



### Capacity constraints affect the link with beneficiary target groups

Implementing partners are not present in the entire country. This is why, in areas where they are not present, they often rely on local health workers, who might approach people living with HIV / AIDS differently than organizations working usually with this target group.

#### Recommendations

- Tailor vegetable gardens training modules to beneficiaries who are not familiar with horticulture.
- Promote nutritional education in horticulture interventions

### Guinea

#### Specific training to increase yields

Beneficiaries received trainings on rice and vegetables production techniques and also the use of fertilizers, which have helped increase crop yields.

**Recommendation:** Strengthen implementing partners' capacity for disaster risk management.

### Mali

#### Supporting communal and associative initiatives to respond better to the crisis

- FAO contributes to the strengthening solidarity amongst beneficiaries through a "revolving system" in which animals are put at the disposal of a certain group of beneficiaries until they have given birth, and are then assigned to other groups, and so on.
- Organizing beneficiaries into groups in market-gardening helps better respond to the crisis.

**Recommendation:** capacity building and technical support are necessary to ensure sustained resilience.

### Niger

#### A crisis prevention and crisis management mechanisms at the regional level

The mechanism to prevent and manage food and nutrition crises is weak at regional, departmental and communal level, due to a lack of human and logistical resources. It is necessary to strengthen FAO's presence at the local level by opening bases in vulnerable areas, to ensure close monitoring of activities and adequate support to decentralized committees.

**Recommendation:** Strengthen the capacities of decentralized services and local communities to increase their preparedness and response to crises.

### Senegal

#### A "cascade" training strategy to build capacities

Cascade training was very successful in FAO's intervention: Partner NGOs and decentralized technical services were trained on agricultural good practices and proceeded with training the heads of farmer associations, who proceeded with training rural communities.

### Chad

#### Recommendations

- Strengthen the institutional and technical capacities of coordinating bodies in the food security sector;
- Strengthen national capacities to ensure a timely quality control of agricultural inputs, in line with agricultural calendar.

## Sub-regional level: West Africa and Sahel

### Capacity building at the heart of FAO's DRM strategy in West Africa and the Sahel region

Whilst resilience and disaster risk management (DRM) are high on the agenda of humanitarian and development actors in the sub-region, the Regional Emergency and Rehabilitation Office (REOWA) believes it is crucial to support countries' requests for capacity building.

Through the joint FAO-WFP DRM/DRM initiative, a capacity building program, designed for both agencies and their key partners, was launched in four pilot countries. Niger and Burkina Faso have already benefited from this program, while Chad and Senegal will soon benefit from it.

Throughout 2012 REOWA actively strengthened partners' operational and institutional capacity through the regional DRR Task Force and the Regional Group on Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR). This was materialized by a regional workshop on good practices and lessons learnt; the celebration of the international DRR Day, and a regional training workshop for trainers in simulation exercises.

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
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## COORDINATION

*Summary of the ideas which originate from the regional workshop on the capitalization of experiences related to the preparedness and response to the Sahel Crisis and to food insecurity in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and Guinea Bissau.*



### Burkina Faso

**Coordination is vital for the strengthening of community resilience**

An action plan was jointly developed by FAO, the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the World Food Program (WFP), the European Union (EU) and the Government.

A multi-sectoral approach was adopted to achieve planned activities. A good collaboration was developed with WFP. Both resulted in the joint production of a roadmap on resilience and disaster risk management.

**Recommendation:** Seek ways to improve relationships with the government in order to ensure effective coordination.

### Côte d'Ivoire

**Planning and a coordinated response between different actors**

The identification of priority intervention areas was carried out during a planning workshop, which involved all implementing partners (Non Governmental Organizations), Donors (European Commission Head Office for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection [ECHO], Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance [OFDA]), United Nations Agencies and Governmental Services. This workshop helped to develop synergies and complementarities with regard to the support provided to beneficiaries (seeds kits with tools and fertilizers or cash) and to harmonize the modalities of cash distribution between various partners.

Based on donors' recommendations, FAO helped partners involved in agricultural recovery activities to purchase improved local seeds and fertilizers. The coordination of the sector by FAO through the Food Security Cluster helped to cover priority areas and to ensure that the most vulnerable households received assistance.

### The Gambia

**An efficient preparation phase due to coordination mechanisms**

- Weekly monitoring meetings on food security were organized by the President of the Council for Food Security, and weekly reports on the situation were produced, thus enabling resources mobilization.
- Coordination with the Government has been excellent. Committees have been established at regional districts and village levels, and a matrix for intervention was developed with the involvement of all stakeholders, namely the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), Government, civil society and donors.

## Mauritania

### Late implementation of coordination response

- The creation of the Food Security Sector Group, in charge of coordinating the various stakeholders (national and international NGOs, UN agencies, etc.), was somewhat late and hampered the effectiveness of the response.
- Emergency culture is poorly developed at national level, and the number of potential partners is limited.

**Recommendation:** Promote coordination amongst stakeholders to develop synergies and improve the quality of the emergency response.

## Niger

### An effective early warning system due to good coordination

The regular Food Security Cluster meetings enabled the constant monitoring of the agro-pastoral season. A mid-term joint evaluation showed early signs of an agricultural deficit, thus allowing the Government to warn people in time. FAO participated to technical meetings on the early warning system and to the evaluation of households' vulnerability jointly conducted by the WFP, FAO, CILSS and FEW NET to identify households facing moderate to severe food insecurity.

### Strengthened partnerships for a multisector response

FAO significantly contributed to the preparation of the support plan for vulnerable communities' in the agriculture and cattle breeding sectors, and to the process of the 2012 consolidated appeal (Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal CAP 2012). Strong collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Livestock and NGOs helped define the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders whilst planning the response.

The Food Security cluster worked well throughout the crisis. At the national level, it supported the coordination of the response through the establishment of thematic working groups that facilitated the search for partners and helped avoid duplication.

NGOs Partner were selected on the following criteria: presence on the ground, logistical and human capacity and implementation of activities that promote multi-sectoralism.

## Senegal

### A complementary inter-agency response

FAO and WFP had the same beneficiaries and the two agencies worked in a complementary way by conducting FAO seeds distribution after WFP food distribution, thereby reducing the risk of seeds consumption by households.

## Chad

### Concerted preparation phase and effective fundraising

The alert was launched in time by the Chadian government in December 2011. Partners (UN agencies, NGOs and government) worked together to launch fundraising activities and the UN System (UNS) early advocacy with donors led to the rapid arrival of funding.

- The response of the Central Response Emergency Fund (CERF) allowed operations to start quickly.
- By February, donors (EU, Switzerland, Denmark, USA, Japan and France) issued a joint statement officially responding to the call for funds.

## Sub-regional level: West Africa and the Sahel region

### Proper coordination and effective leadership in all phases of the response

Good regional and inter-agency coordination helped achieve the following:

- A regular and in-depth monitoring of the food and nutrition situation in the region through markets and crops evaluation missions jointly organized by CILSS, FEWS NET, FAO, WFP, UNICEF, national governments, Action against Hunger, and the active participation in the Food Security and Nutrition Working Group;
- The launch of a common FAO-WFP early warning as early as October and November 2011 at the regional level;
- The development and launch on 15 December 2011 of an inter-agencies *Regional Preparedness and Response Strategy* through the Inter-Agency Permanent Committee (IASC) and its update in February 2012;
- The availability of funds from some donors as soon as December 2011;
- The use of common tools to identify vulnerable areas and communities (Cadre Harmonisé methodology used in regional analyses, active participation of the Regional Emergency and Rehabilitation Office (REOWA) in the Unit of analysis of the Cadre Harmonisé and maps publication since 2011);
- FAO's participation in the elaboration of the food security and agriculture component of all humanitarian appeals and strategies, as well as contingency plans in the region.
- Very good coordination with the Office of the Regional Humanitarian Coordinator helped develop a monitoring and information management and reporting system, in relation to the humanitarian response to the crisis in the Sahel.

### But conflicting analyses affected the response of some donors

In terms of coordination, differences were observed in food security evaluations conducted by regional partners. Consequently, despite the consensus among the majority of partners on the acuteness of the crisis, underestimating its magnitude by a single actor delayed the reactivity of some donors.

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## The Gambia

An effective preparation phase due to efficient coordination mechanisms.

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## West Africa and Sahel region

Methodological problems make it hard to analyze information at the regional level.

Although FAO gathers a high level of information within countries and at the regional level, the absence of a unique data collection methodology, coupled with the variety of the data collected in each country (gender, age, beneficiary livelihoods, nature and amount of the assistance received, impact on production, added nutritional value of the assistance received, etc.) makes data aggregation and harmonization difficult at regional level.

**Recommendation:** to strengthen national and regional support for the analysis and development of response monitoring tools.

## BEFORE THE CRISIS: WARNING

### The Gambia

The delayed declaration of emergency affected the quality of the response.

Awareness raising about the importance of early warning systems did not reach all stakeholders, including agricultural extension workers and farmers. Delayed reaction and the late emergency declaration by policymakers delayed interventions and the availability of certain inputs (seeds did not reach beneficiaries in time).

**Recommendation:** to promote the use of local early warning systems that have proved their effectiveness in countries in the Sahel with a similar risk profile to The Gambia.

### Guinea

Evaluation and planning have been affected by the lack of national crisis management bodies.

In the absence of national bodies in charge of the prevention and management of disasters and food crises, the sound evaluation of needs and the establishment of an efficient response plan was difficult.

**Recommendation:** to create and implement an early warning system.

### Mali

**Recommendation:** to support the early warning system and contingency plans preparation

### Mauritania

An excellent preparation.

The early warning that was launched in late 2011 helped to organize the response quickly and ensured the timely disbursing of funds for the intervention.

### Niger

An effective early warning system due to good coordination.

The regular Food Security Cluster meetings enabled the constant monitoring of the agro-pastoral season. A mid-term joint evaluation showed early signs of an agricultural deficit, thus allowing the Government to warn people in time. FAO participated to technical meetings on the early warning system and to the evaluation of households' vulnerability jointly conducted by the WFP, FAO, CILSS and FEW NET to identify households facing moderate to severe food insecurity.

### Senegal

A preparation phase affected by the late recognition of the emergency

The former government's refusal to recognize the looming crisis and to declare a status of emergency delayed the preparation and response process, and negatively impacted fundraising activities. This affected the quality of the response, in particular the early warning and preparedness phases of the intervention.

**Recommendation:** the Early Warning System, particularly at the decentralized level, must be operational and efficient.

## Chad

### Concerted preparation phase and effective fundraising

The alert was launched in time by the Chadian government in December 2011. Partners (UN agencies, NGOs and government) worked together to launch fundraising activities and the UN System (UNS) early advocacy with donors led to the rapid arrival of funding.

- The response of the Central Response Emergency Fund (CERF) allowed operations to start quickly.
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## **DURING THE CRISIS: THE RESPONSE**

## Burkina Faso

### A diversified and effective response that was based on prior achievements.

Support to the seed sector: the seed sector has been strengthened. Seeds producers have received improved seeds from the agricultural research center, with fertilizers to increase the capacity for seed multiplication. Laboratories to certify the seeds were constructed, and the certified seeds were then purchased by FAO to be distributed to beneficiaries. The use of certified seeds has gone up from 7 to 14% in four years. The vulgarization of seeds legislation has raised awareness among partners of the importance to use certified seeds. Dialogue was facilitated between stakeholders in the seeds sector (e.g. seeds producers and micro-finance institutions) to improve communication and sustainability through a marketing strategy.

### Support to the production and marketing of non-timber forest products

Production and income-generating activities were diversified and strengthened thanks to the production and commercialization of non-timber forest products. Beneficiaries received plants and processing tools and were trained on their use as well as on environmental protection practices, such as the fencing of forested areas for conservation goals.

### Support to livestock farming

Pastoralists received assistance in animal feed and vaccines, which helped to improve the sector as well as beneficiaries' revenue.

Finally, support granted to market-gardening activities in urban and peri-urban areas through the distribution of inputs (vegetables seeds, fertilizer, small tools) and the rehabilitation and construction of wells also helped improve the nutritional intake in families.

### Challenges:

#### The targeting of beneficiaries was difficult due to low compliance with vulnerability criteria:

Most challenges were encountered during the response phase. The vulnerability criteria of the beneficiaries were not strictly observed during the distributions of seeds and poultry, thus limiting the effectiveness of the interventions. The distribution of poultry was further affected by the outbreak of bird flu that caused a high mortality rate amongst animals.

#### Logistical constraints and compliance with contractual agreements:

Logistical problems arose during the distributions of inputs, in particular with regards to the availability of suitable storage sites. In addition, some partners and suppliers did not respect the terms of their agreements with FAO.

**Recommendation:** To improve the capitalization of experiences and results achieved.

## Côte d'Ivoire

### A coordinated response between different actors

Based on donors' recommendations, FAO helped partners involved in agricultural recovery activities to purchase improved local seeds and fertilizers. The coordination of the sector by FAO through the Food Security Cluster helped to cover priority areas and to ensure that the most vulnerable households received assistance.

### Late and restrictive funding

Whilst the preparation of activities was timely and aligned with the agricultural season, the disbursement of funds was often late. This led to delays in the delivery and distribution of agricultural inputs. Moreover, emergency activities to support food security were mainly implemented in the West and Southwest areas of the country, as dictated by some donor's strategic concerns, whilst needs were equally identified in the North of the country.

### Delays in the delivery of inputs

Considering the large quantities of inputs ordered by FAO, suppliers often faced liquidity problems when procuring seeds from producers' groups, thus causing delays in deliveries. In addition the country experienced a shortage of improved seeds which, considering the large amount of beneficiaries to be reached, was very problematic.

## The Gambia

### Supply problems affect the quality of the response.

The embargo imposed by a neighboring country delayed the supply of seeds. Logistical constraints related to transportation of the seeds were also encountered, in particular with regard to the crossing of the River Gambia by ferry. In addition, fertilizer were not available and difficult of access, therefore they were not distributed in sufficient quantities when compared to the distributions of seeds.

## Guinea Bissau

### An effective response due to the use of successfully proven techniques

The use of proven methodologies and techniques in previous interventions, such as the creation of nuclear short-cycle animal husbandry and the construction of standardized shelters, or the management of market-gardening plots in partnership with women's organizations, contributed to the success of the operation.

## Guinea

### A new variety of rice strengthened the livelihoods of vulnerable populations

A new variety of short cycle rice seeds was introduced as part of the response to the crisis. Developed by the Africa Rice Center (Africarice), a specialized research institution, this variety is adapted to the country agro-ecological conditions.

Appreciated for its taste, this variety has given satisfaction to the beneficiaries because of its short cycle (three months, instead of four for local varieties) which allowed the beneficiaries to have some rice during the lean period. Moreover, this variety gives a better yield than local varieties and allows beneficiaries to put aside consumption reserves for four months.

During seeds distribution, a refund system for the granted quantity was established so that other farmers could benefit from this new variety, ensuring optimal access.

## Mali

### A comprehensive and reasoned response to confront a complex crisis.

FAO Mali adopted a dual approach: a response to the food crisis in the Sahel and a specific response for displaced people. This dual response came in the shape of support to market-gardening and small livestock activities of vulnerable households through the distribution of tools, adapted seeds and fertilizers, as well as goats, poultry and the provision of veterinary care.

The involvement of town commissions and village committees ensured that the assistance reached identified beneficiaries. In addition, the technical supervision of the activities by FAO's national experts and FAO's implementing partners ensured the sustainability of the intervention.

The animals procured were examined and quarantined before being distributed to beneficiaries to avoid any contamination.

### Two ways to improve livestock assistance:

The approach aiming at the organization of cattle fairs is yet mastered by fao's partners and technical services. Very few suppliers responded, for lack of trust in the process, which led to delays in the organization of the fairs. Training of partners on the methodology to be followed, as well as greater logistical support is needed to overcome these problems.

Animal feed is not locally available and suppliers are scarce. It is therefore necessary to allow enough time to organize its supply, and to build the local capacity of farmers to organize the feeding of their livestock with the use of local products.

## Mauritania

### An innovative and effective response for vulnerable households.

The distribution of seeds was timely and in line with the agricultural rainy season (July) and the post-flood season (October).

The destocking activities in response to the crisis enabled farmers to secure money to buy animal feed, thereby saving part of their livestock, whilst also providing meat for the most vulnerable households to consume.

- The pilot fodder production activities conducted in seven gardening cooperatives were very successful and the satisfaction of beneficiaries created interest from neighboring pastoral communities. Fodder production allows the use of vegetable gardens after the gardening season thus generating additional income.

- The promotion of sweet potato planting and consumption currently conducted with cooperatives, contributes to improving household food security and nutrition during the lean period.

**Recommendation:** To conduct pilot activities, like the production of fodder by cooperatives.

## Niger

### To restore the livelihoods of vulnerable populations

The availability of improved seeds increased through the support provided by FAO to seeds producers' organizations. From January 2012, all humanitarian actors had access to a directory listing all available improved seeds across Niger.

In addition, FAO covered 38% of the immediate needs of vulnerable households in terms of improved seeds, improving yields for the main agricultural campaign and covering up to 2-3 months of their food needs.

## Senegal

### A complementary and coherent inter-agency response

FAO and WFP targeted the same beneficiaries. The two agencies worked in a complementary way by preceding the distribution of seeds by FAO with WFP food distribution, thereby reducing the risk of seed consumption by beneficiary households.

**Recommendation:** Replicate the good practices identified during the response phase, in particular in terms of sensibilization and targeting.

## Chad

### An appropriate multi-sectoral response

The response was twofold. Direct food support was first delivered by selling the national food stock and distributing the food through WFP and NGOs. The second phase of the response was agricultural support. 165 000 households received support in terms of food for animal feed, rain-fed crops and market gardening in the affected areas of the Sahel region.

### A monitoring system to tailor the response

The establishment of a monitoring and follow-up system enabled FAO to gather regular feedback from beneficiaries, enabling the organization to constantly adapt its response to the needs identified.

### The lack of a national contingency plan reduced the effectiveness of the response.

The lack of foundation for the response (evaluations, national program for support to affected households, etc...) led to an ill-coordinated response and reduced efficiency.

### An inefficient quality-control mechanism for agricultural inputs

- The provision of animal feed has been difficult due the limited financial capacity of suppliers.

- Some technical standards proved ill-adapted to local realities. This is particularly true for animal feed such as cottonseed meal and wheat bran.

- Local capacities being inadequate, the quality-control was entrusted to a international private company, which caused delays in the availability of results and certification of products.

## Sub-regional level: West Africa and the Sahel

### Systematic integration of DRR / DRM approaches into FAO intervention strategies in the sub-region to strengthen the resilience of communities

FAO's programmatic approach has evolved along with the promotion of the DRR / DRM approaches in the region. DRR / DRM approaches are now systematically included in intervention strategies and project documents. FAO, through the Regional Emergency and Rehabilitation Office (REOWA), participates to the DRR Task Force and to the development of national plans for the reduction and management of risks in the region. In addition, FAO put resilience at the forefront during the early stages of the 2012 crisis. As such, the REOWA contributed to the development of the document "Strategic Framework for FAO's Regional Response to the 2012 Sahel Crisis: the urgent need to enhance the resilience of vulnerable populations."

### An inadequate consideration of pastoral issues by actors concerned

The attention given to the very specific situation of livestock and pastoralism before and during the crisis was inadequate, compared to that received by agricultural sector. This is due to the fact that government, partners and donors have less knowledge about the vulnerabilities of pastoral communities in the region.

#### Recommendation

To strengthen the promotion of good practices and DRR/DRM approaches and resilience and ensure their integration into national and regional policies, strategies and plans aiming at food and nutrition security.

## AFTER THE CRISIS: REHABILITATION AND TRANSITION

### Côte d'Ivoire

#### Continuity between emergency measures, rehabilitation and recovery of the local economy

- In emergency response areas (West), FAO undertook income generating activities to stimulate the local economy (processing agricultural products, small animal husbandry, marketing, etc...) and rehabilitated productive infrastructure such as lowland areas for rice growing activities.
- Immediately after the crisis, FAO launched seeds multiplication programs at community level to increase availability and address shortages.

### Mali

#### A supply strategy for local economic development

FAO Mali is strengthening the local economy through its exclusively local procurement and its use of certified seeds analyzed in the national seeds laboratory of Mali.

#### Recommendation

To promote local procurement to strengthen livelihoods and the local economy.

### Niger

#### To improve the supply of agricultural products and develop actions in the longer term to improve the livelihoods of populations

The dependence on sub-regional markets for the supply of cattle feed not only raises the issue of suppliers' financial and logistics capacity, but also the issue of the quality of products.

In addition to responding to the immediate needs of vulnerable populations, interventions should also integrate rehabilitation activities to ensure a smooth transition towards development.

### Senegal

#### A twin-track approach for a more sustainable action

FAO's "Twin-Track Approach" to the response helped address both immediate needs and longer-term issues (setting up drip irrigation systems, lasting fences, wells rehabilitation, etc...).

#### Low level of interest on the part of donors for rehabilitation

The fact that donors prioritize emergency responses instead of rehabilitation interventions hampers the implementation of activities addressing structural causes. As a result, activities such as livestock restocking, creation of Animal Feed Banks (AFB) and fodder production did not get adequate attention.

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
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## GENDER

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### Burkina Faso

#### Targeting and monitoring/evaluation that integrate gender

Programs have been specifically designed for women. This particularly applies to market-gardening and the exploitation of non-timber forest products.

Indicators were defined to specifically collect gender information and evaluate programs.

### Côte d'Ivoire

#### Gender and nutrition harmoniously combined to reduce malnutrition

FAO organized sensitization and nutritional education activities for female-dominated market-gardeners organizations. In addition to nutritional education, culinary demonstrations showcasing local products were organized in the western nutritional centers for mothers. Vegetable gardens were created to train mothers in market-gardening.

### The Gambia

#### Targeting and distribution focused on women

Distributions of rice, vegetable seeds, small tools and fertilizers were specifically aimed at women. In addition, wells were rehabilitated and fences built in community gardens managed by women. Beneficiary targeting gave priority to women headed households.

### Guinea Bissau

#### A lot of attention was dedicated to women

100% of the beneficiaries of market gardening activities were women.

Moreover, 35% of the animal shelters and small cattle units' beneficiaries were women, even though the livestock farming is traditionally managed by men.

### Guinea

#### Targeting women to improve households' income and nutrition

Women headed households and widows, who are considered most vulnerable, were given special attention during the targeting process. 80% of the beneficiaries of vegetable seeds were women. This improved vegetables consumption in families and children's nutritional status, and generated additional revenue.

## Mali

### Promoting nutrition and gender

- Nutrition educational and sensitization activities were conducted in health centers for pregnant and breast-feeding women.
- Vegetable seeds and technical assistance were provided to farmers (male and female) to increase productivity and improve their daily diet.

### Progress needs to be made as far as the granting of market-gardening plots is concerned

Women's access to market-gardening plots was a problem in some places as traditional leaders are not used to grant plots to women. FAO ensured that the plots used by the beneficiaries of the response be permanently assigned to them.

## Niger

### Taking gender issues into account to increase family income

The capacities of women's groups involved in market-gardening were strengthened through the provision of tools and irrigation infrastructure. FAO's intervention also improved the diversification of the beneficiaries' daily diets and improved their income.

## Senegal

### Objectives achieved

Gender issues were taken into account when targeting beneficiaries as FAO expected to reach at least 25% of female headed households in responding to the crisis. Preliminary results seem to confirm that this has been achieved.

**Recommendation:** Give prominence to women in market-gardening and rice-growing activities

## Chad

### Support to activities that are managed by women

FAO's response to the crisis targeted women in particular. This is particularly true for the distribution of animal feed for small ruminants, an activity mainly managed by women.

## Sub-regional level: West Africa and the Sahel region

### Taking into account gender issues systematically

Every single regional strategy and programming documents in connection with the 2012 Sahel crisis systematically included the gender issue, as reflected in the humanitarian appeals and humanitarian strategy that were prepared.

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
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## PARTNERSHIP

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### Burkina Faso

#### An effective partnership led by the Government

Strong partnership was encouraged by both Government and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Both the Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of Livestock obtained good results in terms of efficiency in implementing joint activities.

### The Gambia

#### Many multifaceted partnerships in all phases of the response

- Close collaboration between the Government, UN agencies and other stakeholders was established at the early stages of needs analyses to ensure a concerted response.
- Thematic working groups, composed of members from the civil society, the United Nations and governmental partners, were formed to address emerging issues related to food security.
- Monthly meetings were organized by the United Nations Crisis Unit (co-chaired by FAO and the World Food Program [WFP]) to address resilience at national level.
- Weekly inter-agency reports were produced at the very beginning of the crisis. As activities were slowing down, reports were produced once every two weeks.
- A resource mobilization group chaired by the Ministry of Finance was created.
- Joint monitoring missions were organized with the participation of all partners.
- A working session was held on the initiative of the UN Country Team (UNCT) to draw lessons and evaluate the effectiveness of the response to poor harvests in The Gambia. All stakeholders attended this meeting, including the Ministries of Agriculture and of Finance, as well as the local donor community.
- An information session organized by donors helped review implementation in order to share the successes and challenges.

#### Partnerships to be developed with the private sector

- No mechanism has been put in place to ensure the participation of the private sector in resource mobilization in response to the crisis.
- Government partners were faced with logistical problems such as transportation and lack of adequate infrastructure for the storage of inputs.

### Guinea Bissau

#### A relevant partnership to reach target beneficiaries

The partnership with the National Secretariat for the Fight against HIV / AIDS and the National Network of Associations of People Living with HIV / AIDS enabled FAO to easily reach target beneficiaries.

### Capacity constraints affect the link with beneficiary target groups

Implementing partners are not present in the entire country. This is why, in areas where they are not present, they often rely on local health workers, who might approach people living with HIV / AIDS differently than organizations working usually with this target group.

## Guinea

### An inter-agency partnership for better school meals

In the context of the FAO / WFP collaboration, vegetable gardens were created by FAO in schools whose canteens receive rice from WFP. These gardens allow students and their parents to produce vegetables for the school canteen and diversify children's diet. They also represent an opportunity to offer nutritional education to families.

## Mauritania

### A partnership that creates synergies

Strong collaboration between FAO and the Ministry of Rural Development (MRD) enabled the implementation of a concerted and complementary response, both in terms of types of areas of intervention and activities put in place.

## Niger

### Strengthened partnerships for a multi-sectoral response

FAO significantly contributed to the preparation of the support plan for vulnerable communities' in the agriculture and cattle breeding sectors, and to the process of the 2012 consolidated appeal (Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal CAP 2012). Strong collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Livestock and NGOs helped define the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders whilst planning the response.

The Food Security cluster worked well throughout the crisis. At the national level, it supported the coordination of the response through the establishment of thematic working groups that facilitated the search for partners and helped avoid duplication.

Partner NGOs were selected on the following criteria: presence on the ground, logistical and human capacity and implementation of activities that promote multi-sectoralism.

## Senegal

### A winning partnership for awareness raising

FAO's collaboration with the technical services of the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Livestock, as well as NGOs (Action Group for Community Development [GADEC], Caritas, Agronomists and Veterinarians without Borders [AVSF]), and local and administrative authorities was very good during the sensitization process.

### Operational partnerships of varying quality

The capacity of one implementing partners proved too low and this affected the quality of FAO's response in its area of intervention. Rigorous verification of the technical and monitoring mechanism is crucial before contracting a partnership.

## Chad

### Effective and operational inter-agency partnerships

The collaboration between FAO and WFP in the framework of the Food for Work Program (FFW) and the establishment of green hedges around gardening sites, enabled an integrated response in terms of food aid and support to agricultural production. In addition, NGOs and public services ensured that the agricultural inputs were timely distributed to the beneficiaries.

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
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*What lessons should be drawn from the crisis in order to better prepare for future shocks?*

Regional Emergency and Rehabilitation Office, FAO, Dakar, 4 - 6 December 2012

## RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

*Summary of the ideas which originate from the regional workshop on the capitalization of experiences related to the preparedness and response to the Sahel Crisis and to food insecurity in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and Guinea Bissau.*



### Côte d'Ivoire

#### Late funding

Activities were timely prepared but funding arrived too late in the agricultural calendar, leading to delays in the delivery of inputs.

Activities were implemented mainly on the West and South-West of the country to reflect the strategic interests of donors, while needs in the North of the country remained unaddressed.

### The Gambia

#### Requests not matched by funding

Despite support from FAO's REOWA, the limited presence of technical and financial partners in the country, compounded by a late analysis of the food and nutritional situation, hampered the speed and adequacy of fundraising in the country.

### Guinea Bissau

#### Insufficient funding to cover all needs

Livestock support activities were very demanded by target communities. Unfortunately, funding was insufficient to launch income-generating activities and FAO could only respond partially to the needs identified.

### Guinea

#### Limited local resource mobilization

The limited presence of technical and financial partners in the country, as well as the national socio-political context reduced mobilization of resources.

**Recommendation:** Contribute to the creation and implementation of a resource mobilization strategy

### Mali

#### Resource mobilization to match needs

The political interest that was generated by the conflict in the North facilitated resources mobilization, which exceeded the demands made under the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP 2012) and helped implement a comprehensive global response to the 2012 crisis.

## Mauritania

### Risk management activities underfunded by donors

Parallel to emergency response activities, FAO succeeded in carrying out activities that meet long-term needs such as fodder production, or the improvement of nutrition through sweet potato promotion. Given humanitarian donors' difficulty to finance rehabilitation and development activities, only emergency projects with a short duration were implemented, leading to a less significant impact.

**Recommendation:** Improve visibility and documentation of the response to increase fund mobilization for DRR/DRM and resilience interventions.

## Niger

### Resource mobilization delayed by a confusion of messages to donors

Different interpretations of the situation created confusion among donors and slowed resource mobilization. The disbursement of funds must be timely and coincide with the non flexible requirement of the agricultural calendar.

**Recommendation:** Early identification of needs enables a better response planning and a more effective resources mobilization

## Senegal

### Insufficient interest of donors for rehabilitation activities

Donors' main interest to fund emergency activities, instead of rehabilitation activities, hampered the implementation of interventions addressing the structural causes of the crisis. Thus, activities such as livestock restocking, the establishment of Livestock Food Banks (LFB) and fodder production, could not be developed.

## Chad

### A concerted preparation phase and an effective call for funds

Warning of a very serious crisis was launched by the Chadian government in December 2011, enabling its humanitarian partners (UN agencies and Non Governmental Organizations) to collaborate with the government to appeal for funds. The early advocacy of the UN Agencies towards donors led to the following:

- The response of the Central Fund for Emergency Response (CERF) helped start operations quickly.
- In February 2012, a consortium of donors (EU, Switzerland, Denmark, USA, Japan and France) announced their common intention to fund or contribute directly in response to the call.

## Sub-regional level: West Africa and Sahel

### Insufficient resources and capacity to initiate a rapid response

FAO's lack of own funds prevented REOWA from adequately responding to the unfolding humanitarian crisis by rapidly deploying its own human and financial resources. The response of some donors in the region was late and was focused on food aid and the management of malnutrition, whilst interventions aimed at strengthening protection and the restoration of livelihoods have been under-funded.

### A divergent situation analysis affected the response of some donors

Some divergences were observed in the food security analyses conducted by regional partners. As a result, and despite consensus amongst the majority of partners on the severity of the crisis, the undermining of the unfolding crisis by a single actor delayed the reactivity of some donors.

**Recommendation:** Strengthen FAO's resource mobilization strategy and continue advocacy to preserve and improve the livelihoods of vulnerable populations (including pastoralists).

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**Recommendation:** Promote a participatory approach for the selection of beneficiaries, raising awareness on the selection criteria, to ensure a better response and reduce the risk of conflicts within the targeted communities.

## Mauritania

### A close monitoring of the targeting process is necessary

Even if the beneficiaries' selection criteria are defined and validated by FAO and the Ministry of Rural Development (MRD), the vulnerable communities are designated by local authorities' in the intervention areas. To minimize blunders, FAO conducted support missions on the ground to ensure that criteria are well understood by stakeholders and ensure fairness in the way beneficiary households are identified. This rigorous monitoring is required and must be maintained to ensure transparency.

## Niger

### To improve beneficiary targeting

Targeting has sometimes been difficult. Beneficiary communities ought to be involved and empowered, and a complaint management system should be established to ensure that backlogs and grievances are addressed.

In addition, global food security surveys must be systematically supplemented by specific surveys, such as household economy analyses, in order to improve targeting, particularly with regard to gender and livelihood related criteria.

**Recommendation:** Enhance targeting and accountability vis-à-vis beneficiaries

## Senegal

**Recommendation:** Replicate good practices identified during the response phase, in particular regarding sensitization and targeting.

## Chad

### The targeting process must be improved

The government carried out a joint mission with implementing partners to identify beneficiaries in April 2012, quite late into the crisis. The various partners used this mission to refine the results of the food security survey that was jointly led by the World Food Program (WFP) and the Government in December 2011 and January 2012 and inform decision making.

**Overall Recommendation:** The quality of targeting ought to be evaluated after the distributions

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