3. INTERMEDIARIES AND FACILITATORS of development^[60]

A recent FAO publication (1997a) finds that "In the project framework, the mismatch between the system of reasoning of the "development world", imported through the project-language, and the rural (peasant) world brings about a productive misunderstanding which manifests itself in (...) the emergence of intermediaries, whose competence acquired in terms of mastering the project-language makes them real development brokers, who may enter into competition with politically dominant actors at the local level" (59^[61]).

The organisations promoting development have increasingly sought to interact directly with lower-level counterparts in government. With the pulling out of the state from the provision of most services and from direct involvement in productive activities^[62], and the rise in importance of civil society and the private sector, more interaction is sought with local and regional-level organisations and institutions.

The emergence and consolidation of small-scale, local initiatives has been placed at the core of many current development programmes, and has led to a much more important role for intermediaries, facilitators and ‘brokers’ of development. These actors, mediating between the rural population and project staff, are typically people who comprehend the "project language". Often, they are relatively younger persons who have migrated, learnt the national language well, are functionally literate and have recently returned to their village (in the case of former civil servants, frequently as a result of the downsizing of the state apparatus). In the best of cases they are the local school teachers (or extension agents), but often these intermediaries have not much legitimacy in the eyes of the villagers, and during their absence from the community have lost touch with the natural resource base and, especially, the norms and institutions that govern it.

They are in effect the local ‘development facilitators’, and are important personalities who will influence local institutional development. Process documentation (Mosse 1995) is one methodological tool to investigate the issues revolving around their brokerage function. There are also other clues that emerge from participatory exercises, for example, a qualitative assessment of the way the project language finds its way into local idioms^[63]. Intermediaries may be agents or agencies (go-between institutions, favoured by most development agencies), and their role may be one of acting as filters who translate the project rhetoric not just into local dialect but into reality on the ground, an undertaking that may appear successful to the outside, by superficially complying to donor conditions. In the anthropological literature the study of development brokerage has recently intensified^[64]. It is a function that may of course also be positive, as agents or catalysts of change^[65], through a demonstration effect of "how to do things differently".

The issue of the relationship between the rise of the new type of intermediary and the traditional community leaders, structures and institutions, is particularly interesting and complex. Historically, the latter are the "classic" facilitators who have assured the mediation between the (colonial, then -often but not always^[66] - postcolonial) state and the local population, whereas, increasingly, the former are occupying the role of mediation between development agencies and the local population.

But traditional community leaders do not normally master the tools, first of all linguistically, to bridge the rift with "modern" institutions and have thus, arguably against their will and gerontocratic control, "allowed" the appearance of the new category of intermediaries. Baland and Platteau (1996) conclude that "collective action is probably most satisfactory when it is led by relatively young, literate persons who have been exposed to the outside world and who can find some way of collaborating with traditional structures of authority and leadership" (345). But policymakers must bear in mind that this new type of intermediary generally follows a different agenda, in other words, he or she is usually motivated by self-interest rather than by a desire to preserve the "common well-being" of the community, and is not always a direct stakeholder in NRM. The strategies of both categories of intermediaries will diverge even more substantially in areas in which cash crop production has led to significant financial gains (for example, cotton production in southwest Mali and the northeast of Mozambique^[67]) and incentives for intermediaries to take advantage of their role to (re)gain influence in community affairs (possibly after a prolonged absence).

With increasing commercialisation, monetarisation and commoditisation, there has been a concurrent increase in the levels and expansion of accumulation strategies of an individualistic ("profit-maximising") type, often opposed to the customary community strategies of the subsistence and moral economy. However, the rationale behind the former is not necessarily in contrast with the relations of production inscribed in traditional community institutions, as a number of authors in the development literature would argue (a.o., Lewis, Hyden, Meillassoux, J. Scott). But as its origin lies not with traditional community institutions but usually outside the village, and generally outside of subsistence agriculture, this implies that decentralisation policy, if it is to increase access to resources for a wider percentage of the rural population, must take this into account. Private accumulation is also a quest for prestige and draws its thrust and financial support primarily from commerce, (increasingly) migration, and (decreasingly) the civil service.

In the fieldwork areas in Yemen, intermediaries have become apparent as important actors, particularly in the process of communication between local institutions, development managers and policy makers, including members of Parliament and of political parties, sheikhs, akels, and teachers. Rural development projects in Hadran (Bani Matar Directorate, Sana'a Governorate) are implemented through private contractors with the central government, and include the construction of local roads, health units and schools. The akel of Bait Dalea village (see section 2) monitors a number of projects consisting of the establishment of a water system and the construction of a dam in the village. Sometimes the sheikh, the akel or ordinary villagers provide feedback on the implementation of these projects, and, in most cases the government considers them, but the private contractors do not always revise their plans accordingly. In the case of the Almisial-Almaramid villages (Bani Saad Directorate, Almahwit Governorate, in the mountainous area west of the capital), such private contractors are absent and traditional community leaders play a more central role in NRM.

In Mozambique, traditional rules and practices have not been codified into law nor spelled out, but nonetheless their respect is legally binding. Experience in Mozambique with the land demarcation process, which includes considering the boundaries of the former colonial chieftaincies, the régulados, with the local community definition and production systems analysis process in the context of the National Land Programme, has highlighted the important role of FAO and other partners to step in as "neutral" mediators, by bringing in international experts with a legal anthropology background to articulate Western statutory law with customary rules and practices. Such personnel, who should be socially neutral - also by way of nationality, language and technical background - may draw on the symbolic and political capital of an international agency to bridge the substantial social distance between actors at the national and local levels, as it can easily access most decision-making levels, from village civil society to the national polity.