FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department MEETING OF FAO AND NON-FAO REGIONAL FISHERY BODIES OR ARRANGEMENTS

December 1998

FI:RFB/99/4

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MEETING OF FAO AND NON-FAO REGIONAL FISHERY BODIES OR ARRANGEMENTS

Rome, Italy, 11-12 February 1999

REGIONAL FISHERY ORGANIZATIONS OR ARRANGEMENTS AS VEHICLES FOR GOOD FISHERY GOVERNANCE

SUMMARY

This paper considers the role of regional fishery organizations or arrangements as vehicles for good fisheries governance. The introduction highlights a number of issues concerning the poor state of regional fisheries governance and the need to modify conventional approaches to management and to make them more effective. Levels of governance are outlined noting that both global and national level governance have an impact upon governance at the regional level. Policy and legal references and the role of fishery organizations or arrangements are considered in the context of regional fisheries governance. Ways that might be pursued to strengthen regional governance are reviewed and the importance of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries as a means for promoting sound regional governance is underscored. The paper concludes by proposing that the meeting review the issues and challenges confronting States and fishery organizations or arrangements with respect to improving regional governance, and indicate avenues that might be pursued, and measures that might be adopted, to enhance and strengthen regional fisheries governance.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The need for regional cooperation among States for the conservation and management of fish stocks has been formally recognized at least since 1902, when cooperative scientific research commenced with the establishment of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea. However, since that first initial step, and particularly since the Second World War, both national and international efforts to deal with stock management have intensified, as fish production has increased dramatically due largely to advances in fish harvesting technology. Nonetheless, these management efforts have very often yielded poor results, and global reviews by FAO of the current state of fish stocks indicate that in most cases present systems of fisheries governance have failed to ensure resource conservation and economic efficiency.

2. A recent report on ocean governance succinctly summarizes some of the pertinent fisheries issues:¹"... Overfishing is notoriously resistant to traditional resource management approaches... Uncertainties abound, so that traditional ‘rational’ management approaches based on the underlying assumption of predictability become increasingly unworkable. Because traditional approaches also tend to ignore distributional fairness and to limit participation in the decision-making process, they have limited credibility and lack social support for their implementation among the increasingly broad range of stakeholders involved. ... Fishing is often treated as a right without attendant responsibilities. ... Rule compliance is generally low and pressures within fishery management lead to decisions that err on the side of risk rather than caution."²

3. Given this assessment of fisheries governance, and taking account of the state of many of the world’s fisheries, two questions might be asked concerning governance:

Are fisheries manageable? This question has been posed for decades and the implicit assumption is that fisheries are governable, despite the high degree of ‘lawlessness’ in the fishing industry that is probably unparalleled in any other economic activity. However, it is now being increasingly recognized that for fisheries governance to be effective present management systems must be changed so as to permit them to take a longer-term management perspective whereby they are more flexible and adaptable.³ It should be further recognized that all decisions concerning governance are implemented through national action, since States, individually or collectively, without prejudice of their sovereign rights, are responsible for taking the necessary steps to give effect to such decisions.

Who is responsible for the poor state of fisheries management? Until the very recent past, and in keeping with conventional wisdom relating to national sovereignty and accountability for the protection of national resources, States have assumed a highly centralized, non-participatory approach to fisheries management (i.e., the conventional model within which there was little consultation with stakeholders, including industry representatives). Despite a high level of non-transparent influence of fishery lobbies this approach has not generally been effective, and it might be argued therefore that States themselves must assume much of the responsibility for fisheries management failures.

4. Addressing and improving fisheries governance must be viewed against a recent more general trend in the shift in the role of government.⁴ In this period of adjustment when the role of government is changing and stakeholders are assuming greater participation in decision making (at least in the most democratic countries) the challenge for the State is how to promote and facilitate fisheries governance that is effective in terms of conservation and economic performance, equitable for both current and future generations, and broadly accepted to all stakeholders. The latter includes those who have a direct and real interest in the fisheries sector and those that do not but which, none-the-less, consider that they have a right to participate in decisions concerning what they consider a heritage of humankind. It is this situation, highly summarized, that challenges States, as national resource custodians, and stakeholders in arriving at arrangements designed to strengthen fisheries governance that will ensure the long-term sustainable exploitation of stocks.

5. In keeping with the general philosophy of involving stakeholders more fully in resource management and development, Agenda 21 of the UN Conference on Environment and Development notes that one of the fundamental prerequisites for the achievement of sustainable development is broad public participation in decision making.⁵ This includes new forms of participation in the process of moving towards a real social partnership in support of common efforts for such development. Moreover, Agenda 21 further notes that, with respect to the United Nations institutions at least, broader participation should be on a non-discriminatory basis.⁶ However, for most regional fishery bodies or arrangements, observer participation is not automatic, with no clear guidelines for participation. Normally, industry organizations are treated differently from international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), with no objection being raised concerning the participation of the former, in comparison to the latter. Although regional bodies or arrangements have been encouraged to facilitate broader stakeholder participation, steps in that direction have been modest, with many governments continuing to object to INGOs having observer status at their sessions.⁷

6. Central to the process of governance under a decentralized management approach is the notion that stakeholders with a real interest in a fishery should have the opportunity to participate transparently in the formulation and implementation of fisheries management decisions. Furthermore, this approach to governance implies, inter alia, that stakeholders will:

act responsibly as co-managers in a fishery, being accountable for their actions and or inaction with respect to management;
ensure that fisheries are exploited in a long-term sustainable manner and that decisions concerning exploitation are flexible and adaptable, capable of taking account of circumstances that can change rapidly;
take a holistic view of fisheries management (i.e., an eco-system approach including the people) and allocate fishing opportunities that will promote orderly, rational and efficient behaviour and outcomes;
apply the precautionary approach in decision making in situations where information is incomplete or lacking; and
ensure that the real costs associated with fishing and fisheries are allocated and that these costs are ultimately reflected in the price of fish.

II. LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE

7. While the focus of this paper is on the role of regional fisheries governance, it should be recognized that management systems and action taken both at the global and national levels impact upon regional governance decision-making and consequent outcomes.

8. Global fisheries governance centres around decision-making by international bodies such as the United Nations General Assembly, the Governing Bodies of FAO, including subsidiary bodies, and most importantly, for fishery policy matters, the Committee on Fisheries (COFI).⁸ These bodies have the task of adopting policy and legal instruments that provide the framework for fisheries governance at all levels.

9. On the other hand, national fisheries governance involves, consistent with international and national law, the adoption and implementation of management systems for resources falling under national jurisdiction. It is noteworthy that, at this level, the shifts in governance have been most significant over the last five years. It is also at this level that the change in rights and responsibilities brought about by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 Convention) has had the most impact on governance (e.g. principally, the introduction of extended jurisdiction). The changes already observed in some developed countries, and which are likely to be required in most distant-water fishing nations, relate primarily to institutional arrangements and the role and participation of stakeholders in decision-making processes.⁹

10. Regional fisheries governance focuses on international, cooperative management of shared resources, including those stocks occurring on the high seas. The foundation and framework for regional governance is specified in global instruments, some of which are considered in the next section. At the same time, it must be recognized that sound regional governance depends on effective input from members of regional bodies. This issue concerns two key points:

the political willingness of States to participate openly and cooperatively for the good governance of stocks subject to management; and

the national capacity to meet commitments and obligations technically and financially.

III. REGIONAL FISHERIES GOVERNANCE

Policy and legal references

11. The 1982 Convention refers to regional fishery organizations in the context of management of different types of stocks that cannot be managed by a single State (i.e., because they straddle or occur beyond the national jurisdiction). Under these circumstances concerned States are obligated internationally to take steps to implement cooperative conservation and management measures. Regional fishery bodies are the vehicles by which this obligation can be fulfilled.¹⁰

12. Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 reiterates the need for, and the role of, regional fishery bodies, in the process of achieving sustainable fisheries development. This serves to refocus international attention on the importance of regional bodies or arrangements, underscoring the unique role they should play in securing long-term sustainable use of living marine resources. Moreover, Chapter 17 addresses the need for effective bilateral and multilateral cooperation, within the framework of subregional and regional fisheries bodies, in the programme areas relating to the sustainable use and conservation of high seas and EEZ fisheries. The necessity for coordination and cooperation between regional bodies is also highlighted.

13. Programme area C of Chapter 17 called for a United Nations intergovernmental conference to consider the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks. This conference, which commenced shortly after the Rio Summit, extended from 1993 to 1995. The conference culminated in the adoption of an agreement, commonly known as the UN Fish Stocks Agreement¹¹, in which regional organizations or arrangements were accorded high priority in achieving sustainable practice for the management of the two type of fish stocks. Part III of the Agreement, relating to mechanisms for international cooperation concerning straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, specifies the scope and role of regional organizations or arrangements in facilitating management. This level of detail for these organizations and arrangements had not been previously elaborated in an international fisheries instrument, and as such it served to underscore, yet again, the critical role to be played by regional mechanisms in fishery governance.

14. At the same time that the UN Fish Stocks Agreement was being negotiated, FAO Members were engaged in the negotiation of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries.¹² A voluntary instrument designed to be implemented in a broad manner by all actors involved in the fisheries sector, the Code seeks to promote structural change in the sector in terms of how resources are exploited, managed and used. If effectively implemented by States, the Code should facilitate sustainable practice, as called for in Agenda 21, in lieu of the rapid, and often uncontrolled, exploitation and development that has been characteristic of the fisheries sector up to 1980s.

15. The Code of Conduct urges regional fishery bodies or arrangements to participate in the implementation of all aspects of the Code. However, in the articles relating to fisheries management and fishing operations, a particular call is made to States and regional bodies or arrangements to undertake a number of activities that will promote good governance. With respect to these two articles, the Code encourages States and regional organizations and arrangements, inter alia, to:

apply the precautionary approach to fisheries conservation and management and establish target reference points for management;

establish effective Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) systems and discourage vessels flying the flags of non-members or non-participants from engaging in activities that undermine the effectiveness of conservation and management measures;

publicize the nature and scope of conservation and management measures. These measures should be based on the best scientific evidence available;

promote compatible management measures for transboundary stocks and highly migratory stocks, throughout their range;

foster international cooperation in all matters related to fisheries, including the provision of data and other information; and

compile data and information (including data on by-catch and waste) and make them available, as appropriate;

In addition, echoing the sentiment expressed in Agenda 21, States that are not members of a regional organization or arrangement, but which have a real interest in a particular fishery falling under its competence, should cooperate by becoming members of the organization or arrangement, and actively participate in its work. States that opt not to become members should nevertheless cooperate in the conservation and management of the stocks in question by giving effect to management measures adopted by the organization or arrangement.

16. A similar call is made to States regarding participation in regional bodies or arrangements in the Preamble of the 1993 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (Compliance Agreement). The implementation of this agreement will rely on regional cooperation among States to a significant extent. The Agreement, therefore, assigns regional fishery bodies or arrangements, the task of facilitating such cooperation.

17. The Law of the Sea Convention and other recently concluded instruments indicate the policy and legal role that regional fishery organizations or arrangements should play in promoting sustainable fisheries development. Agenda 21, most notably, re-emphasized the importance of these organizations and arrangements, and gave the encouragement required to review their objectives and mandates to make them more effective vehicles for regional fisheries governance.

Regional organizations or arrangements

18. Regional fisheries governance is effected through the work of regional fishery bodies or arrangements. In considering whether there were realistic alternatives to these mechanisms, the 1998 High-level Panel of External Experts in Fisheries expressed the view that such bodies or arrangements were essential in reinforcing regional cooperation and that recent events concerning fisheries conservation and management required that these bodies be strengthened to cope with new and additional responsibilities under recent instruments, including the provisions of Agenda 21, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, and the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. The Panel also expressed the opinion that the last 30 years had been essential for the collection of information and the acquisition of experience concerning the functioning of regional bodies or arrangements, but that the next ten years would be important for the implementation and enforcement decisions made by bodies.¹³

19. Depending on their respective mandates and structures, regional bodies or arrangements fulfill their missions principally through the following activities:¹⁴

collection and provision of scientific information and data in support of management;

serving as technical and policy forums. For developing countries this is an important function as it enables countries to exchange experiences and for information concerning governance to be disseminated; and

by taking action pertaining to the conservation, management and responsible utilization of resources.

There are more than 30 regional bodies or arrangements dealing with ocean and coastal area fisheries, and while some have effective management mandates (including mandates to allocate resources and to effort control) many of the bodies have, in practice, purely advisory functions and little enforcement capacity.

20. While most regional fishery bodies or arrangements that have fisheries management mandates have failed to deter overfishing (and in some cases to prevent the collapse of stocks within their areas of competence), and to deflect serious international disputes, some bodies have, nonetheless, made important contributions to governance by:

promoting the development of national research and management capacity;

improving and strengthening data collection handling and dissemination;

addressing new issues such as fleet capacity, the effect of the payment of subsidies, and by-catch and discards; and

adopting management measures and resolutions relating to such issues as effort reduction, gear type, minimum sizes and mesh sizes, etc.

However, the effectiveness or slowness of regional governance has been undermined by:

a failure by some States to accept and implement international instruments central to enhanced fisheries governance such as the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and the Compliance Agreement;

a lack of willingness by member States to delegate sufficient decision-making powers and responsibility to the regional bodies;

members of organizations and arrangements not providing complete and accurate data and information concerning their fishing operations, as required, in a timely manner and, in some cases, not reporting catches at all;

outputs of some organizations or arrangements not being operational because of the absence of an appropriate link between the scientific and technical experts on the one hand, and the decision/policy-makers and those responsible for implementing decisions/policies, on the other hand;

poor flag State control both by members and non-members of organizations or arrangements;

the lack of enforcement of management measures both at the national and regional levels, including:

the absence or lack of MCS mechanisms to enforce management decisions;

problems arising from many of the regulated stocks being harvested in mixed fisheries where the overall fishing capacity is neither limited or controlled;

fishing activities of non-members in the waters covered by a regional organization or arrangement;

inadequate human and financial resources to enable organizations or arrangements to carry out their mandates satisfactorily;

the low frequency of meetings of organizations or arrangements.

IV. STRENGTHENING REGIONAL FISHERIES GOVERNANCE

21. Despite past difficulties that regional fishery organizations or arrangements have experienced in their efforts to secure more effective fisheries management, they have the potential to be vehicles for sound fisheries governance provided that they have realistic mandates, the required political backing, and the financial and human capacity to function as they are intended. However, to ensure efficiency, and to promote the type of regional governance that is called for in the international instruments, discussed above, a number of key considerations need to be addressed and fulfilled. In particular, individual and collective action by States is necessary to:

devolve the necessary powers transparently to these organizations or arrangements to enable them to undertake the functions for which they were established;

adopt a pro-active stance with respect to management and attempt to anticipate crises which may confront organizations or arrangements from to time;

promote the full and equitable participation by members in organizations or arrangements, including greater participation in determining and funding work programmes, and greater participation in all inter-sessional activities;

ensure that the organizations or arrangements have adequate financial and human resources to execute their mandates. Moreover, all members should be prepared to contribute financially to the work of organizations as this is considered as a pre-condition for institutional strengthening;¹⁵

periodically review the structures and mandates of organizations or arrangements so that they have the capacity to make effective management decisions and to enforce them.¹⁶ Depending on particular circumstances, this may involve a review of their respective legal and statutory requirements, procedural matters and institutional and capacity building measures;

create new regional organizations or arrangements as a means of closing gaps in management areas¹⁷. However, care should be exercised to avoid duplication;

act in good faith recognizing that the regional governance needs might not always be precisely congruent with national aspirations and goals. In this connection it should be further recognized that many of the problems that confront regional organizations or arrangements arise from the non-compliance activities of members rather than from non-members. When such non-compliance occurs there is often a reluctance on the part of the organization or arrangement to publicize the transgression for fear of creating embarrassment for the member concerned. However, the power of public disclosure should be recognized and used in support of improving regional governance;

faithfully abide by decisions made by organizations or arrangements and be prepared to exercise effective flag State control in all situations;

improve cooperation, via transparent manner, between organizations or arrangements, private sector interests and non-governmental organizations so that real effect can be given to the need to broaden stakeholder participation;

enhance coordination between organizations or arrangements, irrespective of whether they are FAO or non-FAO organizations or arrangements, and other economic groupings, as well as with relevant regional bodies responsible for environmental management;¹⁸

promote maritime boundary delimitation which is essential for fisheries management and resource allocation and as a means of resolving disputes;¹⁹ and

recognize that developing countries face financial, human and technical constraints that can inhibit their capacity to meet their regional obligations fully.

Moreover, efforts should be made to influence the activities of non-members of regional organizations or arrangements. This can be done through international scrutiny and publicity, and if necessary, by bringing moral and political pressure to bear, when the activities of non-members Parties undermine the work of regional bodies or arrangements.²⁰

VI. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR RESPONSIBLE FISHERIES AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

22. The 1998 High-level Panel of External Experts in Fisheries stressed the importance of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries in improving fisheries governance. It was noted "... Among FAO’s major international policy outputs aimed to improve fisheries governance, the Panel stressed the importance of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, adopted by the FAO Conference in October 1995. The Code and its guidelines were technically credible to fisheries experts and readable to non-experts. They are directed toward all States, fishing entities, international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and all persons concerned with the conservation of fishery resources management and development of fisheries."

23. The Panel considered that a priority for FAO was to ensure that the Code and its technical guidelines be effectively implemented starting with their wide dissemination and translation into official languages. Efforts should be made to highlight and implement major provisions such as those that prohibit fishing unless specifically allowed i.e., it is no longer a given right for all to go fishing.

24. The Panel differed in its views as to how prescriptive FAO should be in recommending governance mechanisms for Members. Some members felt that FAO should take a strong stand on what it considers right, whereas others believed that FAO should be careful in its recommendations, promoting rather the advantage and disadvantage of certain governance approaches. However, the Panel was unanimous in its recommendations that FAO:

work with fishery organizations or arrangements to promote objective self-evaluation of governance performance, including the development of performance indicators appropriate to governance; and

address governance issues in international freshwater fisheries.²¹

25. The work of FAO’s Fisheries Department is geared to furthering the goals of the Code of Conduct by technically assisting Members install mechanisms that will facilitate long-term sustainable use of living marine resources. While the Code over-arches the work of the Department, the inter-regional programme to support the implementation of the Code and the recently elaborated strategy, are designed to strengthen fisheries governance at all levels. Indeed, a measure of FAO’s success in implementing the Code of Conduct will be the extent to which governance is improved and the extent that regional fishery organizations or arrangements become more effective vehicles for management.

V. SUGGESTED ACTION BY THE MEETING

26. The Meeting is invited to review the issues and challenges confronting States and fishery organizations or arrangements with respect to improving regional governance and to indicate avenues that might be pursued, and measures that might be adopted, to enhance and strengthen regional fisheries governance.

¹		For a discussion of issues relating to governance and definitions, see Finkelstein, L. S., 1995. "What is global governance". Global Governance. Vol.1. pp.367-372.
²		Costanza, R. et al. 1998. "Principles for sustainable governance of the oceans". Science. Vol. 281. pp.198-199.
³		Symes. David. 1997. "Fisheries management: in search of good governance". Fisheries Research. Vol. 32. pp. 107-110.
⁴		Contributing to these shifts are the following: (i) the recognition that the role of civil society and the market is changing; (ii) greater accountability is being demanded by civil society concerning public actions generally, and particularly with respect to natural resource utilization; (iii) government is not the only crucial actor in addressing complex societal issues; (iv) centralized command-and-control interventions of governments are not always effective; (v) government action can be made more effective in a multi-actor network environment in which different steering mechanisms (government, civil society, market) interact for better negotiation and communication, striking a better balance than is currently the case; and (vi) actors at both the international and national levels interact.
⁵		United Nations. 1992. Earth Summit: Agenda 21 - The United Nations Programme of Action from Rio. UN. New York. 294 p.
⁶		"... Any policies, definitions or rules affecting access to and participation by non-governmental organizations in the work of United Nations institutions or agencies associated with the implementation of Agenda 21 must apply equally to all major groups. ..." See the Preamble to Chapter 23 - Strengthening the Role of Major Groups. United Nations. op. cit.
⁷		The 1998 High-level Panel of External Experts recognized the potential contribution of NGOs of all types to the operation of regional bodies or arrangements by providing expertise and in creating awareness on specific issues. The Panel noted that early consultation with all stakeholders was usually beneficial in resolving conflicts and in consensus building. See FAO. 1998. Report of the High-level Panel of External Experts in Fisheries. FAO. Rome.(mimeo). 45p.
⁸		The 1998 High-level Panel acknowledged that the work of the FAO regional fishery bodies was coordinated at the global level through COFI, which provided the central framework for collaboration. However, the Panel regretted that no practical links existed between COFI and non-FAO regional bodies or arrangements. Moreover, the Panel endorsed the recommendation of the Twenty-second Session of COFI and the Twenty-ninth Session of the FAO Conference that FAO bodies should be reviewed and evaluated in depth by their members to determine what measures might be taken to facilitate the strengthening of each body, as appropriate.
⁹		National fisheries administrations assume the responsibility for the national implementation of a wide range of international decisions taken with respect to fisheries including the UN resolutions (e.g. ban on fishing with large-scale pelagic driftnets), and other international instruments that a State may accept (e.g. the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and the Compliance Agreement) and adopt (e.g. Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries). The administration also is responsible for implementing decisions of regional fishery bodies to which a State may belong.
¹⁰		Article 63 of the 1982 Convention provides for regional bodies for stocks occurring within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of two or more coastal States or both within the EEZ and in area beyond and adjacent to it; Article 66(5) provides for the establishment of regional bodies for anadromous stocks; while Article 118 addresses the need to establish fishery bodies, as a means of cooperation between States, for the conservation and management of high seas living resources.
¹¹		1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. The Agreement is not yet in force.
¹²		FAO support for the implementation of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries forms a major component of the Work Programme of the Fisheries Department, and indeed, the implementation of the Code overarches most, if not all, of the technical work undertaken by the Department. In facilitating the Code’s implementation, FAO’s role is primarily an advisory one where technical input is provided to assist with the elaboration of policy and programmes that will secure the structural adjustment required for improved fisheries governance.
¹³		FAO. op. cit. in Note 7.
¹⁴		It should be recognized that fishery bodies or arrangements can only operate legitimately within their mandates. Criticism of bodies or arrangements is therefore often misplaced in that the constraint on performance is the mandate and not the technical competence of the organization. To remedy this situation the mandate of the body or arrangement must be reviewed if it is to assume an enlarged governance role.
¹⁵		There is a perception that until countries are contributing financially in a direct manner to regional bodies or arrangements, they will not take a continuing and active role in their work. It has been noted that where this is the case there is a high level of interest and participation by members in the work of organizations or arrangements.
¹⁶		The 1998 High-level Panel urged FAO to continue its systematic analysis of FAO regional bodies with respect to their institutional and financial arrangements, the strategies used to implement decisions and recommendations and measures taken to address current international fishery issues.
¹⁷		FAO is technically supporting two initiatives for the establishment on non-FAO regional bodies or arrangements, as a follow-up to the adoption of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, in areas where no such bodies exist.
¹⁸		Consideration of a regular consultative process is warranted so that regional organizations or arrangements might continue to identify and discuss problems and constraints of common concern; identify and develop strategies and mechanisms to address constraints; share experiences and lessons learned and generally improve the effectiveness of coordination among bodies or arrangements. Such consultation will permit them to promote more coherent management approaches.
¹⁹		It is believed that a large part of the resources of the world EEZs are shared between at least two neighbouring nations. Where there are shared resources governance is often impaired by the lack of boundary delimitation (often generated by disputes over non-fisheries resources or territorial claim), and the lack of political will (or interest) in negotiating sharing agreements despite the duty to cooperate under the Law of the Sea Convention.
²⁰		One method to be considered would be to publish in reports the names of the members and non-members that do not abide by regionally agreed fishery management measures. Some countries have used economic sanctions, as Japan did by using market sanctions against imports of northern bluefin tuna that has been taken in the ICCAT area by unauthorized vessels.
²¹		These fisheries were often complicated by the fact that, for example, river basins are used for irrigation, hydropower, transport and for fisheries, fisheries being often a minor use. Although such complex multiple uses do not occur in the marine environment, the Panel believed that lessons in governance may be transferred from international marine fishery governance experience.