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Acronyms

A4A	Agenda for Action
ACF	Action Contre la Faim
AFIS	Agriculture and Food Information System
AGIR	Alliance Globale pour l'Initiative Résilience
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
ASIS	Agriculture Stress Index System
AU	African Union
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CFS	Committee on World Food Security
CH	Cadre harmonisé d'analyse permanente de la vulnerabilité courante
CILSS	Interstate Permanent Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPF	Country Programme Framework
CSM	Civil Society Mechanism (of the CFS)
DDS	Dietary Diversity Score
EC	European Commission
EC-JRC	European Commission – Joint Research Centre
ESA	Agricultural Development Economics Division of FAO
ESS	Statistics Division of FAO
ESW	Gender, Equity and Rural Deployment Division of FAO
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FAPDA	Food and Agricultural Policy Decision Analysis tool
FCS	Food Consumption Score
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warming Systems Network
FIES	Food Insecurity Experience Scale
FSIN	Food Security Information Network
HLEF	High Level Expert Forum
HLPE	High Level Panel of Experts
HLTF	High Level Task Force on Food Security
ICN	International Conference on Nutrition
IEE	Independent External Evaluation
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IGAD	Inter Governmental Authority for Development in East Africa
IGGHR	Improved Global Governance for Hunger Reduction
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
ISFNS	Information Systems on Food and Nutrition Security
LEGS	Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards
LOA	Letter of Agreement
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
MAFSAN	Mapping Actions for Food Security and Nutrition
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MOSAICC	Modelling System for Agricultural Impacts of Climate Change
MTE	Mid-term Evaluation
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
OED	Office of Evaluation
OEWG	Open-Ended Working Group

PSC	Programme Steering Committee
RAI	Responsible Agricultural Investment
RBA	Rome-based agencies
REACH	Renewed Effort Against Child Hunger and Under-nutrition
REC	Regional Economic Community
SHARE	Supporting the Horn of Africa's Resilience
SICA	Central American Information System
SIFSIA	Sudan Institutional Capacity Programme: Food Security Information for Action
SO	Strategic Objective
SOFI	State of Food Insecurity in the World
SUN	Scaling Up Nutrition
SWAP	UN System Wide Action Plan on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment
TCI	Investment Centre of FAO
TWG	Technical Working Group
VGs	Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

Executive Summary

Introduction

ES1. The 'Improved Global Governance for Hunger Reduction' programme, designed at the end of 2011, began with a six-month inception phase at the start of 2012, and has been in implementation since mid-2012. Principally funded by the EU with 30 million euros, the programme is managed by FAO, which is also contributing approximately 17 million euros. The Programme's overall objective is 'better coordinated and informed food security and nutrition governance at global, regional and national levels'; it is organised around four outcomes and 21 outputs. This Mid-Term Evaluation was carried out 18 months into the programme, to assess progress achieved so far and to provide strategic advice and recommendations for implementation over the next two years.

Context

ES2. The programme is particularly relevant to the Millennium Development Goal on hunger reduction, and to efforts to reform the Committee on Food Security to strengthen global governance for food security that began in 2008.

ES3. Two recent paradigm shifts in the approach to food security have also impacted the programme. The first relates to the concept of resilience, now placed centre-stage by many development and humanitarian actors in their strategies, policies and programming around food security. FAO has played a leading role in this debate. Resilience is now also a strategic priority for WFP and the EU. This has become a priority theme for the programme. The second paradigm shift is the renewed emphasis on nutrition, triggered by evidence that this has been neglected by the international development agenda in recent years, whilst high rates of chronic under-nutrition persist. This is now being given renewed emphasis by both the EU and FAO, and has also been identified as a priority area for the programme.

Project concept and design

ES4. This programme was an opportunity for the EC to shift from funding a range of discrete FAO projects to developing a larger more strategic programme embedded in FAO's regular work programme that also supported FAO's process of reform. It was also seen as an opportunity to promote greater collaboration between the three Rome-based agencies. While some within FAO recognised the opportunity to develop a more strategic and coherent body of work, others saw it as a way to fund a wide range of existing FAO technical work on food security. This latter perspective contributed to a wide range of disparate projects being packaged into the programme at the outset. Since then, programme management provided by FAO Agricultural Development Economics Division (ESA) has been working hard to pull this into a more coherent and strategic body of work.

ES5. The programme lacked a conceptual analytic framework to underpin and provide intellectual coherence to its design, and subsequently implementation. There was a missed opportunity to build on work done for an FAO workshop on 'Good Food Security Governance' in late 2011. Also missing was a contextual analysis (or synthesis of existing analyses) of the current state of global governance which could have helped identify where the programme could make greatest contribution. Instead, the programme tended to build on what FAO was already doing or planning to do, in a somewhat *ad hoc* manner.

ES6. Limited time and resources meant there was little opportunity for countries and regions to engage in the programme identification stage. Programme design was therefore mainly headquarters-driven. It was also FAO-driven. Once it had been designed, WFP and IFAD were presented with a menu of outputs and asked where they would like to engage. For this to have been a truly collaborative programme, it would have required a very different approach from the outset in which FAO, WFP and IFAD would jointly design and manage it.

Analysis of the implementation process: management and coordination

ES7. There are considerable challenges to managing a programme of this scale and diversity, including rectifying some of the early design flaws. The Programme Coordinator and Coordination Team appointed by ESA have been pivotal to the success of the programme so far, but are also overstretched by the demands of managing it. Detailed monitoring processes to track performance have been put in place, including the Programme Assessment Matrix and the (now revised) logframe. While these are appropriate monitoring tools, they provide very detailed information for internal consumption, and programme management has struggled to communicate to external stakeholders a more strategic overview of the programme's achievements. This must be improved in the second half of the programme.

ES8. FAO's demanding bureaucratic and regulatory procedures have caused delays and inefficiencies in parts of the programme, especially where Letters of Agreement have to be drawn up and managed with implementing partners. This finding is also common to other FAO evaluations.

ES9. There are a number of ways in which the coordination structures of the programme could be strengthened. The PSC, the principal coordination body, comprises the main stakeholders of the programme, but could be strengthened with one or two individual independent members who do not have a vested institutional interest. The Technical Working Group, currently internal to FAO, could be strengthened by the membership of WFP and IFAD. Country coordination groups, formed for each of the programme's focus countries, play an important function in coordinating outputs at the headquarters level, but more emphasis needs to be placed on strengthened partnership between the EU and RBAs at field level.

ES10. The programme also works through numerous other coordination structures that relate to particular outputs, including the structures of the CFS, the IPC, the FSIN and the CAADP Nutrition Capacity Development Initiative.

Programme performance and progress

ES11. The programme had an achievement rate of 80 to 85% against planned activities in the first eighteen months. Achievement rates were highest for 'Outcome 1, Strengthened CFS', and 'Outcome 2, Better informed food security decision-making processes', partly because these were building on activities that had started before the programme. 'Outcome 3, Use of improved instruments for food security and nutrition policy and programme design and implementation', and 'Outcome 4, capacity development to generate and use food security analysis', include a larger range of activities with weaker connectivity, and have sometimes been dependent on building relationships with other partners. Overall expenditure against budget appears to have been on track for the first two years of the programme.

Strategic focus of the programme

ES12. The breadth of the programme has challenged its ability to maintain strategic focus, rather than operating as a package of disparate projects. There are three main ways in which strategic coherence has been achieved. First, where activities and outputs align closely with the CFS agenda, and where the technical inputs provided by the programme feed into the political process through the CFS, for example the programme's input into the 'Agenda for Action for Addressing Food Insecurity in Protracted Crises'. Second, there is strategic coherence where the programme has provided leadership in normative work on issues that are central to food security governance, for example on food and nutrition security information systems and on resilience measurement. Third, where there are links between the normative work and technical expertise funded by the programme, mostly based in headquarters, and needs at regional and country level, there also has been strategic coherence. This was for example the case in South Sudan around resilience programming.

ES13. There are a number of positive examples of strategic linkages across activities and outputs, for example between some of the technical work and the e-learning courses. But there are also missed opportunities for strategic linkage across the programme, as highlighted in this report. Forging these links must be a priority for the second half of the programme. The MTE identified three 'satellite projects' that do not appear to be well-connected to the rest of the programme, or to be strategic in contributing to the programme's overall aim. These should be revisited to decide whether they remain within the programme.

ES14. Although the rationale for the revised prioritization within the programme in March 2013 is unclear, the themes identified reflect a convergence of FAO and EU agendas and also represent some of the strongest areas of work where the programme can make greatest strategic contribution.

'Value added' of the programme

ES15. Although deliberately integrated into FAO's ongoing work, there are a number of ways in which this programme is 'adding value' over and above the regular business of FAO. First, it has enabled a number of innovative developments, mostly within Outcomes 2 and 3, such as development of the food insecurity experience scale. Second, it has facilitated FAO to provide technical leadership, especially under Outcome 2, for example in reviewing the hunger indicator at the core of the MDG 1c goal.[1] Third, there are examples of how the programme has acted as a catalyst for further developments, for example in the establishment of the Resilience Analysis Unit in East Africa closely linked with IGAD. Fourth, it has provided leverage in generating additional resources for particular activities, for example USAID funding for the FSIN, channelled through WFP. Fifth, it has provided core funding to the reformed CFS, making a significant contribution to the functioning of CFS structures and mechanisms, including the CSM and the HLPE.

ES16. Beyond FAO the 'added value' of the programme relates to the contribution it is making on food and nutrition security information and efforts to improve instruments for food and nutrition security policy. But much of this remains output-driven through FAO's traditional partnerships rather than outcome-driven, with the exception of support to the CFS. There are critical gaps in human and institutional capacities to address food and nutrition

[1] Goal 1c: "Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger".

security, particularly at regional and national levels, which the programme is only just beginning to tackle. So far the programme has probably added greater value within FAO than outside. This should change in the second half of the programme.

Regional and country level impact

ES17. Although global in nature, the programme is expected to make a significant contribution at regional and country level. Although some outputs are dispersed across a range of countries, there are priority countries in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, plus Guatemala and Mozambique. But there appears to be a low level of awareness of the programme at country level, apart from staff who are directly engaged in programme activities. This is for example the case within the Rome-Based-Agencies (RBAs) and the EU Delegations, therefore a missed opportunity for the RBAs to provide technical input to EU Delegations in focal countries. There has also been limited involvement of end users at country level in some of the normative processes supported by the programme. A more positive development is the programme's engagement with regional authorities and bodies, for example through the IPC, and the CAADP Nutrition Capacity Development Initiative facilitated by NEPAD, although regional outreach by the CFS has been less impressive.

ES18. So far there is little evidence of impact at the country level. This is most likely to be achieved where there is a coordinated effort to support country-led initiatives; in this respect most progress has been made in South Sudan and Niger in the last 18 months. Ultimately impact will depend upon the adoption of tools, methods and guidelines developed by the programme, by national authorities, and this in turn will depend upon strong political commitment from the respective authorities.

Collaboration between RBAs, and other strategic partnerships

ES19. Where there was already institutional collaboration between RBAs, for example the joint WFP/FAO strategy on Information Systems for Food and Nutrition Security, the programme has benefited. But RBA collaboration also throws up challenges as each agency has a very different business model and resource base. In practice, collaboration has focused at the output and activity level and has not been guided by a clear strategy.

ES20. It has worked best where two agencies were already working on the same issue and there is a clear common interest, for example WFP and FAO collaborating on FSIN, the IPC and resilience measurement, or where two agencies have different types of expertise that are complementary, for example FAO and IFAD's collaboration on governance and gender in relation to producer organisations. There are some examples of positive collaboration at the country level, for example between FAO and WFP in South Sudan, but this is also challenged by different institutional agendas and levels of resources at this level. The evaluation has identified some missed opportunities for collaboration between the RBAs, especially between FAO and IFAD. This is an opportune time for the RBAs to review their collaboration and address these missed opportunities in the second half of the programme.

ES21. The programme has also developed a number of other strategic and important partnerships with a range of institutions. Collaboration between the RBAs should not be over-emphasised at the expense of these other partnerships that may be more relevant for particular issues.

ES22. The EU is an important development, as well as resource partner. There are some positive examples of active collaboration between the EU and the programme, for example on many aspects of the CFS, but there are also missed opportunities, for example around work on resilience, with SHARE and AGIR in particular, and at country level.

The programme and the FAO reform process

ES23. The programme has undoubtedly contributed to FAO's 'transformational change' process, both to the revision of the strategic framework and to changes in how FAO organises its work. It pioneered a different way of working, across divisions within FAO, and has positively and directly influenced thinking behind the new strategic framework, for example the new strategic objectives on resilience and on reducing rural poverty. The programme is now closely aligned to the new strategic framework.

ES24. Engaging with the process of transformational change has taken up considerable amounts of staff time and has therefore taken its toll on the programme's pace of implementation. But this slow-down in performance is ultimately worth it if the changes contribute to greater programme effectiveness in the next two years, and to improved ways of working within FAO.

Cross-cutting issues

ES25. FAO has a poor record in mainstreaming gender in its work, but the programme has made this a commitment from the outset. There are positive examples of how this has made a difference, for example to the IPC, to LEGS, the VGs and to the food safety work in Uganda, all of which demonstrate gender sensitivity and benefited from bringing in specific gender expertise. But these are a minority of outputs; much less progress has been made overall, especially in addressing gender analysis and gender disaggregation of data. Much of the planned gender mainstreaming work in the programme has been delayed. FAO's introduction of the gender marker in 2014 should, however, provide a useful tool for monitoring progress and identifying where urgent action is needed.

ES26. FAO also had a poor record in addressing nutrition. This, too, has been prioritised by the programme, backed up by FAO's new Strategy and Vision for Nutrition. There are a number of positive examples of the programme's achievement in mainstreaming nutrition, across all four outcomes, and especially under Outcome 3 where significant support has been provided to NEPAD to integrate nutrition into CAADP agricultural investment plans at national level. But the focus on mainstreaming nutrition within FAO has overshadowed the contribution the other two RBAs could make to the nutrition agenda within the programme. And progress in is overly dependent on a small number of committed headquarters staff within FAO.

Conclusions and recommendations

ES27. Flaws in the design stage of the programme left a legacy that programme management has had to work hard to overcome, particularly to develop and strengthen linkages and strategic coherence across the diverse and at times disparate outputs. Nevertheless, with a few exceptions, most outputs are strategically **relevant** to the overall aim of the programme, although lack of contextual analysis at the outset has resulted in some gaps. The **efficiency** of programme implementation has been negatively affected by weaknesses in the design stage and by the demands of FAO's transitional change process. The impact of both of these factors should be much reduced in the coming two years, and it is

the programme's credit that it has positively influenced FAO's change process thus far. In terms of **effectiveness**, the record is mixed. A lot of important foundational work has been done in the first two years of the programme although the utilisation of many of the outputs are yet to be demonstrated. Thus, there is limited evidence of the **impact** of the programme at country level at this stage; the next two years will be critical to demonstrate results, building on the partnerships and foundational work done so far. The potential for **sustaining** the work carried out by this programme should be greatly enhanced by the close alignment between this programme and FAO's reviewed strategic framework, and through the programme's *modus operandi* of working through regional organisations and building their capacity.

ES28. The MTE formulated seven recommendations that address key issues that if tackled, should enable the Programme to achieve its objectives more efficiently and effectively. Most of the recommendations are targeted at FAO's programme management, working closely with focal points in FAO and WFP. Some require action and decisions by the PSC.

Recommendation 1: To the Programme, on strategic coherence

The Programme should strengthen its strategic coherence through the following actions:
a) FAO in consultation with IFAD and WFP should further develop the original conceptual framework for improved governance for hunger reduction, to underpin the programme and give it greater intellectual and strategic coherence. This could also be linked to conceptual thinking underpinning FAO's new strategic framework;
b) FAO in consultation with IFAD and WFP should undertake a rapid contextual analysis (also drawing on secondary sources) of key elements required to contribute to improved governance for hunger reduction in the areas where the programme is focusing, namely Horn of Africa and the Sahel. Through this analysis, the three RBAs should identify elements which require additional emphasis (and possibly resources) through the programme, with particular reference to data collection on food and nutrition security, mapping of food and nutrition security interventions and strengthening the livestock dimension within existing programme outputs;
d) FAO should identify where there could be stronger linkages between outputs of the programme, drawing on the analysis of this MTE especially in support of information systems and policy;
e) The programme management should review the three 'satellite projects' identified by the MTE against the criteria of (i) contribution to improved global governance for hunger reduction, and (ii) strategic linkages to other elements of the programme, to determine whether they should remain part of this programme or be relocated into other FAO programmes

Recommendation 2: To the Programme, IFAD and WFP, on collaboration

The Programme should develop a more strategic approach to collaboration with IFAD, WFP and build on other strategic technical partnerships. More specifically, it should:
a) Map out the comparative advantage of the three RBAs and strengthen collaboration where particular RBAs are not sufficiently engaged yet have the potential to contribute.
b) Include IFAD and WFP focal points in the technical working group;
c) Carry out more joint planning between the RBAs for activities that concern them all, at all levels: headquarters, regional and country level.

Recommendation 3: To the Programme and the EU, on enhanced partnership

The Programme should develop a more concerted partnership with the EU, especially across strategic areas of common interest. More specifically, the two parties should:
a) Jointly identify where technical exchange between key elements of the programme, e.g. FSIN, IPC, resilience, hunger indicators, nutrition and DEVCO staff at headquarters level could be strengthened, drawing on tools developed by the programme and capitalising on windows of opportunity that arise; and

b) Develop a stronger technical cooperation between focal countries of this programme, the EU Action Plan on Nutrition (currently in draft) and EU Delegations that have prioritised food and nutrition security within their indicative plans 2014-2020.

Recommendation 4: To the Programme, on priority setting

The Programme should increasingly be more demand-driven at different levels, drawing on models of good practice. More specifically, it should:
a) Allow space and resources to address issues emerging through the CFS, e.g. post-2015 MDG agenda, possibly leveraging additional funds from other sources;
b) Pursue elements and products which are of particular relevance and therefore offer high potential for utilisation to member states and regional organisations, drawing on policy and other documentation, including FAO CPFs, and planning for appropriate time-frames which may extend beyond the life of this programme; and
c) Decentralise technical capacity to support the programme and build national capacity where the political commitment is strong.

Recommendation 5: To the Programme, on good practices

The Programme should develop and document models of good practice at the regional and country levels, according to context, which demonstrate:
- linkage across programme components and/or with country strategy objectives;
- linkage between the global, regional and country levels
- technical collaboration across the RBAs, other relevant partners and donors; and
- a clear policy commitment from government and/or the regional authority to drive the initiative forward, e.g. being a member country of the SUN movement.

Recommendation 6: To the Programme, on communication

The Programme should develop better articulated communications on programme achievements tailored to particular audiences. More specifically, it should:
a) Raise awareness of the programme across principal stakeholders at regional and country level, with particular reference to EU Delegations and RBAs;
b) Provide succinct reports to principal stakeholders at global level through the Programme Steering Committee, which distinguish the main achievements and impact of the programme from the regular activities.

Recommendation 7: To the Programme, on strengthening governance and programme management

The Programme should strengthen governance, establish better capacitated management and more conducive administrative arrangements in support of principal interventions. More specifically, the Programme should:
a) Consider adding independent members to the PSC, to play a peer review role;
b) Identify additional resources to ensure that programme management has adequate capacity;
c) Identify one budget holder within ESN to oversee all activities in support of mainstreaming nutrition;
d) Identify more efficient and workable administrative arrangements for managing the Multi-Donor Trust Fund in support of the Civil Society Mechanism of the CSF; and
e) Ensure that the quantitative bias of monitoring against the logframe indicators are balanced with more qualitative means of evaluating quality and relevance of the programme's outputs.

1 Introduction

1.1 Background and purpose of the evaluation

1. At the end of 2011, the European Union (EU) and the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) committed to a programme of Improved Global Governance for Hunger Reduction principally funded by the EU with EUR 30 million, and partly funded by FAO with approximately EUR 17 million. The programme stems from the long-standing financial and policy cooperation between the European Commission (EC), FAO, World Food Programme (WFP) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), as well as other food security institutions.[2]

2. The programme was developed building on key lessons learned from previous and on-going initiatives related to food security and nutrition, many of which were funded by the EU.[3] It began with a six-month inception period at the start of 2012 and runs through to the end of 2015. Its overall objective is "better coordinated and informed food security and nutrition governance at global, regional and national levels", by delivering 21 outputs organised around four independent outcomes:[4]

- Outcome 1: Strengthened CFS functioning in accordance with its renewed mandate;
- Outcome 2: Food security decision-making processes at global, regional and national levels use better information and common standards to prevent and/or mitigate the effects of food crises and to effectively address chronic hunger and malnutrition;
- Outcome 3: Use of improved instruments for food security and nutrition policy and programme design and implementation; and
- Outcome 4: Strengthened human and organisational capacities of global, regional and national organisations to generate and use relevant food security analyses.

3. The programme has been aligned with the FAO Strategic Framework 2010-2019 and integrated into FAO's Programme of Work and Budget (PWB) 2012-2013. Since the programme started, the FAO Strategic Framework was reviewed to achieve greater clarity of purpose. The programme has been adapted accordingly and has fed into the strategic framework revision.

4. The programme's implementation strategy rests on three pillars:

- Translating knowledge into action through specific country work by: (i) linking FAO knowledge and operational activities: (ii) collaborating with the country operations of other partners; (iii) capacity development; and (iv) improving communication.
- Creating a more favourable institutional environment for food security through better coordination and partnerships and improved governance; and

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[2] See Annex 1 for the timeline for the programme.

[3] These include: the final evaluation of the EC/FAO Programme on Linking Information and Decision Making to Improve Food Security (2005-2008); the final evaluations of the first phase (2008-2009) and second phase (2009-2010) of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) global project; the Joint Thematic Evaluation of FAO and WFP Support to Information Systems for Food Security (2009); proceedings of the international symposium on ISFS (Brussels 1-2 September 2010); the evaluation of FAO's role in gender and development (2011); and the evaluation of FAO's work and role in Nutrition (2011).

[4] See Annex 2 for a legend of outputs and outcomes.

- Improving the effectiveness of food security interventions by addressing gender and nutrition dimensions.

5. The programme is coordinated by the Agricultural Development Economics Division of FAO (ESA), with the collaboration of eleven FAO divisions, and is intended to be implemented in collaboration with the other Rome-based agencies (RBA): the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the World Food Programme (WFP), in the spirit of the Statement of Intent on Programmatic Cooperation on Food Security and Nutrition signed with the European Commission in June 2011.

6. The programme is governed by a composite mechanism that includes a Programme Steering Committee (PSC), an Executive Committee and a Technical Working Group (TWG). Otherwise the programme operates through existing coordination mechanisms for the Committee on World Food Security (CFS), the High Level Task Force (HLTF) on Food Security, Information Systems on Food and Nutrition Security (ISFNS) and the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC).

7. The Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) was carried out eighteen months into implementation, a little before the mid-point of the programme to provide greater time for corrective action. It aimed at assessing progress achieved so far and informing organisational learning and intended to provide 'strategic advice' to programme management, to oversight mechanisms and to the PSC. The MTE took into account priority areas for the programme discussed in a PSC meeting on 8 March 2013, the Reviewed FAO Strategic Framework 2010-2019, which is due to come into effect in 2014, and the revised version of the logical framework for the programme. Given the complexity of the breadth of the programme, including 21 outputs across the four outcomes, the importance of the cross-cutting themes, and the multiplicity of partners, well beyond the three RBAs, the dimensions of strategic focus and the value added of the programme were given particular attention in this exercise.

8. The Terms of Reference for the MTE[5] identified five areas of interest against which the evaluation should report, discussed in Section 5 of this report:

- Strategic focus;
- Added value of the programme;
- Country level impacts;
- Effectiveness of collaboration between the Rome-based agencies; and
- Contribution to the FAO Reform process.

9. The Issues Paper developed by the evaluation team,[6] added management and coordination of the programme, as a sixth area of analysis. This is discussed in Section 4 of the report.

1.2 Methodology of the evaluation

10. Following the approach outlined in the ToR of the MTE, the principal evaluation methods have included:

[5] See Annex 3, Terms of Reference
[6] See Annex 4, Issues Paper

a. The development of an Issues Paper on the basis of initial briefings with the FAO programme management, programme coordination team and the Office of Evaluation (OED) on the scope and focus of the MTE defining clear lines of enquiry against the five areas of interest;
b. Extensive documentation review of all programme agreements; information products generated by the programme (including progress reports and presentations); policies and strategies informed by the programme, proceedings of meetings, seminars, workshops supported by the programme;
c. Attendance at some selected meetings and side-events at the 40th session of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) 7-11 October 2013 in Rome;
d. Development of a summary analysis and overview of the programme's progress and performance against planned targets from January 2012 to September 2013;[7]
e. Interviews face-to-face, phone or skype with the following groups of stakeholders:
   - staff directly associated with the oversight, the management, the coordination and/or the implementation of the programme (EU, FAO, IFAD and WFP) in both Brussels and Rome at an early stage of the MTE;
   - other staff not directly associated with the programme including those engaged in the FAO reform process and other technical staff of the EU and RBAs in both Brussels and Rome;
   - staff of regional organisations engaged with the programme including NEPAD-CAADP, CILSS, IGAD, COMESA, SICA and ASEAN;
   - senior government representatives, staff of UN organisations, development partners engaged with the programme at country level (with a particular focus on Niger and South Sudan);
   - external stakeholders with a perspective on global governance and food security who are familiar with the programme.

11. The evaluation was underpinned by an iterative process of analysis throughout, to ensure that findings were triangulated and that later interviews build on earlier findings. The Evaluation team also carried out two debriefings in FAO Headquarters on 28 and 29 November, to the TWG and to the PSC of the programme. The EU participated through video conference facilities at the debriefing for the PSC, allowing the opportunity for both audiences to feedback on the initial findings of the MTE.

12. The Evaluation Report is the principal output of the assignment structured according to the five areas of interest outlined in the TOR and following the OED standard outline as far as possible. The conclusions of the report provide an overall assessment against established evaluation criteria. In order to keep the report to a manageable length, findings are supported by specific examples, but detailed descriptions are avoided.

1.3 Constraints to the evaluation

13. Whilst it was always understood that the MTE would explore the strategic dimensions of the programme, it has also become very apparent during the assignment that this can only be achieved through a good grounding and understanding of how the programme is delivering and being informed at all levels through all the outputs.

[7] See Annex 2

14. The great number of outputs and activities carried out by the Programme, and the diversity of these, meant that it was easier for the MTE to draw on evidence from some outputs than others. This in particular considering that early on in the process, due to time constraints and the limited extent of progress made at country level, it was decided that the Evaluation team would not travel to the countries or regions where the programme is engaged.

15. A significant proportion of the outputs and activities are intentionally funded from other external sources as well, and in some case the EU funding relates only to the technical personnel mobilised. While in many cases this is a strength of the programme that may contribute to the sustainability of the work, it also means that it is very difficult to ascertain the contribution of this programme compared with other sources of support, and there has been a limit to the depth in which the MTE could explore certain outcomes, for example related to the CFS.

16. Some respondents to the MTE were anxious about being interviewed either because they did not understand the scope and content of the programme or because they had not been sufficiently engaged with the programme, so many interviews required as much briefing as lines of enquiry.

17. The timing of the MTE, just 18 months into implementation has meant that little demonstrable impact has been achieved through this programme at the "field" or country-level.

2 Context of the programme

18. This section provides a brief overview of some aspects of the context for global governance for food security. It is not intended to be a comprehensive contextual analysis, but rather to identify key points of reference for the programme. It particularly focuses on progress and challenges in meeting the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) on hunger reduction, on reform of the CFS to strengthen global governance for food security and the increasing emphasis placed on the role of regional organisations, and on recent paradigmatic shifts in thinking around food security, with particular reference to resilience and nutrition.

2.1 The run-up to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

19. The third target for the first MDG goal is to halve the proportion of people suffering from hunger (from 24% to 12%) between 1990 and 2015. The indicators for monitoring progress include: i) the proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption; and ii) the prevalence of underweight children under-five years of age.

20. In 2011-2013, a total of 842 million people (1 in 8 people in the world) were unable to meet their dietary energy requirements, or in other words did not have enough food for an active and healthy life. The vast majority of these people (827 million) live in developing regions where the prevalence of undernourishment is estimated at 14.3% in 2011-2013. Assuming that the average annual decline over the past 21 years continues to 2015, the prevalence of undernourishment in developing regions would be 13%, marginally above the MDG target. Africa remains the region with the highest prevalence of undernourishment (1 in

4 people) and is not on track to achieve the hunger target (the prevalence declining only from 32.7% to 24.8% in sub-Saharan Africa). The Asia region as a whole is nearly on track to achieve the target, but is held back by no progress in western Asia and slow progress in southern Asia. Significant reductions in the prevalence of undernourishment have occurred in most countries of eastern and south-eastern Asia as well as in Latin America.[8]

21. Prevalence rates for underweight (too thin for age) in children under five years of age have declined in all developing regions since 1990. Asia has recorded significant gains with prevalence rates falling from 33% in 1990 to 20% in 2010, whilst Africa has only declined from 23% to 18% in the same period. More and more emphasis is now being placed on the prevalence of stunting (too short for age) of children under-five which better represents chronic under-nutrition caused by prolonged inadequacy of food intake and poor health. Progress in reducing stunting is markedly more limited than underweight in most regions.

2.2 The changing landscape for global governance for food security: the CFS and role of regional organisations

22. The global food price crisis of 2007-2008 combined with the financial and economic crisis in 2009 challenged the prospects for meeting the MDG goals on hunger reduction, and drew attention to the inadequacies of global governance for food security and the relative weakness of the Committee on World Food Security that had been formed some 30 years earlier. In response, the 34th and 35th Sessions of the CFS, in 2008 and 2009 respectively, were dedicated to reforming the CFS. This included redefining the vision and role of the CFS as well as overhauling its structure. The reform process has been underpinned by three guiding principles: 'inclusiveness, strong linkages to the field to ensure the process is based on the reality on the ground and flexibility in implementation so that CFS can respond to a changing external environment and membership needs'.[9] Efforts to involve and include a wide range of stakeholders in the CFS, including civil society, the private sector and research institutions, were a particularly significant departure from the old model of the CFS. The aim is to make the reformed CFS 'the most inclusive international and intergovernmental platform for all stakeholders to work together to ensure food security and nutrition for all'.[10]

23. At the same time regional organisations around the globe have been playing an increasingly important role in many policy-related debates and initiatives that directly impact on food security. This ranges from negotiating free trade agreements to disaster risk management initiatives and to playing a more significant role in humanitarian action. Regional organisations are seen as providing an important bridge between international and national systems of governance, and regional linkages are being given particular emphasis in the reformed CFS. However, the findings of recent research are a reminder of the varied effectiveness of different regional organisations, in turn determined by the respective political context and organizational capacity.[11]

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8 The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2013 IFAD/WFP/FAO.

9 See the CFS document on 'Reform of the Committee on World Food Security', presented to the 35th Session of the CFS in October 2009.

10 See, The Committee on Food Security website: http://www.fao.org/cfs/cfs-home/cfs-about/en/

11 See, for example, Zyck, S.A. (2013) 'Regional Organisations and Humanitarian Action', HPG Working Paper, November; and Ferris, L., and Petz, D. (2013) 'In the Neighborhood: The Growing Role of Regional Organisations in Disaster Risk Management', Brookings Institution and LSE, February.

2.3 Paradigmatic shifts in the approach to food security

Resilience

24. In the last couple of years the concept of resilience has been placed centre-stage by many international and increasingly national, development and humanitarian actors in their strategies, policies and programming. This reflects a growing frustration with recurring humanitarian crises in many parts of the world, and with the apparent failure to address the underlying vulnerabilities to shocks and crises despite investment in earlier efforts such as 'Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development' (LRRD) initiatives. This paradigmatic shift is driven by a renewed desire to break down the 'silos' of development and humanitarian assistance, and to reorganize the aid architecture to better meet the needs of those affected by chronic and recurrent crises. It is also driven by the need to address climate change adaptation. According to an ODI Briefing Paper on resilience, published in 2012 when the debate about resilience was gathering momentum:[12]

> 'Building resilience' has been invoked as a new organising principle by the UN, donors and NGOs, as a way to prevent unacceptable levels of human suffering, reduce the costs of emergency response and bring climate change adaptation into mainstream development practice'.

25. FAO has been at the forefront of this debate on resilience, initially promoting the concept and way of thinking as well as pioneering methods for measuring resilience (see Section 5 below). FAO defines resilience as: 'the ability to prevent disasters and crises as well as to anticipate, absorb, accommodate or recover from them in a timely, efficient and sustainable manner. This includes protecting, restoring and improving food and agricultural systems under threats that impact food and nutrition security, agriculture, and food safety/public health'[13]. Building resilience is now also a strategic priority for WFP and for the EU. As noted in FAO's Technical Brief on the Resilience Index, most definitions of resilience emphasise three aspects: (1) the capacity to recover from stresses and shocks, (2) the capacity to adapt to a changing environment, and (3) the transformative capacity of an enabling institutional environment. The EU's definition of resilience (as articulated in its Communication on Resilience), emphasizes the ability to withstand, adapt and recover from stresses and shocks**.**

26. While this focus on resilience clearly represents a paradigmatic shift in the approach to addressing food insecurity, it is still in the early stages and a lot of work is still to be done, to reach consensus around the conceptual framework, to develop, test and apply measurement methodologies, and to demonstrate how this can contribute to more effective programming. The early debate about resilience focused on natural disasters. Increasingly consideration is being given to conflict, which is undoubtedly more challenging as it puts the spotlight on governance issues.

Nutrition

27. Attention to malnutrition, and particularly chronic under-nutrition, has fluctuated on the international development agenda over the past 21 years since the last International

[12] See Levine S., Bain, A., Bailey, S., and Fan, L. (2012) 'The Relevance of Resilience?' *HPG Policy Brief 49,* September, London: ODI, pp 1.

[13] See FAO's Technical Brief on the Resilience Index, funded by this programme

Conference on Nutrition (ICN) hosted by WHO and FAO in 1992. Past efforts to focus on chronic under-nutrition have often failed to attract political commitment because it lacks visibility, sufficient understanding of the causes and long-term effects, and sufficient evidence of interventions that work. Furthermore, it requires a strong multi-sectoral approach to address the issue, which does not sit easily in the institutional frame of governments, UN agencies nor donors. The debate was invigorated in 2008 by the launching of the Lancet's Maternal and Child Under-nutrition Series which highlighted that nutrition was a desperately neglected aspect of maternal, new-born and child health and that more than a third of child deaths and 11% of the total disease burden worldwide was due to maternal and child under-nutrition.[14] It also challenged the international development community to accelerate progress in tackling under-nutrition through more effective coordination and enhanced inter-sectoral approaches.

28. Building from the technical consensus established by the Lancet Series, the once fractured nutrition community came together through the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) movement, which includes governments committed to the nutrition agenda, donors, international organisations, civil society, businesses and academia. SUN has emerged as an influential platform for sharing, learning and driving action to improve nutrition at the national and global levels.

29. The SUN Strategy 2012-15 places emphasis on national leadership, the adoption of policies that draw on best practice, well-costed country plans with an agreed results framework and increased resources in support of these plans. These are key areas of engagement for the EU as a donor, and FAO given its technical and normative role, particularly from the perspective of agriculture and food security.

30. The evidence and understanding of food-based approaches to improving nutrition has long been neglected. There has been a fast growing realisation that explicit and appropriate nutrition outcomes need to be incorporated into agricultural projects, programmes, policies and guidelines, and that monitoring systems rigorously assess their impact on the nutrition benefits to individuals, not just the benefits of production at the household level. Emerging evidence indicates that the gender dimension is vital, since interventions that empower women have a much greater impact on nutrition. Furthermore, multi-sectoral approaches are known to be much more effective.

31. Following the recommendations of an external evaluation of FAO's Role and Work in Nutrition (covering the period 2004-2010), a Strategy and Vision for FAO's Work in Nutrition was finalised in October 2012. Central to the strategy is FAO's role to support Member Nations in their efforts to increase the effectiveness of food and agricultural systems in improving nutrition across the life cycle for their populations. The process of achieving this strategy has been particularly influential in getting nutrition better mainstreamed through the reviewed FAO Strategic Framework 2010-2019.

32. Recent years have seen a strengthened commitment from the European Union to maximise its resources in food and nutrition security, to feature "structural" under-nutrition, and specifically chronic under-nutrition (stunting) amongst its development priorities, and to

[14] The Lancet Series in 2013 attributed malnutrition to 45% (3.1 million each year) of the global deaths of children under the age of five.

better coordinate responses to under-nutrition during emergencies and post-crisis actions and hence strengthen LRRD (Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development).

33. The EU policy framework for development has been much more clearly defined over the past three to four years. The Commission's proposal for increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change outlines the broad strategy to reduce poverty in a rapidly changing world. The EU's approach towards food security and humanitarian food assistance in developing countries has been further refined and in March 2013 a Communication on Enhancing Maternal and Child Nutrition in External Assistance was launched, which outlines the Commission's and Member States' strategy to tackle under-nutrition from both the development and humanitarian perspectives.

34. The Communication on Nutrition is explicit in its support to partner countries to reduce stunting in children under-five years of age by at least 10% (representing 7 million children) of the World Health Assembly goal by 2025,[15] and to contribute to the reduction in the number of children under five years of age who are wasted. To this extent, the EU has now committed to spend EUR 3.5 billion on nutrition sensitive and nutrition specific interventions over the next seven years.[16] This comes at a very significant point in the EU's own planning cycle when development priorities are being set for the period 2014-2020.

3 Analysis of project concept and design

35. In late 2010 the EC first discussed the idea for this programme with FAO. There were a number of motivating factors on the part of the EC. First, having funded a range of discrete projects managed by FAO, there was a clear motivation to move to one larger and more strategic programme that was to be embedded in FAO and in its regular programme[17]. Second, the EC was interested in supporting FAO's process of reform linked to the Independent External Evaluation (IEE) and the Immediate Plan of Action, which had already begun, and was committed to supporting CFS reform. The proposed programme was seen as a way of achieving both. Third, promoting greater collaboration between the three Rome-based agencies was a priority, especially driven by the EU Delegation in Rome and as articulated in the Statement of Intent signed in June 2011.

36. Although this was intended to be a global programme with 'a predominantly normative function', the EC gave much greater emphasis to the regional and country level than in the earlier programme it had funded, 'Food Security Information for Action'. The Programme Description states that *The Programme will strive to address food security governance needs of several countries by trying to respond to specific demands coming from FAO Member countries, while building on existing efforts. To ensure that the Programme also generates country-level outcomes, activities will be pioneered in a selected number of*

[15] The main goal established by the World Health Assembly of last May 2012 was to reduce by 40% the global number of stunted children under 5 by 2025. This global number was then estimated to be 171 Million (2010 WHO figure).

[16] The pledge was made by the EU Commissioner for Development at the "Nutrition for Growth" event prior to the G8 Conference hosted by the UK in June 2013.

[17] The mainstreaming of an EU-funded programme into FAO's Strategic Framework had, *de facto*, begun in in the previous phase of the Programme – Food Security Information for Action' between 2008 and 2011.

countries'. However, as outlined in Section 2 above, the EU's policy priorities in relation to nutrition, resilience and social protection were still very much in evolution at this early stage.

37. Within FAO, some saw the proposed new programme as an opportunity to fund a wide range of existing FAO technical work that more or less relates to hunger reduction, while others (including some within the EU) saw the 'programme opportunity' of the EU funding to develop a more strategic and coherent body of work. The former approach appears to have dominated early on, and contributed to a wide range of disparate projects being packaged into the programme. The latter approach has since been emphasized by ESA in particular, which has worked hard to create a more coherent and strategic programme since the inception phase.

3.1 Conceptual approach

38. The EC proposed that the overarching aim of the programme be 'improved global governance for hunger reduction'. This provides a strong rationale for FAO being the natural home of the programme. The lack of an internationally agreed definition of food security governance was acknowledged early on in the programme design. In late 2011 FAO convened a workshop on 'Good Food Security Governance' which considered the working definition in Box 1 below:

Box 1. Working definition of Good Food Security Governance

'Governance for food and nutrition security relates to formal and informal rules and processes through which public and private actors articulate their interests, and decisions for achieving food and nutrition security (at local, regional and global level) are made, implemented and sustained'

39. A conceptual analytic framework, reproduced in Box 2 below, was presented to the workshop and discussed. Although both the definition and conceptual framework were agreed to be useful reference points for the imminent EU/FAO programme that had just been signed, the evaluation team has found no reference to this conceptual framework, nor to the working definition, since the 2011 workshop. This has been a missed opportunity as such a framework, further developed, could have provided greater intellectual coherence to the programme during the inception and implementation phases, and could have helped to guide linkages across the programme. Instead, governance has been treated as a cross-cutting issue in the programme according to three somewhat minimalist criteria: participation, equity and accountability.

Box 2. Conceptual analytic framework for food security governance, presented to an FAO workshop in December 2011



40. Also missing in the design phase of the programme was a contextual analysis of the current state of global governance for food security, and therefore an analysis of the gaps and how this programme could make greatest contribution[18]. Instead, broad issues were identified in both the programme description and in the inception phase which informed the three-pillar programme strategy. But the lack of contextual analysis means that there is no clear rationale for prioritization within the programme, nor identification of gaps in information and knowledge which could contribute to improved food and nutrition security outside FAO's traditional focus on crop production. This has contributed to a sense that the programme has built on what FAO was already doing or planning to do, but in an ad-hoc manner. This is particularly evident in Outcome 3 where the outputs appear to have been thrown together in a somewhat disjointed and unconnected way. It has also resulted in the relative neglect of sectors such as livestock and fisheries.

41. Given the EU's interest to 'capitalize on the comparative advantages between the European Commission and the Rome based agencies (RBAs) in order to shift from project-by-project decision making towards a longer-term, programmatic multilateral approach and coordinated partnership…to foster greater coherence',[19] the third missing piece in the conceptual approach to the programme was an analysis of the comparative advantage of the RBAs in relation to a programme of this kind, and in relation to the EU. Too much emphasis was placed on collaboration between the RBAs in the design stage of the programme,

[18] Although a number of documents/ processes that explored and analysed the context may have been used as reference points, including the contextual analysis for the Strategic Framework of 2010 to 2019, and for the reviewed Strategic Framework, as well as SOFI and other reports, there was no specific contextual analysis or synthesis of existing documents to underpin and inform this programme.

[19] See Programme description, December 2011, pp.7.

overshadowing the importance of other strategic partnerships for a programme of this kind, and the comparative advantage of partnering with institutions such as the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and other UN agencies where these may have been more strategically relevant. This has subsequently been redressed during implementation as the programme has engaged in a wide range of partnerships. (See Section 5.5 below).

42. Greater investment in these three exercises – developing a conceptual framework, carrying out a contextual analysis, and an analysis of the comparative advantage of the three RBAs and other potential partners – at the design stage of the programme could have greatly contributed to the strategic coherence of the programme from the outset.

3.2 The process of programme design

43. The process of programme design was **mainly headquarters-driven,** with limited consultation with regions and countries despite the EC's desire for a more country-focused programme. This was partly a consequence of limited time and resources allocated to the programme identification stage, which meant there was limited opportunity for regions and countries to engage and articulate their priorities for a global governance programme, and there had been no prioritisation of countries at this stage. Even the inception phase, however, was very much driven from Rome in terms of putting the programme governance and management structures in place, finding ways of working across FAO Divisions, preparing work plans with Rome-based focal points for the programme, and beginning the process of collaboration with the other RBAs. Real engagement with countries and regions only really began with programme implementation. This has sometimes slowed down the process of implementation where consultations to identify regional and country priorities have had to precede action, and where relationships and partnerships have had to be built. (See Section 5.4).

44. Programme design has also been FAO-driven, reflecting the fact that the EU initially approached FAO to discuss and design the programme, and subsequently contracted FAO to manage it. Despite the intention to use this programme to promote closer collaboration between the three RBAs, WFP and IFAD were not brought in until the outcomes and outputs had already been designed by FAO in the workplan[20], and the funding had been allocated across FAO Divisions. At this point WFP and IFAD were asked where they would like to engage with the proposed programme, causing some early confusion and tension when it became apparent that minimal funds would be made available to the other two RBAs[21]. Thus, they were not involved in the strategic design of the programme. For this to have been a truly collaborative programme would have required a very different approach from the outset, in which FAO, IFAD and WFP would have jointly designed it. An analysis of comparative advantage, with reference to each agency's strategic framework, could then have guided which agency would have led on different outputs. But this does not appear to have been an option considered by the EU. As discussed in Section 5.5 below, the actual approach to programme design means that it has become a *de facto* FAO programme, with some input and collaboration with WFP and IFAD on particular activities and outputs.

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[20] The exception to this was ISFNS where WFP and FAO did collaborate in drawing up the workplan, but this was because FAO and WFP already had a joint strategy on ISFNS.

[21] WFP and IFAD have received 2.6% of total programme funding through LOAs in the first two years of the programme.

45. The project is ambitious, not only in terms of thematic breadth but also in terms of its collaborative aspirations with the RBAs and with EU delegations, and its engagement with the FAO reform process. The timescale for a project of such ambition is short, only four years, but this encourages a focus on what is achievable in that time and with considerable resources. The financial resources allocated to this programme (47 million Euros) are substantial, although the breadth of topics covered means that they are spread thinly across a wide range of outputs and activities. This potential limitation has been overcome in many areas by the fact that much of the work is being carried out in partnership with others, and/ or contributing to initiatives funded by other sources. Towards the end of the programme decisions will need to be made about whether and which aspects should continue to be supported to ensure a sustainable impact in strengthening global governance for hunger reduction.

4 Analysis of the implementation process

4.1 Management and Coordination

4.1.1 Institutional arrangements

46. The Agricultural Development Economics (ESA) Division, due to its food security mandate and its past experience at coordinating EC/FAO programmes is, appropriately, the lead technical unit and budget holder of the programme. The ESA is responsible for the overall coordination of the programme, ensuring that all outputs and final outcomes are delivered. Operational support is mobilized across all the 11 concerned divisions and technical staff are dedicated part-time to ensuring that programme results are achieved. Each of the programme outputs is managed by a budget holder and a focal point with support from resource persons related to cross-cutting themes including nutrition, governance, gender and capacity development.

47. The programme is governed by a composite mechanism that includes a Programme Steering Committee, an Executive Committee and a Technical Working Group. Existing coordination mechanisms such as the CFS Bureau and various Advisory Groups and Steering Committees, the FAO/WFP Joint Strategy for ISFNS, the IPC Global Steering Committee and the REACH initiative are used to enhance collaboration. Letters of Agreement are applied to allow the transfer of funds to IFAD, WFP, CSM/CFS, NPCA/NEPAD, SUN Secretariat and IPC partners.

4.1.2 Programme management

48. The challenge of managing a programme of this scale and diversity cannot be underestimated especially when the analysis and rationale behind the strategic focus is still not clear (see section 5.2). Consequently, the strategic priorities of stakeholders have evolved during the course of the programme, there have been competing demands for resources across outputs, internal bureaucracy challenges principal partnerships at the core of the programme (see comments below on the CSM), and the host organization has undergone another strategic review process. Programme management within ESA identified early on in the programme that it would be essential to institute a Coordination Team to facilitate the linkages across the outputs, to factor in the cross-cutting themes, to enable synergies from headquarters to the

regional and national levels and to communicate and report on the programme. The Programme Coordinator and the Coordination Team have been pivotal to the success of the programme by actively representing the programme across the organization and, to a lesser extent with key partners making constant reference to the overall objectives and framework. These management and coordination tasks are important but time-consuming. Members of the Coordination Team also work on technical issues specific to programme implementation, which means they are well-grounded in the programme, but are also over-stretched.

49. As discussed in more detail in section 5.6 of this report, the contribution of the programme to the FAO transformational change process has been influential. This has incurred transaction costs[22] across the programme, and particularly by the Coordinating Team, although it is considered a positive contribution that should make FAO programming more effective in the longer term.

50. The programme is planning against specific annual results and reporting against six monthly cycles. A Programme Assessment Matrix (PAM) is applied to allow the PSC to review progress against planned outputs. The performance assessment undertaken by this evaluation (see section 5.1) has in part drawn upon this analysis. The programme Coordination Team have placed considerable effort into developing programme matrices and presentations which reflect how different outputs are linking, accommodating relevant cross-cutting themes across different geographic areas and drawing on the technical collaboration of the RBAs and other partners. However, there is concern that communications about the programme remain very detailed and portray an internal perspective about processes, which can be difficult for external parties to grasp. More emphasis over the next two years needs to be placed on communicating what the programme is achieving in concrete results that will reduce hunger, and with examples of functional and effective linkages from global to regional to country levels.

51. The logical framework has been revised and aligned with the new FAO Strategic Framework 2010-2019. The revision of the log-frame has retained the four programme outcomes and the principal outputs as in the original version. One output has been added to the fourth outcome, which relates to the strengthened partnership between the EU, RBAs and regional organisations. It is the view of the evaluation that the partnership between the EU and the RBAs is implicit throughout the programme and should not be "isolated" within an output. The same should apply to working with regional organisations which has in fact been a particularly strong dimension of the programme (see section 5.4).

52. A principal undertaking of the log-frame revision has been to make the output indicators, SMART and to reflect current activities as well as to capture the added value of the programme. It is the view of the evaluation that under impact there has to be an explicit indicator on chronic under-nutrition (stunting) of children under-five years of age aligned to the WHA target of 40% by 2025 (and in compliance with the EC Communication on Nutrition). Furthermore, many of the indicators still relate to numbers without reference to relevance (adoption and utilization by national authorities), technical quality and the degree of collaboration with key partners. For these more qualitative types of feedback, other means of feedback may need to be sought, for example user surveys and semi-structured interviews

[22] Transaction costs here refer to the inevitable costs (often in terms of people's time) incurred from working more collaboratively and engaging in a process that has direct implications for the programme, costs that are worthwhile if they contribute to a stronger and more effective outcome.

with intended users. The logframe principally serves a monitoring function for programme management, to whom the job of synthesising and summarising progress and overall achievements will fall, in a form appropriate for other stakeholders (e.g. EC and the PSC).

53. FAO's demanding bureaucratic and regulatory procedures have caused delays and inefficiencies in how parts of the programme are being run. For example, it took nine months to negotiate a Letter of Agreement (LOA) with IFAD for the CoopEquity programme (output 3.5). More concerning is the management of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) for the CSM in the CFS, which is currently being managed through numerous small LOAs and is extremely demanding in terms of reporting.[23] While sound financial management and accountability should not be compromised, the tool does not appear to fit the mechanism. The evaluation team is aware that this finding is also common to other FAO evaluations.

4.2 Coordination structures

54. The principal coordination body is the Programme Steering Committee (PSC) instituted within the design of the programme. It consists of the main stakeholders (EU, FAO, IFAD and WFP) and provides strategic guidance and reviews progress of the programme. FAO is represented in the Steering Committee by the ESA Director and the FAO Brussels Office Director. Having the PSC meet alternatively every six months in Brussels and Rome appropriately represents the stake the donor has in the programme. The chair is currently assumed by FAO when the meeting takes place in Rome: the TOR for the Steering Committee is therefore not being applied which suggests that the chair rotates across the three RBAs. This appears to reinforce the dominant stake FAO has in the programme over the other principal partners. It should also be noted that the PSC comprises stakeholders with a vested interest, as donor, collaborators or implementers. For a programme with such a high-level global aim, one or two independent members who could provide a more objective peer review role could make a useful contribution.

55. The Executive Committee and the Technical Working Group (TWG) were instituted during the inception phase. They are both internal to FAO and ensure coordination at both the strategic and the output level within the organisation. The evaluation recognizes the need of the Executive Committee (consisting of the eleven FAO divisions participating in the programme) prior to the PSC when FAO's representation is solely by the Director of ESA, but this function should be internal to FAO rather than an institutional structure of the programme. Internalising the TWG would appear a missed opportunity to actively engage focal points from IFAD and WFP within the forum since the linkages across the RBAs are surely as relevant and critical as they are within FAO.

56. Country Coordination Groups (CCG) have also been created for each of the focus countries in the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda) and for the Sahel (Mali and Niger)[24] where there is a concentration of programme activities. A country plan template is completed for each focus country. There has also been an effort to coordinate regional level activities through the NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency (NPCA), but it has been unclear within FAO where the institutional engagement for this should be. In principal these groups do include the participation of IFAD and WFP focal

[23] CSM Secretariat staff estimate that over 50% of their time is spent managing the LOAs with FAO
[24] CCGs also exist in Guatemala and Mozambique.

points as and where relevant. The CCGs meet informally on a demand-basis and some are considerably more active than others (e.g. Ethiopia, Kenya, Niger and South Sudan). Some are very focused on one or two elements of the programme (e.g. Somalia on resilience; Kenya on the impact of social protection on agricultural production). The added value of such groups is more at headquarters level than it is at country level, and it is the view of the evaluation that more emphasis should be placed in future on strengthened partnership between the EU and RBAs at the field level.

57. The evaluation also recognises that the programme works through other coordination structures, some of which are referenced in the following paragraphs. The principal structure in this respect is the CFS[25]. Whilst the CFS plenary is the central body for decision-making and coordination at global level, the CFS is also guided by a Bureau and Advisory Group. The CFS Bureau is representative of the regional membership of the CFS and carries out tasks delegated to it by the Plenary and ensures coordination between plenary sessions. The CFS Bureau is guided by an Advisory Group (which includes FAO, WFP and IFAD representatives). The CFS Secretariat (headed by FAO, and including staff members from IFAD and WFP) assists the plenary, the Bureau and the Advisory Group as well as the HLPE. The HLPE, in turn, has its own Steering Committee of internationally recognized experts in food and nutrition security. The CSM is the mechanism through which civil society organisations can engage with the CFS. The CSM is facilitated by a Coordination Committee representing different constituencies and sub-regions. It is supported by a small Secretariat. The value of these different structures and mechanisms is the much greater inclusivity in the CFS that they promote. The overall effectiveness of the reformed CFS mechanisms should be explored in the forthcoming CFS evaluation.

58. The IPC has a long-standing structure including the IPC Global Steering Committee and the Technical Advisory Group (TAG) also representative of the same organisations which include UN, NGOs, technical agencies and regional bodies (see Box 10 in this report). The IPC partner network is very effective and inclusive of the principal actors supporting and utilising the IPC. At the last Steering Committee meeting (October 2013), the IPC Global Strategic Programme 2014-2016 was launched.

59. The Food Security Information Network (FSIN), jointly established by IFPRI, WFP and FAO through this programme, has an Advisory Board composed of selected country representatives, donors, regional institutions, academics and international agencies to provide strategic advice. A Steering Committee comprises of senior representatives of FAO, IFPRI and WFP which oversee the overall implementation of the agreed FSIN work plan. There is concern that given the strategic importance of the Steering Committee, it should include the two principal donors, in addition to the three principal implementing agencies, to strengthen the accountability of the FSIN.

60. The CAADP Nutrition Capacity Development Initiative has a very broad and inclusive Steering Committee which is chaired by the NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency (NPCA) and composed of representatives from Regional Economic Communities, donor organisations, UN organisations including the REACH partnership, SUN Movement, NGOs and universities. The Steering Committee is charged with coordinating all aspects of workshop preparation, including planning, advocacy, communication and fund-raising.

[25] Based on the CFS Reform Document of October 2009

5 Analysis of results by areas of interest[26]

61. This section begins by reviewing overall performance against the four outcomes. It then analyses how the programme according to the five areas of interest identified in the ToR and the Issues paper.

5.1 Performance and progress: an overview

62. This section provides an overview of the performance and progress of the programme from the perspective of the outcomes and principal outputs and the planned activities for each. In respect of length limitations, this evaluation report cannot provide a programme description, nor an analysis of all the activities, given the scale of interventions being undertaken. For a description of the programme, the Inception Report[27] provides the principal reference point for the programme design and achievements are regularly updated in the Programme Progress Reports. This section identifies where particular elements of the programme are facing challenges along with elements that are progressing as planned. An analysis of expenditure through the programme is also provided at the end of the section.

5.1.1 Programme implementation

63. The evaluation has conducted a progress review of the first eighteen months of the programme up to the end of June 2013 based on the Programme Performance Assessment Matrix (PAM). In 2012 the overall rate of achievement against planned activities was 85% (379 activities achieved out of 444 planned) and for the first six months of 2013 the rate of achievement was 80% (297 activities achieved out of 370 planned). These results have been consolidated in the bar chart below in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Activities achieved against those planned by programme outcome January 2012 to June 2013



[26] The term 'results' includes outputs and outcomes

[27] Inception Report for Improved global governance for hunger reduction 2012-2015 GCP/INT/130/EC

64. During this period (1 January 2012 to 30 June 2013) approximately 100% of the planned activities of outcome 1 (strengthened CFS) and outcome 2 (better informed food security decision-making processes) were achieved. In contrast, only 85% (2012) and 62% (2013) of the planned activities of outcome 3 (use of improved instruments for food security and nutrition policy and programme design and implementation) were achieved (73% overall); and 72% (2012) and 80% (2013) of the planned activities of outcome 4 (capacity development to generate and use food security analysis) were achieved (74% overall).

Figure 2: Activities achieved against those planned by output for programme outcomes 1 and 2 January 2012 to June 2013



65. The reasons for the first two of the outcomes out-performing the last two are probably quite varied (see Figure 2 for the performance by output). Firstly, outcomes 1 and 2 build on activities that were largely on-going before the programme started so they have capitalised on earlier gains. For example, in outcome 1 the outputs relate to core functions of the CFS, that began before this programme started and that are also funded from a range or sources; in outcome 2, the IPC, which was launched in Somalia in 2004, had already rolled out across eastern and southern Africa before the outset of the programme. Secondly, the activities are driven either by the collective political agenda of the CFS or the international development agenda relating to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which enforces a greater degree of accountability as these outputs are delivering to a broader constituency. Thirdly, they have a smaller number of principal activities, which are inter-dependent and quite closely linked, which means that they generate more of a critical mass and focus than the other outcomes.

Figure 3: Activities achieved against those planned by output for programme outcome 3 January 2012 to June 2013



66. Outcomes 3 and 4 include a much larger range of activities and their connectivity is not the same (see Figures 3 and 4 for the performance by output). Outcome 3 is sometimes described as the "pot" where projects go which don't fit anywhere else. Particularly weak performers are:

- Output 3.1.4, the web-based platform for mapping food security investments (MAFSAN), which lost its base in TCSF the Special Programme for Food Security (which was disbanded in 2012) and has made no progress since the start-up of the programme[28];
- Output 3.1.2, because responsibilities were split between ESA and ESP, furthermore, the guidance material on strengthening coordination between social protection and agriculture has become a much more inclusive process (involving other partners) and workshops were rearranged to suit regional actors;
- Output 3.1.3 has progressed with both regional and country-level workshops and the preparation of policy briefs, technical review guidelines and price monitoring manuals (but many are in draft stage so not yet registered with the PAM);
- Output 3.3 has only focused on one pilot country to date (Uganda) with an LoA agreed to support a pilot in Thailand and a sub-regional workshop for Asia in 2014;
- Output 3.4, which was intended to link closely with output 3.1.5 by identifying and building the national capacity necessary to deliver on the country roadmaps generated through the CAADP Nutrition Capacity Development Initiative, has faltered on its application in key countries and lacked the necessary leadership within ESN; and
- Output 3.7 tools to mainstream a Right to Food approach in social protection programmes, given the timing, the policy context was not right in Niger and now the project is exploring opportunities in Kenya, but yet to be implemented.

[28] MAFSAN, potentially a very useful mapping tool for food and nutrition security interventions which could be of service to governments and the SUN movement, will be re-established in the ESN division of FAO.

Figure 4: Activities achieved against those planned by output for programme outcome 4 January 2012 to June 2013



67. The slow progress on certain activities in Outcome 4 appears to be due to two main reasons. Firstly, where other partners were involved, there were some delays in establishing the foundations for collaboration (e.g. discussions with CILSS and ECOWAS on collaboration around e-learning were delayed from 2012 to 2013 [output 4.1] and there were delays in getting the MOU signed with the Government of Morocco for MOSAICC [output 4.5]). Secondly, there had to be some rescheduling of the ambitious programme for developing e-learning materials. In addition, restructuring within the TCE division resulted in some delays in implementing output 4.3 with greater progress made in 2013.

5.1.2 Programme Expenditures

68. The total expenditure of the programme against budget lines effective as of 4 December 2013 are presented in Annex 6 to this report. Expenditure against budget in 2012 was on track. In 2013 there are already expenditures over the annual budget allocation against: (i) consultants; (ii) locally contracted labour; (iii) travel; and (iv) GOE both internal and external common services. There are also significant under-expenditures on: (i) training; and (ii) technical support services. Overall expenditures against the total annual budget for 2013 are on track.

69. Figure 5 illustrates the proportion of expenditure since the outset of the programme against the different budget lines. A very significant proportion of the budget is on personnel, either FAO professional staff or contractual staff and their travel. Another key portion is through contracts with CFS/CSM, NEPAD/NPCA, and partners including WFP.

70. Figure 5 provides details of expenditures against each principal budget line for 2012 and 2013 (up to 4 December) respectively with total accumulated expenditure for the first eighteen months of the programme.

Figure 5: Share of total programme expenditure as of 4 December 2013



5.2 Strategic focus

71. The breadth of the programme has caused concern amongst some stakeholders about whether it is able to maintain strategic focus versus operating as a package of disparate projects. As explained in Section 3, flaws in the design process – particularly the absence of a contextual analysis and the lack of a guiding conceptual framework – meant that there was a lack of strategic focus and prioritization early on. There was no clear rationale for the inclusion of some topics and not others in the programme.

72. This section begins by identifying where there is clear strategic coherence in the programme and proceeds to review strategic linkages across the programme: where these are strong and where there are missed opportunities and strategic linkages are still to be forged. It reviews the process and outcome of the revised prioritization that took place in March 2013, and ends by identifying 'satellite projects' that appear to be less connected to the programme as a whole.

5.2.1 Where there is strategic coherence

I. Alignment with the CFS agenda

73. Where the activities and outputs of the programme align closely with the agenda identified by the CFS, there is strong strategic coherence and focus. Three examples stand out:

i. Technical work done by FAO in collaboration with IFAD on land tenure, informing the drafting process of the 'Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security' (VGs), produced and endorsed at the 38th CFS Plenary session in 2012, and now being disseminated by FAO, IFAD and many others, including the EU. (See Box 6 below);
ii. The CFS process for producing an 'Agenda for Action for Addressing Food Insecurity in Protracted Crises', drawing on FAO's analysis of food insecurity in protracted crises and its work on resilience;
iii. Review of the hunger (prevalence of under-nourishment) indicator at the core of the MDG1c target with the aim of looking beyond just the dietary energy supply.

74. In each of these examples the programme is providing technical input and expertise while the CFS hosts a political process through which that technical input is built upon and legitimated and can subsequently be taken forward by CFS member governments, by the RBAs, and by civil society and other actors. It is a moot point which has, or should come first: the technical work of the programme, or agenda-setting and the political process provided by the CFS. Indeed, the synergy is probably strongest where these two processes – technical and political – are intertwined and happen simultaneously, demonstrated well by the process of developing the 'Agenda for Action', see Box 3 below.

Box 3. Agenda for Action

The 'Agenda for Action' has evolved from the "State of Food Insecurity in the World (SOFI) 2010", written jointly by FAO and WFP, which focused on food insecurity in protracted crises. The report was presented to the 36th session of the CFS in 2010 which endorsed the SOFI recommendations and the organisation of a High Level Expert Forum (HLEF) that began work in 2012 to inform the elaboration of an Agenda for Action for Addressing Food Insecurity in Protracted Crises (CFS-A4A). A number of experts prepared a series of briefing papers to inform the HLEF (including one on resilience). The process to elaborate the CFS-A4A has been supported by a Technical Support Team (TST) comprising representatives from all three RBAs, the CSM and the CFS Secretariat. The TST is hosted by FAO, with a full-time Coordinator funded by the programme based in ESA. Following the usual governance mechanisms for CFS products, an Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), comprising CFS members and participants (including the CSM and PSM) was established in April 2013, led by two Co-Chairs (Kenya and the USA). The OEWG is the political process through which iterations and drafts of the CFS-A4A prepared by the TST are considered, commented on and agreed. The OEWG endorsed a Proposed Outline for the Agenda for Action in July 2013, and commented upon a more elaborated version in October 2013. The TST is now preparing a Zero Draft of the CFS-A4A, which includes principles underpinning the Agenda for Action, as well as potential case studies. The Zero Draft and subsequent Draft One will be considered by the OEWG between March and July 2014. The OEWG-informed Draft One of the CFS-A4A will be presented to the 41st session of the CFS in October 2014 for endorsement. More immediate action includes exploring how to mainstream food security concerns into peacebuilding through the G7+ and 'New Deal'. Thus, the technical and political processes are closely intertwined. If the political process succeeds, then the technical work by FAO and others on this topic could have a substantial impact. The duration and cost of the political process means that the stakes are high. To ensure that the 'Agenda for Action' ultimately makes a

difference, stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation indicated that there must be adequate involvement of key actors at regional and country level in the process, and issues that could provide critical points of leverage must be addressed, such as governance and conflict. The Co-Chairs of the OEWG are drawing on the successful experience of negotiating and formulating the VGs through the CFS.

75. This does not mean that the whole programme should be directed by the CFS agenda. The CFS is one of a number of institutions relevant to global governance for hunger reduction, and it is also important that FAO in collaboration with others, has the space to provide leadership in initiating key areas of work and in developing and maintaining normative guidance and tools. But close links and alignment between the programme and the CFS and its evolving agenda undoubtedly helps to strengthen the programme's strategic focus.

II. Leadership in normative work on issues central to food security governance

76. There are a few examples of how the programme is providing strategic leadership on current issues central to food security governance, also described in section 5.3 below, on 'value added'. First, the programme is providing normative leadership on food and nutrition security information systems. Key to that leadership role is the collaboration between FAO, WFP and IFPRI through the Food Security Information Network (FSIN). The broader strategic partnership between FAO, WFP and many other actors on the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) project is another example of the strategic leadership role the programme is playing in relation to food security information systems. Second, the programme is playing a strategic leadership role on resilience measurement, again in collaboration with WFP, IFAD and other strategic partners through the FSIN. This work has strong connections to regional and country-level initiatives, as discussed later in the report (see section 4.4). Third, programme funding has contributed to the normative work on land tenure through the VGs with the publication of a number of technical guides.

III. Within FAO, linking the knowledge function to the operational arm

77. A third and slightly different way in which the programme is contributing to strategic coherence is by linking the normative work and technical expertise funded by the programme, mostly at HQ level, with need and demand at the regional and country levels where capacity and resources are more limited.

78. This has mostly happened within FAO so far. One of the strongest examples is in South Sudan. The FAO office in Juba set its priorities, for example around resilience programming, and has been able to draw upon FAO's technical expertise at headquarters level to carry out a scoping exercise for a common partnership framework on resilience between the three RBAs at country level, and to develop a concept note for resilience programming in two states of South Sudan. In this case the support from FAO HQ was provided jointly with WFP expertise and was particularly appreciated by FAO in South Sudan which has weak capacity in-country compared with the needs and the country office's ambitions. In this way the programme has not only supported the normative work at global level, but has also provided immediate support at operational level, thus strengthening the overall coherence between global and field levels.

79. In the opposite direction the programme enabled FAO's Investment Centre (TCI) to draw on its extensive practical experience in developing normative guidance on social

analysis for investment programming, subsequently developed into e-learning. In this way practical operational experience has contributed to strategic global normative products.

5.2.2 Strategic linkages across the programme

80. For the programme to function as a coherent whole, and be strategically greater than the sum of its parts, there must be strong strategic linkages across activities and outputs. There are a number of positive examples where this is happening, including:

i. the work on resilience and nutrition feeding into, and informing the CFS 'Agenda for Action'
ii. new e-learning courses developed and rolled out, drawing on the technical work of the programme e.g. on gender and food security, on the VGs, and on social analysis which links with the work on social protection
iii. Integrating nutrition into the capacity development support for CAADP National Agricultural and Food Security Investment Plans (NAFSIPs) technically supported by TCI

81. However, the Evaluation also identified a number of missed opportunities for strategic linkage across the programme. Examples are presented in Box 4. Forging these links must be a priority for the second half of the programme.

Box 4. Missed opportunities for strategic linkages across the programme

- A number of initiatives contributing to policy development and investment plans at national level are being carried out in parallel – for example on nutrition, risk management, social protection and food safety. These could be more effectively and strategically pursued together (through NPCA/NEPAD) and linked to the 'Food and Agricultural Policy Decision Analysis' tool (FAPDA). FAPDA could monitor how far these contributions inform food and agriculture policy decisions in focal countries and to what effect (there is still insufficient evidence of this).
- The resilience measurement work funded by the programme is not connected to the IPC despite the years of experience of the IPC and the wealth of relevant longitudinal data available for certain countries (for example, Somalia). This causes considerable confusion at field level, especially where different actors are involved in resilience measurement and in the IPC. There is also little engagement between IPC and the work on hunger statistics carried out by the Statistics Division (ESS). Within FAO there appears to be an unhelpful divide between outputs using a more qualitative approach, in this case the IPC, and outputs based on more quantitative methods, in this case resilience measurement. Opportunities for 'learning across' are therefore missed, as are opportunities for developing mixed methods (despite the rhetoric), and for deepening insights through combining quantitative and qualitative approaches.
- Awareness and visibility of the IPC is weak within CFS, despite its potential contribution in providing early warning of the impact of food price and other economic shocks.
- No explicit links have yet been developed on the measurements of food and nutrition security (the Dietary Diversity Score (DDS) and the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES)[29] being generated by ESN and ESS respectively) with the Food Security Information Network (FSIN) as a platform for sharing standards, methods and tools.

[29] The Household Dietary Diversity Score (HDDS) and the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS), from which the FIES is derived, have however been used together in some project evaluations.

- The work on climate change modelling is being carried out without linkage to the IPC, despite the potential to support crop production assessments and to explore how climate change models could inform, and be informed by the IPC.
- The livestock sector is poorly represented across the programme, with the exception of output 3.9, updating and supporting the 'Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards' (LEGS). Given the programme's focus on Africa where dairy production and small ruminants make a major contribution to food and nutrition security, the lack of attention to the livestock sector is a serious omission and reflects a persistent crop-bias in food security approaches.

5.2.3 Revised prioritization

82. Concerned about the breadth of the programme and how this may dilute its strategic focus, the Programme Steering Committee meeting in March 2013 identified five priority themes:

a. Supporting CFS and some of its main work-streams, including the Guidelines for Responsible Agricultural Investment (RAI) and the Agenda for Action (A4A) for Addressing Food Insecurity in Protracted Crises
b. Implementation of the VGs
c. Resilience-related initiatives (programming and measurement) with a particular focus on the Sahel
d. Stepping up nutrition mainstreaming
e. Supporting the CAADP process

83. This strategic re-orientation triggered some resource re-allocation within the programme, from underperforming or slow-performing outputs to outputs that contribute more directly to the priority themes, and triggered some refining of outputs so they better contribute to the priority themes. However, the rationale for this prioritization was not clear, although some themes reflect a convergence of FAO and EU agendas, in particular on resilience and nutrition. It is less clear how they were influenced by WFP and IFAD emerging strategic priorities despite this being part of the stated intention, although building resilience and improving nutrition do also feature in WFP's new strategic plan and in IFAD's Strategic Framework. Nevertheless, the five priority themes represent some of the strongest areas of work within the programme where there is potential to make the greatest strategic contribution. As indicated in Box 4 above, if some of the missing strategic linkages are addressed, this contribution could be further enhanced.

5.2.4 'Satellite' projects

84. The ad hoc way in which components of the programme were identified in the design and inception phase has resulted in some activities and outputs that do not appear to be well-connected to the rest of the programme, nor particularly strategic in contributing to the overall aim of the programme. Key stakeholders, including the PSC, have raised this issue. The Evaluation has identified activities and outputs that are potential outliers in the programme according to the following two criteria:

- How central is the work in contributing to 'improved global governance for hunger reduction'?
- How strategically linked is the work with other elements of the programme?

85. Although the work may still be highly relevant to food security, the contribution to improved global governance for hunger reduction may be less clear, either because of the choice of activities or because of the way they are being implemented. The outputs identified as 'satellite projects' are listed in Box 5. The Evaluation did not have the time or resources to evaluate each output in the depth necessary to make a clear recommendation about whether it should be retained or removed from the programme. Therefore a process for reviewing these 'satellite projects' should be set up to assess whether they should remain within this programme according to the two criteria above, or be relocated to other programmes within FAO where they would fit better.

Box 5. 'Satellite projects' within the programme to be reviewed

Output no.	Topic	Examples of work carried out	Questions over strategic relevance to the programme
3.8	Sustainable Crop Production Intensification		• Not clear how this initiative is contributing to policy or strategies at the national level
3.7	Tools to mainstream a Right to Food approach in social protection programmes	• Concept note developed on how grievance mechanisms can enhance the right to food in cash transfer programmes	• Not yet linked to any of the other programme outputs on social protection and agriculture
4.5	Technical tools to assess climate variability and climate change impact	• Development of an Agricultural Stress Index System (ASIS) to monitor agricultural drought • Development of a Modelling System for Agricultural Impacts of Climate Change (MOSAICC)	• Poorly integrated into the rest of the programme with no or limited links to other outputs • Limited collaboration with other RBAs • This work may fit better into an FAO programme on climate change

5.3 Value added

86. It has always been the explicit intention of FAO to integrate the programme within the Organisation's own strategic framework to ensure that it supports activities which are aligned to the strategic priorities of FAO towards the eradication of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition. This approach has been supported by the European Union with the understanding that the programme would benefit from the technical knowledge and expertise of FAO, as well as its institutional capacity to manage, coordinate and deliver on the programme outcomes. However, it raises concerns about the added value of the programme in terms of: i) what it is achieving over and above the regular business of FAO; and ii) what does it add beyond FAO, to better coordinated and informed food and nutrition governance at global, regional and national levels.

87. In exploring this area of interest, the Evaluation identified several different ways in which the programme is adding value, described below with examples in each category.

I. <u>Enabling innovative developments</u>

88. There are a number of examples of relatively, new, cutting-edge activities incorporated into the programme, most of them within outcomes 2 and 3. These include:

- the initiative to better harmonise methodologies through the Food Security Information Network (FSIN), which has so far focused on resilience and market information;
- the development of the food insecurity experience scale (FIES) drawn from the Latin America experience, which is now being piloted through the Gallup World Poll (GWP) in Angola, Ethiopia, Malawi and Niger;
- e-learning tools developed by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) which will now provide the opportunity for principal actors to achieve IPC certification;
- work to strengthen the governance and gender sensitivity of producer organisations; and
- the Protection to Production intervention which evaluates the productive impacts of cash transfers on rural poor communities in seven African countries with the intent to generate evidence in support of policy decisions.

II. Enabling technical leadership

89. There are examples where the programme has enabled a technical facilitation role that could only be resourced through a normative and knowledge organisation such as FAO. These largely contribute to outcome 2 although partially to outcome 3 as well. They include:

- the development of the software ADePT-Food Security Module to improve the quality, consistency and availability of food security statistics derived from national household surveys;
- a review of the hunger (prevalence of under-nourishment) indicator at the core of the MDG1c target with the aim of looking beyond just the dietary energy supply;
- the recent work on defining resilience measurement based upon field level pilots; and
- the technical facilitation that FAO has provided through the NEPAD coordinated CAADP Nutrition Capacity Development workshops conducted in eastern, central and southern Africa during 2013 in support of integrating nutrition into National Agriculture Investment Plans (NAIPs).

III. As a catalyst

90. Less than two years in to the programme, it is not easy to identify where the programme has already acted as a catalyst for further developments, but there are three examples from outcome 2 that could be cited. These include:

- rising interest from governments and development partners in the IPC as an analytical framework (including the recently introduced chronic food insecurity scale in version 2) to the extent that it is being applied in some countries without sufficient technical guidance (which represents a real concern to the global coordination unit);
- the establishment of a Resilience Analysis Unit (RAU) in East Africa which will be closely linked with the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD); and (iii) the Food Security Information Network (FSIN) which describes itself as "a catalyst for developing food and nutrition information" a function which it is not yet actively playing at this early stage.

IV. Providing leverage

91. Already the programme has provided some leverage to generate additional resources or commitments to activities that it has been funding. These include:

- USAID funding for the FSIN which is being channelled through WFP and will enable the FSIN to further harmonise information systems on market prices;
- DFID and Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation funding now enables the technical work on FIES to be disseminated;
- IPC capacity-building programme at regional level including e-learning materials;
- the roll-out and dissemination of the voluntary guidelines which now rely on less than 25% of programme funding; and
- funding from the German government for learning programmes developed and rolled out with regional organisations, building on the e-learning materials developed through this programme.

V. Core funding to the Committee on World Food Security (CFS)

92. The financial contribution of this programme to the functioning of the basic structures and mechanisms of the reformed CFS is highly significant, including the CFS Secretariat, the Civil Society Mechanism (CSM) and the High Level Panel of Experts (HLPE). The "value added" is in implementing the principles of the reformed CFS, for example the inclusion of a wide range of stakeholders through the CSM and the HLPE. The CSM, in particular, is seen to have effectively brought civil society into the CSF. The "value added" of the programme funds also appears to have leveraged additional funds into the respective MDTFs. And it has "added value" in supporting the follow-up to CFS endorsements, for example on the VGs. See Box 6.

Box 6. Programme support to the VGs on land tenure through the CFS

FAO and IFAD had been collaborating on land tenure for some time. A policy window of opportunity to take this work forward opened up as the African Union (AU), a number of donors, and the CFS began to engage in land tenure issues. As with the A4A FAO, in collaboration with IFAD, provided the technical input into a political process hosted by the CFS. The CFS process drew in wider inputs, for example from civil society, and resulted in the production of 'Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security'. These were endorsed at the 38th CFS Plenary session in 2012. The programme funds made a particular contribution to the roll-out of the VGs, thus sustaining momentum in the period immediately after they had been endorsed. The programme funded translation of the VGs and FAO staff resources which were key to supporting dissemination and a number of regional workshops. The programme now provides less than 25% of funding to FAO for dissemination activities as other donors have since contributed (including follow-up funding from the EU). This also demonstrates the leverage that this programme can provide. A wide range of partners are now involved in dissemination of the VGs, including a number of regional organisations within Africa and beyond. In many ways the process of drafting and endorsing the VGs was seen as a test case for the CFS, one that is widely seen to have worked. It also provided valuable learning, for example of the time it takes to complete such a process through the CFS, of the value of a diverse range of actors contributing, and of the challenges of raising awareness and roll-out at regional and country level in order to make a difference.

5.3.1 Added Value beyond FAO

93. What does all this mean for the wider world? It means in some instances that FAO is reaching out and facilitating better coordination across key stakeholders at both national and regional level, but this coordination still remains largely output-driven through FAO's traditional partnerships than it is outcome-driven (with the exception of the support to the CFS) and clearly more attention needs to achieve this as programming is more effectively consolidated through the new FAO strategic framework.

94. Whilst considerable effort is being directed towards a better understanding of the hunger indicator, the food security index, the dimension of resilience and the application of the IPC as an analytical framework, there is still insufficient value added to the identification, generation and monitoring of food and nutrition security information and the strengthening of FNS information systems to service analysis and inform decision-making at the policy level. This may in particular be attributed to a slow start-up of the Food Security Information Network (FSIN) and its limited focus at the outset of the programme.

95. Various avenues are being pursued to improve instruments for food and nutrition security policy and food safety, programme design and implementation, but whilst efforts remain relatively fragmented, the political commitment varies from country to country and the capacity of development partners (including FAO) is often insufficient to follow through. The value added at the policy level consequently remains quite weak at this stage of the programme.

96. There remain critical gaps in human and institutional capacities to address food and nutrition security particularly at the regional and national levels to achieve the universal human right to adequate food which the programme is only just beginning to address. Progress requires long-term commitment. FAO's experience of the slow process of capacity development in South Sudan, to which this programme is contributing, is a sharp reminder. It also requires a comprehensive approach to capacity development. The progression from FAO producing e-learning materials to developing the capacity of regional organisations to launch their own e-learning platforms is a step in the right direction, but this alone will not be sufficient to build capacity. Work in this area must be informed by constant feedback of the impact of capacity development efforts.

97. Furthermore, the collaboration between Rome-based agencies discussed later in the report and the mainstreaming of cross-cutting themes such as nutrition and gender, also discussed later on, can contribute significant added value if applied effectively.

98. Overall, although the programme has made a promising contribution in a number of areas highlighted above, at this stage it has probably contributed greater added value to FAO and its strategic planning and programming process than it has yet to better coordinated and informed food and nutrition governance at global, regional and national levels. Hopefully, this will change in the second half of the programme.

5.4 Regional and country level impact

99. The programme is global in nature and it is the intention of the principal stakeholders that it supports the generation of public goods such as tools and methods for improving the availability and application of data and policy instruments to address emerging

and long-standing food security challenges. Furthermore, there is a demand at the international level for guidelines, methods, statistics and analysis on the status of food and nutrition security across the globe and the programme strategically supports that process. Consequently, the programme is based at headquarters level.

100. Nevertheless, it is critical that these public goods are relevant to the policy priorities established at the regional level and that they support the generation of appropriate information and analysis that contributes to decision-making on food and nutrition security in the national contexts. To this end there needs to be broad awareness at all levels of the programme deliverables, which in turn must drive the right balance of engagement at different levels to ensure relevance, effectiveness and impact of the interventions.

5.4.1 Focal regions and countries

101. The programme has chosen to focus activities across a number of countries in the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda), the Sahel (Mali and Niger) plus Guatemala and Mozambique. The rationale is that these countries have high levels of food and nutrition insecurity, they offer opportunities for joint action with IFAD and WFP between emergency and development including resilience, collaboration with EU through the SHARE and AGIR programmes, as well as other regional initiatives through established regional authorities such as IGAD, CILSS, COMESA and NEPAD, that offer sustainability beyond the life of the programme. The programme support has been much stronger to some focal countries than others, as shown in the Niger and South Sudan examples, and certain outputs still "disperse" quite broadly across the African continent, e.g. the work evaluating links between social transfers and agriculture, and beyond Africa, e.g. the Food and Agriculture Policy Decisions Analysis, without adopting sufficient focus according to the programme design. In part, this is attributed to interventions which were initiated before the programme began and could not be changed retro-actively.

5.4.2 Communication between the stakeholders

102. There are low levels of awareness of the programme at a decentralised level. This does not only apply to governments and potential technical partners, but also to the three Rome-based organisations and EU Delegations. Within FAO, knowledge of the programme is limited largely to those staff at country or regional office level who are directly engaged or associated. Also, their knowledge will generally be about one or two of the outputs or they are FAO Representatives who have strong connections with relevant divisions at headquarters level, often due to previous assignments.

103. There has been insufficient effort institutionally to raise awareness of the programme across FAO and to WFP and IFAD at decentralised levels even within the focal countries. This includes awareness of the e-learning resources, which offer considerable potential for capacity building according to countries which use them. A real opportunity has also been missed for the three RBAs to provide technical input to the EU Delegations of focal countries that have identified agriculture and food security as priority sectors, as they prepare national indicative plans for 2014-2020.

104. Furthermore, there is a considerable lack of horizontal communication between countries on good and positive practice generated through the programme, which could be

very beneficial for food insecure countries not yet sufficiently engaged. The programme through its technical partnership should identify and draw upon successful and innovative field practices that potentially can contribute to better governance for hunger reduction, which may not be factored into the current programme framework.

5.4.3 Collaboration with regional bodies

105. A concerted effort has been made across the programme to engage with relevant regional authorities and bodies and many of these entities have been "invigorated" through this partnership. This dimension has been a particular strength of the programme. Principal examples include:

- the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) which recognised this as a key strategic element, not sufficiently considered before, and has focused on building commitment and capacity at this level through very effective engagement with SADC, CILSS and SICA, which is now represented on the IPC Global Steering Committee;
- the CAADP Nutrition Capacity Development Initiative facilitated by NEPAD and supported by FAO which has conducted three workshops at regional level, two directly associated with the programme for East, Central and Southern Africa;
- a similar approach adopted by the risk analysis workshops conducted in South Africa, Sudan, Uganda and Burkina Faso facilitated jointly by FAO and NEPAD focusing on National Agricultural Investment Plans (NAIPs) developed through the CAADP framework; and
- building capacity for regional organisations to run their own e-learning platform (e.g. CILSS, COMESA and ASEAN) .

106. It should be pointed out, however, that this collaboration still depends considerably on the commitment and technical capacity of staff based in headquarters, and only marginally from resources at the regional or sub-regional level of the three Rome-based agencies which are insufficiently accommodated within the programme design.

107. Some elements of the programme have been weaker in their regional engagement, most notably the outreach of the CFS to the regional level. This has been one of the weaker areas of CFS performance. Some progress is now being made, but mainly awareness-raising at regional level. At the CFS 40th Session in October 2013, a communications strategy was presented and endorsed. Although rather late in the day, this is an important step towards strengthening regional outreach. Exploring the effectiveness of CFS outreach and how this could be strengthened could be an important topic for the forthcoming CFS evaluation. The Food Security Information Network (FSIN) has initiated regional links through the Advisory Board, which will hopefully strengthen the regional dimension of this still nascent network.

108. Support has also been extended beyond the geographical focus of the programme, to the ASEAN High Level Consultative Meeting on integrating nutrition into the regional food security framework. A more strategic focus should be on the southern Asia region where levels of childhood stunting remain high.

5.4.4 Relevance of global public goods to decision-makers at a decentralised level

109. Probably the greatest inconsistency within the programme is the degree to which the outputs are determined by the development agenda at a decentralised level. There are outputs which are in response to a global normative function such as refining the FAO indicator on undernourishment and measuring the state of food insecurity in the world. There are outputs, which are very much in line with the international development agenda to more effectively mainstream gender and nutrition into agriculture and food security information systems, analysis and interventions. There are outputs, which pursue a strong human rights agenda such as tools to mainstream a Right to Food approach. There are outputs, which follow long-standing technical initiatives on sustainable crop production and climate change. Many of these normative processes go on with only limited involvement of the end users and consequently don't achieve the desired effect of influencing policy, programming or decision-making at the country level.

110. Then there are outputs which are driven more by the "field" agenda. These include outputs determined by the agenda of the CFS, which represent the broad constituency of the Member States and should reflect country level priorities, such as the Voluntary Guidelines on land tenure and the Responsible Agriculture Initiative; and there are outputs (public goods) that actually originated from the field itself. Good examples of these are the IPC, resilience analysis and measurement, and social protection which all draw upon field practice and the contexts from which they have been piloted. Certainly in the case of both the IPC and the resilience analysis, national authorities of food insecure countries have more readily identified these tools as being very relevant to their analytical and planning requirements.

5.4.5 Country level impact

111. At this stage of the programme, the degree of impact relates as much to the adoption of the tools, methods and guidelines (public goods) by the national authorities as it does to any improvement in the food and nutrition security of the country, which hopefully will be measurable at a later stage in the programme. Considerable efforts have been made in the first stage of the programme through regional processes to integrate nutrition, risk management and social protection into agriculture and food security strategies and policies. The reality is that the follow-through with respect to identifying capacity needs, training, technical and financial support rests very much with the political commitment at national level and the support of the country offices of the RBAs; or in the case of nutrition, the support of REACH partners. Such support should be mobilised collectively across the RBAs, aligned to national processes. This is still very weak in most focal countries.

112. Currently, there is still little evidence of the programme achieving impact at the country level. The principal achievements at this level are:

- IPC analysis, on-going since 2008, which is now conducted in 29 countries;
- the CAADP Nutrition Capacity Development Initiative since 2011 which has been instrumental in generating nutrition country papers and roadmaps across 50 countries and in a limited number of cases these have resulted in nutrition being better integrated into National Agricultural Investments Plans (NAIPs) principally at this stage in West Africa; and
- Uganda has been the only country where the programme has provided specific support to improve and strengthen existing food safety policy development at national level.

113. However, impact at country level is much more likely to be achieved where there has been a coordinated and concerted effort to support country-led initiatives, and where FAO in-country has a strong commitment and capacity. This still depends considerably upon technical assistance from headquarters level, but is moving forward in the right direction. Two country examples are illustrated in Boxes 7 and 8 below:

- South Sudan where the FAO country office has played a key facilitator role; and
- Niger where there has been an explicit national-level commitment to food and nutrition security through the Initiative "3N" Les Nigerians Nourissent les Nigerians, which has generated political momentum through which the programme can very effectively engage.

Box 7. South Sudan Country Study

- South Sudan became a member state of FAO early in 2013, enhancing the opportunities to engage with government on food security and hunger reduction.
- The country was among the first to adopt the IPC at an early stage of the roll-out in East Africa before the start-up of the programme. Similarly, a resilience baseline was conducted in South Sudan before the programme started.
- FAO and WFP jointly conducted a scoping mission in May 2013 for an RBA partnership strategy focused on building resilience. This has now been turned into a concept note "Building Resilience to Food and Nutrition Security Shocks in Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal and Warrap states".
- An FSIN capacity assessment of food security information systems in all ten states was conducted by FAO and WFP in July 2013 to feed into AFIS (the successor to SIFSIA). The programme is planning to conduct a similar exercise in Sudan (also to be resourced through the successor to SIFSIA in the north). The challenge now is how to move forward on a joint FAO/ WFP vision and implementation.
- Aligning the information systems of FAO, WFP and FEWSNET: attempts to align FAO's and WFP's VAM analytical frameworks are progressing very slowly (despite the global FAO/WFP strategy on ISFNS).
- South Sudan participated in the Regional CAADP Nutrition Capacity Development Workshop for East and Central Africa (May 2013) and received FAO technical support in developing the nutrition country roadmap.
- South Sudan is also being considered as a pilot country for the CFS 'Agenda for Action'. This is likely to involve examining the local context against the principles outlined in Part I of the A4A, in order to illustrate how the principles could be (or are being) transformed into action.

Box 8. Niger Country Study

- FAO's institutional commitment to Niger was strengthened by the Director General's visit in November 2012 with the promise of support to operationalize Niger's strategic framework for food and nutrition security: Initiative "3N" les Nigerians Nourissent les Nigerians;
- FAO finalised its Country Programming Framework in June 2013 with emphasis on: (i) strengthening the resilience of vulnerable populations affected by food and nutrition security; (ii) increasing and diversifying agricultural production; and (iii) strengthening institutional capacity in the rural development sector;
- Support to Niger through the programme is coordinated by an informal "country team" convened at headquarters level;

- Support has been provided to the improvement and harmonisation of the two vulnerability assessment tools: (i) Cadre harmonisé d'analyse permanente de la vulnerabilité courante (CH); and (ii) the IPC which has been applied in other parts of Africa. This includes developing country-level capacities through food security analysis, consensus building on food security classifications and training of relevant stakeholders (output 2.3);
- A study on household resilience profiles was conducted in Niger (output 2.2);
- A test of the methodology on the food insecurity experience scale (FIES) at household level was conducted in Niger (as part of a four country pilot) but not specifically financed by the Improved Global Governance for Hunger Reduction (IGGHR) programme (output 2.4);
- Within the framework of the Global Food Security Information Network (FSIN), Niger has been selected as a pilot country to facilitate capacity development initiatives for strengthening information systems on food and nutrition security (output 2.2);
- Niger was an active participant to the CAADP Nutrition Capacity Development Workshop in West Africa in November 2011 organised by NEPAD and technically supported by FAO. This was prior to the programme start-up, but an important contribution to the finalisation of Niger's "3N" initiative. A food-based nutrition sensitive "3N" implementation plan is now under development (output 3.1);
- A rapid capacity development needs assessment for integrating nutrition programming in the agricultural sector was undertaken in 2012 (although without the technical support envisaged from ESN (output 3.4); and now a food and nutrition capacity development action plan for the rural development sector is being facilitated through the REACH partners;
- Producer organisations were supported in Niger: a joint IFAD/ FAO capacity needs assessment was carried out to inform how to strengthen the gender and governance dimensions;
- Under SCPI an economic analysis of an existing database has been conducted to determine the status of adoption of sustainable practices related to agricultural productivity. Secondly piloting of the FFS approach to build skills at community level to enhance production and reduce use of hazardous pesticides; and Community Listener Clubs (CLC) to improve community governance, empowerment and gender relations as a catalyst for livelihood improvements (output 3.8);
- Much of what FAO supports in Niger relates to capacity development. However, under this objective of the programme, work on developing technical tools and training modules for strengthening capacities for Climate Smart Agriculture are being implemented;
- On 30 October 2013 Niger hosted the Africa Day for Food and Nutrition Security. The African Union (AU) used the occasion to advocate for governments to adopt the concept of human rights-based approaches to hunger within their policy frameworks, including legal entitlements – to productive resources, access to food and social protection. Unfortunately, agreement to pilot tools to mainstream a Right to Food approach in social transfer/protection programmes was not achieved, and is now to be launched in Kenya where the right to food is also incorporated into the constitution (output 3.7).

5.5 Collaboration between Rome-based agencies, and other strategic partnerships

114. As described in Section 3, the programme was seen as a vehicle for promoting greater collaboration between the RBAs. This was an explicit intention on the part of the EU, captured in the Statement of Intent signed in 2011, although within the limitations of FAO being contracted to manage the programme as described in Section 3 above. Where there were already institutional arrangements for RBA collaboration, the programme has benefited. There are two particular examples: the RBAs coming together to staff the Secretariat of the

CFS, as envisaged in the CFS reform document[30]; and the joint FAO/ WFP strategy on Information Systems for Food and Nutrition Security (ISFNS), finalized in November 2011 shortly before the programme began.

115. Promoting collaboration at programme level between the RBAs highlights particular challenges. The first relates to issues of alignment between FAO and WFP at corporate level. As both organisations have gone through significant processes of strategic reorientation in recent years, in many ways they have moved more closely together. But there is a sense at country level that lack of clarity and alignment at the corporate level is hampering effective collaboration at programme and project level. The second challenge relates to the very different business models and resource base of the three RBAs. These need to be taken into account in working out how collaboration can be most effectively promoted through this programme. As mentioned in section 3, this was not worked through in the design stage of the programme. Instead, collaboration has been arranged output-by-output, and activity-by-activity rather than guided by a clear strategy based on comparative advantage. It has also been driven by FAO as the overall programme manager and budget-holder, causing some RBA stakeholders to describe this collaboration as 'coordination' of the RBAs by FAO.

5.5.1 Effectiveness of collaboration between the RBAs

116. Despite these challenges, there are examples in the programme of effective collaboration between the RBAs that has enhanced the overall effectiveness of the work. With the exception of the CFS in which all three RBAs are involved, each of these examples refers to bilateral collaboration between FAO and IFAD, or between FAO and WFP. They fall into three categories:

I. Where two agencies are working on the same issue and there is a clear common interest

117. Examples of close collaboration between WFP and FAO mostly relate to Outcome 2, and include: the FSIN, IPC and resilience measurement work. An important factor contributing to effective collaboration on the FSIN is WFP bringing its own pot of resources (from USAID) to the partnership, to match FAO's resources provided through this programme.

118. Examples of close collaboration between FAO and IFAD include: work on land tenure and the VGs (although there is a need for closer collaboration in the process of disseminating the VGs); formulating and disseminating the social analysis guidelines for agricultural investment; incorporating the Platform on Agriculture Risk Management (PARM) initiative into the NPCA Workshop on Integrating Agriculture and Food Security Management Issues in to CAADP Investment Plans in Southern and East Africa (May 2012); and contributing to e-learning on both of the afore-mentioned topics.

II. Where two agencies have different types of expertise that are complementary

119. The clearest example of this is the collaboration between FAO and IFAD on 'Coop-equity' (output 3.5 on 'Improved Tools and Processes to Strengthen the Gender and Equity Dimension of Producer Organisations'). FAO provides the knowledge and experience of

[30] The three RBAs are also making efforts to align their future funding commitments to the CFS

producer organisations while IFAD provides strong gender expertise, especially related to governance of organisations. Long-term and strong professional relationships between the individuals who are the respective focal points in FAO and IFAD have facilitated this collaboration.

III. Collaboration at country level

120. There are positive examples of collaboration at country level between FAO and WFP that are not related to this programme, for example the tri-partite collaboration on resilience between WFP, FAO and UNICEF in Somalia and the REACH partnership between FAO, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, which assists governments of countries with a high burden of under-nutrition to scale-up food and nutrition actions. The collaboration on resilience in Somalia inspired other FAO and WFP country offices in the region to follow suit. It has also highlighted two factors critical to effective collaboration at country level: leadership on the part of the agencies involved, facilitated by good personal relations at the country director/ representative level; and collaboration is facilitated by the respective agencies coming together as equal partners, for example in terms of influence and resources. Nevertheless, this programme can provide resources and incentives to facilitate collaboration at country level, as it has done in South Sudan through WFP and FAO jointly carrying out the resilience scoping exercise and the capacity assessment on food security information systems. However, different institutional agendas for food security information systems prevail, and the two agencies have very different levels of resources, both of which constrain effective collaboration in vision and implementation. IFAD is only recently engaging in South Sudan, but close relations are already developing with FAO; IFAD staff will be housed within FAO's offices in Juba.

121. REACH is operating in 12 countries of which Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Niger and Uganda are of particular relevance to this programme. The REACH partners have been actively engaged in the CAADP Nutrition Capacity Development workshops and as follow-up activities have collaborated in support of the nutrition capacity needs assessments being conducted in Niger and Uganda. In Niger REACH gives particular emphasis to decentralized, multi-sectoral coordination.

122. The evaluation has also identified a number of examples of missed opportunities for collaboration between the RBAs, especially between FAO and IFAD. These are presented in Box 9. Half-way through the programme's life this is an opportune time for the three RBAs to review their collaboration thus far and to address these (and other) missed opportunities.

Box 9. Missed opportunities for collaboration between the RBAs

The missed opportunities below are listed by order of strategic importance:

- Sustainable crop production (output 3.8): this is an obvious area for collaboration between FAO and IFAD. Although IFAD prepared a concept note on sustainable agriculture there has been no further collaboration;
- Livestock and food security between FAO and IFAD. This is an area where there appears to be an overall lack of collaboration between FAO and IFAD, exacerbated by the limited attention given to livestock in this programme;
- Climate change adaptation (output 4.5 and also outputs 2.2.2 and 2.2.3): although climate change adaptation is an area of thematic focus for IFAD, there appears to have been very limited collaboration with FAO on the outputs that relate to this, developing technical tools to assess climate variability and climate change impact, and on resilience;

- Dietary diversity score (DDS) being developed (output 2.4): there is still insufficient collaboration between FAO and WFP to harmonise the DDS with the well-established Food Consumption Score (FCS) or provide suitable guidance on the application of the different tools;
- FSIN and market prices (output 2.2): IFAD is not a partner in FSIN but could make a useful contribution to discussions about harmonization of market price data collection and analysis;
- Social protection and agriculture (output 3.1.2): although FAO has developed a very effective and relevant collaboration with UNICEF, there is scope for further involving both IFAD and WFP on this issue.

5.5.2 Other strategic partnerships

123. As mentioned in section 3, although there is a strong rationale for collaboration between the RBAs, this should not be over-emphasised at the expense of other strategic partnerships which may be more relevant to strengthening global governance for hunger reduction on particular issues. There are many examples of important and appropriate strategic partnerships that have been developed throughout the programme on different outputs. These include: partnership with IPRI in the FSIN; partnership with UNICEF on social protection; the involvement of FEWSNet in the IPC and in FSIN's work on market prices; and the engagement of the World Bank in agricultural statistics, social protection and the IPC. The IPC Global Steering Committee now includes an impressively wide range of stakeholders from NGOs (ACF, CARE, Oxfam and Save the Children) to UN agencies (FAO and WFP), to donor-related bodies (the EC-JRC, and FEWSNET), RECs (CILSS and SICA) and the Global Food Security Cluster. The IPC as a model of collaboration is presented in Box 10. There are also other examples of partnership at regional level.

Box 10. The IPC: a Model of Collaboration

The IPC is a set of analytical tools and processes to analyse and classify the severity of a food security situation according to scientific international standards. It aims at providing decision-makers with an analysis of food insecurity in both emergency and development contexts, and key objectives for response to better coordinate the interventions.

The IPC has four functions: (i) promotion of technical consensus; (ii) common scale for severity classification and early warning; (iii) communication for action; and (iv) quality control assurance. The IPC is now used in 29 countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia. At the regional level the IPC is overseen by Support Teams composed of agency food security advisors and linked with existing regional food security networks. At country level, inter-ministerial and multi-agency working groups support the IPC.

The IPC is one component of the programme coordinated by an IPC Global Support Unit based in Rome. It is accountable to a Global Steering Committee representing a broad technical partnership which includes FAO, WFP and the EC Joint Research Centre (JRC) along with Action Contre la Faim (ACF), CARE, Oxfam, Save the Children, the Global Food Security Cluster, FEWSNET and now two regional bodies: CILSS (west Africa) and SICA (Central America). These organisations are also represented in an IPC Technical Advisory Group to the IPC.

The IPC is a multi-funded initiative with eight donors having contributed to the global development of the IPC since its inception in 2008.

124. The Technical Working Group on Resilience Measurement led by FAO has also brought in a range of partners from academic institutions such as Tulane University, Tufts University and Cornell University, to groups which have led some of the thinking on resilience such as Tango, and more recently representation from IGAD. Whilst this is an impressive list, it is noticeable that the NGO community is not well-represented, with only MercyCorps in the group, nor is FEWSNet. As the resilience agenda develops, many actors are looking to the group to provide guidance on resilience measurement. It is therefore important that it is inclusive of a wide range of perspectives and approaches and is strongly rooted in the realities of the field.

125. There are few examples of partnerships with the private sector in the programme with the exception of the CFS, and work with producer organisations (output 3.5). Yet there are a number of areas where private sector partnerships should be explored, for example in relation to nutrition and food safety.

5.5.3 Collaboration with the EU as a development partner

126. As well as being the principal resource partner, the EU is also an important development partner in the programme as reflected in the Statement of Intent of 2011. The establishment of an FAO Liaison Office in Brussels recognises the strategic importance of this partnership and plays a very positive role in representing the programme at this level. While there are some positive examples of active collaboration between the EU and the programme – for example, the EU's active engagement in many aspects of the CFS, including support for the VGs and their dissemination; and the links between DG SANCO and the work on food safety – there are also missed opportunities, for example the EU's limited engagement with the work of the FSIN, and the work on resilience. Links between this programme and the AGIR programme in the Sahel and the SHARE programme in the Horn of Africa, for instance, are unclear and undeveloped.

127. The greatest untapped potential for collaboration with the EU is at country level. Although there is often a strong funding relationship between EU Delegations and FAO country offices, substantive collaboration around some of the themes and priorities of this programme is not an area of strength. EU Delegations were not involved in recent CAADP workshops on mainstreaming nutrition, for example, despite the recent EC Communication on Nutrition. This was not apparently through lack of effort from the NPCA to have them participate. Indeed, awareness of the programme at the EU Delegation level appears weak, even in focus countries such as South Sudan. This is an area that deserves much greater attention in the second half of the programme, not least to build synergy between work funded by the EU at country level and the aims and objectives of this global level programme.

5.6 The programme and the FAO reform process

128. The 'FAO Reform process' refers to the revision to the strategic framework and associated changes to how FAO is structured and is planning to organize its work in future, also referred to as the 'transformational change process' by FAO's current Director-General.

129. The programme was originally designed under FAO's strategic framework that had been drafted for the period 2010-2019, as a result of an earlier reform process triggered by

the IEE and the Immediate Plan of Action. This has since undergone a major review which has resulted in a reviewed Strategic Framework and five new strategic objectives. While most internal FAO stakeholders see the programme as inherently linked to the FAO reform process, some external stakeholders have questioned the relevance of the link between the programme and FAO reform and the impact of the change process on the programme. The PSC requested an analysis by the MTE of how the programme was supporting 'some key aspects of the FAO Reform process'. The Evaluation examined the connection between the programme and the transformational change process from two angles. First, what has been the programme's contribution to FAO reform, and second, how has the process of reform/ transformational change impacted on the programme, positively and/or negatively. Ultimately, the issue of concern is the extent to which the transformational change process that FAO has embarked upon, is likely to make a positive difference to the programme's ability to fulfil its aim of improved global governance for hunger reduction.

5.6.1 The programme's contribution to FAO reform

130. The Evaluation considers that in many ways this programme pioneered a different way of working within FAO. Two particular examples stand out. First, the programme is unusually set up to work across divisions and has worked hard to break down the silo-way of working, for which FAO has been criticized. Second, the programme has made commitment and efforts to mainstream two important issues – gender and nutrition – in the wake of two organization-wide evaluations that were critical of FAO's performance in these areas. These two evaluations triggered renewed efforts by FAO at corporate level to prioritize both gender and nutrition. A new policy was formulated on gender and a Strategy and Vision on Nutrition. This programme has made a conscious effort to redress the shortcomings highlighted in these two evaluations, to follow the new policies, and to pioneer an approach to mainstreaming. In the words of a senior FAO director, this programme was, in effect, the 'precursor' to the current revision of the FAO Strategic Framework.

131. Not only has the programme modelled new ways of working, which should become the norm after this transformational change process has been completed, it has also influenced the thinking behind the new strategic framework in substantive ways. There is strong alignment between the programme and many of its outputs and Strategic Objective (SO) 1 on eradicating hunger, food security and malnutrition.

132. There are two particular examples of how the programme has influenced SO 3 on reducing rural poverty. First, the work on social protection and agriculture (output 3.1.2) within the programme has been a major influence in designing outcome 3 of SO 3, on strengthening social protection systems in support of sustainable rural poverty reduction. This is not an area where FAO has traditionally been strong. Staff and consultants working on this topic within the programme have contributed their knowledge and expertise, as well as a literature review to formulate this part of the new strategy, from the concept stage to designing a flagship initiative.

133. Second, work carried out under this programme on gender and governance in relation to producer organisations (output 3.5) has directly influenced another part of SO 3, outcome 1 on the enabling environment, and specifically and its commitment to support '*governments and relevant stakeholders … to strengthen formal and informal rural institutions, organizations and services and facilitate peoples' empowerment to actively*

participate in decision making processes and contribute to the improvement of rural livelihoods and the reduction of poverty', with a strong gender dimension.

134. Both of these examples are new areas of focus and expertise developed within the programme, which are now influencing FAO at corporate level. The programme's contribution to FAO's work on resilience has also influenced and informed SO5 on increased resilience of livelihoods. In short, the programme has been highly influential in the transformational change process. It has also demonstrated the transaction costs of working in this more collaborative way, an inevitable consequence of working across disciplines and departments/ divisions. Higher transaction costs are worthwhile as long as they generate more effective outcomes.

5.6.2 How FAO reform has influenced the programme

135. The programme has also been impacted by the process of transformational change within FAO, especially during 2013 when large amounts of staff time have been taken up in consultations and in formulating the new strategic framework. The decentralization and restructuring that has been a consequence of the transformational change process has also taken its toll on the pace of implementation. There are concrete examples of how both have slowed down programme implementation. The follow-up gender mainstreaming workshop planned for November 2013 has been postponed until the new strategic framework will be in place and the reorganization of how gender mainstreaming will be addressed within FAO headquarters is complete. Mapping Actions for Food Security and Nutrition (MAFSAN, output 3.1) lost its institutional home since the dismantling of the Special Programme for Food Security (TCSF) as part of the reform process, which has resulted in no progress through this output since the programme started. There are now moves to re-establish MAFSAN within ESN (see the next section on integrating nutrition).

136. There is inevitably a period of turbulence and uncertainty while these change processes are underway. The distracting impact of the transformational change process on some aspects of this programme's performance, for example on the work on social protection and agriculture, means that the stakes are high. In other words, the slow-down in performance is worth it if the changes ultimately contribute to greater programme effectiveness. The potential for achieving the latter is high as the programme is now much more closely aligned to the new strategic framework, especially to SO 1 on the eradication of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition, and SO 5 on resilience, with significant contributions to SO 3 on rural poverty as indicated above. Indeed, close alignment with the new strategic objectives should increase demand at regional and country level within FAO for the technical expertise and normative guidance that the programme is offering. But this will also be dependent on this transformational change process reaching conclusion, followed by a period of greater stability and consolidation. Ultimately, the FAO transformational change process is intended to improve the way that FAO works and therefore its impact in the longer term.

6 Cross-cutting issues

6.1 Integration of gender equality perspective

137. FAO was starting from a low baseline in terms of its performance in mainstreaming gender when this programme began. The 'Evaluation of FAO's Role and Work in Gender and Development' completed in 2011 found that: '*in around 35-40% of all FAO projects, the gender dimension was ignored, even though gender equality was relevant to achieve the stated project objectives. Not taking gender into account undermined the effectiveness and sustainability of many projects and initiatives. Overall, this weakness was also mirrored in FAO's Global Public Goods. They too lacked a social and gender perspective even when those aspects were relevant and important to most of the topics discussed*'.

138. The commitment to address gender issues in this programme was clearly stated in the inception report, with reference to FAO's Policy on Gender Equality adopted in March 2012. The challenges to achieve gender mainstreaming when the overall competency levels are weak, at least within FAO, as noted in the gender evaluation, were considerable. Five principles guiding gender mainstreaming, drawn from the 2012 FAO's Policy on Gender Equality, were identified at the outset: (1) gender equality in participation; (2) gender analysis; (3) gender-disaggregated data; (4) gender-sensitive design and implementation; and (5) gender-sensitive monitoring and evaluation. Half a day was allocated to gender in the mainstreaming workshop for the programme, held in March 2012. ESW staff subsequently followed up in one-to-one meetings with all output focal points to help identify the gender dimension of that output and the gender expertise that might be needed. A matrix for monitoring progress in gender mainstreaming was also drawn up.

139. There are some positive examples of how this made a difference, as follows:

- With dedicated gender expertise, the IPC developed a gender guidance note to support strengthened gender analysis at country level and the IPC Sub-Working Group on the chronic food insecurity scale paid attention to gender-based indicators of food consumption to capture the quality of diet of women and children (output 2.4);
- Those responsible for the updated version of LEGS had it reviewed for gender-sensitivity (output 3.9);
- FAO produced a technical guide for gender-equitable governance of land tenure to support the principle of gender equality enshrined in the VGs that had been endorsed by the CFS, and a gender perspective has been included in the e-learning materials on the VGs (outputs 3.6 and 4.1);
- The food safety work in Uganda introduced gender-related and social criteria for assessing food safety beyond the usual health criteria, for example applying a gender lens to assessing food security and economic factors related to the impact of exposure to unsafe food (output 3.3).

140. In each of these examples, bringing in specific gender expertise to support the team working on the output was critical to their success. Other enabling factors included: staff who are motivated to address gender inequality and have competence in this area, and a track record on gender equality, for example through the gender focal point network that preceded this programme. However, the positive examples relate to five out of a total of 21 outputs. A review of gender mainstreaming across the programme indicated that rather little progress was made overall in 2012. A lot of planned gender mainstreaming work was deferred to

2013. Whether it has been carried out in 2013 remains to be seen since much FAO staff time has been taken up with the FAO reform process.

141. The first principle for gender mainstreaming for the programme, gender equality in participation, has been given most attention as the different outputs strive to demonstrate gender balance in participation in their work, for example in training. This is important but the more challenging principles of gender analysis and gender-disaggregation of data have received less attention, with the exceptions noted above. Much more needs to be done in promoting gender-disaggregated data collection (beyond disaggregation of data according to the sex of the household head) across Outcome 2 in food security information systems, and in promoting gender analysis in relation to policy initiatives across Outcome 3.

142. The 2012 FAO Gender Policy is an important step in institutionalising accountability for gender equality across the organization. A second step towards strengthening accountability is the planned introduction of the gender marker in 2014, in line with the UN System Wide Action Plan on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (UN SWAP). Applying the gender marker to each individual output of this programme will highlight where urgent action is needed to strengthen gender mainstreaming, and will provide an overview of how the programme is progressing.

143. Of all the programme outputs reviewed, only one qualifies for the highest classification under the gender marker: G-2b – addressing gender equality and/or women's empowerment as the main focus. This is output 3.5 on 'Improved Tools and Processes to Strengthen the Gender and Equity Dimension of Producer Organisations, implemented jointly by FAO and IFAD. With IFAD support, this work has added an important new dimension to the way in which FAO engages with producer organisations, for the first time applying a gender lens, and the governance of producer organisations from the perspective of gender equity. This work at country-level should generate valuable normative guidance materials by the end of the programme.

6.2 Integration of Nutrition

144. Raising levels of nutrition and collecting, analysing and disseminating information on nutrition has always been a principal purpose and mandate of FAO. However, for some time its role and work in nutrition has fallen well short of the expectations of key stakeholders in addressing the increased nutrition concerns worldwide from the perspective of agriculture and food-based interventions. On the basis of a recommendation of the evaluation conducted in 2011, FAO subsequently developed a Strategy and Vision for Nutrition which focuses on: (i) increased knowledge and evidence to maximise the impact of food and agricultural systems on nutrition; (ii) improved food and agricultural systems governance for nutrition; (iii) strengthened national, regional and local capacities to formulate and implement policies and programmes. This was developed alongside the inception phase of the Improved Global Governance for Hunger Reduction programme.

145. Unlike gender, nutrition has not been adopted as a cross-cutting theme within FAO's reviewed Strategic Framework 2010-2019. It is embedded in the first strategic objective, which contributes to the eradication of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition and is also explicit within the third and fifth strategic objectives concerned with the reduction in rural poverty and increase the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises.

146. The timing of the FAO Strategy and Vision for Nutrition at the outset of the programme has provided a real window of opportunity for better integrating nutrition across key areas of work within FAO. This has been strengthened by the commitment of the programme management team and the identification of nutrition mainstreaming as a key programme priority by the Steering Committee in March 2013.

147. A comprehensive matrix was developed during the inception phase, which explored opportunities for the cross-cutting themes - capacity development, communication, governance, gender and nutrition - against each of the outcomes and outputs of the programme. This has been used as a principal reference point for mainstreaming nutrition by the coordination team especially where outputs were not explicitly related to nutrition.

148. The principal achievements in mainstreaming nutrition have been made across the four outcomes of the programme. Under outcome one, there have been opportunities to influence debates on the management of food insecurity in protracted crises and review reports by the High Level Panel of Experts (HLPE) from a nutrition perspective. Under outcome two, inputs have been made to the ADePT food security module; support has been provided to develop a methodology for nutrition classification to complete the instruments of the IPC; engagement with the launch of the FSIN; and important methodological work on the development of nutrition indicators (DDS and FIES) to be integrated in information systems at country level. Under outcome three, there has been the very significant support to the NEPAD initiative at regional level to integrate nutrition (including elements of food safety) in CAADP agricultural investment plans in 50 countries; support to assess and develop nutrition capacities across sectors at country level in both Niger and Uganda; the workshop on strengthening the impact of nutrition through food security and livelihood programming in South Sudan; technical contributions from a nutrition perspective on (i) the linkages between agriculture and social protection, and (ii) the protection of livestock in crisis and emergencies, although not yet integrated in the guidelines; financial support to the Secretariat of the SUN movement; and the revised FAPDA classification. Under outcome four, nutrition elements have been integrated into e-learning materials such as the guidelines on social analysis; and there has been the development of guidelines by TCI to support the integration of nutrition in the development of agriculture investment plans introduced in the two regional CAADP workshops for East, Central and Southern Africa (see Box 11).

Box 11. Mainstreaming Nutrition through the CAADP Framework for African Food Security

The IGGHR programme is supporting an initiative by NEPAD to integrate nutrition into CAADP National Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plans (NAFSIPs) thus strengthening the contribution of the agriculture sector to reduce undernutrition across Africa.

Three sub-regional workshops have been conducted in Dakar, Senegal (November 2011)[31], in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania (February 2013) and in Gaborone, Botswana (September 2013) bringing together a total of 580 participants from 50 countries. Each workshop brought together country teams composed of 6 to 10 professionals from agriculture, health, education, finance, private sector and civil society as well as representatives from Regional Economic Communities (RECs), CAADP development partners, donors, UN (including WFP and IFAD) and NGOs.

[31] The West Africa Workshop was held before the start of the IGGHR programme

Each country team (selected to ensure good representation of all sectors) was tasked to prepare a Nutrition Country Paper (including particular food and nutrition security challenges as well as information on coordination structures, programmes and policies) as well as the identification of case studies to inform the workshop agenda, in preparation for the workshop. During the workshop the participants formulated recommendations and sets of action for mainstreaming nutrition into national agriculture investment plans summarised in a country roadmap[32].

FAO facilitated at the workshops drawing upon technical personnel from ESN, RAF and TCI. TCI helped developed the technical guidelines for mainstreaming nutrition in agriculture based upon their considerable experience of working with national authorities on NAFSIPs.

The effectiveness of follow-up actions at country levels depends considerably upon the political commitment as well as some support from NEPAD and RECs. This is also where links with the UN REACH partnership, the SUN movement and engagement with principal donors (including EU Delegations) could be particularly critical.

149. Given the status of nutrition within FAO at the time the programme was being designed, these achievements are significant and demonstrate the interest across the organisation for greater technical collaboration. It should however be noted that the commitment to mainstream across FAO has led to some neglect of the other two RBAs to contribute to the nutrition agenda especially at HQ level. Furthermore, a major constraint is the lack of awareness by some FAO senior staff, at country and sub-regional level, of the critical contribution the organisation has to offer to nutrition from a food and agriculture perspective and the opportunities for collaboration this throws open at country level, including other RBAs, CGIAR organisations and EU Delegations, especially as most of the focus countries to this programme are members of the SUN movement. Only with this senior level commitment will country and sub-regional offices be sufficiently capacitated, with nutrition staff. There is still too much dependency on a very small number of headquarters staff to deliver at all levels and insufficient technical capacity at the country level in most focal countries. Even within the ESN team at headquarters level there have been considerable differences in levels of commitment towards the different outputs of the programme, which has been a challenge in achieving the desired outcomes.

150. There are also opportunities to generate evidence of how agriculture (including livestock and fisheries) and food security interventions can effectively contribute to nutrition outcomes in different contexts; this is a key area for informing policy and programming in the future. This is where the re-establishment of the management information system for food security and nutrition (MAFSAN) could be instrumental in collating and coordinating this information in key focal countries. Linking this through to FAPDA and the Monitoring African Food and Agricultural Policies (MAFAP) with a strong nutrition lens could be very strategic in view of the international agenda on nutrition.

6.3 Capacity development

151. Building capacity at regional and national level is key to fulfilling the programme's overall aim and to having an impact at country level. Somewhat confusingly the programme has treated capacity development as a cross-cutting theme as well as being the focus of

[32] http://www.fao.org/food/fns/workshops/caadp-nutrition/en/

Outcome 4. As a cross-cutting theme there were two dedicated workshops on capacity development for all output focal points early in the programme, in March and May 2012, which helped to convey the message that capacity development is more than just training, and to encourage capacity assessment processes to precede capacity development investment.

152. There are a range of ways in which the programme is addressing capacity development, including the following:

a. most tangibly, and representing a significant part of Outcome 4, the programme has funded the development of a number of e-learning courses, drawing on technical expertise across the programme;
b. at country level, particularly in the programme's priority countries, for example South Sudan where a comprehensive capacity needs assessment was carried out collaboratively by WFP and FAO to inform a food and nutrition capacity development action plan;
c. capacity development of regional organisations, for example in the IPC, and enabling regional organisations to run their own e-learning platforms;
d. regionally-driven capacity development initiatives, mostly targeting national level, for example the CAADP Nutrition Capacity Development Initiative.

153. Two particular challenges emerge. First, the time it takes to develop capacity in a sustainable manner, which in many cases may require investment and support beyond the life of this programme, for example capacity development efforts with regional bodies. And second, the challenge of doing this collaboratively between RBAs where they may have different priorities and approaches to capacity development, an issue already evident in South Sudan. Nevertheless, the programme is well-placed to capture examples and models of good practice in capacity development, and must constantly seek feedback to refine and fine-tune its approaches.

7 Conclusions

154. The programme got off to a difficult start because of flaws in the design stage. For a programme of this ambition, magnitude and potential, the lack of conceptual thinking and contextual analysis at the outset left a legacy that the programme has had to work hard to overcome. Much effort has since gone into strengthening the linkages, but the breadth of work it is covering and the breakdown into numerous outputs has challenged many stakeholders (apart from those at the heart of the programme) to grasp its coherence and to understand it as a programme; hence the request to the MTE to pay particular attention to the strategic focus of the programme and to its value added.

155. There is greatest strategic coherence where the technical work of the programme is being carried out in close synergy with the CFS agenda and is inputting into political processes through the CFS. There is also strong strategic coherence in areas where the programme is really adding value, for example in providing technical leadership to produce normative products and services, especially where there are effective global-regional-country linkages and this work is underpinned by strategic partnerships (many of which go beyond the RBAs). There are examples of this under Outcome 2, particularly related to food and nutrition security information systems, including the IPC and the work on resilience measurement. The evaluation also identifies a number of areas where the programme could be more strategic, especially by developing stronger linkages between some outputs and by

addressing missed opportunities for collaboration between the RBAs. The evaluation questions the relevance of certain outputs to the programme; consideration should be given to re-locating those outputs to other programmes within FAO.

156. The first two years of the programme have been spent setting it up, pioneering some new areas of work, continuing some work that was already ongoing, engaging with some key policy processes, and producing deliverables in the form of new technical outputs and e-learning courses. The engagement with regional organisations has been particularly strategic and important through this process. However, much of the work at country level is still at an early stage and it is too soon to see an impact. The next two years of the programme will, therefore, be critical in terms of demonstrating clear results, building on the partnerships and foundations that have now been put in place, and realizing the potential that is promised by the close alignment between the programme and FAO's new strategic framework. Much closer partnership with the EU, especially at country level, will be key to making an impact at country level. Achieving all of the above will be critical to demonstrating the value of a large and strategic programme of this nature.

157. There follows a summary of the evaluation's findings according to the conventional evaluation criteria:

Relevance

158. The part of the programme most relevant to the overall governance aim is Outcome 1 through the contribution to the CFS and to supporting the reformed structure and the greater inclusivity it ensures, as well as providing technical input into its political processes.

159. The relevance of individual outputs is generally high to the context in which they are operating, for example the work at regional level through NEPAD/ NPCA and through the RECs, which has been widely welcomed, also the work on nutrition mainstreaming and the IPC. Most outputs are strategically relevant to the overall aim of the programme with a few exceptions highlighted in the report.

160. However, lack of contextual analysis at the design stage may have contributed to some gaps. For example, as improved global governance and many of the programme outputs are dependent on good food and nutrition security information, should the programme be playing a more significant role in strengthening this? There is limited attention to the livestock sector across the programme, for example, factoring the contribution of livestock into information systems and into food security and nutrition policy analysis and formation. This is especially a gap in Africa where livestock are a major contributor to food security.

Efficiency

161. Weaknesses at the design stage have also undermined efficiency as considerable investment has had to be made since to pull it together as a programme from a list of disparate projects. FAO's transitional change process, and especially the review of the FAO Strategic Framework, has drawn staff away from the programme, thus reducing efficiency of implementation in the short-term. This will be worthwhile if it contributes to improved effectiveness of the programme in the next two years and beyond, through greater strategic

alignment between the two and integration of ideas and experience from the programme into the Framework.

Effectiveness

162. A lot of foundational work has gone into the first two years of the programme. There is already a wide range of programme deliverables, including guidelines, analytical tools and learning material, although there is not yet evidence of how many of these guidelines and tools are being used.

163. Working through regional authorities and organisations has been a particular strength of the programme, and can be built upon in the next two years.

164. Where there are strong and strategic linkages across the programme it is at its most effective, but there are also many missed opportunities for linkage across the programme that must be addressed urgently to maximise effectiveness.

165. There are positive examples of effective collaboration across the RBAs and with other strategic partners which have contributed to overall effectiveness, but there are also missed opportunities for collaboration across the RBAs, which has tended to be driven activity by activity, and missed opportunities for more effective and substantive collaboration with the EU, especially at country level.

Impact

166. There is limited evidence so far of the impact of the programme on the ground. This must be demonstrated in the next two years, especially in terms of strengthening the quality and extent of food and nutrition security information and positive influence on policy processes and programming. Potential impact can be greatest where:

- there are close synergies with the CFS agenda and/ or with national government agendas;
- there is political commitment to food and nutrition security, at regional and national levels;
- the programme agenda is aligned with the strategic priorities of FAO country offices, and where there is close collaboration with other strategic partners, including RBAs; and
- there is convergence and closer collaboration with EU priorities, at the headquarters level and especially at country level.

Sustainability

167. Closer alignment between this programme and FAO's reviewed strategic framework should contribute to the sustainability of the work being undertaken as it becomes a clear organisational priority.

168. Working through regional organisations, and especially building their capacity, is a strategic approach to addressing sustainability of some of the work being undertaken. However, where the capacity of regional organisations is low, this will take some time to achieve.

169. EU funding through this programme to support the fundamental mechanisms of the CFS is making a significant contribution. Although additional funds are being leveraged, continued EU funding beyond the life of this programme may be necessary for the CFS to continue evolving and functioning effectively.

8 Recommendations

170. Based on the findings and conclusions above, the MTE formulated seven recommendations that address key issues that if tackled, should enable the Programme to achieve its objectives more efficiently and effectively. Most of the recommendations are targeted at FAO's programme management, working closely with focal points in FAO and WFP. Some require action and decisions by the PSC.

171. For Recommendation 1 below, specific reference is made to the missed opportunities identified by the MTE, discussed in Box 4 of the report.

Recommendation 1: To the Programme, on strategic coherence

The Programme should strengthen its strategic coherence through the following actions:
a) FAO in consultation with IFAD and WFP should further develop the original conceptual framework for improved governance for hunger reduction, to underpin the programme and give it greater intellectual and strategic coherence. This could also be linked to conceptual thinking underpinning FAO's new strategic framework;
b) FAO in consultation with IFAD and WFP should undertake a rapid contextual analysis (also drawing on secondary sources) of key elements required to contribute to improved governance for hunger reduction in the areas where the programme is focusing, namely Horn of Africa and the Sahel. Through this analysis, the three RBAs should identify elements which require additional emphasis (and possibly resources) through the programme, with particular reference to data collection on food and nutrition security, mapping of food and nutrition security interventions and strengthening the livestock dimension within existing programme outputs;
d) FAO should identify where there could be stronger linkages between outputs of the programme, drawing on the analysis of this MTE especially in support of information systems and policy;
e) The programme management should review the three 'satellite projects' identified by the MTE against the criteria of (i) contribution to improved global governance for hunger reduction, and (ii) strategic linkages to other elements of the programme, to determine whether they should remain part of this programme or be relocated into other FAO programmes

172. For Recommendation 2 below, specific reference is made to the missed opportunities for collaboration discussed in Box 9 of the report.

Recommendation 2: To the Programme, IFAD and WFP, on collaboration

The Programme should develop a more strategic approach to collaboration with IFAD, WFP and build on other strategic technical partnerships. More specifically, it should:
a) Map out the comparative advantage of the three RBAs and strengthen collaboration where particular RBAs are not sufficiently engaged yet have the potential to contribute.
b) Include IFAD and WFP focal points in the technical working group;
c) Carry out more joint planning between the RBAs for activities that concern them all, at all levels: headquarters, regional and country level.

173. Recommendation 3 requires joint action by programme management within FAO and by the managers of the programme in the European Commission.

Recommendation 3: To the Programme and the EU, on enhanced partnership

The Programme should develop a more concerted partnership with the EU, especially across strategic areas of common interest. More specifically, the two parties should:
a) Jointly identify where technical exchange between key elements of the programme, e.g. FSIN, IPC, resilience, hunger indicators, nutrition and DEVCO staff at headquarters level could be strengthened, drawing on tools developed by the programme and capitalising on windows of opportunity that arise; and
b) Develop a stronger technical cooperation between focal countries of this programme, the EU Action Plan on Nutrition (currently in draft) and EU Delegations that have prioritised food and nutrition security within their indicative plans 2014-2020.

174. Recommendation 4 is closely related to Recommendation 5.

Recommendation 4: To the Programme, on priority setting

The Programme should increasingly be more demand-driven at different levels, drawing on models of good practice. More specifically, it should:
a) Allow space and resources to address issues emerging through the CFS, e.g. post-2015 MDG agenda, possibly leveraging additional funds from other sources;
b) Pursue elements and products which are of particular relevance and therefore offer high potential for utilisation to member states and regional organisations, drawing on policy and other documentation, including FAO CPFs, and planning for appropriate time-frames which may extend beyond the life of this programme; and
c) Decentralise technical capacity to support the programme and build national capacity where the political commitment is strong.

Recommendation 5: To the Programme, on good practices

The Programme should develop and document models of good practice at the regional and country levels, according to context, which demonstrate:
- linkage across programme components and/or with country strategy objectives;
- linkage between the global, regional and country levels
- technical collaboration across the RBAs, other relevant partners and donors; and
- a clear policy commitment from government and/or the regional authority to drive the initiative forward, e.g. being a member country of the SUN movement.

Recommendation 6: To the Programme, on communication

The Programme should develop better articulated communications on programme achievements tailored to particular audiences. More specifically, it should:
a) Raise awareness of the programme across principal stakeholders at regional and country level, with particular reference to EU Delegations and RBAs;
b) Provide succinct reports to principal stakeholders at global level through the Programme Steering Committee, which distinguish the main achievements and impact of the programme from the regular activities.

Recommendation 7: To the Programme, on strengthening governance and programme management

The Programme should strengthen governance, establish better capacitated management and more conducive administrative arrangements in support of principal interventions. More specifically, the Programme should:
a) Consider adding independent members to the PSC, to play a peer review role;
b) Identify additional resources to ensure that programme management has adequate capacity;
c) Identify one budget holder within ESN to oversee all activities in support of mainstreaming nutrition;
d) Identify more efficient and workable administrative arrangements for managing the Multi-Donor Trust Fund in support of the Civil Society Mechanism of the CSF; and
e) Ensure that the quantitative bias of monitoring against the logframe indicators are balanced with more qualitative means of evaluating quality and relevance of the programme's outputs.