PART I
TECHNICAL AND REVIEW PAPERS (Contd.)

PROBLEM OF THE DETERMINATION OF ALLOCATION PRINCIPLES IN THE NORTHWEST ATLANTIC REGION OF THE USA

Robert L. Edwards

Northeast Fisheries Center, National Marine Fisheries Service, NOAA, Woods Hole, Massachusetts 02543 USA

ABSTRACT

The regional fishery councils in the Northeast inherited a tradition of management based on a long history of U.S. participation in ICNAF. The objectives of ICNAF were not considered appropriate by these councils. The subsequent 2 years of soul searching and formulation of management objectives have been restive but principles are beginning to emerge. The process of developing objectives, it is suggested, will proceed at a rate roughly inversely proportionate to the degree of exploration of the fishery ecosystem and the diversity of quality-of-life perceptions of the society involved. As well, other decisions, outside of the fishery management councils, such as the Bolt Decision concerning the allocation of salmon in the Pacific Northwest between American Indians and more recent arrivals, tend to delay and disrupt the process of establishing objectives by the councils. Development of principles to date has proceeded through a series of ‘crises’ or ‘confrontations,’ usually each succeeding one less emotional and more productive than the preceding. The ultimate question concerning the ‘last frontier of freedom,’ namely the oceans, has not been addressed forthrightly as yet. This has the consequence of continuing to exacerbate the allocation problem given no acceptable basis yet for effectively limiting total effort. Nonetheless, the process is working and it is fair to be optimistic about the future.

RÉSUMÉ

La gestion des Conseils des pêches régionaux dans le nord-est des États-Unis repose sur une longue tradition nationale de participation à la CIPAN. Les Conseils ont estimé que les objectifs de l'organisation n'étaient pas satisfaisants. Les deux années suivantes ont correspondu à une période difficile d'introspection et de formulation d'objectifs de gestion, mais des principes commencent à se faire jour. Le processus de définition des objectifs devrait être en gros inversement proportionnel à l'état de développement de l'écosystème halieutique et au niveau de vie de la société en cause. Certains décrets extérieurs, tels que la “Bolt Decision” concernant la répartition des salmonidés dans le Nord-Ouest du Pacifique entre les amérindiens et les populations arrivées plus récemment, tendent à retarder et gêner le processus d'établissement d'objectifs par la société. L'établissement des principes a procédé jusqu'à ce jour par une série de “crises” ou “d'affrontements,” dont chacune succédait généralement à une autre moins “affective” et plus productive que la précédente. La question ultime concernant la “dernière frontière de la liberté,” c'est-à-dire les océans, n'a pas encore été véritablement abordée. En conséquence, le problème de la répartition des stocks continue de s'aggraver, car aucune base n'a encore pu être fixée pour limiter efficacement l'effort de pêche total. Toutefois, les travaux se poursuivent et on peut être optimiste quant à l'avenir.

INTRODUCTION

Allocation disputes over fisheries in the north-eastern part of the U.S. contain complex psychological and factual elements. These elements are common to any allocation problem that concerns multiple special-interest groups. Whether one talks about allocation of fish, oil, timber, or any other widely used but limited resource, the confrontation script is virtually identical. Adversaries in the disputes denigrate the scientists, economists, and other technical advisors who have evaluated the problem; they warn that the ‘other person’ won't conduct himself properly; they rally for the ‘traditional way’ of doing business; and they express resentment of authorities which impose regulations with objectives that are broader (more altruistic) than their own immediate objectives. An appreciation of the diverse factors contributing to fishery allocation disputes is essential.

Since the allocation process usually begins with an examination and analysis of factual material, the scientists, economists, and other technically trained people are involved right from the beginning. Their products and advice set the stage for addressing the development of management protocols and are accordingly critical elements. The role of the technical advisers will be addressed with particular emphasis, as well as other factors, as they impact the development of management plans.

The diverse and interactive web of difficulties, dilemmas, and paradoxes surrounding the development of a management plan does not lend itself to easy explanation. The many separate aspects of the problem fluctuate randomly in intensity with the passage of time. The changes in problem emphasis are not completely unpredictable, but they don't readily lend themselves to linear ‘programming,’ as the computer person might say.

The nonnormative nature of the political process of itself is responsible for some of the rancor encountered, but long experience has shown that that procedure tends to achieve the best solution in the long run.

BACKGROUND

The recent history of fisheries exploitation in the Northwest Atlantic has been thoroughly documented in the annals of the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF). A useful reference for fishery events of the period 1950–1972 is that of Brown et al. (1976). I will not repeat that history here but only comment upon it briefly.

Prior to 1960 the American fisherman in the northeastern part of the U.S. had only to concern himself with the activities of other American fishermen. The occasional foreign fisherman seen off American shores (most often Canadian) was hardly noticed. There were domestic confrontations even then, some examples of ‘overfishing,’ and some significant, and relatively successful attempts to manage elements of the resource, e.g., the haddock mesh regulation, which was implemented through ICNAF.

Significant foreign exploitation began in the early 1960's. Initially large and relatively unexploited resource blocks such as the offshore hakes and herring were harvested. As time went on and more countries joined the chase for an ever-increasing number of species, the entire ecosystem was affected. A rapid, general decline took place. The events were adequately recorded because the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries (now the National Marine Fisheries Service) had had a history of concern for documenting changes in fish populations, whether natural or man-caused. The scientific data, accumulated in good part as a consequence of the bottomfish survey, eventually helped to bring about an appreciation on the part of all involved that management on a species-by-species basis was no longer a viable option. The resource frontier had been breached (Edwards and Hennemuth 1975). From the time that fact became generally recognized and appreciated until the demise of ICNAF, insofar as it served as the management agency off the shores of the U.S., a series of drastic overall reductions in fish catch were imposed. Over a period of 4 years, the total allowable catch was reduced by 50%.

The Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (FCMA) ended the era of the global Freedom of the High Seas policy for the American Continental Shelf fisheries. The fishery management responsibility devolved, with breathtaking suddenness, from an international agency with broad global guidelines, to two essentially nongovernmental regional fishery management councils, the New England Regional Fishery Management Council (NERFMC) and the Middle Atlantic Regional Fishery Management Council (MARFMC). These two councils, but the NERFMC in particular, inherited a formidable set of problems, including: (1) an almost complete array of depleted resources, (2) a greatly reduced but undefined area of responsibility, and (3) a set of constraints that, in the beginning, significantly limited the full exercise of their legislated purview as they saw it.

The fact that the formal withdrawal of the U.S. from ICNAF and the implementation of FCMA did not overlap by a matter of a few months helped to set the stage for an unfortunate, continuing, subliminal confrontation between the federal government and the northeast councils and the concerned public. Despite the clarity of the language in the act, the FCMA was widely regarded as having totally eliminated the foreign fishery from day 1. On the contrary, it makes resources surplus to American needs available to others. Those who read the bill carefully were also unhappy because they hadn't expected it to turn out as it did.

Whether or not the U.S. had withdrawn from ICNAF, it was nonetheless obligated to honor its prior agreements, made in ICNAF in 1976 and arrived at in good faith, concerning the level of harvest for the following year (1977). Accordingly the federal government took the initiative in developing the necessary management plan. This plan established quotas consistent with the agreements reached in ICNAF, to serve until the regional fishery council could become operational and develop its own, based on its objectives and its determination of optimum yield. However since the FCMA was widely considered to have eliminated foreign fishing, the plan was generally unsatisfactory to both the fishing industry and the public at large.

The American public had long since been convinced that the foreign fleets had all but exterminated the various resources. Even New England's Pulitzer-Prize-winning poetess Anne Sexton (1975) seems to have noticed:

Blame it on God perhaps?
No, I'll blame it on Man
For Man is God
And Man is eating the earth up
Like a candy bar
And not one of them can be left alone with the ocean
For it is known he will gulp it all down.
The stars (possibly) are safe.

By 1976 the resource depletions were pervasive. The fishery segment of the ecosystem overall was at a level somewhat less than 50% of that remembered prior to foreign exploitation. The resource depletions that mattered most were of those species like haddock that traditionally had the greatest acceptance on the American market. The haddock population was depleted by anyone's definition—fisherman, biologist, economist, housewife, exporter, or fishmonger.

The establishment of the economic zone by both the U.S. and Canada necessitated defining the zones of responsibility for each country. Needless to say each country has a different perception of where the line between them should be drawn. The issue remains to be settled. Wherever the line may be drawn in the end, the New England Council's geographic purview had been sharply reduced from that of the traditional perception of what constitutes New England's fishing grounds. Accordingly, allocation problems are further exacerbated because so many of the fish stocks live in both houses and because the concepts of optimum yield appear to vary from one side of the line(s) to the other.

SCIENTISTS AND SCIENCE

For myself, and I am sure for most biologists engaged in dealing with the task of assessing the status of stocks, there is an overpowering sense of déjà vu and frustration associated with discussing any particular allocation problem. Few of these allocation problems are of great interest in themselves since most represent problems in vacuo.

The allocation problems being addressed are often real enough. However, these problems are usually detached from other realities, for example the existence of a limit to the resource itself or the fact that no particular resource is independent of other resources. Under these circumstances the advisor tends to become cynical about the ability of the human race to deal effectively with any problem that challenges any tradition, be it political, social, or religious. To be cynical about the process of determining allocation principles and optimum yield, to insist upon an understanding of the larger problem on the part of those immediately impacted is, in jargon, a ‘cop-out,’ grounded in each individual's conviction of his own set of ‘truths.’ Each of us involved might consider the attitude of Paracelsus, on his deathbed, when he states:

—And this to fill us with regard for man,
With apprehension of his passing worth,
Desire to work his proper nature out,
And ascertain his rank and final place,
For these things tend still upward, progress is
The Law of Life, man is not Man as yet.—

and further on, with regard to his own actions:

As yet men cannot do without contempt;
'Tis for their good, and therefore fit awhile
That they reject the weak and scorn the false,
Rather than praise the strong and true in me;

When Browning wrote this poem, people regarded everything from a teleological point of view. Those interested in man's social progress at the time expected society to evolve into something more perfect as each year passed, although it is unclear what they thought might be the final product. There seemed no limit to natural resources of whatever description-remember at that time settlers were just beginning to cross the Mississippi in some numbers. The frontiers were without limit.

Whether man must be regarded as mechanistically as E. O. Wilson in On Human Nature views him, and the ultimate society developed coldly and logically in accordance with what he is and has been, or whether we look forward to a convergence of mystical truth with scientific ‘fact’ (cf. Capra—The Tao of Physics), man remains man. It serves no purpose to avoid the issues simply because they are difficult to deal with at this time. Certainly none of us should regard ourselves as unique purveyors of truth (potential martyrs) but rather should accept the consequent ‘contempt’ if we wish to be of assistance to society.

Present-day scientific attitudes, but particularly those which established science's independent role to search out knowledge for its own sake, whatever use man might make of it, were firmly established long ago. Jeremy Rifkin, in The Emerging Order, makes the case that this development coincided with and even was part of the natural evolution of the Liberal (Expansionist) Ethos. However it happened, science has steadily freed itself ever more from such constraints as the church (e.g., Galileo) and social traditions (e.g., Spinoza) in the past several hundred years. As a consequence man quickly developed tools, literally and figuratively, that enabled him to exploit the earth to its practical limits.

Science, however, does not provide ‘truth,’ only facts, and ‘laws’ that link or generalize facts. Insofar as science is concerned, the matter of being able to replicate the results of experiments or the application of scientific ‘laws,’ given the appropriate conditions, provides a form of factual truth with a defined statistical zone of uncertainty. Admittedly, in its rational mode, science does move ever closer to ‘truth’ as it applies to our physical reality. The knowledge and data derived from scientific investigation serve man well as guides in particular situations, but cannot ‘objectively’ resolve the subjective matters of the mind without the real possibility of dehumanizing man. Given a set of acceptable ‘objectives’ from society, it can certainly answer many questions concerning options in the physical world with its usual qualifying statistical buffer zone. It neither can demonstrate God, or absolute truth, nor can it unequivocally state, for dramatic example, that murder is inherently bad. It can certainly address the probable ‘factual’ consequences of actions or assumptions within a prescribed range of interactions. Whether the consequences are good, neutral, or bad, however, depends upon the transcendental needs of society, and these are matters of judgment beyond the capability of the scientist as a scientist.

In some especially contentious problem areas the nonscientist can get thoroughly upset with scientists. More often than not the scientists involved have confused the issue themselves.

Recently William Broad discussed the attitudes and teachings of a well known philosopher of science, Paul Feyerabend. While Feyerabend takes an extreme position, he does represent one point of view about scientists. To quote from Broad's article:

The notion that science is an enterprise both rational and progressive is one that is deeply held….

Feyerabend argues that science does not proceed according to a rational method. If there has been progress, it is only because working scientists have broken every principle in the rationalist's rule book and have adopted the motto ‘anything goes.’ The pool of resulting theories has increased, but individual theories are not consistent with one another….

It is rather the competitive pressure between tenaciously held and incompatible theories that makes for progress. Since there is no one ‘scientific method,’ success in science depends not only on rational argument but on a mixture of subterfuge, rhetoric, and propaganda….

Feyerabend goes further. In Against Method he argues that even normal science is a fairy tale—that scientific decision-making, as revealed by the historic record, is a political and propagandistic affair in which prestige, power, age, and polemic determine the outcome of the constant struggle between competing theories and theorists.

What is being discussed in Broad's article is the ambiance within which scientific innovation takes place. All too frequently the innovative scientist (basic-research scientist as opposed to the applied-research scientist) gets caught up in the allocation problems. This truly muddies the waters. He is looking for the ‘great leap forward’ in understanding nature, ‘solving tomorrow's problems’ and not simply and directly dealing with the need for objective advice in the present, based on scientific work somewhat short of the frontier.

People don't usually make a distinction between basic research and applied research, or between the individuals practicing one or the other or both. The scientists themselves often don't clearly distinguish these activities and add to the confusion, sometimes most regrettably, in the competitive scramble for research grants.

Certainly one solution might be that of adopting a new title for research scientists in the mission-oriented agencies. That would be difficult however, because even they must have the competence to do basic research and demonstrate that fact, both to maintain their credibility and that of their agency. Titles are important.

We can't avoid the fact that some scientists enjoy being put upon a pedestal, and are accordingly part of the problem. Many are prone, even eager, to step into the limelight and speak out on judgmental matters, a right given to all citizens. However, unlike ordinary citizens they are identified as scientists. Most of the time it seems to escape notice that scientists divide on most judgmental issues about as do the hoi polloi.

Nonetheless we just cannot escape the fact that science has given mankind an incredible and powerful array of tools in the last several hundred years. A grateful society has, accordingly, also honored and credited the scientist with broad unique capabilities and endowed him with greater intellectual insight and competence when it comes to dealing with society's spiritual problems than he deserves. Society has tended, partly to reduce its own risk when it comes to decision time, to ask the scientist for answers to questions that involve value judgments as well as scientific facts. The scientist in turn, quite naturally, asks that society's objectives be defined so that he may answer the questions properly. Thus begins the confrontation.

The reliance upon science in its proper mode also has its fiscal and practical limits. Whether one likes it or not the world is exceedingly complex and there are real limits to understanding and describing it, especially in detail, and subsequently explaining that understanding to someone else. Much can be learned about the climate of the world, or the marine ecosystem in the vicinity of New England, or the nontidal current systems of the North Sea, but only to a certain extent. Scientists can identify regularities, document trends, and estimate energy exchange rates or population sizes of organisms. The permutations of all possible interactions in a marine ecosystem, however, are so vast that no amount of funding and no amount of study can ever hope to provide either accurate or precise answers to most questions without considerable ambiguity, statistical or otherwise. Carl Sagan, in Broca's Brain, makes the same point, with regard to a speck of salt, in this way:

A typical brain neuron has perhaps a thousand little wires, called dendrites, which connect it with its fellows. If, as seems likely, every bit of information in the brain corresponds to one of these connections, the total number of things knowable by the brain is no more than 10¹⁴, one hundred trillion. But this number is only one percent of the number of atoms in a speck of salt.

This doesn't mean that you throw the baby out with the bath water. It does mean, however, that there are limits to the precision which one can expect from a scientist's advice, given that it is accurate, and they must be recognized. Even in that engineering discipline renowned for its precision in measurement, calculation, and control over material—bridge-building—there are limits. Bridges have collapsed.

Accuracy and precision are constantly confused. A marksman with his sights out of alignment may well be precise but he won't be on the target. The scientist or engineer can also be precise and still wrong to a greater or lesser degree. Surveying property lines using a transit can be very precise; but the earth is not flat and a truly accurate method would take this into account. The methods used suffice for building pyramids but not for getting to the moon.

In the beginning, when there were no palpable ultimate limits to resources, the allocation process was about as ritualistic and painless as going to the nearest gas station and filling the tank for a jaunt in the country. The recognition that there are now compelling global limits is very new for most of us, in spite of the fact that the warning flags have been flying for some time. Even in those situations where there have been limits for many years, as for example in lesser developed countries, the limits were only local and none of them limited aspirations. Any suggestion that there might be regional or global limits has been (and still is) often bitterly resented, and openly addressing such possibilities subjects one to variable degrees of pain, the pain roughly proportional to the variety of quality of life enjoyed by the group affected.

Let me illustrate that point from personal experience. In 1961 I gave the opening address at the Fish in Nutrition Conference in Washington, D.C. (Graham and Edwards 1962). The point was made, given existing and foreseen technology, that it was unrealistic to expect much more than a harvest of 55–60 million tons, on a sustained basis, of recognizable fishery resources. I was informed rather quickly, and quasi-officially, that such estimates, based on the kinds of generalizations possible at the time, shouldn't be made because they would dampen the worldwide enthusiasm for investment in fishery exploitation that obviously would result in solving the world's need for protein. That that estimate was remarkably close to the mark, based on experience to date, is not particularly in question, all the more so given the new recognition of fuel limitations. Had we acted on that estimate at the time, the fishery situation today might have been different. Incidentally, I remain confident that those estimates will be exceeded one day, but only as a consequence of the acceptance of the need for fairly rigid and probably very distasteful controls on harvest. Of itself, however, note that a greater harvest does not necessarily mean that each individual or nation will get its fair share according to its needs as it sees them.

The ‘objectivity’ of scientists has been severely challenged. During the earlier, Freedom-of-the-High-Seas period, this question frequently came up because the scientific advice provided did not deal directly with the domestic perception of the optimum state, but rather with a nondiscriminatory optimum, often defined as ‘maximum sustainable yield’ (MSY) or ‘minimum spawning stock size.’ Each country's domestic optimum was addressed politically. Even today the accusation of nonobjectivity persists. The scientist is still addressing the needs as defined by FCMA, and these needs often extend beyond the immediate needs of the fishing industry itself.

The degree of difficulty experienced in achieving a reasonable consensus on objectives (and the degree of scientific nonobjectivity as defined above) is one measure of the degree of altruism in the affected community or, from another perspective, the relative lack of a consistent ‘covenant vision’ à la Rifkin (1979) with respect to the treatment of the resource. It is accordingly no surprise that dealing with frugality becomes easier if control is handed down to the smallest possible group, even the individual if possible.

THE FISHERMAN'S ETHOS

The fact that there are limits in the global sense has been fairly well accepted, at least in principle. That the limits are as restricted as some people feel they are is still challenged, sometimes vehemently. That one needs to deal with local limits is often even more severely challenged. Limits are more subject to challenge when they are established to benefit a wider community than that being directly subjected to management restrictions. Somebody must give up something to benefit someone else. The FCMA established criteria for fishery management plans. The criteria were established to achieve objectives benefiting all Americans as well as the individual entrepreneur in the fishing industry—thus the criterion that a fishery management plan cannot be based solely on economic benefit, by implication the economic benefit of any one segment of the fishing industry as opposed to another. Initially it is the fisherman who is directly affected.

The typical fisherman is a highly competitive individual. He often seems as much concerned with catching more fish, or bigger fish, than his neighbor as he is with paying his bills. This competitiveness has been and still is a fundamental aspect of his ethos. Restrictive management measures that invoke any of the typical forms of limited entry inevitably reduce the opportunity for such competitiveness, thus reducing a proportionate measure of joy from the fisherman's life. He is more interested in ‘relatives’ than ‘absolutes’.

Recently, Cunningham and Whitmarsh (1979) pointed out that the fishing industry is as innovative as any industry, in good measure because the competitive arena is a common-property resource. It follows that limiting entry will in turn tend to limit innovation. At a time when increased efficiency, i.e., a decrease in the expenditure of energy, is much to be desired, two of society's goals are potentially in conflict. Legislating inefficiency to avoid limited entry, a clear option, may very well protect the resource but it may not save oil. Fishermen understand this and while they don't often make the point explicitly, part of their frustration stems from this understanding.

Fishery management plans to date have tended to be based on particular situations in time and space. There is a marked inclination to deal with the resource as a static entity rather than a dynamic system. It is not difficult to understand why. People eat in real time. Mortgage payments must be met. The traditional experience of the fisherman has encouraged the development of a life-style and philosophy which has allowed him to adjust to situations as they develop, and he has survived, at least to his own satisfaction. Most fishermen realize that they can drive any particular stock to economic extinction, if not literal extinction. These same individuals think that they themselves will not fall by the wayside as a consequence. Management then, on a species-by-species or limited species-group basis, instantly threatens their traditional life-style by limiting options, carrying with it as it does licensing, perhaps some particular form of limited entry, and seasonal and areal restrictions. Added to all this, of course, is the recognition that the array of regulations to implement such measures will be difficult if not impossible to enforce.

One of the most difficult problems to be resolved is that created by the perception that the broader goals of management can be satisfactorily met by treating the renewable resource as a static entity. It is very difficult for a management council to tell the fishing community that they can't take all the surplus production in one year if they wish to approach maximizing the average level of production from this time forward. The haddock again serve as an example. For many years there was only extremely limited recruitment to the haddock population. When a large year class was finally recruited, the industry deeply resented the relatively restricted quota established by the council. The quota was designed to maintain a higher stock level for the future, both to increase the probability of a succession of good year classes and to spread out the harvest of the good year class on hand at the time. The council was in the mode of managing a dynamic system. It was also putting the fisherman in the role of a natural predator in the ecosystem, and subject to ‘starvation’ (e.g., closure of the fishery) when the (defined) ecosystem balance was threatened. From the standpoint of the fisherman, in his traditional ‘real-time’ mode, the quota was obviously too low. Fish were everywhere. Ergo the scientists had obviously underestimated the size of the year class. As fishing effort increased further, the allocations between areas and types of fisheries came into sharper focus and the additional weight of dealing with these problems fell upon the council. The dispute over the size of each group's slice of the haddock pie became contentious. The obvious solution, again, was to try to increase the size of the pie, not to change the objectives established earlier. Every single vulnerability of the data was explored in the effort to avoid difficult allocation decisions. The traditional reliance upon science as perceived by the public to provide answers to difficult social questions was found to be sadly wanting in this new age of limits, and the scientist left feeling that he and Sisyphus had much in common. (Sysyphus was condemned by the gods to roll a stone up a hill and never reach the top.)

MUDDLING THROUGH THE INTERACTIVE WEB

Science by itself will not save the day. Equally, the day will probably not be saved without science.

So where do we go from here?

In 1974, in an article entitled “The Hard Road to World Order”, Gardner stated:

The hope for the foreseeable future lies, not in building up a few ambitious central institutions of universal membership and general jurisdiction as was envisaged at the end of the last war, but rather in the much more decentralized, disorderly, and pragmatic process of inventing or adapting institutions of limited jurisdiction and selected membership to deal with specific problems on a case-by-case basis, as the necessity for cooperation is perceived by the relevant nations…. In short, the ‘house of world order’ will have to be built from the bottom up rather than from the top down.

Gardner was not directly addressing the topic of limits. Nor did he directly relate the problems he was addressing to the growing influence of limits. He nonetheless described some of the symptoms of significant resource limitations. In his book, Muddling toward Frugality, Warren Johnson makes essentially the same point, but connects it directly with resource limits. He states (p. 166) for example: “The type of economy we are heading for will involve a much more intricate adaptation to local environments, and regulation will necessarily be more of a job for state and local governments.” Rifkin (op. cit.), in his analysis of the role of the charismatics and evangelicals in the present-day movement toward recognition and adjustment to limits, states (p. 266): “It is clear that in order to move from an exploitive, capitalist ethos to a decentralized, participatory, steady-state ethos, power over decisions will have to be transferred from the professional and financial elites to the people themselves.”

Each of the individuals quoted above comes from a very different background, and each is involved with different aspects of essentially the same problem. They are, however, doing a more consistent job of defining the elephant than was done by the blind men.

It would appear that in some parts of the world at least, appropriate adjustments to the new realities are well underway whether or not the basic problem was fully recognized. The regional fishery councils established by the FCMA provide a good example of such devolvement of authority and responsibility.

The regional councils have reasonably large areas of geographic responsibility. Even so, many if not most stocks they have under their jurisdiction move seasonally into another council's or country's region. It would be difficult to justify subdividing the areas any further.

Some of the difficulty experienced in New England develops from the rate at which the implementation of the new management paradigm seems to be taking place. Given that there are still alternative protein sources such as turkeys and pigs—no one is going to starve if they don't get their share of haddock—why is it necessary to move so quickly into management regimes that seem so restrictive? The problem is not rate per se, but the difficulty of understanding what is truly required in a management plan at this time, and that of not providing in it more than is really necessary.

Under the circumstances it isn't easy to devise a management scheme that treats the resource as a dynamic process rather than as a static entity. To a limited degree this goal had been achieved by the time the U.S. left ICNAF. An overall catch limit based initially on estimates of the surplus yield of the entire resource segment of the ecosystem was determined and allocated amongst nations. Secondary limits on the principal (most desired) components were imposed to prevent gross distortions of what appeared to be the natural mix of species. In part the allocation process worked as well as it did because there was a reasonable dialogue between scientist and manager. It was appreciated that the ecosystem had a limit as well as an integrity of its own as a whole, that each of the larger resource blocks was valued by somebody, and there was acceptance (if grudging) of the principle of nondiscrimination associated with the policy of freedom of the high seas. The understanding transcended the factual data available.

The situation is very different today. Many resource blocks exist to be exploited by Americans. For a variety of reasons there is still little interest in some of them as alternatives to traditional resources, such as haddock and cod, so options are relatively limited. Further, some allocation proposals being suggested are certainly seen by elements of the fishing community as discriminatory. The voices suggesting that certain species be considered strictly sport or commercial species, or that certain species presently being harvested commercially be set aside in part or in whole as food for other species, serve as illustrations.

There is a need to develop management procedures that do not gratuitously challenge the ability of scientists or economists to help managers to make allocation decisions. The technical advisors certainly can't decide whether or not silver hake should be purchased by the housewife instead of haddock, or that because 10% of the larger cod's diet at times is herring there is need to sacrifice herring in favor of cod. Similarly there is a need for the manager to identify objectives that do not encourage polarization of the fishing community.

Further, the marine fishery allocation problem involves more than just dividing up the available fish. The fish population is also potentially impacted by additional, extra-community activities that result in pollution or physical disruption of the fishing activity.

The phrase “mudding through” in this instance is credited to Charles Lindbloom (1959). He was interested in how decisions were really made as opposed to how experts suggest they should be made. Warren Johnson details this decision process in American or any other nonnormative society with respect to resource limits. His book, Muddling toward Frugality, provides anyone interested with worthwhile insights into this activity. Perhaps one of the most important aspects of such societies is, to quote Johnson:

Rather than leading, the government is more correctly described as following—legitimizing changes once they have become acceptable to the public…. There will inevitably be intemperate language, and self-righteous demands hurled in all directions.

Incidentally it should be noted that even in societies more normative than nonnormative, many of the same problems arise although they may not be so obvious to everyone. The extreme interdependence and complexity of modern societies makes ‘muddling through’ the nonnormative political process doubly difficult.

In the U.S. in recent years a myriad of regulations have evolved from various agencies to serve different purposes, but all of which affect, in varying degrees, any specific industry. For example, the Food and Drug Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Marine Fisheries Service, the Occupational Health and Safety Administration, and several others all promulgate regulations that affect the fishing industry. Additionally, in good part because all citizens are potentially affected in turn, again in varying degree, by regulations in specific situations, e.g., fisheries, formal requirements exist for the advance notice of proposed rule-making and for public review and comment. The need for interagency coordination to reduce confusion and redundancy in regulation takes time. The need for adequate public review of proposed regulations is also time-consuming. But unless there is public participation in the regulatory process at all levels, those regulations finally approved may be deemed unsatisfactory or shown to be defective and not meet with general support. Unilaterally imposed regulations usually end up requiring more rigid—and expensive—enforcement. It follows that the least regulation that gets the job done is the best. Fishery managers must find techniques that minimize the required time-consuming but necessary review procedures since many fisheries-management decisions need to be made in hours or days, not weeks and months, if they are to be successful. And clearly the deeper the manager goes into any allocation problem, the more diffuse and intractable the problem becomes.

Tantalus in Hades provides us with an excellent role-model for the beleaguered fishery manager. (Tantalus was condemned by the gods to stand in water up to his neck and to be forever unable to drink.)

DIALOGUE, A NECESSARY INGREDIENT

The fragmentation of interests of the community of nations served by the scientists of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) is also beginning to be felt. Once the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) served most of the European nations well enough as the management focus. ICES served as its principal scientific adviser. With the development of other, more restricted regional commissions (e.g., the European Economic Community), however, there are now several clearly defined smaller blocks of nations, each of which requires (or will eventually) scientific input tailored to its specific regional needs.

Just as in the U.S., the credibility (objectivity) of ICES science and scientists is now questioned for much the same set of reasons. In both instances an activity called ‘dialogue’ between scientists and managers is beginning.

Dialogue (=communication) is at best a noisy, frustrating process. A typical example is that noise created when the manager asks for advice in terms of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) but doesn't really understand the true nature of the concept (it is an abstraction of some theoretical value but with limited practical value). When the manager finally cuts through the semantic haze he usually finds that his questions, as in the case of the MSY example, implied objectives that are different from those that he had in mind.

The problem of communication has been fully recognized for as long as man has existed. What is often forgotten is that it is a many-channeled, multi-level process, not unidirectional. The process of dialogue will go far to clarify and define the roles of the scientist and manager, and will help each group to understand the capabilities and limits of each other. The day has passed wherein the manager can casually scapegoat the scientist because he uses strange words, and wherein the scientist can sulk in his value-neutral box because the world at large won't adapt to him. All sides have to make an effort to communicate.

AND FINALLY

Having said all this, what are the requirements for successful fishery management?

The first requirement is, at a minimum, the intuitive acceptance of the premise, based on scientific studies, that there is a limit to what the ecosystem can produce, that the size of the fish population generally has more stability than that of individual species, and that the species composition will vary considerably, come what may. A massive, patient effort at public education may also be required to achieve this goal successfully. It should be noted that the recognition of this probable state of affairs should be shared by all citizens. The average person, for example, should be aware of the impact on the fishing industry of any action taken on his behalf since his self-interest played a role in determining the overall criteria that must be met in a fishery management plan, or in determining to what degree the ocean will be used to discard wastes or as a source of energy, a playground, or as highways for commerce.

The second requirement is to devise management systems that clearly put man (in the broadest sense) in the ecosystem exactly as any other predator, thus directly subjecting him to corrective feedback as a consequence of his actions. It's a matter of ecological balance. Done imaginatively, relative rather than absolute values will dominate. The profession of fishing will continue to challenge and excite its participants.

The third requirement is to develop a regime that has a reasonable range of built-in options for the fishing industry, both because there will always be unpredictable or uncontrollable changes in the abundance of particular species, and to maintain the innovative spirit of the industry. Every effort should be made to adopt regulations that do not require unnecessary review procedures where a quick response is needed to deal with the sudden, often drastic changes so characteristic of marine fish ecosystems.

Let's conclude this on an operatic note—Wagnerian at that. We are all, as a result of several hundred years of liberal, expansionist success, in a dilemma a little like that of Tannhäuser following his sojourn with Venus on the Horselberg. You may recall that Venus advocated a liberal ethos of a sort, never-ending indulgence in passion. Those who joined the company of Venus soon reached their limits and passed on into Hell. Tannhäuser escaped the Horselberg but could not succeed afterwards in the outside world. On the point of returning to Venus he died. For those of you who like happy endings, he at least made it to Heaven, although at someone else's expense. We too have been at the resource Horselberg, and we too are trying to escape the consequences. Getting to Heaven (on earth), in our case as well, certainly mandates a more ascetic quality of life than that we have been enjoying.

The fishery allocation problem reflects a global problem in microcosm. It is but a small part of the whole. It is getting a great deal of attention, however, quite possibly more than it deserves. Solving the allocation problems in the fishery arena could very well help to set useful precedents for solving bigger problems, and all of us should accordingly continue to ‘muddle’ on.

LITERATURE CITED

Broad, W. 1980 Science, 206:534–537.

Browning, R. 1976 Paracelsus. Browning: poetical works 1833–1864. Edited by Ian Jack. New York, Oxford University Press.

Capra, F. 1976 The Tao of physics. Boulder, Shambhala.

Cunningham, S. and D. Whitmarsh. 1979 Innovation. World Fishing, 28(8):37.

Gardner, R. 1974 The hard road to world order. Foreign Affairs, 52(3):556–576.

Johnson, W. 1979 Muddling toward frugality. Boulder, Shambhala.

Lindbloom, C. 1959 The science of “muddling through.” Public Administration Review, Spring 1959:79–88.

Rifkin, J. and T. Howard. 1979 The emerging order. New York, Putnam.

Sagan, C. 1979 Broca's brain. New York, Random House.

Sexton, A. 1975 The Earth falls down. The awful rowing toward God. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company.

Wilson, E.O. 1978 On human nature. Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press.

DEVELOPMENT OF FISHERY MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES FOR NORTHERN ANCHOVY

E. C. Fullerton and Melvyn W. Odemar

California Department of Fish and Game, Sacramento, California 95814 USA

ABSTRACT

Reduction fishing for northern anchovy (Engraulis mordax) off California has been opposed by many as an improper use of an important forage species and supported by others as a wise use of an abundant resource. The controversy over the fishery centers on what is considered to be the best use of the resource. Principal uses are as an industrial fish, live bait, and natural forage. Principal users are U.S. and Mexican reduction fisheries, U.S. recreational fisheries, and predatory fish, birds, and mammals. Until recently anchovy management, though based on scientific management principles, has been shaped primarily by competing user groups and did not follow well defined objectives or standards. The recent development of a population model provides a basis for setting harvest levels based on estimated population growth. Incorporation of the model into a state management plan, and later into a federal plan under the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 resulted in management based on explicit objectives, standards, and allocation formulas. A joint management agreement with Mexico is needed as the unregulated Mexican fishery and the increased U.S. quota may well result in overfishing. Future plans must also deal more with the multi-species aspects of anchovy in the ecosystem.

RÉSUMÉ

La pêche de l'anchois aux fins de réduction au large de la Californie s'est heurtée à de nombreux opposants qui y voient une utilisation impropre d'un poisson fourrage important, mais elle est soutenue par d'autres pour qui elle constitue une utilisation judicieuse d'une ressource abondante. La controverse relative à cette pêcherie porte sur ce que l'on considère la meilleure utilisation de la ressource. Ses principaux usages sont les suivants: matière première de l'industrie, appât vivant et fourrage naturel. Ses principaux utilisateurs sont les pêcheries de réduction américaine et mexicaine, les pêcheries récréatives des États-Unis, ainsi que les poissons, les oiseaux et les mammifères prédateurs. Jusqu'à ces temps derniers, l'aménagement des stocks d'anchois, s'il reposait sur des principes scientifiques, avait tout d'abord été conçu par des groupes d'utilisateurs concurrentiels et ne correspondait ni à des objectifs ni à des normes bien définies. La mise au point récente d'un modèle de population a permis de fixer des niveaux de récolte fondés sur une estimation de la croissance des populations. L'incorporation du modèle dans un plan d'État, puis dans un plan fédéral en vertu de la loi de 1976 sur la conservation et la gestion des pêches, a donné naissance à un aménagement reposant sur des objectifs, des normes et des formules de répartition explicites. Un accord d'aménagement concerté s'impose avec le Mexique, étant donné que la pêcherie mexicaine n'est pas réglementée et que l'accroissement du contingent des États-Unis pourrait entraîner une surpêche. Les futurs plans feront également une plus large place aux aspects multi-espèces des stocks d'anchois dans l'écosystème.

INTRODUCTION

State and federal fishery management policies in California have evolved over the years from rather simplistic approaches of conservation and/or utilization to more complex approaches which embody concepts of optimum yield. Management policy was first set in California by the California Fish and Game Commission which was established in 1870. The Commission's purpose, and henceforth the basic management policy of the state, was to provide for the restoration and preservation of fish in the waters of California. The U.S. Bureau of Commercial Fisheries was created the following year in 1871 with a somewhat different goal. Here the concept of development was included and the goal was to assist in the development and perpetuation of the U.S. fishing industry.

It is interesting to note the different attitudes toward management held by California and the federal government at that time. Whereas California's stated goals were restoration and preservation, the federal government's goal included the concepts of development and utilization.

California's management policy broadened in 1970 when the California Legislature declared it to be the policy of the state to encourage the conservation, maintenance, and utilization of the living resources of the ocean and other waters. This policy recognized “…the importance of the aesthetic, educational, scientific and nonextractive recreational uses of the living resources… while at the same time maintaining sufficient resource to support a reasonable sport use and allowing development of existing fisheries and unused resources within the limits of maximum sustained yields.”

Implicit in this policy was the concept of optimum yield, for management practices had to consider objectives ranging from recognizing the value of nonextractive uses to the development of unused resources up to the limits of maximum sustained yield. Some of these objectives if considered separately are mutually exclusive, but if all objectives are considered together they embody the concept of optimum yield.

The concept of optimum yield was first written into federal fisheries law in the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (FCMA). Though an interpretation of how the concept of optimum yield is to be applied in fishery management plans has not been formally adopted, the definition as given in the Act means the amount of fish “... which will provide the greatest overall benefit to the Nation, with particular reference to food production and recreation opportunities; and which is prescribed as such on the basis of the maximum sustainable yield from such fishery, as modified by any relevant economic, social, or ecological factor.”

Following the enactment of the FCMA, the California Fish and Game Commission amended its policy in 1977 to include the concept of optimum yield as well as other features of the Act to make state management policy compatible with the FCMA. Thus, after a little more than a century of fishery management, California and U.S. fishery policies and objectives have broadened, but the original goal of conservation of the resource remains a basic tenet.

Even though conservation has always been a basic tenet of California fishery management policy, state government on occasion has been unsuccessful in accomplishing this goal. The most spectacular example of the state's failure to conserve a fishery resource, and the event most responsible for the California public's skeptacism of fishery management practices, is the collapse of the Pacific sardine (Sardinops sagax caeruleus) fishery. The history of the fishery with its collapse from a high of 658729 tons landed in California during the 1936–37 season to 5 181 tons in the 1952–53 season is a constant reminder to all of the vulnerability of pelagic resources to modern fishing methods. The collapse of the fishery was officially recognized in 1967 when the California Legislature imposed a moratorium on the landing of sardines. Thus, a resource which supported the largest fishery in the western hemisphere in the 1930's and early 1940's, producing nearly 25% of all fish caught in the U.S. during that period, has all but disappeared in commercial quantities from the northern part of its range (Frey 1971).

The collapse of the sardine fishery is seen by many people as being indicative of the inability of scientists and resource managers to manage large-scale pelagic fisheries on a sustained basis. Many people are unaware, or choose to ignore the fact, that even before the fishery peaked, scientists from the (then) California Division of Fish and Game stated that the fishery could not increase without limits, and recommended an annual sardine quota be established (Radovich 1980). These warnings were sounded time and again by state and other scientists, but went unheeded by the California Legislature. Opinions of some U.S. Bureau of Commercial Fisheries scientists which discounted the claims of state scientists, as well as pressure from industry against any catch limitation were instrumental in blocking legislative action.

Times and attitudes have changed and it is highly unlikely that a repeat of the political climate that led to the Pacific sardine collapse could occur in California under today's management authorities and under existing management policies. None-the-less, the sardine experience left an indelible imprint on the public's attitude toward large-scale fisheries for pelagic species in California.

THE ANCHOVY RESOURCE

Such is the case with the northern anchovy fishery in California. At least three distinct anchovy subpopulations exist off the coast of Oregon, California, and Baja California. The population of concern in California is the central subpopulation, which extends from north of San Francisco Bay, California, to Ensenada, Baja California.

Spawning biomass estimates indicate that the anchovy spawning biomass grew from less than 181 000 tons in 1951 and 1952 to more than 4,5 million tons in 1965 (Greenhood et al. 1978). Anchovies are now the most abundant clupeoid fish in the California Current region and are the subject of a controversy among special interest groups over the management of the resource for its best use.

The users of the anchovy resource fall into four major groups. These are: 1) the domestic reduction fishery; 2) Mexico-based reduction fisheries; 3) domestic nonreduction fisheries consisting primarily of live bait for recreational fisheries and including uses as fresh fish, canned fish, and dead bait; and, 4) predatory species of fish, birds and mammals. All of these users have different requirements and different dependencies on the resource. U.S. and Mexican commercial fishermen wish to maximize the reduction take. Recreational fishermen wish to minimize the reduction take and maintain the largest possible anchovy biomass to provide forage for gamefish and an ample supply of live bait. Predatory species require sufficient reservoirs of anchovies to provide adequate forage. Best use of the anchovy resource must take into account the needs of all users.

The largest domestic fishery is by the commercial fleet which fishes for reduction purposes. During the period 1970 through 1975, the annual landings of anchovies for reduction into fish meal averaged 86015 tons. This fleet also fishes for sardines, jack mackerel (Trachurus symmetricus), Pacific mackerel (Scomber japonicus), bonito (Sarda chiliensis), bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus) and sometimes market squid (Loligo opalescens). The fleet consists of about 25 vessels and is basically the remains of the old sardine fleet. Anchovies account for the preponderance of the multi-species harvest, accounting for 45–64% of fishermen's income in the years 1973 to 1975. Reduction landings in 1975 had an estimated exvessel value of $4722000 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1978). Although the fleet is presently dependent on the anchovy fishery for its economic survival, its opportunistic, multi-species characteristic means that the resurgence of presently depressed or depleted stocks of sardines or bonito could turn the fleet's attention toward these species and lessen its dependence on anchovy. The resurgence of the Pacific mackerel population has taken some pressure from anchovy and with the present large population of jack mackerel a more favorable price for this species could dramatically reduce the fleet's dependence on anchovy.

Products from the reduction of anchovy are meal, oil, and solubles with a total value estimated at $9229000 for 1975. However, the amount of meal produced from California anchovies is small in comparison to other sources of fish meal. The largest user of locally produced fish meal is the California poultry industry which has access to other sources of meal, both from fish and vegetable products (U.S. Department of Commerce 1978).

The Mexican anchovy fishing industry is expanding to provide self-sufficiency in fish meal. The 1978–79 season landings of about 136 000 tons nearly tripled the U.S. reduction catch. It is estimated that Mexico's goal of self-sufficiency in fish meal will require a 272200 to 453600 ton harvest from the central stock (MacCall 1979). This would be of considerable exvessel value, estimated to be from $14 million to $23 million based on 1978 U.S. exvessel prices, and would provide jobs and industry in a region beset by chronic economic problems.

The largest nonreduction anchovy fishery is for live bait and chum for the recreational fishery, averaging 5400 tons annually from 1970 through 1975. In contrast to the industrial uses of anchovy, there is nothing that could totally replace anchovy as live-bait or chum for the recreational fishery. Southern California commercial passenger carrying vessels (commercial vessels engaged in carrying passengers for the purpose of recreational fishing) utilize live-bait extensively and much of their operation is dependent on having live anchovies. Prior to the virtual disappearance of sardines as much as 15–20% of the bait consisted of live sardines. Since 1957, nearly 99% of the live-bait has consisted of anchovy. It has been estimated that commercial passenger carrying vessels pay 15% of their revenue for live-bait, amounting to an estimated $1,15 million in 1975. Added to the sale of live-bait to private vessels, the total value of anchovy bait catches averages about $2,3 million or about $420 per ton. Thus, the unit value of anchovies for live-bait is far greater than that for reduction (U.S. Department of Commerce 1978).

The commercial passenger carrying vessel fleet in California in 1975 numbered about 400 and carried about 750000 passengers (U.S. Department of Commerce 1978). Each angler paid an average of $15 per trip, bringing the paid revenues to $11,25 million. Private boats launched from trailers in southern California during 1975–76 were estimated to have provided a minimum of 336000 angler days of marine recreational fishing effort in southern California (Wine and Hoban 1976). This fishery is also heavily dependent on live-bait. The value of these recreational fisheries that is attributable to anchovies is considerable but unknown.

Finally, there are the nonextractive uses of anchovy—the role of anchovies as forage. This use is not quantified, but considering that the annual natural mortality rate of anchovies is around 65%, its use as forage must be great. Anchovy is a prey species throughout its life. As eggs and larvae they fall prey to an assortment of invertebrate and vertebrate species. As juveniles they are primarily found in the nearshore zone and are most vulnerable to species of recreational and commercial importance. These include Pacific bonito, yellowtail (Seriola dorsalis), California barracuda (Sphyraena argentea), salmon (Onchorhynchus sp.) and striped bass (Morone saxitalis). Adult anchovies are found offshore and are prey for species such as albacore and bluefin tuna, both important recreational and commercial species, as well as various sharks, porpoise, pinnipeds and birds. One of the marine birds that prey heavily on anchovy is the brown pelican (Pelecanus occidentalis), which has been declared an endangered species under U.S. law. Anchovies are the major component of the pelican's diet and there is concern over the possible impacts of the anchovy fishery on the viability of the two pelican nesting sites in the southern California area. Unfortunately, little is known of the actual food of these predators or of alternative sources of forage (U.S. Department of Commerce 1978).

HISTORY OF MANAGEMENT 1919-1977

Although the present controversy over reduction fishing for anchovy has been going on for about 15 years, there has always existed in California a strong body of opinion against the use of whole fish for reduction. A 1919 law which prohibited the reduction of whole fish except under permit served to hold down anchovy landings for many years. A shortage of sardines in 1946 resulted in a six-fold catch increase to nearly 8600 tons in 1947 and landings in excess of canning capacities were diverted to reduction plants. This prompted the Fish and Game Commission to require that a high proportion of each ton of anchovies landed be canned and in 1949 the Commission adopted a policy opposing the issuance of reduction permits for whole anchovy. The collapse of the sardine fishery in 1952 and the demand for a substitute for canned sardines resulted in anchovy landings increasing to nearly 39000 tons in 1953. However, the demand for canned anchovies was short lived and landings declined to less than 4500 tons through 1965 (Frey 1971).

The interest in harvesting anchovies in large quantities for reduction was intensified in 1964 when the California Cooperative Oceanic Fisheries Investigation (CalCOFI) Committee proposed an ecological experiment to assist the return of the sardine by simultaneously reducing fishing pressure on the sardine and increasing fishing pressure on the anchovy. This was proposed on the theory that since anchovy is the chief natural competitor to the sardine, the high anchovy abundance was at least in part responsible for holding back the sardine population.

At the time of this proposal the spawning biomass was estimated to be between 1,6 and 2,0 million tons. The proposal was to allow a controlled annual harvest of 181437 tons for approximately three years. Quota adjustments would then be made on the basis of findings during the first phase (Messersmith 1969a). (The unit of measurement used in development of anchovy management strategies has been the short ton, often given as thousands of tons when pertaining to quotas. When converting to metric the amounts have not been rounded off in those instances where the exact tonnage is crucial to the functioning of the model or management strategy.)

A bill was introduced in the California Assembly in 1965 that would have allowed landing for reduction of 104326 tons of anchovy by specified classes of vessels during the period 1 January 1966 through 15 May 1968. The bill passed both houses of the legislature but was not signed into law by the governor. The bill received over 35 000 letters in opposition, more than any other measure that year (Messersmith 1969b). One of the reasons that the governor did not sign the bill was that the purpose of the bill could be accomplished by administrative action and the governor requested the commission reconsider allotting permits for reduction fishing.

The commission then adopted a policy that provided for a reduction fishery on a scientific basis providing that existing uses of the anchovy resource be protected. The 1965 commission regulations provided for an experimental fishery to take 68 000 tons for reduction. Reduction fishing regulations included seasons, zones, and a closure within 5,6 km of the mainland. The California Department of Fish and Game then initiated a program to monitor the fishery and conduct biological studies necessary for resource management. Thus, for the first time in more than 40 years, anchovies were fished solely for reduction purposes.

Rules under which the fishery was to operate were set by the commission based on the department's knowledge of the resource and the fishery. The experimental reduction fishery was authorized on the premise that there was a large under-utilized resource of anchovies. Quotas and processor limits were set to control the growth of the fishery. Fishing zones were established in the belief that this would prevent overfishing in local areas, especially where these areas bordered important live-bait fishing areas.

At the time the zones were established there were no data on the movement of anchovies. Subsequent tagging studies indicated that anchovies can and do move long distances. The Department of Fish and Game concluded that the zones did not provide the function for which they were intended as long as the season remained unchanged and the fishery was restricted to beyond 5,6 km from shore. This, plus the high costs in patrolling the zones, prompted the commission in 1969 to reduce their number. This was a compromise with recreational fishermen who favored the retention of the original zones (Messersmith 1969a).

Management of the anchovy reduction fishery in recent years by the Fish and Game Commission has relied on four basic management tools: catch quota, season, area closures, and size limit. The nonreduction fishery has not required many regulations to limit take because of the self limiting nature of these fisheries. Under present fishing methods large-scale purse seining is not practical for the live-bait fishery, which must land these delicate fish in a lively condition, and the market for canned anchovies is presently insignificant.

The management tool receiving the most attention has been the catch quota. Beginning in 1965 the Fish and Game Commission established annual reduction quotas based on recommendations from the Department of Fish and Game and various user groups. On occasion these quotas were increased in-season depending on the department's assessment of the condition of the resource and on public input. Quotas and inseason increase were set at commission meetings open to the public and all interests, including government scientists, administrators, and user groups, were given opportunity to air their views. Typically the reduction fishery representatives would advocate a very liberal quota, government scientists and administrators would recommend a more cautious harvest based on the 1964 CalCOFI proposal, while live-bait fishermen and recreational fishing interests would urge a very restricted quota. The resulting quotas were always less than recommendations by industry and government scientists and administrators, but more than that recommended by recreational interests. This created a polarization between government and recreational interests. The latter viewed the government scientists as being in the “pocket” of industry since the scientists' recommendations were seen by the recreational interests as being closer to the desires of industry than to the desires of recreational fishermen.

Quotas were set at 68 039 tons during the seasons 1965–66 through 1969–70, 99 790 tons during the seasons 1970–71 through 1972–73, and 104 326 tons during the seasons 1973–74 through 1976–77. In-season quota increases were made during the 1969–70, 1973–74, and 1975–76 seasons resulting in revised quotas of 127 006, 122 470, and 136 078 tons respectively. During the period 1965 through 1975 the spawning biomass estimates ranged from 2 526 000 to 4 227 000 tons.

The next major development in anchovy management occurred in 1977 when the commission adopted a management plan developed by the California Department of Fish and Game (Greenhood et al. 1978). The plan contained options that would automatically set annual reduction quotas based on the estimated size of the spawning stock each year. The plan was developed to conform state management of anchovy to the guidelines established by the soon to be enacted Fishery Conservation and Management Act.

In developing the plan and alternative management options the department worked with an advisory group comprised of commercial and recreational user representatives. Thus, options presented to the commission represented the views of the various user groups. Four options were presented in the plan and one was recommended by the department for adoption. The three rejected options, and reasons for their disapproval by the department, were as follows:

• Continuation of existing management. This would have harvested anchovy at less than optimal levels, thus subjecting the surplus stocks to foreign allocation under the FCMA. Existing management did not set aside a minimum reserve stock to adequately maintain the reproductive potential and meet all forage and recreational needs.

• No reduction fishery. Prohibition of reduction fishing would result in economic loss to the fishing industry and would result in increased costs of feed to agricultural interests. The optimum yield surplus would then be made available to foreign fishing.

• Sport Fishing Institute (SFI) plan. The SFI plan provided for an allocation of no more than 10% of the spawning biomass when the biomass was greater than 907 185 tons, and zero when less. This proposal was very conservative when the spawning population approached 2,1 million tons and greater and did not take advantage of the growth potential of the resource. On the other extreme, as the resource approaches the minimum reserve this plan provided for a greater harvest than that recommended by the department.

The management plan recommended by the department and adopted by the commission had a number of safeguards to prevent overharvest and to protect other uses of the resource, including forage and live-bait. The principal points of the plan were:

• Establish a 907 185 tons spawning biomass reserve stock to provide fish for forage, live-bait and fresh fish fisheries.

• Maintain the spawning biomass near a level that has greatest growth potential (fluctuating around 2,1 million tons).

• Base annual quotas on spawning biomass estimates. The recommended quota was ⅓ of the excess over 907 185 tons when the spawning biomass fell below 2,1 million tons with an upper limit of 408233 tons when the biomass exceeds 2,1 million tons.

• Establish a 195 045 tons interim U.S. quota for the 1977–78 season pending completing negotiations with Mexico concerning joint management of the resource. (In 1977 the quota formula would have provided for the maximum quota of 408 233 tons for both U.S. and Mexico based on the most recent biomass estimate.)

The commission adopted the plan recommended by the department in 1977 for the 1977–78 season. However, they did not adopt the recommended California quota of 195 045 tons. Instead they opted for a continuation of the 104 326 tons quota of the preceding few years. This was decided after numerous heated public hearing of the proposed plan. Although the commission did not dispute the scientific basis for the recommended plan, they were swayed by the strong opposition of mainly recreational interests against an increased reduction quota for 1977–78. Also, there was no 1977 spawning biomass estimate. The most recent biomass estimate was 3269000 tons in 1975. Additional concerns related to the lack of a joint management agreement with Mexico and the need for an adequate reserve for forage and livebait.

The most significant new development in the plan was the use of a population model and harvest plan in setting catch quotas (Greenhood et al. 1978). The model was first presented at a meeting of Mexican and U.S. fishery scientists in 1976 (Radovich, unpublished) and is based on the pattern of anchovy population growth since 1951. The model assumes that population growth is limited by the small spawning biomass present when the population is low, and when the population is large the growth rate is limited because all suitable habitat is utilized, allowing no further expansion. Under these assumptions maximum growth rate occurs at a population size half way between zero and the maximum capacity.

The MSY developed by the model was 408 233 tons at a spawning biomass of 1,8 million tons. The annual catch at various sizes of the spawning biomass was estimated to stabilize at 398 254 tons. Maximum carrying capacity was estimated at 3,6 million tons. Prior to the development of the model it had been speculated by some that the resource had a potential yield in excess of 1 million tons. The model refuted earlier claims of a vast resource capable of sustaining 1 million ton yields but sustained the CalCOFI proposal that a 181 437 ton harvest could safely be taken from a biomass of approximately 1,8 million tons.

The plan retained then existing regulations on seasons, size limits for reduction fishing, and area closures that had been established primarily to reduce conflict between reduction and nonreduction fishing.

MANAGEMENT UNDER THE FCMA

The next phase of anchovy management came about as the result of the enactment of the FCMA in 1976, giving the U.S. government exclusive management authority over all fisheries within the zone extending from 5,6–370 km offshore. Fishery management plans prepared under the authority of the FCMA must be consistent with National Standards for Fishery Conservation and Management contained in the Act. Briefly the National Standards require that conservation and management measures shall:

• prevent overfishing while achieving the optimal yield;

• be based upon the best scientific information available;

• to the extent practicable manage an individual fish stock as a unit throughout its range;

• not discriminate between residents of the United States;

• promote efficiency in the utilization of fishery resources;

• minimize costs and avoid unnecessary duplication.

The above list is incomplete but presents the principal points covered by the standards.

Federal control over the anchovy fishery was assumed following approval of an anchovy fishery management plan by the U.S. Secretary of Commerce on 13 July 1978. The plan was developed by a team of scientists from the state and federal governments and academia under the auspices of the Pacific Fishery Management Council, a regional council established pursuant to the Act. The objectives of the plan were briefly as follows:

1. to prevent overfishing of the central stock within the U.S. Fishery Conservation Zone (FCZ) and Mexico;

2. to achieve the optimum yield on a continuing basis;

3. to maintain sufficient anchovy population within the FCZ to sustain adequate levels of predators;

4. to avoid conflicts between U.S. recreational and commercial fisheries;

5. to promote efficiency in the utilization of anchovies within the FCZ.

Scientific and statistical input to the plan was carefully evaluated by a standing committee of 11 experts appointed by the council. This committee was comprised of nine biologists, an economist, and an attorney. An advisory panel of nine persons representing commercial, recreational, and environmental interests provided input throughout plan development and adoption. All meetings of the council and the management development team were open to the public and public hearings were held to review the draft plan and the various options.

This was by far the most exhaustive examination of fishery management data and strategies ever conducted for the anchovy fishery and has been cited as an outstanding example of fishery management plan development under the FCMA.

Six different management measures were considered for the reduction fishery. These were seasons, area closures, size restriction, limited entry, sex restriction, and harvest quotas. Options for each measure ranged in number from one to six. The only option involving the nonreduction fishery was a guaranteed allocation.

The options receiving the most attention involved the setting of reduction quotas. The scientific basis for the quotas was the population model developed in the California plan. The model was refined and the resulting production curve gave a maximum yield of 439 078 tons at a spawning biomass of 1,6 million tons (U.S. Department of Commerce 1978; MacCall 1979). The options were developed on the premise that harvest levels must reflect the current status of the stock, so that a margin of growth is allowed when the biomass is low and greater quantities may be harvested when the biomass is high. Choice of a quota formula had to take into consideration the effects the take would have on the fish stock, the economic value, and the expected natural instability of the fish stocks. Domestic quotas also had to take into account the extent to which the resource is to be shared with Mexico.

Six harvest quota options were presented. These consisted of the existing California plan, alternatives developed by the plan development team, and options proposed by recreational and commercial interests. Each harvest formula had a cutoff below which the quota would be zero; a harvest quota which was a fraction of the biomass; and in some instances a maximum limit the quota could reach. The options were as follows:

Option 1 — Quota is ⅓ of the spawning biomass in excess of 907 185 tons, with an upper limit of 408 233 tons. (California Plan)

Option 2 — Quota is ⅓ of the spawning biomass in excess of 907 185 tons. (Option selected by council)

Option 3 — Quota is 1/5 of the spawning biomass in excess of 453 593 tons.

Option 4 — Quota is 1/10 of the spawning biomass, but is zero when the spawning biomass is less than 907 185 tons. (Suggested by recreational interests.)

Option 5 — Quota is 1/4 of the spawning biomass, but is zero when the spawning biomass is less than 907 185 tons.

Option 6 — Quota is ⅓ of the spawning biomass in excess of 453 593 tons. (Suggested by reduction fishing interests.)

Analyses of the probable effects alternative harvest formulas would have on several characteristics of the resource were presented in the plan to assist in selecting the formula most likely to satisfy three important plan objectives. These were the median biomass occurring under each harvest formula, the net economic value of the fishery, and the percent of years it is expected that the reduction fishery would not be allowed because of the biomass falling below the cutoff (Table 1).

Analyses of resource characteristics under various options in Table 1 indicates that even though the option selected does satisfy plan objectives there were other options that would have better met some of the plan objectives. For example, the California plan (Option 1) would have produced the same high economic benefits as Option 2 while at the same time better satisfying objectives of conservation of the resource and stability of the fishing industry. However, these differences are not great and the Council members could not put complete faith in such analyses of probable benefits.

The plan adopted is very close to the existing California plan. The harvest quota remains the same in that the total quota is set at ⅓ of the biomass over 907 185 tons. The major changes in the quota are: 1) the 408 233 ton limit is removed; 2) nonreduction fishing is not allowed when the spawning biomass is less than 90 718 tons; 3) when the spawning biomass is equal to or greater than 907 185 tons the total quota is limited to 70% of ⅓ of the spawning biomass in excess of 907 185 tons to provide an allocation to Mexico (the 70:30 allocation formula is based on distributional patterns of anchovy eggs and larvae; this is an interim allocation pending agreement with Mexico over joint management of the resource); and 4) the nonreduction fishery is limited to 11 430 tons when the spawning biomass is between 90 718 and 907 185 tons, and is allocated the first 11 430 tons of the quota when the biomass exceeds 907 185 tons.

The plan adopted included landing quotas for conservation reasons and for allocation amongst users, fishing seasons and area closures to reduce the possibility of conflicts between reduction and bait fishermen during periods of peak demand for live-bait, and a size limit. The minimum size limit of 12,5 cm was supported by commercial fishermen and it does give some protection to pre-spawners. Options for establishing limited entry and adjusting harvest quotas based on the sex ratio of the catch were not adopted.

Table 1. Selected resource characteristics under various quota options. (Adapted from U.S. Department of Commerce Northern Anchovy Fishery Management Plan, 1978).

The question to be asked now is, does the plan provide for the best use of the anchovy resource? Since the plan is essentially a compromise between competing users, it follows that few, if any, of the measures adopted will fully satisfy all users. The definition of best use will differ from user to user. Best use to a commercial harvester may be all fish that can be caught on a sustained basis to provide income to fishermen and processors and fish meal for agriculture. Under different economic conditions this could be the acceptable definition in the U.S., and it may be the prevailing position of the Mexican government. On the other extreme, best use could be defined as no fishery take to provide maximum forage for fish, birds and marine mammals. These extreme definitions of best use, however, are not appropriate under the guidelines of the FCMA considering the present condition of the resource and competing demands of the users. Overall the plan adopted appears to satisfy the stated objectives of the plan. How well the plan meets these objectives in practice will become evident as years pass.

According to the developers of the plan, the main strength in the plan is the theoretical robustness of the model (MacCall, personal communication). That is, the model calls for a reduced take when the spawning biomass is low, and hence the population growth potential is low, and provides for a larger take when the population and the growth potential is high. The reserve provides added protection, especially when the spawning population is low. The major concern now is the absence of an agreement with Mexico for joint management of the resource. Without such an agreement there will be no way of adjusting total harvest to reflect biomass fluctuations.

The first year of the anchovy fishery under federal jurisdiction produced some unexpected results. Spawning biomass estimates from 1965 through 1975 ranged from 2,5 million tons to 4,3 million tons and the reduction quotas never exceeded 127 000 tons. Under the management plan adopted by the council the allowable U.S. take would have ranged from around 381 000 tons to around 782 000 tons during that period. The spawning biomass estimate in 1977, however, dropped substantially to around 1,2 million tons, resulting in a total U.S. harvest quota for the 1978–79 season of 64 349 tons of which 47 627 were allocated to the southern California reduction fishery. Under the old California plan formula with no allocation for Mexico, the U.S. harvest quota would have been 91 928 tons. However, had there not been an anchovy biomass estimate in 1977, and there probably would not have been one in the absence of a federal anchovy management plan, the quota under California management authority would probably have been set at 104 326 tons for the 1978–79 season in keeping with the most current anchovy population data and management practices. Thus, the plan which under population levels of recent years would have allowed a significant quota increase, instead resulted in the lowest quota since the reduction fishery started in 1965, and lower than what probably would have been allowed under California management. This came as quite a shock to commercial interests who expected a much higher quota under federal control of the resource.

The reduction quota for the 1979–80 season has been set at 141 612 tons. Even though this is a record high quota, it is less than the median anchovy catch of 288 000 tons estimated in the plan. Applying the 70% U.S. allocation formula and subtracting the 11 430 tons allocated for nonreduction fishing produces a median U.S. reduction quota of around 190 000 tons.

FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

The concern now in anchovy management is where do we go from here? There are a number of weaknesses in the present management system that need to be corrected. The most urgent need is for a harvest agreement with Mexico. Mexico's fishery is presently unregulated by catch quota and the continued expansion of their fishery will negate our management efforts.

Another concern is the development of annual biomass estimates which are essential to the operation of the plan. Biomass estimates are based on egg and larvae surveys which are very expensive to conduct. Prior to the development of the anchovy plan the annual surveys had been reduced to once every three years. Now with the plan in place NMFS has decided to do at least an abbreviated survey annually. The reliance on this single method for estimating biomass is also of concern to the managers and investigations are underway to develop alternative methods of estimating biomass and recruitment into the fishery.

Finally, the role of anchovy in the southern California bight ecosystem is different now than during the 1950's and 1960's. The model used in the fishery management plan is based on the growth characteristics of the population during that period. Since then the Pacific mackerel, a known voracious predator of anchovy, has increased from a very depleted level in the 1950's and 1960's to a strong population at the present time. The predation of Pacific mackerel on anchovy could significantly decrease the anchovy's ability to sustain its population under the harvest rates called for in the plan. Also, if the Pacific sardine population was to significantly increase, this could lower the carrying capacity for anchovy. A true understanding of the role of anchovies in the southern California bight is not attainable in the foreseeable future, therefore the resolution of many of these problems will probably remain in the political arena.

In reality, the ultimate decision concerning the determination of best use of a resource has to be made in the political arena. Science and the best intentions of resource managers can only go so far in allocating resources for the best use. The final decision has to combine the best of science, sound management principles, and the judgment of the citizenry.

LITERATURE CITED

Frey, H.W., (ed). 1971 California's living marine resources and their utilization. Calif. Dep. Fish and Game. 148 p.

Greenhood, E.C., H.W. Frey, C.E. Blunt, Jr. and staff. 1978 Management plan for northern anchovy. Calif. Dep. Fish and Game, Marine Resources Management, Report No. 1:1–62.

MacCall, A.D. 1979 Population models for the northern anchovy (Engraulis mordax). Manuscript. To be published in: Rapp. P.-V. Reun. CIEM, (177)

Messersmith, J.D. 1969a Anchovy—small fish, big problem. Outdoor California. Calif. Dep. Fish and Game, 30(5):1–3.

Messersmith, J.D. 1969b A review of the California anchovy fishery and results of the 1965–66 and 1966–67 reduction seasons. In The northern anchovy (Engraulis mordax) and its fishery 1965–1968. Calif. Dep. Fish and Game Fish Bull., 147:6–32.

Radovich, J. 1980 The collapse of the California sardine fishery: what have we learned? In M.H. Glantz and J.D. Thompson, eds. Resources management and environmental uncertainty: lessons from coastal upwelling fisheries, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York.

U.S. Department of Commerce. 1978 Implementation of northern anchovy fishery management plan. Federal Register, 43(141):31651–31879.

Wine, V. and T. Hoban. 1976 Southern California independent sportfishing survey annual report. Calif. Fish and Game Marine Resources Tech. Rep., (76-14):1–299.