FISHING CAPACITY AND EUROPEAN UNION FLEET ADJUSTMENT - ERIK LINDEBO^[57]

ABSTRACT: FISHING CAPACITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN MEASURED USING AGGREGATE TONNAGE AND ENGINE POWER OF FISHING VESSELS TO ALLOW THE USE OF STANDARDIZED MEASUREMENTS FOR ALL MEMBER STATES. THESE MEASUREMENTS HAVE FORMED THE CORE OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT INITIATIVES IN THE FORMS OF THE MULTIANNUAL GUIDANCE PROGRAMMES (MAGPS) SINCE 1983. THESE INITIATIVES HAVE BEEN EXTENDED TO INCORPORATE MEASUREMENTS OF FISHING EFFORT SINCE 1992, FORMING THE BASIS FOR MEMBER STATES FLEET CAPACITY TARGETS, TRADITIONALLY BASED ON BIOLOGICAL ADVICE.

IN THIS PAPER, THE FRAMEWORK, OBJECTIVES AND RESULTS OF THE MAGPS ARE CONSIDERED. VESSEL DECOMMISSIONING SCHEMES AND OTHER MEASURES OF MEMBER STATES ARE EXAMINED WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION GIVEN TO THE CURRENT MAGP INITIATIVE. PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE CURRENT USE OF FISHING CAPACITY MEASUREMENTS AS CRITERIA FOR THE PROGRAMMES ARE ADDRESSED, TOGETHER WITH A DISCUSSION OF THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF MAGP MEASURES AS A MEANS TO REDUCE THE OVEREXPLOITATION OF FISH STOCKS AND TO IMPROVE FLEET EFFICIENCY. THE ISSUE SURROUNDING THE EXPENDITURE OF EU FLEET ADJUSTMENT IS ANNEXED.

1. INTRODUCTION

MANY FISHERIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) ARE CONSIDERED TO BE OVERCAPITALIZED AND REQUIRE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT TO ENCOURAGE THE RATIONAL AND EFFICIENT EXPLOITATION OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES. FISHERIES MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL FLEETS HAS OFTEN BEEN SOUGHT THROUGH VOLUME-DRIVEN INPUT CONTROLS AS OPPOSED TO MARKET-DRIVEN OUTPUT CONTROLS. THIS HAS OFTEN LED TO FLEET OVERCAPACITY AND 'RACE TO FISH' BEHAVIOUR, WITH THE POTENTIAL UTILIZATION OF FISHING CAPACITY EXCEEDING THE OPTIMAL CAPACITY LEVELS. THE EU AND MEMBER STATES (MS) HAVE THUS BEEN REQUIRED TO PURSUE A STRUCTURAL POLICY IN ORDER TO ADDRESS THE IMBALANCE BETWEEN FLEET CAPACITY AND AVAILABLE RESOURCES.

THIS PAPER CONSIDERS THE CONCEPTS OF FISHING CAPACITY AND TARGET CAPACITY AND EXAMINES THESE CONCEPTS AS UNDERSTOOD UNDER THE STRUCTURAL POLICY OF MULTIANNUAL GUIDANCE PROGRAMMES (MAGPS). THE FRAMEWORK AND RESULTS OF THESE PROGRAMMES ARE CONSIDERED AND THE APPLICATION IS CRITICALLY DISCUSSED IN LIGHT OF THE DEFINED OBJECTIVES.^[58].

2. FISHING CAPACITY

2.1 DEFINITION

FISHING CAPACITY IS GENERALLY DEFINED AS "THE ABILITY OF A STOCK OF INPUTS (CAPITAL) TO PRODUCE OUTPUT (EFFORT OR CATCH). FISHING CAPACITY IS THE ABILITY OF A VESSEL OR A FLEET TO CATCH FISH" (FAO, 1998: P. 2). IT FOLLOWS THAT FISHING CAPACITY IS "THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF FISH OVER A PERIOD OF TIME THAT CAN BE PRODUCED BY A FISHING FLEET IF FULLY UTILIZED, GIVEN THE BIOMASS AND AGE STRUCTURE OF THE FISH STOCK AND THE PRESENT STATE OF THE TECHNOLOGY". THAT IS,

WHERE Y_C IS CURRENT YIELD OR CATCH, E_C IS THE CURRENT EFFORT GENERATED BY A FULLY UTILIZED FLEET (100 PERCENT CAPACITY UTILIZATION), S IS FISH STOCK BIOMASS, THE FISHING FLEET IS THE STOCK OF INPUTS, AND ASSUMING THAT MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES ARE RELATED TO SUSTAINABILITY OF THE RESOURCE (FAO, 1998).

ALTHOUGH FISHING IS AN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AND FISHING OPERATIONS HEAVILY DEPEND ON THE ECONOMIC OUTCOME, THE DEFINING AND MEASURING OF FISHING CAPACITY IN PRACTICE HAVE EXCLUDED ECONOMIC FACTORS. INSTEAD, FISHING CAPACITY HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN ESTIMATED THROUGH THE MEASUREMENT OF CERTAIN, RELATIVELY STRAIGHTFORWARD, PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF A FLEET IN ORDER TO GIVE AN INDICATION OF THE MAXIMUM POTENTIAL OUTPUT. THESE CHARACTERISTICS MAY INCLUDE THE NUMBER OF VESSELS, VESSEL TONNAGE, ENGINE POWER, HOLD SIZE, VESSEL LENGTH AND GEAR AND FISHING METHODS USED. OTHER DETERMINING FACTORS, THAT MAY BE MORE DIFFICULT TO DEFINE, INCLUDE AVAILABLE FISHING TIME, STOCK CATCHABILITY AND SKILL AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE SKIPPER AND CREW (TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY).

THE EXACT FISHING CAPACITY INDICATOR USED WILL DEPEND ON THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FISHERY OR FLEET AND THE AVAILABILITY OF RELIABLE DATA. FOR EXAMPLE, IT IS GENERALLY ACCEPTED THAT FOR TRAWLERS THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IS ENGINE POWER. FOR GILL-NETTERS, HOWEVER, THE ENGINE EFFECT WOULD BE OF LIMITED IMPORTANCE - IT IS MORE LIKELY THAT VESSEL TONNAGE WILL DETERMINE FISHING CAPACITY, SINCE THE SIZE OF THE VESSEL WILL LARGELY DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF GEAR AND SIZE OF CREW ONBOARD. APPLYING A UNIVERSAL CAPACITY MEASURE ACROSS A RANGE OF FISHERIES MAY THEREFORE PROVE INADEQUATE AND HAS PROVEN TO BE A STUMBLING BLOCK WHEN ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF GLOBAL FISHING CAPACITY MEASUREMENT. APPLIED MEASUREMENT PROCEDURES MAY THEREFORE ONLY BE APPLICABLE ON A FISHERY-BY-FISHERY BASIS, OR AT BEST, ON A REGIONAL BASIS.

2.2 MEASUREMENT IN THE EU

FISHING CAPACITY IN THE EU HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN MEASURED IN TERMS OF TWO VESSEL CHARACTERISTICS, NAMELY GROSS TONNAGE OF THE VESSEL AND ENGINE POWER. THESE TWO CHARACTERISTICS HAVE BEEN MONITORED AND REGISTERED AS INDICATORS OF FISHING CAPACITY IN THE MAJORITY OF MS. THE NUMBER OF VESSELS, NUMBER OF FISHERS, AND CATCH AND LANDING DATA HAVE ALSO BEEN MONITORED BUT HAVE NOT BEEN INCORPORATED AS OFFICIAL INDICATORS IN CAPACITY REDUCTION INITIATIVES.

THE NUMBER OF KILOWATTS (TOTAL OF THE MAXIMUM CONTINUOUS POWER)^[59] OF A VESSEL ENGINE IS A RELATIVELY STRAIGHTFORWARD MEASURE, ALTHOUGH DIFFERING MEASUREMENT PROCEDURES IN MS HAVE CAUSED SOME COMPLICATIONS. PROBLEMS HAVE INCLUDED DE-RATING PRACTICES AS WELL AS DIFFERING MEASUREMENTS IN TERMS OF OFFICIAL KW AND MAXIMUM EFFECT KW.

THE GROSS TONNAGE MEASURE OF THE VESSEL HAS BEEN LESS STRAIGHTFORWARD. HISTORICALLY, TONNAGE HAS BEEN MEASURED AS GROSS REGISTERED TONNAGE (GRT), AS DEFINED BY THE OSLO CONVENTION 1947, OR AS A PARTICULAR NATIONAL UNIT OF TONNAGE. THE EU HAS BEEN PROGRESSIVELY MOVING TO A COMMON STANDARD FOR MEASURING TONNAGE, A VOLUMETRIC MEASURE KNOWN AS GROSS TONNAGE (GT) AS DEFINED BY THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON TONNAGE MEASUREMENT OF SHIPS 1969. HOWEVER, THE TONNAGE REGISTRATION OF MANY MS FLEETS STILL INCLUDES A MIXTURE OF MEASUREMENTS AS A RESULT OF THE SLOW AND COMPLICATED CONVERSION PROCEDURE. SINCE THE GT MEASURE OFTEN GIVES A HIGHER TONNAGE VALUE THAN THE GRT MEASURE, THE TOTAL TONNAGE OF THE FISHING FLEET IS ALSO EXPECTED TO INCREASE ACCORDINGLY.

ALTHOUGH BOTH GT AND GRT MEASURE VESSEL VOLUME, NO MEANINGFUL CONVERSION FACTOR HAS BEEN GIVEN TO AID THE TONNAGE STANDARDIZATION PROCESS. ACCORDING TO PRESENT LEGISLATION^[60] ALL EXISTING VESSELS WITH A LENGTH OF 24 METRES OR MORE MUST NOW BE MEASURED IN GT, AS DEFINED BY ANNEX I TO THE 1969 CONVENTION. ALL NEW VESSELS WITH A LENGTH OF 15 METRES OR MORE MUST ALSO BE MEASURED IN GT IN THE SAME MANNER. VESSELS OF LESS THAN 24 METRES, WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN REBUILT OR MODIFIED, MAY STILL BE RECORDED IN TERMS OF GRT. THESE VESSELS, HOWEVER, ARE REQUIRED TO BE RE-MEASURED BY 2004, ACCORDING TO THE 1969 CONVENTION.

A SIMPLER METHOD IS ALLOCATED TO NEW AND EXISTING VESSELS OF LESS THAN 15 METRES IN LENGTH, DUE TO THE LESSER IMPORTANCE OF THE SUPERSTRUCTURE VOLUME OF THESE VESSELS.^[61]

WHERE V IS VOLUME, GIVEN BY:

WHERE LOA IS THE LENGTH OVERALL (I.E. THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE FORWARD AND THE AFTER PERPENDICULARS AS DEFINED BY THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SAFETY OF FISHING VESSELS); B₁ IS THE BREADTH IN METRES (ACCORDING TO THE 1969 CONVENTION); AND T₁ IS THE DEPTH IN METRES (ACCORDING TO THE 1969 CONVENTION).

EXISTING VESSELS WITH AN OVERALL LENGTH EQUAL TO, OR GREATER THAN, 15 METRES AND LESS THAN 24 METRES MAY BE ESTIMATED IN A SIMILAR MANNER IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE COMMISSION CONSIDERS THE ESTIMATED VALUES TO BE SUFFICIENTLY ACCURATE. THIS LENIENCE HAS BEEN TEMPORARILY GRANTED DUE TO THE CONSIDERABLE TECHNICAL DEMANDS INVOLVED IN MEASURING VESSELS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 1969 CONVENTION.

IN ADDITION TO THIS FISHING CAPACITY TERMINOLOGY, FISHING CAPACITY (AS DESCRIBED ABOVE) HAS BEEN USED IN THE EU TO DEFINE A FURTHER TERM OF FISHING EFFORT, WITH THE TWO TERMS WORKING IN PARALLEL TO ACHIEVE DESIRED FLEET REDUCTIONS SINCE 1992. LASSEN ET AL. (1996) STATE THAT FISHING EFFORT CAN BE CONSIDERED AS COMPOSED OF TWO SEPARATE ELEMENTS: A CAPACITY ELEMENT (VESSEL AND GEAR CHARACTERISTICS) AND AN ACTIVITY ELEMENT (CAPACITY UTILIZATION, FISHING TIME ETC.). THAT IS,

THE EU ADOPTED A FISHING EFFORT MEASURE IN INDIVIDUAL FLEET SEGMENTS, IN TERMS OF AGGREGATE TONNAGE, ENGINE POWER AND FISHING ACTIVITY. THESE ARE:

WHERE N IS THE NUMBER OF VESSELS IN THE FLEET SEGMENT, A_I IS THE VESSEL'S NUMBER OF SEA-DAYS DURING THE OBSERVATION PERIOD, J_I AND P_I IS THE VESSEL'S AVERAGE TONNAGE (GT/GRT) AND ENGINE POWER (KW) RESPECTIVELY, IN EACH FLEET SEGMENT DURING THE OBSERVATION PERIOD.

THE PROBLEM WITH THE FISHING CAPACITY AND FISHING EFFORT TERMINOLOGY IS UNCERTAINTY SURROUNDING THE EXTENT OF ANY BIOLOGICAL IMPACT AS A RESULT OF A REDUCTION IN FISHING EFFORT. FURTHERMORE, THE ESTIMATION OF FISHING EFFORT IS COMPLEX AND OBJECTIVES HENCE MAY BE MANIPULATED. SOME MEMBER STATES HAVE ADOPTED ALTERNATIVE MEASURES FOR THE PURPOSES OF CAPACITY MANAGEMENT (E.G. SEE BOX 1 FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM SYSTEM).

BOX 1. VESSEL CAPACITY UNITS

IN ORDER TO AGGREGATE FISHING CAPACITY MEASUREMENTS OF THE FISHING FLEET, UNITED KINGDOM FISHERIES MANAGEMENT HAS ADOPTED VESSEL CAPACITY UNITS (VCUS) AS OPPOSED TO SIMPLY USING UNITS OF TONNAGE AND ENGINE POWER. THE UNIT USES A WEIGHTING PROCEDURE TO DERIVE AN OVERALL AGGREGATE OF FISHING CAPACITY:

WHERE LOA IS OVERALL VESSEL LENGTH IN METRES, B IS VESSEL BREADTH IN METRES AND P IS ENGINE POWER OF THE VESSEL IN KILOWATTS.

THIS UNIT IS BELIEVED TO BE PROPORTIONAL TO THE VESSEL'S ABILITY TO CATCH FISH. THE VCU MEASURE SERVES AS A BACKBONE OF A COMPETITIVE TENDERING SCHEME UNDER THE DECOMMISSIONING PROGRAMME. SINCE THE DECOMMISSIONING SCHEME FORMS A VITAL COMPONENT OF MANAGEMENT EFFORTS TO REDUCE OVERCAPACITY IN UNITED KINGDOM FISHERIES, THE USE OF A RELIABLE AND MEANINGFUL MEASURE OF CAPACITY IS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE. THE USE OF VCUS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM IS NOT PART OF ANY EU REGULATION AND REMAINS A NATIONAL, AND SOMEWHAT CONTROVERSIAL, INITIATIVE TO DEAL WITH FISHING CAPACITY.

THE CURRENT SITUATION OF MS FLEETS IS MONITORED USING MONTHLY DECLARATIONS TO THE COMMUNITY REGISTER OF FISHING VESSELS. THE REGISTER IS MEANT TO BE A RECORD OF THE PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ALL THE COMMERCIAL MARINE FISHING VESSELS IN THE EU FLEET. IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, THE DATA FOR SOME NATIONS ARE INCOMPLETE. IN THEIR MONTHLY DECLARATIONS, EACH MS MUST NOTIFY THE COMMISSION OF ANY CHANGES TO THE FLEET, SUCH AS NEW CONSTRUCTIONS, WITHDRAWALS, MODIFICATIONS OR CHANGES IN ACTIVITY. THE REGISTER IS CONTINUALLY BEING UPDATED AND THE RELIABILITY OF THE INFORMATION IMPROVED. AN AMENDMENT TO THE REGULATION WAS RECENTLY ADOPTED WHICH BOTH EXTENDS AND SIMPLIFIES THE INFORMATION TO BE COMMUNICATED, AND ALSO PUTS INTO PLACE THE PROCEDURES FOR DIRECT ACCESS TO THE DATABASE BY THE MS. THIS WILL GREATLY SPEED UP THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND ALLOW THE REGISTER TO BE USED TO MONITOR THE ACCESS OF VESSELS TO THE VARIOUS FISHERIES.

3. TARGET FISHING CAPACITY

3.1 DEFINITION

OVERCAPACITY IS EVIDENT IN MANY GLOBAL FISHERIES TODAY. BIOLOGICALLY, OVERCAPACITY CAN BE THOUGHT OF AS A LEVEL OF CAPACITY THAT, WHEN FULLY UTILIZED, PRODUCES A LEVEL OF FISHING MORTALITY THAT THREATEN TO REDUCE THE FISH STOCK BIOMASS BELOW THE MAXIMUM SUSTAINABLE YIELD (MSY). FROM AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, OVERCAPACITY CAN BE DEFINED AS A FULLY UTILIZED FISHING CAPACITY THAT REDUCES YIELD BELOW THE MAXIMUM ECONOMIC YIELD (MEY) (PORTER, 1998).

THE EXTENT OF OVERCAPACITY CAN BE ESTIMATED BY ACCOUNTING FOR THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CURRENT POTENTIAL CAPACITY OF THE FLEET AND THAT OF A DEFINED OPTIMAL FLEET CAPACITY. A LEVEL OF OPTIMAL CAPACITY WILL DIFFER FROM FISHERY TO FISHERY AND WILL ALSO DIFFER, SINCE PERCEPTIONS BY BIOLOGISTS, ECONOMISTS, FISHERIES MANAGERS, POLITICIANS, ETC., OBVIOUSLY VARY. FOR EXAMPLE, THE OPTIMAL LEVEL MAY BE ONE THAT MAXIMIZES FIRM PROFITS, MAXIMIZES SUPPLY TO MARKETS, MAXIMIZES REGIONAL EMPLOYMENT OR PROMOTES FISH STOCK GROWTH. THE OPTIMAL LEVEL OF CAPACITY IS OFTEN PERCEIVED TO BE A CAPACITY TARGET LEVEL OF FISHERIES MANAGEMENT, WITH ITS ESTIMATION THUS BEING HIGHLY DEPENDENT ON FISHERIES SPECIFICITY AND MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES. HOLLAND AND SUTINEN (1998) STATE THAT REGARDLESS OF WHICH OPTIMAL OR TARGET LEVEL IS CHOSEN, AND ON WHAT BASIS, THE LEVELS AND THE MIX OF VARIABLE INPUTS ARE EXPECTED TO CHANGE AS BIOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC AND REGULATORY CONDITIONS CHANGE IN THE FISHERY. HENCE, DESPITE AN UNALTERED FLEET SIZE, THE POTENTIAL, OPTIMAL AND TARGET CAPACITY LEVELS OF THE FLEET MAY ALTER CONSIDERABLY.

FAO (1998: P. 11) HAVE PROPOSED A GENERIC DEFINITION, WHERE TARGET CAPACITY IS "THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF FISH OVER A PERIOD OF TIME THAT CAN BE PRODUCED BY A FISHING FLEET IF FULLY UTILIZED, WHILE SATISFYING FISHERY MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES DESIGNED TO ENSURE SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES". THAT IS,

WHERE Y_T IS TARGET YIELD OR CATCH, E_T IS TARGET EFFORT GENERATED BY A FULLY UTILIZED FLEET, AND S IS THE FISH STOCK SIZE.

3.2 MEASUREMENT IN THE EU

THE TARGET LEVEL OF FISHING CAPACITY OF THE EU FLEET HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN BASED ON SCIENTIFIC ADVICE FROM BIOLOGISTS, WHERE THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN TO BALANCE FISHING CAPACITY WITH FISH STOCK AVAILABILITY. MANAGEMENT TARGETS HAVE THUS BEEN GIVEN ON THE BASIS OF WHAT LEVELS OF FISHING MORTALITY ARE SOUGHT. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FISHING MORTALITY, FISHING EFFORT AND FISHING CAPACITY IS KNOWN TO BE COMPLEX SINCE SEVERAL PROCESSES MAY INTERACT DURING A FISHING OPERATION THAT ULTIMATELY DECIDE WHERE AND WHEN FISHING EFFORT IS EMPLOYED. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FISHING EFFORT AND FISHING MORTALITY IS USUALLY EXPRESSED AS:

WHERE E IS EFFORT AND Q IS THE CATCHABILITY COEFFICIENT. HOWEVER, AS LASSEN ET AL. (1996) POINT OUT, AN APPROPRIATE DEFINITION FOR PRACTICAL USE HAS BEEN DIFFICULT TO ATTAIN DUE TO THE LACK OF EVIDENCE PROVING A RELATION BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL INPUT FACTORS AND FISHING MORTALITY. THE COMMON LACK OF INFORMATION ON CRUCIAL ACTIVITY PARAMETERS, IN ADDITION TO BASIC VESSEL AND GEAR CHARACTERISTICS, PROVIDES FURTHER DIFFICULTIES.

GULLAND ET AL. (1990) CONCLUDED THAT AN AVERAGE 40 PERCENT REDUCTION IN FISHING MORTALITY WAS REQUIRED TO REBALANCE FISHING CAPACITY WITH AVAILABLE RESOURCES IN THE EU. THIS INCLUDED THE RECOMMENDATION OF A 30 PERCENT REDUCTION IN FISHING OF DEMERSAL STOCKS, A 20 PERCENT REDUCTION FOR BENTHIC STOCKS, BUT NO CHANGE IN FISHING OF PELAGIC STOCKS. HOWEVER, THE REPORT PROVIDED NO GUIDANCE ON HOW FISHING CAPACITY AND FISHING MORTALITY WERE TO BE EQUATED AND NO RELIABLE MATHEMATICAL MODEL BY WHICH THIS CAN BE DONE SEEMS TO EXIST (HOLDEN, 1994).

STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES IN THE EU HAVE NONETHELESS DIRECTLY BASED TARGET CAPACITY ESTIMATIONS ON TARGET LEVELS OF FISHING MORTALITY AND SPAWNING STOCK BIOMASS OF INDIVIDUAL FISH STOCKS. CURRENT REDUCTION TARGETS OF INDIVIDUAL FLEET SEGMENTS (CLASSIFIED IN TERMS OF GEAR, AREA AND STOCKS FISHED) ARE BASED ON DEPLETION RISK (DR); OVERFISHED (OF) OR FULLY EXPLOITED (FE) CLASSIFICATIONS FOR EACH FISH STOCK (SEE APPENDIX A). THE CURRENT MAGP AIMS TO REDUCE FISHING EFFORT BY 30 PERCENT WHERE DR STOCKS ARE EXPLOITED AND BY 20 PERCENT WHERE OF STOCKS ARE EXPLOITED. THERE SHOULD BE NO INCREASE IN FISHING EFFORT WHERE FE STOCKS AND OTHER STOCKS ARE BEING EXPLOITED.

EACH MS FLEET SEGMENT OR FISHERY HAS AN EFFORT REDUCTION TARGET (ERT) CALCULATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING FORMULA:

WHERE RR IS THE REDUCTION RATE AND W IS THE PERCENTAGE OF THE CATCH OF A FLEET SEGMENT OR FISHERY THAT COMPRISES DEPLETION RISK AND OVERFISHED STOCKS. THE REDUCTION RATE FOR A FLEET SEGMENT OR FISHERY IS DETERMINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STOCK CLASSIFICATION IN APPENDIX A, BY REFERENCE TO THE COMPOSITION OF ITS CATCH AS BETWEEN DEPLETION RISK, OVERFISHED, FULLY EXPLOITED OR OTHER STOCKS^[62] (SEE TABLE 1).

TABLE 1. TARGET FISHING EFFORT REDUCTIONS FOR EU FLEET SEGMENTS AND FISHERIES

NOTE: *IF DR STOCKS AMOUNT TO >5% OF FLEET SEGMENT/FISHERY CATCHES THEN REQUIRED REDUCTION IS 30% Ö = INCLUDED IN FLEET SEGMENT/FISHERY CATCH, X = NOT INCLUDED IN FLEET SEGMENT/FISHERY CATCH. SOURCE: COUNCIL DECISION 97/412/EC.

THE ULTIMATE MANAGEMENT ADVICE HAS BEEN VERY ABSTRACT IN RELATION TO THE TARGETS THAT HAVE BEEN SET, DESPITE BEING BASED ON SCIENTIFIC ADVICE. IN ADDITION, THE ADVICE THAT HAS BEEN GIVEN HAS NOT ALWAYS BEEN FOLLOWED. THE TARGETS THAT HAVE BEEN SET HAVE ALSO ONLY CONCERNED THE DESIRED PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CAPACITY OR EFFORT OVER A SET PERIOD OF TIME AND NOT THE REACHING OF AN ULTIMATE TARGET LEVEL. THE TARGETS FOR MS HAVE BEEN ULTIMATELY BASED ON THE SITUATION OF THE FLEET IN 1983 (WHEN THE EU STRUCTURAL POLICY WAS FIRST IMPLEMENTED) AND HAVE NOT BASED ON ANY SCIENTIFIC ESTIMATIONS OF OVERCAPACITY. LIKEWISE, LATER EU ENTRANTS SUCH AS SPAIN AND PORTUGAL HAD FLEET REDUCTION TARGETS SET IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR FLEET SITUATION AT THE TIME OF THEIR ACCESSION IN 1986.

4. STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT OF THE FISHING FLEET

4.1 FRAMEWORK

IN ORDER TO ATTAIN A SUSTAINABLE BALANCE BETWEEN THE CAPACITY OF THE EU FISHING FLEET AND THE AVAILABLE RESOURCES, AND TO REDUCE INEFFICIENT 'RACE TO FISH' BEHAVIOUR, A COMPREHENSIVE STRUCTURAL POLICY HAS BEEN IN FORCE SINCE 1983. THIS POLICY HAS BEEN SOUGHT THROUGH A STRING OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT MEASURES, INCLUDING VESSEL DECOMMISSIONING AND EFFORT REDUCTION. OTHER MEASURES SUCH AS JOINT VENTURES, EXPORT TO THIRD COUNTRIES AND VARIOUS SOCIAL SUPPORT HAVE ALSO BEEN APPLIED BUT ARE NOT DISCUSSED IN THIS PAPER. THE MEASURES HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED UNDER THE MULTIANNUAL GUIDANCE PROGRAMME (MAGP) FRAMEWORK. THE PRESENT PROGRAMME, MAGP IV, RUNS UNTIL THE END OF 2001. ADDITIONAL FINANCING MEASURES TO RENEW AND MODERNIZE VESSELS HAVE ALSO BEEN APPLIED TO HELP RESTRUCTURE THE EU FISHING FLEET, ALTHOUGH APPLIED SEPARATELY TO THE MAGPS.

THE PROBABLE IMPACT OF SUCH STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT ON AREAS DEPENDENT ON FISHING CAN BE MEASURED BOTH SOCIALLY AND ECONOMICALLY. AT A SOCIAL LEVEL, A REDUCTION IN FISHING CAPACITY WILL HAVE A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON JOBS AT SEA AND THE UPSTREAM SECTOR (SUPPLIES, SHIPYARDS AND HARBOUR ADMINISTRATIONS). ON THE OTHER HAND, THE DOWNSTREAM SECTOR IS LIKELY TO SUFFER ONLY DURING THE TIME REQUIRED FOR THE 'RECAPITALIZATION' OF FISH STOCKS, SINCE THE QUANTITIES CAUGHT WILL EVENTUALLY INCREASE, THUS INCREASING THE NUMBER OF JOBS DOWNSTREAM. IN ECONOMIC TERMS, THE PROFITABILITY OF FISHING COMPANIES AND COMPETITIVENESS OF EUROPEAN PRODUCTS IS LIKELY TO IMPROVE AS A RESULT OF THE ELIMINATION OF THE OVERCAPACITY OF THE EU FLEET. HOWEVER, THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT JOB LOSSES WILL ALSO NEED TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

4.2 VESSEL DECOMMISSIONING

THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF DECOMMISSIONING IS TO REDUCE CAPACITY, THROUGH THE VOLUNTARY REMOVAL OF REDUNDANT VESSELS, SO AS TO BRING FLEETS FISHING PARTICULAR RESOURCES INTO BALANCE WITH THEIR ALLOCATED QUOTA. THE PROCESS WORKS BY GIVING FISHERS A FINANCIAL INCENTIVE TO LEAVE THE FISHERY, USUALLY IN THE FORM OF A GRANT. IN THEORY, THE VESSELS THAT REMAIN IN THE FISHERY WILL BENEFIT AND IMPROVE THE OVERALL EFFICIENCY AS GLOBAL PRODUCTION INCREASES. THE EXPECTED EFFECTS WILL INCLUDE A SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN THE ECONOMIC RESULTS OF THE FISHERIES COMPANIES, THROUGH A REDUCTION IN FIXED COSTS AND IMPROVED CATCHES, AND GREATER COMPETITIVENESS (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1996).

A SUCCESSFUL DECOMMISSIONING PROGRAMME WILL RELY ON WHETHER FISHERS CAN BE DRAWN OUT OF THE FISHERY FOR FUTURE FINANCIAL GAIN, AS OPPOSED TO WHAT THEY WOULD OTHERWISE GAIN IF THEY REMAINED IN THE FISHERY (FROST ET AL., 1995). FISHERS MAY ALSO WITHDRAW FROM THE FISHERY BECAUSE OF THE POOR FUTURE PROSPECTS REGARDLESS, RESULTING IN A FINANCIAL LOSS AND REEMPLOYMENT ELSEWHERE.

A VESSEL DECOMMISSIONING PROGRAMME IS EXPECTED TO REMOVE THE MARGINAL PLAYERS FIRST (I.E. OFTEN THE OLDEST AND LEAST EFFICIENT VESSELS) AND IT MAY PROVE MORE DIFFICULT TO TABLE SUFFICIENT FINANCIAL INCENTIVES AT THE LATER STAGES OF THE PROGRAMME IN ORDER TO ENTICE THE MORE EFFICIENT VESSELS. IT COULD ALSO BE EXPECTED THAT VESSEL DECOMMISSIONING MAY LEAD TO SOME REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH, AS THE VESSELS LEFT IN THE FISHERY MAY BE ABLE TO EXPLOIT A LARGER SHARE OF THE QUOTA.

THE PROGRAMMES HAVE BEEN APPLIED IN MOST MS UNDER THE MAGPS. THE ISSUES OF FUNDING, ELIGIBILITY AND REMOVAL MECHANISM HAVE OFTEN BEEN ADDRESSED AND DEFINED BY THE INDIVIDUAL MS MANAGEMENT REGIME. FOR EXAMPLE, THE UNITED KINGDOM PROGRAMME HAS INCLUDED THE ANNUAL TENDERING OF THE PERMANENT REMOVAL OF VCUS OF ACTIVE VESSELS OVER 10 METRES (BANKS, 1998).

4.3 EFFORT REDUCTION

A LESS PERMANENT MEASURE HAS BEEN APPLIED TO MAGPS SINCE 1992 UNDER THE FISHING EFFORT CONCEPT, WHERE MS MAY REDUCE THE OVEREXPLOITING NATURE OF FISHING FLEETS BY LIMITING THEIR FISHING ACTIVITY (AS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 2.2). GENERALLY KNOWS AS 'TIE-UPS', THIS MEASURE REQUIRES VESSELS TO REMAIN IN PORT FOR A MINIMUM NUMBER OF DAYS IN PORT PER YEAR, THUS REDUCING THE OVERALL FISHING EFFORT AND SUBSEQUENT PRESSURE ON FISH STOCKS. ALTHOUGH THIS MEASURE MAY ADDRESS THE BIOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES IT IS UNLIKELY TO ADDRESS THE MORE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE OF IMPROVING THE STRUCTURE OF THE FLEETS. SINCE THIS MEASURE IS LARGELY A 'REGULATION BY INEFFICIENCY', THE OVERALL ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE FLEET IS UNLIKELY TO IMPROVE SIGNIFICANTLY, ALTHOUGH EMPLOYMENT LEVELS MAY BE MAINTAINED.

4.4 VESSEL RENEWAL AND MODERNIZATION

GRANT AID HAS BEEN ALLOCATED FOR THE CONSTRUCTION AND MODERNIZATION OF FISHING VESSELS TO ENSURE THAT THE EU FLEET REMAINS COMPETITIVE, TO IMPROVE SAFETY ON BOARD VESSELS, TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF FISH HANDLING AND TO ENCOURAGE THE USE OF MORE SELECTIVE GEARS. HOWEVER, ATTAINING AID IS CURRENTLY POSSIBLE ONLY IF THE CORRESPONDING INCREASE IN FISHING EFFORT HAS BEEN ALLOWED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE MAGPS. CLOSE MONITORING IS REQUIRED TO ENSURE THAT THE REPLACEMENT OF OLD AND LESS EFFICIENT VESSELS WITH NEW OR MODERNIZED VESSELS DO NOT LEAD TO AN OVERALL INCREASE IN EFFORT THAT WILL HAMPER MAGPS REACHING THEIR OBJECTIVES.

5. MAGP I AND II (1983-91)

MAGP I (1983-86)^[63] WAS BASED ON NATIONAL PROGRAMMES THAT WERE ADOPTED IN THE FORM OF A COMMISSION DECISION THAT TRANSLATED THE INSTITUTION'S COMMITMENTS WITH REGARD TO THE PROPOSALS MADE BY EACH MS INTO ITS SECTORAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS. THEY DETERMINED THE STABILIZATION OF FLEET CAPACITIES FOR EACH MS BY THE END OF 1986, SIMPLY EXPRESSED IN POWER (KW) AND TONNAGE (GRT). THE GOALS WERE MODEST, BUT FOR THE FIRST TIME GAVE STATUTORY EXPRESSION OF THE DESIRE TO CONTROL THE RACE FOR POWER. AT THE TIME, HOWEVER, THE FLEET CAPACITY IN ALL MS EXCEEDED THE TARGETS AS THERE WAS A CONTINUED EXPANSION IN MANY FISHERIES, AND THE REASONS FOR THIS WERE IDENTIFIED AS (GULLAND ET AL., 1990):

• INCONSISTENCY IN METHODS FOR MEASUREMENT OF CAPACITY;

• ABSENCE OF ANNUAL TARGETS;

• LACK OF EXPERIENCE IN STRUCTURAL POLICY; AND

• ABSENCE OF OBJECTIVES FOR PERMANENT WITHDRAWAL OF EXISTING VESSELS TO COMPENSATE FOR NEW CONSTRUCTIONS.

MAGP II (1987-91)^[64] WAS ADOPTED WITHIN A NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK WITHOUT UNDERMINING THE PLANNING PRINCIPLES OF THE PREVIOUS REGULATION. THE DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE COMMISSION LED TO FIVE-YEARLY REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO A REDUCTION IN EACH NATION'S FLEET CAPACITY, BY TWO PERCENT IN TERMS OF POWER AND THREE PERCENT IN TERMS OF TONNAGE. WITH REGARD TO FISHING FLEETS, THE MAGPS HAD TO COMPROMISE A SET OF OBJECTIVES, TOGETHER WITH A STATEMENT OF THE MEANS NECESSARY FOR ATTAINING THEM.

THE MINIMUM INFORMATION TO BE CONTAINED IN THE MAGPS INCLUDED:

• THE INITIAL SITUATION AND FISHING CAPACITY OF THE FLEET, BY CATEGORY OF VESSEL, TYPE OF FISHING AND REGION;

• THE SITUATION OF THE FLEET AND ENVISAGED FISHING CAPACITY ON COMPLETION OF THE PROGRAMME; AND

• THE INVESTMENTS NEEDED, THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE AND THE LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS PLANNED IN ORDER TO ATTAIN THE OBJECTIVES.

ONCE AGAIN, HOWEVER, MS RACE FOR POWER CONTINUED UNCHECKED. THIS WAS LARGELY DUE TO MASSIVE STATE AIDS TOWARDS CONSTRUCTION AND TECHNOLOGICAL IMPROVEMENT. SPAIN AND PORTUGAL JOINED THE EU, PRACTICALLY DOUBLING THE SIZE OF THE EU FLEET, AND INCREASED THE PERCEIVED COMPETITION WITHIN THE EU FLEET.

THE SYSTEM HAD NO FACILITY FOR CONTROLLING FLEET ENTRIES AND EXITS, OTHER THAN THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF A PROVISION, NAMELY ARTICLE 8 OF REGULATION (EEC) NO 4028/86, WHICH GAVE PRIORITY TO CONSTRUCTION AIDS TO SHIP-OWNERS WHO ELIMINATED TONNAGE EQUIVALENT TO THAT BUILT. BEING MERELY A PRIORITY RATHER THAN A REQUIREMENT, THIS PROVISION WAS GENERALLY DISREGARDED. UNDER THE SAME REGULATION, THE COMMUNITY REGISTER OF FISHING VESSELS WAS ESTABLISHED (SEE SECTION 2.2).

THE RELATIVE FAILURE OF THESE PROGRAMMES WERE ATTRIBUTED TO (DGXIV, 1995):

• FISHERS AND NATIONAL AUTHORITIES WERE NOT CONVINCED THAT THERE WAS AN OVERFISHING PROBLEM;

• THE RELATIVE AMBIGUITY OF THE OBJECTIVES AND A LACK OF SUFFICIENT POLITICAL THRUST;

• CONTINUED AIDS TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENTIRE FISHERIES SECTOR;

• THE NATURE OF THE TOOLS FOR MEASURING THE PROGRESS OF THE PROGRAMMES AND THEIR RESULTS. THE COMMUNITY REGISTER OF FISHING VESSELS WAS NOT YET INSTITUTED AND DISPARATE UNITS OF FISHING CAPACITY, IN TERMS OF TONNAGE AND ENGINE POWER, COMPLICATED MONITORING FURTHER; AND

• THE LACK OF PROPER MONITORING OF FLEET ENTRIES AND EXITS, RESULTING IN MAJOR WASTAGE OF PUBLIC FUNDS. IN EFFECT, THERE WAS NOTHING TO PREVENT DECOMMISSIONED VESSELS BEING REPLACED BY NEWLY CONSTRUCTED VESSELS OF THE SAME CAPACITY.

6. MAGP III (1992-96)

6.1 OBJECTIVES

THE COMMISSION DRAFTED A ROUGH PROPOSAL FOR A NEW MAGP THAT TOOK ACCOUNT OF THE GENERAL STATE OF THE VARIOUS STOCKS, AS CONCLUDED BY GULLAND ET AL. (1990), AND PRODUCED A RANGE OF DESIRABLE REDUCTIONS OVER A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD. THESE INCLUDED A 30 PERCENT REDUCTION IN FISHING OF DEMERSAL STOCKS, A 20 PERCENT REDUCTION FOR BENTHIC STOCKS, BUT NO CHANGE IN FISHING OF PELAGIC STOCKS. IT AIMED TO ENSURE THAT STOCKS IN MOST DANGER OF OVERFISHING WERE CORRECTLY TARGETED UNDER THE FLEET REDUCTION PROGRAMMES.

THE PROPOSALS WERE MET WITH A CHILLY RESPONSE FROM MS, OWING TO ITS SHORT-TERM ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS. THE COMMISSION, THEREFORE, DECIDED ON A ONE-YEAR TRANSITIONAL PROGRAMME FOR 1992, A TWO PERCENT UNIFORM REDUCTION IN FISHING EFFORT, TO GIVE EXTRA TIME FOR CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS. THE MAGP WAS SUBSEQUENTLY AMENDED FOR THE PERIOD 1993-96 AND SET THE REDUCTION LEVELS OF 20 PERCENT FOR DEMERSAL STOCKS, 15 PERCENT FOR BENTHIC STOCKS AND 0 PERCENT FOR PELAGIC STOCKS.^[65]

6.2 FISHING EFFORT REDUCTION

IN CONTRAST TO THE PREVIOUS MAGPS, DESIRED CUTS WERE NOT EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF CAPACITY REDUCTIONS BUT OF DECREASE IN FISHING EFFORT (SEE SECTION 2.2). IT WAS DEFINED AS THE PRODUCT OF ITS CAPACITY EXPRESSED IN TONNAGE (GT) AND INSTALLED POWER (KW) AND THE NUMBER OF DAYS SPENT AT SEA PER REFERENCE PERIOD (T). MS ALSO ACCEPTED THE NEED FOR A COMMON SET OF VESSEL MEASUREMENTS AND AGREED ON THE CREATION OF A COMMUNITY REGISTER OF FISHING VESSELS TO MAKE THE INFORMATION ON FISHING CAPACITY AND EFFORT MORE OPEN AND EASY TO CHECK.

UNDER THE PROGRAMMES, REDUCTIONS COULD EITHER BE CARRIED OUT THROUGH CAPACITY REDUCTION (VESSEL DECOMMISSIONING) OR BY KEEPING VESSELS IN PORT FOR SET PERIODS OF TIME (EFFORT CONTROL). AT LEAST 55 PERCENT OF THE REDUCTION HAD TO BE ACHIEVED BY CAPACITY REDUCTIONS. DESPITE THE ADOPTION OF THIS NEW TARGET TERMINOLOGY, MS DECIDED TO REACH THEIR SET OBJECTIVES SOLELY THROUGH CAPACITY REDUCTIONS. SOME MS DID ATTEMPT TO UTILIZE A REDUCTION IN EFFORT TO MEET THEIR OBJECTIVES, BUT LARGE UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING THEIR IMPLEMENTATION MEANT THAT THE EFFORT REDUCTION APPROACH WAS NOT USED.

IT WAS EMPIRICALLY ESTIMATED THAT OVER RELATIVELY LONG PERIODS, TECHNICAL PROGRESS WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR A CONSTANT, AVERAGE INCREASE IN FISHING EFFORT OF AROUND TWO PERCENT PER YEAR. IT WAS, THEREFORE, FURTHER DECIDED THAT A CORRESPONDING AND EQUALLY CONSTANT, AVERAGE DECREASE IN FISHING EFFORT WAS REQUIRED. TECHNICAL PROGRESS COULD THEREFORE TURN FISHING INTO A THREAT TO THE RESOURCE THAT NEEDED TO BE OFFSET BY A CORRESPONDING ADJUSTMENT IN FISHING EFFORT.

6.3 FLEET SEGMENTATION

MAGP III SET DIFFERENT TARGETS FOR REDUCING FISHING EFFORT ACCORDING TO THE TYPE OF STOCK BEING EXPLOITED (I.E. DEMERSAL, BENTHIC OR PELAGIC). THE TRANSLATION OF THESE TARGETS INTO CONCRETE TERMS PROMPTED EACH MS TO SEGMENT ITS FLEET DEPENDING ON HOW EACH OF ITS SEGMENTS WAS GEARED TOWARDS THESE STOCKS, DEFINED ON THE BASIS OF THE ZONE FISHED, THE SPECIES EXPLOITED AND THE FISHING GEAR USED. THE OBJECTIVES FOR 1996 FOR EACH SEGMENT WERE CALCULATED BY APPLYING THE VARYING SEGMENT REDUCTION RATES, WITH THE GLOBAL OBJECTIVES FOR 1996 AND ANNUAL INTERMEDIATE OBJECTIVES CALCULATED AS THE SUM OF THE OBJECTIVES BY SEGMENT.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS WERE MADE FOR MULTIPURPOSE VESSELS THAT ALTERNATELY TARGETED SENSITIVE AND NON-SENSITIVE STOCKS TO WHICH DIFFERENT GUIDELINE RATES FOR REDUCING FISHING EFFORT APPLIED. IN SUCH CASES, THE USE OF MEASURES TO REDUCE EFFORT TARGETED AT SENSITIVE STOCKS WERE ADVOCATED IN ORDER TO AVOID REDUCING THE CAPACITIES OF A SEGMENT WHOSE FISHING PRESSURE ON NON-SENSITIVE STOCKS WAS NOT EXCESSIVE. IN AREAS WHERE INDISCRIMINATE FISHING ACTIVITIES MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO IDENTIFY A SINGLE-SPECIES FISHERY, THE GUIDELINE RATE FOR THE MOST SENSITIVE SPECIES IN THE AREA WAS APPLIED.

THE PROCEDURE TO SEGMENT MS FLEETS, HOWEVER, ONLY ALLOWED MS TO MAKE THE PROGRAMME OBJECTIVES MORE UNCLEAR AND CAUSED FURTHER CONFUSION OVER THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SET OBJECTIVES AND THE BIOLOGICAL ADVICE THAT IT WAS BASED UPON.

7. FLEET DEVELOPMENT

FLEET CAPACITIES CONTINUED TO GROW UNTIL 1986/87, AFTER WHICH IT STABILIZED BETWEEN 1986/87 AND 1992. ALTHOUGH NO RELIABLE DOCUMENTATION OF FLEET EXPANSION EXIST, THE EXPENDITURE TOWARDS CONSTRUCTION AND MODERNIZATION, IN RELATION TO CAPACITY REDUCTION (SEE APPENDIX C), INDICATES THAT THE EU FLEET CAPACITY WOULD HAVE INCREASED DURING THE 1983-90 PERIOD. HOWEVER, MAGP III BEGAN TO MAKE REAL INROADS INTO CAPACITY WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRANSITIONAL MAGP FOR 1992.

REDUCTION IN FLEET CAPACITY ACCELERATED WITH AN 18 PERCENT REDUCTION IN TONNAGE AND A 12 PERCENT REDUCTION IN POWER OF THE EU FLEET DURING THE 1991-96 PERIOD (TABLE 2).

TABLE 2. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SIZE OF THE EU FLEETS AGAINST MAGP TARGETS

NOTE: EXCLUDING FINLAND AND SWEDEN. SOURCE: EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1997).

HOWEVER, THE PROGRESS TOWARDS MEETING THE 1996 TARGETS WAS VERY UNEVEN, DESPITE THE FACT THAT FOR THE EU AS A WHOLE THE OVERALL TARGETS HAD BEEN CLEARLY MET BY THE END OF 1996. THE SITUATION OF THE DUTCH AND UNITED KINGDOM FLEETS WERE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN. AS SEEN IN TABLE 3, THESE TWO NATIONS WERE STILL REQUIRED TO MAKE CUTS IN BOTH TONNAGE AND ENGINE POWER AT THE END OF 1996. BY CONTRAST, A NUMBER OF MS HAD MORE THAN MET THEIR TARGETS, THEREBY ALLOWING THEM ACCESS TO EU GRANTS FOR VESSEL RENEWAL AND MODERNIZATION.

A FURTHER PROBLEM WAS THAT ALTHOUGH THE OVERALL REQUIRED REDUCTION TARGETS HAD BEEN MET, THIS MASKED A NUMBER OF POINTS OF DETAIL REGARDING PROGRESS IN EACH MS. EACH MS HAD TO REACH THE INDIVIDUAL TARGETS SET FOR EACH FLEET SEGMENT AND SOME MS THAT HAD ALREADY ACHIEVED THEIR OVERALL TARGETS STILL HAD TO MAKE FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN PARTICULAR FLEET SEGMENTS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE UNITED KINGDOM HAD ALREADY MET ITS 1996 TARGETS FOR A NUMBER OF SEGMENTS BY THE END OF 1994, BUT IT STILL HAD ABOUT 18 PERCENT AND 36 PERCENT OVERCAPACITY RESPECTIVELY IN KEY DEMERSAL TRAWLER AND BEAM TRAWLER SEGMENTS.

TABLE 3. MS FLEET OBJECTIVES AND SITUATIONS 1996

* BASED ON ITALY REPORT. SOURCE: EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1997).

8. CURRENT MAGP IV (1997-2001)

8.1 OBJECTIVES

AT THE END OF THE PERIOD OF APPLICATION OF THE MAGP III, IT WAS CLEAR THAT WHILE THERE HAD BEEN SOME DECLINE IN THE SURPLUS CAPACITY OF THE EU FLEET, ALL THE OBJECTIVES HAD NOT BEEN ACHIEVED, IN PARTICULAR BY CERTAIN MS. NUMEROUS ISSUES AROSE FOLLOWING THE END OF MAGP III (DES CLERS, 1996). FIRSTLY, FLEET REDUCTION WAS GLOBALLY FIXED AND CONCERNED ONLY OVEREXPLOITED DEMERSAL (20 PERCENT) AND BENTHIC (15 PERCENT) STOCKS, PROBABLY ENCOURAGING CAPACITY BUILD-UP IN THE LESS REGULATED PELAGIC, SEMI-PELAGIC AND SHELLFISH FISHERIES, AND ON STOCKS STRADDLING ON THE HIGH SEAS. SECONDLY, CONTINUED CONTRADICTORY POLICIES AND LACK OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC UNDERPINNING FAILED TO GIVE PRIORITY TO THE DECOMMISSIONING OF THE FLEET ACTUALLY TARGETING OVEREXPLOITED STOCKS.

MOREOVER, THE TECHNICAL PROGRESS ACHIEVED IN THE INDUSTRY OVER THE PERIOD CERTAINLY HAMPERED COMPLIANCE WITH THE GUIDELINES. A FURTHER FACTOR WAS THE REPETITION OF CATASTROPHIC DECLINES IN FISH PRICES, WHICH LED SOME FLEETS TO INCREASE FISHING TO OFFSET THE DROP IN INCOME. THIS CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASING FISHING EFFORT, FURTHER AGGRAVATING OVEREXPLOITATION OF RESOURCES. THE FLEET RESTRUCTURING MEASURES, THEREFORE, HAD THUS FAR BEEN UNABLE TO IMPROVE STOCKS OR BOOST COMPETITIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY. IT APPEARS THAT THE STATUS OF THE MAJORITY OF STOCKS HAD NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGED OVER THE PERIOD.

BEFORE MAGP IV WAS IMPLEMENTED, THE COMMISSION ASKED A GROUP OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS TO EVALUATE THE STATE OF FISH STOCKS (LASSEN ET AL., 1994). THIS REPORT SHOWED THAT SEVERAL COMMERCIAL STOCKS WERE STILL COMING UNDER FAR TOO MUCH FISHING PRESSURE. AS A RESULT, THE COUNCIL DECIDED THAT FISHING EFFORT UNDER MAGP IV SHOULD BE CUT BY 30 PERCENT WHERE STOCKS WERE IN DANGER OF COLLAPSE (DEPLETION RISK) AND 20 PERCENT WHERE STOCKS WERE BEING OVERFISHED, WITH A ZERO INCREASE IN FISHING EFFORT FOR OTHER STOCKS (SEE APPENDIX A). THE RATES WERE REGARDED TO BE MODERATE ACCORDING TO THE PERCENTAGE OF THE CATCH MADE UP OF THESE STOCKS. VESSELS OF LESS THAN 12 METRES OVERALL LENGTH THAT USED PASSIVE GEARS WERE EXEMPT FROM ANY REDUCTION REQUIREMENTS^[66]. BACKLOGS STEMMING FROM THE PREVIOUS PROGRAMME WERE ALSO INCORPORATED INTO THE NEW PROGRAMME. THE CURRENT EU AND MS FLEET OBJECTIVES FOR MAGP IV ARE GIVEN IN TABLE 4 AND 5.

TABLE 4. EU FLEET OBJECTIVES FOR 2001

NOTE: EXCLUDING ITALY. SOURCE: EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1999).

TABLE 5. MEMBER STATE FLEET OBJECTIVES FOR 2001

NOTE: EXCLUDING ITALY. SOURCE: EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1999).

THE PROGRAMME CONCENTRATES THE REDUCTIONS IN EFFORT ON THOSE FLEET SEGMENTS OPERATING ON THE MOST VULNERABLE STOCKS AND ATTEMPTS TO MINIMIZE THEIR SHORT-TERM SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT. IN ORDER TO REACH THE OBJECTIVES EACH MS MUST ADOPT LEGISLATION TO CONTROL THE RENEWAL OF THE FLEET, WHICH ON A SEGMENT BASIS DETERMINES THE REQUIRED RATIO BETWEEN ENTRIES AND EXITS OF VESSELS. IT FOLLOWS THAT AID CANNOT BE GRANTED TO THE RENEWAL AND MODERNIZATION OF THE FLEET, RESULTING IN AN INCREASE IN FISHING EFFORT, UNLESS STATED OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN MET (SEE APPENDIX C). SINCE THE OVERALL OBJECTIVES OF MAGP IV HAVE ALREADY BEEN MET (SEE TABLE 4), IT SHOULD BE ANTICIPATED THAT THE CAPACITY OF THE EU FLEET WILL INCREASE THROUGH RENEWAL AND MODERNIZATION IN ELIGIBLE FLEET SEGMENTS.

A PROBLEM THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IS THAT THE CONCENTRATION OF THE PROGRAMMES ON STOCK VULNERABILITY CRITERIA HAS PURELY BEEN A TECHNICAL ISSUE. THAT IS, THERE IS NO APPARENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CALCULATED REDUCTIONS AND THE FISHING PRESSURE ON THESE STOCKS, AND THE CATCH DATA THAT IS USED IS NOT PUBLIC INFORMATION.

8.2 FISHING EFFORT REDUCTION

THE PROGRAMME FIXES THE EFFORT REDUCTION OBJECTIVES TO BE ACHIEVED FOR DEFINED MS FLEET SEGMENTS, ACCORDING TO THE STOCKS EXPLOITED AND THE FISHING GEAR EMPLOYED (SEE SECTION 3.2). ANNUAL INTERMEDIATE TARGETS CONTINUE TO BE IN FORCE. FOR VESSELS USING ACTIVE GEARS, EFFORT REDUCTION CAN BE ACHIEVED BY EITHER REDUCTION IN CAPACITY OR EFFORT, OR A MIXTURE OF THE TWO, PROVIDING THAT EFFORT CAN BE EFFECTIVELY MONITORED AND CONTROLLED. GERMANY, FRANCE, IRELAND, THE NETHERLANDS, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND SWEDEN MAKE USE OF THIS PROVISION IN SOME FLEET SEGMENTS, WHEREAS OTHER MS INTEND TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES PURELY THROUGH REDUCTIONS IN CAPACITY. BECAUSE OF THIS, THE REQUIRED OVERALL CAPACITY REDUCTIONS HAVE BEEN LESSENED DUE TO SOME MS FLEET SEGMENTS SEEKING REDUCTIONS THROUGH EFFORT CONTROL. MS CAN STILL DECIDE ON THE MANNER THEY INTEND TO MEET THEIR OBJECTIVES AND TARGETS HAVE BEEN CALCULATED, TAKING POSSIBLE BACKLOGS OF THE PREVIOUS MAGP INTO ACCOUNT (SEE DANISH EXAMPLE IN APPENDIX B).

CONSIDERABLE PROBLEMS WITH FISHING EFFORT REDUCTION, AS OUTLINED ABOVE, INCLUDE THAT THE DETERMINATION OF REFERENCE LEVELS AND FLEET SEGMENTATION HAS NOT BEEN UNDERTAKEN IN AN OBJECTIVE MANNER. THE ELEMENT THAT ACCOUNTS FOR BACKLOGS OF THE PREVIOUS PROGRAMME HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY SUBJECT TO SUBJECTIVE DECISIONS AND HAS IN MANY CASES RESULTED IN LENIENT TARGET AMENDMENTS.

9. MAGP V - AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

A MID-TERM REVIEW OF MAGP IV IS CURRENTLY UNDER WAY AND A RECENT REPORT BY THE SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC COMMITTEE FOR FISHERIES (STECF, 1999) CAN BE SEEN AS A PRELIMINARY CONTRIBUTION TO THE OVERALL REVIEW. STECF RECOGNIZES IN THEIR REPORT TO THE COMMISSION THAT IN ORDER TO PREPARE FOR THE NEXT MAGP PHASE, A FULL EVALUATION OF PREVIOUS PROGRAMMES NEEDS TO BE UNDERTAKEN.

THIS NEEDS TO CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING:

• THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PROGRAMMES;
• EFFECTS ON STOCKS AND FISHERIES;
• ASSESS WHETHER OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN MET;

• ASSESS THE EXTENT OF ANTICIPATED AND UNANTICIPATED SIDE EFFECTS.

THE STECF (1999: P. 11) FURTHER CONSIDERS THAT: "IN VIEW OF THE LOW REDUCTION RATES APPLIED TO MEMBER STATES' FLEETS IN MAGP III AND IV IN COMPARISON TO WHAT WAS RECOMMENDED ACCORDING TO THE STATE OF THE STOCKS, AND THE WAY THEY HAVE BEEN APPLIED, THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF MATCHING FISHING CAPACITY TO RESOURCE AVAILABILITY IS UNLIKELY TO HAVE BEEN FULLY ACHIEVED BY THE END OF 2001".

A COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION SHOULD THEREFORE ADDRESS THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS (E.G. SEGMENTATION, SCRAP AND BUILD POLICIES, ACTIVITY CHANGES ETC.) AND HOW ECONOMIC AND OTHER INCENTIVES HAVE INFLUENCED THEIR EFFECTIVENESS. STECF (1999) FURTHER SUGGESTS THAT FOR THE COMMISSION TO IMPLEMENT MAGP V SUCCESSFULLY, THE FOLLOWING AREAS WILL NEED TO BE INVESTIGATED OR CLARIFIED:

• REVIEW THE STATE OF THE FISH STOCKS EXPLOITED BY THE EUROPEAN FLEETS, INCLUDING THOSE FOUND IN THIRD COUNTRY WATERS;

• REVIEW THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE FLEETS;

• COMMENT ON THE LEVELS OF FISHING MORTALITY IN RELATION TO PRECAUTIONARY FISHING MORTALITY REFERENCE POINTS (OR SIMILAR REFERENCE POINTS);

• GAIN A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF FLEET DYNAMICS AND THE BEHAVIOUR OF FLEET SEGMENTS IN RELATION TO SPECIFIC MANAGEMENT MEASURES GIVING AN INSIGHT TO THE LIKELY EFFECTIVENESS OF SUCH MEASURES;

• FURTHER INVESTIGATE THE FISHING CAPACITY, FISHING EFFORT AND FISHING MORTALITY RELATIONSHIP TO ANTICIPATE MORE ACCURATELY THE EFFECTS OF CAPACITY REDUCTIONS ON FISHING MORTALITY.

THE LATTER ISSUE IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT SINCE IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT, IN PRINCIPLE, THE CONTROL OF CAPACITY AND EFFORT CAN BE USED TO CONTROL THE OVERALL LEVEL OF FISHING MORTALITY. IT WILL THEREFORE BE IMPORTANT TO DEFINE WHAT IS MEANT BY EACH CONCEPT AND HOW THEY WILL BE MEASURED, AND TO UNDERSTAND THE PRACTICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THESE CONCEPTS.

IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF MAGP V WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE MATCHING OF EU FISHING CAPACITY TO RESOURCE AVAILABILITY, THROUGH SIMILAR FLEET ADJUSTMENT INITIATIVES.

10. DISCUSSION

THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF MAGPS IN ORDER TO RESTRUCTURE EU FISHING FLEETS RAISES A NUMBER OF ISSUES THAT NEED TO BE ADDRESSED. THIS INCLUDES THE DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF FISHING CAPACITY, THE USE OF VESSEL DECOMMISSIONING AND THE APPLICATION OF EFFORT RESTRICTIONS. ANY EFFECTIVE REDUCTIONS IN FISHING CAPACITY/EFFORT MAY BE OFFSET BY VESSEL RENEWAL AND MODERNIZATION AND THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT GRANTS IN THE OVERALL STRUCTURAL POLICY, THEREFORE, ALSO NEEDS TO BE CONSIDERED.

10.1 FISHING CAPACITY/EFFORT REDUCTION

FISHING CAPACITY HAS BEEN MEASURED IN TERMS OF VESSEL TONNAGE AND ENGINE POWER. VESSEL TONNAGE HAS BEEN REGISTERED AS GRT, GT AND OTHER NATIONAL UNITS. THE MIXTURE OF THESE MEASUREMENTS HAS CAUSED SOME CONFUSION IN RELATION TO MAGP OBJECTIVES AND SITUATIONS OF NATIONAL FLEET SEGMENTS. ALTHOUGH IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT MEASUREMENTS WILL BE HARMONIZED, THE RESULTS OF PREVIOUS MAGPS SHOULD BE INTERPRETED WITH SOME SCEPTICISM. ENGINE POWER, IN TERMS OF KW, HAS BEEN A MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD UNIT TO MEASURE ALTHOUGH TECHNICAL PROBLEMS SUCH AS DE-RATING PRACTICES MAY HAVE UNDERESTIMATED THE REGISTERED ENGINE POWER OF SOME VESSELS. FURTHERMORE, ENGINE POWER HAS BEEN MEASURED AND REGISTERED AS BOTH OFFICIAL AND MAXIMUM EFFECT UNITS AND HAS HENCE LED TO FURTHER CONFUSION OVER THE EXACT DEVELOPMENT OF FLEET ENGINE POWER. MEASUREMENT DISCREPANCIES HAVE PROMPTED FREQUENT ADJUSTMENT OF FIGURES IN THE COMMUNITY REGISTER OF FISHING VESSELS AND OBVIOUS PROBLEMS CAN BE VIEWED BY REFERRING TO THE EXACT VALUES IN THE TABLES GIVEN IN THIS PAPER^[67]. THE LACK OF RELIABLE AND HARMONIOUS CAPACITY INDICATORS SHOULD BE SEEN AS ONE OF THE MAIN STUMBLING BLOCKS IN PAST AND PRESENT CAPACITY REDUCTION INITIATIVES.

IF PRACTICAL MEASUREMENT PROBLEMS ARE OVERCOME THERE MAY STILL BE MORE A THEORETIC COMPLICATION THAT NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED. DEFINING FISHING CAPACITY IN TERMS OF TWO INPUT UNITS COULD BE SCRUTINIZED. FISHING CAPACITY, OR THE ABILITY OF A VESSEL TO CATCH FISH, IS A HIGHLY COMPLEX CONCEPT AND DEPENDS ON MULTIPLE-INPUTS. ALTHOUGH TONNAGE AND ENGINE POWER WILL SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE VESSEL'S CATCHING ABILITY, AND MONITORING OF THESE INPUTS MAY PROVIDE A SIMPLE INDICATOR OF CAPACITY, IT SHOULD BE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT OTHER INPUTS THAT ARE NOT MONITORED MAY ALLOW AN INCREASE IN EFFECTIVE FISHING CAPACITY (THROUGH INPUT SUBSTITUTION). THE LEVELS OF CAPACITY UTILIZATION, TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS WILL ALSO DETERMINE THE ABILITY OF VESSELS TO CATCH FISH AND NEED TO BE CONSIDERED. THE FISHING CAPACITY, FISHING EFFORT AND FISHING MORTALITY RELATIONSHIP (THAT MAGP ADVICE HAS BEEN BASED UPON) ALSO NEEDS TO BE FURTHER ANALYZED.

CAPACITY REDUCTION THROUGH VESSEL DECOMMISSIONING SHOULD ALSO BE DEBATED. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE LEAST EFFICIENT VESSELS ARE THOSE THAT ARE LIKELY TO BE REMOVED FROM THE FISHERY FIRST. THESE VESSELS MAY, IN EFFECT, NOT HAVE A CONSIDERABLE IMPACT ON OVERALL CATCHES AND THEIR REMOVAL MAY, THEREFORE, NOT HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON FISHING PRESSURE. IF RELATIVELY EFFICIENT VESSELS ARE REMOVED, THE REMAINING VESSELS MAY BE ALLOWED TO INCREASE THEIR EFFORT IN ORDER TO UTILISE A LARGER SHARE OF THE QUOTA ('EFFORT CREEPING'), RESULTING IN A SIMILAR LEVEL OF PRESSURE ON STOCKS. VESSEL DECOMMISSIONING CAN ALSO BE EXPECTED TO BECOME MORE EXPENSIVE WITH TIME AS THE MORE EFFICIENT VESSELS WILL REQUIRE GREATER FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO BE ENTICED OUT OF THE FISHERY, AND THE REQUIRED EXPENDITURE FOR SUCH A SCENARIO IS VIRTUALLY UNKNOWN.

THE REDUCTION IN FISHING EFFORT ALLOWS MS TO REDUCE THEIR REQUIRED CUTS IN PHYSICAL FISHING CAPACITY. ALTHOUGH THIS MAY HAVE A SIMILAR EFFECT ON FISHING PRESSURE ON STOCKS, IF COMPARED TO CAPACITY REDUCTION, IT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED THAT RESTRICTING VESSEL ACTIVITY IS ONLY A TEMPORARY SOLUTION AND DOES NOT ASSIST TO STRUCTURALLY ADJUST THE SIZE OF THE FLEET TO AVAILABLE RESOURCES. THIS WILL MAINTAIN AN ARTIFICIALLY HIGH LEVEL OF FISHING CAPACITY, IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS DESIRED. HOWEVER, A RESTRICTION ON EFFORT WILL PROBABLY REDUCE PROFITS AND MAY FORCE SOME INEFFICIENT VESSEL OUT OF THE FISHERY.

10.2 VESSEL RENEWAL AND MODERNISATION

IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE EU FLEET EFFICIENCY, TO IMPROVE SAFETY ON BOARD VESSELS, TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF FISH HANDLING AND TO ENCOURAGE THE USE OF MORE SELECTIVE GEARS, CONSTRUCTION GRANTS HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD OF THE MAGPS. IT COULD BE ARGUED THAT AN INCREASE IN CAPACITY FOR SAFETY PURPOSES ONLY SERVES FOR THAT PURPOSE AND MAY NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT THE VESSEL WILL FISH MORE INTENSIVELY. HOWEVER, CRITICISM HAS FOCUSED ON THE LACK OF CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN THE RESTRUCTURING ELEMENTS OF VESSEL DECOMMISSIONING AND CONSTRUCTION AND THE STRUCTURAL POLICY WAS HENCE CONSIDERED AS ONE OF 'SCRAP AND BUILD' UP UNTIL 1992, WHEN THE FOCUS ON REDUCTION WAS EVENTUALLY READDRESSED AND CLARIFIED.

IT HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED THAT THE REMOVAL OF OLD AND RELATIVELY INEFFICIENT VESSELS THROUGH DECOMMISSIONING WAS FOLLOWED BY THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW VESSELS THAT WERE MORE EFFICIENT AT CATCHING FISH. GRANTS TOWARDS MODERNIZATION OF OLDER VESSELS HAVE ALSO ASSISTED TO INCREASE FISHING PRESSURE THROUGH TECHNOLOGICAL IMPROVEMENT (E.G. A MODERATE ESTIMATE IS A TWO-THREE PERCENT PRODUCTIVITY INCREASE PER YEAR), IN ADDITION TO THE GENERAL UPKEEP OF VESSELS THAT OWNERS WILL INVEST IN. THEREFORE, DESPITE RECOGNIZED CAPACITY REDUCTIONS IN TERMS OF TONNAGE AND ENGINE POWER DURING THE LATTER MAGP PERIOD, THE EFFECTIVE FISHING CAPACITY OF THE MS FLEETS MAY HAVE REMAINED UNALTERED OR ACTUALLY INCREASED. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY A PROBLEM DURING THE 1980S WHERE MEASURES USED TO CURB FISHING CAPACITY WERE LARGELY MADE INEFFECTIVE AS A RESULT. THE 1990S HAVE SEEN STRICTER CONTROLS ON THE GRANTING OF AID FOR RENEWAL AND MODERNIZATION ALTHOUGH IT HAS CONTINUED TO CAUSE CONTROVERSY. FUTURE GRANT RESTRICTIONS ARE CURRENTLY BEING DISCUSSED (SEE APPENDIX C), WHERE THE DISCUSSION IS FUELLED BY CONSIDERABLE NATIONAL DIFFERENCES. THE CONTINUED MODERNIZATION OF SOME MS FLEETS HAVE ALSO BEEN SEEN AS A COMPETITIVE THREAT TO OTHER MS, LEADING TO LOBBYING FOR THE AVAILABILITY OF FURTHER CONSTRUCTION GRANTS IN CERTAIN MS.

10.3 THE COMMISSION'S ROLE

IN ADDITION TO THE MANY THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES FACING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A SUCCESSFUL CAPACITY REDUCTION MECHANISM IN THE EU, THE ROLE OF THE COMMISSION ITSELF HAS LIMITED ITS PROGRESS TO SOME EXTENT. THE COMMISSION HAS ADDED TO THE LACK OF CLARITY OF PROGRAMMES BY ALLOWING MS TO ADJUST PROGRAMME OBJECTIVES THROUGH ACCEPTING DIFFERENT CAPACITY DEFINITIONS AND MEASUREMENTS. FURTHERMORE, AMENDMENTS OF MS OBJECTIVES HAVE SOMETIMES BEEN ADOPTED, AS WELL AS COMPLEX FLEET SEGMENTATION PROCEDURES, SEEMINGLY AIDING TO MASK THE OVERALL CAPACITY SITUATION OF MS FLEETS. WITHOUT THE CLARITY OF PROGRAMME ELEMENTS AND OBJECTIVES IT IS A CONSIDERABLE TASK TO ASSESS WHETHER THERE HAS IN FACT BEEN ANY REAL REDUCTION IN FISHING PRESSURE ON OVEREXPLOITED STOCKS.

11. CONCLUDING REMARKS

EU FISHERIES HAVE BEEN SUBJECT TO TRANSNATIONAL ADJUSTMENT EFFORTS IN ORDER TO ADDRESS THE IMBALANCE OF FISHING CAPACITY AND AVAILABLE RESOURCES. THIS HAS INCLUDED THE APPLICATION OF MAGPS WHERE OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN SET IN TERMS OF DESIRED REDUCTIONS IN FISHING CAPACITY OF THE FLEETS, AND MORE RECENTLY THROUGH THE REDUCTION OF FISHING EFFORT OF INDIVIDUAL FLEET SEGMENTS TARGETING SPECIFIC STOCKS, OR THROUGH A COMBINATION OF THE TWO. DIFFICULTIES OF TRYING TO ADDRESS BIOLOGICAL IMPERATIVES WHILE ACCOMMODATING A MULTITUDE OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC INTERESTS HAVE HAMPERED ITS PROGRESS.

DUE TO THE SEVERE LACK OF RELIABLE AND TRANSPARENT DATA, THE EXACT MONITORING OF THE PROGRESS OF FLEET DEVELOPMENT IN RELATION TO PROGRAMME OBJECTIVES HAS BEEN DIFFICULT. THEREFORE, THIS PAPER HAS BEEN UNABLE TO ANALYZE EMPIRICAL EXAMPLES TO ANY GREAT EXTENT THAT WOULD HAVE ASSISTED A MORE COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE CAPACITY REDUCTION INITIATIVES.

ALTHOUGH MOST OF THE LATTER MAGP REDUCTION OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN MET, THE TRANSLATED EFFECT OF A SIMILAR REDUCTION IN FISHING PRESSURE ON STOCKS REMAINS IN DOUBT. IT CAN BE EXPECTED THAT ISSUES SUCH AS TECHNOLOGICAL IMPROVEMENT, EFFORT CREEPING FOLLOWING VESSEL DECOMMISSIONING, GRANTS FOR VESSEL RENEWAL AND MODERNIZATION, TEMPORARY EFFORT RESTRICTIONS, LACK OF COMPLIANCE BY CERTAIN FLEET SEGMENTS, AND POSSIBLE RELOCATION OF CAPACITY IN LESS REGULATED FISHERIES, WILL ALL DETERMINE THE SUCCESS OF THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF SUCH PROGRAMMES. THE PRINCIPAL FISHING CAPACITY, FISHING EFFORT AND FISHING MORTALITY RELATIONSHIP, INCLUDING THEIR DEFINITION AND RELIABLE MEASUREMENT, WILL REQUIRE FURTHER ANALYSIS IF MEANINGFUL FLEET REDUCTION TARGETS ARE TO BE SET IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DESIRED MULTI-OBJECTIVES OF EU FISHERIES MANAGEMENT.

12. REFERENCES

BANKS, R. 1998. SUBSIDISING EU FLEETS: CAPACITY REDUCTION OR CAPITAL SUBSIDISATION. CA WORKSHOP, PORTSMOUTH, OCTOBER 1998.

DES CLERS, S. 1996. STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT OF THE EUROPEAN FISHING FLEET - THE NEXT MULTI-ANNUAL GUIDANCE PROGRAMME (MAGP 4 1997-1999). MAGP DOCUMENT FOR I. LUTCHMAN WWF-UNITED KINDGOM.

DGXIV, 1995. STRUCTURAL POLICY TO ASSIST FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE. DISCUSSION SEMINAR HELD BY THE COMMISSION WITH THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. DG XIV/464/95-EN. OCTOBER 1995.

DGXIV, 1998. EUROPEAN UNION AID FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FISHING INDUSTRY (1994-99). DGXIV INTERNET PUBLISHED.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1996. PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL DECISION CONCERNING THE OBJECTIVES AND DETAILED RULES FOR RESTRUCTURING THE COMMUNITY FISHERIES SECTOR FOR THE PERIOD FROM 1 JANUARY 1997 TO 31 DECEMBER 2001 WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVING A BALANCE ON A SUSTAINABLE BASIS BETWEEN RESOURCES AND THEIR EXPLOITATION. COM (96) 237 FINAL. BRUSSELS 29.5.96.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1997. THE ANNUAL REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AND TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ON THE RESULTS OF THE MULTI-ANNUAL GUIDANCE PROGRAMMES FOR THE FISHING FLEETS AT THE END OF 1996. COM (97) 352 FINAL. BRUSSELS, 11.7.97.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1999. THE ANNUAL REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AND TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ON THE RESULTS OF THE MULTI-ANNUAL GUIDANCE PROGRAMMES FOR THE FISHING FLEETS AT THE END OF 1997. COM (1999) 175 FINAL. BRUSSELS, 27.4.1999.

FAO. 1998. REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP ON THE MANAGEMENT OF FISHING CAPACITY. LA JOLLA, UNITED STATES, 15-18 APRIL 1998. FAO FISHERIES REPORT NO. 586. ROME, FAO.

FROST, H. ET AL. 1995. THE IMPACT OF THE EU DECOMMISSIONING SCHEME WITH PARTICULAR RESPECT TO DENMARK AND THE NETHERLANDS. THEME SESSION ON IMPROVING THE LINK BETWEEN FISHERIES SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT II: CAN WE MANAGE FISHERIES BY TECHNICAL MEASURES ALONE? ICES.

GULLAND, J.A. ET AL. 1990. REPORT OF AN INDEPENDENT GROUP OF EXPERTS ON GUIDELINES FOR THE PREPARATION OF MULTI-ANNUAL GUIDANCE PROGRAMMES IN RELATION TO THE FISHING FLEET FOR THE PERIOD 1992-1996. INTERNAL DOCUMENT FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION. BRUSSELS, NOVEMBER 1990.

HATCHER, A. 1998. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S STRUCTURAL POLICY FOR THE FISHING INDUSTRY. CA WORKSHOP, PORTSMOUTH, OCTOBER 1998.

HOLDEN, M. 1994. THE COMMON FISHERIES POLICY: ORIGIN, EVALUATION AND FUTURE. FISHING NEWS BOOKS.

HOLLAND, D. & SUTINEN, J.G. 1998. DRAFT GUIDELINES ON FISHING CAPACITY. PAPER PRESENTED AT FAO TWG CONSULTATION, APRIL 1998.

LASSEN, H. ET AL. 1996. REPORT OF THE GROUP OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS TO ADVISE THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON THE FOURTH GENERATION OF MULTI-ANNUAL GUIDANCE PROGRAMMES. DGXIV/298/96-EN, APRIL 1996.

LINDEBO, E. 1999. A REVIEW OF FISHING CAPACITY AND OVERCAPACITY. SJFI WORKING PAPER NO. 14/1999.

PORTER, G. 1998. TOO MUCH FISHING FLEET, TOO FEW FISH: A PROPOSAL FOR ELIMINATING GLOBAL FISHING OVERCAPACITY. PREPUBLICATION DRAFT. WWF, AUGUST 1998.

STECF, 1999. 8^TH REPORT OF THE SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC COMMITTEE FOR FISHERIES. COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER. SEC (1999) 932, BRUSSELS 14.06.1999.

APPENDIX A. CLASSIFICATION OF STOCKS

TABLE 6. CRITICAL STOCKS AS STATED IN COUNCIL DECISION 97/413/EC, CONCERNING THE OBJECTIVES AND DETAILED RULES FOR RESTRUCTURING THE COMMUNITY FISHERIES SECTOR FOR THE PERIOD FROM 1 JANUARY 1997 TO 31 DECEMBER 2001 WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVING A BALANCE ON A SUSTAINABLE BASIS BETWEEN RESOURCES AND THEIR EXPLOITATION.

DR DEPLETION RISK: SPAWNING STOCK BIOMASS PRESENTLY BELOW MBAL OR LIKELY TO BE IN THAT POSITION IN THE SHORT-TERM AT CURRENT LEVELS OF FISHING MORTALITY.

OF OVERFISHED: MODERATE TO SUBSTANTIAL GAINS IN LONG-TERM YIELD IF EFFORT IS DECREASED; IF HEAVILY OVERFISHED, MEDIUM-TERM RISK OF SPAWNING STOCK BIOMASS FALLING BELOW MBAL.

FE FULLY EXPLOITED: NO SUBSTANTIAL LONG-TERM GAINS OR LOSSES IF EFFORT IS MODERATELY INCREASED OR REDUCED.

ZONES: III BCD (BALTIC SEA), IIIA (SKAGERRAK AND KATTEGAT), IV (NORTH SEA), VI (WEST SCOTLAND), VIIA (IRISH SEA), VIIBC (WEST IRELAND), VIIEFGHJK (CELTIC SEA AND WESTERN CHANNEL), VIID (EASTERN CHANNEL), VIIIABD (BAY OF BISCAY), VIIIC AND IXA (IBERIAN PENINSULA), AND MS (MEDITERRANEAN SEA).

APPENDIX B. OBJECTIVES OF MAGP IV - DANISH EXAMPLE

TABLE 7. OBJECTIVES AND SITUATIONS OF DANISH FLEET SEGMENTS AT THE END OF 1997

TABLE 8. FISHING EFFORT SITUATION OF DANISH FLEET SEGMENTS IN 1997

SOURCE: EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1999).

TABLE 9. FISHING EFFORT REDUCTION OBJECTIVES OF DANISH FLEET SEGMENTS DURING MAGP IV

NOTE: DR = DEPLETION RISK, OF = OVERFISHED

GT* INCLUDES ESTIMATED GT VALUES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRESENT DECISION. OBJECTIVES WILL BE REVISED AS REAL GT VALUES BECOME AVAILABLE.

SOURCE: COMMISSION DECISION 98/126/EC.

APPENDIX C. STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT EXPENDITURE

THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1986 STRUCTURAL REGULATION WERE ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED TO RUN FOR TEN YEARS. IN 1993, HOWEVER, AS PART OF A GENERAL REFORM OF THE STRUCTURAL FUNDS, ALL THE COMMON STRUCTURAL MEASURES RELATING TO FISHERIES WERE INTEGRATED INTO THE OVERALL SYSTEM OF EU STRUCTURAL FUNDING UNDER A SINGLE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT, THE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT FOR FISHERIES GUIDANCE (FIFG). THE SPECIFIC TASKS OF THE FIFG INCLUDED HELPING TO ACHIEVE A SUSTAINABLE BALANCE BETWEEN RESOURCES AND THEIR EXPLOITATION, A STRENGTHENING OF THE COMPETITIVENESS OF STRUCTURES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMICALLY VIABLE ENTERPRISES.

THE REGULATION REQUIRED EACH MS INITIALLY TO DRAW UP A SINGLE PROGRAMMING DOCUMENT, TO INCLUDE A SECTORAL PLAN FOR FISHERIES TOGETHER WITH AN AID APPLICATION. THE SECTORAL PLAN HAD TO CONTAIN A STRATEGY TO THE ADJUSTMENT OF FISHING EFFORT AND THE RENEWAL AND MODERNIZATION OF THE FLEET, AS WELL AS THE MEANS (LEGAL, FINANCIAL, ETC.) ENVISAGED FOR ATTAINING THOSE OBJECTIVES. OTHER MEASURES (E.G. SUPPORTS TO MARKETS, AQUACULTURE, PORT FACILITIES, TRAINING ETC.) WERE ALSO INCLUDED BUT ARE NOT THE FOCUS OF THIS PAPER.

THE TOTAL ANNUAL EXPENDITURE BY THE EU ON AID FOR VESSEL CONSTRUCTION AND MODERNIZATION PROJECTS, AS WELL AS ON AID FOR ADJUSTMENT OF CAPACITY, DURING THE PERIOD 1983-93 IS SUMMARIZED IN TABLE 10. IT IS APPARENT THAT DURING THE PERIOD 1983-90 VERY LARGE SUMS IN EU AID WERE DIRECTED TOWARDS VESSEL CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS. AFTER 1990, HOWEVER, WHEN THE RATES OF AID WERE REDUCED AND THE COMMISSION ADOPTED A STRICTER ATTITUDE TO THE GRANTING OF AIDS TO THOSE NATIONS NOT MEETING THEIR MAGP TARGETS, THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN THIS CATEGORY OF AID. AT THE SAME TIME, AID TOWARDS FLEET REDUCTION MEASURES INCREASED CONSIDERABLY.

TABLE 10. ANNUAL EU AID FOR FLEET MEASURES 1983-93 (ECU MILLION)

SOURCE: HATCHER (1998).

THE TOTAL BUDGET ALLOCATIONS (EU AND NATIONAL) APPROVED BY THE COMMISSION FOR THE FLEET RENEWAL MEASURES (RENEWAL AND MODERNIZATION PROJECTS) AND EFFORT ADJUSTMENT MEASURES UNDER THE SECTORAL PLANS SUBMITTED BY EACH MS FOR THE PERIOD 1994-99 IS GIVEN IN TABLE 11.

THE FIFG REGULATION FOR 2000-2006 IS DUE TO BE APPROVED AND INCLUDES THE CONTINUED PROVISION FOR A MECHANISM TO MANAGE FLEET DEVELOPMENT, AIMING TO ACHIEVE AN APPRECIABLE REDUCTION IN FLEET CAPACITY. THIS MECHANISM WILL BE GOVERNED BY CERTAIN PRINCIPLES, SOME OF WHICH ARE STILL UNDER DISCUSSION (E.G. ENTRY/EXIT RATIO):

MS WILL HAVE TO ESTABLISH A PERMANENT PROGRAMME OF FLEET ADDITIONS AND REMOVALS, WHEREIN ADDITIONS THROUGH THE BUILDING OF NEW UNITS BACKED BY PUBLIC FUNDS WILL BE CONDITIONAL ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF GREATER CAPACITY ACHIEVED WITHOUT PUBLIC AID. TO OBTAIN A GRANT TO BUILD 100 TONNES, INVESTORS WILL HAVE TO WITHDRAW 130 TONNES WITHOUT PUBLIC AID. THE MAGP IV ANNUAL TARGETS AS WELL AS THE TARGETS FOR THE RELEVANT SEGMENT ALSO HAVE TO BE MET. SMALL-SCALE FISHING FLEETS ARE EXEMPT FROM THIS RULE WHERE ADDITIONS MUST NOT LEAD TO AN OVERALL INCREASE IN FISHING EFFORT

TABLE 11. EU AID FOR FLEET MEASURES 1994-99 (ECU MILLION)

NOTE: VALUES FOR FINLAND AND SWEDEN ARE FOR 1995-99. SOURCE: EUROPEAN UNION AID FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FISHING INDUSTRY, DGXIV (1998).

PENALTY MEASURES AGAINST MS THAT DO NOT OBSERVE THE RULES AGREED IN THE MAGP AND THE COMMUNITY REGISTER OF FISHING VESSELS WILL BE STRENGTHENED. THUS, IF THE ADDITION/REMOVAL PROGRAMME IS NOT PUT IN PLACE, OR IF IT IS NOT OPERATIONAL, PUBLIC FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE RENEWAL OF THE FLEET WILL BE FORBIDDEN AND APPLICATIONS FOR THIRD COUNTRY LICENCES MAY BE SUSPENDED.

THE THREE TYPES OF PERMANENT CESSATION OF FISHING ACTIVITIES (SCRAPPING, EXPORT TO A THIRD COUNTRY OR ASSIGNMENT TO ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN FISHING) WILL CONTINUE.