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CO-MANAGEMENT AND RIGHTS-BASED MANAGEMENT - Chairman: George Kailis, MG Kailis Pty Ltd, Perth


Co-Management and Rights-based Fisheries - M. Haward and M. Wilson
Community Management in Groundfish: a New Approach to Property Rights - F.G. Peacock and J. Hansen
The Creation of Property Rights along Lake Kariba through the Formation of a Fishermen’s Association - R. Gwazani

Co-Management and Rights-based Fisheries - M. Haward and M. Wilson

M. Haward
Institute of Antarctic and Southern Ocean Studies, University of Tasmania,
GPO Box 252-77 Hobart Tasmania 7001, Australia
<[email protected]>
and
M. Wilson
Faculty of Fisheries and the Marine Environment, Australian Maritime College
PO Box 21 Beaconsfield Tasmania 7270, Australia
<[email protected]>

1. INTRODUCTION

Fisheries have traditionally be seen as common property resources rather than as private goods (Gordon 1954). This has led to fishing being considered as a paradigmatic case of the 'tragedy of the commons' (Hardin 1968) where individual self interest, through increases in catch effort, leads inexorably to a stock collapse. Regulation limiting effort, with power exercised by an external authority, was seen as the only way to reduce such tragedies in the fishery (but see Ostrom 1987). Recent literature has, however, noted that the analytic problems deriving from confusing 'common property' with 'open access' have resulted in private property regimes become the only alternative to regulation (Ferguson 1997: 286). Insights from the growing literature on governance over common property resources (McCay and Acheson 1987; McCay 1994, Larmour 1997) have increasingly emphasised co-management as an appropriate response to fishery management dilemmas (Sen and Nielsen 1996). The 'privatarian' argument does, however, remain influential, utilising neo-classical assumptions about individual economic rationality (Ferguson 1997: 286). Ferguson examines self-management as a complementary 'solution' to the introduction of market-based rights approaches, arguing that this solution has the added advantage of increasing the effectiveness of rights-based management.

Australian fisheries are small on a world scale but individual fisheries have developed to the point where they are significant export earners and critical to the economies of specific locations. At the same time a number of Australian fisheries are fully exploited. While current claims of a general crisis in Australian fisheries may be overstated, the present debate on fisheries management has particular salience. Fisheries management involves a complex balance between ecologic sustainability, economic performance and community benefit. This balance, the effective underpinning of co-management arrangements, can be enhanced by increasing the involvement of resource users in management. In Australia the establishment of institutional arrangements facilitating industry involvement in management provide an important adjunct to the use of rights-based approaches to management.

2. CO-MANAGEMENT: THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICE

Co-management can be defined as "an arrangement where responsibility for resource management is shared between government and user groups" (Sen and Neilsen 1996: 46). In Australia this approach was formalised through the introduction of Management Advisory Committees (MACs) and associated consultative groups within Commonwealth fisheries in 1992, and the introduction of similar arrangements within the state and territory fisheries. Rights-based co-management arrangements in Australia have developed at a time when traditional regulatory based fisheries management have been seen to have 'failed' in a number of fisheries around the world. Concern with such failures has re-introduced concepts such 'self governance' as the basis for an alternative approaches (Wilson et al. 1994, but see rejoinders from Parsons and Maguire [1996] and Hilborn and Gunderson [1996]). Cooperative management has been advocated to counter regulatory failure (Wilson et al. 1994), including non-compliance with laws and regulations (Sutinen, Rieser and Gauvin 1991).

Co-management arrangements introduce a further dimension to the debate over rights in fisheries. This debate has centred on the relationship between government and industry in ensuring a balance between short-term economic viability of what are arguably fully exploited fisheries and needs for longer term sustainability of catch. Since most fisheries are classic 'common pool resources', where a limited number of individuals may have access to what is communal property, a central problem is the balance between individual benefits gained by the fisher as opposed to broader community benefits (including conservation of stocks). The processes and outcomes in working towards this balance are commonly known as fisheries management. 'Management' is itself an important element, overlaying the 'conservation' of stocks; 'community' interest; and the 'economic' performance of fishers and the fishery. These latter three elements have been seen as critical 'paradigms' shaping conflict over fisheries management (Charles 1992: 379). Fisheries managers face difficult tasks in balancing demand from different communities of interest1. Defining and identifying 'community' becomes a critical element in co-management.

1 For example environmental organisations have been critical of an over-emphasis on the interests of commercial fishing and a lack of clarity in the development of ecologically sustainable development in the work of the Australian Fisheries Management Authority. These criticisms were also made by Australian National Audit Office (ANOA) in a performance audit of AFMA in 1995 (ANOA 1995). Following the tabling of the ANOA report the management of Commonwealth fisheries were subject to further inquiry by a House of Representatives Standing Committee on Primary Industries, Resources and Rural and Regional Affairs (HORSCPIRRA) (HORSCPIRRA 1997).
A 'Community' is an 'open textured concept' (Taylor 1982) subject to many definitions and uses, including what has been seen as a symbolic 'spray-on solution' to organisational failure (Bryson and Mowbray 1981). Theoretical bases for co-management derive from Tonnies's concept of gemeinschaft (socially constructed order) (Tonnies 1887). More recently Taylor (1982) developed "an idealized community" from "empirical studies of stateless societies to identify the conditions under which people sustained order without centralized, hierarchical forms of government" (Larmour 1997: 386). For Taylor, order was achieved by the community's shared norms and values, the existence of multiple relationships between members of the community and the use of shaming or retaliation against defectors from these norms and values (see also Larmour 1997: 386-87). Effectively co-management creates socially constructed order (including forms of 'rights') from the recognition of the shared interests and values (reciprocity) among the community defined by these interests.

Reciprocity provides the basis of community self-enforcement for mutual obligations, which together with shaming or ostracism, can be powerful instruments. Sturgess, for example, notes that "it is not in the interests of commercial fishers to ignore the damage being done to the catch in one or two years time [through catch of under-size fish]. While nothing might be said on the first occasion, if this behaviour is repeated the offending fisher will be spoken to" (Sturgess 1997).

While this may reinforce community values, the difficulties of community self-enforcement are also significant. As Larmour notes "notions of governance derived from stateless societies or common pool resources do not sit easily with other notions of governance that emphasise human, economic and cultural rights" (1997: 390). Commitments to justice and fairness are seen as fundamental, but, as Healey and Hennessy (1998) note, such commitments can lead to increasingly complex management arrangements to implement such values. It is these institutional frameworks which paradoxically can contribute to management failures in common pool resources (Healey and Hennessy 1998: 109).

Co-management is predicated on individuals and groups (forming a community of interest around a fishery) recognising that such problems arises from their day-to-day activities. In relation to the more practical use of co-management, the attraction of 'community based' management is obvious. Too often the community has not recognised that problems are theirs to own. Responses following recognition and ownership of the problem are likely to have much greater effectiveness that solutions imposed on that community. There are some obvious caveats. It is equally clear that community action cannot resolve all issues. Difficulties arise in dealing with spill-over effects - the actions of fishers who lack kinship or community ties (thus escaping community sanction), or who fish either predator or prey species - affecting the food chain and thus biomass.

One important aspect of community involvement relates to the role of the fishing industry itself. Seeing the industry as a community provides important theoretical and practical insights into fisheries management. In terms of theory the developing literature dealing with common pool resources emphasises community solidarity as a means of providing effective 'self management'. In practice, while fisheries may be fragmented and a unified view of them is difficult to ascertain, the role of industry self-management is an integral component in ensuring compliance with both externally imposed management arrangements and community-based codes of practice. Compliance with management measures is clearly more likely when these measures can be shown to directly benefit the fisher's economic performance.

3. REVISITING THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS

The tragedy-of-the-commons thesis was popularised by an influential article by Garrett Hardin in 1968, although the organisational and administrative issues to which it is concerned have a long history, and were first raised by David Hume in the mid- 18th century2. The tragedy of the commons as discussed by Hardin has utility on several levels. It is a metaphor for a catastrophe that can arise from the problems between individuals and groups actions. And, the tragedy of the commons has empirical significance in the case of managing certain types of resources and public goods. Hardin's essay also provides the basis for engaging in discussions on the role of individuals and their relations with other members of communities who are also assumed to be 'rational actors'.

2 David Hume also considered aspects of this problem. Hume was concerned with the issues which arose from farmers having to organise together to drain a meadow or field, an action which would benefit them all in the long term but would involve each of them in considerable work in the short term. The example has been well described - the problem that arises is a classic free rider problem; it may be rational to stand back and let others do the work rather as the benefits will inevitably come to you. Hume's example reinforces the problems of free riding and the problems between individual and collective benefits. These ideas are more fully raised in a discussion of the tragedy of the commons, see Colebatch & Larmour (1993, 6).
Hardin's essay was written at a time (the late 1960s) of considerable concern about global environmental catastrophe and concern at resource depletion and over population. Hardin used an example of the medieval common to illustrate the extent of the problem of self-interest or individual rationality. In seeking individual benefits and acting in a way that is rational (adding extra cows to gain added individual returns) the villagers destroy the common and thus create a catastrophe. Since individuals were responsible for the tragedy Hardin was dismissive of the ability of individuals to organise to resolve it without imposition of externally imposed discipline. This discipline could be imposed either by rules about conduct (changing the nature of human action) or by changing the nature of the common. Hardin emphasised two solutions; (a) externally imposed regulation of conduct or privatisation; (b) the latter utilising market instruments and private rights to ensure that the common remained viable.

4. PRIVATE RIGHTS

Common pool resources have traditionally relied on formal rules - usually through legislation or regulatory instruments - to resolve the 'tragedy of the commons'. More recently market-type instruments have been introduced with the development of rights-based fisheries management. The use of tradeable rights and the creation of quasi-market approaches by such 'trades' in fisheries management has clearly provided an alternative paradigm for both fishers and fisheries managers. In its extreme form this paradigm tackles the 'tragedy of the commons' by creating private property regimes, based on what have been termed 'privatarian' approaches to common pool resources. The development of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) creates quasi property rights, provides an opportunity to utilise market mechanisms and allows the market to determine the value of the quota or its component 'units'. Setting the total allowable catch (TAC) and determining quota and unit shares of the TAC provides a powerful tool for fisheries managers in the control of fishing effort and 'technology creep'.

In the 1990s Australian governments have increased the use of economic instruments, chiefly through the introduction of individual transferable quotas, fishing rights and resource rent recovery, as a means of overcoming regulatory failure associated with an inability to control fishing effort. This in part conforms to the privatisation solution - changing the nature of the common - advocated by Hardin. One effect has been to increase the direct interest and involvement of fishers in the management of their fisheries, but "the Hardin metaphor deflects analytic attention away from the actual socio-organizational arrangements able to overcome resource degradation and make common property regimes viable" (Ferguson 1997: 295). It is these arrangements which are the basis of co-management.

5. CO-MANAGEMENT AND RIGHTS-BASED APPROACHES

The tragedy-of-the-commons thesis, and the focus on regulatory and/or market regimes as solutions to the tragedy, has had significant influence on fisheries management. Concerns over exploitation of stocks increasingly often lead to fisheries management 'solutions' which cast regulatory arrangements and government control as the only means of protecting fish stocks and controlling fishers. This approach dominated fisheries management arrangements in Australia as elsewhere but, in what may be seen as a classic case of regulatory failure, was less successful in restricting effort and catch levels in fisheries.

As Anthony Charles has noted in relation to Atlantic Canada '[h]istorically fishery management in Canada was based on a polarised view of the worlds, in line with Hardin's 'Tragedy of the Commons': fishers were seen as selfish profit maximisers, versus regulators as protectors of the resources. This perspective, although flawed, actually became self-fulfilling' (Charles 1997, 108). As a result fishers, excluded from decision-making had few incentives to moderate catches. Simply speaking they were seen as rapacious maulers of the commons unable, or unwilling, to reduce short-term profit over long term sustainability of stocks in the fishery.

Increased support for co-management derives first from a reappraisal of view of the inevitability of a tragedy-of-the-commons; and second from the recognition of the limits of government action. The possibility of an alternative solution to those proposed by Hardin has already been suggested. A number of writers have shown that Hardin's pessimistic prognosis for the commons is in fact limited. Berkes, Feeney, McKay and Acheson used a number of brief examples to show "that success [in managing the commons] can be achieved in ways other that privatisation or government control" (1989: 91). Berkes et al. point out that "[c]ommunities dependent on common-property resources have adopted various institutional arrangements to manage those resources, with varying degrees of success in achieving sustainable use" (1989: 91). These arrangements can, in fact, be quite complex as shown in studies of community rights-based fishing arrangements in different parts of the world.

6. MANAGING AUSTRALIAN FISHERIES

International debate over fisheries management arrangements is replicated in Australia where the great majority of Commonwealth fisheries are fully, if not over, exploited. Australian reforms in fisheries management provide an important study which has application to other fields and in other countries. Australian fisheries have undergone a period of development in the last five years with export earnings of fisheries products exceeded $A one billion for the first time in 1992-93. This development occurred at the same time that the majority of Australia's fishery stocks were heavily exploited, emphasising the need for fishery management to balance short-term economic performance with longer-term ecological sustainability. Recreational fishing is also a significant element - surveys indicate that 4.5 million Australians undertake at least one fishing trip a year with over 800 000 people regarded as 'serious' fishers (Industry Commission 1992, 203). Traditional fishing activities by Australia's indigenous peoples raise important management issues such as access to resources and sea claims (Bergin 1991, 1993; Exel 1994), and may provide direct conflicts with commercial fishing interests.

The Australian public is becoming increasingly aware of this nation's responsibility for management of the fishery resources within its fishing zone and exclusive economic zone, the world's fourth largest (7 000 000 km2 in area, roughly equivalent to Australia's terrestrial land mass). In most cases though, public attention is drawn to these responsibilities by secondary means; the scarcity of fish, high prices in markets or retail outlets, or publicity and conflict surrounding closures or restrictions in different fisheries. These outcomes are the public face of fisheries management. The less public face of fisheries management - institutional arrangements, the impact of legislative and regulatory obligations on government officials (and increasingly on industry), the relationship between science and management and industry government relations - is given little public or academic attention.

The introduction of an institutional basis for industry involvement within Australian Commonwealth fisheries was also part of wide ranging reforms to fisheries in the early 1990s. The legislative reforms in Commonwealth fisheries in 1990-91 created a statutory authority, the Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) to undertake day-to-day management of Commonwealth fisheries and saw statutory management plans established for all Commonwealth fisheries (Haward 1995). These management plans gave increased roles and responsibilities to the fishing industry at the same time that industry was provided with statutory-based fishing rights and became levied with full cost recovery for management costs. Thus, these reforms radically changed the traditional regulatory-based, input controls, and as a result, the relationship between government and industry (Haward 1995). The relationship between industry's increased responsibilities and the move to output-controls in fisheries management which give greater property rights in the fishery has been critical in enhancing alternative approaches to management.

One cannot understate the influence of these legislative and administrative reforms on the fishing industry. These developments took place during a period in which the Australian fishing industry was undergoing significant structural change, grappling with over-capitalisation and problems in reduced stock levels in major fisheries and an increasing dependence on export markets. Two significant outcomes have been identified. The first was the response of the fishing industry to increasing responsibilities and their recognition of the challenges facing industry3. The second relates to the facilitation of the involvement of industry in management, which lead to several parliamentary or government inquiries between 1993 and 1997. The most recent House of Representatives inquiry into AFMA, which reported in June 1997, reiterated the importance of industry involvement in management through the broadening of the role and membership of MACs.

3 One response was the change in name of the peak (i.e. representative) industry body from the National Fishing Industry Council to the Australian Seafood Industry Council.
The MAC model is as an example of institutional arrangements that reflect a shift away from traditional government-dominated management structures and processes. MACs (although established and maintained under a regulatory framework) have introduced a form of cooperative management to these fisheries. The members of a MAC (which usually consist of 6-8 people, comprising 3-4 catch sector representatives; a fisheries manager; a fisheries scientist; an environmental representative; chaired by an independent chairman) are established under relevant legislation to provide 'advice' on the management of a fishery to AFMA. The MACs' focus on consensus-based decision making emphasises the internal dynamics of the MAC as the most critical variable in determining effectiveness in cooperative management.

7. CONCLUSION

The introduction of property rights, cost recovery and user charges have clearly enhanced the 'user pays-user says' relationship. The relationship between such rights and industry involvement in fisheries management is, however, more complex. While current fishery advisory bodies may be viewed as symbolic attempts at co-management where incorporation of industry views, while important, does not reduce the level of government control, in practice fishers have considerable influence on management of their fishery. A positive aspect is the ongoing developing collaborative approaches to management based on recognition of concepts of rights deriving from shared, or community, interests. This is clearly part of the ongoing evolution of such approaches where recognition of communities of interest can be the base for substantive co-management model. This evolution has included representation of non-commercial fishing and environmental interests within Australian MACs and ongoing concerns with balancing ecological sustainability with economic efficiency.

8. LITERATURE CITED

Australian National Audit Office (ANOA) 1995. Commonwealth Fisheries Management - Australian Fisheries Management Authority, Audit Report No 32, 1995-1996 AGPS, Canberra.

Bergin, A. 1991. Aboriginal sea claims in the Northern Territory of Australia, Ocean and Shoreline Management, 15 (3), 171-204.

Bergin, A. 1993. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Interests in the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, GBRMPA, Townsville.

Bergin, A. and M. Haward 1995. International environmental conventions and actions-potential implications for the fishing industry, Outlook 95, 1, 281-299.

Berkes, F., D. Feeney, B. McKay and J.M. Acheson 1989. The benefits of the commons Nature, 340 (13) 91-93.

Bryson, L., and M. Mowbray 1981. Community: the spray-on solution, Australian Journal of Social Issues, 16 (4), 255-267.

Charles, A.T. 1992. Fishery conflicts: a unified framework, Marine Policy, 16, 379.

Charles, A.T. 1997. Fisheries management in Atlantic Canada, Ocean and Coastal Management, 35 (2-3), 101-119.

Colebatch, L. and P. Larmour 1993. Market, Bureaucracy and Community, Pluto Press, London.

Exel, M. 1994. Australian fisheries management - resource allocation and traditional rights, Outlook 94, 2, 231-237.

Ferguson, J.R. 1997. The expanses of sustainability and the limits of privatarianism" Canadian Journal of Political Science, 30 (2), 285-306.

Fisheries Reviewed 1993. Report of the Senate Standing Committee on Industry, Science, Technology, Transport, Communications and Infrastructure Canberra.

Gordon, H.S. 1954. The economic theory of a common property resource: the fishery, Journal of Political Economy, 62, 124.

Hardin, G. 1968. The tragedy of the commons, Science, 162, 1243-48.

Haward, M. 1995. The commonwealth in Australian fisheries management: 1955-1995, The Australasian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy, 2 (2), 313-325.

Healey, M.C. and T. Hennessy 1998. The paradox of fairness: the impact of escalating complexity on fishery management, Marine Policy, 22 (2), 109-118.

Hilborn, R. and D. Gunderson 1996. Rejoinder - chaos and paradigms for fisheries management, Marine Policy, 20 (1), 87-89.

HORSCPIRRA 1997. (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Primary Industries, Resources and Rural and Regional Affairs) Inquiry into the Management of Commonwealth Fisheries AGPS, Canberra, 1997.

Industry Commission 1992. Cost Recovery in Fisheries Management Report No. 17 Canberra.

Larmour, P. 1997. Models of governance and public administration, International Review of Administrative Sciences, 63, 383-394.

McCay, B.M. and J.M. Acheson (eds.) 1987. The Question of the Commons, University of Arizona Press, Tucson.

McCay, B. 1994. The ocean commons and community, Dalhousie Review, 74 (3), 310-39.

Ostrom, E. 1987. Institutional arrangements for resolving commons dilemmas: some contending approaches, in McCay, B.M., and J.M. Acheson (eds.) The Question of the Commons, University of Arizona Press, Tucson.

Parsons, L.S. and J.-J. Maguire 1996. Rejoinder-comments on chaos, complexity and community management of fisheries, Marine Policy, 20, (2) 175-176.

Sen, S. and J.R. Nielsen 1996. Fisheries co-management: a comparative analysis, Marine Policy, 20 (5), 405-418,

Sturgess, G. 1997. Cooperation comes into its own, Australian, January 30, 11.

Sutinen, J.G., A. Rieser and J. R. Gauvin 1991. Measuring and explaining noncompliance in federally managed fisheries, Ocean Development and International Law, 21, 335-372.

Taylor, M. 1982. Community, Anarchy and Liberty Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Tonnies, F. 1957. Community and Society translated C. Loomis, Michigan State University Press, East Lancing, [1887].

Wilson, J.A., J.M. Acheson, M. Metcalfe and P. Kleban 1994. Chaos, complexity and community management of fisheries, Marine Policy, 18 (3), 291-305.

Community Management in Groundfish: a New Approach to Property Rights - F.G. Peacock and J. Hansen

F.G. Peacock and J. Hansen
Department of Fisheries and Oceans
Resource Management Branch, Marine House
Dartmouth, Nova Scotia B2Y 4T3 Canada
<[email protected]>

1. INTRODUCTION

Canada's demersal fisheries were based on the cod fisheries of the Atlantic coast, supplemented by haddock, pollock, flatfish, cusk and hake for the Scotia-Fundy sector (the waters off the coast of Nova Scotia). The Atlantic cod collapse had a major impact on all Atlantic Canada and most cod resources remain severely depressed to this day. Up until 1976 these resources were managed by the International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF). Domestic management of groundfish fisheries on Canada's Atlantic coast began in 1976, with the extension of jurisdiction to 200nm. This newly formed economic zone was to herald bounties from the sea through the replacement of foreign fishing with Canadian effort using management planning to define and direct fishing operations for the betterment of the Canadian public. This approach was expressed in the 1976 Policy for Canada's Commercial Fishery (Canada 1976) which stated the need to move to an economically viable fishery. In the case of groundfish, management planning outlined several objectives designed to accomplish this economic viability policy principle.

The groundfish fishery in Atlantic Canada is arguably the most complex of any fishery in Canada. Groundfish is the generalized term for a series of species of fish, mostly gadoid, which are harvested separately or collectively by many fleets involving thousands of fishermen. In the Scotia-Fundy Region, the community-based approach discussed in this paper depends on nine separate fleets, based on a combination of different gear usage (mobile and fixed-gear) and vessel sizes (vessels range from the very small under-10m to large wetfish trawlers over-30m in length). These fleets harvest eleven groundfish species ranging from cod to redfish in five NAFO divisions (Figure 1). This diversity of the fleets made attainment of the 1976 policy goals exceedingly difficult. The policy approach was to first develop management plans for the large, far ranging offshore-vessel fleet. Management initiatives were gradually introduced to other fleet sectors over the subsequent several years. For the inshore fixed-gear fleets, which use vessels under-19.8m in length and utilize handline (manual and automated), longline and gillnet gear, full management applications, including quotas, were not in place until the 1982 fishing season.

The goal of economic viability has led to a series of crises during the 25 years since 1976, largely owing to a number of factors working at cross purposes within the planning process. While the principle of economic viability remained paramount within the 1976 Policy, the lack of clear definition of what this actually was gave rise to individual interpretations and manifestations. It became clear that management approaches did not meet the policy objectives, and the planned benefits to fishermen and the public of Canada, were thus not forthcoming. This led to a series of studies to define new directions for fleets as crises within these arose. For instance, in 1982, the Kirby Task-Force released a plan to bring stability and viability to the offshore groundfish fleets through the use of Enterprise Allocation programmes. This report again talked about developing plans to allow for economic viability. However, the focus only related to the offshore fleets (vessels over 30m).

The second crisis in the mobile-gear sectors within the Scotia-Fundy region came in 1989. The Scotia-Fundy Groundfish Task-Force (Hache 1989) focused recommendations on capacity/resource imbalances and mechanisms needed to bring stability and economic viability to the inshore components of the groundfish industry. The concept of maintaining an inshore fixed-gear sector outside of the offshore management plan, or through the use of allowances after 1982, permeated thinking of the day. It was generally accepted that inshore, fixed-gear operations, although numerous (3300 vessels), would apply relatively little effort on the large and seemingly fully-resilient groundfish stocks. Management of the larger inshore mobile and fixed-gear and offshore vessels (500 vessels) became the priority. Thus, by 1986 vessels over 19.8m were on company-based enterprise allocation programmes while the mobile gear sector under-19.8m and the fixed-gear sector 13.8-19.8m opted for ITQ based programmes, beginning in 1991. The vessels under-13.8m working fixed-gear (3300 strong) operated under an overall quota that was harvested on a competitive basis. This sector was permitted to continue fishing on a 1500kg/trip limit once the annual fleet quota had been reached.

Following the demise of cod resources in most parts of the Atlantic in 1992-93, widespread closures were implemented in the 1990s. On the Scotian Shelf, groundfish stocks in NAFO divisions 4Vn and 4VsW were closed in August 1993 and remain closed. Cod in NAFO divisions 4X and 5Z continue to be depressed as do haddock, pollock, cusk and hake resources. Many Scotian Shelf stocks have population biomasses at record low levels and it is only because fishers harvest a wide variety of groundfish in the NAFO divisions 4X and 5Z (Southwest Nova Scotia/Georges Bank) that fisheries are allowed to continue. The latest scientific advice suggests that groundfish resources continue to be depressed in Atlantic Canada, the USA and in International waters. At present, fishers are using harvest targets approximately 30% of those in 1990. The devastation of the groundfish resources has emphasized the need for management mechanisms that would allow fleets to better balance their capacity with the size of resource, for the continued viability of both. By 1995, all fleets (except the fixed-gear, under 19.8m fleet) had developed mechanisms to allow catch adjustments as the resource biomass changed size. There were two prominent events that called for management of the fixed-gear inshore fleet. The first was the dramatic reduction in the resource and the impact that the large active and inactive fixed-gear licences might have on it. The second was the increase in fixed-gear licences as a result of imposing ITQs on the mobile-gear sector.

Figure 1: Locations of NAFO Divisions in the Scotia-Fundy Region (5Y, 5Ze, 4X, 4W, 4V) of Atlantic Canada. NAFO Division 3P is in Newfoundland Region

Attempts began in the mid 1990s to bring management applications to the entire inshore fixed-gear sector. The 1500kg/trip limit provision for the under-13.8m vessels was eliminated in 1994 as one means of bringing the fishery in line with the resource. However, the development of management approaches within this diverse sector proved long and circuitous before the current community-based concept was developed. During the process, many associations representing inshore fixed-gear segments arose, resulting in intense competition within the advisory committees for allocation advantage, and often culminating with demands for the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans to intercede to change sharing arrangements. The priority to ensure continued viability of the inshore fleet resulted in destructive management decisions and resulted in overfishing of the dwindling resources.

Given the many problems with the management of the inshore fixed-gear fleet, a new approach was introduced in 1995 on a trial basis in one area - Halifax West, Sambro, Nova Scotia, and was followed by a three-year test application on a regional basis beginning in 1997. This approach recognized differences within the sector by redefining fleets using either geography or "like-minded" views to better define fleet structures in order to accommodate the demands of the particular fleet-group in question. The term "like-minded" simply refers to the recognition of groups of fishers who have common management objectives. This trial in 1995 became the community-based management approach of today. As will be described below; it received wide acceptance. Industry management boards currently have almost complete control within this process and have moved the management concept well beyond that envisioned in 1995. The community approach may have application to other parts of the world or within other emerging issues such as aboriginal rights. This paper describes the development of community-based management, along with challenges, pitfalls, lessons learned and opportunities for the future.

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE NEED FOR CHANGE IN THE FIXED-GEAR FISHERY

The demise of the groundfish resources underlined the need for a rationalization of fleet fishing-capacity. The fixed-gear 13.8m fleet was the most numerous and although many vessels were marginal in activity, more than 2000 vessels were attempting to make a significant portion of their income from the Scotia Fundy groundfish resources. At the same time groundfish resources were mostly in decline and were being shared by other fleets that had already addressed the problems of viability and over-capacity. However, the size and diversity of the under-13.8m fleet presented unique challenges that prevented a similar management approach to the over-13.8m fleet. Management activities in the over-13.8m fleets had at least started to address the fishing-capacity - resource balance by the mid-1990s. For the under-13.8m fleet in particular, the size of the fleet and the number of landing sites made enforcement very difficult if not impossible, and the large number of participants made it a political issue. Further, the large number of inactive licences raised the issue of the right versus the privilege to fish. There was also the belief that this gear does not harm the resource, i.e., no level of capacity was harmful. This belief was re-enforced by non-government organizations (NGOs) that were supporting an anti-ITQ movement. Further, the bulk of the coastal community infrastructure was invested in this small-boat fixed-gear fleet (Table 1). The large number of landing ports, processing plants and the easy opportunity of direct marketing in the USA also supported the demand to find viable solutions to this problem as they could not be supported by the level of the resource, which was now at 30% of 1980's levels. This section below describes some of the management attempts on this fleet, providing context to the community-based management approach.

Table 1
Characteristics of the Scotia-Fundy groundfish fleets

Mobile-gear fleet (trawl)

Size 12m to 40m
500 vessels (1980)
135 vessels (1995)
2/3 all quotas
ITQ Management (1982-1990)

Fixed-gear fleet (longline, gillnet, handline)

Size less than 12m
330 vessels (1980)
3300 vessels (1995)
1/3 all quotas
Competitive Management

Other

500 landing ports; 300 plants;
direct sales to USA fresh market


The under-13.8m fleet was assigned separate fleet-quotas in the 1987 Atlantic Groundfish Management plan for portions of the Scotia-Fundy sector. However, separate fleet-quotas had not been assigned to all groups until 1997. Table 1 provides a summary of the status of the various groundfish fleets operating within the Scotia Fundy sector. While the under-13.8m fixed-gear fleet was not formally defined in all areas until 1997 (it began in 1987 in some areas) the use of limited-entry licensing began in 1976. Therefore, the ability to compare the fixed-gear and mobile-gear fleets through time has been a fairly easy task. However, there is a degree of estimation in these figures as formal handline licensing for non-automated handlines did not occur until 1991. Prior to this, handline activity was either part of any longline operation or as a separate operation designated under regulations. Criteria for this latter form of handline fishing required a fulltime, registered fisher using a vessel licensed under the government system. Therefore one can only assume that the number of participants has not changed over time.

The first major attempt at restructuring the small fixed-gear fleet occurred through the split in quota. This was first attempted in fisheries east of Halifax in the 1980s, and later and more successfully as a trial in 1995 using the community-management approach. From the trial in Halifax West/Sambro(HW/S), Nova Scotia, the development of a complete management approach based on community-allocations for vessels under-13.8m allowed the separate development of these fleets (under-13.8m) from the larger fixed fleet (13.8-19.8m).

At the same time that the HW/S began its community-management project, the remainder of the fixed-gear sector in the under-13.8m group established an allocation system based on the three gear-types of handline, longline and gillnet. In this approach, each licence-holder was required to choose between using one of three possible gear-types. Quotas were assigned based on the participation with these three broad gear categories. However, this approach proved to be unsuccessful with quota depletion occurring rapidly. Within these sectors, there did not develop any system of self-government and consequently the race-for-fish continued, as has been the experience with other competitive fisheries (Hardin 1968).

In contrast, the mobile-gear fleets through the use of quasi property-right programmes of EA's and ITQ's successfully addressed the imbalance between fleet numbers and available resource. The numbers of mobile-gear vessels active today is a reflection of this fleet's ability to adjust to economic and supply situations and ensure their viabilty operations. The inability of the fixed-gear fleet under-13.8m to address over-capacity within its quota share led to severe problems among all fleets as this sector utilized political pressure to change historical sharing arrangements (i.e. transfer quota to this sector at the expense of the others). However, rather than making these changes, DFO continually pressed for solutions to be found within the fleet sectors, a practice that in hindsight was ultimately responsible for the development of the community-management approach.

Environmental groups also became prominent in the debate. Along with the continuing support for coastal communities as a "proper way of life", new dialogue on environmentally-friendly harvest methods and ecosystem management became popular. They believed that the fixed-gear applications of gillnet, handline and longline were "more" ecologically friendly and moved the process towards more long-term, sustainable harvest applications and generally enhanced rather than degraded the resource overall. These arguments tended to be used within the sector as justification for the status quo as well as justification for the transfer of quota from mobile-gear to this fleet sector. Thus by the mid-1990's rationalization of most groundfish fleets had occurred except for the continuing over-capacity of the under-13.8m fixed-gear sector.

3. THE COMMUNITY BOARD SYSTEM

In 1995, the Halifax West group of fishers was the first to try a new approach - one based on area or community rather than boat size. Approximately 50 active vessels out of a total fleet of almost 100 vessels (Figure 2) requested to be permitted to manage an allocation of groundfish based on historic shares of the available resource. DFO assigned this group a quota of fish approximately equal to the historic share, applied as a percentage to the annual total quota. This group was given permission to manage this allocation as a "separate fleet" fully independent of the remainder of the fixed-gear fleet. DFO contributed to this exercise by encouraging dialogue on communities of interest for allocation purposes and, for the Halifax West experiment, providing separate allocations, monitoring and undertaking opening and closing season.

Figure 2: The number of active and total number of groundfish licences by community group from 1996 to 1998

This initiative proved interesting to the rest of the fixed-gear fleet (all vessels under-19.8m), which was struggling with the day-to-day problems of an over-capitalized fishery. Through an industry-sponsored workshop and many industry/government meetings, the fixed-gear community decided to establish a programme of community management for the entire fixed-gear under-19.8m sector. As a beginning, vessels in the 13.8-19.8m category were to be excluded. This was done to allow the relatively small number of licence-holders operating vessels in the 13.8-19.8m category to create a separate group which would allow an independent management application to occur. This group was therefore separate and developed an independent harvest plan. For the remaining fleet under-13.8m, the following measures were implemented:

i. A series of seven communities were established based solely on geography (Figure 3). The concept of "like-minded individuals" supported by DFO was rejected in favour of a geography definition as a means of avoiding the concept "corporate concentration/ITQ management" within the inshore, fixed-gear groups. However, the Shelburne community, because of the great differences between highline vessels and smaller inshore operators both in performance and philosophy, subsequently required partitioning into two separate management groups. This necessity provides one of the examples of why the geography decision was, in reflection, somewhat inferior to the like-minded approach.

ii. All fishers were assigned to a community-based on the area of registry of the licence-holder as of 31 December 1996. To ensure choice, an opting-out provision was available which was relatively unattractive but which ensured that a choice would be made by each fisher.

iii. Establishment of Community Management Boards (CMBs), comprised of elected representatives which in most cases are fishers. These are private boards, designed to provide input into in-season management and to develop, implement, control and monitor the activities of the community fleet. Management boards also provide representatives to the public advisory process, including input into the long-term planning process for the gear sector. Terms of reference for the public fixed-gear under-13.8m fleet advisory process stipulate three representatives from each management board. At their inception, the CMBs were thought of as the social/economic driver for the particular community sector and were responsible for all activities associated with these functions, including the development and implementation of co-management approaches. Each CMB developed a Conservation Harvest Plan (CHP), was responsible for controlling fishing activities of members and adopting standardized monitoring and catch controls and created management boards of elected fishers.

iv. Quota was allocated to each of the CMBs on the basis of catch history of each individual using the 1986-1993 period and standardized to 1996 quota levels. These calculations were based on landings that could be attributed to an individual licence-holder plus unidentified (by licence-holder) landings from processors within these various communities. This process utilized numerous input sources, including DFO, for data analysis and a mediator to resolve differences in opinion with respect to community sharing.

v. CMBs could trade quota among communities, trade or exchange members, apply penalties for breach of violations of CHPs and generally conduct a business-like approach to fishing within the conservation umbrella demanded within the precautionary approach.

Figure 3: Location of the seven community groups in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Each community group has a separate community management board

What the community management approach represented was the development and implementation of a self-governance system that did not reach down to the boat level, as is done in ITQ systems, but nevertheless represents a quasi-property approach, but at the community level.

In order to analyze the community approach and the CMBs, it is helpful to analyze management activities against a model of the planning and implementation process. Figure 4 provides a schematic representation of the type of analysis posed. While it is not intended that this paper go into the details of why this schematic was used (the details can be found in a discussion paper by Burke et al. 1996), needless to say the elements interrelate to create a management mosaic.

Figure 4: Schematic representation of the various elements involved in the planning and implementation of the community management boards

4. STRATEGIC ISSUES

If one compares the community management plans of 1996 and beyond with those previously prepared, one finds several strategic issues, which contributed to the success of this approach. Since the beginning of the process, plans for this sector had largely been developed through a "top down" process using DFO as the lead developer, implementer and controller, with industry relegated to an advisory role. This type of management, which was common in many countries in the late 1970s and 1980s, created an adversarial system in which little positive dialogue occurred. These readily developed situations where no climate for change existed. This was most evident among the smallest of the vessels which, while comprising 30% of the fleet, had over the years been able to effect great protection from the system thus ensuring some degree of viability at the expense of other fixed-gear groups.

The need for a bottom-up approach became evident. However, to move to the current situation several factors were required:

i. The government needed to change its approach to management. In this instance, an internal programme review proposed a change in philosophy to a process where the government facilitated direction and assisted industry uptake.

ii. There was the need for the industry to want to change the process, which in this case was the 1995 experiment.

iii. Government was required to stop pandering to lobby groups, which occurred to a limited extent in this case, but was sufficient to remove the leverage of the small boat owners.

iv. New ideas needed to be developed, which directed the industry to new avenues of approach.

v. The industry needed organizers who could develop plans on behalf of industry and who could work together for the collective good of the fleets in question.

Therefore, while the plan was for something quite different, the end-result was an industry-adopted approach almost fully supported by industry.

5. ANNUAL PLANNING

As described earlier, the process involved the establishment of CMBs made up of elected industry representatives (although in one instance a non-fisher community mayor is a board member). The process of moving to these management-communities could not be described as democratic in its commonly accepted sense. Fishers by nature tend not to be participatory, either in dialogue, or through written expression. While criticism is common among fishers, as is support for election processes, the history in the Scotia Fundy fisheries shows that participation in voting procedures is not strong. In the instance of developing-communities of fishers where quota allocation would rest with assigned licence-holders, it became obvious that all licence-holders would be required to choose one of the community groups, or the default DFO group, before allocation settlement could occur. Therefore DFO forced every licence-holder into a community through a vote, with an abstention indicating the DFO group choice. In this sense, DFO forced the issue.

Once divided into groups the responsibility for developing harvest plans, which reflected social and/or economic interests, fell to the industry. Simply put, without a plan that respects conservation and delivers, at the same time, industry requirements, no fishery would occur. Industry decided on a community-basis how to deliver the conservation standards as well as the appropriate harvest and performance approach. After 15 years of commonality, suddenly there were eight plans allowing eight individual applications. Industry boards also became responsible and accountable to the membership for the performance of the fleet and the members within the fleet, which in some cases included development and administration of penalty structures.

Figure 5: Percent allocation of quota amongst community groups.

6. ENTITLEMENTS

Role and responsibility sharing has been a constant theme in most co-management approaches now being introduced into several Atlantic Coast commercial fisheries. In the community-management approach, significant shifts in sharing of responsibilities have occurred, which emphasize the increased role of the fishers in the overall application of the fish management approach.

Within this "new arrangement", government maintains the activities of licensing, registration of vessels, identification and limitation of gear and the description of area to be fished or controlled. Many of these applications occur through DFO-administered licence conditions with delivery through DFO-enforcement.

The CMBs are now vested with the responsibility for defining entitlements on how to harvest the assigned allocation. The seven communities have taken a number of approaches, which range from a competitive fishery (by gear type) within an overall community-quota on a per species basis, to an industry-developed and delivered ITQ initiative. Combinations, or permutations, of these approaches were also used in the other community groups. The approaches can vary and can be independent, or can work in conjunction with each other. The choice is the community's to make.

In order to get to this point, it was necessary to determine initial allocations to each community, which included dividing the initial fixed-gear under-19.8m overall quota into two distinct groups. This partitioning at 13.8m as had occurred many years earlier in NAFO divisions east of Halifax was based solely on catch history. The resultant under-13.8m-quota-allocation was subsequently divided among the eight competing management groups.

Always a contentious issue, the need to define allocations was an essential step in the process of shifting responsibility to the industry for many of the decision-making areas (Figure 5). The process of "initial allocation" utilized mediation as well as a thorough vetting through workshops and meetings. Government, in support of this process, also provided suggestions as to possible approaches, including the development of sharing possibilities. The problem with allocating quota to users is that there are normally winners and losers. In this case, the added concern of unknown catch histories further complicated this issue as all users claimed shares regardless of the source of the historical record. In the end, fishers agreed upon a sharing format using the following criteria:

i. Cumulative catch history on an individual/per species basis by community

ii. Unidentified landings from each community were counted as a percentage share of the community in question

iii. Upon completion of the share calculations, apportioning involved 97% of calculated amounts, the remaining 3% was supplied to individual communities to address to some degree inequities that resulted in the 1995 fishery

iv. For the Shelburne community groups, elections to determine community of choice for each fisher

v. Provision of transfers of quota among communities, and for instances where fishers move from one community to another, the requirement of both communities' agreement, including whether or not the catch history would move as well

vi. Equal shares for a portion of the overall quota.

Thus industry has moved toward establishing communities that function for the good of the members of that community and participate in the stewardship of the resource along with the government and other private and government agencies.

7. CATCH/EFFORT MONITORING

CMBs control the fleet and individual movements and restrictions through developed and implemented industry harvest-plans. Industry, in developing these plans, follows set standards and principles for conservation while at the same time devising mechanisms that deal with community needs. In all cases, where internal designs require monitoring functions, responsibility for this falls on the fisher and, or, community. To that end, the role of government in the process is to ensure that the overall conservation objectives are met and that the overall agreed community-allocations are respected. This is the government investment into the system, i.e. respecting and controling overall allocations within the conservation rubric. This government audit-function ensures both conservation approaches are adopted and respected and that industry-agreed sharing occurs. The government lists and records seasonal quota-limits developed by the management boards and individual vessel-landings are provided to boards to assist in managing industry-imposed or conservation-dictated limits.

The foundation for this process is the Dockside Monitoring Programme (DMP) that is based on the entitlement. The type of management adopted (ITQ or quota-limited competitive catch), type and size of vessel, contribute directly to the level of recorded detail. DMP is a 3-step process of: (a) hail from sea, (b) verification of unloading amounts at dockside and (c), collection and data entry of catch data on a real-time basis. This service is an independent function of several companies funded by the fisher.

8. ENFORCEMENT

In addition to the monitoring of catch and quota, additional requirements to ensure the conservation of the resource are delivered through a combination of government activities and industry commitment and delivery. From the government perspective, controls involve the use of at-sea boardings, observers and sea/air surveillance to augment the hail/DMP process. Industry supplements at-sea monitoring mostly through the funding of the "at-sea" portion of the costs of observers.

From an industry perspective, in addition to the funding activities, peer-pressure has provided a significant deterrent to illegal fishing activities, including those that compromise conservation or activities that compromise industry harvest-plans. In some communities, industry sanctions have been adopted in an attempt to control illegal activities. Normally, industry boards administrate sanctions but the mechanism can vary. What is common is that all penalties, which are normally reductions in quota and/or time that can be spent at sea, are more draconian than government-penalties using court systems, and secondly all penalties are determined by the fishers. Normally in such processes there is no appeal procedure as in the formal government system, making the effectiveness quite remarkable.

9. RESOURCE ANALYSIS

One can generally assume that in such co-management applications cooperation with science requirements would be high. Fishermen do not fully understand survey techniques used by government scientists and often insist that the information is wrong because it does not reflect what is being experienced on the water. It is also true that in almost all cases fishers believe in some form of conservation. However the definition of what that is, is often difficult to determine. Therefore, in a collaborative setting, industry is often eager to provide assistance to science initiatives, particularly to advance two specific goals: (a) to better understand the resource which might translate into more quota and (b), to ensure that scientific surveys fully cover the management unit.

In the case of community-management, what has occurred to better the science-understanding? First, there has been more dialogue between scientists and industry on the subject of groundfish in the Southwest Nova Scotia area. Partially aided by an industry advisory council (the Fishery Resource Conservation Council), this dialogue has advanced the understanding within the communities of science issues and species interactions. Improved knowledge provides for a better approach to management. Second, the communities have provided additional funds to extend government surveys or have participated in the survey process. In either case, the enhanced knowledge has proved beneficial. This improved knowledge base is manifested in a science-advisory process that is more interactive and more detailed in its analysis. Specifically, community fishers participate in the Regional Advisory Process (RAP), often providing valuable comments on suggested inferences from data sets. An increased industry knowledge-base also contributes to overall knowledge that translates into better community decisions, and by understanding the process in more detail, the delivery of data by fishermen improves.

10. BUSINESS ANALYSIS

While there has been little actual analysis of the community-management approach to date, this is something that will be focused on in the near future. However, initial comments suggest that the cost of fishing has gone up. This is largely due to transaction costs and the additional costs of setting up the systems, complete with controls. The increased cost of management appears to be due to the costs of establishing the community boards, but in the long run, savings are expected to occur as more responsibilities flow to the harvesters.

A second issue surrounds the level of participation. While the community-approach did not reduce licence numbers, the opportunity among communities to address issues in a more business-like manner has resulted in a reduction in total participation. Today, licence numbers are closer to a balance with resource and even in communities where a more socially-oriented approach of sharing has been adopted, the adjustment in participants has occurred as well. The number of active vessels in all communities fishing in the NAFO Division areas of 4X and 5Y has decreased from 1275 in 1996 to 773 in 1999 (Figure 2). Having said this, the large number of licence-holders has dictated that a solution to this resource and licence number imbalance must be found. In the highline fleets, some level of licence-stacking has occurred and the use of informal ITQ arrangements has provided for some balancing. However, in other communities, there are no mechanisms to afford adjustment outside of those identified above (i.e. retirement) and therefore, there is a need for a more economic solution if a balance is to be desired. In spite of this deficiency, community-management has afforded opportunities to invoke closure when community-quotas are reached.

11. ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE

In spite of the advances championed by the fishers within these communities, a number of problems persist. First and foremost is the rift among individuals and groups that support a more socially-guided fishery based on a competitive format within an overall quota, and those desiring a more economically-driven fishery using quasi-property-right mechanisms. Those in the social camp argue that community control should not allow evolution in the other direction, which they feel creates a "have vs. have-not" syndrome so widely disliked among small boat owners.

The informal quasi-property-right approach adopted by some community-management groups is also criticized by formal ITQ groups who, under the current system, must pay larger access fees to acquire individual quota. Allowing such quasi-property-right arrangements is said to be a mechanism by which the government "subsidizes" the inshore fixed-gear fleet.

The second issue surrounds the resolution of inter-community conflicts. Prior to the introduction of the community-management approach, inter-community conflicts, mainly over allocation issues, were the norm. Today one can see cooperative approaches in projects such as the Bay of Fundy Council, which is a council made up of two CMBs as well as several non-consumptive users and is dedicated to developing an ecosystem management approach in the Bay of Fundy. In addition, one sees cooperation between CMBs in the transfer of quotas and other management related issues, suggesting that the autonomy provided by such a management system provides for ancillary cooperation benefits as well.

The third issue focuses on conservation. Has this approach changed the industry's approach to conservation positively or negatively? In most instances there have been positive responses to conservation approaches. One might say that overall, the fleet is more conservation-oriented under this system than under the previous competitive format. However, problems continue. While there has been a significant reduction in discarding and hi-grading, these practices continue at a level believed to be too high since the introduction of the Community-Management approach. Under the current management framework, this comment could apply to any fleet-group. The declines in groundfish stocks overall and the apparent imbalance in relative quotas contributes to these problems but clearly the industry continues to have some distance to go to be a fully conservation-oriented harvest sector. The husbandry of the resource, while prominent in the minds of most, can be overshadowed by the needs of survival, and in cases where there continues to be imbalance between resource and fleet numbers, the problems of conservation will continue.

12. CONCLUSIONS

The decision-making approach related to the partitioning of the resource among communities, and the flexibility within communities to devise appropriate management applications for each community group, has eliminated virtually all of the criticism and lobbying of previous planning approaches. One of the main developments of the community-approach is self-governance, an essential characteristic of formal ITQ systems.

In providing community autonomy and accountability, this approach allows for community solutions to the problems of fish management, many aspects of enforcement, transfers of quota and catch history, monitoring and conservation of the resource. Over time, remaining issues associated with the imbalance between fleet and resource will be resolved within the context of the community. To accomplish these goals there has been an increased cost-burden on both government and industry. However, as efficiencies continue in the process, we expect that both government and industry will realize significant savings while at the same time benefit from a more enlightened management system that is flexible, being able to change as time and conditions dictate.

13. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Drs. M. Sinclair, E. Kenchington and R. O'Boyle (Science Branch, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Bedford Institute of Oceanography) provided useful comment on the manuscript.

14. LITERATURE CITED

Burke, D.L., R.N. O'Boyle, P. Partington and M. Sinclair 1996. Report of the Second Workshop on Scotia-Fundy Groundfish Management. Can. Tech. Rep. Fish. Aquat. Sci 2100: vii + 247pp.

Burke, L., C. Annand, R. Barbara, L. Brander, M.A. Etter, D. Liew, R. O'Boyle and G. Peacock 1994. The Scotia-Fundy Inshore Dragger Fleet ITQ Programme Background, Implementation and Results to Date. ICES C. M. 1994/T:35.

Canada 1976. Policy For Canada's Commercial Fisheries, Fisheries and Marine Service, Department of the Environment: 70pp.

Gardner, M. 1988. Enterprise Allocation System in the Offshore Groundfish Sector in Atlantic Canada. Mar. Res. Econ., Vol. 5: 389-454.

Hache, J.E. 1989. Report of the Scotia-Fundy Task-Force, Fisheries and Oceans, Canada: 86pp.

Hardin, G. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, 162: 1243-1248.

Kirby, M.J.L. 1982. Navigating Troubled Waters, A New Policy for the Atlantic Fisheries, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Task-Force on Atlantic Fisheries:152pp.

Halliday, R.G., F.G. Peacock and D.L. Burke 1992. Development of Management Measures for the Groundfish Fishery in Atlantic. Canada Marine Policy, November 1992.

The Creation of Property Rights along Lake Kariba through the Formation of a Fishermen’s Association - R. Gwazani

R. Gwazani
Sebakwe Recreational Park
P. Bag 8040, Kwe Kwe, Zimbabwe
<[email protected]>

1. BACKGROUND ON LAKE KARIBA

Lake Kariba is a man-made lake on the Zambezi river between the northern border of Zimbabwe and the southern border of Zambia. The lake is 5364km2 in area and the third largest man-made lake in Africa after Lake Volta and Lake Nasser. The dam was constructed in the early 1960s for the generation of electricity for both Zambia and Zimbabwe. Due to the large nature of the project, construction of the dam flooded large areas of the catchment area. This lead to the displacement of all the families which were originally settled along the Zambezi river. Prior to construction, the families could settle on either side of the river and freely cross between Zimbabwe and Zambia. This free movement is now restricted because the lake is as wide as 40km in some areas and the two countries are now under different Governments.

The displaced families were promised fishing rights as compensation to land and property lost in the process of movement. Based on this promise the Chiefs and their offspring settled along the lakeshore in fishing villages named after them. The families are growing and their need for financial resources is increasing, thus forcing them to look for alternative sources of income. Some men and women are employed in the different Government and private sectors of the country while others are employed in agricultural production. Since the land along Lake Kariba is non-arable and the rainfall marginal, the people who are farmers always move further inland in search for more arable land. To them fishing is a seasonal activity for the dry season, meanwhile farming is the major activity during the rainy season. In addition, the need for schools and clinics and such social infrastructure also justifies the securing of second homes away from the fishing villages.

Lake Kariba is so large that it is now an attraction for many, providing, employment, income, recreation and residence. The introduction of a pelagic sardine Limnothrissa miodon (Kapenta) has provided the basis for a multimillion dollar fishery. The classes of people making a living from Lake Kariba vary because some of the activities require high capital and equipment investments while others do not. For example, the kapenta industry requires high equipment investment. On the contrary, gill-net fishing is conducted with simple dugout wooden canoes and with one or two hand-made nets. The minimal capital investment needed to enter the gill-net fishing is partly the reason for the high influx of people into Lake Kariba, generally from low income groups.

The incoming fishermen have their own negative impacts on the traditional system of operation they find within an area because they tend to ignore and disrespect the traditional leaders’ exercise of resource management. Attempts by Central Government to keep the traditional groupings intact through the issuing of annual fishing permits has proven difficult to implement due to lack of manpower and equipment. Fishing permits are issued jointly by the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWM) and the Rural District Council (RDC). The DNPWLM is the responsible authority for all terrestrial and aquatic resources in the country, meanwhile the RDC is the lowest arm of Central Government and operates in rural areas. In this case Lake Kariba is made up of two RDCs: Binga and Nyami Nyami. Several studies show that the numbers of people entering the fishery keep increasing, for instance, the latest study by Songore et al. (1998) indicates that:

i. there is overcrowding in some fishing villages, for example, there is a total of 1404 fishermen on Lake Kariba, twice the recommended number of 771

ii. fish catch per unit effort has reduced and

iii. fish size has generally become smaller and thus smaller net mesh sizes are now being used.

The fact that the management problems have been increasing forced the Government to consider creating a sense of ownership within fishermen through creation of some property rights over the fishing grounds (Kwaramba and Nzunga 1994). The DNPWM decided to extend to fisheries the communal area management strategies that are currently being applied to terrestrial animals.

2. ADOPTION OF THE COMMUNAL AREA MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME FOR INDIGENOUS FISHERIES RESOURCES

The Communal Area Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) is a management programme that the DNPWLM has adopted for over 10 years. CAMPFIRE as a management programme involves the various stakeholders, i.e. the communities, the DNPWM and the RDC. The communities are required to be aware of the wildlife resources in their area and the value attached to each species by age and sex. The RDC then arranges for training of its communities on game counting, quota setting and resource monitoring. The DNPWM grants Appropriate Authority to the respective RDC to manage its wildlife, through implementing problem animal control, anti-poaching and sustainable utilization. The RDC is allocated a quota in relation to the quota suggested by the communities. The RDC puts to tender the hunting quota and negotiates a lease agreement with the selected professional hunter or private operator. The operator then pays fees for the concession and trophies to the RDC. The revenue collected from the operator is later distributed as benefits to the communities directly suffering the cost of living with wildlife. The CAMPFIRE principle assumes that local communities living with wildlife are the best custodians of that resource as long as they receive benefits accruing from its proper management.

Adoption of the CAMPFIRE principles in fisheries varies slightly in that the fishing permits are issued directly to the fishermen. The local communities are the operators. Such operation by the custodians ensures that they are participating in resource utilization and, through proper management structures and awareness programmes, overexploitation is reduced. The second difference is that all the revenue obtained from fishing goes to the fisherman directly and he has the full responsibility of deciding on how to use it. The third difference is the structure that CAMPFIRE operates under i.e. the ward (comprising 6 villages) and village (comprising 100 households) structures of the RDC. In the case of Lake Kariba, fishing villages have been taken as the units of operation. A body that links all wards and encompasses all fishermen is in the process of being formed which will operate as an association and provide fishermen with a forum to communicate with the various relevant authorities and among themselves. In comparison, the Gill-Net Fisherman’s Association will be similar to the Kapenta Producers Association currently functioning on Lake Kariba. It is the anticipation of the DNPWM, the RDC and the fishermen that the GNF Association will promote:

i. A team working spirit and provide a sense of belonging

ii. A sense of security in terms of renewal of fishing permits

iii. Infrastructure development of facilities which require joint use and management

iv. A sense of ownership in all fishermen and hence create an environment that facilitates local monitoring of illegal activities and

v. A spirit of joint resource management through putting value to fish recording and data collection.

The objectives of the Association have been set up together with the fishermen. Although this may appear like a top-down approach, it is not because the process has always been with the full participation of fishermen. Effort are being made to avoid the top-down approach since it has proved to be ineffective (Nielsen and Vedsmand 1999). The establishment of functional institutional arrangements and management capacities of fishermen is a process that requires the initial involvement of Government which will later decrease as the fishing communities begin to show increased decision making powers.

3. THE PRODUCERS ASSOCIATION

3.1 Objectives

The objectives of the Association are:

i. To become aware of and exercise fishing rights and rights over land

ii. To increase period of fishing lease and participate in the setting up of lease conditions

iii. To have control on access to fishing grounds

iv. To have powers of inclusion and exclusion on members

v. To set up a constitution and by-laws

vi. To participate in RDC planning meetings and represent fishermen at different forums

vii. To hire services of a lawyer

viii. To establish infrastructure for fish production, processing and marketing

ix. To operate competitively and

x. To have collateral security for borrowing.

3.2 Structure

When established the name of the association will be Lake Kariba Gill-Net Fisherman’s Association. So far, the structure formed is at district level and the National level is still to be set up. The structure in place arises from grouping of existing fishing villages into sub-areas. A sub-area is made up of four to five fishing villages as per fisherman’s recommendations. In Nyami Nyami RDC there is a total of 16 fishing villages and Binga RDC 20 villages. There are 4 sub-areas in each RDC. The sub-areas are alphabetically named as, A, B, C and D in Nyami Nyami and E, F, G and H in Binga. This structure can be summarized as follows:


Nyami Nyami RDC

Binga RDC

Village level:

16 villages

20 villages

Sub-area level:

A, B, C and D

E, F, G and H

District level:

All 4 sub-areas

All 4 sub-areas

National level:

Single representation for the 2 RDCs



3.3 Progress with the formation of the Association

The process involves extensive consultation with fishermen and participatory methods are used before any decisions are reached. The achievements are as follows:

i. Eight management committees have been established in the 8 sub-areas. The management committees are responsible for organizing meetings, forming a link between fishermen and the authorities and ensuring that discussed issues are effected.

ii. Two management committees have been formed for each district to represent sub-areas at district level.

iii. A constitution has been drafted in each district.

iv. Training on management techniques and resource monitoring has been conducted in both districts.

v. Each sub-area has started fund raising.

vi. Fishermen drafted a brochure on what they preferred for the rules and regulations of fishing and compared these with the rules that were initially set by the DNPWLM.

vii. Fishermen participated in the demarcation of fishing grounds for the lake shore master plan and

viii. The RDCs have agreed to issue all fishing permits through the association and to recognize the association as the body representing all fishermen.

The role of the Association at sub-area and district levels has been discussed and outlined below in terms of fish production, processing, marketing, access rights and resource management. Sub-areas function at village level ensuring that fishermen have easy access to fishing gear, operate at optimal levels, and meet the market demand for fish. The district representation ensures that there are cold rooms and transportation facilities to market fish on a regular basis. There are many responsibilities of the sub-area representation:
i. Production - to sell fishing gear to fishermen and monitor quality of fish caught

ii. Processing - to put up concrete tables and running water for fish processing in fishing villages

iii. Marketing - to buy fish from villages and then sell to district representatives

iv. Access rights - to recommend names of fishermen to the council for renewal of their permits

v. Resource management - to keep the proper catch and effort records for research purposes and

vi. Fund raising - to receive subscriptions and all fees at village level.

The responsibilities of the district representative are:
i. Production - to secure fishing equipment in RDCs for resale in sub-areas

ii. Processing - to put up freezing facilities in sub-areas and in the RDCs

iii. Marketing - to buy fish from sub-areas and then retail them to hotels

iv. Access rights - to spearhead discussions on leases

v. Resource management - to organize training in resource management and

vi. Fund raising - to seek funding through proposal writing.

4. CONCLUSION

The process of forming the Association has proved to be long and dynamic requiring genuine commitment on the part of the facilitating agencies. The fishing communities are large and their level of participation and acceptance of the new management regime varies. This variation demands constant follow-up on all activities to ensure uniformity in understanding. There is also variation in the level of confidence among fishermen, which needs to be addressed through regular encouragement. Fishermen need to be motivated, receive incentives and have the capacity to meet goals and achieve objectives. Relevant and timely training will create the proper environment for a capable team of fishermen.

Before fishermen can be actively involved in assuming the responsibility of managing the resource, the trust lost during the past top-down approach must be restored. The relationship between fishermen and the authorities has always been one of conflict. Fishermen have been on the receiving end of the authoritarian systemand never part of the planning system.

The initial stage of empowering communities requires administrative, technical and financial support from the relevant authorities. Fishermen have always operated as individuals and it will take time before they appreciate the advantages of operating under a single body with set objectives. However, in this case, a joint approach is a prerequisite before any skills can be imparted. Financially, fishermen are not yet in a position to establish the basic infrastructure required for the fish business. They need technical and financial assistance to improve their fishing gear, fish processing facilities and marketing skills. Borrowing from financial institutions will be possible once fishermen can use their joint assets as security.

For fishermen to assume full responsibility for the resource an enabling legislation has to be created. Fishermen should be able to make decisions that can influence policy. Since conditions of the lease agreement are still to be drafted there is an opportunity which should be used to ensure that fisherman’s rights over the demarcated fishing zones are outlined and clarified to all parties concerned. The role of Government should be advisory and not instructive. The problem of overcrowding will be solved by fishermen as they gain an increased sense of ownership and as they exercise their power of exclusion to protect and enjoy the resource.

5. LITERATURE CITED

Kwaramba, R. and S. Nzunga 1994. Can the gill-net fisherman’s association solve the long dreaded problems on the Lake? CAMPFIRE Fisheries Report No 1 pp. 1-19.

Nielsen, J.R. and T. Vedsmand 1999. User participation and institutional change in fisheries management: a viable alternative to the failures of top-down driven control. Ocean and coastal management 42 pp. 19-37.

Songore, N., M. Mugwagwa and A. Moyo 1998. Results of the 1998 frame survey Lake Kariba-Zimbabwe shore. Project Report No. 92 pp. 1-38.


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