1. There are over thirty Regional Fishery Bodies (RFBs)¹ operating worldwide. Nine of them were established under the FAO Constitution (FAO bodies) and 24 were established under international agreements between three or more contracting parties (non-FAO bodies).

2. There are several differences between FAO and non-FAO bodies:

• All FAO bodies, except the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), were established before 1982 (when the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea was adopted) and although their mandates have been reviewed, many of them have in practice purely advisory functions in support of fisheries development and management². This is particularly the case of FAO inland RFBs³. However, non-FAO inland RFBs such as the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization, whose work is limited to well defined shared water bodies, have management functions.
• The secretariats of all FAO bodies are either provided, or assisted, by the FAO Secretariat, which also provides technical backstopping and finances most of the technical activities (working groups, etc.). The secretariats of non-FAO bodies are maintained by the members.
• FAO bodies also serve as mechanisms to train and mobilize local expertise and to progressively develop applied and management research competence with a view to encouraging self-reliance of national fisheries departments.
• Non-coastal States membership tends to be more restricted in non-FAO bodies.
• FAO bodies operate mainly in tropical and sub-tropical areas and the majority of their members are developing countries.
• The work of FAO RFBs is coordinated at the global level through the Committee on Fisheries (COFI), which provides the central framework for collaboration that is indispensable for global fishery governance. No mechanism exists to coordinate the work of non-FAO bodies.

3. Recent international instruments concerning fisheries conservation and management⁴ require that these bodies be strengthened to cope with new and additional management responsibilities. During the last 3 decades, a great amount of experience has been gained in the functioning of RFBs and despite their shortcomings, there have been perceptibly significant improvements in performance of several bodies during the last decade. It is anticipated that in the next decade, the greatest challenge to RFBs will be better implementation and enforcement of decisions.

4. In this regard, the 1998 High-Level Panel of External Experts in Fisheries⁵ endorsed the recommendation of the Twenty-second Session of COFI and the Twenty-ninth Session of the FAO Conference that FAO bodies should be reviewed and evaluated by their members to determine what measures might be taken to facilitate the strengthening of each body. The Panel of External Experts further recommended that FAO should:

• work to encourage and promote more coherent management approaches among RFBs, where possible, and approach with caution the creation of new bodies. In this respect, it suggested that FAO could encourage the convening of ad hoc consultations and working parties to address certain emerging issues as a mid-way alternative to the creation of new and/or subsidiary bodies;
• continue their systematic analysis of FAO RFBs concerning institutional and financial arrangements; strategies used to implement decisions and recommendations; and measures taken to address current international issues raised by both FAO and non-FAO bodies;
• convene a special meeting of managers and secretaries of FAO and non-FAO bodies, to identify and address common problems and constraints, and develop strategies and mechanisms to address constraints, share experiences and lessons learned, and improve the effectiveness of the bodies⁶.

5. FAO has taken steps to address the first two of the above recommendations. The present paper provides background information to permit a preliminary consideration of the third recommendation by participants at the Meeting of FAO and non-FAO RFBs.

6. A series of issues constrain the efficient operation of RFBs. The main issues can be grouped into four categories and relate to: (A) expectations of the international community with regard to the role of international RFBs in the conservation and management of world fisheries, (B) mandate and functions, (C) structure, and (D) budgetary levels and financing of the bodies.

7. The outcome of recent global conferences⁷ and the deliberations of COFI have impacted on fishery governance requirements, and on the perception of the international community regarding world fisheries resources and their sustainable management and utilization. These conferences have also contributed to the elaboration and adoption of three recent international instruments: the Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (the Compliance Agreement), adopted in 1993 by the FAO Conference, the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (the UN Fish Stocks Agreement), adopted in 1995, and the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. Each of these instruments, and in particular the latter two, re-emphasize the crucial role that RFBs and civil society organizations are expected to play in good global fishery governance⁸.

8. The Compliance Agreement seeks to encourage countries to take effective action, consistent with international law, and to deter the reflagging of vessels by their nationals as a means of avoiding compliance with applicable conservation and management rules for fishing activities on the high seas. With respect to the role of RFBs, the preamble to the Compliance Agreement calls upon States which do not participate in global, regional or sub-regional fishery organizations or arrangements to do so, with a view to achieving compliance with international conservation and management measures. Article V(3) further provides that the parties shall, when and as appropriate, enter into cooperative agreements or arrangements of mutual assistance, on a global, regional, sub-regional or bilateral basis, in order to promote the objectives of the Agreement. Article VI provides for exchange of information to RFBs in paragraphs (4), (10) and (11). Finally, Article VII requires the parties to cooperate on a global, regional, sub-regional or bilateral level, to provide assistance to developing State parties, in order to assist them to fulfill obligations under the Agreement.

9. The UN Fish Stocks Agreement complements and strengthens a number of provisions of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Agreement seeks to ensure a harmonious development of coherent conservation and management measures for EEZs and the high seas, and thereby alleviate some of the existing tensions and conflicts. However, the effective implementation of this instrument would depend on political will and a high degree of cooperation between coastal States and high seas fishing nations and fishing entities on a range of technical issues. The Agreement provides that where a competent RFB exists, States should either become members of the body, or they should agree to apply the conservation and management measures established by such organizations. This provision is stringently reinforced by Article 8(4), which provides that only those States which are members of such a RFB, or which agree to apply the relevant RFBs conservation and management measures, shall have access to the fishery resources to which these measures apply. Article 9 and 10 provide for the establishment and functions of RFBs. Article 11 examines the nature and extent of participatory rights for new members, and Article 12 requires transparency in the activities of RFBs. Articles 18-23 address the subjects of monitoring, control and surveillance by flag States providing for international, regional and sub-regional cooperation in enforcement. Finally, Article 13 promotes the strengthening of existing organizations and arrangements.

10. The Code is a voluntary, broad and comprehensive instrument that sets out principles and standards for the conservation and management of all fisheries and aquaculture including processing and trade in fish and fishery products, research and the integration of fisheries and aquaculture into coastal area management. The Code makes numerous references to the role of RFBs in establishing a responsible international fisheries regime. Article 1.2 notes that the Code is global in scope, and directed towards fishing entities that include RFBs. From Article 4.1, such entities are charged with collaborating in the implementation of the Code. Under Article 6.5, RFBs should apply a precautionary approach to the conservation, management and exploitation of living aquatic resources. Article 7 on fisheries management makes numerous references to the role of RFBs in attaining management objectives, providing a management framework and procedures; data gathering and management advice; application of the precautionary approach; describing management measures; and implementation of the Code itself.

11. An important characteristic in the elaboration of these instruments is the active involvement of civil society organizations in the process. Understandably, national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in fisheries approach the issues from different perspectives, i.e. those of fish-workers, industry, development, management and environmental protection. Indeed, Article 12 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement provides for observer or other rights to representatives of non-governmental organizations. Several RFBs are willing to strengthen cooperation with both civil society organizations and the private sector, but the modalities for such cooperation have not been elaborated in several cases.

12. A number of issues characterize the current world fisheries situation. These include:

• overfishing, over-capacity and overcapitalization of the sector,
• high rate of discarding in some fisheries/areas,
• emergence of environmental values in fishery resource use,
• globalization in almost all aspects of fisheries (in particular trade),
• changes in consumption patterns and perceptions,
• transparency, accountability, partnership and good governance.

These emerging issues and the expectations of the international community are reflected in the three recent international instruments and in global debates on fisheries.

13. The international community further expects RFBs to play a central role in ensuring that the provisions of these instruments are implemented. In this context, and as is evident in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11, the international instruments encourage States to establish RFBs where appropriate, and to strengthen existing bodies in order to improve their effectiveness in establishing and implementing conservation and management measures. The instruments and, in particular, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, gives an important role to RFBs in the compliance and enforcement system of the Agreement. It directs them to be responsible for adopting more detailed conservation and management measures which must take into account certain fundamental factors. It also encourages them to promote an integrated, ecosystem-wide conservation and management scheme and to apply the precautionary approach in all aspects of its work. Furthermore, it gives a central role to RFBs in the sharing of data and information collected by States.

14. The mandates of RFBs may be to: (i) provide advice (i.e., advisory functions), and/or (ii) take decisions concerning the conservation, sustainable management and use of one or more species, as well as the affiliated aspects of fisheries in a defined region or sub-region⁹ (i.e., regulatory functions).

15. The need for sound scientific advice and for its effective communication to the policy makers of the members of RFBs is, of course, common to all bodies. The advisory function of a RFB is implemented through a series of inter-sessional activities during which scientific information and data concerning the resource and other aspects of the fishery are collected, analysed and discussed, and the main conclusions and recommendations are distilled by experts for action by their respective competent authorities. The three most common methods used by RFBs to collect scientific information are:

• through an external scientific body such as the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), which undertakes this task for the International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission (IBSFC), the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization (NASCO), and the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC);
• through an internal scientific body, established under the RFB's constituting agreement, usually consisting of experts from members of the body, as in the case of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) and the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT); or
• through ad hoc working groups or technical consultations, as with most FAO bodies.

16. Advice should ideally be formulated so that all the implications (scientific, technological, legal, economic, etc.) are clearly identified and analysed. In order to do this, RFBs, inter alia, rely on the results of scientific research undertaken by their members and/or by the mechanisms through which data are compiled and analysed, and formulate conservation and management measures (such as the total allowable catch and allocation of quotas). Personal relations and experiences, as well as full and free discussion between scientists and decision-makers, usually go a long way to enhancing the credibility of advice.

17. Scientific research: As fishing pressure on stocks increases so, also, does the complexity of regulatory measures (e.g. towards ecosystem management) and the stresses on the scientific advisory system on which those measures are based. In almost all cases, research is undertaken by members, and the bodies limit themselves to promoting, coordinating or planning national research inputs to the regional mechanism. In some situations, RFBs undertake investigations themselves with their own staff

18. Compilation and analysis of data: Efficient fishery management requires access to a wide range of information, including those of a socio-economic nature. Members of a RFB have an obligation to provide accurate and complete information on a timely basis; but it is the responsibility of the body to check on its accuracy and to compile and publish it with minimal delay. Many RFBs continue to be impaired by the lack of adequate data and this situation is being increasingly recognized. Despite better appreciation of the value of good statistics, the actual improvement in statistics barely keeps pace with the increased demands in relation to more complex management approaches. Most RFBs have accumulated a wealth of knowledge of the stocks in the regions covered by their agreements through working groups set up for such purposes, but updating remains a problem in the developing world. Failure in the supply of data by members, under-reporting or gaps in landings data, inadequacy of effort and capacity data, inadequacy of current models, lack of socio-economic data are among the reasons why scientific advice may fall short of what is needed in a particular situation.

19. Formulation of conservation and management measures: One of the main tasks undertaken by RFBs is the formulation of conservation and management measures. Two series of problems are related to this task. The first one relates to the scope and nature of conservation measures and to the multiplicity of factors of a political, scientific, legal and economic nature involved in their formulation. Some of the complexities will be discussed below. The second relate to the decision-making process and will be discussed in paragraphs 26-34.

20. Determination of total allowable catch (TAC) and allocation of quotas is a major aspect of management in many RFBs. The extent to which RFBs are involved in the determination of total allowable catch (TAC), taking into account not only biological but also social and economic factors, varies and depends on the wishes of the members of the bodies. Access controls of any form, such as licence limits, territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs) or individual transferable quotas (ITQs), create certain forms of property rights and their introduction often causes a re-distribution of wealth. As a consequence, these are essentially political decisions which many RFBs have difficulty in addressing and which, often, do not even fall within their mandate.

21. Precautionary approach: Sustainable productive fisheries require management approaches which ensure a high probability of stocks being able to replenish themselves under any condition. Because of the inherent uncertainty in the aquatic environment and in human behaviour, this can only be achieved by taking a precautionary approach¹⁰.

22. The precautionary approach gained prominence as a result of the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, formulated at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration states that "in order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation".

23. The precautionary approach is considered important in fisheries to the extent that it is included in the Code of Conduct and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. The precautionary approach has a number of implications in the activities of RFBs. Some of them are the following:

• better data is needed,
• uncertainty should be systematically investigated,
• outputs should be identified corresponding to objectives,
• target and limit reference points should be established,
• methods used for assessment need to be revised,
• robustness of management regime to (a) overfishing and (b) environmental change should be assessed,
• contingency plans should be developed, etc.

24. The precautionary approach would be relevant to RFBs in several aspects of their work. Most of the current RFBs were established before the formulation of the precautionary approach, but several of them have started to discuss the implementation of the principle. These bodies include ICES, NASCO, IBSFC, the North Atlantic Fishery Organization (NAFO)¹¹, and the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). The GFCM Agreement was amended in 1997 to apply this approach to its conservation and management decisions.

25. Proper or efficient fishery management requires that RFBs find effective means to restrict fishing mortality within safe biological limits. However, the necessary information to calculate the required reference points in a precautionary way is not often available. In addition, there is a tendency in RFBs to reach decision by consensus and/or to exploit fisheries at the higher risk end of the range recommended by scientists. Furthermore, RFBs are required to acknowledge and assess uncertainty in the understanding of the state of the stocks and forecast the effect on future outcomes of management actions. Briefly, less knowledge, more cautious the approach.

26. The regulatory functions of RFBs relate to the decision-making process and the implementation of such decisions, as well as the settlement of disputes.

27. Decision-making: Fisheries management decision-making is not simply a technical process but involves the taking of decisions that are essentially political with a bearing on national sovereignty, such as the allocation of resources and fishing effort, or the enforcement of regulations. Others have international implications such as monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) of transboundary stocks or those stocks which are adjacent to national jurisdictions. There has also been an increase in the number of parameters to be included in fishery management decisions, with an increased emphasis on socio-economic aspects of fisheries, complicating the decision-making process. The relative importance of issues that members are willing to address, and the impact on them, may differ significantly because of differences in situations (including economic situations) and circumstances. The tendency of many RFBs to take decisions by consensus lead to decisions on minimum-common denominator and the "too little, too late" syndrome stressed by many analysts in the last two decades. All these constitute impediments to the regulatory function of RFBs and to effective fishery management. An important ingredient for appropriate decision-making is to involve policy-makers in the process and not merely the technicians in fisheries departments.

28. Implementation of decisions: Some RFBs are empowered to make binding decisions, while others can only produce recommendations. In between these two extremes, it is sometimes provided that recommendations will become binding after a given time if members do not object to them. However, even when members have taken action to implement decisions and recommendations, enforcement remains a serious problem for many RFBs (particularly in the high seas) and it is increasingly apparent that adopting recommendations is only a partial solution to the problem of effective management of fisheries. Some RFBs operate independent MCS systems. Such schemes are likely to be effective and build the confidence of those involved in fishing if they are perceived as fair and equitably enforced.

29. Settlement of disputes: The agreements of non-FAO RFBs and the bodies established under Article XIV of the FAO Constitution usually contain provisions for the settlement of disputes. Common property resources have often been the source of tensions and conflicts, within States, between neighboring States and also between coastal and distant-water fishing nations. In the last decades, a number of international instruments were adopted which have as one of their objectives the avoidance and resolution of conflicts in the sector.

30. Although these instruments exist, it is common knowledge that conservation and management measures of RFBs have been undermined by fishing vessels of members and non-members of the body which do not comply, for example, with the established fishing quotas and other measures.

31. The settlement of disputes is therefore one of the important tasks of RFBs. The agreements establishing RFBs usually provide for their own institutional arrangements and procedures that reduce conflicts and facilitate the resolution of disputes at local level when they arise, using dispute resolution procedures (such as arbitration, mediation, judicial settlement, etc). These procedures tend to engage the disputants actively in seeking a result acceptable to all the parties.

32. The requirements that contribute to a successful conflict resolution process, include:

• freedom of the disputants to participate in or withdraw from the process,
• opportunity for mutual gain,
• active participation of the interested parties,
• identification of the interest of the disputants,
• neutral development of possible solutions and options,
• capability of the parties to enter into and carry out agreement.

These requirements are difficult to meet simultaneously in disputes related to fisheries. Several of them could be met over time if there is the political will on the part of the disputants and if they are convinced of the impartiality of the negotiator and the confidentiality of the process. The presence of effective MCS systems do help to limit some of the disputes, but the situation is complicated when the other disputant is not a member of the RFB concerned.

C. Issues related to the structure of the bodies

33. The term "structure" is used here to describe the various components of a RFB in the context of the definition provided in footnote 1. This would include, but is not limited to, the geographical area of competence and species covered, membership, and subsidiary bodies.

34. Geographical area of competence and species covered: In most large water bodies there is at least one regional RFB. For those large water bodies where there are no RFBs, discussions are on-going for the establishment of such RFBs, for example the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, the South-East Atlantic Ocean, and the Caspian Sea. FAO is providing technical inputs to the current initiatives in the Western and Central Pacific and the South-East Atlantic. With respect to the Caspian Sea, negotiations among littoral countries have been in train since 1993 after two countries began initial negotiations at FAO Headquarters. The International Whaling Commission (IWC) is the only body which, under the terms of the convention establishing it, is concerned with the conservation and management of a resource in all oceans where the resource occurs. In all other cases, the geographical area under the purview of individual RFBs is limited.

35. Some bodies deal mainly with a single group of species. This is the case with marine mamals handled by IWC and the tuna bodies. Most bodies deal with all or most of the commercial species in the area covered by the agreement establishing the body. A primary policy direction of contemporary importance that has been adopted recently in terms of area covered and species of interest to RFBs, is ecosystem management. As illustrated by the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, among other things, there is the requirement that States share data concerning the capture of non-target species and that States assess the impact of fishing on non-target and associated or dependent species and their environment. The ecosystem approach is often considered as an element of the precautionary approach (paragraphs 22-25). It will be necessary to assess to what extent the adoption of the ecosystem approach to fisheries management could affect the membership composition and functions of existing bodies. Already, one could suggest that the adoption of the precautionary approach and the ecosystem management approach strengthen the call for greater collaboration among RFBs with regard to information flows and exchanges.

36. Membership: The conditions for membership vary among RFBs and this could also affect the performance of the bodies. Several agreements or conventions provide that under certain conditions membership of the RFB is open to States other than the coastal States in the geographical area of competence or to States other than the original members. In other instances, the membership is restrictive. For several FAO bodies, membership is open to all Members and Associate Members of the Organization with interests in the fisheries of the region concerned.

37. Almost all conventions or agreements establishing RFBs provide for the participation of observers. While some bodies have accepted the participation of civil society organizations, the participation of such organizations as observers to the sessions of some bodies remains an unresolved issue. Recently, the European Community (EC) has opted to become member of some bodies, with mixed competence with its member countries on certain issues, in keeping with the Common Fishery Policy of EC. It is possible that in the future, other economic integration organizations would apply to become members of some RFBs. It might be necessary to hypothesize what changes, if any, such developments could have on the performance of the bodies concerned.

38. It happens sometimes that when a body is established not all potential members join immediately. In some cases some potential members wish in a first phase to familiarize themselves with the workings and, in some cases, with the conservation and management problems involved, and would attend a few meetings in an observer capacity before deciding to apply for full membership. Most conventions or agreements establishing RFBs also contain provisions to enable members to withdraw.

39. Participation: Under existing rules of international law, membership in any RFB, with the related acceptance of all rights and duties, is entirely voluntary. In other words, outsiders cannot be compelled to become members or to abide by the rules and regulatory measures as defined by a RFB. The status of fisheries of member countries varies from one extreme to another, resulting also in widely different attitudes to problems. The conditions for membership, the composition of its members, etc., could impact on the degree of participation and collaboration of the members, their ability to contribute resources to the activities of the body, etc., and hence the performance of the body concerned.

40. The work of a RFB may also be jeopardized by the lack of participation of non-coastal fishing countries (usually distant water fishing nations). Consequently, special efforts are usually made to secure their cooperation and participation. Non-member countries may be invited to participate in an observer capacity. In practice, when these countries avail themselves of the opportunity, this goes some way towards ensuring the cooperation of all countries concerned.

41. Subsidiary bodies: A number of RFBs have or may establish subsidiary bodies that could be thematic (research, development, management, etc.) or sub-regional as in the case of some FAO RFBs. The performance of the subsidiary body and by inference that of the parent body could be affected by the composition of the membership, the degree to which all participants must or should reflect a national stance, the clarity of the terms of reference of the organ, the powers entrusted to their chairperson, the working language(s) of the organ and the degree to which all or the majority of members can express their views fluently in the working language(s), and the manner through which recommendations are reached (consensus, by vote, etc). As most of the important scientific work of many bodies is undertaken by subsidiary bodies or ad hoc working groups, care should be exercised in the setting up of these bodies.

42. Lack of technical and financial resources has prevented many RFBs from implementing recommendations and follow-up to recommendations. In some cases it has negatively affected the performance of bodies as planned activities could not be undertaken.

43. The financial implications of membership in RFBs are two-fold:

• there are the expenses relating to the attendance of representatives, experts and advisers of members at meetings of the body concerned and its subsidiary organs;
• joint expenses required to cover the operation costs and also in a few cases the cost of independent research, MCS, enforcement of management decisions by the body itself.

The first type of expenses are usually borne by the members individually. Joint expenses are assessed among members in different ways. Here there are significant differences between FAO and non-FAO bodies. For FAO bodies, except IOTC, the expenses for activities are almost entirely provided by FAO Regular Programme budget. Some activities are also undertaken with extra-budgetary resources, or cooperative projects in which a number of countries coordinate their resources. Extra-budgetary support to FAO bodies has largely been terminated during the 1980s, affecting the performance of these bodies.

44. The second type of funding is common to non-FAO bodies. Various methods have been used to apportion joint expenses. The simplest method is equal sharing. It is easy to implement when the level of development of members is more or less the same. In other cases, the members contribute to the joint expenses or what is commonly called the autonomous budget in accordance with a scheme and scale of contribution adopted by the body. The parameters that usually enter into the equation include a basic fee that is unrelated to either national wealth or fish production, a charge that reflects the members national wealth, as well as a charge for fish production. In bodies with members of different economic strengths, the values given to the different parameters can be weighted to give certain advantages to the less developed members, and hence encourage their participation in the activities of the body. The absence of trade data on the value of certain species could limit the reliability of information used to calculate members contribution to the bodies budget, where this is a factor in the equation.

45. It should be pointed out that when a RFB has gone through its formative stage, as almost all FAO bodies have, it may need to become more dependent on the commitment and contributions of its members. In order to give its members effective control on the mechanism and responsibility for its progress, it may be essential for the body to have a responsible secretariat selected and financially largely supported by the members. This remains a major issue for most FAO bodies.

46. The Meeting is invited to review the issues raised, and further to:

• identify ways and means for RFBs to promote better implementation of international instruments and initiatives,
• discuss better ways to promote the precautionary approach,
• identify better mechanisms for the exchange and flow of information among RFBs and between RFBs and FAO on the state of resources, management schemes, success and failure,
• identify needs for close collaboration between RFBs on a geographic or species basis and the means/mechanisms to improve such collaboration,
• consider mechanisms for the coordination of the activities of RFBs.