EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE ON CONTROL AND ERADICATION OF AN OUTBREAK OF AFRICAN SWINE FEVER IN WESTERN NIGERIA

EMPRES Emergency Prevention System for Transboundary Plant Pests and Animal diseases

FDL&PCS Federal Department (Director) of Livestock and Pest control Services (Nigeria)

SUMMARY

African Swine Fever (ASF) outbreaks were first confirmed in Nigeria in November 1997. In spite of the proximity of the infection in the neighbouring countries, a great delay has been noticed between the probable primary outbreak and the recognition of the disease, although early and accurate recognition of ASF is extremely important for the containment and eradication of the disease. In addition, from the first outbreaks, it appeared that the Nigerian reporting system was not efficient enough and could not serve as an early warning system. That suggests that the links between States and Federal services are loose, creating therefore an information gap.

The EMPRES system's approach has not been applied and ASF is presently spreading in all directions. The spread of this devastating transboundary disease could have been avoided if the FAO recommended actions had been undertaken in time. A trend of high mortality levels has been recorded throughout the country between September 1997 and October 1998. The total number of declared dead pigs in that period reached 125 000 in 9 States of the Federal Republic: Lagos State, Ogun State, Kaduna State, Benue State, Enugu State, Akwa Ibom State, Rivers state, Plateau State and Delta State. Data are not normally collected on the field and we still ignore the real extension and spread of ASF, the limit of the infected areas and the precise location of the foci.

According to the consultant's opinion, the infection came likely from the OU�M� department in Benin. ASF was initially declared in Lagos and Ogun States, bordering the Benin Republic. It has also been reported in virtually all the Southern and Middle Belt States of the Nigerian Federation.

ASF spread throughout Nigeria and the result of pigs/pig products movements over considerable distances also suggests that human factor should be considered as the most important means involved in the ASF spread. Pig markets also played an important role in spreading ASF, as some of the outbreaks were declared in the big markets of Kafantchan in Kaduna State, Gboko in Benue State and Makodi in Adamawa State.

Follow-up investigation have not yet been completed in many States, owing to logistic and financial problems.

At the present stage, the only way to ascertain the presence or absence of the disease, is to undertake an epidemiological investigation throughout the country.

Laboratory diagnosis and consequently epidemiosurveillance and restocking, are facing a challenge due to the shortage of vehicles/motorcycles in the field and the petrol crisis.

Before the ASF epizootic, the pig production had been the fastest growing livestock industry. The present epizootic has considerably reduced the pig population of the infected states and led to disastrous socio-economical effects.

Pigs contributed significantly to the economic welfare of the rural population. Consumption of their products played an important role in the social and cultural life of most of the communities in the southern and Middle-Belt States.

The survival rate seems to be higher than normally expected in a fully susceptible population of pigs. During the follow-up visits to ASF foci, the consultant revealed a presence of residual pigs which survived the outbreak. The epidemiological situation is therefore further complicated by the probable carrier status that can exists in residual pigs which have not yet been identified.

The Abeokuta meeting (21-22 October 1998), Federal and State DVSs recommended the adoption of the "slaughter out and compensation" policy as a strategy for ASF eradication. The decision to eradicate rather than to live with the disease and all its socio-economical impacts is hard to take. In all the areas visited by the consultant, no stamping out has been attempted and no funds have been allocated to carry out the sanitary slaughter and to pay a compensation.

The ASF control programme initially directed to the primary infected States (Lagos and Ogun States) should now cover the whole country. The consultant emphasised the importance of the epidemiological investigation and the epidemiosurveillance as a tool for an efficient eradication programme. An epidemiological assessment of the situation should preceed any control strategy applied.

Considering the different epidemiological situations prevailing in the States, the consultant proposed to adopt for the newly infected States the three phases strategy: an emergency phase, a surveillance phase and a restocking phase.

In the primary infected states, the strategy should directly start with the second phase. Such strategy needs adequate funding as it is obvious that an important gap exists between the activities to be carried out and the financial means provided. It has been noticed, through field visits performed by the consultant in 5 states, that there are not adequate operational funds to enable veterinary staff to perform control and surveillance operations;funding is still the major issue. The FAO consultants suggested to the FDL and PCS to approach national and international funding organisation such as the: National Disaster Relief Fund,Family Support Programme, Petrolium Trust Fund , ECOWAS, UNDP or EU.

To support and assist the Nigerian authorities to control the ASF epizootic, FAO has sent international consultants to provide technical assistance; the TCP also procured an equipment, materials and supplies. The purpose was to assist in establishing field and laboratory diagnostic capabilities, to diagnose rapidly the disease if it appears in any area of the country, to train veterinary staff in early warning, quick reporting, information and epidemiological surveillance and to advise on ASF control strategy and control/eradication measures to be implemented.

The consultant recommended a whole series of measures including: formation of eradication bodies, funding of the operational programme, declaration of a state of animal disease emergency, information and public education, improvement of the reporting system, extension of the training programme, implementation of investigation and surveillance programme, destruction of residual pigs, closure of pig-markets, adoption of a compensation policy, the laboratory activity and the starting of a study on the social and economical effects of the ASF epizootic.

Until now, most of the already recommended measures have not yet been implemented, allowing ASF to spread country wide and become a national disaster. The current outbreaks of ASF may develop into a serious epidemic covering most of Nigeria.

INTRODUCTION

This second mission of the consultant to Nigeria, is part of the FAO inputs of the TCP/NIR/7822 (E) and follows previous missions to this country by Dr G. Davies (November 1997), Dr K. El Hicheri, the consultant itself (May/June 1998) and Mr I.D. Gumm (August/September 1998).

African Swine Fever (ASF) outbreaks were first confirmed by Dr Davies, FAO Consultant,in an ASF assessment mission in Nigeria, Togo and Ghana (October/November 1997).

Dr Davies reported that the officials were quite confident that the country was ASF-free. During a visit to the areas bordering Benin Republic, he learnt that from mid-September 1997, pigs already died massively in Badagri and surrounding villages in Lagos State and in Ipoka Local Government, Ogun State.

The same situation was experienced by the second consultant sent to Nigeria by FAO in May/June 1998 who advised the Osun State authorities to carry out an epidemiological investigation independently and not only rely on reporting. Such an investigation has been conducted after the consultant departed and led to the discovery of several outbreaks which suggested that the disease has been active in this State from early April 1998.

The management disciplines necessary for prompt and effective action to overcome the ASF emergency situation and to face the initial outbreaks were not achieved.

In spite of the proximity of the infection in the neighbouring countries, a delay has been noticed between the probable primary outbreak and the recognition of the disease; the EMPRES approach has not been applied. There were neither actions related to early warning nor to early reaction. The new outbreaks are still reported lately.

ASF is presently spreading in all directions, mainly eastward. The first outbreaks have not been successfully fought and the disease has not been successfully contained in the primary infected States. This failure in the containment of the primary outbreaks led the disease to evolve to a devastating epizootic; the efforts necessary to stop its progression to further still not infected areas, will be costly.

The Nigerian authorities, with FAO assistance, have already invested a large amount of time and money in control/eradication efforts, but the necessary funding was not at the required level.The spread of ASF could have been avoided if the recommended actions had been undertaken in time and the necessary measures of prevention, containment and control had been carried out without delay.

In the villages, no effort has been made to convince pig-owners to keep their pigs in fences or other types of enclosures to isolate and protect them, and pig markets appeared to be the most important centre of the disease's spread.

PIG PRODUCTION

The pig population in Nigeria has shown in the recent years, a noticeable increase; from nearly 2 million pigs in 1984, it jumped to 7 million in 1997. Most of these pigs are owned by smallholders. This important pig population contributed highly to the food security of the low income rural and peri-urban population. In fact, pork remains the cheapest source of meat in Nigeria. In several States, most families raise pigs on small and medium scale; in Benue State, the veterinary services reported 27 000 pig-owner families.

Before the ASF epizootic, the pig industry had been the fastest growing livestock industry which included: creation of cooperatives and large scale pig-farms; In Lagos, demand for pork was continually on the rise and an important trend of importation from other producer States was observed. The present epizootic has considerably reduced the pig population of the infected states and led to disastrous socio-economical effects.

Concerning the importance of pig population the data are difficult to obtain; livestock and veterinary services are only in the possession of data of the registered pig-farms which represent a small part of all the pig-farms. There are no data on the importance of the village free-ranging pig population and an accurate census of pigs in the country is not likely to be achieved although the ASF epizootic offers that possibility. Such a census could be carried out through an epidemiological investigation survey which is of primary importance for the control/eradication programme and which could collect data on the importance, type and distribution of the pig population.

Depending on the State, pigs are predominantly confined commercial pigs or village free-ranging pigs. The commercial pigs are cross-breeds obtained by crossing large White with Duroc and eventually Hampshire breeds, with local breeds. The village pigs are predominantly of local type. The commercial cross-breed type of pig is a middle size white pig, well adapted to the Nigerian environment and corresponding to market demands.

In the visited States, most of the pig population is of commercial type; the animals are kept confined in well constructed cement piggeries. The commercial large scale pig-farms are found in large towns like Lagos, Ibadan or Kaduna.

When kept in villages, free-ranging/scavenging pigs cost little to feed, if nothing. Large scale pig husbandry are more costly, involving the necessity to buy feed from the market and to pay salaries to workers.

EPIDEMIOLOGY

Apart from the outbreak in 1973, nothing suggests that the ASF epizootic was declared in Nigeria before 1997.

According to the consultant opinion, the infection came likely from the Oueme, "departement" of the Benin Republic which shares the border with Lagos State and Ogun State. Oueme, had in fact the most important pig population in Benin Republic and the higher density of pigs. This "departement", has previously been investigated by the consultant who thinks that it had been infected in June/early July 1997. For someone who knows the importance of an unofficial exchanges of goods between the two countries, there is no need of evidence to assume that in the mean time, the virus should have crossed the border and infected the bordering LG in the two Nigerian States. It is likely that ASF was active in these LG since at least the beginning of August 1997 but only come to the attention of the authorities two months later.

Due to the inefficient reporting system, the first outbreaks had not been reported and the first FAO consultancy mission (to assess the risk factors regarding the possible ASF spread to Nigeria, October 24 to November 11, 1997) - surprisingly discovered that ASF had already been present in Ogun and Lagos States, from nearly two months (late August/middle of September 1997).

ASF, that was initially declared in Lagos and Ogun States, has now been reported in almost all the Southern and Middle Belt States of the Nigerian Federation. In Kaduna State, the Katsit International Market, seems to be the nucleus of ASF outbreaks in different States. This market is also known to be a major source of pigs for slaughter, coming from different States as River, Delta, Edo and Lagos States. Its epidemiological importance (distribution centre of the ASF virus through trade) must be stressed.

In fact, the fast spread of the disease throughout Nigeria, suggests an intensive pigs/pig products movements over considerable distances with participation of traders, butchers, pig-owners as well as consumers.

The human factor should therefore be considered as the most important mean involved in the ASF spread. Pig markets played an important role in the ASF spread, as some of the outbreaks declared in the big markets of Kafantchan in Kaduna State, Gboko in Benue State and Makodi in Adamawa State.

According to the review of the current ASF status in Nigeria, made in the DVSs meeting of Abeokuta, a trend of high mortality levels has been recorded throughout the country between September 1997 to October 1998. The total number of declared dead pigs in that period of time reached 125 000 in 9 States of the Federal Republic: Lagos, Ogun, Kaduna, Benue, Enugu, Akwa Ibom, Riverse, Plateau and Delta. DVSs reported that the disease is gaining speed and spread quickly from infected to uninfected States, and in the infected states, from infected to non infected areas. According to the reports sent by field veterinary officers, most of the affected herds are owned by smallholders of those owing between 1 to 50 pigs. In certain areas, the major losses are restricted almost entirely to the poor rural pig-owners.

Most of the declared uninfected States, are basing their declaration of ASF-free status only on the absence of ASF reporting which is not satisfactory. Data are not normally collected from the field and if so, they are fragmentaric and and inadequate. Under these conditions, the required disease epidemiological mapping cannot be performed and we still do not have a real information on the extension and spread of ASF, the limit of the infected areas and the precise location of the foci. To ascertain the presence or absence of the disease, at the present stage, the only way is to run an epidemiological investigation throughout the country. The States veterinary services are expected to search for the disease and to organise the reporting. The absence of data and mapping will have negative effects on the control/eradication programme. It will also make difficult, the follow up and assessment of the operations.

According to the position paper presented by the Federal Department of Livestock and Pest Control Services (FDL and PCS) at the States Director of Veterinary Services meeting (DVSs), the ASF events which have taken place since the reports of the disease in Lagos State and Ogun State were first received, are the following :

The consultant visits to the previously infected and surrounding states, revealed the following current situation in these states:

In Ogun State, the first outbreak occured in September 1997; the infection was limited and is still limited to free-ranging pigs in the four LG bordering Benin Republic. The visit of the consultant in these LG confirmed the heavy losses on the local free-ranging pigs. DVS stated that not a single report was received on infected commercial pig-farms; nothing substantial is noticed in the 16 other LG of the State. The situation in this state seems to be stabilised.

The Ogun State veterinary services are facing funding and mobility problems to continue carrying out surveillance measures and are asking Federal services for additional funding.

In Lagos State, the first outbreak occured nearly at the same period than Ogun State, in Badagry near the border. According to the DVS report, ASF spread was limited to the border area and to Agege in Lagos city. It is suggested that ASF virus spread from Lagos to other states due to the fact that Lagos, being the biggest market, gathers he pig production of several states. The losses have not been quantified, and the veterinary services limited their actions to advises and recommendations on movement restriction, and to some publicity in the newspapers. According to the DVS pig-farmers are well informed and aware of the ASF problem. At present, the situation seems to stabilise.

In Oyo State, not a single case has been officially reported despite the proximity of infected areas in Ogun state and Osun State. The surveillance is enforced and pig-farmers are informed through media and field veterinary staff. The consultant visited several villages and pig-farms in the East and West parts of the State and did not find any evidence of the ASF presence.

In Osun State, the first outbreak occured probably in April 1997 in Shasha and Ifetedo LG, South of the State. From these primary foci ASF spread to Ile-Ogbo and Iwo LG in the North West part of the State. The most recent reports indicated an outbreak in Ilesha LG, in the Centre-East of the State. The 2/3 of the State could be considered as infected.

In the North and Central part of the State, most of the pigs are kept confined in premises or in fences, but that did not protect them from ASF. The infection is likely originated from Lagos area where Osun pig-farmers and cooperatives are selling their pigs and from where they buy their feed. The fact that ASF declared simultaneously in several pig-farms of the same area suggests this route of infection.

The number of pigs involved and the rate of mortality and slaughter are not yet precisely known. Most of the farmers did not know how the ASF penetrated the farm;, they were only able to indicate that the disease declared first in the neighbouring pig-farms. In most of the pig-farms visited, although all the pigs were reported to have died, several pigs of all ages were observed by the consultant who recommended their elimination, destruction and burial as quickly as possible.

A great effort has been made on public information and awareness through State radio and television.

In Ondo state, not an ASF case has been reported from the beginning of the epizootic despite the fact that the number of free-ranging pigs in the State is more important than the number of commercial pigs and that Ifetedo ASF declared focus, one of the primary foci in Osun State is at few hundred meters from the West limit of Ondo state.

DVS staff are organising very well the prevention phase; farmers are literate, well educated and are following the veterinary services instructions in matter of prevention. A great effort is made on public information and education, through churches and radio messages broadcasted twice a day.

Professor Tim Obi (AGAH) visited Kaduna, Benue, and Enougou State. The current situation in these States is the following :

In Kaduna State, the first outbreak occured in August 1998 through the Kafantchan pig-market and now, most of the State is considered infected. The first ASF outbreak notice came from Zonkwa in August 1998; it was traced to Katsit pig-market in Kafantchan. The outbreaks in Kaduna State resulted in the loss of nearly 10 000 pigs and the disease is still active early November 1998.

In Benue State, the first outbreak occured in July 1998; the retrospective epidemiological investigation revealed that a pig-farmer bought a pig from another State and thus infected its herd and introduced the disease in Benue State. Benue state is one of the biggest pig-producer (more than 20% of the total country production). Pig production contributes significantly to the economy of the State; it was the fastest growing livestock industry before ASF epizootic. Most of the pigs are owned by small holders and it has been found that that nearly 2 100 pig-farms have been infected. The number of affected pigs reached

80 000 from which 61 000 died. The mortality rate was found to be 77%. Gboko, Otukpa and Guma LG areas were the most affected LG, showing the highest mortality figures. The total losses are estimated to nearly 292 millions Naira (US 3. 5 millions $).

In Enugu State, several ASF foci have been discovered in N'suka area, North West of the State, and around Enugu Town. The mortality rate was around 70%.

Whilst the consultant was in the country, other unofficial information indicated the ASF presence in Abia State, Adamawa State, Plateau State Akwang State and Anambra State.

In Abia State, ASF affected at least 9 farms; the mortality rate was about 70%; samples have been sent to NVRI. A press release of the 23 d September urged pig-farmers to report all death of pigs in their herds, and to restrict movements of pigs. An adequate compensation have been promised for those who will report early.

In Anambra State, a private source (private veterinarian), not yet confirmed, suggests that ASF is present in the State, and that some cases have been observed.

In Kwara state, officials are alerted, pig-breeders associations are informed but no ASF cases are reported. The Agriculture and Natural Resources Commissioner held a press conference and an article on ASF was published in "the Nigerian Herald". The publicity is continuing. 10 LG have been visited by veterinary staff .

SOCIO-ECONOMICAL EFFECTS

Pigs contributed significantly to the economic welfare of the rural population. They also played an important role in the social and cultural life of most of the communities in the southern and middle-belt States, providing cheap meat and contributing by porrk supply to traditional marriages and burial rites. In addition, pigs provide a ready and regular source of cash to meet the rural families needs, such as paying school fees and expenses, health expenses and farm inputs, on a day to day basis. In many affected areas, parents were not able to send their children to school because of the heavy losses in their pig herds.

In any country in the world, the goal of pig production operation is to make money or provide some advantages such as a cheap source of animal protein for the family diet; so any epizootic threatening this animal production threatens the food security of the population and its social balance.

ASF as an epizootic, has the potential to cause catastrophic pig production losses, and it has been aknowledged that, on going ASF epizootic has devastating effects and socio-economic challenges, therefore creating a national disaster situation. When ASF infects a country, all pig-owners, large or small holders, are affected. Although large commercial producers can usually take protective measures for the long term, smallholders are often unable to protect themselves against the disease and heavy and repeated losses may lead to the abandon of the pig business.

Socio-economic effects of the epizootic are visible in Nigerian affected areas, as entire village pig population were wiped out and a good source of income for the villagers was ruined. In the eastern and southern States, the situation, even if not yet precisely known, is likely to be disastrous, breaking entire family social life. It took place, among others, in Benue State, where most of the pig-owners are women (smallholders), in charge of the family budget.

States and Federal Governments are worried by the serious threat posed by the ASF epizootic to the food security of the country and especially to the low income population as the rural and periurban populations for whom, pork is the cheapest animal protein they can afford.

CONTROL/ERADICATION MEASURES

Country wide, the process of depopulation of the infected areas, disinfection, sentinellisation and gradual restocking will take months and could take more than a year; so pig-farmers should be informed of the time needed to carry out normally each phase of the programme. In this context, affected states are making efforts to implement the following appropriate control measures such as publicity and public education, control of movements of pigs/pig products, closure of pig markets, collection and submission of samples to NVRI for laboratory diagnosis:

ASF diagnosis is mostly based on clinical diagnosis rather than laboratory diagnosis because of the difficulties to collect, store, and send samples to NVRI which is presently the sole laboratory able to make the required tests and analysis.

According to the answers of pig-farmers, to my questions on what kind of signs the pigs show before death, the main clinical signs described were: depression, fever, movements incoordination, reddish color of the pendant part of the skin, redness of the testis and partial or complete loss of appetite; the sick pigs resumed to eat one or two days before their death. There was no evidence of diarrhea. These clinical signs described by the pig-owners were suggestive of ASF and the very high mortality rate, do not leave any doubt concerning the diagnosis of ASF. Although only few samples, which revealed positive, have been sent to NVRI, the cause of mortality among pigs in the areas visited by the consultant, is without doubt ASF. In all the visited pig-farms, most of pigs died and have been deeply buried. The survivors rate ranges from 0% to 30%.

Now, when the disease is raging throughout the States, the veterinary staff of the infected areas, have had the opportunity to examine and observe sick pigs and are therefore able to recognise the clinical signs and post mortem lesions on the affected herds. The problem is that a great part of pig-farmers do not deal with official veterinary staff and therefore are not in a position to be informed nor trained for the recognition of the disease and to the necessity to report it when it happens.

A veterinarian, basing on the informed from a pig-breeder may tentatively diagnosis ASF cases, but he must have a good laboratory to turn to for a quick and accurate confirmation diagnosis.

The laboratory diagnosis is essential for the confirmation of the disease presence, for the follow up of the epidemiological situation and for the implementation of the epidemiosurveillance programme which is based mainly on laboratory testing.

According to the FAO laboratory specialist consultant, the laboratory facilities of the virology department at NVRI, are old and inadequate, but a working fluorescent microscope is available in the Dermatophilosis Department, and a working ELISA reader is available in the Trypanosomiasis Department. This consultant also reported that glassware and plasticware were in short supply. However,the competence of the technical staff in basic laboratory procedures was relatively good. Under such conditions, the FAO consultant was able to establish at NVRI the three essential techniques - IFAT, ELISA, and immunoblotting.

Most of the affected States sent samples to the NVRI; these samples tested positive, indicating that the disease is spreading nation-wide. Unfortunately, the number of samples received by NVRI was very low considering the number of areas infected in 9 States. The ASF laboratory diagnosis results, reported by NVRI at the DVSs meeting held the 21-22 October 1998 in Abeokuta, revealed that:

This raises the issue of samples transport as there is not a public service in a position to do that; in all the cases State veterinary services have to mobilise a car, a driver and a large amount of petrol for the transport of one or two samples to NVRI which is located at nearly 500 km from most of the affected areas. In such a situation, the consultant recommended to continue to sample infected herds and to keep the tissues samples in the freezer and the blood samples in the refrigerator until an opportunity offers or the number of samples could justify the transport. FDL&PCS responsible as well as the National Coordinator and the National Consultant and several State DVSs insisted on the necessity to implement ASF laboratory diagnosis units in Ibadan Faculty of Veterinary Medicine and in N'suka University. These two locations, according to these responsible, have the equipment and capabilities to perform ASF diagnosis; they only lack of chemicals and reagents. In fact, NVRI is located too far from most of the infected areas of the Southern and Eastern States, and the present lack of funds and petrol are serious handicaps for the collection and transport of samples on long distances.

Laboratory diagnosis and consequently epidemiosurveillance and restocking, are facing a challenge due to the very few communication means in the field and the petrol crisis that immobilise the field veterinary staff or severely limits their autonomy and mobility. In such a situation, the field veterinary staff which are responsible for the samples collection, cannot perform their task; so very few samples are sent to the laboratory for confirmation or testing. The inadequacy of operational funding may also lead to the impossibility to collect and send samples to the laboratory.

Samples have not yet been sent to the FAO Reference Laboratory for a molecular epidemiology studies. The Onderstepoort Institute for Exotic Diseases in South Africa, is already in a position to undertake the required analysis - for characterisation and classification.The Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP) studies have proved useful in the epidemiological classification of virus strains; so the possibility to determine RFLP's of isolates from different origins is real and it is now necessary to undertake the analysis and compare Nigerian strain(s) with European and other African strains. The epidemiological classification of ASF virus is important in order to be certain of the origin of the Nigerian virus; characterisation of ASF virus isolates during an outbreak will also indicate whether a single strain or multiple strains are involved; in another hand, comparisons with isolates from other countries may pinpoint the origin of the epizootic or may at least exclude some of the possibilities or suspicions

The most efficient way to control ASF is to prevent its entry , first in the country, then in the State, the LG and at last in the village or farm; so a major part of the prevention task lies with Federal and States inspection and quarantine officials; they are responsible for controlling the entry of live pigs and pig products, to assure that no ASF virus enters their states. But we cannot expect that these control and inspection to be 100% effective.

The early and accurate recognition of ASF in part of the country is extremely important for the containment and eradication of the disease while it is still localised; an early reaction might have prevented the outbreak developing into a major epizootic.

To stop the entry and/or spread of a transboundary animal disease, is a matter of prevention and preparedness on the part of the veterinary services first, then of the part of the whole country. In the case of Nigeria, the state of preparedness of the veterinary services was very weak because no Animal Health Emergencu Preparedness against ASF was in place and did not include:

From the first outbreaks it appeared that the Nigerian reporting system was not efficient. Most of the outbreaks have not been reported and many information remains at the village/farm level and/or at the LG and State authorities level, not yet reported to the federal services. That suggests that the links between States and Federal services are loose, creating therefore an information gap, even if the Federal Services are represented at States level, by at least one federal veterinary officer. Logistic and funding problems appear to play an important role in this apparent inefficiency.

The reporting system, if not improved, could seriously affect in the future the suggested active surveillance programme. The consultant recommended to repair the radio sets once used for communication and the involvement of all the social, economical and administrative authorities as well as affected breeders into an efficient and rapid reporting system.

An investigation and continued epidemiosurveillance programme has been proposed by the consultant at the end of his mission, and a model of an investigation form (Annex II) has been drafted and left with the proposal in the FAO representation to be sent to FDL&PCS.

In ASF recovered pigs, high antibody titres occur but they do not neutralise the virus and most of the recovered pigs become carriers. This typical for ASF inability of antibodies to neutralise the virus reduces the chances for the discover of an effective vaccine. Disease for which no protective vaccine nor treatment exists, suggests that countries need to think ahead to avoid facing wide spread infection and to implement an animal health system able to react preventively against such a disease.

At country or at State level, early warning with quick identification and reporting of the disease is possible only with:

In case of a positive diagnosis, the country or State authorities must be ready to act before the disease has a chance to spread further. From that early reaction depends the future of the entire swine industry of the country/state. Early reaction means quick actions taken by the emergency task force; these actions must come in the form of:

It has been proven by the ASF spread, that Nigeria was unprepared to face such an epizootic; none of the above mentioned basic technical element were in place. Even if the need to strengthen the National Animal Disease Emergency Preparedness (NADEP) is recognised, emergency preparednes to ASF and other transboundary diseases does not seem to be the main priority of the Nigerian Veterinary Authorities.

The lack of co-operation between pig-breeders and local authorities and field veterinary staff, would involve hiding of residual pigs and clandestine restocking, so the active participation of the pig-owners is needed for the implementation of an efficient surveillance network. But pig-owners cooperation without some form of payment or incentive, is very unlikely. It has been reported in several areas, that pig-owners are not all cooperative with veterinary staff; many cases of residual pigs and some cases of self-restocking have been noticed in spite of the recommendations of the field veterinary staff. These attitudes and behaviour suggest that the enthusiasm of the pig-owning community is not consistent in different areas where ASF has devastated the pig herds.

The pig-owners co-operation could be strengthened by the training at local level, of Animal Health Defence Groups which could help in the control and surveillance operations.

The spread of the disease in Nigeria, does not appear as a linear sort of progression, from village/farm to village/farm. The reports from Kaduna State or Rivers State, far away from the initial outbreaks, are suggesting a pigs/pig products movements over considerable distances, by all means of transportation on roads and rivers. These movements should be prohibited. Control post should be strengthened on already installed road barriers for security or custom purposes.

To stress the importance of this issue, the TCP/NIR/7822 (E), insisted on the responsibilities of the local communities in establishing their own quarantine and movements control, and considered this statement as the most important in the fight against the spread and progression of the epizootic. Pig-owners and farmers have their own idea on how to protect their herds and do their own movement control; this type of control operates, as it operated in other countries, providing that the will and encouragement exist.

From the first notification of outbreaks, control posts should have been set up along the limits of the infected areas in order to contain ASF from spreading beyond. In some of the states, it seems perfectly clear that at this stage, and more than one year after the first reported outbreak, veterinary control posts on road barriers have not been oparational.

A well informed public, and especially the pig-owners, is a major asset for an effective eradication programme; so, honest and complete public information and education are imperative. In this field of control operations, Federal and States governments are doing noticeable efforts, especially in the area of public information/education.

In many countries, before an ASF information and public education accurate programme is set up, anyone with access to media became an "ASF expert" and spread false or misleading information, resulting in a great deal of public scepticism and mistrust, leading consecutively to a very low credibility level for ASF programme officials.

The case repeated in Nigeria; the inexact news spread by some newspapers in shortage of scoops, introduced a wide spread fear among consumers whom believed that they would catch ASF and die by eating pork. These believes are hard to get rid of, because "what is written in a newspaper is undoubtfully true". Such inexact information resulted in many areas in:

All the pig-farmers met during the field visits of the consultant, complained about the depression of the market and about the bad news spread on pork consumption; some of these pig-farmers have already sold their stock at low price, others are waiting to adjust their decision, to see what will be the situation at Christmas and the festive season, as most of them are preparing pigs for that period of the year. Some other pig-farmers have already decided to give up, abandon pig-farming and shift to poultry or fishery.

Considering the sensitivity of this issue, continued public education should be one of the ASF control activity that should not be based on the sole news propagated by the media; close contact between field veterinary staff and pig-owners could be achieved through farm visits, local meeting, information days and workshops to enable pig-owners to:

Furthermore, a major public information and awareness effort should be made to tell pig-owners that they would be compensated and would receive a fair price or incentive for the slaughtered, destroyed and buried pigs in the framework of the control/eradication programme.

Such a campaign is necessary to win the cooperation and aid of the rural population and the pig-farmers associations. The adopted and already implemented sanitary measures for the ASF eradication should be well explained in order to obtain pig-farmers adhesion to the programme and their assistance in the field operations.

The information materials prepared with the help of the FAO consultant and others under preparation, should be widely distributed.

The TCP Project put a high emphasis on the training programme. The training will be carried out on a state and regional (LG or Zone) levels, in order to familiarise the participants with the disease recognition and the basic epidemiology of ASF. 5 training workshops at state level, 25-35 sessions of training at LG or Zone level and training at community level were programmed .

The first scheduled training of trainers workshop on ASF control/eradication was held in Abeokuta, Ogun State, the 4-5 November 1998. It was animated by the FAO international and national consultants as well as by fully competent national lecturers. Discussion were held on:

The first workshop was attended by 40 specialists, including most of the State veterinary staff and State officers from other bodies such as police, immigration, customs and insurance.

All the training material used have been duplicated and every attendant has been provided with a complete set in order to help him to organise and animate training sessions in his area (zone or local Government).

Follow-up investigation have not been completed in many States, due to logistic problems, apparently financial, funds having not been available by the States and federal authorities. In many cases, investigation made revealed that the outbreak followed commercial activities of traders and butchers. These activities should had been prohibited in the infected areas and strictly controlled in the whole state.

Thorough epidemiological assessment of the situation should precede any control strategy, as a control strategy cannot be conceived and implemented if we have no knowledge of the prevalent epidemiological situation.

In such case, we can be sure that the conceived strategy would be changed in the course of action and this may have negative effects on the control operational activities.

A national survey should be carried out; it will assist in determining the status of ASF in the different States of the Federation; it will also provide the necessary data for a safe restocking through sentinellisation. The results of such a survey could be used for the delimitation of the infected areas and the selection of ASF-free areas and ASF-free healthy herds susceptible to provide, for the programme, sentinel pigs and restocking pigs; field survey are also needed for the collection of epidemiological information such as the activity of the disease, the presence and rate of residual pigs, the precise location of the foci and their state of activity and, the self restocking attempts.

The remaining pigs after the disease has killed most of the pigs in a herd, seem to be in important number in the visited pig-farms and villages. The survival rate seems to be higher than normally expected in a population of pigs facing the lethal disease for the first time, and therefore, fully susceptible. In several pig-farms visited by the consultant in Osun State, in spite of the fact that these farmers are registered by the veterinary services, a great number of "survivors" have been found. The consultant was obliged to explain to the owners the danger these pigs represent for the future of their pig business, and the necessity to slaughter them as quickly as possible. These registered farms represent a small part of the total number of pig-farms in the area, so it is presumed that most of them are still keeping residual pigs, ignored by the Veterinary Services.

Follow-up visits to ASF foci, revealed the presence of residual pigs having survived the outbreak. In spite of the veterinary staff recommendations to slaughter and bury these survivors which represent a great risk for the restocking programme, some of the farmers showed reluctance to such a measure, even if they did not openly oppose to such recommendations. This sort of behaviour will result on loss of time for further surveillance and information.

Compensation is the key word of any control/eradication strategy. If adopted, compensation should be well calculated and balanced. It must compensate the losses caused by the action of the government, and mainly the slaughter of sick, infected, in contact and residual pigs.

In all the areas visited by the consultant, no stamping out has been attempted and no funds have been allocated to carry out the slaughter and compensation operation.

Even after the meeting of Abeokuta, which major component was to draft a national slaughter and compensation policy, the issue has not yet been solved no decision has been taken sofar.

From the talks with the pig owners, most of them stated that they would agree to slaughter their pigs immediately if they receive some compensation that would allow them to start again the pig business. From that point of view, the slaughter out of pigs in infected farms and villages could be done by the pig-owners themselves, with financial incentive to them, to slaughter and bury their own pigs.

For that kind of operation, slaughter teams, usually employed in other African countries, are not useful; not only they will not justify the expenses but they will definitively not achieve control.

In case of lack of compensation or absence of any kind of incentive, it is better not to recommend the slaughter. In case of compensation, if its level does not cover an important part of the costs of production, pig-owners could be no more interested and would try to make money and cover their costs, selling sick and infected pigs instead of slaughtering them. Developing a rapid and consisting procedure for compensating pig-farmers would help to overcome their resistance to the eradication programme.

Participants of the Abeokuta meeting, recommended to the Federal and State Governments adoptation of the measures including:

Most of these recommendations have been largely and deeply discussed before adoption and have been send to higher authorities in form of a communique.

The measures recommended are part of the strategy adopted. The issue of slaughter and compensation policy is not yet resolved as no decision has already been taken. In all the areas visited by the consultants, no stamping out has been attempted and no funds have been allocated to carry out the slaughter operation.

ASF ERADICATION STRATEGY FOR NIGERIA

It has been indicated in the TCP agreement, that the most effective strategy is to eliminate the source of infection by killing all infected and in contact pigs and disposing properly of the carcasses by incineration or deep burying and by imposing strict zoo-sanitary control measures; key control activities being:

The DVSs meeting held in Abeokuta, Osun State, was the third of its kind in Nigeria; it gathered the DVSs of the infected and threatened states, the NVRI Director the Directors of the veterinary teachers hospitals and the Director of FDL&CPS. The agenda of the meeting concerned the current overview of ASF in Nigeria, reports from the States on the current situation, progres report on laboratory diagnosis, socio-economic and financial aspects of the epizootic and control operations, including slaughter and compensation. A round table discussion was held on all the issues raised and mainly on ASF control/eradication strategies. A final recommendation communique was drafted.

The Abeokuta meeting follows the one held on 24-26 September 1998 in Damature, Yobe State, which was also directed on the issue of strategies for the Rinderpest control, towards eradication of the disease in Nigeria. In the Damature meeting, the issue of ASF had already been discussed and a situation report had been introduced by the Director of the FDL&CPS, alerting the DVSs against ASF and requesting them to carry out proper investigation and report to the FDL&PCS for necessary action. The brief indicated that FAO assisted Nigeria with a TCP for an amount of US 364 000 $ and that in addition, the Federal Government had given counterfund allocation of 15 millions Naira (US$176 000).

In the Abeokuta meeting, the contribution of DVSs was focused on the necessity to stop the decimation of the national pig herd, and the need of an effective pig movements control. The spread of the epizootic was at that moment concerning, among others, the States of Kaduna, Benue, Rivers, Delta and Osun. The issue of public information was discussed and the necessity was expressed to ensure effective publicity in order to educate pig-farmers and the public on the disease.

The vital issue of slaughter and compensation policy was discussed and DVSs were requested to collect more information on the disease through investigation, prepare and submit proposals for its stamping out and work out costs and other implication for slaughter and compensation as control measures. DVSs recommended also to the Federal and States governments to adopt the slaughter and compensation policy which they consider as the most effective action for the ASF control/eradication. They also recommended that adequate compensation should accompany the compulsory slaughter, in order not to aggravate the already devastating situation.

The presence at this meeting of the two international consultants and the national consultant of the FAO was an opportunity for a better sensitisation of the DVSs to the necessary and rapid implementation of the control measures.

The consultant presented the different strategies adopted by previously infected countries in Eastern and Southern Africa as well as in Europe, Caribbean and West African countries. He proposed what he thought the most adapted strategies for the different Nigerian States considering their different epidemiological situations. A round table on the social, economical and financial effects of the disease, insisted on the threat posed by ASF to the food security.

In Abeokuta, Federal and State DVSs recommended the adoption of the slaughter out and compensation policy as a strategy for the ASF control/eradication, considering that this option is the most viable one.

The decision to eradicate rather than to live with the disease and all its socio-economical impacts is hard to take, because the only way to eradicate ASF from the infected States would be to eliminate all the pigs in the infected areas; but eradication activities are enormous financial, technical and logistic tasks.

The implementation of an eradication programme must take into consideration the socio-economical realities, the nature of the terrain and, the means to mobilise. The large number of villages and farms raising pigs and the high density of the pig population in the southern and middle belt sates mean enormous difficulties for the realisation of the programme.

The ASF control programme initially directed to the primary infected States (Lagos and Ogun States) should now cover the whole country and a National Control/Eradication Programme must be instituted.

Such a programme should be coordinated at a national level by a national co-ordinator having full authority on the Federal and State Veterinary Services. That means that, at this stage of the development and spread of the disease, the only one who can co-ordinate efficiently both the operations at state level as well as the inter-departmental activities is the Federal Director of Livestock.

In the mean time, a follow up body should be created and chaired by the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources and in which the National Coordinator will assume the role of General Secretary. This body should be inter-departmental as the control and eradication of the ASF epizootic requires the assistance and effective intervention of other departments such as information, internal affairs, public health, finance. Such a body should be implemented in each State in order to perform the follow up of field operations and other control activities.

Considering the different epidemiological situations prevailing in the States, the consultant proposed to adopt for the newly infected States the three phases strategy covering :an emergency phase, a surveillance phase and a restocking phase. In the primary infected states, the strategy should directly start with the second phase. (Annex I).

The emergency phase will be the most important phase and should be as short as possible. During this phase, prevention and control measures should be implemented. The prevention measures are those dealing with investigation, information and public awareness, movements prohibition, pig confinement and laboratory diagnosis. The control measures are those of stamping out, cleaning and disinfection.

The surveillance phase will be a period of vigilance of all the concerned parties involved in the control and eradication programme. During this second phase, the activities that should be carried out are as follows: a period of disinfection and ban of repopulating, the identification and slaughter of all the residual pigs, sentinellisation, serosurveillance and the training of pig-owners, veterinary staff and action teams.

The restocking phase will be partly prepared during the second phase; during this third phase, continued epidemiosurveillance should be carried out, as well as confinement and quarantine measures should be maintained until the country is declared non infected, and restocking should be done with ASF-free pigs.

The consultant emphasised the importance of the epidemiological investigation and the epidemiosurveillance as tools for an efficient control/eradication programme (Annex II).

Field investigations are needed for the collection of epidemiological information such as the activity of the disease in the foci, the precise location of the foci and the importance of the affected pig population. In the threatened areas, the survey will allow the confirmation of the ASF-free status. Continued ASF epidemiosurveillance, is based on the fact that some pigs escape death, survive the outbreaks and could be possible carriers that will perpetuate the ASF domestic cycle and let a possible enzootic situation develops.

Such strategy needs adequate funding. This issue has been clearly mentioned in the TCP agreement which specified that prior to carry out training sessions, it should be ascertained that the country can make financial contribution to a slaughter out campaign. Unfortunately it has been noticed through the field visits performed by the consultant that at the states level there are no adequate operational funds that enable veterinary staff to perform control and surveillance operations. Until now the FDL&PCS had only send to the states services 100.000 Naira for each State to perform such activities, including information campaign and samples collection and transport to NVRI. It is obvious that an important gap exists between the activities to be carried out and the financial means provided.

The FAO consultants suggested to the FDL&PCS to approach national and international funding organisation such as : the National Disaster Relief Fund, The Family Support Programme, the Petrolium Trust Fund , UNDP or EU.

To efficiently perform the control programme, the active participation of the pig-owners is needed but, pig-owners cooperation without some form of payment or incentive is unlikely and it has been noticed in several areas, that pig-owners do not co-operate with veterinary staff. The constitution of Defence Groups and Action Teams have been recommended to involve pig-owners in the field activities and therefore be in closer contact with veterinary field staff.

REPOPULATION

In the old foci, the epizootic has apparently burnt itself out and repopulating becomes a serious consideration.

To perform reinstatement, the first step is the identification of non infected areas and suppliers. The identified herds should be tested according to the epidemiological surveillance programme proposed (annex II). The next step in reinstatement of the pig industry is the restocking programme; Suitable premises for restocking will need to be identified, involving inspection of previously infected premises. These should be disinfected by the owner and could receive Sentinel Pigs (SP) bought by the pig-farmer in identified, non infected, controlled herds. The identification of suppliers of SP would take place at the same time as the identification of non infected farms; finding suitable means of identification of pigs (ear tags could be proposed), must be put in motion immediately.

Repopulating of villages where pigs have been slaughtered in accordance with ASF control regulations, should take place within 4-5 months of slaughter, using SP. Disinfection is not possible in village conditions and should neither be recommended nor attempted. It is only recommended to thoroughly clean the environment from died pig carcasses and remnants of organic material as well as to keep pigs in fences if possible. Villages that are not infected could supply the SP as well as restocking pigs.

If the SP remain healthy, for the period of sentinellisation, and respond negatively to the serotests, the previously infected site should be declared safe and pig-farmers could begin restocking.

FUNDING

It has been clearly stated, in the TCP agreement signed by both FAO and Nigerian Federal MANR, that the national institutions responsible for project implementation are the Federal and National departments of livestock and that the Government will provide all the necessary facilities and logistics for the effective implementation of the project activities. It is also declared in the TCP agreement, that prior to carry out the training programme, it should be ascertained that the country can make a financial contribution to a slaughter out campaign.

It has been noticed, through field visits performed by the consultant in 5 states, that there are no adequate operational funds to enable veterinary staff to perform control and surveillance operations; funding is still the major issue for all the responsible met by the consultant. Meetings with Commissioners (State Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources), with Permanent Secretaries and Chairmen of LG, revealed the lack and need of funds. For instance, the DVSs of Osun State (ASF infected) and of Ondo State (ASF-free), received each one, only 100 000 Naira (US 1 200 $) from the FDL&PCS to perform such activities, including an information campaign and samples collection and transport to NVRI.

DVSs in their meeting in Abeokuta, stated that compulsory slaughter without adequate compensation , will aggravate the already devastating situation by creating a massive movement of live pigs and of pig products, therefore aiding in further ASF spread. They also recommended that funding should be jointly shared by federal (70%), State (20%) and Local government (10%).

The FAO representative and consultants suggested that the funding of the ASF eradication programme could be sourced from :

During the last meeting with Dr Abegunde, deputy Director of FDL&PCS, in Abuja November 06, 1998, FAO consultants urged FDL&PCS :

FAO ASSISTANCE

Late 1997, the Nigerian Federal Government requested assistance from FAO, to combat African Swine Fever.

The FAO cooperation then assistance was apparent from the first days of the ASF outbreak declaration, even before it has been requested by the Federal Government in order to support and assist the Nigerian authorities to control the ASF epizootic.

The FAO have sent international consultants to provide technical assistance. The purpose was to help establish field and laboratory diagnostic capabilities, to rapidly diagnose the disease if it appears, to train veterinary staff in early warning, quick reporting, information and epidemiological surveillance and to advise on ASF control strategy and control/eradication measures. The initial consultancy assistance included the ASF epidemiologist specialist(FAPO-EMPRES), whos task was to evaluate the epidemiological situation, assess the risks for the other states, make the necessary recommendations, and draft a Technical Co-operation Programme's (TCP) Project of assistance for the ASF control in Nigeria.

Under the Present TCP/NIR/7811 (E)Project the FAO sent to Nigeria a laboratory diagnosis specialist in order to enforce the capacity of NVRI to diagnose ASF virus and antibody, so the presence of ASF could be confirmed and a sero-monitoring could be conducted efficiently. The ASF control specialist has been sent twice for the advising on ASF control measures, sensitisation of responsible at different levels, assistance on information and training programmes, assessment of the epidemiological situation and drafting of an eradication strategy and of surveillance programme. The national consultant was recruited. and is performing very well. Dr D. West, as former Director of FDL&PCS, is well known and appreciated by Federal and States veterinary staff. His knowledge of the country and of the officials revealed very helpful for the success of the TCP implementation. Dr. West has a good relationship with the national co-ordinator and is working in close co-operation with him.

The present TCP also procured the equipment, materials and supplies. All these inputs have been acquired by the HQ services and the FAO representation. The 20 motorcycles have been retrieved from the port ; the car is operational from the 25 th of October and the consultant used it for his field visits; the 3 computers are ready. The FAO Representative, in order to respond to the request of the FDL&PCS, works to assure the ringht distribution of goods.

Some lines of the present TCP Project's budget including: General Operating Expenses, Materials and Suplies as well as Official travel need to be clarified in order to allow for their more extensive use for the ASF active surveillance and control. The photographic and video-film coverage is being prepared.

The video-film company have already been approached by the National Consultant for this purpose. The NVRI and Osun State veterinary services have each one already prepared an amateur video-film The consultant drafted a synopsis (Annex IV) for a professional video-film, send it through FAOR to FDL&PCS and left a copy of it with the National Coordinator. It has been advised to send copies to all DVS so they could fellow the same synopsis if they intend to prepare an ASF video-film.

Finally, the Project implemented series of training courses and training of trainers on ASF field diagnosis/recognition and control, in different States of the Federation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Eradication bodies : A High Commission (or Interministerial Commission) for ASF eradication should be constituted, consisting of cabinet-level responsible and authorities from government agencies involved in the eradication effort. This commission should be headed by top level official, and should have the responsibility to define and promulgate specific eradication policies and follow-up the execution of these policies.

For a better efficiency, once the decision to eradicate and compensate is taken, it is recommended to establish a separate eradication programme apart from the regular livestock/veterinary services routine activities. Such programme should be responsible directly to the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

DVSs should be accountable to the State in regard to reporting, information, investigation and surveillance activities, including samples collection, storage and transport. A thorough work plan should be drafted for the guidance and follow up of the scheduled activities. A time table should be prepared for each activity.

2. Funding : Sources of funding should be already identified for compensation, transport, information, public education, disinfection, laboratory diagnosis and other direct costs of eradication so that a precious time is not lost searching for funds when an outbreak occurs in an area of a state and that all efforts are needed to concentrate on control/eradication operations.

As a system of compensation has not yet been established, it is imperative to implement it as quickly as possible, because if the pig-owners are not payed for the pigs that are slaughtered for sanitary reasons. Under those circumstances nd there is little chance of obtaining their indispensible support and co-operation.

3. Emergency : A state of "Animal Disease Emergency" should be declared in each of the affected States. The limits of infected areas should be known with precision and the foci of an outbreak should also be precisely reported in order to establish epidemiological mapping which would be helpful for different phases of the control/eradication programme.

Efforts should be made to improve the capacity of emergency preparedness to African Swine Fever and other emergency diseases.

Specialists in various fields as: epidemiology,laboratory diagnosis, disinfection, carcass disposal, pig production, information, public education, should be identified and trained in emergency procedures and organised in task force in each State. These identified specialists should be immediately mobilised in case of an outbreak with the task of soonest its containment.

A small nucleus of such specialists should be kept as an emergency programme staff which could be increased (if required ) by additional personnel during an emergency situation.

4. Information and public education : Written guidelines on information should be established. The primary public information objective is to reach the target people within the infected areas, so the pig-owners would be aware of the disease and the need for the programme and would understand its different phases. National Authorities should enhance farmers awareness of the danger represented by the epizootic for their own herd, their source of income and their food security. The National Information Campaign should be launched, in order to encourage pig-owners to confine and quarantine their pigs. The Campaign should stress the devastating character of the ASF. The message must be clear, that the pigs are endangered and that pig-owners have more to loose by allowing them to wander freely than enclosing them. Pig-owners and breeders should be warned not to allow anyone to bring pigs or their products from another area and more particularly from infected areas; they also should be warned not to feed any leftovers of pig meals to pigs.

Public education should be mainly directed to pig-farmers, pig-owners at village level, pig traders, and butchers. It should aim at explaining the danger represented by the disease for their professional activities as wellas for the e pig industry at a country scale. Pig-owners should be urged to aid the officials rather than resisting and delaying eradication. Consumers should also be educated in order to prevent false appreciation of the disease and false interpretation of the adopted measures.

The education of the pig industry's employes could be performed through public awareness campaigns, meetings and workshops at local, state and federal scale, with the help of the mass-media.

5. Reporting : An efficient and rapid reporting system should be implemented so, the collected information, by veterinary field staff doing the active surveillance, could be quickly reported to concerned bodies, to enable them to carry out an early reaction. Radio sets which once permitted good communication between the DVS and facilitated the reporting of any abnormal animal health situation, should be repaired.

6. Training of trainers workshops: the workplan initially designed for the present TCP Project, must not be limited to only 5 states, but should be extended to all the infected and threatened states, in order to train and prepare veterinary and other staff to react properly.

They should be trained in ASF recognition, sampling and transport of samples, pig-owners information and in preventive and control measures.

7. Investigation and surveillance : An epidemiological investigation programme and a continued epidemiosurveillance programme should be rapidly implemented in order to precise the limits of the infected areas, to precisely designate the location of ASF foci, to collect samples, to inspect previously infected premises and villages and localise residual pigs, to inspect and register all non infected commercial pig-farms and villages and commence the epidemiosurveillance programme in these sites.

A high priority should be given to the surveillance and public education should be continuous. The States DVSs should be urged to carry out the necessary epidemiological investigations and surveillance, and to collect and send samples to NVRI.

Pig-owners and farmers should be more effectively involved in investigation, surveillance and control activities through their professional bodies as pig-farmers associations and/or co-operatives. Special animal health defence groups should be set up to give assistance to the field veterinary staff and be part of recommended actions teams.

8. Residual pigs: They should be tested and/or eliminated. To do that, it is recommended that a task force involving pig-farmers associations should be set up urgently, to eliminate the residual pigs in order to allow restocking with ASF-free pigs after a period of rest and sentinellisation.

9. Pig markets : They should be closed all over the country and slaughter of pigs should be carefully controlled by veterinary inspectors to avoid trade of infected pigs and pork.

Free-ranging of pigs should be strictly prohibited in the infected areas and all running pigs should be killed in order to enforce this disposition of the law. Confinement should be compulsory in the observation areas surrounding the infected areas.

10. Compensation : Compensation for dead pigs should not be adopted; if not, it will encourage pig-farmers to declare the disease very late, because they have always the hope to see it comes to an end and that they could restock with the remaining pigs which they consider as resistant pigs.

Pig-farmers never heard about a disease that kills all the pigs and, as they are secured by a promise of compensation, they will not be in a hurry to declare mortality, allowing therefore the virus to spread. On the contrary, if compensation is limited to slaughtered pigs under the governmental policy, pig-farmers will certainly rush to declare the first cases, so the stamping out can start as soon as possible while the pigs, even the sick ones, are still alive.

11. Laboratory : Once the ASF crosses the border line of the State, an early diagnosis is necessary before the disease can spread to most part of the state. Good reporting and efficient sampling systems are required.

ASF virus isolates should be compared with those isolated in previously infected countries.

The epidemiological classification of ASF virus strains is important in order to ascertain the origin of the present Nigerian ASF virus and let us know if only one or several viral ASF strains are involved.

In this context, samples should be sent to FAO Reference Laboratory -the Onderstepoort Veterinary Institute/Onderstepoort Institute for Exotic Diseases,e Republic of South Africa for molecular characterisation and comparison with other isolates.

A sera bank for future retrospective epidemiological NVRI investigation, should be organised. The issue had already been discussed by the FAO laboratory consultant and the responsible of the virology department at NVRI. Advises on how to catalogue sera have been provided.

To facilitate laboratory diagnosis and tests for the Veterinary Services of middle belt and southern States, it is recommended to develop laboratory facilities for ASF diagnosis in the Ibadan's Faculty of Veterinary Medicine and in N'suka university

12. DVSs meetings: Future DVSs meetings on ASF issue should include all DVSs, even those of the non infected States; these meetings should be held monthly and given the maximum publicity. The assembly of Federal and States DVSs could be transformed in an executive body of the National Inter-ministerial Commission, in charge of the implementation and carry out of the control/eradication measures.

13. Economic and social effects: considering the economical, social, and cultural importance of the pig production in Nigeria and more precisely in the southern and middle belt States, it is recommended to start an investigation on the subject in those locations.

It is therefore suggested to recruit a national consultant to carry out this investigation. This national consultant should have a profile of an agricultural economist with a background in sociology. The required investigation should be carried out without delay; its results, could demonstrate the devastating effects of the epizootic and would be of great interest as a justification for further requests to fund the still running programme of eradication and the coming programme of restocking and long term surveillance.

CONCLUSION

It took more than one year - after the first outbreak had been reported - before real control efforts could begin.

Apart of the inefficient reporting procedures and the absence of an early reaction system, Nigeria suffered also from the lack of diseases emergency preparedness structures and of an early reaction system. More than one year after the infection of the country, very little have been done for the improvement of these systems and for the implementation of effective control measures, in order to contain the disease in the already infected areas and to prevent its spread through trade and pigs/pig products movements to other parts of the country. Until now, most of the recommended measures have not been implemented, allowing ASF to spread country wide and to become a national disaster.

The present epizootic has notably reduced the pig population in the infected States; in most of the areas visited by the consultant, the pig population had been notably reduced through deaths an slaughter of infected and exposed animals.

Generally speaking, the awareness of the officials and of the public has grown with the spread of the disease, so the few measures taken, under the pressure of the events, have always been implemented too late. The DVSs are willing to react more rapidly and more efficiently but they are handicapped by the lack of funding; nevertheless they are carrying out at least a good public information/education campaign.

Because entry of any transboundary disease is so likely in this time of globalisation, mass and qick transport and free trade, countries are beginning to see the benefit of setting up an emergency task force as a precaution against transboundary diseases.

By doing this, these countries are prepared to face and fight such diseases without a delay.

Unfortunately, no system for emergency animal diseases eradication existed in Nigeria when ASF struck the country. If a pre-established body for handling emergency outbreak existed, Nigeria might have been able to eradicate the disease at a lower cost and in a short time by quarantining and slaughtering pigs in a few focal areas of infection, before the disease had a chance to spread across the country.

The political will, even if expressed firmly at the highest level, had no effects on the grass root level, if the pig-owners not showing from their side that they also have the will to control the disease and protect their herds.

A participatory approach is essential to obtain the cooperation of the farmers and villagers but the compensation issue is always pending and compromises the needed adhesion of the pig-owners to the programme. Eradication cannot be successful if complete slaughter is not achieved, and this cannot be achieved if pig-owners do not fully collaborate with veterinary services and authorities.

The consultant fear to see the ASF evolving to an enzootic as the disease is loosing virulence and shifting from the acute form to a sub-acute form, allowing more infected pigs to escape death.

Long time considered as a 100% killer of infected herds, ASF in its less acute form has a lower mortality rate, allowing a greater number of pigs to survive. Such "survivors" are virus carriers and can continue to carry the ASF virus for prolonged period, most likely for as long as they live, perpetuating therefore the ASF domestic cycle; we may then observe from time to time, a "heat up" of the disease and the reocurrence of the cycle of large outbreaks and higher losses. Under these conditions, the 7 millions pig population in Nigeria is under threat of extinction and the food security of the country population is seriously endangered.

The lack of quick means of communication from the field, and national shortage of petrol, revealed to be the main constraints to the collection of data on the epidemiological situation and to the provision of samples to NVRI.

Funding is the main issue to be solved in order to carry out the recommended strategy and measures.

Annex 1: Letter to the Director FMANR

At the end of my mission, I want to thank you for the help and assistance yourself and your staff at the Federal and States levels provided to me.

I visited during this mission, the two previously infected States of Lagos and Ogun and the surrounding states of Oyo, Osun and Ondo. The last information I collected during my visits shows that:-

During my field visits, I have had the opportunity to meet with the state's veterinary staff and with the field veterinary staff in all the local Government visited. I also met most of the Commissioners and/or the Permanent Secretaries of the state's MANR and some Chairmen of Local Governments. I also visited 56 pig-farms, 2 border towns, one pig market and one abattoir. All along these trip I met with pig-farmers, members of co-operatives and members of pig-farmers associations:

The DVSs meeting held in Abeokuta (21-22 November 1998) was very effective and the policy and measures recommended to the Federal and States Governments fit exactly the control/eradication objectives of the TCP.

The first workshop for the training of trainers on control and eradication of ASF, held in Abeokuta was perfectly organised and has been carried out successfully. The trainers should now hold workshops in their Local Governments in order to train, sensitise and involve all concerned partners.

I believe, that the implementation of the control/eradication policy would benefit from some factors which may play a positive role; such factors are:

But the issue of funding stays the most important issue in this phase of evolution of the epizootic.

Based on the previous epizootic, experienced in Cote d'Ivoire and Benin Republic, and on the information collected during my two missions in your country, I'm proposing to your attention 4 documents I drafted while visiting the infected and threatened areas. The following documents which I'm joining to the present letter may be of some help in the implementation of the required actions for the eradication of the disease:

1. A strategy for the control/eradication of ASF; strategy that could be adopted for Nigeria.

2. A programme for an epidemiological investigation and a continued epidemiosurveillance in Nigeria which could be implemented rapidly and could greatly help to carry out the control programme.

3. A programme for sentinellisation which could be implemented as soon as possible, in previously infected sites, and would help to ascertain that ASF is under control in these areas.

4. A synopsis for an ASF video-film which will help keeping tracks of the present epizootic and which can be used as training material.

My mission report will be transmitted as usual through the FAO Permanent Representative in Nigeria.

I hope I have contributed to some extent, to the huge task you and your staff are carrying out for the control of the ASF epizootic.

Annex II:

These two epidemiological aspects are essential for the success of the ASF control/eradication programme, considering the rapid spread of the disease, the uncertainty of the situation in several states, the weakness of the field veterinary structures, the absence or delayed reporting from the field and some difficulties in the communication system.

Field investigation are needed for the collection of epidemiological information such as:

It is recommended that a general survey should be initiated throughout the country in order to know the ASF epidemiological situation. Such a survey is essential for the primary infected states, the newly infected states as well as the threatened states neighbouring the infected areas and those which consider themselves safe and out of reach.

In these states, the survey will allow the veterinary services carrying out the ASF control programme, to confirm the exact location of the foci for further mapping and implementation of the surveillance and sentinellisation programmes, to appreciate the exact losses and the ways of introduction of the virus, to evaluate the epidemiological situation and to reach the target public for further information and training.

In these states, the survey will let us know, the extension and delimitation of the infected areas and the rapidity of the spread of the disease, it will help to determinate the preventive measures to be implemented in the infected areas as quarantine and movements prohibition. It also offers the same advantages listed for the primary infected states.

In these states, the survey will allow the veterinary services to confirm that the different areas of the state are ASF-free, to enforce the information/public awareness campaign and the reporting system, and to implement the preventive measures, an early warming system and an early reaction system.

Such a survey will enable the livestock and veterinary services to gather valuable information on the importance, type, distribution and location of the pig population. To carry out such a survey, it is proposed an investigation form that can be easily filled by any personnel of the veterinary staff, the extension people and the members of the pig-farmers associations and co-operatives. Half an hour explanation is more than sufficient to explain to this personnel the objectives of the investigation, how to fill the form and to whom to send it by the quickest way.

To give results and be beneficial to the ASF control/eradication programme, the epidemiological investigation should be carried out as soon and as quickly as possible in order to regain time and terrain upon the progression of the virus.

The chapter I and the chapter II of the form should be filled for all sites (villages, pig farms) either they are/were infected or not, the chapter III and IV should be filled for the only infected sites.

The programme of the continued ASF epidemiosurveillance is based on the fact that, after many ASF outbreaks which are supposed to kill 100% of the susceptible pigs for a reason or another, some pigs escape the death, survive the outbreak and could be possible carriers that will perpetuate the ASF domestic cycle and let a possible enzootic situation develops within the country.

To ascertain that these two possibilities exist or not and considering the ASF epidemiological situation in Nigeria where different situations exist, it is highly recommended to implement from now on, an epidemiosurveillance programme which will complete and follow the epidemiological investigation.

Apart the issue of residual pigs, continued ASF epidemiosurveillance is also dictated by:

Therefore, a programme for continued ASF epidemiosurveillance in Nigeria, should be elaborated based on:

2. The Serosurveillance and sampling of dead or slaughtered pigs in abattoirs, markets, butcheries and pig-farms

Reporting even if is has to go through the official services, cannot be left to the sole states veterinary services; the pig industry concerns in the first rank the producers whom are the source of the information. They would be most motivated and could report rapidly.

The extension services from their side, are far better represented on the grass-root level than the field veterinary staff. Extension people are in the best position to report rapidly any suspicious pathological event at village and farm level, helped by chiefs of communities and pig-owners.

State laboratories, at least those equipped and run by trained personnel for ASF laboratory diagnosis, as well as the National Veterinary Research Institute (NVRI) of VOM, should be part of the reporting network as they receive samples from all parts of the country.

The contribution of the State and Federal veterinary services is nevertheless essential and will consist in coordinating the activities of the network and collecting the information from the different sources. These services should be provided, for this activity, with the necessary means of transportation in order to keep track of the situation, act on any information received and carry out serosurveillance.

done essentially for commercial herds and on village The serosurveillance and sampling should be residual pigs. For that purpose:

1. For commercial piggeries: Sampling (bleeding) of 10% of breeding stock and 10% of slaughtered pigs from each pig-farm every 6 months.

2 For village pigs (free ranging): Sampling of 10% of village pigs in previously infected areas, after 6 and 12 months. Introduced pigs should be included in the sampling. Tissues samples (spleen and sub-mandibular and mesenteric lymph nodes) should be collected where and when possible.

5% of adult pigs (over 6 months of age) should be sampled once (blood samples only); if none of the samples are positive, it can be assumed that ASF is not endemic in the area, and if there is no incidence of ASF in this areas, there is no need to repeat the operation.

If markets are still held in such areas, the simplest approach would be to sample pigs brought to the market to be sold for slaughter.

Annex III: Investigation Form

Annex IV: STRATEGY FOR THE CONTROL/ERADICATION OF AFRICAN SWINE FEVER IN NIGERIA

From the first outbreaks, the presence of ASF, in the two South Western States of Lagos and Ogun, has concerned both ASF-free and ASF-infected states. With the infection still limited, if not contained, to some states and considering the obvious dangers of letting ASF run rampant from a state to another, it is imperative to eradicate it from the country rather than allowing it becomes enzootic and remains a continuous threat to the national economy.

Before to adopt a National strategy for the ASF control/eradication, it is important to remember that:

1. There is no effective vaccine nor treatment which can be used against ASF. In the absence of such a vaccine, control of the disease depends on early observation, rapid diagnosis and implementation of a control programme based on strict sanitary measures.

2. In a newly infected country or state, ASF can spread rapidly by direct contact and/or indirect contact between infected pig and non infected pig populations. So the goal of the control/eradication programme should be to prevent and stop these contacts in order to slow down then stop the spread of the disease.

3. Time is the most important factor which conditions the success or the failure of the control programme. The time lost before ASF is noticed, reported, and before the necessary measures are taken, is to the benefit of the virus which can therefore spread without any obstacle in all directions. The delay can reaches months, letting the disease develops and progresses in an epizootic, far more difficult to control than the initial outbreak.

4. To carry out an efficient control/eradication programme, it needs important resources in funds, equipment, biological products and man power. If these resources are not gathered, the success of the strategy will be compromised because it will lack always something to perform the objectives of the strategy.

5. For the rapid execution of the programme, the pig-farmers co-operation is absolutely necessary; in case of delay, the co-operation of the pig-owners will weaken and those of them affected by the initial/outbreak will try to restock secretly.

6. The issue of compensation, in cash or in kind, is the cornerstone of an efficient control/eradication programme. If a system of compensation does not already exist, it is imperative to implement it as quickly as possible, because if the pig-owners are not payed for the pigs that are slaughtered for sanitary measure, there is little chance of obtaining their indispensable support and co-operation for such programme.

According to the different epidemiological situations prevailing in the different states, the control/eradication programme should be carried out in several steps as follow:

6. The epidemiological surveillance in order to protect the country/state against a new outbreak.

Many factors can contribute to the success of a National control/eradication strategy, but the main factors which conditionate this success are:

1. A clearly, officially and publicly expressed political will by declaring an "Animal Health Emergency" at both Federal and States levels

3. The implementation of inter-ministerial and co-ordination bodies, the issue of ASF control/eradication being a joint effort.

The strategies adopted by previously affected countries are multiple and differ from a country to another according to geographical considerations (the case of Islands) and/or socio-economical factors.

In the Southern and East African Countries, where ASF is enzootic, the strategies adopted are mainly based on a control/containment policy: stamping out in the foci in case of outbreak; enforcement of movements prohibition or restriction ; Quarantine of the infected herds; promotion of confined husbandry methods, and epidemiological surveillance.

In Europe, the eradication policy have always been adopted: stamping out of all the pigs of the infected area; strict movements prohibition in the infected area; movements control out of the infected area; compensation and epidemiosurveillance. The success of this type of strategy is mainly based on the early and massive reaction.

In the Caribbean Islands also, the eradication policy has been adopted: depopulation of the whole country (San Domingo; Haiti) or of part of it (Cuba) when early massive reaction have been possible; period of rest after disinfection; sentinellisation and repopulation.

In West African countries, 3 over 7 infected countries choose the control/eradication policy; the others are considered ASF enzootic countries:

The DVSs attending the Abeokuta meeting (21-22 October 1998) recommended to the Federal and States Governments to adopt the stamping out and compensation policy as strategy of ASF control/eradication. They consider that this strategy is the most viable option to adopt and that compulsory slaughter without adequate compensation will aggravate the situation and aid in further spread of the disease. The stamping out by slaughter should concern all clinically affected, high risk, in contact and recovered pigs.

1. An Emergency phase: which is the most important phase from the point of view of the implementation of the control activities. This phase should be as brief as possible (3 months) for the efficiency of the sanitary measures. During this phase the following activities should be carried out:

1.1 Investigation: The investigation will concerns mainly the confirmation of the reported information, the epidemiological assessment of the situation, the clinical diagnosis and the determination of the infected areas limits.

1.2 Information: of the Federal and State services, the neighbouring countries, the regional and international organisation.

1.3 Implementation of emergency and co-ordination bodies such as Federal and States Inter-ministerial commissions and co-ordinators; emergency task force and action teams.

1.5 Laboratory diagnosis: every reported case should be confirmed by the laboratory. Confirmation of the national laboratory should be confirmed by the regional and international reference laboratories, at least for the first cases. A continued collaboration should be initiated and will permit the identification/characterisation of the caused virus strain or strains (Ondersteport in RSA and Purbright in UK).

1.7 Stamping - out and destruction of carcasses: This operations will concern all infected and in-contact pigs in the infected areas, all the pigs trying to escape these areas, all remaining pigs surviving the outbreak. This slaughter action should be linked with compensation. The slaughter operations must be completed by the deep burying of carcasses and litter, covered by limestone. The quarantine of the infected area should be enforced.

1.8 Cleaning and disinfection: The cleaning and disinfection operations will concern the premises and their equipment, the fomites, the vehicles and all possibly infected tools. A good cleaning should be done, before disinfection, to remove all the organic matters from walls and grounds.

2. A Surveillance phase: That is a period of vigilance of all the concerned parties involved in the programme. The surveillance phase will cover normally a period of 5 to 6 months. During this second phase, the following activities should be carried out:

2.1 Period of sanitary rest of the premises and previously infected sites: This period could cover at least 3 months after the last reported case in the foci. During this period the following can be carried out:

2.2 Sentinelisation: After the period of sanitary rest and before restocking, sentinel pigs should be freed in the premises and villages, they will run in all the possibly infected places and if they survive after a period of 6 weeks the site can be declared safe and be restocked.

2.3 Serosurveillance: In this phase the serosurveillance will concern the sentinel pigs and the declared non infected pig farms and villages.

2.4 Training of pig owners on husbandry methods in infected areas: training of pig owners and technology on the recognition of ASF by the clinical signs and lesions it provocates. Training all veterinary staff and action teams on prevention and stamping out activities.

3. A Restocking phase: This third phase has been partly prepared during the second phase. During this phase:

The whole control programme will take at least one year if every measure is carried out without problem. This strategy can be applied in the infected states of the country taking into consideration that at least two states have overstepped the emergency phase.

As we are facing, in Nigeria, different epidemilogical status, depending of the states, the strategy could be entirely or partly implemented.:

1. A number of common measures can be taken in the whole country; that is to say:

2. In Lagos State and Ogun State the first outbreaks happened more than one year ago, so there is no more an emergency phase and the recommended measures to add to the common measures listed before, are:

3. In the recently infected states the three phases of the strategy should be carried out.

Annex V: ASF VIDEO-FILM

It has been planned in the TCP agreement signed between the FAO and the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, that a video-film will be prepared, by contracts with film/video production companies, for documentation and training modules in ASF control/eradication campaign.

Such a video-film can record the different phases of the epizootic in Nigeria and the adopted control operations and field action in order to eradicate the disease. If prepared early enough the video-film could be used in the training sessions at communities, local government and state levels. It also can be used as a training material for veterinary staff, on what can be done for the control of transboundary animal diseases. Some parts of this film could be also used to enrich a complete video film the FAO is preparing with the help of Onderstepoort Institute in South Africa. For these reasons it is very important that a complete synopsis be written so the retained video-film company can follow the needs of the MANR technical services of the. For that purpose, I drafted a project synopsis in points which are:

These 11 points of the proposal are detailed in the following document titled "A synopsis for an ASF video-film"

I noticed that some of the concerned states are preparing such an information document. It would be good if they try to follow the same synopsis so they can enrich by some views and scenes the national video-film. We can also obtain from these video films a selected set of pictures which can be transformed in slides and used in the training sessions.

Annex VI: A programme for sentinellisation

In order to ascertain that the ASF epizootic in Nigeria is under control, a programme for sentinellisation should be implemented in previously infected sites (villages and pig farms). To ensure that these sites and premises are not still infected by the ASF virus, before restocking, this programme should cover all the infected villages, pig-farms and other sites contaminated by the disease as well as sites highly suspicious, even if no confirmation of the presence of the virus had been made.

Sentinellisation consists on introducing ASF susceptible pigs in these sites and in monitoring them during a 6 weeks period. During that period, the pigs are left to wander freely on the site so they could be in contact with potentially infective materials. The number of "sentinel pigs" (SP) introduced depends on the surface to cover; it should be at least of 2 in villages at 1 or 2 in each premise in pig-farms.

SP are ASF susceptible pigs acquired in non infected areas, in well known healthy pig farms; that suppose from then on, the identification of these pig-farms which will be selected, listed and protected, to serve finally as a source of SP and after that for repopulation stocks. The SP are submitted, before their introduction in the previously infected sites, to a serological test (they should prove negative to ELISA test) and to identification by ear tags. A follow up form should be left in the hands of the community chief or the pig- farmer. This form should be filled, by the veterinary staff in charge of the sentinellisation operation at every visit, and every epidemiological information covering the situation of the SP should be reported on it. If, at the end of the 6 weeks period, none of the sentinel pigs have died, and none are serologically positive to ASF, it is considered safe to restock with ASF-free pigs.

After depopulation, by compulsory slaughter, the premises should have been thoroughly cleaned and disinfected. Sentinel pigs can be introduced within 3 months of disinfection if this was carried out immediately after depopulation, or within one month if disinfection was performed weeks or months later. Theoretically, SP should be introduced at 10% of the capacity of the piggery; however in circumstances where both availability and costs are problematic, at least 2 pigs should be introduced to circulate in all parts of the sites for 6 weeks.

After depopulation, by compulsory slaughter, the disinfection cannot be practically carried out in the village situation, unless the pigs were kept confined. In which case, the enclosure should be thoroughly disinfected. As far as possible any organic material of porcine origin should be collected and buried before introduction of SP. Two or more SP, depending upon the size of the area, should be introduced in each village/focus to range freely for 6 weeks. A public crier should inform the population of the sentinellisation operation and invite everyone to take care of the sentinel pigs. It should be better if some recommendations are written on the back of the follow up form to that purpose.

A very close follow up should be implemented by veterinary field staff. Normally villages will take care of these SP as they knew that it is in their interest that these sentinel pigs will stay alive. A fortnightly follow-up is recommended.

After the 6 weeks period all the SP should be slaughtered and samples should be taken for laboratory tests. A post mortem examination will permit to notice the presence or absence of ASF specific lesions. The spleen, the lung; lymph nodes, kidneys and a sample of blood should be taken from each slaughtered pig and sent to the laboratory. Sera should be treated by indirect ELISA technique and organs by Direct Immunofluorescence.

Sentinellisation is not an easy operation; it needs organisation and pig-owners co-operation. In case of clandestine restocking the compulsory slaughter, should be applied firmly. The following protocol summarises the different steps of sentinellisation:

4. Monitor pigs for 6 weeks (pigs that die should be subjected to full post- mortem examination by veterinarian and samples submitted to the laboratory

5. Slaughter pigs after six weeks and take blood and tissues for laboratory testing

Sentinel pig = Pre-adult or adult healthy pig + never been in contact with ASF virus + fully susceptible to ASF.

"Sentinel" = The first to die if the environment is still infected. Its death will launch alarm.

Sentinellisation = Action of introducing SP in previously infected sites and of following up their status according to a pre-established timely delimitated programme

1. Prospection + SP acquisition could be done during the period of sanitary rest:

1. Negative tests: Restock safely with healthy ASF-free Pigs + sero-surveillance

2. Positive tests: Cleaning + disinfection + 1 month rest + repeat sentinellisation.

Annex VII: Itinerary

October
Thursday, 8	Arrival in Rome
Friday, 9	Briefing with Dr K. Wojciechowski (AGAH) Briefing with Mrs H. Niggemann (TCOR) Co-ordination meeting with Professor Tim Obi, FAO International consultant
Sunday, 11	Departure to Lagos. Night in Lagos (IITA)
Monday, 12	Departure to Abuja; contact with Dr H. Ashami FAOR
Tuesday, 13	Meeting with Dr D. West National Consultant (NC) and Dr Abegunde Deputy Director of FDL&PCS Meeting with FAOR; discussion of my mission programme
Wednesday, 14	Working session with the NC for preparation of training and information material Meeting with Dr J. Ladan Director, of FDL and PCS, and staff about the TCP content
Thursday, 15	Departure to Lagos Meeting at Lagos with Dr S. Oluokun National Coordinator (NCr) Field visit to pig-farms and cooperatives in Agege area in Lagos
Friday, 16	Working session with the NC and NCr Meeting with Mrs Agbolajobi Permanent Secretary (PS) of the State Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (MANR) Meeting with Dr O. Olawale and staff in the Direction of Veterinary services (DVS) of Lagos State Visit to the Ojokoro Ifelodun ooperative at Ikeja (Agege, Lagos) Visit to Badagry and the border check point with Benin Republic
Saturday, 17	Visit to NDEGFS, pig-breeders cooperative at Sy Oke Oro village Visit of the Yougstar cooperative pig-farm (previously 1 000 pigs) Visit of Labak pig-farm (previously 600 pigs)
Sunday ,18	Departure to Ibadan (IITA, Oyo State)
Monday, 19	Departure to Abeokuta (Ogun State) Information meeting with Dr Osunfisan, Ogun State DVS and veterinary staff
Tuesday, 20	Meeting with Mrs Olabisi Aboaba, Commissioner of MANR and Mr Kol Olaniran PS of Ogun State Field visit to Ilara, Idogo village and meeting with community chief Istre Salako, Tube pig-market and meeting with community chief A. Akebude, Idoko check-point in the Local Government (LG) bordering Benin Republic
Wednesday, 21	Participation to the DVSs meeting held in Abeokuta
Thursday , 22	Participation to the DVSs meeting in Abeokuta Meeting with NC and NCr and Pr Obi on the organisation of the training of trainers workshop
Friday, 23	Visit to Oyo State Information meeting with State DVS, Mr EA. Ayoola president of pig-farmers association and, veterinary staff Visit to the LG pig-abattoir at Bodija, chief Moa Bemigbose pig-farm, Oyaomiye pig-farm at Ejioku, Runstad farm at Adjela, Ayoola farm At Olomi, Mr O. Adepoju farm at Alomi
Saturday, 24	Field visit to, to Fayinka Food Farm (oyo LG), Osin Farm and Ayediran farm at (Agboye LG), Ore-Bode village and Araromi place (free-ranging pigs), Rem farm and Gbabel farm in Oyo LG
Sunday, 25	Rest and reporting work
Monday, 26	Field visit to the border area: Iseyin town and veterinary clinic, Odoto place in Pago village, Budo Abiri village, Kajola LG, Adewely farm and Bola farm Meeting with Mr Aro Amao, chairman of the Iwajowa LG Visit to Itasa village (free-ranging pigs)
Tuesday, 27	Meeting with Mrs Fajola, PS of the Oyo State MANR
Wednesday, 28	Departure from Ibadan to Oshogbo in Osun State Information meeting with Dr I.R. Yussuf Deputy DVS, and veterinary staff Meeting with Osun State MANR Permanent Secretary
Thursday, 29	Field visit to Iwo LG, Ayeedire LG and Ola-Ouwa LG: Shoyele Farm, Amusayo Farm, Agumola Farm Meeting with Mrs Olatunji, Chairman of the Ayeedire LG Visit of Akinwumi farms, Ogoluwa farms and Victor farms
Friday, 30	Field visit to Ilesha LG Information meeting with pi-farmers and veterinary staff of Ilesha LG Visit of Leventus Foundation pig-farm
Saturday, 31	Departure from Oshogbo (Osun State) to Akure (Ondo State) Information meeting with DVS and State veterinary staff Field visit around Akure Zone : Chief Magi Farm, Oba village (running pigs),Midland food farm and Asala Farm
November
Sunday, 1st	Rest and reporting work
Monday, 2	Field visit to Owo LG, North East of Akure : Samtose Farm (Uso village),otog Farm and Osude farm Field visit to Oke-Ibo LG and Ile-Oludji LG in Ondo Zone, South West of Akure: Ademosun Farm and Opeke Farm Field visit to Odijgo LG : Village Pioneer Project piggery, at Ajue and MANR Piggery at Ondo Town
Thursday, 3	Meeting with the PS of the State MANR Visit to Oke Igbo town at the limit with Osun State, facing the reported ASF Focus of Ifetedo in Osun state Departure to Abeokuta Meeting at Abeokuta with the NC and the NCr for the preparation of the training Of trainers workshop
Wednesday, 4	Animation of the training of trainers workshop and lecturing
Thursday, 5	Animation of the training of trainers workshop and lecturing Departure to Lagos late in the afternoon
Friday, 6	Departure from Lagos to Abuja early in the morning Debriefing meeting with FAOR and Pr T. Obi End of the mission meeting in the FDL&PCS with Drs.Abegunde and Nwakanube
Saturday, 7	Reporting work and travel from Abuja to Lagos
Sunday, 8	Meeting with Dr Oluokun, NCr Travel from Lagos to Rome via Milano
Monday, 9	Arrival to Rome early the morning Meeting with Dr K. Wojciechowski
Tuesday, 10	Debriefing meeting with FAOHQ staff
Wednesday, 11	Back home travel

Table of Contents

Abbreviations Used in the Report

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

PIG PRODUCTION

EPIDEMIOLOGY

SOCIO-ECONOMICAL EFFECTS

CONTROL/ERADICATION MEASURES

ASF ERADICATION STRATEGY FOR NIGERIA

REPOPULATION

FUNDING

FAO ASSISTANCE

RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSION

Annex 1: Letter to the Director FMANR

Annex II:

Annex III: Investigation Form

Annex IV: STRATEGY FOR THE CONTROL/ERADICATION OF AFRICAN SWINE FEVER IN NIGERIA

Annex V: ASF VIDEO-FILM

Annex VI: A programme for sentinellisation

Annex VII: Itinerary