

Plan of Action

WEST & GAZA BANK & STRIP

2011-2013



Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United
Nations



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FOREWORD



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Foreword

By the Minister of Agriculture, Palestinian Authority

Palestine faces a protracted crisis characterized by access restrictions to natural resources (water and land), recurrent conflict, a longstanding economic food-access crisis, the breakdown of livelihoods and insufficient institutional capacity to respond. The movement of goods and people into and out of Palestine has been severely restricted, which has negatively impacted the lives of the Palestinian population. As such, Palestine must be considered as a unique case with distinctive requirements in terms of interventions by the humanitarian and development community. The protracted nature of the crisis requires revisiting approaches of external assistance on a regular basis in order to match needs, challenges and institutional constraints with response.

The agricultural sector remains a foundation of Palestinian life and is an integral component of Palestinian cultural, economic and social fabric. In addition to its traditional significance, agriculture is particularly important for Palestinians as it embodies their perseverance, confrontation and adherence to their land under the threat of confiscation and settlement activities. It also provides a refuge and a source of income and food supplies at times of crises. In this context, a significant number of Palestinians, who were denied access to work in Israel, have resorted to agricultural activity. Several of the key humanitarian issues in Palestine, namely restricted access and poor livelihood protection and water scarcity severely impact Palestinians dependent on agriculture for consumption purposes or as a source of income. Since 2002, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has supported the preparation for, and response to, food and agricultural threats and livelihood emergencies in Palestine through emergency relief, rehabilitation and revitalization of productive capacity of about 80 000 families. FAO interventions help protect access and entitlements of Palestinian farming households to land, water, services and markets. Such interventions are essential to enhance overall food security, reduce dependency on relief assistance amongst vulnerable Palestinians and contribute to institution building.


In order to address these challenges, FAO has developed a Plan of Action (PoA) for the period 2011–2013, to serve as a strategic planning tool to guide FAO operations in Palestine through the design of food security-oriented responses to emergencies and protracted crises. This document is a 'living' and dynamic document, tailored to the current and expected reality in Palestine over the next three years. The PoA is fully aligned with the fundamental sectoral and development-oriented strategic plans, mainly: the National Development Plan (Establishing the State, Building our Future" 2011–2013; and the Agriculture Sector Strategy "A Shared Vision" 2011–2013 with its action plan. The PoA builds also on the FAO Medium Term Strategy for Palestine "Bridging Emergency and Development, Proposed Strategy for FAO Assistance" and reflects FAO's strategic alignment with the sector policies and strategies of national counterparts and and the FAO Regional Priority Framework for the Near East 2009–2012.



The PoA is the result of a comprehensive consultative process with the Ministry of Agriculture of the Palestinian Authority (MoA), donor agencies and representatives from partner organizations, including United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations and government institutions. In particular, the MoA acknowledges the long-standing and valuable partnership with FAO, which reflects a unique and coordinated approach to enhancing development priorities and achieving a coordinated agriculture sector response.

The PoA's structure follows the sequence of a conceptual framework, progressing from situation analysis to response options analysis, planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation and its duration is designed to allow FAO to go beyond the conventional short-term response intervention and address more adequately the increasing need to adopt a disaster risk management (DRM) approach to humanitarian interventions, balancing emergency response (36 percent) with enhancing local capacity for preparedness (27 percent) and transition to development (37 percent). Achieving this humanitarian imperative hinges on four individual areas of action, or PoA programme components, that will assist directly 30 000 poor rural households through (i) improved household-level food production, (ii) strengthened income and purchasing power; (iii) higher levels of domestic food quality and nutrition; and (iv) more adequate food safety. Additionally, (v) capacity development and (vi) coordination have been identified as stand-alone, overarching programme components, which reflect FAO's comparative advantage as the lead United Nations agency for food security and agriculture and will impact the overall effectiveness and sustainability of the PoA's outcomes.

MoA wishes to express its sincere acknowledgement and appreciation to the FAO team for their relentless support to the Palestinian agricultural sector and its institutions, which reflects very positively on the livelihood of farmers and herders throughout the country. MoA expresses its full support to the PoA and confirms its strong commitment and support to its implementation, while capitalizing on the long history of successful cooperation with FAO over the past 9 years in serving Palestinian farmers and herders and protecting their rights and entitlements to their land, water and natural resources.



Dr. Ismail Daiq

Minister of agriculture





ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS

ARIJ	Applied Research Institute – Jerusalem/Society
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CEDAW	United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
DRM	Disaster risk management
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GAP	Good Agricultural Practices
GDP	Gross domestic Product
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
IEE	Independent External Evaluation of FAO
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JFFLS	Junior Farmer Field and Life School
LACS	Local Aid Coordination Secretariat
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MoYS	Ministry of Youth and Sport
NGo	Non-governmental organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PCBS	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
PoA	Plan of Action
RBM	Results-based Management
SEFSec	Socio-economic and Food Security Survey
UN	United Nations
UN Women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
WBGS	West Bank and Gaza Strip
WFP	World Food Programme

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS), recurrent conflict and increasing restrictions over natural resources, markets and services are depriving families of their basic needs for survival and placing their ability to cope under severe strain. Food security and livelihoods have been directly impacted by increased controls on the movement of people and goods; impediments to construction and infrastructure investment; confiscation of land and natural resources; and the direct destruction of homes, crops, livestock assets and infrastructure. Many are becoming dependent on external aid – unable to produce food or earn incomes.

High dependency on imported food (80–90 percent for most staple commodities), increased international food prices and vulnerability to drought have exacerbated the plight of Palestinians to provide for their families. With plummeting incomes, households are forced to engage in informal trade and piecemeal agricultural work, assume debt, sell assets and decrease consumption, which render them increasingly vulnerable. Further complicating the situation, the population growth rate is 3 percent and over 40 percent of the population is under 15 years old. The combination of high unemployment, rapid population growth and low levels of female participation in the labour force significantly increases the economic burden on primary wage earners.

Small-scale farmers, herders and fishers in the WBGS are among the hardest hit population, despite the potential of agriculture to reduce reliance on imported food, minimize vulnerability to international price hikes and increase economic access to food by enhancing employment and income. The significant loss of Palestinian land, limited access to markets, destruction of key agricultural assets (including water resources), and the separation of farmers from their fields and fishers from the sea continue to sever the rural poor from their livelihood.

In order to mitigate the impact of the crisis, it is vital to assist families to maximize and safeguard the use of their remaining assets and resources and to expand their livelihood opportunities. Helping farmers to replenish their asset base and improve their agricultural practices will increase not only household food production and income, but also their chances of retaining access to their land.

Optimizing the use of natural resources, with a particular focus on water scarcity, is necessary to mitigate the impact of natural hazards, increase resilience to shocks and preserve productive capacity for future generations. Focus must also lie in stimulating the potential of the WBGS' youth to build a vibrant productive civil society, and in actively empowering women as agents of development in their homes and communities.

The WBGS Plan of Action (PoA) 2011–2013 is a 'living' document that sets forth the approach and methodology of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) to maximize, and expand the impact of, efforts to improve food security in a sustainable way. The PoA represents a shift in strategy from predominantly relief-driven project interventions to a more programmatic approach, based on disaster risk management, which balances emergency response (36 percent) with enhancing local capacity for preparedness (27 percent) and transition to development (37 percent).

Achieving this humanitarian imperative hinges on four individual areas of action, or PoA programme components, that will assist directly 30 000 poor rural households (i.e. 195 000 people): (i) improved household-level food production, (ii) strengthened income and purchasing power; (iii) higher levels of domestic food quality and nutrition; and (iv) more adequate food safety.





Additionally, (v) capacity development and (vi) coordination have been identified as stand-alone, overarching programme components, which reflect FAO's comparative advantage as the lead United Nations agency for food security and agriculture and will impact the overall effectiveness and sustainability of the PoA's outcomes.

Furthermore, the PoA sets out how FAO will contribute to fundamental strategic documents, including the national Agriculture Sector Strategy "A Shared Vision" 2011–2013, and the United Nations Medium Term Response Plan in the WBGS.

Programme component	USD
Improved household-level food production	28 173 475
Higher incomes and strengthened purchasing power	12 524 875
Higher domestic food quality and nutrition	8 015 315
More adequate food safety	4 611 255
Strengthened institutional capacity	2 048 200
Reinforced operational coordination and evidence-based, food security-related information management	1 734 480

INTRODUCTION



INTRODUCTION

The West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) faces a protracted crisis characterized by access restrictions to natural resources (water and land), recurrent conflict, a longstanding economic food-access crisis, the breakdown of livelihoods and insufficient institutional capacity to respond. The movement of goods and people into and out of the WBGS has been severely restricted, which has negatively impacted the lives of the Palestinian population.

As such, the WBGS must be considered as a unique case with distinctive requirements in terms of interventions by the humanitarian and development community. The protracted nature of the crisis requires revisiting the approaches of external assistance on a regular basis in order to match needs, challenges and institutional constraints with response.

In order to address these challenges, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has developed a Plan of Action (PoA). The PoA is a strategic planning tool that will guide FAO operations in the WBGS through the design of food security-oriented responses to emergencies and protracted crises.

The PoA's structure follows the sequence of a conceptual framework, progressing from situation analysis to response options analysis, planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. The programme's 36-month duration is designed to allow FAO to go beyond the conventional short-term response intervention and address more adequately the increasing need to adopt a disaster risk management (DRM) approach to humanitarian interventions.

The PoA for the WBGS is a 'living' and dynamic document, tailored to the current and expected reality in the WBGS over the next three years. It is cross-referenced to fundamental sectoral and development-oriented strategic documents, including: the Palestinian National Development Plan of 2010–2013; the Ministry of Agriculture's (MoA's) Agriculture Sector Strategy "A Shared Vision" 2011–2013; and the FAO Regional Priority Framework for the Near East 2009–2012. The PoA builds on the FAO Medium Term Strategy for the WBGS "Bridging Emergency and Development, Proposed Strategy for FAO Assistance" and reflects FAO's strategic alignment with the sector policies and strategies of national counterparts.



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Plan of Action (PoA) formulation process

The PoA is the result of a comprehensive desk study and three-day planning workshop involving staff from FAO's three offices in the WBGS, donor agencies and representatives from partner organizations, including United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations and government institutions, such as the MoA.

The PoA process entailed developing strategic objectives around the challenge of food security in the WBGS. This was achieved by analysing the underlying causes of food insecurity, describing the current situation – which is dynamic and critical to targeting – and determining the best courses of action given these factors.

1. SITUATION ANALYSIS

GENERAL BACKGROUND

Levels of food insecurity in the WBGS have been directly affected by a marked decrease in economic growth since the start of the second intifada. Owing to the conflict, the Palestinian economy has been affected by: (i) increased controls imposed by Israel on the movement of goods, services and people; (ii) impediments to construction and infrastructure investment; (iii) the expansion of Israeli settlements, resulting in the confiscation of land and natural resources, and associated violence; and (iv) the direct destruction of houses, crops, animals, as well as water and sanitation infrastructure. In addition, lack of development financing by donors and the Palestinian Authority is impeding economic recovery and perpetuating a severe livelihood crisis. Current gross domestic product (GDP) growth is estimated at 8.5 percent; however, this growth is contingent upon humanitarian aid injections into the economy. Adversely to the overall growth trend, the share of agriculture in total output declined from 13 percent in 1994 to 6 percent in 2010¹.

In the West Bank, the construction of Israel's Separation Barrier² has led to the significant loss of Palestinian land, destruction of key agricultural assets (including water resources), and separation of farmers from their land, and thus from their livelihoods. The population with land or other assets in the Seam Zone³ and those with livelihood activities in Area C⁴ are most affected. Political and economic separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip since 2006/07 has further eroded markets and affected public revenue. The Gaza Strip has been under an Israeli military imposed blockade since the Hamas takeover in June 2007, with severe restrictions on the entry of goods, and the virtual halt of exports and movement of Palestinian people in and out of the territory. In addition, restricted areas of land and sea in the Gaza Strip contribute to the impoverishment of the population, as an estimated 123 200 people depend on agriculture and fisheries for their livelihood.



Key Facts

Population: 4 048 403

No. of refugees: 1 885 188

GDP per capita: USD 1 390 (2009)

Labour force by occupation:

agriculture 13%; mining and manufacturing 11%;

services 38%; construction 13%

Total land area: 6 024 km²

Total arable land: 1 060 km²

Life expectancy: female: 73 years; male: 71 years

Literacy rate: female: 91.3%; male: 97.4%

Human Development Index: 110/182

(Source: UN; PCBS; ARIJ)

¹ International Monetary Fund (IMF), Macroeconomic and Fiscal Framework for the West bank and Gaza: Sixth Review of Progress, September 2010. <http://www.imf.org/external/country/WBG/RR/2010/092110.pdf>

² The Separation Barrier cuts through 8 out of 11 West Bank governorates, isolating the farms, greenhouses, grazing lands and water resources of thousands of farmers. Almost 15 percent of West Bank agricultural land will be lost once the construction of the Separation Barrier is complete.

³ The Seam Zone is the land between the Separation Barrier and the 1967 border.

⁴ Under the Oslo Agreements, Area C of the West Bank remains under full Israeli administrative and military control.

ROOT CAUSES OF FOOD INSECURITY ⁵

LOW ECONOMIC ACCESS TO FOOD

Food-insecurity levels in the WBGS have changed little over the past six years, ranging from 33 to 38 percent⁶. However, with an estimated annual growth rate of 3 percent, the WBGS population is expected to double within 20 years and the absolute number of food-insecure people will grow even if the prevalence remains at current levels. Food insecurity in the WBGS is chronic as it directly relates to the political dimensions affecting most drivers of economic growth, including access to land, water, markets and jobs. Hence, ensuring that the current and future food needs (i.e. food and nutrition security) of the population will be met is a strategic humanitarian priority.

The ability to access food in the WBGS is largely determined by a household's economic situation, which is negatively affected by the curtailment of livelihoods and economic opportunities. Additionally, a young population (more than 40 percent of the population is below 15 years of age) and low female participation in the labour force mean that the economic burden on wage earners is very high. The economic burden is measured by the average number of people supported by one income earner. In the West Bank, an average of five people are dependent on one income earner. This number is higher in the Gaza Strip, where an average of eight people are dependent on one income earner.

The political and economic contexts directly influence food-insecurity levels in the WBGS. Levels of unemployment soared during the second intifada owing to an increase in imposed restrictions on access and movement. Although current unemployment levels have stabilized, they remain high. This is largely a result of the loss of employment in the Israeli labour market and seasonal labour opportunities behind the Separation Barrier. In addition, the unstable political environment is a disincentive for private sector investment, further limiting the availability of jobs. In the Gaza Strip, the blockade imposed by Israel following the Hamas takeover in June 2007 led to a further deterioration of the economy, with most productive enterprises forced out of business and a spike in unemployment. Over three-quarters of the population in the Gaza Strip is now dependent on humanitarian assistance.

Rising international food prices have also reduced the purchasing power of households. The high dependency on imported food in the WBGS – an estimated 88 percent⁷ of food available in the WBGS is imported – has led to a highly volatile market environment. For example, the recent global decline in cereal production and the influence of market speculation have led to a hike in the price of imported flour, a vital staple food commodity in the WBGS. Institutional weaknesses of the Palestinian Authority hamper the ability to develop policy tools to mitigate the impact of rising food prices. Israel also places high protective tariffs on the import of goods into Israel, which, as imports must first enter Israel and then the WBGS, results in higher prices for products and agricultural inputs in the WBGS. Furthermore, all Palestinian trade transits through Israeli-controlled ports or border facilities, where charges, delays and cumbersome requirements, such as back-to-back transportation, further increase costs⁸. In addition, fluctuations in fuel prices and the poor state of Palestinian road networks and other infrastructure are costs that are also ultimately borne by the consumer, further decreasing economic access to food.

Factors contributing to low economic access to food

- High annual population growth rate (WBGS: 3%)
- High ratio of dependants per wage earner (Gaza 8:1; West Bank: 5:1)
- Low female participation in the labour force
- Reduced livelihood and economic opportunities
- Political and economic instability
- Heavy reliance on food imports (WBGS: 88%)
- High international food and agricultural input costs
- Low purchasing power
- Lack of access to markets



⁵ See also Annex 1.

⁶ Comparison of the prevalence of household food security in the period 2006–2009 is limited by the use of different methodologies. However, recent comparable estimates were produced for 2009 and 2010, indicating a slight improvement in the food insecurity level as it decreased from 36 percent to 33 percent.

⁷ Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS; 2010), Statistical Abstract no. 10. Based on 2007/08 agricultural statistics.

⁸ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimated that costs to Palestinian traders are at least 30 percent higher than those accrued by their Israeli counterparts. (Transit and Maritime Transport Facilitation for the Rehabilitation and Development of the Palestinian Economy. UNCTAD/GDS/APP/2003/1, New York and Geneva, United Nations Publications).

LOW DOMESTIC FOOD PRODUCTION

Availability of food in the WBGS is not a problem per se as gaps in demand can be covered through imports, although international market price fluctuations have severe impacts on the population's economic access to food. Even in the Gaza Strip, where the availability of food may fluctuate due to restrictions on imports from Israel, the tunnel trade with Egypt ensures that shops' shelves are not bare. However, the poor economic situation and high import and transportation costs mean that many items are priced beyond the reach of most consumers. Improved domestic production would increase the availability of food – thereby reducing reliance on imported food and vulnerability to international price hikes – and at the same time increase economic access to food by enhancing employment and income. However, development of the agriculture sector is hampered by a number of factors.

Access to agricultural land and the sea is restricted in several ways. In the Gaza Strip, venturing near the imposed fishing limit of 3 nautical miles has proven extremely dangerous. This renders 85 percent of Gaza's fishing zone off limits⁹. Likewise, an access-restricted area (known as the 'Buffer Zone') of up to 1.5 km into the land border with Israel is off-limits and this is enforced by regular live fire, restricting access to 35 percent of Gaza's remaining agricultural land¹⁰. In the West Bank, the Separation Barrier has resulted in the confiscation of over 50 000 dunums, and the associated permit regime makes it extremely difficult for farmers near the barrier to access their remaining land. Farmers require permits to access their land through designated agricultural gates, and the number of hours they are open for agricultural activity is controlled by the military. Over 0.5 million dunums (5.1 percent) of land have been expropriated for settlement expansion and a further 18 percent of the West Bank is restricted to Palestinians for military reasons.¹¹ Furthermore, Israel retains complete control of over 60 percent of the West Bank (Area C), requiring permits (often delayed or denied) for developing the land or water resources¹².

Restricted access to water for irrigation and animal husbandry is a major cause of limited domestic food production in the WBGS. In the Gaza Strip, extraction from the shared aquifer stands at around 200 percent of its annual recharge capacity, leading to increased salination from seawater intrusion and deteriorated water quality for plant, animal and human consumption.



Factors contributing to low domestic food production

- Access restrictions to agricultural land and sea
- Drought
- Limited access to water (irrigation/ livestock)
- High cost of tankered water
- Uncontrolled chemical fertilizer/ pesticide use
- Low knowledge/capacity in quality farm management
- Inadequate economic/ physical access to inputs
- Poor infrastructure
- Weak extension services
- High vulnerability to plant/ animal pests and diseases

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In the West Bank, Israel retains complete control over the aquifers and uses 83 percent of the water; Palestinians are continually denied permits for the construction of pipelines, cisterns and wells. In both areas, recent droughts have underscored the high vulnerability to climatic shocks, and the need to purchase tankered water reduces the profitability of farming.

⁹ Since January 2009, fishers' access to fishing grounds has been further restricted to 3 nautical miles. The previous fishing zone was 6–9 nautical miles before Operation Cast Lead, 12 nautical miles from Bertini Commitments. See FAO, *Farming without Land, Fishing without Water: Gaza Agriculture Sector Struggles to Survive*, May 2010.

¹⁰ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)/World Food Programme (WFP), *Between a Fence and a Hard Place: The Humanitarian Impact of Israeli Imposed Restrictions on Access to Land and Sea in the Gaza Strip*, August 2010.

¹¹ World Bank, *Palestinian Economic Prospects: Gaza Recovery and West Bank Revival*, 2008.

¹² OCHA, *Area C Humanitarian Response Plan*, August 2010.

As farmers attempt to compensate for low productivity, uncontrolled use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides on limited land resources could result in the degradation of land and water quality. This is partially due to the limitations facing research systems in agriculture and related extension services. On one hand, the difficulties faced by extension services (i.e. veterinary and plant protection) have resulted in low capacity and knowledge among farmers in quality farm management, including the protection of genetic plant and animal resources. On the other hand, farmers lack economic or physical access to inputs to improve their farming techniques. Furthermore, extension services are weak in their capacity to identify needs, which would allow for the formulation of responses to meet gaps. The weaknesses in extension services have further repercussions on mechanisms to prepare for, respond to and recover from natural or hazard shocks (water scarcity/drought, plant and animal diseases).

The high cost of imported agricultural inputs also stifles development and innovation in the agriculture sector. Poorly maintained agricultural infrastructure, such as greenhouses and chicken units, contributes to high vulnerability to pests and diseases. Palestinian veterinary and plant protection services would be hard-pressed to deal with a major new outbreak, particularly in the Gaza Strip.

Another factor leading to low domestic food production is reliance on traditional agricultural methods and outdated equipment. The stagnant economy and volatile political situation discourage outside investment, while the conservative lending practices of banks and poorly-developed microfinance and credit schemes make it difficult for farmers to borrow money in order to modernize their equipment or expand their operations. This is further complicated by farmers' inability to provide collateral to borrow money.

INADEQUATE FOOD UTILIZATION

The main causes of inadequate food utilization in the WBGS are the lack of regulatory policies protecting domestic consumers, erosion of household income and purchasing power, and inadequate access to public infrastructure services. Owing to high levels of cash and food assistance, the dietary diversity of Palestinian households (including those which are food insecure) is not generally compromised. However, households within the lowest income groups are purchasing more energy-dense foods and fewer nutritious foodstuffs that are potential providers of micronutrients¹³. As households purchase lower quality foods, this translates into unhealthy cooking practices causing problems of undernourishment among lower income groups.

In the West Bank in particular, micronutrient deficiencies are found to be related to the consumption of unfortified wheat flour¹⁴. Generally, micronutrient deficiencies are also a result of low nutritional awareness and limited education on proper nutrition. Further investigation is required to better analyse recorded trends of higher levels of micronutrient deficiency in young girls than young boys.


Another reason for poor food utilization is the weak institutional capacity of the Palestinian Authority to establish and enforce standards on food safety. Wide gaps in food-safety regulation and policies and limited laboratory testing capacity are compounded by the inability to control what enters the borders of the WBGS, leading to many untested and potentially unsafe foodstuffs available in the market. Additionally, poor-quality food storage facilities and processing equipment can result in the contamination of food, a prospect made more likely in the Gaza Strip by the frequent cuts to electricity supply. Generally, insufficient food-safety and quality regulation for domestic consumer protection contributes to an inadequate food quality control system, resulting in the loss of food quality.

¹³ Palestinian Expenditure and Consumption Survey collected by PCBS.

¹⁴ Academy for Educational Development, 2009. Analysis of Inspection Results from Salt and Wheat Flour Samples Taken in 2009 in the West Bank.

Diagram 1 – Food security-related situation analysis

Food insecurity-related problem tree for the West Bank and Gaza Strip



CURRENT SITUATION



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2. CURRENT SITUATION

Main findings of the Socio-economic and Food Security Survey (SEFSec¹⁵) 2009–2010

A total of 1.4 million Palestinians (33 percent) continue to be food insecure. Despite a slight improvement in the overall food-security situation, geographical disparities exist. However, the characteristics of food-insecure households show that they are typically larger in size, with a higher dependency ratio and children/adult ratio, as well as a higher number of female adult members.

In the past year, food-insecurity levels have improved in the central area of the West Bank; however, the northern and southern areas have experienced a further deterioration. The total drop in the population affected by food insecurity in the central area of the West Bank is an estimated 33 000 people, while in the northern and southern areas it has risen to an estimated 59 000 people. This is likely due to the concentration of economic growth in Ramallah, which has not trickled to the northern and southern areas where most livelihoods are dependent on manufacturing industries and agriculture. Furthermore, disparities exist between households living inside and outside of the closed area between the Green Line and the Barrier, with the populations living inside the closed area worse off owing to restrictions in accessing land and labour markets.¹⁶

In the Gaza Strip, there has been an overall improvement in food-security levels, which may be attributed to a combination of the substantive increase in aid after Operation Cast Lead (December 2008 – January 2009), the positive impact of social safety-net reform, and the tunnel trade which serves as a shock absorber to the blockade on the Gaza Strip. The current, overall food-insecurity levels in the Gaza Strip have returned to the pre-Cast Lead period. The number of people in the Gaza Strip who are food insecure has dropped by 50 000. However, rural areas of the Gaza Strip have seen a further deterioration in food-insecurity levels as compared with urban and refugee camp areas, owing to limited assistance, reduced access to land and damage to agricultural infrastructure following Operation Cast Lead. In rural areas of the Gaza Strip, the total population currently experiencing food insecurity is an estimated 29 000 persons; between 2009 and 2010, the food-insecure rural population increased by 8 000 people.¹⁷

SEFSEC highlights

Food-insecure population:

- 1.4 million (33%)

Food-security situation:

- Overall improvement
- Geographic disparities

Geographic disparities West Bank:

- Central region improved (drop in food-insecure pop.: 33 000)
- Contributing factors: concentrated economic growth in Ramallah
- North and south deteriorated (rise in food-insecure pop.: 59 000)
- Contributing factors: high reliance on agriculture/manufacturing; land/labour market restrictions (between Green Line and Barrier)

Geographic disparities Gaza Strip:

- Overall improvement (drop in food-insecure pop.: 50 000)
- Contributing factors: increase in aid; social safety-net reform; tunnel trade
- Deterioration in rural areas (rise in food-insecure pop.: 8 000)
- Contributing factors: limited assistance; reduced land access; damage to rural infrastructure



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¹⁵ SEFSec is a FAO/WFP/PCBS partnership.

¹⁶ The analysis excludes populations living in the area of East Jerusalem annexed by Israel in 1967.

¹⁷ While the prevalence of food insecurity among the rural population has increased by 2 percent between 2009 and 2010, in absolute terms, these numbers increase by 6 percent when taking population growth into account.


Map 1 – Food security levels in the WBGs



Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

Food Security Levels in the West Bank and Gaza Strip

July/August 2010



RESPONSE PLAN




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3. RESPONSE PLAN

The response plan to be pursued by FAO in the WBGS is based on a thorough analysis of the food-security situation, including quantitative and qualitative assessments of the target groups most in need. It is also informed by guiding principles and strategic considerations, some of which (such as technical feasibility) are self-explanatory, while others are further elaborated in this section.

PROGRAMME OBJECTIVES¹⁸

Diagram 2 – Objective hierarchy of the PoA



GOAL

Improved food security of the Palestinian population¹⁹

OUTCOMES

Outcome 1: Higher economic access to food

While the core of the response to economic access to food lies within job creation, as well as cash-transfers and food-for-work interventions, the particular context of the WBGS is characterized by very limited, or non-existent, subsistence farming and herding, as a very small percentage of households' own production is consumed by the households themselves. Therefore, household food production is a non-negligible source of income for smallholder farmers and herders, as well as casual and seasonal labour in rural areas. This outcome will be supported by programme components, or outputs, 1 and 2.

Outcome 2: Improved food utilization

The need to systematically improve food utilization has emerged only recently on the agenda of emergency and development actors in the WBGS. FAO has a significant comparative advantage and a normative mandate in these areas. This outcome will be supported by programme components, or outputs, 3 and 4.

PROGRAMME COMPONENTS²⁰

FAO's work plan has been divided into six related but distinct programme components, reflecting a move towards a programmatic, rather than a project-based, approach in responding to priority areas of intervention in the WBGS. Activities foreseen under each programme component have been selected based on a field review conducted by FAO as part of the preparatory work for the formulation of this PoA. The review allowed FAO to draw lessons from existing interventions, and to discuss cost-effectiveness and modalities for scaling-up innovative activities.

¹⁸ See Annex 4 – Logical Framework.

¹⁹ Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.

²⁰ See detailed programme components in Annex 7 and budget per result/component in Annex 6.

The first four programme components correspond to the four outputs identified in the objective tree (see Diagram 2). Additionally, in support of these four outputs and as core functions of FAO, capacity development and coordination have been highlighted as stand-alone programme components. This reflects the importance of such overarching interventions in the WBGS context, as well as FAO's comparative advantage in delivering them in the food security and agriculture sectors.

Programme component 1: Improved household-level food production

Given the existing limited availability of, and further reduced access to, natural resources (water, land and sea), this programme component focuses on the imperative to develop extremely effective and sustainable household production units. This will be achieved essentially through improved quality inputs and knowledge transfer. This component will also apply preparedness elements to the outbreak of pests and diseases and the development of rapid response capacity.

Programme component 2: Higher incomes and strengthened purchasing power

This programme component will examine rural job and market opportunities for individuals and groups. FAO will promote women's associations and small-scale enterprises, with focus on diversification and better access to markets. FAO will also reinforce linkages with existing food-for-work programmes as a potential marketing opportunity for local production.

Programme component 3: Higher domestic food quality and nutrition

This component will focus in particular on strengthening education and knowledge related to food preservation, post-harvest handling and nutrition. One of the main vehicles will be the use of the Junior Farmer Field and Life School (JFFLS) approach.²¹

Programme component 4: More adequate food safety

This programme component will be FAO's contribution to the existing interministerial platform on food safety, led by the Ministry of National Economy in partnership with the MoA and the Ministry of Health. This will include support to regulatory frameworks for food safety, services (laboratory system) and processes (animal identification).

Programme component 5: Institutional capacity development

The PoA will support the realization of two courses of action set out in the MoA's Agriculture Sector Strategy "A Shared Vision" 2011–2013: (i) upscale the competence and effectiveness of agricultural institutions (Section 5.3.1); and (ii) train and rehabilitate human resources (Section 5.3.3).

Programme component 6: Operational coordination and evidence-based, food security-related information management

This core function will be implemented in close partnership with the MoA, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) and the World Food Programme (WFP). Evidence-based tools such as the Resilience Analysis Model ²² will be further refined and rolled out. The current analytical framework informing appropriate humanitarian assistance in various coordination fora is weak in the following: (i) understanding of livelihood-associated risks and coping mechanisms; (ii) monitoring of risk factors and effects on household resilience, and identifying the appropriate course of action; and (iii) a coherent and effective system of information that captures lessons learned and best practices in preparing for and responding to livelihood shocks.

<i>Programme component</i>	<i>USD</i>
Improved household-level food production	28 173 475
Higher incomes and strengthened purchasing power	12 524 875
Higher domestic food quality and nutrition	8 015 315
More adequate food safety	4 611 255
Strengthened institutional capacity	2 048 200
Reinforced operational coordination and evidence-based, food security-related information management	1 734 480

²¹ See Annex 2 for a more detailed description of the JFFLS methodology in the WBGS.

²² The Resilience Analysis Model measures the ability of a household to maintain a certain level of well-being (i.e. being food secure) to withstand shocks and stresses by examining the household's income and food access, access to basic services, assets, social safety nets, stability and adaptive capacity.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

The response strategy to be pursued by FAO in the WBGS is based on the guiding principles set out below. Some are explained further elsewhere in this document, while others are self-explanatory.

- Contribution to key policy objectives, as detailed in the Palestinian National Plan 2011–2013, the Agriculture Sector Strategy “A Shared Vision” 2011–2013, and the United Nations (UN) Medium Term Response Plan (see Introduction and Section 6)
- Benefits to target groups (see Section 3)
- Complementarities with other stakeholders’ interventions (see Section 6)
- Financial and economic cost-benefit
- Contribution to institutional capacity development
- Technical feasibility
- Environmental impact
- Links to FAO’s Global Vision and Strategic Framework 2010–2019 (see Section 3)
- A modified DRM approach (see Section 3)

TARGET GROUPS ²³

The FAO PoA will provide assistance to some 30 000 food-insecure households (i.e. 195 000 people) between 2011 and 2013.²⁴

There are approximately 100 000 small- and medium-scale farmers and herders in the WBGS. In recent years, FAO’s support has reached one-third of this population. Through the PoA, FAO will continue to support around the same number of people annually – one third of small-scale farmers, with specific focus on those experiencing, and vulnerable to, food insecurity. Typical profiles of FAO beneficiaries are as follows:



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²³ See Annex 3 – Detailed beneficiary and targeting analysis.


²⁴ The average food insecure household size in the WBGS is 6.7 members.

Small-scale farmers, herders and fishers

FAO will focus primarily on small-scale and secondarily on medium-scale farmers, herders and fishers because of their limited productive assets (**A**), low income and access to food (**IFA**), and low access to social safety nets (**SSN**), such as food assistance and social security. Their remoteness and the current Israeli-imposed restrictions result in limited access to basic services (**ABS**), such as water, health care and electricity, while their low adaptive capacity (**AC**) results from a low diversity of income sources and the limited number of coping mechanisms available to the household. Finally, smallholders are also characterized by limited professional skills, basic educational level, low employment ratio and a high number of unemployed household members, thus a low level of stability (**S**).

Attaching weighted numerical values to these six components of resilience (using data derived from the survey) provides graphical representations of households' ability to cope with food insecurity, with a smaller area equating to less resilience.

Graph 1 – Resilience (R) by land and livestock ownership



Women


FAO recognizes the specific challenges faced by women and the subsequent importance of assisting women, particularly female-headed households, to achieve its goal of alleviating food insecurity. Protecting women's right to food also ensures the protection of the same rights for children in the family through the agency of women as primary caregivers and household managers. FAO seeks to promote women as agents of development rather than as beneficiaries. In 2009, the Palestinian Authority signed a presidential decree endorsing the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Although the Palestinian Authority, which governs only the West Bank, cannot be a state signatory to CEDAW, the move signifies a political will to incorporate international norms on gender equality into institution building and its future vision.

In the WBGS, women are considered especially vulnerable as are sult of the difficulties they face in accessing labour markets and work opportunities. The participation of Palestinian women in the labour force is only 16 percent, and thus their tangible contribution to economic development and growth in the WBGS is low ²⁵. Women constitute about 49 percent of the total population ²⁶; therefore, a significant proportion of the potential production capacity in local economies is underutilized. ²⁷

However, women contribute to the economy through unpaid informal work, raising children and their role as household managers. The contribution of women to agriculture is significant, yet rarely recognized. Moreover, women are most vulnerable to poverty and discrimination owing to their lower level of income, social exclusion, lack of professional skills and limited access to and/or control over productive assets.

The specific vulnerability of women is reflected in the resilience graph below. It shows that the shape of resilience for rural female-headed households compared to male-headed households is skewed towards a lower level of income, food access and access to assets, and a higher level of dependence on social safety nets.

Graph 2 – Resilience of head of household by gender



FAO'S NEW VISION AND STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK 2010–2019

The Independent External Evaluation (IEE) of FAO conducted in 2006 provided the Organization with leverage for change. To respond to some of the key issues highlighted in the IEE, FAO has realigned its core business towards a new strategic framework, implemented through an initial plan of action for renewal. The strategic framework, which is driven by results-based management (RBM), requires a strengthened planning and reporting capacity, as well as much more effective knowledge sharing in order to achieve the common goals of FAO.

The Vision included in FAO's Strategic Framework 2010–2019 is that by 2020 we will all be living in "a world free of hunger and malnutrition where food and agriculture contribute to improving the living standards of all, especially the poorest, in an economically, socially and environmentally sustainable manner".

²⁵ PCBS, 2009.

²⁶ PCBS (2009), Mid-year estimates (103 males: 100 females).

²⁷ Ibid. 2007.


This will be achieved through the active pursuit of three **Global Goals**:

- reduction in the absolute number of people suffering from hunger, progressively ensuring a world in which all people at all times have sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life;
- elimination of poverty and the driving forward of economic and social progress for all, with increased food production, enhanced rural development and sustainable livelihoods; and
- sustainable management and utilization of natural resources, including land, water, air, climate and genetic resources, for the benefit of present and future generations.

In order to achieve its Global Goals and Vision, FAO has defined 11 **Strategic Objectives**. The Strategic Objectives reflect the Vision of FAO and the three Global Goals of its Members. They focus on where FAO can best assist Members to achieve sustainable impacts in addressing the challenges and opportunities facing food, agriculture and rural development. The Strategic Objectives represent a combination of interlinked sectoral and cross-sectoral impacts, addressing the areas of crops, livestock, fisheries, food safety, forestry, natural resources, enabling environments, food security, gender, emergencies and investment.

CIRCULAR DRM APPROACH ²⁸

The Palestinian situation can be categorized as a chronic emergency with recurring crises. For this reason, it is helpful to conceptualize the relationship between preparedness, response and transition as a circular²⁹ (rather than the traditionally linear) relationship.



Preparedness³⁰: Vulnerability to crises, threats & emergencies is reduced through better preparedness and integration of risk prevention and mitigation into policies, programmes and interventions.

Response: Countries & partners respond more effectively to crises and emergencies with food- and agriculture-related interventions.

Transition: Countries and partners have improved transition and linkages between emergency, rehabilitation and development.

Development-oriented initiatives, such as training and institutional capacity development, serve to improve the population's ability to respond to future natural or human-induced shocks. There is also considerable overlap between preparedness and response, whereby projects designed to reduce vulnerability in periods of calm also serve to bolster livelihoods during upswings in conflict, closure or confiscation. Likewise, the line between response and transition is rarely clear-cut: projects combining emergency and developmental approaches ensure that successful interventions become sustainable and that beneficiaries of emergency interventions can move out of a state of perpetual vulnerability.

²⁸ See Annex 8 – Classification of activities by programme component and link to the DRM model.

²⁹ Other models for DRM approaches, such as a spiral or even Möbius strip, have been proposed. It is not the place of this Plan to discuss their merits; the point is simply to recognize the fact that all three elements flow into each other, and may even be present at the same instant in different locations or subsectors.

³⁰ FAO readers may note that this box and section correspond to the Organizational Results set out in Strategic Objective I of the FAO ten-year vision.

RISK ANALYSIS



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4. RISK ANALYSIS

External risks must be considered in order to ensure an adequate, ongoing understanding of the context of FAO operations during the implementation of the PoA. Risk is defined as the effect of uncertainty on objectives (whether positive or negative). Risk management can, therefore, be considered the identification, assessment and prioritization of risks, followed by the coordinated and economical application of resources to minimize, monitor and control the probability and/or impact of events. A detailed analysis of financial/economic, environmental and political/security risks are outlined in Annex 5.

RISK MONITORING

Regular risk monitoring will be undertaken by FAO WBGS senior management over the period of the PoA in order to establish:

- if any risks have changed;
- which risk controls are being used; and
- the effectiveness of the risk-control actions and techniques.

STEPS PROPOSED WITHIN THE PROGRAMME TO ADDRESS IDENTIFIED RISKS

Financial Economic risks

Given the current global economic situation and the impact this has had on donor funding capacity, FAO will develop a funding strategy for operations in the WBGS to reinforce co-funding mechanisms or joint programming. Fluctuation in the levels of funding will be carefully monitored and additional donors sought.

Led by FAO's monitoring of international markets for food and agricultural inputs, FAO will continue to monitor the impact of global fluctuations on the economic and food security of Palestinians through an annual SEFSec and other monitoring tools. PoA activities will be informed by the results of this monitoring.

Environmental risks

A number of activities within the PoA focus on DRM approaches and are designed to mitigate environmental risks and the impact they have on FAO operations and beneficiaries. These include:

- development of a sector-wide mapping and response tool to better understand the patterns of climatic shocks and address their impact on farmers and herders in the WBGS; and
- capacity enhancement support to the MoA and other institutions to increase the quality of food-safety regulations and standards.

Political Security risks

FAO, as part of the UN Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), will continue to monitor the political situation in the WBGS and periodically review developments in line with programme objectives. Although FAO has a limited mandate to conduct political advocacy, it contributes to policy-level initiatives to protect Palestinians from further reduction in access to land, sea and livelihood resources (e.g. water and agricultural inputs) owing to the political situation, through its participation in the HCT Advocacy Working Group. All advocacy will be conducted under the banner of the UN in the WBGS to ensure that FAO's mandate is not compromised.

In regard to the security risk, FAO contributes to the cost of the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). In the WBGS, UNDSS effectively supports UN agencies, programmes, funds, and organizations and their implementing partners in security management. FAO offices in Jerusalem, Gaza and Ramallah are compliant with the Minimum Operational Security Standards and all travel to the Gaza Strip (Phase IV) is undertaken with full support from UNDSS.

DONOR RESPONSE



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5. DONOR RESPONSE

This section provides information on donor contributions to the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) 2010 in general (Chart 1) and to FAO in particular (Charts 2 and 3) in the WBGs³¹.

Chart 1 shows that some key sectors to food security (i.e. agriculture and education) represent only a marginal contribution to the humanitarian assistance in the WBGs and that food aid remains the most supported humanitarian response.

Chart 1 – Donor contribution to CAP 2010





Chart 2 provides an overview of trends in funding to FAO and highlights, in particular, the relative stability of donor contributions against the CAP (approximately USD 6 million on average since 2007).


Chart 2 – FAO funding trend



³¹ Source: FAO Field Programme Management Information System – November 2010.

Chart 3 provides information on the composition of the FAO portfolio for the WBGS over the same period (2007–2010). FAO interventions during this timeframe have been predominately short-term response interventions, characterized by input transfers. Transition reflects primarily the support to institutional capacity development and group organization (women and youth), while preparedness includes activities aiming to diversify sources of production and income, and supporting productive safety nets.

Chart 3 – Typology of FAO portfolio within a DRM framework model



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RESPONSE IMPLEMENTATION



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6. RESPONSE IMPLEMENTATION

FAO INTERNAL IMPLEMENTING ARRANGEMENTS



FAO contribution to coordination working groups

Chair:

- Agricultural Sector (UN CAP)

Co-chair/lead/technical advisor:

- Agriculture Sector Working Group (LACS)
- Food Sector (WFP, UN CAP)
- Water Scarcity Task Force (Palestinian Water Authority, UNICEF)
- Backyard Food Production Group – Gaza (Oxfam)

Active member:

- Social Protection Working Group; Nutrition Thematic Working Group; Communication Working Group; Advocacy Working Group; Medium Term Response: Food Security, Livelihoods and Employment Strategic Area Group

Main office in Jerusalem: There are 23 international and national employees, including a head of office, programme managers, administrative and finance officers and assistants, procurement assistants, logistics officers and a Food Security Analysis Unit.

Sub-office in Ramallah: The office is staffed with eight national employees in charge of project implementation and food security analysis. In addition, 20 extension agents from the MoA provide project support.

Sub-office in Gaza: Eight national employees are in charge of project implementation. In addition, four extension agents provide technical support to project implementation.

FAO headquarters: The Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division, as budget holder, provides overall administrative and operational support to field operations (five international staff) and reporting support (one international staff). In addition, a multidisciplinary team of experts from relevant technical services provides technical backstopping from headquarters and through field missions.

PARTNERSHIPS

The particular humanitarian context and working environment in the WBGS call for extraordinary levels of performance and effective working relationships among all stakeholders. The FAO Coordination Office in Jerusalem has a solid network of partners, including the Palestinian Authority, UN agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community-based organizations and the private sector. Throughout the implementation of the PoA, FAO will build on existing, successful partnerships and explore the potential for new partnerships in the target locations based on need and the proven competencies of the organizations concerned.

FAO provides direct support to the Palestinian Authority by administering the Agricultural Projects Information System database and acting as Technical Adviser to the Agriculture Sector Working Group for the Local Aid Coordination Secretariat (LACS). FAO is also sector lead for the the Agriculture Sector and co-lead with WFP of the Food Sector within the framework of the UN for the CAP, focussing on humanitarian issues. FAO also co-leads the Water Scarcity Task Force with the Palestinian Water Authority and the United Nations Children's Fund. In the Gaza Strip, FAO and Oxfam lead the Backyard Food Production Group.

FAO also works closely with the Ministry of Social Affairs and the European Union Delegation in Jerusalem in the Social Protection Working Group, and is a member of the Nutrition Thematic Working Group. Within the framework of the UN and the Humanitarian Country Teams FAO is an active member of the Communication Working Group and Advocacy Working Group, as well as a member of the Medium Term Response: Food Security, Livelihoods and Employment Strategic Area Group, which provides a framework for coordinated UN support to the Palestinian Authority's state-building objectives.

FAO is actively involved in UN Joint Programming and provides technical assistance to two ongoing programmes: (i) the Millennium Development Goal Trust Fund, with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women); and (ii) the Human Security Trust Fund, as lead agency with UNESCO, UN Women and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). Both programmes fall under the umbrella of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process. Furthermore, FAO is involved in both humanitarian and longer-term UN joint programming initiatives in East Jerusalem, Jordan Valley and Area C.

Since 2003, through strategic partnership with WFP and UNRWA, FAO has worked on evidence-based food-security monitoring, analysis and information systems. FAO conducts yearly Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis together with WFP, and is currently institutionalizing the SEFSec in collaboration with PCBS and WFP. Furthermore, FAO has developed a Resilience Analysis Model specifically for the WBGS as a project beneficiary impact assessment tool and policy analysis tool. FAO regularly mobilizes Palestinian institutions and consulting firms to conduct specific studies on food-security issues and, together with WFP, publishes regular working papers on food-security profiling topics, as well as market monitoring analysis. FAO intends to scale up this strategic partnership while executing the PoA.

A number of existing partners will continue to be closely involved in the delivery of relief and development, and will assist FAO in reaching its beneficiaries through a variety of agricultural activities. For initiatives in the livestock/veterinary and horticulture sectors, the MoA will remain the main partner; however, the successful revitalization of the agriculture sector will depend on the active participation of a vast number of national and international NGOs and farmers' cooperatives. Institutionalization of the JFFLSs by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education and the Ministry of Youth and Sport (MoYS) will continue to be supported by FAO's involvement with women's associations, while new partnerships to support this methodology will be forged.



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PROGRAMME MONITORING, EVALUATION AND REPORTING



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7. PROGRAMME MONITORING, EVALUATION AND REPORTING

Aligned with the RBM focus of the FAO Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division's Operational Strategy 2010–2013, monitoring, evaluation and learning will be an integral component of FAO's operations in the WBGS through this PoA. Some of the key tools for monitoring the implementation of the PoA's activities are highlighted in the PoA's logical framework (Annex 4). In addition, process monitoring is necessary at activity level, once funding for the proposed activities is secured, in order to ensure that implementation is on-track.

Evaluation and review are indispensable, not only because FAO must be accountable to the needs of its beneficiaries, but also because of the wider political, social and economic impacts of humanitarian aid.

MODALITIES

Monitoring is a system of continuous assessments that is used to measure the extent to which implementation is going according to plan, as well as the use of resources. It is a system of continuous feedback, present throughout the PoA, which feeds into the implementation process and will involve the supervision or periodic review of each activity. Monitoring will be conducted at project level, and guided by logical frameworks developed at the project-design level.

Evaluation is the systematic analysis of operations. It is used to adjust or redefine objectives, reorganize institutional arrangements or redistribute resources to the extent possible. It is intended that a PoA internal review will be undertaken at the end of the first year of implementation (January–December 2011), with a PoA impact evaluation to take place in 2013.


The key criteria for both the review and the impact evaluation will be:

- **effectiveness:** the extent to which the PoA intervention's outcome was achieved, or is expected to be achieved;
- **efficiency:** the cost-effectiveness in achieving outputs, or the ratio of outputs to inputs to achieve the PoA's outcome;
- **impact:** positive or negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by the PoA's interventions, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended; and
- **relevance:** the extent to which the PoA addresses prevailing problems in a changing context.

In addition, the impact evaluation will measure sustainability: the actual and likely continuation of benefits from the PoA's interventions after completion.

Diagram 3 relates the criteria of sustainability, impact, effectiveness, efficiency and relevance to the vertical hierarchy in the PoA's logical framework.

Diagram 3: Relating monitoring and evaluation criteria to the PoA logical criteria³²



³² Adapted from the European Commission Aid Delivery Methods, Volume 1, Project Cycle Management Guidelines – March 2004.



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LEARNING AND REVIEW

The FAO team in the WBGS places considerable importance on documenting experiences and lessons learned, which enables the team to learn from challenges and apply new knowledge and experience to other programmes. In particular, it will help the team to review the current PoA and choose appropriate strategies for the next PoA. Monitoring will involve periodic reviews of the effectiveness of introducing the PoA.

At project level, internal reviews/evaluations will be conducted for funded projects in order to promote continuous programme learning. The main points of project review and evaluation will be documented and shared with relevant stakeholders to ensure transparency, accountability and organizational learning.

REPORTING

Exact reporting mechanisms will depend on programme funding and donor requirements. In addition, an annual report will be prepared and widely distributed, which will concisely assess: (i) the extent to which the PoA's proposed activities have been funded and carried out; (ii) the outputs produced; and (iii) the progress made towards realizing its objectives. It will also present recommendations for future follow-up action arising from the PoA.


ANNEXES



ANNEX 1 – ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between unemployment levels in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with changes in the levels of employment of Palestinians in Israel. As shown, a decrease in the level of employment in Israel correlates with a decrease in the level of unemployment in the West Bank. In the Gaza Strip, fluctuations in unemployment levels are more related to closures during intermittent periods of conflict, although job losses in the Israeli market are also associated with the rise in unemployment levels.


Figure 1: Unemployment versus employment in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel



* Average figure from the first to the third quarter of 2010.

Figure 2 shows an annual change in the consumer price index of food, transportation and all other commodity items. Between 2006 and 2007, the food price index remained relatively stable until 2008. Since 2008, there has been a prevailing increase in the price index of food, with levels by the end of 2010 peaking above the index in 2008.

Figure 2: Consumer price index in the WBGS



ANNEX 2 – JUNIOR FARMER FIELD AND LIFE SCHOOLS (JFFLS) IN THE WBGS



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Since early 2008, FAO WBGS has been implementing JFFLS concepts and practices, targeting rural school girls and boys in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in collaboration with FAO's Gender, Equity and Rural Employment Division, the Ministry of Education and Higher Education and MoYS. To date, over 1 000 young girls and dozens of teachers in rural areas of the WBGS have received training on best practices to improve their knowledge base and life skills through learning about food production, nutrition, ecosystem services, climate change, life and communication skills and cultural understanding, among other topics.

Evaluations carried out during the programme show that youth feel more confident, have higher self-esteem and perform better academically. Teachers reported that students have a positive attitude towards school and that their grades have improved.

In the WBGS, the JFFLS approach has developed two innovative mechanisms that are key for its sustainability. One is the delivery of food by local women's associations to JFFLS students during the sessions. This has increased impact at community level, as well as initiated income-generating activities through small grants to the women involved. The other main innovation has been the systematic enrolment of beneficiaries in local youth clubs run by the MoYS and the Youth Development Association. The strong partnership with the Palestinian Authority's ministries has been crucial to FAO's success in strengthening institutional capacity and fundamental in achieving the main goal of the JFFLS approach – its adequate institutionalization. The inclusion of agricultural lessons in the MoYS' selected youth clubs has been piloted through FAO's interventions in the region and, consequently, the enrolment of JFFLS youths in the clubs.

In addition to government schools, the JFFLSs are being implemented in several UNRWA schools in the Gaza Strip, where UNRWA teachers have received training in JFFLS concepts and approaches, and are sharing the knowledge and skills with their students. This cooperation between FAO and UNRWA is being considered also for the West Bank.

ANNEX 3 – DETAILED BENEFICIARY AND TARGETING ANALYSIS



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In the WBGS, there is growing consensus on the need to harmonize targeting criteria in order to enhance the impact of aid on beneficiaries. Hence, the CAP 2011 indicates that food security, as a goal, can be addressed through different assistance sectors, namely food aid, cash aid and agriculture-based livelihood protection/support. This position is also fully endorsed by the Palestinian Authority.

Within the framework of the social safety-net reform, the Ministry of Social Affairs is to establish and manage a beneficiary database—based on poverty and eligibility criteria—to which all relief and development agencies should refer for beneficiary selection. In the interim, FAO identifies its beneficiaries using selection criteria based on food insecurity and poor socio-economic status. The below beneficiary profiling is based on the output of SEFSec data analysis³³ and will help to improve FAO's beneficiary selection process, as well as lay the foundation for more systematic and quantitative beneficiary impact assessment. FAO is rolling out improved beneficiary targeting and impact assessment within the framework of the gender mainstreaming process and in close consultation with the Food Security and Programme Teams.

Based on the SEFSec, there are an estimated 81 000 households reliant on crop farming, 19 000 reliant on herding and fishing, and 12 000 reliant on a combination of herding and crop farming in the WBGS. Approximately 100 000 of these are small or medium sized. These agriculture-based livelihoods remain closely associated with high food insecurity and vulnerability. The food security of crop farmers and herders in the WBGS is influenced mainly by their available assets. Food insecurity is more prevalent among small-scale herders and farmers with small landholdings, compared to those with larger herds and land sizes. Moreover, food insecurity is generally less severe among crop farmers than among herders, because the former engage in other livelihood opportunities.

Food insecurity affects 18 percent of crop farming households (an estimated 15 000 households), and 32 percent of herding households (an estimated 6 000 households). However, crop farming households are more likely to become food insecure if they are more heavily dependent on farming as a source of income³⁴.

³³ FAO/WFP/PCBS, SEFSec, 2010, WBGS.

³⁴ Households heavily dependent on agriculture are defined as crop farming or herding households that rely on deriving more than 50 percent of their income from agriculture.

In fact, 43 percent of crop farmers who depend on agriculture as a source of income are food insecure, compared to 29 percent among herding households. However, the food-insecurity level of households that practice a combination of herding and crop farming lies somewhere in between when compared to households engaged exclusively in herding or farming. Their food-insecurity level stands at 21 percent, and increases to 25 percent among households that are heavily dependent on agricultural incomes (i.e. over 50 percent of income derived from agriculture).

Profile of crop farmers with >50 percent of income derived from agriculture

The total population of crop farmers in the WBGS deriving more than 50 percent of their income from agriculture is estimated at 39 000 people, or 7 000 households (average family size of 5.6). The average share of income that they generate from agriculture is 88 percent. The difference in the average share of income between food-insecure and vulnerable crop farmers is minimal. Slightly less than half (49 percent) of these crop farmers are either food insecure or vulnerable (3 356 households). The average income of food-insecure and vulnerable crop farming households is USD 3 (adult/day), while that of the average crop farmer is USD 5 (adult/day). The expenditure level of a food-insecure and vulnerable crop farmer is USD 3.5 (adult/day), meaning that these households are likely living off of credit. In comparison, the average expenditure of a crop farmer amounts to USD 6 (adult/day).

Definition of landholding size

Small-scale farmers:	1 dunum
Medium-scale farmers:	4 dunums
Large-scale farmers:	284 dunums

A food-insecure and vulnerable crop farming household is slightly larger in size and has more child members than the average crop farming household. However, food-insecure and vulnerable farming households plant on smaller plots of land (6 dunums) than the average (10 dunums). They rely on rainfed field crops and are vulnerable to drought. The average unemployment rate among food-insecure and vulnerable households is as high as 53 percent, as compared with 31 percent among the average crop farming household. This leads to a higher dependency ratio (i.e. the average number of dependants to each employed member) among food-insecure and vulnerable households, which have 5.6 dependants to each employed member, as compared with 4.8 members among the average farming household.

Profile of herding households with >50 percent of income derived from agriculture

The total herding population that derives over 50 percent of income from agriculture is estimated at 20 400 people, or 3 200 households (average family size of 6.4). The average share of income derived from agriculture among herding households is 90 percent; and the difference between that of food-insecure and vulnerable herders is minimal (1 percent higher). These households are mainly concentrated in Area C of the West Bank, where access to grazing

Definition of herd size

Small-scale herder:	4 head
Medium-scale herder:	24 head
Large-scale herder:	127 head

land, water and shelter is restricted. Herding communities in Area C face additional protection issues due to the constraints in developing infrastructure in the areas they inhabit. Over 40 percent of this population group is food insecure and vulnerable (1 333 households).

Large household sizes are characteristic of herding communities. The average size of food-insecure and vulnerable households is 7.7 members. Moreover, the average unemployment rate of food-insecure and vulnerable herders is nearly double that of the average herding household (59 percent and 31 percent, respectively). Similar to crop farming households, this leads to a higher dependency ratio among food-insecure and vulnerable herders (average of around seven dependants per employed member, as compared with five dependants per employed member among the average herding household).

The average income and expenditure (adult/day) among food-insecure and vulnerable herding households is as low as USD 3 and USD 3.6, respectively – which is half that of the average herding household. Despite this, food-insecure and vulnerable households on average own a larger flock of goats and sheep (33 head) as compared with the average herding household (30 head). The type of flock owned has an impact on food-insecurity levels; owning more sheep than goats and one to two cows leads to improved food security.

Profile of mixed herding and crop farming households

The total population relying on income from a mixed livelihood of herding and crop farming is 87 100 people, or 12 000 households (average family size of 7.4 members). This group possesses an average of 7.6 dunums of land and cultivates mostly fruit trees (5.2 dunums) and vegetables (1.2 dunums). More than 60 percent of their cultivation is rainfed. These households keep a variety of livestock, which on average includes 14 head of sheep, 9 head of goats and 150 head of poultry. Mixed herding and crop farming households derive 29 percent of their income from agriculture. However, other sources contribute to their income, such as the private sector (37 percent), public sector (14 percent) and Israel (9 percent). Their average income and expenditures are generally much higher, at USD 8 and USD 7.8 (adult/day), respectively, compared to groups relying exclusively on crop farming or herding.

Food insecurity and vulnerability affect 28 percent (3 300 households) of the mixed herding and crop farming group. The food-insecure and vulnerable households are similarly characterized by a larger household size (8.5 members). On average, they are exclusively cultivating 5 dunums of land with fruit trees (66 percent) and field crops (34 percent). Their livestock holdings are smaller in size (an average of six sheep, ten goats and eight poultry). They rely on deriving 31 percent of their income from agriculture, but also generate on average 43 percent from private sector employment and 7 percent from public sector employment. Their average income and expenditure levels (adult/day) are as low as USD 3.4 and USD 3.7, respectively.

Additionally, an estimated 3 731 households are food insecure and vulnerable to food insecurity. They consist of unemployed heads of households and rely on deriving less than 50 percent of their income from agriculture. They are an equally important target group due to the potential to enhance their income through agriculture and improve their resilience to food insecurity.

The groups targeted by the PoA are those with limited resilience to food insecurity and facing predictable food insecurity. These people require full attention through a combination of short- and medium-term interventions. The interventions foreseen under the PoA are designed to increase resilience by enhancing people's ability to manage risk over time, and to diminish the need for humanitarian interventions when hazards occur. Household resilience to food insecurity is defined as a household's ability to maintain a certain level of well-being (food security) in the face of risks, depending on that household's available options to make a living and on its ability to handle risks.

Women

In the WBGS, humanitarian problems and everyday challenges have a disproportionately adverse socio-economic effect on girls and women. This is acknowledged in the Security Council Resolution 13/25, which requires all parties during conflict to consider and protect the specific needs of women. The principle of non-discrimination is a fundamental prerequisite to protecting human rights. However, promoting gender equality often necessitates focusing on the specific rights of women in order to ensure that gender equity is achieved under this principle.



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Palestinian women suffer under both the protracted political situation and in the context of a strict social patriarchy. Women in rural areas, with rural livelihoods and/or children can be especially vulnerable.³⁵ In light of historical, social and political factors, women face greater difficulties in becoming economically active, and asserting entitlement over land and resources as they are often not recognized as contributors to the household economy due to their low labour force participation and the constraints they face in obtaining employment. Men also face challenges in terms of physical access to land, resources and the labour market due to Israeli-enforced movement and access restrictions (e.g. closures, the blockade of Gaza) and often face threats to their physical security in accessing livelihoods (e.g. farming near military training areas, in the West Bank Seam Zone, the Buffer Zone in the Gaza Strip). Without access to productive resources, people's economic well-being and ability to provide for their family's basic needs are limited.

FAO TARGETED POPULATION

<i>Food-insecure and vulnerable herders and crop farmers heavily dependent on agriculture (deriving over 50 percent of their income from agriculture)</i>	<i>Households</i>	<i>Total population</i>
Food-insecure crop farmers	2 985	18 848
Vulnerable crop farmers	371	2 001
Food-insecure herders	912	7 808
Vulnerable herders	421	2 480
Food-insecure mixed (herding and crop) farmers	745	6 305
Vulnerable mixed (herding and crop) farmers	116	466
<i>Food-insecure and vulnerable herders and crop farmers partially dependent on agriculture (deriving 50 percent or less of their income from agriculture) with an unemployed head of the household</i>		
Food-insecure crop farmers	685	5 059
Vulnerable crop farmers	688	4 729
Food-insecure herders	1 511	10 714
Vulnerable herders	125	376
Food-insecure mixed (herding and crop) farmers	500	3 903
Vulnerable mixed (herding and crop) farmers	222	2 010
Total	9 281	64 699



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³⁵ FAO (2008) Women and the Right to Food: International Law and State Practice p.12, available at http://www.fao.org/righttofood/publi_en.htm.

ANNEX 4 – LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

	Indicators	Means of verification	Assumptions
Goal – Improved food security	By the end of 2013: Food security of targeted beneficiaries is maintained or improved (baseline 2010: 33 percent food insecure; 13 percent vulnerable to food insecurity; 21 percent marginally food secure; 33 percent food secure).	FAO programme evaluation compared to SEFSec 2010 baseline.	
Outcomes			
• Higher economic access to food	By the end of 2013: Food expenditure out of total expenditures for targeted households is reduced by 10 percent (baseline 2010: 53 percent of expenditure is spent on food; households spending over 44 percent of expenditure on food are worst off). Improved access to micronutrients among beneficiaries (baseline: 50 percent of West Bank food-insecure households with poor and borderline food consumption score; 39 percent of Gaza Strip food-insecure households with poor and borderline food consumption score).	FAO programme evaluation compared to SEFSec 2010 baseline, food consumption score patterns.	Food prices do not further increase dramatically between 2011 and 2013.
• Improved food utilization			
Programme component 1			
• Improved household-level food production	By the end of 2013: Farm production per unit of land (mainly vegetables and livestock, plus by-products) of 24 000 households is increased by at least 5 percent.	FAO programme evaluation (baseline currently being finalized).	No major natural disasters (pests, droughts, animal disease outbreaks). Access to natural resources (land and water) is not further restricted.
Programme component 2			
• Higher incomes and strengthened purchasing power	By the end of 2013: • Nominal wages of 30 000 households are increased through improved farming and agroprocessing activities. • 70 percent of small-enterprises and women associations supported by the programme are profitable.	SEFSec annual report and ad hoc surveys. Resilience Model Analysis.	Access to market outlets in WBGS is not further restricted or impeded by Israeli separation wall. Demand for locally made food items increases.
Programme component 3			
• Higher domestic food quality and nutrition	By the end of 2013: • 2 000 households have increased knowledge in food utilization, production, packaging and labelling.	Ad hoc pre- and post-intervention survey.	Experts are nationally available to organize food storage and food processing trainings.
Programme component 4			
• More adequate food safety	By the end of 2013: • Food safety regulatory framework is endorsed and enforced (baseline: no food safety regulatory framework). • Veterinary laboratory is operational and delivering phytosanitary certificates (baseline: no operational, central veterinary laboratory services).	Percentage increase in Global GAP standards certification. Veterinary lab reports of granted certification in accordance with WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS Agreement) and Codex Alimentarius.	Partners involved in the Trade and Productive Capacity Cluster remain committed and activities continue to be coordinated in a synergetic manner.
Programme component 5			
• Strengthened institutional capacity	By the end of 2013: • Secretariat is established with Terms of Reference and an annual work plan. • "Shared Vision" and Action Plan are implemented and monitored. • Policy papers are established and implemented on soaring food prices, food safety and natural resource valorization.	Internal sectoral review with partners and donors.	Political stability within the Palestinian National Authority.
Programme component 6			
• Reinforced operational coordination and evidence-based, food security-related information management	By the end of 2013: • A sector-wide system of monitoring economic and food-security shocks is established and utilized for the WBGS. • Standard operating procedures are established for water scarcity per livelihood. • Agriculture sector is effectively represented in the CAP and MTRP.	Internal sectoral review with partners and donors.	True partnership model is conducive to further maintain an enabling environment for sharing information and analysis.

ANNEX 5 – “WHAT IF” RISK ANALYSIS

Key Risks		Impact	Probability	Assumptions
Financial/Economic				
Insufficient, and/or uneven delays in, funding due to the financial uncertainty of the global aid sector.	Insufficient funding would hamper FAO's capacity to meet PoA objectives in the WBGS, particularly with regard to human resource capacity to maintain/scale-up activities.	Moderately probable.	Donor contribution to FAO remains in the same range for the period 2011–2013.	
	The 'humanitarian focus' of donor support (through the CAP) would reduce FAO's capacity in the areas of early recovery, food-security analysis and institutional capacity development.	Highly probable. As the CAP remains the sole channel of funding in the WBGS, new initiatives, such as the UN Trust Fund, are not funded to-date.		
Dramatic fluctuations are experienced in international markets for food and agricultural inputs.	Unpredictable increases in the cost of food products for Palestinians would increase vulnerability to food insecurity and dependence on food assistance as humanitarian response.	Highly probable. In February 2011, global food prices increased for the eighth consecutive month.	Menu option for addressing high food prices is in place.	
	Continued spikes in the cost of agricultural inputs, such as fodder, would limit FAO operations to emergency response in order to mitigate the impact of these costs.			
Environmental				
Worsening of climatic conditions.	Recurrent drought <ul style="list-style-type: none">Recurrent drought in pastoral and agricultural areas would worsen the water scarcity problem for herders and farmers, increase dependence on purchased tankered water, and reduce the effectiveness of water storage response options (cisterns).Uneven distribution of rains would mainly affect farmers through yield reduction.	Highly probable. Given the geographical conditions, drought impacts farmers and herders regularly.	Climatic conditions are favourable for farming and livestock-rearing activities.	
	Flash flooding <ul style="list-style-type: none">Floods or excessive rains would increase the risk of diseases for humans and livestock. The outbreak of animal diseases would weaken animal production.Floods or excessive rains would destroy crops, increase prices and, therefore, put a strain on vulnerability to food insecurity.	Moderately probable. Over the past three years, there have been flash floods annually. Flooding has been mainly contained within the Jordan Valley Area and the Gaza Strip.		

Animal and plant disease.	Outbreaks of transmissible animal diseases (including transboundary) would increase the risk of livestock mortality and morbidity, thereby worsening food insecurity.	Moderately/highly probable. The absence of food safety regulation and border inspection (especially through the tunnels to Gaza) significantly increases the likelihood of transmission of transboundary diseases. There is a lack of institutional capacity to identify and respond to outbreaks in order to mitigate the impact and spread of pests and diseases.	Outbreaks will be contained and loss of livelihood assets among the population will be minimal.
	Further diffusion of plant diseases, such as tuta absoluta, would reduce crop yields and overall production, contributing to an increase in market prices.		Outbreaks will be contained and damage to crops will be contained.
Political context/Security			
The political context dramatically worsens and violent conflict erupts.	A dramatic deterioration in the political situation in the WBGS could obstruct FAO's capacity to implement operations due to security considerations and access to beneficiaries.	<u>Moderately probable.</u> Although high-level political talks are ongoing in the WBGS, there has been little improvement for Palestinians on the ground. A high level of violent conflict is not expected; however, the ongoing smaller incidents may lead to tightened security measures.	High-level political negotiations and the international 'profile' of the WBGS reduce the likelihood of deterioration in the security situation.
Dramatic reduction in access to agricultural areas.	A further reduction in access to agricultural land (and the sea in Gaza) would result in lower productivity and further economic losses for farmers and pastoralist herders, and a general further decline in the agriculture sector.	<u>Highly probable.</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Despite statistics showing a lower number of security checkpoints in the West Bank, continued settlement expansion, settler violence, restrictions on movement and the Separation Barrier continue to further restrict access to land. The blockade of Gaza and ongoing incursions continue to limit access to the land and sea for livelihood activities. 	The political/security context does not see an increase in Israeli settlement expansion and security checkpoints, etc. The blockade of Gaza ends.
Internal political divide worsens.	<p>A division in the political factions between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would continue to challenge the operations of FAO, through difficulties in procuring agricultural inputs for Gaza, staff movement and access, and a successful integrated FAO response in the WBGS.</p> <p>Continuation of the current aid policy limitations on programming in the Gaza Strip may have funding implications on Gaza operations if the political situation worsens.</p> <p>A tightening of 'accountability' by the defacto government in the Gaza Strip would limit the safe space for humanitarian operations in the Gaza Strip.</p>	<p><u>Low probability.</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Although the political tensions within the WBGS are not evidently improving, FAO has managed to maintain a presence and programme in the Gaza Strip through careful monitoring and risk analysis of the situation. Security levels in the Gaza Strip have not worsened significantly since Operation Cast Lead in 2009. 	The political situation between factions within the WBGS improves or stays the same.

ANNEX 6 – BUDGET PER RESULT/COMPONENT

Plan of Action budget summary 2011 - 2013							
Expenses	Costs	Component 1	Component 2	Component 3	Component 4	Component 5	Component 6
1. Human Resources	7 926 000	1 645 050	1 645 050	1 443 450	1 241 850	949 800	1 000 800
2. Travel	600 000	96 200	96 200	96 200	96 200	111 200	104 000
3. Contracts	8 800 000	4 500 000	2 490 000	590 000	1 120 000	0	100 000
4. Training	1 560 000	216 000	270 000	162 000	324 000	516 000	72 000
5. Expendable procurement	30 300 000	18 810 000	6 540 000	4 710 000	240 000	0	0
6. Non-expendable procurement	1 200 000	90 000	90 000	30 000	915 000	30 000	45 000
7. Technical support services	540 000	90 000	90 000	90 000	90 000	90 000	90 000
8. Operational running costs	990 000	165 000	165 000	165 000	165 000	165 000	165 000
9. Total direct costs	51 916 000	25 612 250	11 386 250	7 286 650	4 192 050	1 862 000	1 576 800
Administrative costs (10%)	5 191 600	2 561 225	1 138 625	728 665	419 205	186 200	157 680
10. Total costs	57 107 600	28 173 475	12 524 875	8 015 315	4 611 255	2 048 200	1 734 480

ANNEX 7 – PROGRAMME COMPONENTS

Programme component 1: Improved household-level food production

Given the current limited availability of, and further reduced access to, natural resources (water, land and sea), this programme component focuses on the imperative to develop effective and sustainable production units. This will be achieved essentially through improved quality input and knowledge transfer. This component will also include preparedness elements for the outbreak of pests and diseases and the development of a rapid response capacity.

Activity 1.1: Support and develop effective and sustainable food production systems, through:

- boosting fruit and vegetable cultivation through the provision of essential, quality inputs and technical support;
- providing in-kind and technical support to poor families to enable them to continue/establish backyard food production (plant, livestock and aquaculture units); and
- restoring and protecting herders' livelihoods through quality inputs and fodder distribution.

Activity 1.2: Improve water availability and management for irrigation and livestock, through:

- constructing and/or repairing rainwater harvesting cisterns to support vulnerable farmers in agricultural production and assure enough water to herders for their animals;
- repairing and improving the efficiency of groundwater wells for irrigation;
- establishing/repairing irrigation systems (networks) and conveying systems (pipelines) to improve water transportation from the water source to farmers' plots, thereby increasing efficiency;
- enhancing wastewater treatment and reuse at the community and household levels; and
- improving the management of water resources (irrigation networks, water storage and grey water treatment and reuse).

Activity 1.3: Rehabilitate damaged/unproductive agricultural infrastructure and production assets (e.g. farmland, greenhouses and animal shelters).

Activity 1.4: Support necessary services to farmers and herders and improve their access to them, through:

- supporting preparedness elements for the outbreak of pests and diseases, and the development of rapid response capacity;
- providing in-kind and technical support for veterinary services and vaccination programmes to assist herders without access to basic government services; and
- providing in-kind and technical support to enhance the use of drought-tolerant crop seeds and shrub seedlings (the use of area-specific, drought-tolerant seeds and seedlings reduces costly water expenses and increases the availability of animal fodder).

Activity 1.5: Support fisheries-based livelihoods through the provision of essential inputs and training.

Activity 1.6: Provide technical and in-kind support to optimize natural resource management and utilize local food and agriculture heritage.

Programme component budget:

Expenses	Amount in USD
Human Resources	1 645 050
Travel	96 200
Contracts	4 500 000
Training	216 000
Non-expendable procurement	18 810 000
Technical support services	90 000
Operational running costs	90 000
Administrative costs (10%)	2 561 225
Total costs	28 173 475

Programme component 2: Higher incomes and strengthened purchasing power

This programme component will evaluate rural job and market opportunities for individuals and groups. FAO will promote women's associations and small-scale enterprises, with focus on diversification and better access to markets. FAO will also reinforce linkages with existing food-for-work programmes as a potential marketing opportunity for local production.

Activity 2.1: Improve the performance of farmers', herders' and women's groups and associations through developing/enhancing their business plans and quality management systems, and improving their linkages with available support services and opportunities (e.g. microfinance, extension, veterinary services and marketing companies).

Activity 2.2: Support livestock farmers to increase productivity, profitability and income through innovative approaches, such as establishing/improving the services of feed/service centres, enhancing artificial insemination using improved genetic material, and providing training on improved flock management, hygiene and protective health practices and alternative feed production.

Activity 2.3: Provide necessary in-kind support and training to vulnerable women and their associations in food processing, cottage industry, quality and safety, and marketing skills, and enhance their access to local and external markets.

Activity 2.4: Enhance employment opportunities and income generation through agricultural activities, such as land reclamation, establishment/rehabilitation of agricultural infrastructure and assets, and forestation of new lands.

Programme component budget:

<i>Expenses</i>	<i>Amount in USD</i>
Human Resources	1 645 050
Travel	96 200
Contracts	2 490 000
Training	270 000
Expendable procurement – inputs	6 540 000
Non-expendable procurement	90 000
Technical support services	90 000
Operational running costs	165 000
Administrative costs (10%)	1 138 625
Total cost	12 524 875



Programme component 3: Higher domestic food quality and nutrition

This component focuses in particular on strengthening education and knowledge related to food quality, preservation, post-harvest handling and nutrition. FAO will continue its activities at the community and institutional levels, with special focus on the following interventions.

Activity 3.1: Enhance good agricultural practices (GAP) and quality standards in food production at the micro and institutional levels, through:

- providing necessary inputs and technical support to enable farmers to access and adopt market-oriented quality standards and obtain local and/or international quality certifications (e.g. GlobalGAP and organic farming);
- providing technical support to MoA and the Palestinian Standard Institute to develop and adapt local quality standards for agricultural produce; and
- improving the knowledge and awareness of producers, traders, consumers and related stakeholders on quality standards and quality brands.

Activity 3.2: Enhance the knowledge base and life skills of vulnerable rural youth through JFFLSs, and contribute to their income-generating opportunities and positive involvement in their communities.

Activity 3.3: Enhance household dietary diversification and the nutrition value of locally produced fresh food through tailored in-kind support, training and awareness-raising activities, targeting in particular women and youth.

Programme component budget:

<i>Expenses</i>	<i>Amount in USD</i>
Human Resources	1 443 450
Travel	96 200
Contracts	590 000
Training	162 000
Expendable procurement – inputs	4 710 000
Non-expendable procurement	30 000
Technical support services	90 000
Operational running costs	165 000
(Administrative costs (10%	728 665
Total cost	8 015 315



Programme component 4: More adequate food safety

This programme component will be FAO's contribution to the existing interministerial platform on food safety, led by the Ministry of National Economy in partnership with the MoA and the Ministry of Health. This will include support to regulatory frameworks for food safety, services (laboratory systems) and processes (animal identification).

Activity 4.1: Provide in-kind and technical support to Veterinary Services and other related services of MoA to develop a sustainable system with adequate procedures for the identification and traceability of animals and animal products, create a central database for animal farms and livestock owners in the WBGS, and establish a process for the regular updating of the database.

Activity 4.2: Provide the necessary technical support to MoA for upgrading and expanding the central Veterinary Laboratory, which is crucial to ensure effective surveillance and accurate diagnosis of common animal diseases and pests.

Activity 4.3: Provide technical, policy and coordination support to MoA and other stakeholders in regard to food-safety issues.

Programme component budget:

Expenses	Amount in USD
Human Resources	1 241 850
Travel	96 200
Contracts	1 120 000
Training	324 000
Expendable procurement – inputs	240 000
Non-expendable procurement	915 000
Technical support services	90 000
Operational running costs	165 000
Administrative costs (10%)	419 205
Total cost	4 611 255

Programme component 5: Strengthened institutional capacity

Over the past year, FAO has been supporting the agricultural community led by MoA through the development of the Agriculture Sector Strategy “A Shared Vision” 2011–2013, which feeds into the new cycle of the Palestinian National Plan for 2011–2013. The strategy was developed through a comprehensive, countrywide consultative process in all districts of the WBGs and involved all relevant stakeholders (e.g. the Government, NGOs, the private sector, UN agencies, donors and farmers’ associations).

Realizing this vision calls for a series of policy reforms and action planning for the implementation of innovative development programmes. This will require strengthened capacity within MoA and among relevant stakeholders in sector planning, investment programme preparation, food-security analysis, evaluation and related information management (statistics, information systems). FAO will continue its technical support to enhance institutional capacity, with special focus in the areas detailed below.

Activity 5.1: Support and enhance the capacity of MoA and relevant stakeholders in the implementation of the Agriculture Sector Strategy “A Shared Vision” 2011–2013, a part of the overall Palestinian National Development Plan for 2011–2013. This will include:

- supporting MoA in the development of a comprehensive action plan for “A Shared Vision”, through a countrywide participatory process to identify and prioritize the necessary interventions to fulfill objectives identified in the strategy;
- establishing and operationalizing a Sector Strategy Secretariat within MoA to guide and oversee a sound and adaptive roll-out of “A Shared Vision”, including financial and policy coordination and taking into consideration emerging challenges, such as the recent soaring food prices and water shortage; and
- provision of technical support to establish a functional food-security board that will develop, monitor and coordinate food-security policies, based on evidence-based information analysis.

Activity 5.2: Continue supporting the management and utilization of the Agricultural Projects Information System, a web-based response monitoring tool with 170 members.

Activity 5.3: Support an interstakeholder Water Scarcity Task Force.

Activity 5.4: At national level, FAO will continue working with and offering technical assistance to the MoA, the Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development, the Ministry of Education and Higher Education, the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. This assistance will include coordination, assessments, training, technical assistance and the formulation of policy papers and plans.

Programme component budget:

<i>Expenses</i>	<i>Amount in USD</i>
Human Resources	949 800
Travel	111 200
Training	516 000
Non-expendable procurement	30 000
Technical support services	90 000
Operational running costs	165 000
Administrative costs (10%)	186 200
Total cost	2 048 200

Programme component 6: Reinforced operational coordination and evidence-based, food security-related information management

Effective and efficient use of resources in agriculture-related interventions depends, to a great extent, on the ability of stakeholders to make proper use of food-security information and coordinate interventions in order to avoid overlap and gaps.

As such, FAO's Emergency and Rehabilitation Coordination Unit in the WBGS has been a central provider of food-security information and technical agricultural advice for the humanitarian community since 2002. This was made possible through the development of a partnership approach, which entailed engaging in dialogue with NGOs and other partners, involving them in policy and strategy discussions, and learning respect and trust.

Therefore, this programme component aims to consolidate operational coordination mechanisms and ensure that medium- and long-term perspectives are kept in mind in the planning of sector response by promoting agricultural recovery and the rebuilding of livelihoods and food security from the earliest possible moment – and discouraging short-term actions that could have negative long-term effects.

Activity 6.1: Convene and manage meetings and ensure coordinated support to national authorities and efforts, as appropriate.

Activity 6.2: Assure efficient information management.

- Agricultural Projects Information System:
- FAO will assure a smooth and progressive transfer of the Web site to the MoA as its capacity for information technology is being built. However, FAO will continue providing support to the management of the Agricultural Projects Information System, as appropriate.
- Coordination and information fora:
- The dissemination of agriculture- and food security-related information will be ensured through position papers, thematic maps and FAO's participation in the HCT, EU Informal Humanitarian Policy Dialogue Forum ("Friday Group"), Water Scarcity Task Force and Protection Cluster (Displacement Working Group).

Activity 6.3: Coordinate assessments and analysis.

- FAO will continue supporting and mainstreaming the SEFSec Monitoring System Resilience Analysis.



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Integrating the concept of resilience into food-security analysis has recently been piloted by FAO in the WBGS. It aims to measure the capability of households to absorb the negative effects of unpredictable shocks as a legitimate component of vulnerability analysis. Considering that exposure to risk (e.g. soaring food prices, financial crises) is often unpredictable, resilience must therefore be measured in a systemic manner. A resilience approach investigates not only how disturbances and change may influence the structure of a system, but also how ways of meeting needs may change.

Activity 6.4: Build consensus on response priorities, strategies and standards (forming sub-working groups, as needed) in relation to:

- drought cycle and water scarcity management;
- soaring food and input prices;
- natural calamities; and
- economic or political shocks.

Activity 6.5: Coordinate the preparation of relevant sections of interagency appeals.

- FAO will continue acting as the lead agency for agriculture and co-lead for the Food Security Cluster (if and when rolled out) in the framework of the CAP and flash appeals.
- FAO will contribute to the consultative and updating process of the joint UN Medium Term Response Plan, which defines the complementary roles of UN agencies in the Palestinian National Development Plan.

Activity 6.6: Monitor sector performance.

- With the understanding that successful sector management requires a system to analyse its efficiency and effectiveness, FAO will involve partners and plan interventions if sector performance needs improvement.

Programme component budget:

Expenses	Amount in USD
Human Resources	1 000 800
Travel	104 000
Contracts	100 000
Training	72 000
Non-expendable procurement	45 000
Technical support services	90 000
Operational running costs	165 000
Administrative costs (10%)	157 680
Total cost	1 734 480

Annex 8 – Classification of activities by programme component and link to DRM model

			Programme component 1: Improved food production	Programme component 2: Improved household income	Programme component 3: Higher domestic food quality and nutrition	Programme component 4: More adequate food safety
Transition	Response	Preparedness	Monitoring and analysis	Monitoring and analysis		
			Leadership and coordination			
			Building resilience of communities and households		Training and awareness	
			Preparedness for and response to pests and diseases			
			Distribution of inputs	Job creation/short-term livelihood support		
			Rehabilitation of assets	Improving business skills		
			Sustainable agriculture interventions	Sustainable income generation	Improving food storage, processing and packaging facilities	
			Advocacy	Improving quality and marketability		
				Advocacy		
			Research and development	Supporting investment	Quality standards and benchmarking	
			Access to credit	Marketing channels and exports		
			Infrastructure development	Capacity building of cooperatives	Testing and laboratory facilities	
			Institutional capacity building	Market information system	Animal identification system	



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PREPARING FOR, AND RESPONDING TO,
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