Human interaction in tuna fishery management

Richard S. Shomura
Hawaii Institute of Marine Biology, University of Hawaii
P.O. Box 1346
Kaneohe, Hawaii 96744 USA

Robert F. Harman¹
Western Pacific Regional Fishery Management Council
1164 Bishop Street, Suite 1405
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813 USA

Gary Sakagawa
Southwest Fisheries Science Center
National Marine Fisheries Service
P.O. Box 271
La Jolla, California 92038-0271 USA

¹ Present address: Argonaut, P.O. Box 2114, Honolulu, Hawaii 96805 USA

Research in fisheries management has usually focused on the dynamics of the fish resource, and issues relating to other aspects of management, have often played lesser roles. The First FAO Expert Consultation on Interactions of Pacific Tuna Fisheries held in Noumea, New Caledonia, in 1991 directed attention exclusively on resource-mediated interactions. While this decision avoided distractions from non-resource-mediated elements, it begged the issue of management. The present report reviews three examples of tuna interaction in the Pacific and notes the role that human interaction played in the management decisions related to these cases. The three case studies include the eastern Pacific tuna-dolphin, high seas drift gillnet, and pelagic fisheries in Hawaii. While these studies do not portray the entire spectrum of fisheries management, they demonstrate the critical role that human interplay has on fisheries management.

1. INTRODUCTION

In 1991 the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations organized a technical meeting to review tuna fisheries interaction in the Pacific Ocean (Shomura et al., 1994). In describing the features of tuna interaction, Kleiber (1994) classified fishery interactions as resource-mediated interactions and non-resource-mediated interactions. He noted that the focus of the 1991 consultation was on resource-mediated interactions and that the latter would not receive much attention. While this decision avoided straying from the important biological and fisheries aspects of tuna interaction, the absence of any discussion of human interactions in management of tuna fisheries may be an omission that should not be neglected since management decisions go beyond evaluating and weighing scientific evidence. Indeed, management decisions usually only begin with scientific evidence and are completed within a milieu of politics and emotion.

The present paper reviews briefly several tuna interaction cases in the Pacific and the resulting complex human interactions that led to specific management decisions. The case studies include (a) tuna-dolphin interaction in the eastern Pacific, (b) high seas drift gillnet fishery and the bycatch issue, and (c) pelagic fisheries interaction in the Hawaiian Islands area. It is not the intent of this paper to review in detail any of these issues, but to highlight events, the management decisions taken, and note the outcome of these decisions.

2. EASTERN PACIFIC TUNA-DOLPHIN PURSE SEINE FISHERY

The tuna-dolphin interaction in the eastern Pacific has resulted in dramatic changes in the purse seine fishery during the past two decades. Although the eastern Pacific purse seine fishery involved dolphins in their fishing operations since 1959, the problem of dolphin mortality did not come to public attention until 1968 (Perrin, 1968). Based on limited data, the mortality at that time was estimated at 350,000 dolphins per year (Joseph, 1994). The mortality drew the attention of conservation groups and the general public; the issue contributed greatly to the passage of the US Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) of 1972 (Joseph, 1994). One goal of the MMPA was to have dolphin mortality reduced to insignificant levels approaching zero. The law, however, allowed for incidental kill of dolphins during the course of commercial fishing operations.

During years subsequent to passage of the MMPA there was a marked decline in dolphin mortality. The decline resulted from several efforts including establishment of an annual kill quota (which was reduced incrementally), gear requirements, elimination of sundown sets and the development of fishing procedures to allow escape of dolphins. By 1990 the dolphin mortality had been reduced to 53,000 animals (Joseph, 1994). Despite this marked reduction in mortality, the environmental community through public lobbying was able to make the tuna processing industry in the USA adopt a “dolphin-safe” policy. By virtue of this policy, adopted in 1990, the processing industry would only purchase tuna which carried a certification that it had not been caught in a porpoise-associated purse seine operation.

Subsequent events took two directions. In 1992, the international community working through the IATTC adopted an International Dolphin Conservation Program (IDCP). The objectives of the IDCP were to progressively reduce dolphin mortality to levels approaching zero and to seek means of capturing large yellowfin without the association of dolphins. This approach would ensure the continuation of a dolphin-associated purse-seine fishery. The other event was the passage by the US Congress of the International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992 (IDCA). The Act called for a 5-year moratorium on dolphin-associated purse-seine fishing commencing 1 March 1994.

The two initiatives appear to head in diametrically opposite directions. The International Dolphin Conservation Program would continue to address the dolphin mortality problem while the dolphin-associated purse seine fishery continued. The current dolphin mortality rate attributed to purse seine operations has been estimated to be less than 0.1%, a mortality rate substantially lower than the dolphin replacement rate (2% to 6%) for the various populations. Thus, the current bycatch rates of dolphin do not appear to endanger the overall populations levels.

The International Dolphin Conservation Act apparently will have little effect on the purse seine fishery of the USA since US-flag vessels have virtually quit operating in the eastern Pacific. Because embargoes are part of the IDCA, the Act will impact other nations that continue dolphin-associated purse seining. To date, the result of these actions has been (a) virtual collapse of US participation in the eastern Pacific tuna fishery, (b) consolidation of other tuna fleets in the eastern Pacific, especially Latin American countries, (c) development of markets other than USA for tuna taken from the eastern Pacific, (d) increase in consumption of tuna by Latin American countries, and (e) virtual elimination of the US as a market for eastern tropical Pacific tuna production.

The eastern Pacific dolphin issue appears to have taken a shift in objective and viewpoint as the mortality problem was being resolved. Initially, the prime concern and objective was to reduce the mortality of dolphin substantially and to assure maintenance of the dolphin populations at viable levels. As the mortality rates were reduced proponents of the “dolphin-safe” movement in the USA continued to push for zero-tolerance; thus, despite the success of the reduction in dolphin mortality, the USA purse seine fleet continued to be denied use of this fishing method in the eastern Pacific. Further, the continuance of the “dolphin-safe” policy appears to subject other nations with USA views relating to dolphins.

3. PELAGIC DRIFT GILLNET FISHERY

The demise of a newly-developed pelagic drift gillnet fishery in the 1970s provides a remarkable example of how perceptions and beliefs held by sectors outside the immediate fishery management structure are able to influence management decisions; decisions that are made before scientific evidence has justified a decision.

Until the 1970s, gillnets were mostly used in coastal waters and management problems were domestic in nature. An exception was the high-seas salmon fishery in the North Pacific, which reached its peak in the late 1950s. Management of this fishery was provided by the International North Pacific Fishery Commission (INPFC). When the fishery declined markedly due to the adoption of the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones in the North Pacific, especially by Japan and the USA, the problem of high seas competition for salmon was markedly reduced. That is, however, until the former salmon netters converted to catch squid. The squid fishery continued to catch large amounts of salmon on the high seas (Huppert and Mittleman, 1993). Huppert and Mittleman (1993) trace the conversion of salmon fishing vessels to fishing for neon flying squid, Ommastrephes bartramii, in the North Pacific. This newly developed fishery expanded rapidly in the 1970s with the addition of vessels converted from longline fishing (Gong et al., 1993). The gillnet fishery was not a single target fishery but one that ranged the Pacific and other oceans for marlins, swordfish, albacore, and other tunas (Gong et al., 1993; Huppert and Mittleman, 1993).

The magnitude of this pelagic gillnet fishery in the North Pacific and the movement by several distant water fishing nations to utilize pelagic gillnets for albacore in the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific were probably responsible for drawing an alarmed reaction by South Pacific island nations (Cambell, 1989) and the world's environmental community. In a review of net fisheries in the North Pacific, Uchida (1985) noted that there were nearly 3.5 million units of nets available in the North Pacific which, if strung end to end, would extend a distance 4.2 times the earth's circumference at the equator. By the late 1980s articles began appearing in various publications deploring the actions of these “curtains of death” (e.g., see WPRFMC, 1990). Concern was directed mostly to the bycatch of these pelagic gillnets, especially marine mammals and seabirds. Additionally, concern in the USA was directed to the waste of resources (both target species and bycatch) due to “drop-outs” and to “ghost fishing” of derelict nets. It should be noted that all of these concerns were perceptions based on speculation or limited data.

In 1989 South Pacific island nations initiated formal objection procedures to stop a newly-developing pelagic gillnet fishery for albacore in the high latitudes of the South Pacific. Also, in late 1989 the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution No. 44/225, entitled “Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World's Oceans and Seas” (Huppert and Mittleman, 1993). Among actions called for in the resolution was one to “..review of the best available scientific data on the impact of large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing by June 30, 1991....” A meeting was held in Tokyo, Japan from 4-6 November 1991 (Ito et al., 1993). Although limited bycatch data on pelagic gillnet fishery were provided in several of the technical papers of the meeting, there did not appear to be any quantitative measure of the impact of bycatch mortalities on the well-being of their respective populations.

In December 1991, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 46/215 on large-scale pelagic drift gillnet fishing which superseded resolution no. 44/225. Resolution 46/215 called for a 50% reduction in fishing effort by 30 June 1992, curtailed further expansion of high-seas gillnet fishing in other areas, and a global moratorium on all large-scale pelagic high seas drift gillnet fishing by 31 December 1992 (Huppert and Mittleman, 1993). Burke (1993), noted that prior to the adoption of Resolution 46/215 in December 1991, data of the South Korean and Taiwanese fleets for 1990 and 1991 were available. These data indicated the bycatch of these fleets were often “far below” rates experienced by other fisheries at that time. Also at the November 1991 meeting it was noted that observer programs specifically designed to collect detailed bycatch data from the gillnet fleets of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan fleets were started only in 1989 (Fitzgerald et al., 1993). Thus, the UN General Assembly decided to adopt resolution 46/215 in December 1991 even while data were just beginning to be gathered and analysed by the scientific community to determine the impact of bycatch by the pelagic gillnet fishery. The apparent basis for this decision was that it would be extremely difficult for driftnet nations to provide statistically sound evidence of “..the absence of harm to the marine environment and ecosystem of the North Pacific” (Huppert and Mittleman, 1993). It should be emphasized that under such criteria, very few fisheries would exist today. Similar views were expressed by Burke (1993).

It is unfortunate that policy makers did not allow for adequate evaluation of the high seas gillnet bycatch issue before advocating a ban of gillnet fishing in the high seas. In considering human emotions and prevailing views of resource utilization the rapid manner in which the gillnet issue was handled was not unexpected. On the one hand, the fishery landed large quantities of a resource that does not have wide-spread popularity and demand; thus, the supply-demand issue was not one of international dimensions. On the other hand, available information indicated the gillnet bycatch to include seabirds, marine mammals, turtles and a wide range of fish species. This diverse bycatch resulted in convergence of wide-spread interest groups to oppose gillnet fishing. Interestingly, this appears to be one of the few instances when commercial fishing interests other than squid fishers, e.g. surface albacore fishery, were in concert with conservationists opposing gillnet fishing.

4. HAWAII'S PELAGIC FISHERIES

The case of Hawaii's pelagic fisheries interaction represents a situation where management decisions were made in the near absence of data that substantiated claims made by one pelagic fishery sector that another sector was having a direct impact on tuna resources and catches.

Hawaii's pelagic fisheries include a domestic longline fishery, a small pole-and-line fishery for skipjack tuna, commercial and recreational troll fisheries, and a coastal handline fishery for tunas. These fisheries have experienced the usual ups and downs in fishing success over the years (Boggs, 1994).

In the late 1980s, and coinciding with the “discovery” of productive swordfish grounds in the North Pacific and poor fishing in other areas, domestic longliners from the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico moved to Hawaii in large numbers. The longline fleet increased from 35 vessels in 1987 to 135 in 1990 (Pooley, 1994). While longliners and other pelagic fishermen had existed peacefully in Hawaii for much of the 1900s, some of the new vessels set their gear in areas or in a manner different from those longliners that had been working in Hawaii for years.

In the early 1990s the conflicts between the new entrants in the longline fishery and the long-established commercial and recreational trollers in Hawaii increased beyond simple verbal complaints; cases of vandalism and even gunfire were reported (Pooley, 1990). The Western Pacific Regional Fishery Management Council (WPRFMC), as the principal federal management body in the region, examined available data. These data showed that with the exception of overlapping areas of fishing in some key locales, claims of reduced trolling success due to the expansion of the longline fleet could not be confirmed.

The WPRFMC held a series of public hearings to obtain views on the issue. Other than the instances of gear conflict, there did not appear to be sufficient evidence to promulgate management measures directed to resource impacts. While there was concern on the part of the council about the potential of localized overfishing and potential impacts on pelagic fish stocks, there were no data to support management actions based on these concerns. Some of the management measures were designed to halt the rapid expansion of the longline fishery, so that data on the fishery could be collected and analysed (e.g., federal logbook program and entry moratorium). The WPRFMC developed other measures that were justified largely on the basis of social aspects of the conflict (i.e., large areas closed to longline fishing around the main Hawaiian Islands. Skillman et al. (1993) reported that no research on longline-surface fishery gear conflicts had been carried out to support a management solution, and that the social and economic costs of the area closures were, and continue to be, borne almost entirely by one fishery sector, the longline fishery.

The lack of information defining the relative role and importance of the several pelagic fishery sectors in Hawaii led to management decisions which were based on the perceptions and vocal acclaim by the largest user group, the small-boat trolling sector.

5. CONCLUSION

While the dynamics of the fish stocks should perhaps be the foundation of management measures, fisheries management is fundamentally a process of human interaction and decision-making. The three examples summarized briefly in this paper point to management by public acclaim, a process which often ignores the quantity or quality of solid evidence about the resource. In the case of the eastern Pacific tuna-dolphin issue, the high dolphin mortality at the time of public exposure appears to have entrenched the views of the conservation groups and the general public in the USA to an immovable position. Although subsequent dolphin mortality was markedly reduced, and to levels far less than the dolphin replacement rates, the “dolphin-safe” movement appears to be holding fast for a zero-tolerance level.

The high seas gillnet issue suggests that even when available scientific evidence indicates the situation may not be as dire as presumed, public acclaim can even sway events at an international level. In this situation, it appears that separating the issue of coastal gillnet fishing from pelagic gillnet fishing eliminated the need to address bycatch problems of coastal gillnet fishing; gillnetting is a common method of fishing in coastal waters world-wide. On the other hand, the major pelagic gillnet fishing nations were few in numbers. The point made here is not that pelagic gillnet fishing is good or bad, or whether the level of bycatch is unconscionable, but that good management practice calls for review and evaluation of data leading to sound management decisions. This did not seem to be the case with the pelagic gillnet fishing issue.

The Hawaii pelagic fisheries conflict demonstrates the ability of one fishery sector to persuade managers to take a highly conservative position at the expense of another fishery sector. In Hawaii, with the exception of some overlap in the area of fishing, the available evidence did not demonstrate any impact of one fishery sector over the other that would have necessitated the management actions taken.

In summary, certain aspects of human interplay such as emotion and politics often overshadow science in the decision-making process for fisheries management. In contrast, the vast majority of funding and human resources, at least in the USA, are directed at assessment of the fish stocks and related topics. If fishery managers are to make rational, informed decisions, more attention must be focused on the human dimension of fisheries, such as sociology, cultural anthropology and economics. While having such information will not necessarily guarantee that good management decisions are made, fishery managers must have this information to consider all dimensions of the fishery and better avoid management by public acclaim.

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