

Early disease detection Surveillance

K Depner
18 February 2019
Belgrade


What's all about?

A: Early detection >>> **Passive / Active** surveillance ????

B: Disease control and eradication

Hunting strategy, biosecurity, feeding strategy, etc...

- ***B works only when A works***
- ***A can only be successful if based on a proper risk assessment***



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

Risk Assessment Germany

- Assessment for import risk through
 - Legal import of pigs and products
 - Contaminated vehicles and clothes
 - Wild boar
- Qualitative not quantitative
 - Negligible / low / medium / likely / high
- With confidence level
 - Low, medium, high

Qualitative
Risikobewertung
zur Einschätzung der
Afrikanischen Schweinepest aus
Verkehrsmitteln/Gelegenheiten in Europa
nach Deutschland

Carola Sauter-Louis


Risk assessment on local level (district)




Risk areas: „urban“ WB; high WB density; resting areas on highways, etc...

ASF - CSF - FMD

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High Risk Period (HRP)



Low contagiousity => low (initial) mortality
ASF remains undetected in large pig farms (below the normal mortality threshold)

HRP -> farm size


- *back yard: rather short*
- *large farm: rather long*

Surveillance

Surveillance can be:

- to prove freedom of disease
- to detect new cases
- to determine the prevalence
- to monitor the evolution of the disease
- to calm down trade partners and neighbours
- to show activity....

Surveillance can be based:



Surveillance:

- on farm level (backyard ↔ commercial)
- in the village (epidemiological unit???)
- in the area (backyard ↔ commercial)
- in the country/region

- *Clinical examination*
- *Sampling for laboratory tests*

The preconditions for the design of surveillance activities are based on the epidemiology of the disease

The following basic knowledge about the disease enables the planning of surveillance programmes

- Clinical disease (clinical course and clinical signs)
- Contagiousity
- Laboratory tests
- Ways of transmissions
- Biosecurity "factor"
- Human factors


- ⇒ Commercial farms
- ⇒ Non-commercial farms
- ⇒ Outdoor farms

Passive & Active surveillance


Traditionally

- Surveillance based on "5/95" (*ASF diagnostic manual*)

Period during which a WB can be hunted



100 WB



5 of 100 infected (5%)

5/95-Concept

On the day of sampling 5 out of 100 WB (5%) are incubating ASFV. To find at least 1 positive WB 45 have to be sampled same day (95% confidence)!

(Prevalence of 2% -> 78 WB have to be sampled (1% ... 96 WB...))

Early detection of ASF in wild boar

Passive surveillance vs. active surveillance


	tested	positive	% <i>positive</i>
<i>Passive (found dead)</i>	245	177	<i>72.24</i>
<i>Active (hunted)</i>	2765	40	<i>1.45</i>
		217	

Passive / Active: 72.24 / 1.45 = 49,82

*The probability to detect an ASF positive animal is
50 times higher in dead animals than in hunted animals*


81 out of 100 positive cases are likely to be detected in **dead** wild boar
(177 / 217 x 100 = 81)

SANCO G177, April 2017, ANON A/B




2.1.5. Sampling for laboratory investigations will be performed

- ~~in~~ in case of clinical signs (such as fever or haemorrhagic lesions).
- ~~Each week, virological testing of at least the first two death (post weaning pigs or pigs older than 2 months) in each production unit~~ All dead pigs to be sampled and tested.
- Ante or post-mortem signs raising suspicion at home slaughtering at least within the area covered by Commission Decision 2014/709/EU.




ASF outbreaks in Latvia in 2014



Experimental studies
(Pietschmann et al., 2015)

8 %

$2 / 24 = 0,08$ (8%)



Field observations
(Oļševskis et al., 2015)

12 %

$69 / 585 = 0,12$ (12%)