· Full name of arrangement
Agreeement on Cooperation in the Fishing Industry, 11 April 1975
Entry into force: 11 April 1975
Contracting parties: Russia (having succeeded the USSR as a party) and Norway
Source of arrangement text for this report: United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 983, pp. 8-9.
· Nature of arrangement (treaty, MOU, Joint Statement etc.)
Treaty.
· Scope (sectors covered)
General cooperation between the parties in respect of their fisheries interests within the area covered by the 1959 North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention.
· Provision for harmonisation regarding conservation and management (if any)
None.
· Maritime boundary delimitation aspect (if any)
None.
Furthermore, Art V states that “[n]othing in this Agreement shall affect the rights, existing or future claims or legal opinions of the Contracting Parties regarding the nature and scope of their fisheries jurisdiction”.
· Geographical scope
The area covered by the 1959 North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention.
· Consultative mechanism (if any)
Þ Primary consultative mechanism
To assist in implementing the Agreement, the parties are to establish the Joint Commission (Art III(1). Following entry into force of the Agreement, each party is to appoint one representative (and one alternate) to the Commission (Art III(2)).
The Commission is to inter alia: (a) consider all questions arising in connection with the implementation of the Agreement; (b) draw up plans for the development of the cooperation covered by the Agreement; (c) organise consultations; and (d) as necessary, draft proposals and recommendations for the parties (Art IV).
Þ Frequency of meetings
The Commission is to meet at least once a year (Art III(3)).
Þ Delegations
Honneland (2000) states that the Commission “includes members of the two countries fishery authorities, ministries of foreign affairs, marine scientists, and representatives of fishermen’s organizations”.
Þ Subsidiary bodies
Honneland (2000) refers to a working group, consisting of four representatives from each party, established at the 21st session of the Commission in 1992 “to consider the question of cooperation between the control bodies of the two states”. Honneland (2000) states that in 1993 the working group “presented a list of 18 proposals... [m]ost... regarding exchange and coordination of information and procedures”. There was a favourable response to these proposals by the Commission (see below).
Honneland (2000) states that “[t]he Parties also agreed to appoint a Permanent Committee under the Joint Commission that could meet at short notice when necessary to discuss management and enforcement issues. The committee was a continuation of the Expert Group and came to be known as the Permanent Russian-Norwegian Committee for Management and Enforcement Cooperation within the Fisheries Sector.... The number of representatives in the Norwegian delegation has varied from three to eleven, and in the Russian delegation from three to eight (excluding interpreters, but including observers)”. The Committee was established in 1993.
Þ Decision-making
[The Agreement does not expressly provide for a mechanism for decision-making by the Commission.]
Þ Nature of decisions (binding or advisory)
The Commission is to, as necessary, draft proposals and recommendations for the parties (Art IV).
· Elements of fisheries management covered
Þ Research and stock assessment
The parties agree to promote cooperation on a basis inter alia of reciprocity concerning practical problems in the matter of fisheries, and are to consult each other on such problems, paying special attention inter alia to the coordination of scientific research on the conservation and rational use of living resources within the area covered by the 1959 North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention (Art I).
The parties are to conduct a mutual exchange of information on fishing statistics and the results of fisheries research (Art I).
Þ Conservation and management
The parties agree to promote cooperation on a basis inter alia of reciprocity concerning practical problems in the matter of fisheries, and are to consult each other on such problems, paying special attention inter alia to measures for the conservation and rational use of living resources within the area covered by the 1959 North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention (Art I).
Þ Monitoring, control and surveillance
The Agreement does not expressly refer to cooperation on MCS. However, the 1978 Agreement provides for use of the Commission for certain MCS issues. Furthermore, in the 1993 the parties established the Permanent Russian-Norwegian Committee for Management and Enforcement Cooperation within the Fisheries Sector, under the Commission (Honneland [2000] - see above).
Measures developed through this Permanent Committee have included inter alia: (a) exchange of catch and landings data; (b) establishment of procedures for informal information exchange about the situation at sea (facilitated by Norwegian aid in improving communications); (c) monitoring of valid fishing and port tickets; (d) participation of inspectors from one party in inspections of that party’s vessels and in the ports and waters of the other party; (e) elaboration of joint conversion factors for fish products of all species (except haddock); (f) elaboration of joint procedures for opening and closing fishing grounds; and (g) establishment of joint seminars for enforcement officers (Honneland [2000]).
Þ Training
The parties are to exchange experience on matters relative to the development of fisheries, fishing methods, fish processing technology and methods of increasing fish stocks (Art I). Further, the parties are to contribute to cooperation between interested organisations, associations and enterprises in the fishing industry in matters of mutual interest (Art II).
Measures developed through the Permanent Russian-Norwegian Committee for Management and Enforcement Cooperation within the Fisheries Sector have included since 1993 inter alia: (a) participation of inspectors from one party in inspections of that party’s vessels and in the ports and waters of the other party; and (b) establishment of joint seminars for enforcement officers (Honneland [2000]).
· Provision for review (if any)
[The Agreement does not expressly provide for review.]
· Full name of arrangement
Agreement Concerning Mutual Relations in the Field of Fisheries, 15 October 1976
Entry into force: NOT KNOWN
Contracting parties: Russia (having succeeded the USSR as a party) and Norway
Source of arrangement text for this report: United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1157, pp. 147-149.
· Nature of arrangement (treaty, MOU, Joint Statement etc.)
Treaty.
· Scope (sectors covered)
· Provision for harmonisation regarding conservation and management (if any)
Art 4(2): “The Contracting Parties shall cooperate... with a view to ensuring the harmonisation of any new measures for the regulation of fishing in [specified] areas... in so far as is practically feasible.”
· Maritime boundary delimitation aspect (if any)
None.
· Geographical scope
Areas under the parties’ respective fisheries jurisdiction, beyond their territorial seas.
· Consultative mechanism (if any)
Þ Primary consultative mechanism
There is provision for using the Joint Commission (established under the Norway/Russia 1975 Agreement) for consultations on (a) reciprocal allocation of quotas (Art 2(b)) and (b) harmonisation of conservation and management measures (see below).
Þ Frequency of meetings
[Regarding Joint Commission, see summary of Norway/Russia 1975 Agreement.]
Þ Delegations
[Regarding Joint Commission, see summary of Norway/Russia 1975 Agreement.]
Þ Subsidiary bodies
[The Agreement does not expressly provide for any subsidiary bodies.]
Þ Decision-making
[Regarding Joint Commission, see summary of Norway/Russia 1975 Agreement.]
Þ Nature of decisions (binding or advisory)
[Regarding Joint Commission, see summary of Norway/Russia 1975 Agreement.]
· Elements of fisheries management covered
Þ Research and stock assessment
[The Agreement does not expressly provide for cooperation on research or stock assessment.]
Þ Conservation and management
The parties are to cooperate with a view to ensuring the harmonising of any new measures for the regulation of fishing in the areas under the parties’ respective fisheries jurisdiction (beyond their territorial seas) “in so far as practically feasible” (Art 4(2)). This cooperation is to be through consultations, either within the Joint Commission (established under the 1975 Agreement) or through “other suitable channels” (Arts 4(2) and 2(b)).
Regarding anadromous stocks, the parties agree not to fish for anadromous stocks beyond areas under their respective fisheries jurisdictions (Art 6). The parties are to implement this principle through inter alia bilateral agreements (Art 6).
The parties undertake to cooperate directly and through appropriate international organisations to ensure responsible management and conservation of the living resources of the sea, particularly in respect of: (a) stocks of fish and other living resources occurring within the parties’ respective fisheries jurisdictions (but beyond their territorial seas); (b) stocks of fish occurring in the high seas beyond and adjacent to areas under the parties’ respective fisheries jurisdictions; and (c) stocks having a relation of mutual dependence with the stocks referred to in “(a)” and “(b)” above.
Þ Monitoring, control and surveillance
Each party is to provide the other with details of its fishing vessels (and fishing support or supply vessels specifically accompanying such vessels) that will be engaged in fishing for the allocated quotas in the waters of the other party (Art 3).
Each party is to ensure that its nationals and vessels comply inter alia with the requirement (established in Art 4(1)) that vessels of one party, when fishing in the waters of the other party, comply with that latter party’s “conservation measures, laws and regulations” (Art 5(1)).
Þ Training
[The Agreement does not expressly provide for cooperation on training.]
· Provision for review (if any)
[The Agreement does not expressly provide for review.]
· Full name of arrangement
Agreement on an Interim Practical Arrangement for Fishing in an Adjoining Area in the Barents Sea, 11 January 1978
Entry into force: 27 April 1978
Contracting parties: Russia (having succeeded the USSR as a party) and Norway
I have not had access to this instrument (in English), and so rely on Hey (1989), Churchill & Ulfstein (1992) and Churchill (1993) in this respect. References below to “EOL” refers to “Exchange of Letters”.
· Nature of arrangement (treaty, MOU, Joint Statement etc.)
Churchill & Ulfstein state that “the Agreement consist of three parts:... exchanged letters, an annex with the relevant coordinates, and a protocol containing substantive provisions and corresponding statements made by the two parties upon exchange of letters”.
· Scope (sectors covered)
A Provisional Joint Fishing Zone is established in the Barents Sea, pending the delimitation of the maritime boundary between the two parties.
Hey (referring to the EOL and to Protocol Arts 5-8) states that “[c]ooperation between the parties is referred to in respect of: the determination of TACs, the exchange of information related to vessels, the amending of articles [of the Protocol] concerned with fishing by vessels from third states, conservation measures, and the management of Atlantic-Scandinavian herring”.
· Provision for harmonisation regarding conservation and management (if any)
[No information is provided in Hey, Churchill & Ulfstein or Churchill in this respect.]
· Maritime boundary delimitation aspect (if any)
The Agreement establishes a Provisional Joint Fishing Zone covering inter alia an area in which the maritime boundary between the two parties has not yet been delimited (see below).
Churchill & Ulfstein state that the statements made by the parties upon the exchange of letters confirms “the parties’ intention to reach a final delimitation solution and the non-prejudicial character of the Agreement”.
· Geographical scope
The Barents Sea. Churchill states “the agreement applies to a clearly defined area of some 67,500 km2. This area includes not only a part of the disputed EEZ boundary zone, but also some parts of what are indubitably the Norwegian and Soviet EEZs”.
· Consultative mechanism (if any)
Þ Primary consultative mechanism
Hey (analysing the EOL and Protocol Arts 5-8) states that “the exchange of information regarding vessels fishing in the area is to take place directly between the parties, whereas the other issues with respect to which the Agreement requires cooperation are to be dealt with through the [Joint Commission]” (established by the 1975 Agreement).
Þ Frequency of meetings
[Regarding Joint Commission, see summary of Norway/Russia 1975 Agreement.]
Þ Delegations
[Regarding Joint Commission, see summary of Norway/Russia 1975 Agreement.]
Þ Subsidiary bodies
[No information is provided in Hey, Churchill & Ulfstein or Churchill in this respect.]
Þ Decision-making
[Regarding Joint Commission, see summary of Norway/Russia 1975 Agreement.]
Þ Nature of decisions (binding or advisory)
[Regarding Joint Commission, see summary of Norway/Russia 1975 Agreement.]
· Elements of fisheries management covered
Þ Research and stock assessment
[No information is provided in Hey, Churchill & Ulfstein or Churchill in this respect.]
Þ Conservation and management
Hey (referring to the EOL and to Protocol Art 7) states that “[c]ooperation between the parties is referred to in respect of [inter alia]... the determination of TACs,... conservation measures, and the management of Atlantic-Scandinavian herring”. These issues are to be dealt with through the Commission (see above).
The TACs determined by the Commission are based on recommendations by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). Hey (referring to the EOL and to Protocol Art 6(c)) states that “[t]he manner in which the TACs are to be allocated is provided in the agreement. Each party is entitled to half of the TACs and allocations for third states are to be determined through consultation between the parties. In addition, the Protocol provides that fish caught by foreign vessels licensed by the one party shall be deducted from the allocations made to that party, and that fish caught by a vessel licensed by both parties shall be deducted in equal parts from the allocations made to each party”.
Hey (referring to Protocol Art 7) states that “the agreement provides that the regulations on gear, minimum mesh size and minimum fish size as recommended by NEAFC [North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission]... have been applied where appropriate” and adds that “[t]hree regulations applicable to specific species are also included in the Protocol”. These latter regulations stated inter alia that (a) vessels of third states are not to fish for Atlanto-Scandic herring and (b) no vessels are to fish for salmon (Hey).
Þ Monitoring, control and surveillance
Hey (referring to Protocol Art 3) states that “each party is to refrain from exercising jurisdiction with respect to vessels flying the flag of the other party”. Churchill & Ulfstein additionally conclude that “one party is excluded from enforcing the regulations [laid down in the Protocol or established by the Commssion] against [third state] vessels licensed by the other party”. However, Churchill & Ulfstein (referring to Protocol Art 10(b)) state that “[b]oth parties may take enforcement action against vessels which do not have a licence from either of the parties”.
Hey (referring to Protocol Arts 5, 6 & 8) states that “[c]ooperation between the parties is referred to in respect of [inter alia]... the exchange of information related to vessels [and] the amending of articles [of the Protocol] concerned with fishing by vessels from third states”. The former issue is to be dealt with directly between the parties, the latter issue is to be dealt with through the Commission (see above).
Churchill & Ulfstein (referring to Protocol Art 4-7) state that “[v]essels from third states shall be allowed access only if licensed by one or both parties. Conditions for third states fishing are set out... and it is required that the licensing party informs the other party about the vessels licensed”.
Þ Training
[No information is provided in Hey, Churchill & Ulfstein or Churchill in this respect.]
· Provision for review (if any)
[No information is provided in Hey, Churchill & Ulfstein or Churchill in this respect.]
· Full name of arrangement
Agreeement between Iceland, Norway and Russia Concerning Certain Aspects of Cooperation in the Area of Fisheries, 15 May 1999.
Entered into force: NOT KNOWN
Signatories: Iceland, Norway, Russia
Source of arrangement text for this report: internet
-
http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/barents.htm
· Nature of arrangement (treaty, MOU, Joint Statement etc.)
Treaty.
· Scope (sectors covered)
Fisheries only. The main theme is a reciprocal access regime, effected through two subsidiary Protocols (Norway/Iceland and Russia/Iceland).
· Provision for harmonisation regarding conservation and management (if any)
None.
· Maritime boundary delimitation aspect (if any)
None.
· Geographical scope
The EEZs of the parties, and the high seas portion of the Barents Sea.
· Consultative mechanism (if any)
None.
Þ Primary consultative mechanism
Þ Frequency of meetings
Þ Delegations
Þ Subsidiary bodies
Þ Decision-making
Þ Nature of decisions (binding or advisory)
· Elements of fisheries management covered
Þ Research and stock assessment
[Neither the Agreement nor the Protocols make any express reference to cooperation on research or stock assessment.]
Þ Conservation and management
The two Protocols both make reference to the North East Arctic cod, a stock shared between Norway and Russia and for which a TAC (of 480,000 tons for 1999) has been “recognized” by these two States. (The TAC was actually set by the Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission [Churchill, 1999]). Through their respective Protocols with Iceland, Norway and Russia are coordinating access by Iceland to this stock both in their respective waters and in terms of an allocation to Iceland from the overall stock. This is evidently a form of cooperation between two coastal States on the conservation and management of a shared stock. (However, it should be pointed out that this apparent cooperation over a shared stock was in fact largely driven by the desire of Norway and Russia to end fishing by Iceland for that part of the stock straddling onto the high seas part of the Barents Sea [Churchill, 1999].)
In the two Protocols, Iceland undertakes not to fish for Barents Sea capelin (another stock shared between Norway and Russia) for the duration of the Agreement. (However, Churchill [1999] reports that that the capelin fishery has in fact been closed to Norwegian and Russian vessels since 1993, due to the poor state of the stock.)
Þ Monitoring, control and surveillance
Within the Agreement, Art 5 requires the flag State to ensure compliance with “the conservation and management measures as well as national rules and regulations established for the operation of fishing activities referred to in Article 2”. (Art 2 refers to the power of the parties to allow reciprocal access.)
Furthermore, the parties agree to work together to take measures “when relevant” to discourage flag-hopping by their nationals “for the purpose of engaging in fishing activities that undermine the effectiveness” of the Agreement and of the Art 5 management measures (Art 6). The parties agree to ban landings of catches “if it has been established that such catches have been taken in a manner which undermines the effectiveness” of the Agreement and Art 5 management measures, and to deny port access to vessels that have engaged in such activities (Art 7).
Though the motivation for the Art 6 and 7 measures may have been the threats posed by non-party vessels fishing on the high seas in the Barents Sea, such measures are also applicable to nationals or vessels (as appropriate) of the parties fishing in the EEZs of the parties.
The two Protocols place different emphasis on MCS. The Norway/Iceland Protocol does not refer to MCS. The Russia/Iceland Protocol, in its Art 7, refers quite extensively to MCS (although largely in the sense of MCS applied by Russia to Icelandic vessels fishing in Russia’s waters).
Þ Training
[Neither the Agreement nor the Protocols make any express reference to cooperation on research or stock assessment.]
· Provision for review (if any)
Any party may request review of the Agreement or a Protocol to which it is a party, by formal notification to the Depositary through diplomatic channels, no later than six months before 31 December 2002 or before the expiration of any subsequent four year period (Art 12(3)).
· Full name of arrangement
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the Baltic Sea and the Belts, 13 September 1973
Entry into force: 27 July 1974
Protocol, 11 November 1982
Entry into force: 10 February 1984
Contracting parties to Convention as amended by Protocol: Estonia, European Community, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia (having succeeded the USSR as a party).
Source of arrangement text for this report: internet - http://www.ibsfc.org/
References below to “the Convention” are references to the Convention as amended by the Protocol (and by a further amendment made in September 1994, entering into force on 31 December 1996).
· Nature of arrangement (treaty, MOU, Joint Statement etc.)
Treaty.
· Scope (sectors covered)
Fisheries only. Art II(2) states that the Convention “shall apply to all fish species and other living marine resources in the Convention Area”.
· Provision for harmonisation regarding conservation and management (if any)
Only in the sense that the recommendations of the International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission are binding (on non-objecting parties).
· Maritime boundary delimitation aspect (if any)
None.
Furthermore, Art III states that nothing in the Convention “shall be deemed to affect the rights, claims or view of any Contracting State in regard to the limits of territorial waters and to the extent of jurisdiction over fisheries, according to international law”.
· Geographical scope
All waters of the Baltic Sea and the Belts excluding internal waters (Art II(1)). There is no high seas elements to the Baltic Sea or the Belts.
· Consultative mechanism (if any)
Þ Primary consultative mechanism
Art V(1) establishes the “International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission”. The Commission is to elect a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman from amongst its members (Art V(3)). The Commission has its office in Warsaw (Art VI(1)). Art VI(2) states that “[t]he Commission shall appoint its Secretary and as it may require appropriate staff to assist him”. The office of the Commission is to be in Warsaw (Art VI(1). The Commission is to adopt its rules of procedure (and other provisions which the Commission considers necessary for its work) (Art VI(3)) and its financial rules (Art VII(1)).
By Art IX(1), the Commission is to: (a) coordinate resource management “by collecting, aggregating, analysing and disseminating statistical data”; (b) promote coordination, “as appropriate”, of scientific research; (c) prepare and submit recommendations “concerning measures referred to in Article X” (see below) for consideration by the parties; and (d) to examine certain information submitted by the parties.
Þ Frequency of meetings
Except where the Commission decides otherwise, its sessions are to be held every two years (Art VIII(1)). In practice, the Commission meets annually (Rules of Procedure for the Commission, rule 6.1).
The Commission is to meet once every two years, “[e]xcept where the Commission decides otherwise”; however, ad hoc meetings may occur upon the request of a party if that request is supported by another party (Art VIII(1)).
Þ Delegations
Art V(2) states that each party may appoint “not more than two representatives as members of the Commission and such experts and advisers to assist them as that State may determine”. The Commission is to elect a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman from among the representatives of the different parties (Art V(3)); the Chairman does not have a vote, but the relevant party may then appoint another representative to serve in the Chairman’s place.
Þ Subsidiary bodies
Art IX(3) states that “[t]o perform its functions the Commission may set up working groups or other subsidiary bodies and determine their composition and terms of reference”. Examples of bodies established include the following:
Standing Working Group on Regulatory Measures
Standing Working Group on Finance and Administration
Working Group on Control and Enforcement
IBSFC Salmon Action Plan Surveillance Group
Working Group on Long Term Management Objectives and Strategies for Herring and Sprat
Working Group on Fishery RulesÞ Decision-making
Each party is to have one vote. Decisions and recommendations of the Commission are to be adopted by a two-thirds majority of votes of the Contracting States, present and voting at the meeting. However, any recommendation relating to a party’s waters shall only enter into force for that party only if that party votes for it (Art VIII(3)).
Art XI establishes an objection procedure. Thus though recommendations are binding on the parties, a recommendation will not become binding on a party that had objected to it. A party may at any point withdrawn its objection. Art XI also establishes a termination procedure: from after the date of entry into force of a recommendation a party may notify its termination of acceptance, whereupon the recommendation will cease to be binding on that party one year later.
Þ Nature of decisions (binding or advisory)
Binding. (See above.)
· Elements of fisheries management covered
ÞResearch and stock assessment
Art IX(2) establishes a linkage between the Commission and the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), whereby the Commission in implementing its functions is to “where appropriate, seek the services” of ICES.
Art XIV is clear that the Convention does not apply to operations conducted solely for the purpose of scientific investigations by vessels authorized by a party for that purpose, or to fish and other marine organisms taken in the course of such operations (on the condition that such catch shall not be sold, exposed or offered for sale).
Þ Conservation and management
The types of measures concerning which the Commission may make recommendations to the parties include inter alia: (a) regulation of fishing gear, appliances and catching methods; (b) regulation of size limits of fish; (c) establishment of closed seasons or closed areas; (d) establishing TACs or fishing effort limits, including TACs for areas under the fisheries jurisdiction of parties; and (e) “any other measures related to the conservation and rational exploitation of the living marine resources” (Art X).
Each party is under a duty to implement recommendations (both within its territorial sea and in its fisheries jurisdiction waters) (Art XII(2)).
In practice, the Commission has established a consolidated set of Fishery Rules. This is updated after each Commission meeting. They include rules on inter alia: inter-annual TAC flexibility; quota exchange and quota transfers; catch reporting; refusal of landings; logbooks; prohibitions on certain types of fishery (end use of fish; method; species); prohibitions on certain species or sizes of fish on board; gear stowage; permissable by-catch; discarding; gear characteristics; marking of fishing gear; and closed areas and seasons.
The TACs themselves are listed separately from the Fishery Rules. The TACs are established each year at the Commission meeting for the following year, for the main four commercially exploited species, i.e. cod, herring, salmon, and sprat. The Commission website reports that “TACs have been the main tool or basic tool of the management procedure and they have been introduced first in 1977 for cod, sprat and herring, and in 1988 for salmon”.
Long-term management schemes have been adopted. The Commission website states that these include: (a) the 1997 Salmon Action Plan; (b) the 1999 Long Term Management Strategy for Cod Stocks in the Baltic Sea; and (c) the 2000 Long Term Management Strategy for the Sprat Stock; a Long Term Strategy for the Herring Stock will be further discussed in 2001.
Action Programmes for all fisheries were adopted by early 1998. The Commission website states that “[p]ending ongoing analysis by ICES, IBSFC intends to implement these Action Programmes by establishing stock-specific ‘target reference points’ and ‘limit reference points’, as provided for in... the FAO Code of Conduct... with the objective to achieve ‘sustainability’ well before 2030”.
Þ Monitoring, control and surveillance
Each party is under a duty to take appropriate measures to ensure compliance by its nationals and vessels with the Convention and recommendations (Art XII(1)), to take appropriate action in case of infringement (Art XII(1)) and to inform the Commission of these measures and action (Art XII(3)).
In that (a) the Commission may prepare and submit recommendations “concerning measures referred to in Article X” for consideration by the parties (Art IX(1), (b) most of the measures in Art X are expressly conservation and management measures and (c) Art X inter alia also refers to “any other measures related to the conservation and rational exploitation of the living marine resources”, the Commission’s competence is arguably extended to recommendations relating to MCS.
Þ Training
[The Convention does not expressly provide for cooperation on training.]
· Provision for review (if any)
[The Convention does not expressly provide for review.]
· Full name of arrangement
Agreement for the Establishment of a General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean
The Agreement analysed below is that amended up to and including 1997. However, it is to be emphasised that not all of the amendments have yet entered into force.
Accepting parties to original agreement: Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, European Community, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Romania, Spain, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Yugoslavia.
Accepting parties to agreement as amended up to and including 1997: Cyprus, European Community, France, Italy, Malta, Turkey.
Source of arrangement text for this report: internet - http://www.fao.org/Legal/default.htm
· Nature of arrangement (treaty, MOU, Joint Statement etc.)
Treaty.
· Scope (sectors covered)
Fisheries and aquaculture in the Mediterranean and Black Sea and connecting waters. The Agreement establishes the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (see below).
· Provision for harmonisation regarding conservation and management (if any)
Only in the sense that the recommendations of the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean on conservation and management measures are binding (on non-objecting parties).
· Maritime boundary delimitation aspect (if any)
None.
· Geographical scope
The Mediterranean and the Black Sea and connecting waters (referred to in the Agreement as “the Region”) (Art IV and Preamble). The Members, when accepting the Agreement, are to state explicitly to which territories their participation is to extend, and in the absence of such a declaration, participation is to be deemed to apply to all the territories for the international relations of which the Member is responsible (Art XV).
· Consultative mechanism (if any)
Þ Primary consultative mechanism
Art I(1) establishes the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean, “within the framework of the Food and Agriculture Organization”. The Commission is to elect a Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen (Art II(9)). The seat of the Commission is to be in Rome (Art II(11). The Commission may, by a two-thirds majority of its membership, adopt and amend its own Rules of Procedure (Art II(12) and Financial Regulations (Art II(13). The Commission may accept donations and other forms of assistance from organizations, individuals and other sources for purposes connected with the fulfilment of any of its functions, donations being placed in a Trust Fund (Art IX(6-7) and Art X(6)).
The Members of the Commission are to be such Members and Associate Members of the FAO and such non-Member States as are members of the United Nations (or any of its Specialized Agencies or the International Atomic Energy Agency) that are: (a) coastal States or Associate Members situated wholly or partly within “the Region”, (b) States or Associate Members whose vessels engage in fishing in the Region for stocks covered by the Agreement, or (c) regional economic integration organizations of which any State referred to above is a member and to which that State has transferred competence over matters within the purview of the Agreement; and which accept the Agreement (Art I(2)).
The purpose of the Commission is to promote inter alia the development, conservation, rational management and best utilization of living marine resources. Its functions and responsibilities are to inter alia: (a) review the state of these resources and the corresponding fisheries; (b) formulate and recommend appropriate measures (including implementing measures) for the conservation and rational management of living marine resources (see below); (c) encourage, recommend, coordinate and, as appropriate, undertake training and extension activities in all aspects of fisheries; and (d) encourage, recommend, coordinate and, as appropriate, undertake research and development activities (see below) (Art III(1)).
There is to be a Secretariat (implied by Arts X(2) & XIII(3)). The Secretary of the Commission is to be appointed by the FAO Director-General with the approval of the Commission (or the Members) (Art XI(1)).
Þ Frequency of meetings
The Chairman of the Commission is to normally convene a regular session of the Commission every year unless otherwise directed by a majority of the Members (Art II(10)).
Þ Delegations
Each Member is to be represented at sessions of the Commission by one delegate, who may be accompanied by an alternate and by experts and advisers (Art II(1)).
Þ Subsidiary bodies
The Commission may establish (a) temporary, special or standing committees to study and report on matters pertaining to the purposes of the Commission and (b) working groups to study and recommend on specific technical problems (Art VII(1)).
The following subsidiary bodies currently exist:
Þ Decision-making
Subject to rules relating to Regional Economic Integration Organizations (not related here) each Member is to have one vote, decisions of the Commission are to be taken by a majority of the votes cast, except as otherwise provided by the Agreement and a majority of the total membership of the Commission is to constitute a quorum (Art II).
However, the Commission’s recommendations on conservation and management measures are to be adopted by a two-thirds majority of Members of the Commission present and voting (Art V(1)). The Agreement provides for an objection procedure. Any Member may within 120 days of the date of notification of a recommendation object to it and in that event shall not be bound by it; an objection may be withdrawn at any time (Art V(3)).
Þ Nature of decisions (binding or advisory)
Binding, in that non-objecting Members are to give effect to any Commission recommendations on conservation and management measures from the date determined by the Commission (Art V(2)).
· Elements of fisheries management covered
ÞResearch and stock assessment
The functions and responsibilities of the Commission are to inter alia: (a) to review the state of the resources and the corresponding fisheries; and (b) to encourage, recommend, coordinate and, as appropriate, undertake research and development activities, including cooperative projects in the areas of fisheries and the protection of living marine resources (Art III(1)).
Þ Conservation and management
The functions and responsibilities of the Commission are to inter alia formulate and recommend appropriate measures (including implementing measures) for the conservation and rational management of living marine resources (Art III(1)(b)(i)). These are to include measures: (a) regulating fishing methods and fishing gear; (b) prescribing the minimum size for individuals of specified species; (c) establishing open and closed fishing seasons and areas; and (d) regulating the amount of total catch and of fishing effort and their allocation among Members.
When formulating and recommending such measures, the Commission is to apply the precautionary approach, taking into account also the best scientific evidence available and the need to promote the development and proper utilisation of the marine living resources (Art III(2).
Þ Monitoring, control and surveillance
The conservation and management function of the Commission is not restricted to the formulation and recommendation of conservation and management measures. It also includes the formulation and recommendation of measures to implement such recommendations (Art III(1)(b)(ii)). Implementation could be interpreted as extending to MCS.
Þ Training
The functions and responsibilities of the Commission are to inter alia encourage, recommend, coordinate and, as appropriate, undertake training and extension activities in all aspects of fisheries (Art III(1)).
· Provision for review (if any)
[The Agreement does not expressly provide for review.]
· Full name of arrangement
Convention Concerning Fishing in the Black Sea, 7 July 1959
Entry into force: 21 March 1960
Contracting parties: Russia (having succeeded the USSR as a party), Bulgaria, Romania
Source of arrangement text for this report: internet
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http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/blacksea.htm
NOTE: The Convention is in the process of replacement by the Convention for Fisheries and Conservation of Natural Resources of the Black Sea; negotiations include Georgia, Turkey, Ukraine as well as parties to the 1959 Convention.
· Nature of arrangement (treaty, MOU, Joint Statement etc.)
Treaty.
· Scope (sectors covered)
Fisheries research, fisheries conservation and management, fishing technique and refuges for fishing vessels in the Black Sea.
The parties agree to cooperate and to assist one another in: (a) carrying on rational fishing in the Black Sea; (b) improving fishing technique; and (c) carrying out research in the field of ichthyology and hydrobiology for the purpose of maintaining and augmenting the stocks of fish in the Black Sea with a view to increasing the yield (Art 1). However, Art 1 adds that the provisions of the Convention are not to affect the status of the territorial and inland waters of the parties.
Art 11 states that the Convention is not to impede the conclusion of bilateral agreements on matters relating to fishing in the Black Sea between any two parties or between a party and any other Black Sea State, so long as such agreements do not conflict with the terms of the Convention.
· Provision for harmonisation regarding conservation and management (if any)
· Maritime boundary delimitation aspect (if any)
None.
· Geographical scope
The Black Sea (with the exception of the waters of Black Sea non-contracting parties).
· Consultative mechanism (if any)
Þ Primary consultative mechanism
Art 8 establishes the Joint Commission, which is to function under a statute drafted by it at its first meeting and approved by the parties.
The duties of the Commission are to inter alia: (a) work out agreed measures to regulate fishing; (b) introduce amendments to Art 5 concerning the species and dimensions of fish (see below); (c) coordinate the planning of fisheries scientific research projects; and (d) determine the nature and extent of the statistical and other data which each party is to supply to the Commission for the purpose of implementing the Convention (Art 9).
Þ Frequency of meetings
The Commission is to meet at least once a year in the territory of each of the parties in turn (Art 8).
Þ Delegations
Each party is to appoint one representative to the Commission (Art 8).
Þ Subsidiary bodies
[The Convention does not expressly provide for any subsidiary bodies.]
Þ Decision-making
Recommendations and decisions are to be deemed to be adopted by the Commission if they receive the favourable votes of the representatives of all the parties (Art 10).
Þ Nature of decisions (binding or advisory)
Binding, in that on the matter of introducing amendments to Art 5 concerning the species and dimensions of fish, the Commission may take decisions (Art 10).
Advisory, in that on that on all matters within its competence (see Art 9 - see above), the Commission may only make recommendations to the parties (Art 10). Such recommendations are to be submitted to the parties for approval and may be given effect if none of the parties raises objections within four months (Art 10).
· Elements of fisheries management covered
Þ Research and stock assessment
The duties of the Commission are to inter alia: (a) coordinate the planning of fisheries scientific research projects; and (b) determine the nature and extent of the statistical and other data which each party is to supply to the Commission for the purpose of implementing the Convention (Art 9).
For the purpose of preparing forecasts for fishing in the Black Sea, the parties agree to exchange operational information concerning the migration of industrial fish, indicating the time and place at which they congregate, the direction of movement, the density of the schools, and the hydrometeorological conditions in which such congregations and migrations are observed (Art 6).
With a view to the rational utilization of Black Sea fish stocks, the parties agree to exchange information annually on the results of scientific research on marine ichthyology, hydrobiology and fishing technique. Furthermore, the parties are to exchange statistical data on catches of fish (Art 7).
Þ Conservation and management
The duties of the Commission are to inter alia: (a) work out agreed measures to regulate fishing; and (b) introduce amendments to Art 5 concerning the species and dimensions of fish (see below) (Art 9).
The Convention establishes minimum sizes “at which fish may be taken” for specified species and requires that any fish taken which is under the prescribed size must be put back in the sea (Art 5). However, the taking of fish of such species under the prescribed minimum size is to be permissible in specified percentage proportions (Art 5). The taking of Acipenser nudiventris is to be prohibited for five years from the date of entry into force of the Convention (Art 5).
Þ Monitoring, control and surveillance
[The Convention does not expressly provide for cooperation on MCS.]
Þ Training
The parties agree to inter alia assist one another in (a) carrying on rational fishing, (b) improving fishing technique, and (c) carrying out research in specified areas (Art 1 - see above).
The Commission is to inter alia work out agreed measures to develop industrial fishing technique (Art 9).
· Provision for review (if any)
[The Convention does not expressly provide for review.]
· Full name of arrangement
Agreement for the Establishment of the Regional Commission for Fisheries, 11 November 1999
Entry into force: not yet in force
Accepting parties: Qatar, Saudi Arabia
Source of arrangement text for this report: internet
-
http://www.fao.org/fi/body/rfb/RECOFI/recofi_agreement_text.htm
· Nature of arrangement (treaty, MOU, Joint Statement etc.)
Treaty.
The Agreement was adopted at the 117th Session of the FAO Council.
· Scope (sectors covered)
Fisheries and aquaculture in the Arabian/Persian Gulf. The Agreement establishes the Regional Commission for Fisheries (see below).
· Provision for harmonisation regarding conservation and management (if any)
Only in the sense that the recommendations of the Regional Commission for Fisheries on conservation and management measures are binding (on non-objecting parties).
· Maritime boundary delimitation aspect (if any)
None.
· Geographical scope
The geographical area covered, known as “the Area” is defined in Art IV. However, broadly speaking, the area covered is the waters of the Arabian/Persian Gulf (with the exception of the parties’ internal waters).
· Consultative mechanism (if any)
Þ Primary consultative mechanism
Art I(1) establishes the Regional Commission for Fisheries, “within the framework of the Food and Agriculture Organization”. The Commission is to elect a Chairperson and two Vice-Chairpersons (Art II(2)). The seat of the Commission is to be in Cairo (Art II(5)). The Commission may, by a two-thirds majority of its membership, adopt and amend its own Rules of Procedure (Art II(7)) and Financial Regulations (Art II(8)). The Commission may accept donations and other forms of assistance from organizations, individuals and other sources for purposes connected with the fulfilment of any of its functions, donations being placed in a Trust Fund (Art IX(5-6) and Art X(5)).
The purpose of the Commission is to promote inter alia the development, conservation, rational management and best utilization of living marine resources. Its functions and responsibilities are to inter alia: (a) review the state of the resources and the corresponding fisheries; (b) formulate and recommend appropriate measures (including implementing measures) for the conservation and rational management of living marine resources (see below); (c) encourage, recommend, coordinate and, as appropriate, undertake training and extension activities in all aspects of fisheries; and (d) encourage, recommend, coordinate and, as appropriate, undertake research and development activities (see below) (Art III(1)).
Membership of the Commission is to be open to Members and Associate Members of the FAO and such non-member States of the FAO as are Members of the United Nations (or any of its Specialized Agencies or the International Atomic Energy Agency) that are coastal States or Associate Members which territories are situated wholly or partly within “the Area” (see below) and that accept the Agreement (Art I(2)).
The FAO is to provide the Commission’s Secretariat, with a Secretary appointed by, and responsible to, the FAO Director-General (Art II(6) and Art XI(1)).
Þ Frequency of meetings
The Chairperson of the Commission is to normally convene a regular session of the Commission every year unless otherwise directed by a majority of the members (Art II(4)).
Þ Delegations
Each member is to represented at sessions of the Commission by one delegate, who may be accompanied by an alternate and by experts and advisers (Art II(1)).
Þ Subsidiary bodies
The Commission may establish (a) temporary, special or standing committees to study and report on matters pertaining to the purposes of the Commission and (b) working groups to study and recommend on specific technical problems (Art VII(1)).
Þ Decision-making
Each member is to have one vote; in general, decisions of the Commission are to be taken by a majority of the votes cast, except as otherwise provided by the Agreement and a majority of the total membership of the Commission is to constitute a quorum (Art II(2)).
However, the Commission’s recommendations on conservation and management measures are to be adopted by a two-thirds majority of Members of the Commission present and voting (Art V(1)). The Agreement provides for an objection procedure. Any Member may within 120 days of the date of notification of a recommendation object to it and in that event shall not be bound by it; an objection may be withdrawn at any time (Art V(3)).
Þ Nature of decisions (binding or advisory)
Binding, in that non-objecting Members are to give effect to any Commission recommendations on conservation and management measures from the date determined by the Commission (Art V(2)).
· Elements of fisheries management covered
Þ Research and stock assessment
The functions and responsibilities of the Commission are to inter alia: (a) to review the state of the resources and the corresponding fisheries; and (b) to encourage, recommend, coordinate and, as appropriate, undertake research and development activities, including cooperative projects in the areas of fisheries and the protection of living marine resources (Art III(1)).
Þ Conservation and management
The functions and responsibilities of the Commission are to inter alia formulate and recommend appropriate measures (including implementing measures) for the conservation and rational management of living marine resources (Art III(1)(b)(i)). These are to include measures: (a) regulating fishing methods and fishing gear; (b) prescribing the minimum size for individuals of specified species; (c) establishing open and closed fishing seasons and areas; and (d) regulating the amount of total catch and of fishing effort and their allocation among Members.
When formulating and recommending such measures, the Commission is to apply the precautionary approach, taking into account also the best scientific evidence available and the need to promote the development and proper utilisation of the marine living resources (Art III(2).
Þ Monitoring, control and surveillance
The conservation and management function of the Commission is not restricted to the formulation and recommendation of conservation and management measures. It also includes the formulation and recommendation of measures to implement such recommendations (Art III(1)(b)(ii)). Implementation could be interpreted as extending to MCS.
Þ Training
The functions and responsibilities of the Commission are to inter alia encourage, recommend, coordinate and, as appropriate, undertake training and extension activities in all aspects of fisheries (Art III(1)).
· Provision for review (if any)
[The Agreement does not expressly provide for review.]
· Full name of arrangement
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada on Fisheries Enforcement, 26 September 1990
Entry into force: 16 December 1991
Contracting parties: Canada, United States of America
Source of arrangement text for this report: hard copy supplied by US and Canadian Governments.
· Nature of arrangement (treaty, MOU, Joint Statement etc.)
Treaty.
· Scope (sectors covered)
A reciprocal fisheries enforcement arrangement covering the parties’ respective internal waters, territorial seas and 200 nautical mile zones.
· Provision for harmonisation regarding conservation and management (if any)
[Enforcement only.]
· Maritime boundary delimitation aspect (if any)
The Agreement addresses the need for fisheries cooperation in a situation where some fisheries jurisdiction boundaries are not yet delimited. However, it does not go as far as creating any time of special feature or zone in relation to the undelimited boundaries.
Furthermore, Art IV states that:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to limit the authority of either Party to enforce its fisheries laws within its waters [i.e. internal waters and the territorial sea] and zones [i.e. the 200 nautical mile zone], or in hot pursuit therefrom, in accordance with international law.
Furthermore, Art V states that:
The Parties reaffirm their commitment to ensure full respect for maritime boundaries between them delimited by mutual agreeement or third-party dispute settlement, including by the International Court of Justice. Nothing in this Agreement, and no acts or activities taking place pursuant thereto, shall prejudice the position of either Party with respect to the location of any disputed maritime boundary or the legal status of waters [i.e. internal waters and the territorial sea] or zones [i.e. the 200 nautical mile zone] claimed by either Party.
· Geographical scope
The internal waters, territorial sea and 200 nautical mile zone of each party.
· Consultative mechanism (if any)
Þ Primary consultative mechanism
The parties are to consult as necessary regarding the implementation of the Agreement, including regarding: (a) the effectiveness of penalties to deter violations by nationals, residents and vessels of a party in the other party’s internal waters, territorial sea or 200 nautical mile zone; (b) the accuracy and consistency of navigational aids; and (c) the standard fisheries law enforcement practices in the vicinity of maritime boundaries (Art II).
Þ Frequency of meetings
Consultations “as necessary” (Art II).
Þ Delegations
[The Agreement does not expressly provide for limits on the size or nature of delegations to the consultations.]
Þ Subsidiary bodies
[The Agreement does not expressly provide for any subsidiary bodies.]
Þ Decision-making
[The Agreement does not expressly provide for a mechanism for decision-making in the course of the consultations.]
Þ Nature of decisions (binding or advisory)
[The Agreement does not expressly state whether any decisions taken in the course of the consultations are to be binding or advisory.]
· Elements of fisheries management covered
Þ Research and stock assessment
[The Agreement does not expressly provide for cooperation on research or stock assessment.]
Þ Conservation and management
[The Agreement does not expressly provide for cooperation on conservation and management.]
Þ Monitoring, control and surveillance
Each party is to take appropriate measures to ensure that its nationals, residents and vessels do not violate, within the internal waters, territorial sea or 200 nautical mile zone of the other party, the latter party’s fisheries laws and regulations (Art I).
The measures to be taken are to include prohibitions on violating the other party’s laws and regulations regarding: (a) gear stowage; (b) fishing without authorisation; and (c) interfering with, resisting, or obstructing in any manner, efforts to enforce such laws and regulations (Art I).
The measures may also include such other prohibitions as each party deems appropriate (Art I).
Þ Training
[The Agreement does not expressly provide for cooperation on training.]
· Provision for review (if any)
[The Agreement does not expressly provide for review.]
· Full name of arrangement
Convention for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, 2 March 1953
Entry into force: 28 October, 1953
Protocol, 29 March 1979
Entry into force: NOT KNOWN
Contracting parties to Convention as amended by Protocol: Canada, United States of America
Source of arrangement text for this report: McCraughran, D.A. and S.H. Hoag, The 1979 Protocol to the Convention and Related Legislation International Pacific Halibut Commission Technical Report No.26 (Seattle, Washington: IPHC, 1992), pp. 15-21
References below to “the Convention” are references to the Convention as amended by the Protocol. References below to “ROP” means Rules of Procedure of the International Pacific Halibut Commission (adopted 19 January 1954, as amended).
· Nature of arrangement (treaty, MOU, Joint Statement etc.)
Treaty.
· Scope (sectors covered)
The commercial and sport fishery for Pacific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis).
· Provision for harmonisation regarding conservation and management (if any)
Establishes allocation percentages between the parties.
· Maritime boundary delimitation aspect (if any)
The Convention’s annex (in para 16) lays down some provisions specifically related to fact that maritime boundaries between Canada and the USA in the Convention area are yet to be delimited (see below).
However, Art VI states that nothing in the Convention “shall be construed to affect or prejudice any position or claim which has been or may subsequently be adopted by either Party in the course of consultations, negotiations or third party settlement procedures respecting the maritime jurisdiction, including the limits thereof, of Canada or of the United States”.
· Geographical scope
The waters under the “exclusive fisheries jurisdiction” of each party, collectively known as “Convention waters” (Art I(3)).
· Consultative mechanism (if any)
Þ Primary consultative mechanism
International Pacific Halibut Commission (Art III(1)). The Commission shall elect from its members (“Commissioners”) a Chairman and Vice Chairman; these offices must be from different parties and must rotate annually between the parties (ROP, Rule 4). The seat of the Commission is Seattle, Washington, USA (ROP, Rule 13). The Commission must appoint a Director (who must in turn appoint staff members) and an Assistant Director (ROP, Rules 7 and 10). The Commission has a power to hold annual meetings with representatives of the halibut fishery industry (ROP, Rule 11).
Þ Frequency of meetings
The Commission may alternate its regular annual meeting and its mid-year meeting between Canada and the United States, and may hold other meetings as it may determine necessary (ROP, Rule 2). The Commission may hold public hearings as may be determined by the Commission (ROP, Rule 2).
Þ Delegations
Art III(1) states that the Commission “shall consist of six members, three appointed by each Party”. Under US legislation, one of the three US members must be an official from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and two must be must be knowledgelable or experienced concerning the North Pacific halibut fishery. Except where the Commission decides otherwise, Commission members may be accompanied by one or more experts and advisers (ROP, Rule 1).
Þ Subsidiary bodies
There is no express provision in the Convention or the ROP for subsidiary bodies. However, the Commission website indicates that a Conference Board, a Processor Advisory Group and a Research Advisory Board exist.
The Conference Board, created in 1931 by the Commission, represents Canadian and US commercial and sport halibut fishermen. Members are designated by union and vessel owner organisations from Canada and the US. The Processor Advisory Group (PAG), formed in 1996, represents halibut processors.
At the Commission’s annual meetings, the Commission’s staff make presentations on stock status, seasons etc. to the Board and the PAG, plus the Commissioners, in a public session. Each of the Board and the PAG then meets over several days and in turn delivers an independent report to the Commissioners, again in a public session, on the staff’s presentations. The Commissioners therefore consider reports from three groups in total (i.e. the Board, the PAG and the Commission staff) when making final decisions.
The Research Advisory Board (RAB), formed in 1999, consists of both fishermen and processors and offers suggestions to the Commission’s Director and staff on areas where Commission research should focus. The RAB also reviews the Commission’s research programme at the formulation and output stages.
Þ Decision-making
Art III(1) states that “[a]ll decisions of the Commission shall be made by a concurring vote of at least two of the Commissioners of each Party”.
Þ Nature of decisions (binding or advisory)
Advisory. Conservation and management measures decided by the Commission require the approval of the parties (Art III(3)).
· Elements of fisheries management covered
Þ Research and stock assessment
Art III(2) states that “[t]he Commission shall make such investigations as are necessary into the life history of the halibut and may conduct or authorize fishing operations to carry out such investigations”.
Under Art III(3), the Commission has a power to (with the approval of the parties and consistent with the Convention’s annex) “make such regulations... for the collection of statistics on the catch of halibut as it shall find necessary to determine the condition and trend of the halibut fishery”.
The ROP provide for the establishment of “Supplemental Research Funds”, derived from monies received other than from the parties’ regular contributions to the Commission’s annual budget (e.g. from private organisations or government agencies) (ROP, Rule 21). The monies concerned are to be for the “purpose of funding Pacific halibut research”.
The 2000 Pacific Halibut Fishery Regulations do not apply to fishing operations authorized or conducted by the Commission for research purposes (Regulation 5(6)).
Þ Conservation and management
The Commission has a power to decide various conservation and management measures for the purpose of maintaining “optimum yield” (Art III(3)). However, such measures must be consistent with the Convention’s annex and must be approved by the parties. The trigger for decision of measures is that “investigation has indicated such action to be necessary”. The measures may be decided with respect to (a) national and fishing vessels of the parties and (b) fishing vessels licensed by the parties.
The measures are prescribed by Art III(3) to include dividing the Convention waters into areas and, with respect to directed halibut fishing, inter alia (a) establishing open (or closed) seasons or closed zones, by area; (b) limiting catch quantity and minimum fish size, by area; (c) fixing the size and character of fishing gear, by area and (d) making regulations for the licensing of vessels. The Commission may also, with respect to vessels fishing for other species, “permit, limit, regulate or prohibit” halibut by-catch, by area.
In practice:
Art I(2) states that “[n]othing... in this Convention shall prohibit either Party from establishing additional regulations, applicable to its own nationals and fishing vessels, and to fishing vessels licensed by that Party, governing the taking of halibut which are more restrictive than those adopted by the International Pacific Halibut Commission”.
The Convention’s annex establishes the formula (a 60/40 split) by which the Area 2 TAC (“set by the Commission”) is allocated between Canada and the US (Annex, paras 3 and 4). (Area 2 covers both Canadian and US waters.) However, the Commission is under a duty to review this formula by 1 January 1981 “and thereafter as it considers appropriate” and to “recommend for the approval of the Parties any appropriate changes” (Annex, para 14). In fact, the Commission did not recommend a departure from the formula established by the annex until 1985 (McCaughran and Hoag, 1992). The formula may also be reviewed towards the end of each fishing season (Annex, para 15).
The Convention’s annex (in paras 2 and 5-12) establishes various rules for Canadian nationals and/or fishing vessels licensed to fish for halibut in US waters, including (a) a halibut quota; (b) a ban on retaining other species on board (except for bait); and (c) and procedures on licensing, vessel marking and reporting. However, licences with a validity beyond 31 March 1981 are not provided for by the annex. McCaughran and Hoag (1992) report that Canadian fishing in US waters was “phased out during 1979 and 1980”.
In “boundary regions” in the Convention area, pending delimitation of maritime boundaries between Canada and the United States, as an interim measure neither party is to authorize fishing for halibut by vessels of third parties (Annex, para 16).
Þ Monitoring, control and surveillance
With the exception of boundary regions (see below), each party has the right to enforce the Convention (and any regulations adopted pursuant to it) (a) in all Conventions waters in respect of its own nationals and fishing vessels and (b) in its waters in respect of nationals or fishing vessels of either party or of third parties (Art II(1)). Regulation 21 of the 2000 Pacific Halibut Fishery Regulations additionally provides that “[t]he unloading and weighing of halibut may be subject to the supervision of authorized officers to assure the fulfillment of the provisions of these Regulations”.
In boundary regions in the Convention area, pending delimitation of maritime boundaries between Canada and the United States, the following principles are to be applied “as interim measures”: (a) “as between the parties, enforcement of the Convention shall be carried out by the flag State”; (b) “neither Party shall authorize fishing for halibut by vessels of third parties”; and (c) “either Party may enforce the Convention with respect to fishing for halibut, or related activities, by vessels of third parties” (Annex, para 16).
However, cooperation on MCS is facilitated by Art II(3) which requires each party to “take appropriate measures to ensure that its nationals and fishing vessels allow and assist boardings and inspections of such vessels in accordance with... [Art II(1)]... by duly authorized officials of the other party”.
Þ Training
[The Convention does not expressly provide for cooperation on training.]
· Provision for review (if any)
Apart from the duty of the Commission to review the allocation formula for Area 2 (see above), neither the Convention nor the ROP expressly provides for review of the Convention.
· Full name of arrangement
Treaty between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Pacific Salmon, 28 January 1985
Entered into force: 18 March 1985
Contracting parties: Canada, United States of America
Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America, 30 June 1999 (amending the 1985 Treaty Arrangements)
Entered into force: 30 June 1999
Parties: Canada, United States of America
Source of arrangement text for this report: internet
-
http://www.psc.org/Treaty/TREATY.HTM
NOTE:
· Nature of arrangement (treaty, MOU, Joint Statement etc.)
The 1985 Treaty Arrangements and the 1999 Agreement were effected by exchange of letters between the Canadian and US governments.
· Scope (sectors covered)
Fisheries for specified Pacific salmon stocks. The specified stocks are those which originate in the waters of one party and: (a) are subject to interception by the other party; or (b) affect the management of stocks of the other party; or (c) affect biologically the stocks of the other party (Art I(6)). The term “transboundary river” (see below) means a river that rises in Canada and flows to the sea through the US (Art I(6)).
· Provision for harmonisation regarding conservation and management (if any)
Establishes allocation percentages between the parties.
· Maritime boundary delimitation aspect (if any)
None.
Furthermore, the 1999 Agreement regarding Northern Boundary Coho states that “[t]he provisions of this agreement are without prejudice to the position of either Party with respect to the location of the maritime boundary in the Dixon Entrance area”.
· Geographical scope
The waters (including rivers) under the exclusive fisheries jurisdiction of each party.
· Consultative mechanism (if any)
Þ Primary consultative mechanism
Art II(1) establishes the Pacific Salmon Commission, composed of two national sections (a Canadian section and a US section). One national section is to appoint a Chairman, the other a Vice Chairman, these posts alternating between the two national sections on an annual basis (Art II(5)). The Commission is to make by-laws and procedural rules for itself and for subsidiary bodies, “as may be necessary for the exercise of their functions and the conduct of their meetings” and subject to the approval of the parties (Art II(7)). These by-laws have since been made (and amended over the years). The seat of the Commission is in British Columbia (Art II(9)). The Commission is to appoint an Executive Secretary (Art II(15)) and may engage staff or authorise the Executive Secretary to do so (Art II(16)).
Þ Frequency of meetings
The Commission is to hold an annual meeting and may hold other meetings at the request of the Chairman or of either party (Art II(10)).
Þ Delegations
The Commission is to consist of not more than eight Commissioners, of whom not more than four shall be appointed by each party (Art II(3)). At open meetings of the Commission, each Commissioner may be accompanied by his/her designated Alternate Commissioner and by experts and advisors (ROP, Ch.II, Rule 1). At executive sessions of the Commission, attendance is to be limited to Commissioners, Alternate Commissioners, and up to eight experts and advisors from each national section or such other numbers as may be agreed by the Chair and Vice-Chair (ROP, Ch.II, Rule 2).
Þ Subsidiary bodies
Standing Committees:
The Commission is to establish a Committee on Research and Statistics and a Committee on Finance and Administration and may eliminate or establish committees as appropriate (Art II(17)). The Commission by-laws include procedural rules for Standing Committees. However, under the 1999 Agreement, the parties agree to request the Commission to eliminate the Committee on Research and Statistics and to reconstitute it as the Committee on Scientific Cooperation. This Committee is to be composed of no more than eight members, drawn from both governmental and non-governmental scientific communities, to be nominated four each by the respective national sections of the Commission. The Committee’s mandate is to: (a) assist in setting the Commisison’s scientific agenda (in consultation with the Committee’s scientific and technical committees); (b) provide support to the Commission’s scientific and technical committees; (c) monitor the parties’ progress in enhancing science cooperation and consultation, and make recommendations to enhance such cooperation and consultation; and (d) undertake certain assigned task relating to habitat and restoration.
Panels:
The Commission is to establish Panels (specified in Annex I of the Treaty [as amended by the 1999 Agreement]) and may recommend to the parties the elimination or establishment of Panels as appropriate (Art II(18)). The Commission by-laws include procedural rules for Panels (on inter alia representation and voting requirements).
The Treaty establishes some principles regarding the Panels. The Panels are to provide information and make recommendations to the Commission with respect to the functions of the Commission and carry out such other functions as the Treaty may specify or as the Commission may direct (Art II(19)). Where fisheries intercept stocks for which more than one Panel is responsible, the appropriate Panels shall meet jointly to carry out their functions and if the Panels cannot agree, each may make an independent report to the Commission (Art II(20)). Each Panel is to consist of not more than six members and six alternate members from each party (Art II(21)). The principles established by the Treaty on appointment of a Chairman and a Vice Chairman (Art II(5) - see above), decision-making (Art II(6) - see below) and meeting frequency (Art II(10) - see above) apply mutatis mutandis to each Panel (Art II).
The Treaty requires that Panels are to consider the parties’ annual reports (i.e. (a) their forecasts of fishery characteristics and conservation and management regimes and (b) their post hoc reports of fishing activities) and provide their views to the Commission (Art IV(1-4)).
The Panels specified in Annex I of the Treaty (as amended by the 1999 Agreement):
Key elements of the mandate of the Fraser River Panel are laid down in Art VI and further clarified in a 1985 Memorandum of Understanding between the Parties. The Panel is to propose regulations to the Commission for the harvest of Fraser River sockeye and pink salmon (Art VI(2)) subject to joint review with other appropriate panels of the parties’ annual forecasts of fishery characteristics and conservation and management regimes (see above). Once regulations have become approved (via the Commission) by the parties, the Panel may, during the fishing season, then make orders for the adjustment of fishing times and areas stipulated in the annual regulations in response to variations in anticipated conditions (Art IV(6)). Such orders appear to have direct effect on the parties (subject to the parties reviewing the orders for consistency with domestic legal obligations) (Art VI(6)).
Technical Committees:
The parties are to establish or maintain (as appropriate) Technical Committees (specified in each of the six chapters of Annex IV of the Treaty [as amended by the 1999 Agreement]). In general, each Technical Committee is to report to specified Panels and to the Commission. The Commission by-laws include procedural rules and ethical guidelines for Technical Committees. The Technical Committees are listed below:
Other bodies:
The Commission website indicates the existence of other subsidiary bodies, including inter alia:
Selective Fishery Evaluation Committee
Technical Committee on Data Sharing
Working Group on Data StandardsÞ Decision-making
The Commission may make recommendations to, or advise, the parties on any matter relating to the Treaty (Art II(8)). Each national section has one vote in the Commission and a decision or recommendation of the Commission may be made only with the approval of both national sections (Art II(6)).
Þ Nature of decisions (binding or advisory)
Advisory. The “fishery regimes” recommended by the Commission to the parties require the approval of the parties (Art IV(5-6)).
· Elements of fisheries management covered
Þ Research and stock assessment
Treaty:
The parties are to cooperate in inter alia research in fulfilling obligations to (a) prevent overfishing and provide for optimum production and (b) provide for each party to receive benefits equivalent to the production of salmon originating in its waters (Art III).
The parties are under a duty to conduct research to investigate the migratory and exploitation patterns, the productivity and the status of stocks of common concern and the extent of interceptions (Art X(1)). However, the Commission may make recommendations to the parties regarding the conduct and coordination of research (Art X(2)) and, subject to normal requirements, each party is to allow nationals, equipment and vessels of the other party conducting research approved by the Commission to have access to its waters for the purpose of carrying out such research (Art X(3)).
Furthermore, the parties are under a duty both to exchange inter alia fisheries statistics on a current and regular basis in order to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty and to provide data on inter alia catch and effort for all relevant stocks to the Commission (Art XIV).
Research elements within each of the chapters of Annex IV (as amended by the 1999 Agreement) include inter alia the following:
Chapter 1 (on Transboundary Rivers)
Assessments of the run of the Strikine river sockeye salmon stock (i.e. both a pre-season forecast by the Transboundary Technical Committee and in-season estimates under an agreed Stikine Management Plan, using a forecast model developed by the Committee) are required. Modifications to the Management Plan and forecast model require the agreement of both parties. Assessment of other stocks in other rivers are also provided for.
Chapter 2 (on Northern British Columbia and Southeastern Alaska)
Provides for a joint Northern Boundary Technical Committee, with a mandate to inter alia make stock assessments and develop a joint database for such assessments.
Chapter 3 (on Chinook Salmon)
Provides for a joint Chinook Technical Committee, with a mandate to inter alia: evaluate stock status trends; recommend, and monitor performance under, stock assessment standards; evaluate management actions; and recommend research projects.
Chapter 4 (on Fraser River Sockeye and Pink Salmon)
Provides for a Technical Committee for the Fraser River Panel, with a mandate to inter alia analyse proposed management regimes. Aside from the Technical Committee, the parties are to establish and maintain data sharing principles and processes which ensure that the parties, the Commission, and the Fraser River Panel are able to manage their fisheries in a timely manner consistent with the Chapter.
Chapter 5 (on Coho Salmon)
Provides for a joint Coho Technical Committee, with a mandate to inter alia: evaluate management actions; review stock status; develop a joint database for assessments; identify exploitation rates producing maximum sustainable harvests; devise analytical methods for the development of alternative regulatory strategies; identify information and research needs, including future monitoring programs for stock assessments; and for each season, make stock and fishery assessments.
Chapter 6 (on Southern British Columbia and Washington State Chum Salmon)
Provides for a joint Chum Technical Committee, with a mandate to inter alia: review stock status; develop a joint database for assessments; devise analytical methods for the development of alternative regulatory strategies; identify information and research needs, to include future monitoring programs for stock assessment; and for each season, make stock and fishery assessments and evaluate the effectiveness of management.
1999 Agreement:
The parties agree to encourage greater cooperation between fisheries managers through inter alia timely exchange of data.
In respect of Northern Boundary Coho, the parties also undertake to cooperate to close their respective fisheries in specified circumstances (usually where catch falls below a specified level).
Þ Conservation and management
Treaty:
The parties are to cooperate in inter alia management in fulfilling obligations to (a) prevent overfishing and provide for optimum production and (b) provide for each party to receive benefits equivalent to the production of salmon originating in its waters (Art III).
The views of the Panels on the parties’ annual forecasts of conservation and management regimes (see above) are to be reviewed by the Commission, which in turn is under a duty to recommend “fishery regimes” to the parties (Art IV(5)). Following adoption by the each party, each Party is to then establish regulations to implement the regimes (Art IV).
Specific procedures for the adoption of conservation and management measures relating to (a) sockeye and pink salmon, notably in the Fraser River and (b) spawning escapement in transboundary rivers are provided for in the Treaty (Arts VI and VII respectively).
In fulfilling their functions, the Panels and the Commission are under a duty take into account the conservation of steelhead trout (Art IX).
Conservation and management elements within each of the chapters of Annex IV (as amended by the 1999 Agreement) include inter alia the following:
Chapter 1 (on Transboundary Rivers)
Requires the parties to improve procedures for coordinated or cooperative management of the fisheries on transboundary river stocks. Various conservation and management measures (and cooperative procedures for their development) are then laid down for fisheries harvesting specified salmon stocks originating in the Canadian portion of specified rivers (including in some cases percentage allocations of the TAC between the parties).
Chapter 2 (on Northern British Columbia and Southeastern Alaska)
Provides for a joint Northern Boundary Technical Committee, with a mandate to inter alia recommend conservation measures to the Northern Panel. Chapter 2 also lays down various conservation and management measures applicable to the parties.
Chapter 3 (on Chinook Salmon)
Requires the parties to establish a chinook management program that meets specified objectives and to implement a management regime to meet these objectives. Lays down various conservation and management measures applicable to the parties. Provides for a joint Chinook Technical Committee, with a mandate to inter alia recommend strategies for the effective utilization of enhanced stocks.
Chapter 4 (on Fraser River Sockeye and Pink Salmon)
Establishes maximum US percentage allocations of salmon in the Fraser Panel Area. Canada is to provide various information to inform the TAC and pre-season planning. Various tasks related to conservation and management are given to the Fraser River Panel. Furthermore, Chapter 4 provides for a Technical Committee for the Fraser River Panel, whose members are to inter alia provide technical assistance in the development of proposals for management plans to their respective national sections of the Panel.
Chapter 5 (on Coho Salmon)
The parties agree to develop management measures and programs to prevent further decline in spawning escapements, adjust fishing patterns, and initiate, develop, or improve management programs for coho stocks. The parties agree, for coho stocks shared by Washington and southern British Columbia fisheries, to cooperate in the development of coho salmon management programs designed to meet specified objectives and to implement a management regime to meet these objectives. Furthermore, Chapter 5 maintains a joint Coho Technical Committee, with a mandate to inter alia for each season, recommend conservation measures to the Commission.
Chapter 6 (on Southern British Columbia and Washington State Chum Salmon)
Lays down various conservation and management duties applicable to the respective parties.
1999 Agreement:
The parties agree to (a) participate, to the extent practicable, in each other’s public consultation processes leading to the establishment of annual management regimes and (b) encourage greater cooperation between fisheries managers through inter alia staff exchange arrangements, workshops and timely exchange of data.
In respect of Northern Boundary Coho, Canadian and US managers are to exchange on a weekly basis information on coho regarding stock status, catches and fishery management information including open areas and times for each fishery. Furthermore, Alaska is under a duty to consult with Canada regarding specified changes to its troll management plan prior to implementation.
Þ Monitoring, control and surveillance
Treaty:
Following adoption by the each party of the fishery regimes recommended by the Commission (see above), each Party is to then enforce the regulations established to implement these regimes (Art IV).
Þ Training
1999 Agreement:
The parties agree to encourage greater cooperation between fisheries managers through inter alia staff exchange arrangements and workshops.
· Provision for review (if any)
Treaty:
The Commission is under a duty to, “whenever appropriate”, review the Annexes; it may then make recommendations to the parties for their amendment (Art XIII(2)).
In Annex IV, Chapter 1 (as amended by the 1999 Agreement) the parties agree to, midway through the chapter period or at another agreed time, review the chapter and determine if they want to renew it for an additional period of time.
In Annex IV, Chapter 2 (as amended by the 1999 Agreement) the parties agree to review the chapter a minimum of two years prior to its expiration with a view to renewing it.
