central Banks (which could even become institutional counterparts), so as to ensure advocacy and effective policy dialogue on critical issues.
  - Actual drafting of policy documents and design of sub-sectoral policies when necessary, in cases of extremely weak institutional capacity (as found in post-conflict contexts); outputs can then be submitted to the government for consideration.
  - Extending the assistance until bottlenecks for policy reform are resolved, such as the creation of a legal and prudential framework in the case of Burundi.
  - Enhancing the capacity of FAO technical units and FAO Representatives to monitor the adoption of policy recommendations over a period of time after a policy project has concluded.

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## Annex V

### **Cambodia – Capacity Building of Professional Agricultural Organizations and Local Rural Development Institutions/Assessment and Localization of the Millennium Development Goal on Reducing Poverty and Hunger**

by Lokendra P. Poudyal<sup>1</sup>

#### **1. Policy context**

After the Khmer Rouge takeover in April 1975, Cambodia suffered almost two decades of war, which ended in 1993 with the promulgation of a new Constitution and elections under the auspices of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia in the same year. Another independent election was held in July 1998, and the new government established as a priority the creation and mobilization of professional agricultural organizations in its efforts to formulate suitable agricultural and rural development policies.

Agreeing to this concept, FAO supported the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) and the Ministry of Rural Development (MRD) with the project Preparation of Capacity Building Programmes for Professional Agricultural Organizations and Local Rural Development Institutions (TCP/CMB/8822). (Prior to this project, FAO had supported MAFF through another project, which focused on the restructuring of MAFF's central and provincial structures.) Another project in which FAO has been assisting Cambodia in its policy formulation and implementation process in the area of agriculture and food security is the Assessment and Localization of the Millennium Development Goal on Reducing Poverty and Hunger (CMB/02/016/08/12). This project was executed under the financial support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and provided technical assistance for designing policies and targets for localizing Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 1 (reduction of poverty and hunger). These two projects form the basis of this case study.

The country was emphasizing market economy orientation for increased food production and food security. In this regard, mobilization of professional agriculture organization was felt essential to contribute to increasing the productivity and rural income of farmers. Similarly, the mobilization of Village Development Committees was expected to maximize local potential. These considerations were significant in the context of sustainable food security. Realizing the fact that the farmers require improved access to production services, MAFF attempted to obtain support from various agencies and emphasized preparation of implementation by strengthening capacity of the farmer organizations.

Previously, FAO had provided technical support for the preparation of the Food Security and Poverty Alleviation Project (FSPAP 2000-2005) and the Second Socio-Economic Development Plan (SEDP II). Within FSPAP, FAO's assistance focused on the formulation of an agriculture policy and strategy that would help improve food security. Regarding the preparation of SEDP II, FAO's focus was on preparing the agriculture and rural development chapter. These supports were consistent with the Rome Declaration and World Food Summit 1996 and re-affirmed the government's commitment made in the World Food Summit 2002. All of these factors indicate the key role of the agriculture and rural development sectors as a contributor to the reduction of poverty and hunger. The implementation of CMB/02/016/08/12 project was one of the efforts falling into the preceding frameworks.

#### **2. FAO and the policy assistance process**

The government and FAO have prepared a joint National Medium Term Programme Framework (2006-2010) document, which elaborates the structure of possible FAO support to Cambodia. This document is useful for both FAO and the government in developing their respective plans coherently. This document aligns with the priorities outlined in the National Strategic Development Plan and the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF).

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<sup>1</sup> By **Dr. Lokendra Prasad Poudyal**, FAO Consultant, based on **Poudyal, L.P.**, Lesson learning in policy assistance: Cambodia Case studies – "Capacity Building Programmes for Professional Agricultural Organizations and Local Rural Development Institutions" and "*Préparation de programmes de renforcement des organisations professionnelles agricoles de des institutions de développement rural*", FAO, March 2007.

Both projects were implemented through a series of dialogues between the government and FAO. To facilitate implementation, the government formed technical committees comprised of key stakeholders. The committees helped to develop an environment for the adoption of recommended policies. They were also useful in ensuring national ownership of the process and maintaining inter-ministerial cooperation. For example, FAO has tried to work closely with the Advisory Committee on the MDGs. This committee was provided with information on the methods, adoption criteria and targets. Feedback was obtained and suggestions were integrated to improve results.

FAO emphasized broader participation of people at all levels and had tried to use already established rural development committees at different levels, hoping that their mobilization would conform to the ongoing decentralization process.

Realizing that government ownership of recommended policies helps minimize the delay in their adoption, FAO attempted to integrate its policy assistance process with the need- and priority-based proposals put forward by the government, to the extent that these proposals were relevant to FAO's mandate. Most of the recommendations emerged within the short span of the project duration. However, they proved difficult for the government to absorb, since it did not have adequate technical capacity and budget. Therefore, there may be a need for follow-up activities until the policy recommendations are fully implemented.

The long list of policy recommendations generated by the two projects was not conducive to helping the government establish priorities. In turn, the chances of the recommendations being adopted were decreased, given the limited resources and capacities in the country. The government does not perceive the recommendations as part of a coherent policy but rather as a "patchwork" that does not fit well within the bigger picture of national needs and priorities. This ultimately minimized the hope for post-project implementation of the recommendations. In fact, most of the policy recommendations are somewhere in between "partially" adopted and "not totally rejected", and the adoption process has generally taken much longer than expected due to the government's limited technical and budgetary capacity and the lack of coordination among stakeholders. Overlapping mandate of the ministries with regard to the issues related to agricultural and rural development was another problem.

As often as possible, throughout the project FAO helped coordinate and define roles and functions of the different ministries and other stakeholders for the planning and implementation of activities to avoid overlaps, duplications and gaps.

Since the end of these two projects, FAO has been trying to arrange some follow-up activities by attempting to mobilize funding from donor countries. However, it has met with limited success, in part due to the recent preference of donors for supporting co-financed projects, which has made the follow-up process more complex and the mobilization of funds more difficult. Moreover, all professional agricultural organizations established to date operate independently. They do not have any federation or union to voice their collective agenda at the higher level. The problems faced by these organizations include:

- Limited knowledge, skills and experience among the members and leaders.
- Limited funds for involvement in greater business.
- Lack of adequate infrastructure for the office.
- Lack of farmers' capacity to purchase more shares, which could form a working capital.
- Small number of establishments to attract government's attention.

This shows that overall the process by which the assistance was provided had not been adequately designed as it led to important shortcomings.

### **3. Expertise mobilized by the policy assistance process**

The government considers FAO as a credible working partner on the issues related to food production, food security and institutional development. The government appreciated the joint consultations that FAO initiated and admired its imposition-free working style in suggesting policy recommendations.

In the two projects analysed here, FAO provided technical support through national and international experts whose qualifications, competences and experiences were well appreciated by the government. For the first project, the team was comprised of:

- Two international consultants (Institutions Specialist and Professional Agriculture Organization Specialist).
- Two senior (already retired) experts (Professional Agriculture Organization Specialist and Specialist for Needs Analysis and Training Programme Planning).
- Five national consultants (Institutions Specialist, Rural Socio-economist, Professional Agriculture Organization Specialist, Data Management Specialist and Training Specialist).

The second project included the support of:

- Three international consultants (Policy Officer/Team Leader, Agricultural Policy Specialist and Rural Development Policy Specialist and Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist).
- One national staff (Policy and Programme).
- FAO mission, which also provided inputs.

Necessary guidance was provided by organizing occasional backstopping missions from the responsible FAO technical unit. Government staff were fully satisfied with the quality of services offered by these technical experts. In particular, they observed the use of relevant cross-country experiences as quite useful in shaping policy recommendations consistent with domestic needs and priorities. At the same time, the staffing capacity at the FAO country office was small if compared to the number of incoming advisory requests from the government. Some technical staff should be added to this office to improve its catalytic strength.

The policy assistance activities were launched according to the project schedule, which had positive impact on the sequencing and credibility of FAO's management. Although FAO played a significant role in the policy reform process, its contribution was not fully acknowledged; in particular, for the project on professional agricultural organizations and rural development institutions. This project covered a subject that many other donor-supported projects had implemented. However, FAO's role was fully acknowledged with respect to the project on localizing MDG 1.

#### **4. Lessons learned**

FAO's support was useful for the government to address some of its priority issues such as the establishment and mobilization of local organizations for effective service delivery at the decentralized level. However, the adoption status of some policy recommendations was not encouraging: after six years, many have still not been adopted. In this regard, the establishment of a monitoring system would not only help to control deviations but would also contribute to accommodating emerging changes as they become relevant to the context of recommended policies.

Experience indicates that there is no quick-fix approach to policy change. The time needed for the process of translating policy recommendations into action might take five years, and even more. This implies that the policy assistance process should have its span over a longer period of time than what can be envisaged under an individual Technical Cooperation Project.

The involvement of a particular technical unit in a country is determined by the existence of a project. Once the project is over, the working relationship between the country, the FAO country office and the technical unit (s) ceases to exist. This situation is a serious constraint to carrying through the adoption of recommendations formulated during the implementation phase. In order to maintain momentum, follow-up arrangements are needed to cater to the needs of post-project consultations.

The FAO Representative's personal rapport with the government staff is an essential ingredient for discussing emerging issues with government and also in facilitating the adoption process. Some government staff noted that successive FAO Representatives can have various degrees of involvement. This indicates the need to encourage and strengthen FAO Representatives' catalytic role in the policy assistance process.

The policy recommendations were primarily based on the technical analysis of the reforms desired. However, they often failed to examine the operational ground realities in terms of their relevance to the context, availability of funds and technical competence of the government staff. Analysis of these aspects is important for successful implementation, and the policy recommendation process should not ignore them.

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## Annex VI

### Libya – National Seed Program – Preparatory Assistance by Mouldi Zouaoui<sup>1</sup>

#### 1. Policy Context

The total arable land in Libya is about 2 170 000 hectares, of which 355 000 hectares are devoted to permanent crops. Agricultural activities are generally limited to the Mediterranean coastal strip and the low mountainous land, as well as in scattered oases in the desert.

The bulk of agricultural production comes from the privately owned farms. Government farms, mainly under irrigation in the desert, produce cereals and forage on about 50 000 hectares.

Libya is well aware of the role that efficient agriculture can play in achieving food security, reducing the dramatic foreign exchange cost of imports and improving social welfare. National decision makers are also convinced that there are two main sources that can bring about the needed increase in food and agricultural production: (i) the remarkable increase in water supply brought to arable land by the “Great Man-made River” (GMR) project; and (ii) by cultivating more land and increasing agricultural productivity. An increase in agriculture-sector performance will need to be accompanied by an improved technological package and optimum use of inputs, mainly improved seeds.

In recognition of the role improved seeds can play, the government has made a number of efforts over the past decades to build a national seed programme. Although these efforts have had some impact, the seed programme showed many weaknesses at the time the FAO project was initiated and was considered inadequate to constitute a credible basis in the national drive towards a modern and vibrant agriculture. Weaknesses included:

- Lack of appropriate equipment for seed production and processing.
- Absence of a credible seed enterprise charged with production, processing and distribution.
- Lack of seed legislation, certification and crop variety catalogues.
- Lack of a national seed strategy and coordinating body charged with preparing a national seed policy and plan and coordinating activities (including exports and imports).

In order to address these problems, in May 1999 the Government of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya requested FAO’s technical assistance, which was provided under the Technical Cooperation Project (TCP) “National Seed Programme – Preparatory Assistance” (TCP/LIB/8921).

The project outputs were meant to pave the way for the planned five-year Unilateral Trust Fund seed project, which was to provide assistance to develop a National Seed Programme by initiating preliminary actions on seed policy, setting up infrastructure for germplasm information management, creating country-wide awareness on seed, preparing the foundation for a massive seed propagation programme, and ensuring sustainability of systematic seed multiplication activities and quality control procedures.

At the time of the project, Libya had been under US sanctions since 1986, barring the country from having access to US technologies and financial services. In 1992, an embargo was imposed by the United Nations, which virtually isolated the country by drastically limiting its economic, financial and cultural relations with rest of the world. The national context was therefore characterized by political difficulties (embargo), budget restrictions (low oil prices) and scarcity of experienced technicians and policy analysts. This complicated the work of the FAO team. (The embargo was finally lifted on October 2004 and US sanctions were lifted gradually to reach normal relations in 2006.)

When the project started, FAO was the single foreign partner cooperating with the government in the development of the agricultural sector. Under such conditions it is important to consider the real

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<sup>1</sup> By **Mouldi Zouaoui**, FAO Consultant, based on **Zouaoui, M.**, Libya Case Study “National Seed Programme Preparatory Assistance” (TCP/LIB/8921), FAO Rome, October 2006.

motivations of the Ministry of Agriculture's request for policy assistance. Was it really to build a comprehensive seed project? Or was it to find a way out of the difficulties of an exceptional situation? This doubt on whether there was a real political will to undertake deep reforms in the seed sub-sector may explain the difficulties met in implementing some of the recommendations that the project made.

## **2. FAO and the Policy Assistance Process**

The main counterpart of the project was the Ministry of Agriculture, which was institutionally weak and facing serious resource constraints. After 2001, its responsibilities were reduced progressively and the ministry was downgraded to a simple production service in 2002. In fact, the real decision makers for the agriculture sector were the Ministry of Finance and the State Bank, which focus on strategic and long term issues. Seed policy was not among their priorities, and they were not involved in the project, thus hindering the implementation of some of the recommendations made, especially those with financial and long-term implications.

The project was certainly hampered by the lack of an FAO Country Office in Libya with an FAO Representative who could establish the appropriate conditions for dialogue with these two key decision makers. A lack of other important stakeholders also compromised the visibility and relevance of agricultural considerations within the policy debate. This made it difficult for FAO to fully understand the national context.

Timeliness was also an issue since it took roughly one year for FAO to respond to the policy assistance request. Combined with the change of ministers, these factors could explain the low level of awareness and attention paid to agricultural concerns, and seed in particular.

Lack of communication created some difficulties during the project. Project documents were very poorly disseminated, to the extent that the reports formulating the recommendations were not known even by some members of the FAO team involved in the project. This may be due in part to the very strong oral tradition in the country, and the fact that people are not inclined to reading, especially when documents are in English. More could have been achieved if there had been follow-up activities planned. But this did not occur because of the absence of a Country Representative and the lack of resources (human and financial), which had not been anticipated for this purpose in the policy assistance project.

## **3. Expertise mobilized by the policy assistance process**

Before the project, there had been no dialogue among private- and public- seed sector organizations and the Ministry of Agriculture. The project initiated and facilitated dialogue among stakeholders by organizing a two-day forum. The project team and 50 participants drawn from all relevant actors (farmers, seed importers, seed growers, extension, research, Ministry of Agriculture, agricultural projects and the University of Tripoli) participated in the forum. The project team succeeded in gathering this broad array of stakeholders to formulate policy proposals and build a consensus on recommendations (eight recommendations were made and four were approved and fully implemented).

In addition to policy advice, the project included some capacity-building activities. This aspect of FAO's intervention was well appreciated in the country and helped to build trust and contributed to the implementation of recommendations.

Altogether, six experts were involved in this project. The International Seed Industry Consultant was appointed Team Leader. The team included only experts with technical skills. Given the country's limited human and financial resources and the complexity of the project (which is not only a technical project but has legal, political and communication aspects), the project should have included provision for a legal specialist to support the drafting of legal texts (National Seed Policy and/or a Seed Law) and a facilitator for ensuring close follow-up until the implementation of the recommendations.

Combining involvement of national consultants with international consultants was very productive and improved the policy process because experienced staff living and working in the country helped to

build trust, mutual confidence and understanding. It should also contribute in the future to ensure continuity of dialogue and flow of information, particularly with external partners.

The non-adoption of some recommendations made can also be explained by the lack of coordination between organizations responsible for coordination (Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning and State Bank) and the Ministry of Agriculture. In addition, more attention paid by FAO to programmes of other agencies in the country could have helped to build consensus and facilitated the implementation and funding of project follow-up activities.

#### **4. FAO's policy assistance management**

The lack of follow-up was certainly the main reason for which some crucial recommendations were not implemented. Follow up is an essential condition for effectiveness of the policy assistance provided.

The nature of the TCP, which has limited scope, resources and flexibility, has constituted a clear constraint in Libya since the country was facing very specific and unique conditions (immediate aftermath of a long embargo, a significant cultural and economic gap with the rest of the world, marginalized role and place of agriculture in the national economy, etc.) that would have required a higher degree of adaptation to local condition and more flexible rules.

#### **5. Lessons learned**

The project demonstrated that providing policy assistance is a complex activity. Such assistance works with people – trying to change their mentality – and with institutions – seeking to influence their policy and regulations. Its effectiveness depends on a variety of factors, in particular the technical qualities and experience of the team experts providing the assistance, as well as their competence, knowledge of the country (culture, tradition, etc.), modesty, flexibility and receptiveness.

Other lessons learned from the project are as follows:

- In order to minimize risk of ineffectiveness of policy assistance, it is important to deeply analyse the request for assistance before starting a particular activity, to make sure that there is a genuine demand for policy assistance, and that it is clearly formulated regarding its purpose and objectives.
- A proper dialogue between the FAO team and key decision makers in the country and in other organizations providing technical assistance would have eased the implementation of the recommendations and contributed to raise the visibility of agricultural concerns in the mind of key decision makers, while at the same time ensuring that recommendations formulated by FAO are in line with macroeconomic considerations.
- It is critical to have an effective communication strategy which is well targeted and adopts a style that responds to the culture and educational level of the target audience.
- It is in the nature of TCPs to be short and quick. However in special situations (war, embargo, and weakness of human and financial means) there should be some provision for more flexibility and latitude to the experts to adapt the project to the process in the country and to an evolving environment so as to increase effectiveness.



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## Annex VII

### Morocco – Support to the General Agricultural Development Council by Brahim Amouri<sup>1</sup>

#### 1. Policy context

Morocco has been rolling out a major programme of economic reforms since the early 1980s in its effort to liberalize the economy and forge a new political and economic direction. In 1995, the country joined the World Trade Organization, which made it imperative for the national economy to adapt to the international environment and meet the challenges of a competitive market. In 1996, it signed a new Association Agreement with the European Union for a free trade area to be set up in 2010. This new economic and institutional reality has called for a greater diversity and promotion of civil society actors, and for a new relationship between the public and private sectors.

It is against this background that the Ministry of Agriculture, Rural Development and Marine Fisheries felt a strong need to more effectively set the agenda for an agricultural development policy and programmes. The General Council for Agricultural Development (*Conseil Général du Développement Agricole*, CGDA) was set up in 1993 as a result of the restructuring of the Ministry, in order to enable it to play this role by providing an appropriate forum for the exchange of information, consultation, collaboration and partnership between the actors involved, and to enable them to set up and implement agricultural policies. For the CGDA to be able to carry out these tasks, it needed to build up its analytical capabilities and its capacity to formulate proposals, as well as to adapt its organizational structure and methods to meet the demands generated by the new kind of relationship between the public and private sectors. It also needed to equip itself with high-performance tools and systems to promote consultation, collaboration and information exchange among the different economic operators, and to train its human resources and those of other partners so as to broaden participation.

With these aims in mind, the Minister for Agriculture wanted the CGDA to benefit from FAO's experience and the expertise it has gained helping agricultural institutions adapt to new national and international realities. In addition, the government requested FAO's assistance in light of the excellent relationship and fruitful cooperation maintained over several decades.

#### 2. FAO and the policy assistance process

The Minister for Agriculture and the President of the CGDA contacted the FAO Representative in Morocco directly, in order to explore the possibility of the CGDA receiving assistance from FAO to help it take its institutional plans forward. The Representative contacted the Rural Institutions and Participation Service (SDAR) of FAO for help with the technical aspects, as SDAR was already involved in institution-building activities in the agricultural sector in Morocco through several Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) and Unilateral Trust Funds (UTF) projects. The Director of the Rural Development Division (SDA) personally followed the work leading to the finalization of the assistance project, and secured the support of all the relevant FAO units. The outcome of these efforts was the preparation of the TCP/MOR/8926 project document, "Supporting the General Council for Agricultural Development", which is the subject of this case study.

The parties opted for a participatory approach from the outset. Annual meetings/seminars were organized to discuss the issues and policies that needed to be covered by the project, as well as to define priorities and ensure that all actors were up to standard in their areas of responsibility.

The participation of SDAR and then of FAO's Policy Assistance Division (TCA) Director himself proved very helpful in facilitating the assistance process. Their attendance every year at the CGDA meetings meant that they could regularly meet all the participants, including the Minister, and that the timing and required profiles of expertise for the assistance could be decided together. The FAO Country Office

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<sup>1</sup> By **Brahim Amouri**, FAO Consultant, based on **Amouri, B.**, "*Projet TCP/MOR/8926 Appui au Conseil Général du Développement Agricole*", October 2006 (translated from French by I. Waterstone).

played a vital role, and with the help of TCA and SDAR succeeded in creating a strong sense of teamwork among the FAO units.

The recommendations were drawn up systematically and within the timelines set out in the work plan established for the project, and there were no delays in the implementation planning stage. All stakeholders participated in the process. The proposal to prioritize capacity building and training first, by dedicating the second institutional seminar of the CGDA to these, was very wise. It meant that there could be a response to a need that all partners considered essential.

Formulating the recommendations was slow, labour-intensive and participatory. The system of allocating particular topics or themes to individual task forces encouraged a multi-disciplinary approach and helped participants acquire a feeling of ownership of the recommendations. Meetings were held with stakeholders to discuss the content and their participation in putting the recommendations into practice. The dialogue between the CGDA and the other actors was facilitated by the fact that the new President had also been Secretary General of the Ministry. His sense of tact and the respect in which he is held helped to largely avoid conflicts of authority and responsibilities arising between the various partners.

Several members of the CGDA council visited FAO headquarters to familiarize themselves with the methods and procedures for preparing FAO's State of Food and Agriculture (SOFA) and for setting up and maintaining FAO's World Agricultural Information Centre (WAICENT). These missions received institutional support from FAO, through its services and staff responsible for these areas. The dialogue established between the FAO teams and the visiting groups of CGDA council members proved to be effective and mutually rewarding.

### **3. Expertise mobilized by the policy assistance process**

The expertise provided was of a very high level, and good use was made of it through the involvement of senior CGDA personnel (including its president) and the use of mixed teams of national and international consultants. Moreover, in certain areas covered by the project, the CGDA was able to benefit from FAO's experience directly through the staff members in charge of these areas.

The use of international experts as well as national consultants proved to be highly effective in terms of the efficiency of the assistance provided, the quality of input, and efficiency of cost. The national experts were carefully chosen and often came with well-established reputations in their fields of specialization and thus brought their knowledge of the sector and of the decision-making channels in the country. The involvement of senior FAO technical staff (whether in service or retired) as consultants meant that the CGDA experts were able to develop a direct relationship with them, which in turn helped to form the basis for an ongoing, long-term cooperation between the relevant FAO units and the CGDA. (It should be noted here that the majority of the consultants had a reasonably good knowledge of the situation and conditions in Morocco.)

### **4. FAO's policy assistance management**

The project supports and reinforces the efforts undertaken by Morocco of institution building in the Ministry of Agriculture, the cooperative sectors and the chambers of agriculture. FAO had the experience and the expertise in these fields, in addition to in-depth knowledge of conditions in the country. It was therefore clear which divisions needed to become involved in the project.

SDAR was appointed as Lead Technical Unit for the implementation of the project. Other units contributed to this work, in particular TCA. The FAO Representation in Rabat was very actively involved, along with FAO's relevant regional and subregional offices, in a demonstration of well-coordinated teamwork.

On the Moroccan side, the Ministry of Agriculture was in charge of delivering the project, which it tasked to the CGDA. The Minister also proceeded to appoint Engineers and Chief Engineers as members of the CGDA council, and to allocate its financial resources.

The significant support given to the CGDA as part of the project stems from the fact that FAO firmly believes that the CGDA can play an important role in agricultural development in Morocco by carrying out the missions it is tasked with. The support is provided in a coordinated manner by several FAO divisions, often through their own staff members, and is tailored to meet the needs of the CGDA as identified by the latter in agreement with FAO. With respect to FAO headquarters, the Director of TCA acts as the direct contact for the CGDA President and the FAO Representative and is responsible for follow-up on the assistance requested; he also participates in the annual institutional seminars of the CGDA. The Representation has played a fundamental role, especially as it is equally convinced of the importance of the CGDA's role in agricultural policy.

## 5. Lessons learned

Six key recommendations came out of the project, one of which could not be evaluated in this case study, because of insufficient information. Of the remaining five, only one has not yet been implemented, despite the sustained efforts of the CGDA to give it practical substance. The project also had an indirect and very positive impact on the national debate on agricultural policy.

The assistance provided was effective, efficient and of high quality, and both the government and FAO were pleased with the outcome. Work on the project was helped by some very favourable conditions:

- The request for assistance was clear and detailed, and formulated in response to concrete priority needs.
- The new government under the system of political alternation supported the request for assistance, which had been formulated in response to needs identified by the Minister for Agriculture of the preceding government.
- FAO was already engaged in similar institution-building work and the project was thus able to benefit from the experience acquired.
- There is a substantial and sustained dialogue on agricultural policy between the FAO Representative and the Ministry of Agriculture.
- The government values FAO's expertise, and relations between the government and FAO are excellent. The same applies to the cooperation and contacts between high-level personnel of both parties.

These conditions helped FAO adopt an appropriate approach for carrying out the project, one which could properly take into account outside factors potentially affecting the assistance process and the formulation of the recommendations.

However, as noted above, one of the six key recommendations of the project was not adopted. The reason for this is that it was based solely on an analysis of the technical aspects, without taking into account the budgetary implications, the complexity of the organizational and institutional structures involved, and the conflicts of authority and overlapping of responsibilities of the actors concerned. Taking such factors into account is essential, which is why all the participants need to be involved at every stage of the process of formulating recommendations.

Cooperation between the CGDA and FAO, particularly with TCA, continued well beyond the end of the project. This cooperation took a number of forms and covered a number of areas, developing the foundation of an intellectual partnership, which is one of the recommendations of the project. Cooperation includes: the regular participation of the Director of TCA in the annual institutional seminars of the CGDA; FAO support to the CGDA during the negotiations on the free trade area with the United States; and the assistance project currently being prepared for FAO to participate in carrying out the CGDA's current programme of studies. Both parties are working to develop this partnership further by maintaining ongoing dialogue and focusing on agricultural policy issues of interest to both.

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## Annex VIII

### Poland – Polish Rapeseed Sector Review

by Jurek Michalek<sup>1</sup>

#### 1. Policy context

In 2001-2002, economic growth in Poland had slowed down considerably. As a result of newly introduced (trade distortionary) policy instruments, some oilseed crushers claimed to be facing negative protection (i.e. effective taxation) leading to a significant drop in the profitability of the edible oil industry.<sup>2</sup> Crushers felt especially disadvantaged because of decreasing world market prices for export of rapeseed meal, a general economic slowdown and reforms directed towards more free trade in Poland, in particular through the implementation of the Central European Free Trade Agreements (CEFTA). Their economic situation deteriorated when tariffs for certain oil products were reduced in January 2001 and some limited exports of rapeseed were granted subsidies.<sup>3</sup>

The major policy issue from their perspective was to launch action aiming at changing these policies and ensuring that the crushing industry in Poland became profitable again.<sup>4</sup> At the same time other agri-food sectors in Poland were in similar or even worse economic situations (i.e. subject to much more distortionary policies). However, the lack of adequate mechanisms for making comparisons and setting up relevant priorities for FAO policy assistance in Poland resulted in this particular request for assistance being accepted by FAO, although the request did not come from the policy makers' side and was not officially requested by the government.

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was concerned with improving the economic condition of some of its customers, and in particular with one of the major crushing plants to which it had given a large loan. By supporting this project with a relatively small grant, EBRD sought to create an opportunity to: i) undertake the review of the rapeseed sector in Poland; ii) contribute to further modernizing the food industry through continued equity investments; and iii) discontinue some of the most distortionary agricultural/trade policies, such as export subsidies, by presenting to the Polish government their adverse effects on the entire edible oil processing sector.

The policy assistance was provided by the FAO Investment Centre, a division of FAO which is designed to cooperate with financial institutions (World Bank, the International Fund for Agricultural Development and regional banks such as the EBRD in particular). The FAO Investment Centre is partly funded by FAO, and partly funded by partner financial institutions.

#### 2. FAO and the policy assistance process

Following the EBRD, the FAO Investment Centre undertook to conduct a policy assistance activity in the rape seed sector in Poland under the EBRD/FAO Cooperation Programme. The request and project were treated in a standardized manner, along the lines of the 55 similar projects that FAO had implemented in Eastern Europe under the above programme between 1996 and 2006. Project objectives stated that the FAO assistance was to be issue-neutral and expected to take into account the interests of both major stakeholders (i.e. crushers and rapeseed producers).<sup>5</sup> Since there were no

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<sup>1</sup> By **J. Michalek**, University of Kiel, Germany based on **Michalek, J.** Poland Case Studies: "Rapeseed Sector Review" (COOP/POL/P /108030 COOP/POL/P/098310), FAO Rome, 2006.

<sup>2</sup> This opinion was not shared by all edible oil processors, especially by those who imported at this time cheap oil and processed it to other products. Their profitability was at that time rather high.

<sup>3</sup> Interestingly, although none of the proposals made by the FAO project report had been adopted, the economic situation of crushers improved dramatically over the 2003-2005 period. This positive development discouraged the crushing industry from entering into any official co-operation with the Union of rapeseed producers although such dialogue was seen at the time the project as an important step towards improvement of the situation in the rapeseed sector (see: FAO report).

<sup>4</sup> EBRD and Kruszwicka Company were the most active to request the project.

<sup>5</sup> It is unclear why interests of those important stakeholders were granted more attention than that of others such as consumers and taxpayers, given that a potential agreement between two former interest groups would have a negative impact on the latter through an increase of consumer prices.

other projects on the edible oil sector in Poland at the time, FAO considered the policy assistance to be “fully justified”.

According to the project Terms of Reference, the FAO assistance was expected to be implemented within several days. The mission of two international consultants was supposed to last no longer than two weeks and the project report (including recommendations) was to be delivered “no later than two weeks after the experts’ return from Poland”. Furthermore, the project Terms of Reference stated that the report was to be commented on by both FAO and EBRD, which would create an analytical bias in favour of EBRD’s interests, since it had funded one of the stakeholders – the crushers.

As the project had not been officially requested by the government, there was no project terminal statement and no official submission of project report/recommendations to the government. In fact, the original request for this project came from a party which by any terms could not be assessed as issue neutral, i.e. one of the crushing plants. Many of the people interviewed (including policy makers and independent analysts) regarded above the assistance as not justified. In their view, at the time when the project was formulated, there were other agricultural and food sectors exposed to inconsistent and distortionary policies that faced many more severe economic difficulties and required much more attention than the almost completely privatized and relatively well-functioning crushing sector. Retrospectively, many of the people interviewed were surprised by the role FAO played in this exercise. There were some doubts as to whether FAO was not used as an instrument for pursuing specific interests of some groups.

The FAO Policy Assistance Project was implemented during from 2001-2002 in two phases (initially it was to consist of only one phase):

- **Phase I:** Preparation of a “Polish Rapeseed Sector Review”, (2001). Cost: USD 42 000.
- **Phase II:** Organization and participation in two seminars (March 2002 and November 2002). Cost: USD 43 000.

The total cost of the project was borne 70 percent by EBRD and 30 percent by FAO.

The policy recommendations formulated by the FAO consultants during the first phase of the project are considered the most important project output as they “were intended to provide a strategy for the future development of the sector” and “should be considered as a priority by the government.”<sup>6</sup>

The analysis of the level of adoption of the recommendations shows that out of 14 “most important” recommendations, 12 recommendations (86 percent) were not adopted. Moreover, adoption of the two remaining recommendations may have little to do with this project, as they would most probably have been implemented anyway.

Participation of ministry officials during implementation of the first project phase can be described as weak. As there was not an official request for the policy assistance, most of the potentially responsible persons at the ministry were neither aware of the project nor of its report. Officials responsible for liaising with FAO described it as a “no-real project”. However, some consider that the project created an opportunity to initiate a dialogue among the key interest groups (i.e. on direct payments and sectoral implications of Poland’s EU membership) and collect additional arguments which could be used during EU accession negotiations.

Independent policy analysts affiliated with various public research institutes specialized in policy analysis of agriculture and food sectors felt completely ignored by the authors of the FAO report, both during project formulation as well as during analysis of the sector and formulation of policy recommendations. This was a source of concern because, as national policy experts, they were in strong disagreement with the report recommendations. After formal completion of the project, their opinion about the assistance provided by FAO proved to be quite influential.

The majority of people interviewed during the preparation of this case study considered the report (and the entire analysis) as too biased towards preservation of the interests of crushers. National policy

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<sup>6</sup> Polish Rapeseed Sector Review – Executive Summary, p viii.

makers supported the project itself but not its recommendations. Consultations on the side of FAO authors with other parties (e.g. rapeseed producers, ministry officials, independent analysts) regarding an analysis of situation, main conclusions, as well as possible implications and institutional constraints for adoption of recommendations, appeared insufficient. Due to a low priority assigned to the project, policy makers were not particularly interested in a critical assessment of policy recommendations at the time they were formulated. While the project was implemented almost autonomously during the first phase (i.e. without a close consultations with policy makers and policy analysts), involvement of the government during its second phase was much more visible through participation in two seminars. Yet, during the second phase it became quite clear that policy makers viewed the project's recommendations as material for discussion of the future of Polish rapeseed sector after EU accession only, and not as a priority issue itself, which would require more careful consideration.<sup>7</sup>

Several elements of the policy assistance process can be evaluated positively: flexibility, relatively short time frame of its implementation, and a good selection of the main players. Furthermore, the project was implemented according to well-established standards, e.g. rapidly produced policy report supplemented with activities aiming at institutional capacity building. In essence, the *formal* structure and modalities of its implementation were viewed by FAO as adequate.

### 3. Expertise mobilized by the policy assistance process

The project benefited from the services of two international consultants and of national consultants only in the second phase. An agricultural economist from the FAO Investment Centre and a policy officer from the FAO subregional office (Budapest) backstopped the project. The level of expertise was deemed not fully appropriate from a technical perspective.

- In view of interviews conducted with policy makers and independent policy analysts afterwards, the adoption of the project recommendations was not reasonable and professionally not justifiable. Moreover, putting project recommendations into practice had not been seriously considered as it would have brought about *additional* distortions to the economy and violated many existing (EU-compatible) legal rules. It is regrettable that no experienced national consultant had been associated with the early stage of the project, when recommendations were being formulated.
- Many of the experts interviewed highlighted that the analysis carried out was too focused on alleviation of *temporal sectoral instabilities* and disregarded the most important issues, such as mid-term conditions for the rapeseed sector in the perspective of EU accession, which had however been flagged as an important project objective. This, along with little if any consideration for eventual administrative, political and financial consequences of the adoption of the recommendations made, was considered by those interviewed as a serious weakness. Only seminars and discussion of various topics (including presentations by various interest groups) during the second phase of the project were assessed as generally "valuable" by policy makers.<sup>8</sup>

Moreover, the experts selected for the project lacked adequate communication skills that would have enabled them to enhance the level of participation by different interest groups.

It is likely that insufficient knowledge about the topic (CAP and EU policies) and too strong a link to EBRD prevented the FAO Investment Centre's technical officers or the Regional Office involved in the project from actively questioning the report's recommendations. The emphasis was placed more on formal conditions of the policy process (e.g. evidence of contacting various policy stakeholders) than on the quality of the process.

<sup>7</sup> For political reasons, policy makers were at this time pursuing their own agenda, e.g. support of a dialog between the key stakeholders and willing to support any agreement between crushers and rapeseed producers. There was no evidence of any particular support assigned by policy makers to any other recommendation presented in the FAO report.

<sup>8</sup> The especially strong support of crushers and rape seed producers for government's position regarding introduction of EU compatible direct payments was assessed as very positive.

#### 4. Lessons learned

A number of very important lessons were learned from the project and subsequent case study preparation:

- Policy advisory activities on topics that are not a national priority and appear to be strongly associated with particular interests or donors have relatively less chances of having their recommendations implemented.
- When the national capacity exists, nationals can use some results of a policy assistance activity for other purposes that may suit their objectives better than what was initially intended by the assistance provided.
- It is important for policy advisors to understand the local conditions (policy orientation, major objectives pursued by the government and the country at large, interest groups and their views) and the opportunities and constraints these conditions offer for a particular policy advisory activity.
- Applicability should be a central criterion when formulating policy recommendations.

Lessons specific to FAO:

- Generally, all policy assistance projects implemented by FAO should be requested by the government and procedures respected, as well as the principle of government “ownership.” (In this case, it is questionable whether the request for policy assistance initiated by the group of edible oil producers would have been classified as justifiable by FAO had a systematic review of the situation of other agri-food sectors taken place.)
- Given its status as a neutral organization, FAO should pay more attention to the perception of the general public regarding its involvement in projects that could be assessed as biased in favour of the interests of certain groups.
- All policy activities or projects should be very carefully discussed with the government at the initial stage to assure that they will address the most important policy priorities.
  - Policy assistance projects (selection of issues and priority areas) should be planned ahead and not be a surprise to the government.
  - More resources should be provided to carefully plan policy assistance in each FAO member country.
  - External funds provided by donors should be used in a manner suitable to FAO and national priorities.
- Particular attention should be provided to the quality of policy assistance projects, i.e. selection of experts, enough time given for analysis and recommendations and quality backstopping.
- A comprehensive project monitoring and evaluation system should be developed at FAO to track achievements and assess their quality, as well as provide for independent assessments.

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## Annex IX

### Saint Lucia – Assistance in National Fisheries Legislation by Yves Renard<sup>1</sup>

#### 1. Policy context

As a small island nation in the Eastern Caribbean with important fisheries resources, Saint Lucia has taken a strong interest in processes related to the international law of the sea and other international instruments relevant to the sector. At the time of the request for FAO assistance, the Department of Fisheries (DOF) was already engaged in an internal review of its fisheries legislation which, according to the original project document of 2001, “highlighted a number of deficiencies, including: protection of the interests of local fishermen vis-à-vis competing interests in the local waters; stakeholder participation in fisheries management; licensing of sport fishing; absence of a legal framework for the control of aquaculture; the need for control and regulation of fish landing sites and processing establishments; and improvement in the enforcement framework, i.e. measures with respect to registration and marking of vessels.”

The initiative for this policy assistance project that took place in 2001 came directly from the DOF in the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. As expressed by the consultant who provided the policy assistance, “perhaps the most striking aspect of the Saint Lucian fisheries management situation at the moment... is the clear divergence between what is being done in practice in the area of fisheries management and administration and the legal framework established in the Fisheries Act and Fisheries Regulations”.

This short-term policy advice project must be placed against the background of the overall assistance and collaboration FAO has provided to the countries of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) over the past three decades. This in turn should itself be placed within the larger context of the collaboration between the Wider Caribbean region and FAO, primarily under the auspices of the Western Central Atlantic Fisheries Commission (WECAFC). FAO’s continuous involvement can be attributed to three main considerations:

- The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) began its work in 1973, giving states additional jurisdiction over fisheries resources adjacent to their coasts, with major implications for fisheries policy and operations. FAO was committed to assist its Member States in meeting these new responsibilities.
- FAO and its member states saw the need to promote fisheries monitoring, control and surveillance as critical requirements for effective conservation, management and development.
- Fisheries management and development were seen as important channels to achieve food security, especially in small-island developing states.

Within this overall context, the main steps and features of FAO’s collaboration with Saint Lucia and the rest of the region in the field of fisheries policy should be briefly described. Work on fisheries legislation in the region started in the early 1980s, with contributions of FAO and of several Canadian institutions, especially the Dalhousie Ocean Studies Programme, which provided a comprehensive framework for the development and management of the fisheries sector. At that time, FAO sponsored and convened a series of three regional workshops to develop the fisheries legislation for the OECS, involving fisheries personnel and representatives from the legal departments of the various governments concerned. The workshops resulted in the adoption of new fisheries legislation in most of the countries and territories of the OECS.

Soon after, in response to specific demands from the sub-region and in recognition of the specific conditions of the small island states of the eastern Caribbean, WECAFC established its Committee for the Development and Management of Fisheries in the Lesser Antilles, commonly known as the Lesser

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<sup>1</sup> By **Yves Renard**, FAO Consultant, based on **Renard, Y.**, Saint Lucia Case Study: “Assistance in Fisheries Legislation” (TCP/STL/0165), FAO, Rome October 2006.



Antilles Committee, which held its first meeting in Saint Lucia in May 1983. All these efforts in fisheries development and marine resource management were receiving full political backing at the time.

Following this initial phase, FAO remained directly involved in fisheries policy and legislation processes throughout the region. In Saint Lucia, a first FAO-sponsored review took place in 1991 and another in 1996, which were motivated primarily by the need to ensure that the national policy instruments were consistent with the new international policy framework. The next main FAO activity in fisheries policy that was of direct relevance to Saint Lucia was the conduct of the policy assistance mission of 2001, which is the focus of this case study.

## 2. FAO and the policy assistance process

As previously mentioned, the initiative for this policy assistance project came directly from the DOF. The objective, as stated in the original project document, was “to support the internal review of fisheries legislation”. The project thus aimed at inserting itself in, and contributing to, an ongoing process of legal review driven and implemented by the country and its national institutions.

The expected outputs of the project were to:

- discuss and comment on the work being undertaken by the DOF to review, revise and update its legislation;
- translate all comments into legislative amendments to the current legislation, as appropriate;
- assess the requirements for legislative amendments to implement the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and the FAO Compliance Agreement;
- provide on-the-job training on drafting national legislation;
- discuss the provisions of the draft legislation with fishing industry stakeholders.

## 3. FAO’s expertise

The impact of FAO’s policy work on the fisheries sector in Saint Lucia and the rest of the region are of course too broad and too numerous to mention here, but it is possible to identify the main areas of expertise and achievement.

Over the years, FAO has provided a forum where policy issues could be identified and debated, without necessarily prescribing solutions or instruments, but creating the conditions for these issues to be addressed. The forums have been made possible principally through WECAFC and its Lesser Antilles Committee, but also through the working parties, the *ad hoc* working groups and the various thematic workshops. Most of FAO’s work in the field of fisheries policy is not directly aimed at defining the contents of policy in the Caribbean, as this is clearly the domain of national governments and regional inter-governmental bodies, but its work provides the background information and the analyses needed for policy formulation, and encourages policy debate.

A less tangible but nevertheless very important output of FAO’s involvement in fisheries policy in the region has been the strengthening of local capacity and “local policy voice”. This has been achieved in a variety of ways, through formal training programmes, exchanges, study tours and other forms of knowledge and information dissemination.

While being supportive of local agendas, FAO has been an implicit and explicit advocate of regional approaches, and has provided tangible support in this direction to regional institutions. FAO has also helped countries of the region, and the region as a whole, to enforce global policies and apply global instruments. In some respects, FAO has helped the region to fulfil its commitment to behave as a responsible global citizen, and to play an active role in global fora, in spite of the small size and limited capacities of these countries. FAO’s work on global policy has remained fully consistent with national and regional conditions and priorities. Indeed of the most significant impacts and outputs of FAO’s policy work in the fisheries sector in the region has been the facilitation of a complex, multi-dimensional process that has helped to build a very solid and coherent policy framework. FAO has contributed very directly to the definition and adoption of instruments of policy implementation. This is undoubtedly the most tangible set of outputs that has been delivered.

#### **4. FAO management**

The resources allocated to the project were:

- Four weeks of a legal expert provided by the FAO
- One workshop with fishing industry stakeholders
- Time of local counterparts and other participants estimated at 3 person-months.

The original time frame of the mission was March – May 2001. A draft final report was released within this time frame, and submitted to local counterparts for review and comments. On the basis of these comments, the final report was submitted in September 2001. Following receipt of the final version of the report, the DOF continued the process of legal review, and one officer was assigned to gather comments and coordinating the inputs from all members of staff.

#### **5. Lessons learned**

##### **Linking national, regional and global processes**

This case study demonstrated that policy assistance interventions are most effective when they occur in a broader framework where policy issues are identified and debated and policy options are considered. It also showed that policy assistance can be a suitable means for linking national and regional policies and processes to the international policy context, and demonstrating to countries the relevance of the international context.

In this context, policy assistance constituted a mechanism to link global and local policy and the wide range of actors involved. This places an organization such as FAO in the challenging role of facilitator, having to balance the need for impartiality with a commitment to promote and support specific policy objectives. This study suggests that this role is best performed by putting issues on the agenda and options on the table, instead of imposing specific solutions, and by providing the moments and the spaces where policy issues and directions can be discussed and explored.

At the same time, in the Caribbean, the regional approach to fisheries policy is particularly important because national policies alone are unable to deal with shared resources and issues. Moreover, regional policy helps to pool and exchange technical expertise and experiences. It also validates and supports national policy and gives it more weight on the international scene.

##### **Coordination**

Coordination of policy and development assistance is highly desirable. In the fisheries sector in the Caribbean, coordination has been effective and beneficial due to a number of factors and actions by FAO, including:

- The use of WECAFC as a mechanism for exchange of information and harmonisation of policies.
- FAO's participation in activities and processes led and sponsored by other organizations.
- Provision of explicit and implicit support to the strengthening of regional institutions and their roles as coordinators and facilitators.

##### **Design and implementation**

When designing and implementing policy assistance, continuity is important, particularly in terms of the people, who should share a long-term vision of what fisheries management and development should be, develop and use an intimate knowledge of local issues, processes and actors, and be able to link various interventions, provide follow-up and place actions within a larger context.

In this regard, it is also important to involve a mix of local and external experts. Policy assistance is far more effective when it combines local relevance with external validation, when it allows external consultants to participate in and contribute to local institutions and processes, and when it also gives local experts the opportunity to participate in external and global processes. Moreover, it is always to

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select people with the right combination of technical skills, experience, ability to communicate and legitimacy to provide advice in a given policy environment.

### **Some guidelines**

In the design and implementation of policy assistance interventions, a number of simple guidelines emerged:

- It is desirable to assess the status of implementation of past recommendations, and the reasons for non-implementation when applicable, before making more recommendations.
- Attention should be paid to the quality of the request and to the process through which the request is formulated, as a policy assistance initiative can be much more effective if the key actors are given the opportunity to contribute to its design.
- The rapidity of a response to a request for policy assistance is critical, but it must be applied without compromising on quality.
- The duration of a policy process is important.
- The use of concrete examples to support policy advice is always beneficial, as it is easier for the recipients of policy assistance to use the experience of another country rather than deal with an issue in abstraction.
- Regardless of the length of time and type of process used, recommendations have a better chance of being adopted when they are accompanied with a plan of action.
- It is always better to allow recommendations and conclusions to emerge from local processes.
- Policy-making is a multi-dimensional and inter-sectoral process, and the policy process is a cyclical one. Institutions delivering policy assistance need to understand that cycle and ensure that their interventions, which are typically linear and punctual, can be inserted into complex policy cycles and processes.
- Countries prefer to define their own policy goals and objectives; they do not always welcome international assistance in defining the *content* of development policy. At the same time, in some instances it can be desirable for an organization such as the FAO to be forceful in advocating the need for a statement of policy objectives.
- FAO's policy assistance has been less concerned with the policy processes, and this may be a weakness, as countries would benefit from more targeted and intensive efforts aimed at building their internal capacity for policy reform and development and at enhancing the quality and effectiveness of the processes they use.

## Annex X

### Serbia – Institutional Development and Capacity Building for the National Forest Program of Serbia

by Tanya Alfredson<sup>1</sup>

#### 1. Policy context

In 2001, after decades of quasi-communist rule, civil war, economic sanctions and international isolation, the Republic of Serbia faced a devastated national economy. Its capacities in education, technology and the private sector were deteriorated and its infrastructures anachronistic. Popular defeat of President Milosevic in the 2000 national elections ushered in a series of shifts in the domestic and international political context. A new national agenda of institutional reform and modernization reflected the mood of a population that was eager to break with the past, overcome crippling poverty, and resurrect its standing with the world.

Although the forestry sector accounted for only 0.03 percent of Serbia's Gross Domestic Product (2001), forest land occupies 27 percent of Serbian territory. Between 1990 and 2001, foreign exchange earnings from Serbian wood product exports had fallen from USD 195 million to USD 30 million. Reforestation rates, administration and forestry management practices had also drastically declined. The forestry sector provides employment opportunities for rural Serbian populations with few other prospects for income generation, supplies fuel and non-timber products for household consumption and sale, and contributes to the aesthetic and recreational resources of the nation. Although nearly 50 percent of Serbian forests are privately owned, plots are small and scattered, administrative services to the private forests are poor and wood quality very low. These deteriorated conditions reflect the economic hardship of the country as a whole, but are also the result of an institutionalized neglect of private forests. The new government's national strategic agenda, which included transition to a market economy and entrance into the EU as key objectives, created pressure on public officials to rectify the historic neglect of this sector. The Serbian government requested FAO assistance in establishing a modern forestry administration equipped to compete in a market oriented economy.

The FAO Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) project *Development and Capacity Building for The National Forest Programme of Serbia (TCP/YUG/2902(A))* was the first internationally sponsored development project in the Republic of Serbia after the removal of UN sanctions. FAO assistance was requested to help establish a modern forestry administration and was delivered in two phases. In the first phase, international consultants conducted an exploratory mission to understand challenges facing the sector. Their recommendations for further assistance were presented in an inception report in December 2001. The second phase evolved from a project proposal and was funded at USD 301 000 over 20 months. The stated objectives were to:

- Draft a forestry policy and strategy for the forest sector.
- Revise the existing forestry law or draft new legislation harmonized with other national legislation and recent international agreements, conventions and resolutions relevant to forestry.
- Design a self-reliant forestry institutional framework capable of providing leadership for sustainable development of the sector, including private forestry development.
- Strengthen national capacities for policy and programme development.

Five TCP recommendations were analysed for this case study. The recommendations and their status of implementation at the time of review are as follows:

1. Develop public participation in the forestry sector organized on all levels and including all stakeholder groups. (*Successfully implemented*)
2. Develop private forestry cooperatives and associations. (*Partially implemented*)

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<sup>1</sup> By **Jean Balié** from the Serbia Case study on Lesson learning in policy assistance by **Tanya Alfredson**, November 2006.

3. Draft a new national forestry strategy based on participation and in harmony with European guidelines. (*Implemented after the project*)
4. Draft a new Forestry Law harmonized at all levels: international (European) and national (across sectors and with the Forestry policy). (*Not implemented*)
5. Develop state trade policy to encourage domestic production by cutting customs duties for imported wood processing machinery and equipment. (*Not implemented*)

## 2. FAO's design of the policy assistance process

The effectiveness of the policy assistance process in Serbia was influenced by a number of factors:

- It originated with a Serbian request and the project's effectiveness benefited from this demand driven process.
- It was delivered at an opportune political moment, when the national mood was one of eagerness for broad reform and the international context was favourable. This could be seen as an example of a policy window.
- The expertise and thoroughness of the exploratory mission was an important first step in creating a solid understanding of the issues facing the sector and for setting a positive tone for later FAO/client government interactions based on trust and respect.
- Initiatives benefited when assistance was well timed and sequenced.
- Other successes could be attributed to the ability of team leaders to work across problems and to tie together resources and achievements synergistically.
- Adoption of recommendations was facilitated when FAO experts were able to convey how the recommendation helped to address individual stakeholder interests and concerns.
- Contacts with bilateral donors established during the course of the TCP were instrumental for sustaining needed funding for follow-up efforts.

However, the project faced a number of significant contextual and logistical challenges. The Serbian leadership's stated strategic objectives of achieving accession to the EU and of transitioning to a market-oriented economy created strong incentives throughout the government to adopt international standards and practices and to promote cooperative approaches that facilitated FAO's efforts to develop participative processes. On the other hand, a dearth of national experience with participatory policy making, including an absence of supporting institutional or legal frameworks, made the first two recommendations completely innovative, and created many challenges for implementation.

The primary challenges coming from the national context related to the adoption of the third recommendation and included poor pre-existing communication both between the sectors and within the forestry sector itself, and widespread lack of information or access to bad information upon which to build stakeholder dialogue on a new forestry strategy. Factors which facilitated adoption of recommendations included the existence of a pro-reform government and the presence of highly supportive and forward thinking persons in the ministry who were eager to enhance the productivity of the sector and bring it into step with developments in the international arena.

The fact that there was a lack of clear vision at the ministry of what the forestry law should look like also represented a major challenge for the project. In addition, because domestic laws in many sectors were under revision, the task of creating forestry laws (fourth recommendation) that were harmonized with other national laws was also very difficult and sometimes logistically impossible. This was compounded by the existence of inconsistent international legal frameworks.

The fifth recommendation does not appear to have ever been afforded high priority within the project, which tended to focus on more macro-level concerns. The recommendation was informed by members of the private sector, who wanted more direct support from the Serbian government, but failed to take into account the view of government and the majority of stakeholders that the proposed mechanism (cutting customs duties) was not a realistic option given the lack of national resources and the prevailing attitudes of policy makers. The recommendation was never viewed as politically viable and no substantial effort to change this perception appears to have been made. At the same time, other recommendations to enhance government support for the private sector by, for example, increasing state investment in forestry roads, equipment and training, appeared more promising.

Therefore, the main question is why this recommendation was made if it was neither perceived as a priority nor sufficiently supported by bringing in convincing arguments and generating stakeholder approval.

### **3. Expertise mobilized by the policy assistance process**

Expertise is a valuable commodity in the process of creating stakeholder confidence in FAO's recommendations. An essential feature of FAO assistance was the ability of FAO international consultants to work closely with national consultants, including sub-recommendations to tailor approaches to stakeholder groups. Project consultants won the confidence of Serbian government officials, and ultimately the quality and credibility of the provided expertise helped build trust. Specifically, it was noted by numerous national participants that the high-level profile of selected experts helped establish the credibility and authority of subsequent activities and eventually FAO programmes. The involvement of the senior consultant was vital to the success of the recommendations and of the project in general. He was described on multiple occasions as an inspirational figure who could be recognized as an authority figure. His expertise and ability to capture an understanding of the Serbian experience earned him respect and confidence, which were key factors in the positive reception of many of the recommendations.

The effects of inadequate technical knowledge and expertise in the area of forestry law were one of the main explanations for the non-adoption of the fourth recommendation. Participants in the working group for a new forestry law complained that the legal work of the national consultants failed to provide the guidance needed. (The adoption of fourth recommendation also suffered from understaffing in general.)

### **4. FAO's policy assistance management**

Project management, planning and conflict management skills are important to successful policy assistance. Technical assistance should include assistance geared towards ensuring the sustainability of proposed initiatives. FAO project staff cultivated relationships with bilateral donors during the TCP portion of the project. A successor project under FAO/Finnish government direction called "Forest Sector Development in Serbia" (GCP/FRY/003/FIN) continued to provide activities to reinforce gains made under the initial assistance effort. On the other hand, frequent personnel changes at an early stage of the project interfered with assistance process.

When the project faced a dearth of legal expertise and conflict among team members from different disciplines, management could have been better at providing supervision of relatively inexperienced national experts, supporting the steering committee and playing a more pro-active role in intra-team conflict resolution.

Greater staffing levels on the project would also have enabled the team to provide additional support to private owners that would have improved the pace and rate of success.

Lastly, consultants and members of the ministry expressed frustration with FAO procedures. For instance, the view was frequently expressed that institutional procedures related to FAO communications, resource allocations and staffing slowed down progress on the project and created a negative image of the organization.

### **5. Lessons learned**

Although not all recommendations examined were fully adopted in the course of the project, for the most part they made important contributions to the national policy dialogue, helped to better illustrate domestic challenges, and in many cases continued to be addressed in the national debate and bilateral assistance projects. A number of important lessons emerged:

***Relationship-building as a foundation for effective policy assistance.*** It was felt by many members of the Serbian government team that FAO's cultivation of positive working relationships with key figures at the ministry was an important ingredient in the project's successes. Many persons interviewed felt these efforts helped to build confidence in key FAO staff. The Serbian case suggests

that this confidence is an important pre-requisite for an effective assistance process and a healthy policy dialogue.

**The importance of timing and sequencing of policy assistance strategies.** FAO's work in Serbia underscores that successful adoption of policy recommendations requires support not only from policy makers and authorities, but also from intended beneficiaries. A sequencing of assistance efforts, beginning with stakeholder education and early involvement of key government figures, proved effective. Flexibility in timing is also important, especially with respect to participation. Although implementation efforts went beyond the scheduled end date, stakeholders agreed that the delays were necessary to create ownership of the finished product. The trade-off was viewed unanimously as an acceptable one.

**The need for contingency planning** when sequencing does not fall as anticipated. For example, due to delays in the adoption of a national forestry strategy the FAO/DF drafting team began drafting a new forestry law before a national forestry strategy had even been created. The project would have greatly benefited if it had been able to bring in additional legal assistance quickly and at an early stage of the process, in order to compensate for these conditions.

**Realistic communication strategies.** Challenges related to communications (phone, internet, road accessibility) often constrained the technical assistance process, especially in disseminating information on pre-existing laws (and drafts). Communication infrastructures should be well understood in advance of project start-up so that adequate communication strategies can be devised at the outset of programmes.

**The essential role of strong and committed national counterparts.** Leadership from the ministry gave strong support to the recommendations. A supportive Director of the Directorate of Forests also played a facilitative role to win support for the process. The project team understood that involvement of top-level decision makers would be essential, even though the time constraints they faced would make it harder to involve them in workshops and trainings.

**Capacity building activities as an essential component of assistance.** Project staff provided ministry staff and rural communities with conflict management techniques, which helped them overcome long-standing conflicts that had been a barrier to association.

**Creating linkages within and among project components.** Implementation of the first recommendation laid a crucial foundation for the second (creation of Private Forest Owner Associations). Stakeholders and FAO staff benefited from previous training in project management and were able to apply the acquired skills to their work with private foresters. Similarly, the degree of stakeholder receptiveness was partially due to preparations made during previous phases.

**Cost-benefit analyses.** Cost-benefit analyses should be considered as an additional tool in the assessment and planning stages of the project to help consultants concentrate their final set of recommendations on those with the highest probability of success, given available domestic resources.

**Proper oversight.** Project coordinators and team leaders should be held accountable for providing needed oversight. More on-site presence by the team leader and greater involvement of existing national capacity would have greatly improved outcomes.

**Streamlining FAO procedures.** There is a need to streamline FAO procedures (hiring, authorizations, timely payments) so that country offices may adapt to local conditions with greater flexibility and less delay.

## Annex XI

### Sierra Leone – Agriculture Sector Review and Agriculture Development Strategy

by Fatoumata Jawara<sup>1</sup>

#### 1. Policy context

Located in West Africa, Sierra Leone is endowed with abundant natural resources but remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with an estimated 80 percent of its more than 5 million inhabitants living below the poverty line. An 11-year civil war between 1990 and 2001 precipitated wanton destruction of the country's infrastructure, displaced half of the population and exacerbated the incidence of poverty, hunger and malnutrition.

After a period of introspection about the factors that led to the outbreak of war, the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) and the international community took steps to promote peace and stability, restructure and decentralize government institutions, tackle corruption, poverty and hunger and resuscitate the economy. Although some players within the policy community articulated that reviving and transforming the agriculture sector was crucial in the process of reconstruction, its importance was woefully sidelined during the formulation of the 2001 Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP).

It was against this backdrop that the National Policy Advisory Committee of Sierra Leone (a think tank) and FAO formally encouraged the GoSL to place agriculture at the centre of its transformation and economic development strategy. The government responded after the general elections in 2002, when President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah unveiled a bold commitment to food security and the right to food, and pledged that "no Sierra Leonean should go to bed hungry by 2007" during his inaugural address to the nation.

The context in which the FAO project operated was constituted by favourable and unfavourable elements to its implementation.

Favourable elements included:

- The President's pledge, which helped to focus minds within the policy.
- The good reputation of FAO in the country as a trusted adviser and advocate in government policy circles.

Unfavourable elements included:

- The weakness of human resources capacity at the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MAFS) regarding food security policy coordination, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, especially at mid-management levels; and low retention of experienced staff.
- Bureaucratic constraints on resource allocation by the Ministry of Finance for the implementation of policy objectives. This budget programming process also tends to often overlook the seasonal nature of agricultural programmes.
- Donor representatives based in Sierra Leone were concerned about working with MAFS, due to accountability concerns, which was a serious constraint for using funds available for agriculture programmes.

Of mixed influence was the government's burgeoning decentralization and restructuring activities. Triggered by shifts in policy thinking, these activities could potentially improve governance systems; on the other hand, they could significantly put the brakes on policy adoption and implementation processes in some sub-sectors (notably the forestry sub-sector).

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<sup>1</sup> By **Materne Maetz**, Policy Assistance Division, FAO, based on **Jawara, F.**, Lesson learning in policy assistance Country Case study Sierra Leone, Agriculture Sector Review and Agriculture Development Strategy, FAO, October 2006.



## **2. FAO and the policy assistance process**

UN agencies and FAO in particular took advantage of the policy window opened by the President's speech by dispatching a high-level mission to Sierra Leone in 2002 in order to seek ways of fulfilling the pledge. During the consultations, the possibility of launching a comprehensive Agriculture Sector Review (ASR) project and organizing a Right to Food Symposium were discussed.

Meanwhile, the MAFS produced a Medium-Term Agricultural Strategy document for food security with assistance from academics at N'jala University in Sierra Leone, the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA) in Nigeria, and FAO Sierra Leone. The document was subsequently presented to the World Bank for funding support. Although it highlighted the key areas in the sector requiring attention, it fell short of providing requisite background studies to inform a long-term development strategy and the forthcoming PRSP. The ASR supported by the project analysed here, which took place between April and October 2003, filled the gaps in the MAFS strategy document by providing in-depth information on the status of the agriculture and fisheries sectors, identifying investment options required for the transformation of the entire sector and enabling a sufficient incorporation of food security and agriculture into the PRSP.

World Bank, IFAD and UNDP joined FAO and GoSL as implementing partners. The process began in earnest after the first Right to Food Symposium in Sierra Leone in May 2003. A multidisciplinary team of 20 international consultants and 18 national counterparts were involved in what turned out to be a complex operation. A National Steering Committee chaired by the Deputy, MAFS, was established to provide general oversight of the activities of the team, and an international team leader and one national team leader were appointed to coordinate the activities of the sub-sector specialists and their local counterparts.

As a result, the ASR produced policy recommendations and options, along with proposals for pre-investment and investment projects, which fed directly into Sierra Leone's PRSP, produced in 2005. Counterparts saw also their capacity strengthened.

Methods used to shape policy recommendations included: reviews of existing government policies; surveys and diagnostic studies; and interviews and consultations with stakeholders (including farmers). These methods ensured a good degree of ownership of the recommendations by national stakeholders. On the whole, the dialogue process was well executed. Original policy ideas were born of the exchange of regional and international experiences between the ASR participants and the findings contained in the diagnostic studies. The fact that the ASR took place before the much-anticipated National Census meant that it missed out on a useful source of up-to-date information.

However, at the time of review, the ASR documents had still not been formally launched. Although draft versions of the documents were available to the ASR participants after wrap-up, dissemination of the final version of the documents occurred only in June/July 2006, which was considered late by some of the persons interviewed for this case study. Despite this, the outputs of the ASR are being used by many as reference material. Demand for the documents by those respondents who did not participate was high. Suggestions were made that a wider cross-section of stakeholders should receive copies, especially the District Directors of Agriculture, non-governmental organizations, universities and parliamentarians.

## **3. Expertise mobilized by the policy assistance process**

As mentioned earlier, the ASR was conducted by a multidisciplinary team of 20 international consultants and 18 national counterparts coordinated by one international and one national coordinator. An international research specialist developed the research methodology for the sub-sectors, the institutions specialist was charged with carrying out a survey of the relevant institutions and a project analyst joined the team to prepare the synthesis report and edit the findings. Other experts worked on special issues such as Gender and Sociology, Food Safety Nets, Community and Farmer-based Organizations and the Right to Food.

National counterparts were primarily tasked with infusing local knowledge and experience in the respective subject areas and supporting the international team during the research, dialogue and

policy formulation processes. However, a good number were unable to fulfil their supportive roles effectively, as the level of expertise of ASR national counterparts selected by GoSL ranged from very poor to good.

Participants (including the national team leader) have commended the quality of work produced for the crops sub-sector by the international Agronomy specialist of FAO. Contributions from the Land Tenure, Right to Food, Food Safety Nets, Agricultural Extension, Agricultural Research and Marketing and Trade specialists from FAO were judged as being among the best. However, contributions from the Rural Finance, Community and Farmer-based Organizations, Forestry and Gender and Social Aspects specialists fell below expectations.

Moreover, disappointing performances by the international team leader and the project analyst affected the process and outcome of the project and prolonged the wrap-up phase.<sup>2</sup> A more versatile and proactive international team leader would have enhanced the quality levels of some of the technical documents.

Despite some shortcomings, which were mitigated through replacements and reassignments of tasks to other team members as the project unfolded,<sup>3</sup> it is the general opinion that the presence in post-conflict Sierra Leone of a large multidisciplinary team of international specialists was a morale-boosting experience for national counterparts. The diversity of skills and the level of knowledge-sharing contributed to achieving positive results for the project.

#### **4. FAO policy assistance management**

The time frame and arena for the project appear to have been appropriate, although there were concerns about time management once the process began. In particular, some international specialists left before completing their tasks. Also, international specialists arrived at different times as the project unfolded, causing planning and coordination bottlenecks. ASR participants interviewed during the preparation of this case study felt that these issues limited the amount of time spent on substantive and procedural discussions in a team setting. Some felt that the team was simply too large for effective coordination; others considered that effective project management rather than team size was the core problem of the Sierra Leone ASR.

The lack of financial compensation of national counterparts as promised through a prior “gentleman’s agreement” caused some discontent in the national team. Promising financial compensation to national counterparts does not seem to be good practice as their services are an integral part of the government’s contributions to the policy assistance project and thus FAO is not obliged to make financial compensation other than daily subsistence allowances during periods of travel. These issues should be clarified at the outset, to avoid lingering misunderstandings that can compromise the working atmosphere.

#### **5. Lessons learned**

As pointed out by an official from the Planning Evaluation Monitoring and Statistics Division of MAFS, “For every major policy shift it is always necessary to conduct a thorough situational analysis...the ASR was able to deliver on that front.” The project indisputably churned out a vast array of policy recommendations for the short and long term in the various sectors and sub-sectors. And they have been widely adopted.

*The key positive lesson which could be drawn from the Sierra Leone case study is the importance of gauging the national policy mood and aligning intervention strategies accordingly. Other important lessons are described below.*

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<sup>2</sup> According to a number of ASR team members the international Team Leader under-performed as manager of the ASR project, could not synthesize ASR material for the main report, and left prematurely. The international Co-team Leader subsequently assumed wrap-up and other tasks.

<sup>3</sup> One specialist was replaced during the process and reassignments were necessary in cases where international specialists left before completing their tasks and/or draft technical reports.

**Quality of specialists' contributions.** As with any project of this magnitude, the calibre of specialists varied and so did the quality (background information, clarity and originality of recommendations, etc.) of the technical documents they produced. Sierra Leone was reeling from the effects of a devastating conflict, and a good number of national counterparts could not fulfil their supportive roles effectively. Therefore, there was a need for FAO to be extra vigilant in making sure that the selected specialists were adequately briefed and had some experience working in complex environments before the launch of the project.

**Ownership of the process.** Establishing a National Steering Committee, widening the policy dialogue circle and linking the project with the PRSP cemented ownership of the process and outcomes of the project.

**Project follow-up.** It is critical to ensure that project monitoring and follow-up plans are in place, preferably before the launch of the project. These issues were not adequately addressed and thus had some negative effects on the project outcome.

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## Annex XII

### South Africa – Formulation of an Integrated Food Security and Nutrition Programme in South Africa

by Colin Mc Carthy<sup>1</sup>

#### 1. Policy context

At the national level, South Africa does not face a problem of food insecurity. However, at micro-level, household and intra-household food insecurity and malnutrition are prevalent because of constraints in access to adequate food supplies as well as deficiencies in nutrition. This can causally be linked to poverty and unemployment, which means that addressing the problem of food insecurity and poor nutrition cannot be the domain of a single government agency or resolved through one single policy measure. A multi-faceted approach is required that covers efforts by all levels of government, and policy coordination therefore becomes extremely important. It is this need that brought about the request for FAO assistance in formulating an **Integrated Food Security and Nutrition Programme** (IFSNP) for South Africa.

The Government of South Africa made a request for FAO support, and in March 2003 the project (TCP/SAF/2903) was approved and subsequently launched in July 2003. As a Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) project, it was destined to run through a defined project cycle starting with a request for assistance addressed to the Director-General of FAO; the appraisal of the project at different levels of FAO; the approval of the project by the Director-General of FAO; the signing of a project agreement with the government; and the implementation and monitoring of the project jointly by FAO and relevant national institutions. The final phase is completion and follow-up, signalled by a terminal statement or concluding letter from FAO to the government. This is followed, one year later, by a report to FAO headquarters and the government by the national institutions concerned and the FAO Representative in which the follow-up as well as catalytic impact of the project are reviewed.

The project analysed here was aborted before the final stage could be reached. Consequently, the research methodology and report design for this case study could not analyse policy effectiveness in terms of the adoption and implementation of policy assistance recommendations. Rather, the study focused on the process of the project to identify the principal events in the implementation leading to the eventual breakdown, the causes of the termination, and the management of the breakdown itself.

The research method adopted consisted of desk research of selected publications and all project documents; structured interviews with a number of South African government officials, researchers and FAO staff; and electronic correspondence with FAO personnel in particular. The objective of the case study was to learn lessons from a process that failed to produce an outcome and recommendations that the Government of South Africa could either implement or not implement. It also sought to reach some conclusions as to how termination could have been avoided.

#### 2. Causes of failure<sup>2</sup>

Although the “exogenous/endogenous” categorization specified for the lesson-learning exercise could not be used to analyse a terminated project, the distinction between exogeneity and endogeneity provided a useful reference to evaluate the process and the reasons for the project’s failure.

##### **Lack of government cooperation**

All research indicates that the principal cause of the project’s failure was the ineffectual participation of the government. The FAO officials and consultants who worked on the project were unable to obtain the necessary commitment, cooperation and input from the government officials concerned. It was precisely this lack of commitment and cooperation that led to the suspension of project activities

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<sup>1</sup> By **Colin McCarthy**, FAO consultant, based on **McCarthy, C.**, Case Study: Formulation of an Integrated Food Security and Nutrition Programme in South Africa (Ref: TCP/SAF/2903), FAO, November 2006.

<sup>2</sup> Since the project was aborted, the purpose and structure of this case study differ from those of the others.

and subsequently to an effort to resuscitate it, which in turn brought forth no national response and cooperation. It would seem that the project just faded away.

Why did national cooperation not materialize? Some of the explanations offered can be regarded as speculative, but they are at least informed speculation.

- One explanation, offered by an FAO official, is that the FAO staff and consultants did not fully understand the internal dynamics of the Department of Agriculture (DoA) and the protocol procedures required, i.e. the right buttons to press and people to contact to move matters forward.
- Government departments in South Africa are still in a process of post-apartheid transformation, which could explain the high staff turnover that affected the project.
- The project was an adjunct of policies already in place. Assistance was sought to integrate existing strategies; the element of urgency expected of a TCP project was absent. Discussions also revealed the possibility that FAO, specifically the Director-General, might have attached higher priority to having the project on board as a TCP project than what applied in the mind of the South African authorities.
- The current (2006) FAO Representative in South Africa emphasized that by 2004 the project had been overtaken by events, specifically the National Medium Term Investment Programmes that exist as part of the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme, which in turn is a NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa's Development) initiative. It was asserted that FAO's eventual effort to resuscitate the project did not receive much reaction because of that larger programme. Currently, one of these "major programmes" is the FAO-supported Special Programme for Food Security, which is strongly supported by the Director General of the DoA.
- The lack of enthusiasm and hence cooperation, compared to the situation found in other African countries, can be ascribed to the fact that South Africa is not a borrowing country. In South Africa the intention to borrow is not a factor that encourages cooperation with international development agencies and consultants. It has also been pointed out by FAO and government officials that since South Africa has substantial academic and research capacity, the view in some official circles is that national capacity exists to do the work offered by international agencies.

Two other explanations have also been raised. The first is the relative weak position of the DoA within the ministerial Social Cluster. This is difficult to assess, and while it could be true it does not logically explain a lack of cooperation. It could affect the output of the project and the acceptance and implementation of recommendations, but not the management of the project. The second explanation was offered by a government official who saw a reason for failure in the difference in FAO and government expectations. It is not clear what these differences are, and furthermore, they should have surfaced and been addressed when TCP assistance was requested and the Project Agreement concluded.

### **Divergent views within FAO**

Research indicated that divergent views on the project also existed within FAO, specifically between the Policy Assistance Division and the Field Operations Division. Some divergence had to do with the relation between the IFSNP and the Special Programme on Food Security managed by the Special Programmes Management and Coordination Service within the Field Operations Division. This might have had an important impact on the ability of FAO to respond to and interact in a proper fashion with the government. However, an FAO executive responded that he does not recall any divergence of views between the two FAO divisions on the design and implementation of the project. He also mentioned that the Field Operations Division was a member of the task force in charge of implementing the project and ensuring consistency between the activities of the two divisions in South Africa. The divisions joined efforts to reactivate the initiative when the government's interest seemed to be fading, and both divisions shared the same objective and strategy in efforts to obtain a higher commitment from the DoA.

## **3. Lessons learned**

The analysis of the demise of an approved project can produce lessons which are as important as those derived from projects that have successfully run the full cycle of implementation. The first

operational objective of any approved policy assistance project must be to produce a final outcome in the form of recommendations based on rigorous investigation. The project must run its course to completion; termination represents a waste of financial and human resources.

By definition, FAO has no control over exogenous forces that can bring about the termination of projects. From an endogenous perspective, however, it can consider internal mechanisms, procedures and management systems that can avoid elements of systemic failures in managing projects. But equally important is the need to develop procedures that will allow FAO to address operational problems caused by exogenous factors, and if a project cannot be rescued, to manage its termination in a properly recorded way.

Some general and specific lessons can be learned from the termination of the project.

### **The importance of institutions**

Institutions are important when policy assistance and implementation are considered, and the failure of a project can to a large extent be ascribed to institutional factors. Organizations that have to play by the rules are served by people, who, in the context of FAO-government relationships, are the civil servants that work at all levels of government. This means that institutional failure can be brought about by the failure of administrators and managers to obey the rules of interaction. FAO is also an organization that has to play by the rules and is also exposed to the failure of officers to play by them.

### **The need for fall-back positions**

Pre-emptive arrangements need to be built into the operational framework of TCP projects, especially if project termination has occurred before it has been fully implemented. In this case study, signals of a lack of government cooperation surfaced relatively early into the project, and the TCP operational framework should have provided for such an eventuality with prescribed action recorded in the Project Agreement. The very least that is required is an operational guide on how, under what conditions, and when, a project is to be terminated formally before it has completed the full cycle. The operational framework provides for terminal statements or concluding letters for completed projects, but there does not seem to be a provision for an official "project termination" report. In addition, a study of FAO documentation did not reveal that the existing Field Programme Management Information System (FPMIS) had been applied to the project in a way that could have served as an early-warning system of project failure.

### **Systematic and coherent record-keeping**

The apparent absence of an FAO progress record was remarkable. What is available is a number of "back-to-office" and other reports, but not a coherent progress report of the project that gives a sequential overview of activities, progress and problems experienced. In the electronic era with its highly efficient and cost-effective information processing systems, keeping and editing such a record should be a relatively easy task.

## **Annex XIII**

### **Enhancing the Effectiveness of Policy Assistance: Analytical Framework for Country Case Studies**

**by J. Balié and M. Aguirre**

#### **1. Introduction**

The purpose of this analytical framework is to help consultants identify, analyse and draw preliminary lessons from the country case studies. This analytical framework proposes a step-by-step approach to undertake a country case study but also offers a fair degree of flexibility to adapt to various local conditions.

#### **Structure of the Analytical Framework**

PART 1: PRELIMINARY RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS .....	106
PART 2: IDENTIFICATION OF POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO BE ANALYSED .....	107
PART 3: ANALYSIS OF SELECTED POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS .....	110
PART 4: COMPARATIVE SUMMARY, FINDINGS AND PRELIMINARY LESSONS LEARNED .....	112

The four tables inserted in the framework need to be filled by the consultants and included in their report. Additional comments or information can be provided to further explain and justify the content of each table.

Table 1 : List of all policy recommendations .....	109
Table 2 : Explanation of the status of adoption .....	111
Table 3 : Comparative summary .....	112
Table 4 : Synthesis of findings and identification of preliminary lessons .....	112

#### **Core analytical issues**

1. How can we characterize the effectiveness of a policy assistance intervention?
2. How can we identify the favourable conditions under which policy assistance can be effective and unfavourable conditions that constraint the policy assistance?
3. How can we identify good practices of policy assistance interventions?

#### **Preliminary remarks**

The identification of policy recommendations to be analysed in greater detail should cover the whole spectrum of the project.

The consultant may wish to differentiate the policy recommendations according to their policy nature (e.g. regulatory, institutional, technical, and financial). Policy recommendations can also be distinguished type of advice: macro-sector interface; sector; sub-sector; specific issue.

## PART 1: PRELIMINARY RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

<p><b>Step 1</b></p>	<p><b>Identify source of information</b> on policy assistance project:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Available material (project documents, evaluation reports, report on outputs, etc.).</li> <li>• Interviews with resource persons and other stakeholders.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Step 2</b></p>	<p><b>Identify all recommendations</b> as outputs of the policy assistance project.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Build the list of recommendations.</li> <li>• Also identify other contributions that are not encapsulated in the recommendations.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Step 3</b></p>	<p><b>Assess the recommendations</b> according to the six following <b>formulation criteria</b>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Availability</b> of information and people.</li> <li>• <b>Clarity of the what (y/n)</b>: Is the recommendation self-explanatory?</li> <li>• <b>Clarity of the why (y/n)</b>: Extent to which the recommendation is relevant to the problem/issue it addresses.</li> <li>• <b>Clarity of the how (y/n)</b>: Description of the process for implementing the recommendation.</li> <li>• <b>Clarity of the who (y/n)</b>: Information about the targeted authorities responsible for the implementation of the recommendation.</li> <li>• <b>Independence</b>: Are the recommendations independent or linked among each other?</li> </ul> <p><b>One other dimension to be considered:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Degree of originality of the recommendation</b>: Assess whether the recommendation is not yet widely shared among stakeholders at the time of the beginning of the project and which therefore adds value to the national policy debate.</li> </ul>



## PART 2: IDENTIFICATION OF POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO BE ANALYSED

<p><b>Step 4</b></p>	<p><b>Build a list of pre-selected policy recommendations by</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Taking into consideration <i>policy recommendations only</i>. Selecting those that are specific and <u>excluding those that are too general or too vague</u> unless they entail a strategic scope, in which case specific proposals on how the change should be affected must be made.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Step 5</b></p>	<p><b>Select the policy recommendations to be analysed, first by using the <u>importance</u> criteria</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consult with the FAO author on the <u>most important policy recommendation for policy change made by the project</u>. Consult with government policy makers on the list of policy recommendations to identify the ones they believe are most important.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Step 6</b></p>	<p><b>Assess the status of adoption of selected policy recommendations.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It is a <u>first appraisal</u> that is left to the judgement of the consultant.</li> <li>• This assessment will be completed in the second phase of the analysis. The detailed actual status of adoption will be documented after the interviews with key stakeholders.</li> </ul> <p>Ensure that the list of policy recommendations analysed offers a <u>good mix of implemented/not implemented policy recommendations</u>.</p>
<p><b>Step 7</b></p>	<p><b>Select the policy recommendations using the <u>Coverage</u> criteria.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• This step refers to the <u>themes used at time of selection of the case studies</u> (agriculture policy, agriculture trade, environment, fisheries, food security, forestry, processing, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, rural development) and <u>categories</u> (macro-interface, sector, sub-sector, specific issue).</li> <li>• Policy recommendations should be chosen so as to be representative of the themes covered by the project.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Step 8</b></p>	<p><b>Select the remaining policy recommendations according to the formulation criteria</b> presented in step 3. The possible combinations of the formulation criteria allow for creation of clusters. Each <i>cluster</i> is defined by the possible combination of formulation criteria. The suggested steps are as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Classify the policy recommendations.</li> <li>• Determine how many policy recommendations belong to each cluster.             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. y-y-y-y, where y-y-y-y = y (clarity of what); y (clarity of why); y (clarity of how) and y (clarity of who); select the policy recommendation.</li> <li>ii. n-n-n-n: Select one policy recommendation only if it is possible to work on it given the information availability.</li> <li>iii. The same logic applies for the rest of the cases.</li> <li>iv. y-y-n-n.</li> <li>v. y-y-y-n.</li> <li>vi. y-n-n-n.</li> <li>vii. other combinations if relevant.</li> </ol> </li> </ul> <p><b>Note:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Consultants will be able to decide the number of selected policy recommendations within each cluster depending on the total amount of policy recommendations.</i></li> <li>• <i>Select the cluster of y-y-y-y. For this cluster, we suggest that those policy recommendations that are linked to others be eliminated. However, if dependent policy recommendations are well documented or can provide an interesting lesson, then it is worth including them in the analysis.</i></li> <li>• <i>Repeat the same process for the n-n-n-n cluster.</i></li> </ul>

<b>Step 9</b>	<p><b>Label the selected policy recommendations.</b></p> <p>Identify the status of adoption differentiating by:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <u>Policy principle</u>, which regards a fundamental explanation of general reasons to adopt the policy recommendation.</li> <li>2. <u>Policy objective</u>, when the policy recommendation is guided by the achievement of a certain purpose that is considered attainable.</li> <li>3. <u>Policy instrument</u>, when the policy recommendation is concerned with using specific interventions in the agriculture sector and/or economy.</li> </ol> <p><b>Note:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· <i>It is expected that policy recommendations corresponding to a principle will be complemented by more detailed policy recommendations at lower levels: at the objective, then at the instrument levels.</i></li> <li>· <i>If the latter are implemented, then the former are also by necessity (in part at least). This means that the structure of the policy recommendations should be developed, showing how policy recommendations at the principle or objective level are to be implemented by means of other policy recommendations at the instrument level.</i></li> </ul> <p><i>However, it could be possible to have a situation where a lower level policy recommendation often contributes to implementing several higher-level ones, and where higher-level policy recommendations are implemented through several lower-level ones.</i></p>
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Table 1 : List of all policy recommendations

	STEP 3: Formulation criteria						Additional criteria	Criteria analysed in STEP 5 & 6			STEP 7 Coverage Criteria		Selected Policy Recommendations (Y/N)	STEP 9 Labelling		
	Info availability	Clarity on what (Y/N)	Clarity on why (Y/N)	Clarity on how (Y/N)	Clarity on who (Y/N)	Independence (Y/N)		Degree of originality of the recommendation	Importance criteria according to FAO team	Importance criteria according to national policy maker(s)	Status of adoption according to preliminary appraisal by the consultant	Themes			Categories	
1																
2																
3																
4																
5																
6																
7																
8																
9																
10																
11																
12																
13																
...																

Note: Selected recommendations could be highlighted

### PART 3: ANALYSIS OF SELECTED POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

**Note:** This analysis needs to be made for each policy recommendation

<p><b>Step 10</b></p>	<p><b>Describe the status of adoption</b> of each policy recommendation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Status of adoption:</b> has the policy recommendation been adopted by the authorities; was the sequencing of actions undertaken consistent with policy recommendation; and has it been integrated in the national policy framework (adopted in project report, reflected in a policy statement, in a decision taken, or actually implemented)?</li> <li>• <b>Satisfaction</b> of the status of adoption:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Are recipients/beneficiaries satisfied with the status of adoption? Why/why not?</li> <li>○ Is FAO satisfied with the status of adoption? Why/why not?</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<p><b>Step 11</b></p>	<p><b>Describe the exogenous factors</b> that affected the process and the policy recommendation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>NATIONAL POLICY CONTEXT (NPC):</b> Local conditions in the country when the project was implemented; key elements of history; origin of the policy assistance intervention (political change, genuine request, FAO advocacy); international influence; others.</li> <li>• <b>PLAYERS AND ISSUES (P&amp;I):</b> How stakeholders interact with each others, level of influence of each player, issues they encountered or raised (rank them if necessary according to their influence on the policy process).</li> <li>• <b>POLICY PROCESS AND DIALOGUE (PPD):</b> The policy process is the process through which the policy is “produced”. It helps clarify the player’s position with respect an issue and/or bring other players around this position. This section also includes information on the quality of the decision-making process, the extent to which relevant stakeholders were involved, and the degree of complexity of the institutional framework.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Step 12</b></p>	<p><b>Describe the endogenous factors</b> that affected the status of adoption of the recommendation. This analysis will focus on FAO’s response to the exogenous factors and will be conducted according to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Context in the Policy Assistance Project and in FAO (CPAP):</b> This refers to several aspects in FAO and in the project team, including FAO internal politics, specific issues regarding FAO context, the level of support to the project, extent to which other issues regarding FAO affected the policy assistance process, and specific internal organization and management arrangements in FAO and/or in the project.</li> <li>• <b>Process of the Policy Assistance Project (PPAP):</b> This refers to several elements of the process to implement the policy assistance project: time frame (when, how long); targeted players (with whom); and the choice for policy interactions and the mode of operation (how and where).</li> <li>• <b>Expertise of the Policy Assistance Project (EPAP):</b> Quality and quantity of the technical inputs and adequacy of the experience.</li> </ul>



## PART 4: COMPARATIVE SUMMARY, FINDINGS AND PRELIMINARY LESSONS LEARNED

<b>Step 15</b>	<p>This exercise aims to synthesize and compare all the policy recommendations previously analysed.</p> <p>According to the analysis that was done, fill in the following table describing in few words the nature of the key factors influencing each recommendation. The various factors listed in column two will have to be further disaggregated for this purpose.</p>
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**Table 3: Comparative summary**

	Factors	Recommendation 1	Recommendation 2	....
Exogenous	National Policy Context			
	Players and Issues			
	Policy Process and Dialogue			
	Other...			
Endogenous	Context in FAO and the project			
	Policy Assistance Process			
	Expertise			
	Other...			

<b>Step 16</b>	<p><b>Identify findings and draw of preliminary lessons:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Using the previous step as input, identify relevant findings whether by <b>FREQUENCY, STRENGTH OF EVIDENCE and/or SIGNIFICANCE</b>.</li> <li>Classify these main findings according to endogenous and exogenous factors (left column).</li> <li>Reflect on the "main findings" column to draw preliminary lessons, do's and don'ts, and best practices that can be derived from your comparative analysis.</li> </ul>
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**Table 4: Synthesis of findings and identification of preliminary lessons**

	Factors	Main findings	Preliminary lessons, do's and don'ts, best practices
Exogenous	National Policy Context		1) New <b>endogenous</b> approaches, and ways in which the exogenous dimension can be better taken into account (adapting policy assistance to exogenous factors): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>...</li> <li>...</li> <li>...</li> </ul>
	Players and Issues		
	Policy Process and Dialogue		
	Other		
Endogenous	Process of Policy Recommendation		2) How can current approaches be enhanced? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>...</li> <li>...</li> <li>...</li> </ul>
	Policy Assistance Process		
	Expertise		
	Other		

## 2. Proposed Guidelines for the Interviews

The aim of the interview guidelines is gather additional information on the policy recommendations to be analysed, and more specifically on their status of adoption, exogenous and endogenous factors that were influential. The interview may combine several policy recommendations depending on their nature and/or the person interviewed.

### I. Read the recommendation (s)

- What do you think of this policy recommendation?
- To what extent would you consider that this policy recommendation has been adopted? Why?

### II Questions on exogenous factors

*Questions are related to National Policy Context, Players and Issues, and Policy Process and Dialogue.*

- What is worth mentioning about the National Policy Context at the time the policy recommendation was made?
- What players were involved as supporters or opponents in the adoption of this policy recommendation? Why?
- From your view, what were the issues considered for this policy recommendation? Why?
- How would describe the policy process and dialogue that led to the adoption of this policy recommendation?

### III Questions on endogenous factors

*The goal is to find out the key elements regarding the context in FAO and in the project, the policy assistance process, and the expertise provided to arrive at the policy recommendation(s)*


- What can you say about the context of the policy assistance project in FAO?
- To what extent would you consider that FAO and this project were effective with respect to this policy recommendation?
- How would you describe the policy assistance process?
- What can you say about the time frame (when and how long)?
- What can you say about the choice of stakeholders and arena (who and where)?
- How would you improve this process?
- What would you say about the expertise mobilized in this project (the extent to which experts played a key role based on their profile, network, experience, etc.)?
- Any comments on FAO's follow-up on the advice given after completion of the project?

### IV. Preliminary findings and conclusions

- What could say about the follow-up provided to the policy assistance project?
- What are the policy recommendations that could be considered as original, if any?
- What would you say about possible synergies or contradictions among the policy recommendations provided by the policy assistance project?
- What preliminary lessons would you draw?
- What would you point out to improve the outcome of the policy recommendation analysed?

BLANK





The literature available on best practices for providing policy assistance and influencing effectively national policy processes is insufficient to provide appropriate guidance to those whose work it is to help countries in shaping their policies and ensure that the advice they provide has a good chance of being adopted by governments.

Based on these premises, this study, qualitative in nature, uses the results of a review of existing literature, a consultation with 25 agencies conducting policy assistance activities and an in-depth review of 12 FAO policy assistance projects to highlight a series of good practices that can contribute to enhancing the effectiveness of policy advisory activities. It shows that understanding the context within which policy assistance is provided, the process followed, the expertise mobilized and an effective and creative management are critical factors of influencing policy processes. It demonstrates the need for international and bilateral agencies to regard policy assistance in a new way: a knowledge-based activity where technical and analytical skills are necessary but not sufficient and need to be complemented by “soft” skills like facilitation and negotiation.

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