4. Trade related measures to combat unregulated fishing

4.1 Introduction

Until the mid 1990s, CCAMLR’s monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) measures were based on conventional approaches as used by many other fisheries management authorities, both national and international (Rayfuse 2000). Such approaches largely relied on the application of flag state jurisdiction and the fulfillment of port state responsibilities. The CCAMLR MCS measures therefore included prohibiting fishing without due authorization, monitoring fishing location using vessel monitoring systems (VMS) and notification of vessel movements. Also included were port inspections, the development of an at-sea inspection scheme (Sections 3.3 and 5.2.3) and comprehensive fisheries data reporting (Miller, Sabourenkov and Slicer 2004).

At-sea inspections in the Convention Area have essentially been confined to areas of intensive fishing, mainly around Sub-Antarctic islands and inside 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic, or Fishing, Zones (EEZ or FZ) established under coastal state jurisdiction. VMSs are deployed and monitored by flag states. Reports to CCAMLR are thus usually confined to instances when fishing vessels enter the Convention Area and, or, cross the boundaries of CCAMLR Statistical Sub-areas and Divisions.

With the circum-Antarctic expansion of deepwater longline fisheries for toothfish in the early to mid-1990s (Figure 4), CCAMLR soon realized that the traditional MSC approaches would likely prove to be inadequate, especially in combating a persistent and expanding IUU fishery (Agnew 2000). The problem was compounded by the size of the Convention Area and by the mix of jurisdictional conditions represented therein (Section 5.2.2).

Many authors (e.g. Lutgen 1997, Dodds 2000, Green and Agnew 2002, Kirkwood and Agnew 2004, Sabourenkov and Miller 2004, Miller, Sabourenkov and Slicer 2004) have documented the emergence and development of IUU fishing for Dissostichus spp. in the Southern Ocean in general and in the Convention Area in particular. CCAMLR was faced with a situation in which the stricter regulatory measures became in some areas, such as around South Georgia, the more IUU fishing moved eastward (Figure 4). Attendant restrictions in both diplomatic and legal efforts to address issues such as fishing by Non-Contracting Parties (NCPs) and the use of Flags of Convenience^[259] greatly compounded CCAMLR’s difficulties in effectively combating IUU fishing (Agnew 2000, Green and Agnew 2002).

The situation remains further complicated in that the origin of toothfish catches is hard, if not impossible, to verify in the absence of regular and accurate reporting procedures when catches may be taken both within and outside the Convention Area. For example, a number of countries such as Chile, Argentina and Uruguay have developed toothfish fisheries within their domestic EEZs outside the Area. Others, (France South Africa and Australia), have toothfish fisheries in their EEZs and FZs within the CCAMLR Area. Toothfish also occur on the high seas adjacent to the Convention Area, particularly in the Indian Ocean.

Finally, a growing demand for toothfish has meant that catches continue to attract high prices - an added incentive for IUU operators to continue fishing and, if necessary, go to substantial lengths to conceal the origin of IUU-caught fish (Agnew 2000, Green and Agnew 2002). As CCAMLR’s efforts to regulate IUU fishing became more effective, IUU operators have been seeking new ways of "laundering" the origin of toothfish catches and other steps to enhance their market share or increase the supply of toothfish. As a consequence, CCAMLR was moved to develop additional and innovative measures to combat IUU fishing (Agnew 2000). These have the dual objective of controlling and, or, monitoring, IUU fisheries in the Convention Area and preventing the sale of IUU-caught fish on world markets.

4.2 History of CCAMLR trade-related measures

In 1998 CCAMLR began to pursue additional measures to monitor landings and the access to international markets of toothfish caught in the Convention Area by its Members, as well as in waters under their jurisdiction (Agnew 2000, Green and Agnew 2002). At the time, various other initiatives to monitor international trade in specific fish species had been negotiated or were in the process of being negotiated internationally. The most prominent of these was the Bluefin Tuna Statistical Document (BTSD) introduced by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT) in 1992 (ICCAT 1966, 1993). The BTSD monitors trade in fresh and frozen tuna. A subsequent measure requires that ICCAT Members prohibit landings in their ports of tuna caught outside ICCAT measures or in the absence of a BTSD (ICCAT 1993).

FIGURE 4. Development of IUU fishing in the CCAMLR Convention Area [from Sabourenkov and Miller (2004)]

Unlike the ICCAT and BTSD, CCAMLR toothfish trade-related measures introduced a number of new and important elements. For example, the BTSD only applies to catches entering international trade and so it represents a "trade documentation system". It is not as encompassing as the CCAMLR Catch Documentation Scheme (CDS) that targets all harvested, landed, transhipped and traded toothfish catches. In considering the development of the CDS in some detail, Agnew and others (Agnew 2000, Larson 2000, Green and Agnew 2002, Sabourenkov and Miller 2004) have stressed that the design, adoption and implementation of the Scheme by far constitutes CCAMLR’s most significant attempt to combat IUU fishing both in the Convention Area and on a global basis.

The key principles underpinning the CDS (Box 4) were never intended to provide stand-alone measures, but should rather be viewed as an integral component in a suite of CCAMLR measures aimed at combating IUU fishing. Bearing this in mind, the CDS’s two main objectives are best summarized as

• tracking landings of, and the world trade in, toothfish caught both within and outside the Convention Area and

• restricting access of IUU-caught toothfish from the Convention Area to international markets.

Since its adoption, and entry into force on 7 May 2000, the CDS has been refined through versions of the CCAMLR Conservation Measure 10-05 (CCAMLR 2002b), (Box 5). Tracking toothfish landings via the CDS requires both identification and verification of catch origin. This enables CCAMLR through landing or transhipment records to identify the origin of toothfish entering the markets of all participants in the CDS. It also facilitates determination of whether toothfish in the Convention Area have been caught in a manner consistent with the CCAMLR Conservation Measures. The data collected by the CDS are vital for estimating "total" toothfish removals, an essential factor in improving stock assessment and for providing more precise information on global catch levels (Sabourenkov and Miller 2004).

The CDS creates a precondition limiting market access only to those fishing operators complying with the Scheme’s provisions (Agnew 2000). To do so, the CDS relies on participation by all CCAMLR Members engaged in toothfish fishing within, and outside, the Convention Area. It also encourages other CCAMLR Contracting Parties as well as NCPs (Section 5.2.4 provides further discussion on the obligations of NCPs) who conduct fishing within and outside the Convention Area to participate in the world toothfish trade. A notable demonstration of the CDS’s positive effect in this context has been reflected in product price levels on the major international markets particulary in the United States and Japan. Toothfish sold in conformity with the CDS fetch a much higher price than fish sold outside the Scheme (Sabourenkov and Miller 2004).

A notable CDS innovation [Paragraph 14 of Conservation Measure 10-05 - CCAMLR (2002b)]) provides participants in the Scheme with an opportunity to require additional verification of catch documents from a vessel’s flag state. In particular, VMS information can be sought for catches taken on the high seas outside the Convention Area when landed in, imported into, or exported from the territory of a CDS Party. Under certain conditions, non-compliance with CDS requirements may result in confiscation of toothfish catches or imports; a provision to be implemented nationally [Paragraphs 2.101 in Annex 5 of CCAMLR (2001)] and internationally (CCAMLR 2002b).

The CDS is open to both CCAMLR Parties and NCPs and draws non-participating states into the Scheme in such a way that their catches can be monitored (Green and Agnew 2002). This ensures that cooperation with NCPs is encouraged without discriminating between their obligations under the Scheme and those of CCAMLR Contracting Parties. This requirement essentially mirrors Articles 117 -118 of the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC)(Anon. 1983) and Article 8 of the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UNFSA)(Anon.1998a).

We should emphasize that CCAMLR went to considerable lengths to ensure that the CDS is consistent with the provisions of the World Trade Oorganization (WTOo) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Agnew 2000). As Larson (2000) has indicated, the CDS employs measures similar to those for other marine species and which have been found to be in inconsistent with WTOo–GATT obligations. However, unlike such measures, the CDS strikes a careful balance allowing CDS Parties to meet CCAMLR conservation needs without violating the legal rights of fellow WTOo-Members In particular, it ensures that any discrimination on the basis of national origin is minimized (Larson 2000). Consequently the CDS expressly addresses three of the WTOo’s key concerns – non-discrimination, transparency in multilateral resolution and a demonstrable linkage to a policy aimed at conserving the resource(s) in question.

Despite this, the CDS continues to attract widespread interest within the WTO, particularly by its Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE). The WTO Secretariat has indicated that: "The CDS, along with the ICCAT BTSD, can be considered to provide an example of appropriate and WTO-consistent (i.e. non-discriminatory) use of trade measures in multilateral environmental agreements" (WTO 2000a). Nevertheless, the CTE as a whole has yet to reach formal consensus on the matter and how RFMOs such as CCAMLR may take part in its business (WTO 2000b).

Finally the CDS serves to define more precisely the role of port (i.e. where toothfish are landed) as opposed to "market" (i.e. into which toothfish are imported for sale following export from elsewhere) states. This distinction aims at discouraging trade in IUU-caught toothfish without diminishing any flag state responsibility. Recent experience in application of the CDS has focused on the need for CCAMLR NCPs to assume heightened responsibility for combating trade of toothfish taken in a manner that expressly undermines the CCAMLR Conservation Measures (Green and Agnew 2002). Not only does this improve the CCAMLR’s ability to combat IUU fishing directly, it is at the centre of ensuring that obligations under UNFSA Articles 20, 21 and 23 (Anon. 1998a) are as effectively and widely met as possible (see Section 5.2.6).

4.3 Development of CCAMLR trade-related measures

The CDS has been in operation for a little over three and a half years. It has provided much information and enabled CCAMLR to act expeditiously to address certain IUU activities, particularly falsified or fraudulent DCDs. However, despite the CDS’ obvious merits, CCAMLR remains concerned at the continued persistence of IUU fishing in the Convention Area [Paragraph 8.3 in CCAMLR (2002c)]. It has therefore embarked on various initiatives to enhance the CDS’s performance. The more prominent of these aim to address the:

• use of flags of convenience resulting in reduced flag state participation and responsibility

• use of ports of CCAMLR NCPs to land toothfish without a valid DCD

• insufficient monitoring of transhipments at sea - a difficult task given the geographic extent of the convention area

• misreporting of catch origin - either deliberate or accidental

• "laundering" of fish either through using false DCDs or by issuing documents that are not carefully monitored by the flag and/or port state and

• inconsistent verification of catch position, either by "patchy" flag state monitoring and/or verification of VMS data, or by non-deployment of VMS, or by at-sea tampering with VMS units.

To date, revisions of the CDS have aimed at clarifying the Scheme’s provisions, particularly the deadlines attached to exchange of CDS information between participating parties at any stage of the trade cycle ranging from the landing of toothfish catches through to actions taken by the flag, port, export or market states and culminating in final import and product sale. Such work continues and is currently being conducted by a specially convened CDS Inter-sessional Task Group [Paragraph 7.12 in CCAMLR (2002c)]. This Group includes personnel from CDS Parties with fishery, trade, enforcement, legal and information management expertise.

4.4 Evaluation of CDS performance

CCAMLR has established a centralized and secure CDS database at its Secretariat in Hobart. The database has a web-based interface to provide accredited national CDS operators access to DCD information. The system constitutes an effective network for information exchange between CDS Parties on landing, export and import certification and verification.

The CDS is clearly an important component in a suite of CCAMLR measures aimed at eliminating IUU fishing in the Convention Area. Table 3 shows how the CDS, in the time since it became operational, has combined with other measures to detect and address potential violations of CCAMLR Conservation Measures. It is clear that all CDS Parties have increased their efforts to support the Scheme, especially through conducting in-port inspections of both CCAMLR Contracting and Non-Contracting Party vessels (Sabourenkov and Miller 2004). This trend continued in 2003.

TABLE 3
CCAMLR Conservation Measures (CM) or Resolutions aimed at supporting application of the CDS under Conservation Measure 10-05 (CCAMLR 2000b)

CDS-derived statistics show that Japan, the United States, the European Community and the People’s Republic of China are the main importers of toothfish (Sabourenkov and Miller 2004). Based on trade statistics provided for 2000, Canada should also be included in the list of main toothfish importers [e.g. as implied by Paragraph 5.42 in CCAMLR (2001a)]. While these states, except Canada, are CDS Parties, recent reports prepared by TRAFFIC (Trade Records Analysis of Flora and Fauna in Commerce) International (Lack 2001, Lack and Sant 2001, Willock 2002) show the global market share of these countries in the toothfish market to be of the order of 90 percent. Over 90 percent of traded toothfish are, in turn, supplied by Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, South Africa and the United Kingdom - all CCAMLR Members. CCAMLR continues to work actively to involve NCPs responsible for the remaining 10 percent of toothfish traded and caught under the CDS [Paragraph 7.3 in CCAMLR (2002c)]. Finally, it should be noted that the CDS now covers a large portion of the world’s surface and a high proportion of the global population (Figure 5).

4.5 Further CDS development

With the UNFSA’s recent entry into force (Section 5.2.5), it is anticipated that implementation of the CDS will be strengthened, particularly in terms of more global application of the provisions on cooperation in fisheries management set out in UNFSA Articles 8 and 17 (Lutgen 2000, Dodds 2000). As a consequence, CCAMLR’s standing as a regional fisheries management organization (RFMO) will be boosted in terms of emerging international practice so placing pressure on NCPs to meet their obligations under the UNFSA to cooperate in the conservation and management of "transboundary" stocks such as toothfish (Lutgen 2000). While CCAMLR may be unlike other RFMOs, UNFSA Article 1.(1).(d) does not preclude any RFMO having purposes other than fisheries conservation or management alone (Molenaar 2001). Even though not essential, the unique sovereignty situation and other characteristics attached to the CAMLR Convention could be used to justify use of non-flag state powers in accordance with UNFSA Articles 21 and 22 (Anon. 1998a) to enhance international efforts aimed at ensuring sustainability of certain exploited fish stocks.

The CDS is also likely to benefit from global standardization of catch certification and trade documentation systems initiated by the FAO in collaboration with various regional fisheries organizations, including CCAMLR (FAO 2002, Miyake 2002). The FAO consultations, while still at a relatively early stage, are likely to address cooperation with both WTO and the World Customs Organization (WCO). As the CDS combines features of both catch certification and trade documentation, and since it is consistent with the provisions of current international fisheries arrangements such as UNFSA, it constitutes a useful prototype on which future standardization could be based.

Finally, over the past year CCAMLR has established and tested an "online" facility to augment timely submission and processing of CDS documents using a central, secure database at the CCAMLR Secretariat [Paragraph 7.16 in CCAMLR (2002c)]. The system, or "Electronic CDS" (E-CDS), will enable all CDS Parties to issue and process DCDs online thereby creating a "real-time" network for exchanging information on certification and verification of landings, exports, re-exports and imports. The key features and benefits of the E-CDS are outlined in Box 6.

FIGURE 5. The CDS’ geographic area of application

[from Miller, Sabourenkov and Slicer 2004]

5. Further development of the ccamlr fisheries management and conservation regime

5.1 Introduction

The first part of this paper documented three examples of CCAMLR’s efforts to implement some of Article II’s general provisions (summarized in Box 1). These illustrate attempts to: (a) ensure that harvesting does not compromise sustainability of harvested stocks during periods of maximum uncertainty, i.e "precaution" is applied during periods of fishery development (Section 2), (b) minimize direct effects of fishing on species affected by such operations, i.e. negative affects on certain ecosystem (figure 5,) components are minimized (Section 3) and (c) promote a more holistic approach to management by dealing with complete stocks of harvested species both within and outside the Convention Area (Section 4).

It remains to be shown how such initiatives can be developed further to improve the effectiveness of CCAMLR’s management approach. In recent years, a considerable body of literature has addressed this particular issue (e.g. Agnew 1997, Constable et al. 2000, Miller and Agnew 2000, Constable 2002, Everson 2002, Miller 2002). Rather than repeating, or trying to summarize, such information we will focus on some key areas of concern. We then evaluate the information presented here as a means of assessing CCAMLR’s achievements (Section 5.2) as well as possible future challenges to its effectiveness (Section 5.3).

5.2 CCAMLR’s achievements

5.2.1 Introduction

As a "new generation" (i.e. post-LOSC) agreement, CCAMLR’s evolving management practices have resulted in the several noteworthy achievements considered below. Each achievement may be viewed as "strategically important" since it addresses principle likely to influence CCAMLR future actions and, or, policies.

5.2.2 Precautionary and ecosystem approach to management

CCAMLR’s efforts to develop a management approach that is both precautionary and ecosystem-based stand out as the organization’s preeminent achievement (Everson 2002, Miller 2002). As demonstrated for new and exploratory fisheries in Section 2, the foundation for the development of such an approach was laid by WG-DAC (Miller 2002) As such, the Commission and Scientific Committee were able to pursue more operationally-effective interpretations of Article II based on the coherent and pre-agreed principles set out in Box 7.

Nevertheless, as Constable (2002) has highlighted, CCAMLR’s development of an integrated precautionary approach has been largely confined to a single species - Euphausia superba (Antarctic krill). In this case, CCAMLR’s exercise of precaution became based on a rudimentary management procedure that includes pre-agreed decision rules to guide adjustment of catch limits. Such controls are, in turn, subject to scientific assessment of stock(s) status (Miller 1991, Nicol and de la Mare 1993, de la Mare 1996, 1998, Constable et al. 2000, Miller and Agnew 2000). The procedure also implicitly accounts for predator needs to provide an element of precaution when calculating krill catch levels (Miller and Agnew 2000).

The application of the decision rules approach for krill has been generalized to other CCAMLR species, such as D. eleginoides (Constable and de la Mare 1996) and C. gunnari (de la Mare, Williams and Constable 1998). In this respect, decision rules are reviewed for the species concerned with subsequent assessments being contingent on available knowledge and the inherent limitations of the applied methodologies. By using a generalized approach to assess long-term annual yields, provision is made for incorporating uncertainties into a single assessment to provide further precaution (Constable et al. 2000).

Despite advances in refining its ecosystem and precautionary approach, CCAMLR has some way to go in developing explicit management procedures to account for ecosystem considerations. As Constable (2002) and de la Mare (1996) have emphasized, it still has to develop a management procedure that improves the probability of maintaining ecological relationships and that also ensures predator needs are met by allowing for a sufficient "surplus" from harvested stocks to meet such needs. How such a procedure could be applied is illustrated in Figure 6 and its key features are summarized in Box 8.

A post-hoc summary of the management approach developed by CCAMLR for the krill fishery has been provided by Miller (2002) and Figure 7 illustrates the systematic manner of CCAMLR’s management approach. Further, CCAMLR has recognized its limitations in its efforts to manage the krill fishery from both a precautionary and ecosystem-based perspective. As a result, it has attempted to further develop a decision-making process aimed at incorporating dependent (i.e. ecosystem) considerations more explicitly into developing management advice for the krill fishery (Figure 8).

In addition to the steps outlined in Figure 6, other considerations (after Constable 2002) to be addressed, or currently being developed, include:

• ensuring that correct and timely decisions are facilitated so that the conservation (including rational use) provisions of Article II are better met

• undertaking sufficient monitoring to ensure that harvest controls do not affect dependent predators in some unacceptable way

• allowing sufficient time to detect and rectify any harvest-induced changes in the ecosystem within the two or three decades recovery period set out in Article II

• refining assessments of harvested stock yield by taking into account new estimates of demographic parameters and by dividing precautionary yield into small-scale management units of appropriate scale (Murphy et al. 1988, Murphy 1995) to improve predictive power and spread the risk of irreversible ecosystem changes and

• developing operational objectives for non-harvested species (Beddington and de la Mare 1985, Butterworth 1986, de la Mare 1996) to account for uncertainties associated with ecosystem function, the dynamic relationships amongst predators, and those between predators and their prey (Constable 2002).

Finally, CCAMLR’s attempts to develop its precautionary approach, pre-empted by some years similar efforts by the international community (e.g. as documented in FAO 1995, 1996).

5.2.3 The jurisdictional imperative

The biogeographic limits of species harvested in the CCAMLR area are generally confined to the Convention Area (i.e. south of the Antarctic Convergence) and to depths between 500m and 2500m in shelf waters, or on shallow seamounts in the northern parts of the Area [Fischer and Hureau 1985, Shust 1998 and pages 387-413 of Annex 5, Appendix E in SC-CAMLR (1995)]. Stocks of species such as D. eleginoides are also found in areas just north of the Convention’s northern boundary, particularly in the Indian Ocean (Kock 1992).

Initially, fishing grounds for D. eleginoides were confined to areas close to a few oceanic islands within the Convention Area, most notably, CCAMLR Statistical Sub-area 48.3, the Prince Edward Islands (Sub-areas 58.6 and 58.7), the Crozet Islands (Sub-area 58.6), the Kerguelen Islands (Statistical Division 58.5.1), and Heard and McDonald Islands (Division 58.5.2). The unique provisions of the CCAMLR Chairman’s statement (CCAMLR 2002a) allowed the states involved (Australia, France, South Africa and, in practice, the United Kingdom) to exercize jurisdiction over most of the productive fishing grounds in accordance with CCAMLR Conservation Measures and, or, through more stringent national measures.

This arrangement provided for coastal state enforcement in conformity with CCAMLR’s requirements - a situation that provided an incentive for the United Kingdom in 1993 to define fishing waters (including a Maritime Zone of roughly equivalent area) outwards to 200 nautical miles offshore around South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands (Clover 1991, Anon. 1993). The United Kingdom justified this action in response to growing IUU fishing for D. eleginoides in the area concerned, despite Argentine concerns over sovereignty. Since then, the United Kingdom has applied CCAMLR Conservation Measures and maintained control over authorizations to fish in this zone.

It is interesting to note how France and South Africa, in contrast to the United Kingdom practice, have reconciled application of CCAMLR Conservation Measures and national measures under the Chairman’s statement. France has formally lodged reservations to any Measure that may impact on both its territorial, jurisdictional and administrative procedures in its sovereign waters within the Convention Area. South Africa initially only recorded reservations in respect of Conservation Measures that may affect its sovereign rights, particularly in terms of affecting attached permit conditions. However, it began to record reservations to more administrative measures (such as to Measures 23-04 and 23-05 on data reporting) in 1997. This may give the impression that South Africa only began to expand its reservations after the country’s political changes in 1994 and in response to the development of a fishery for D. eleginoides in its EEZ around the Prince Edward Islands. However, examination of all Measures to which it has expressed reservation do not substantiate either conclusion since four reservations were recorded prior to 1994 and five after. While France has recorded a greater number of reservations (14 as opposed to 9) compared to South Africa, the principles underpinning reservations appears similar for both countries (Table 4).

Australia has never recorded any formal reservation in respect to application of CCAMLR Conservation Measures within its EEZ/FZs within the Convention Area. Nevertheless, it has clearly stated in the Commission’s report [e.g. Paragraph 11.78 in CCAMLR-XXI (2002c)] that: "any fishing or fisheries research activities in that part of Divisions 58.4.3 and 58.5.2 that constitutes the Australian EEZ around the Australian Territory of Heard Island and McDonald Islands must have the prior approval of Australian authorities". In this regard, proclamation of a FZ adjacent to the Australian Antarctic Territories (in accordance with the Fisheries Management Act 1991 and the Maritime Legislation Amendment Act 1994) is viewed as a "good faith" attempt to regulate the fishing activities of Australian flagged vessels adjacent to the Territories rather than an attempt to augment any sovereignty claim contrary to the spirit of Article IV of the CAMLR Convention (Joyner 1995).

TABLE 4
Number and types of reservations lodged by South Africa and France on application of CCAMLR conservation measures

See Section 5.2.2 for detailed discussion. Measures are identified following numbering in CCAMLR (1997a, 2002b)

A further point is whether reservations for any particular Conservation Measure has lead to any significant impact in the effective application of the Chairman’s statement. This is hard to judge. However, if the full intent of the statement’s paragraph 3.(a) (CCAMLR 2002a) is applied then it could be anticipated that both South Africa and France in applying their sovereign powers would have promulgated national measures at least comparable to, or more stringent than, those of CCAMLR. This does not appear to be case, particularly in light of South Africa’s repeated assertion of a need to continue year-round fishing to combat IUU fishing in the Prince Edward islands’ EEZ (Brandão et al. 2002). Such an assertion could be interpreted as the reason for a reservation being recorded in respect of closed season requirements set out in measures such as Conservation Measures 141/XVI and 142/XVI (CCAMLR 1997a) aimed at protecting breeding seabird populations from incidentally mortality during longline fishing in the region.

Finally, both France and South Africa have not recorded reservations to a number of significant Measures aimed at combating IUU fishing. These include Conservation Measures 10-04 mandating deployment of VMS, 10-05 describing the CDS, 10-06 promoting compliance by Contracting Party vessels and 10-07 promoting compliance by NCP vessels.

Taken as a whole, the above situation does not imply that IUU fishing is no longer a challenge to coastal state sovereignty in the Convention Area. Possibly, with the exception of South Africa, because of their lack of enforcement capability (Brandão et al. 2002), the countries most affected (France and Australia) have devoted considerable effort to protect their waters from such fishing. Despite these efforts, IUU fishing has seriously affected specific toothfish stocks^[260]. Around the Prince Edward Islands, such fishing has severely threatened the future sustainability of D. eleginoides in the region (Brandão et al. 2002).

An ancillary consideration is the extent to which the Convention’s provisions (particularly Conservation Measures) can be effectively applied on the high seas within the Convention Area (Joyner 1995, Levy 1997). The situation is exacerbated by the Convention’s Area’s geographic extent (ca. 35 x 10⁶. km²) which tends to favour fishing outside CCAMLR’s regulatory control, particularly by vessels flying the flags of CCAMLR NCPs (Agnew 2000). While the list of specific Conservation Measures dealing with CCAMLR NCPs systematically grows, there is still a need to balance the implied regulatory provisions of such Measures with the rights of all states, CCAMLR Contracting and Non-Contracting Parties alike, to fish the high seas under LOSC Article 116 (Anon. 1983).

It should be recognized that when LOSC Article 116 is read in conjunction with Articles 117 to 119 (Anon. 1983), there is a clear obligation on all states to cooperate in the conservation and management of marine living resources on the high seas and to take appropriate measures to ensure this occurs. The FAO Compliance Agreement (Anon. 1998b) and UNFSA Articles 8, 19 to 23 (Anon. 1998a), provisions oblige states fishing on the high seas in the CCAMLR Convention Area to do so consistent with measures aimed at ensuring stock sustainability and in a manner which does not discharge them from cooperating with CCAMLR in the conservation and management of relevant fisheries resources.

Despite these obligations, there is still scope to explore how effectively the LOSC provisions, and especially those of UNFSA, could be aligned with CCAMLR’s efforts to combat issues such as IUU toothfish fishing (Dodds 2000) within the Convention Area, as well as in closely adjacent zones. The expression of CCAMLR’s institutional support to the FAO International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU)(FAO 2001) is a step to address this problem [Paragraph 8.15 in CCAMLR (2002c)].

5.2.4 Enforcement issues

It has been suggested that CCAMLR’s potential actions are severely limited in apprehending vessels fishing in defiance of its Conservation Measures on the high seas compared to those of coastal state in areas under national jurisdiction within the Convention Area (Lutgen 1997, Kirkwood and Agnew 2004). Nevertheless, the management processes and ancillary enforcement measures essentially remain the same (Joyner 1998). These are best summarized in a common "enforcement paradigm" for both jurisdictional regimes (Figure 9).

An initial concern in addressing the enforcement paradigm is that, like most RFMOs, CCAMLR’s high seas regime is based on flag state enforcement. Rayfuse (1998) has suggested that such regimes exhibit a few inherent, serious, flaws. These tend to arise from insufficient, or inaccurate, data reporting, lack of enforcement capability and intransigence amongst others; considerations all compounded by the Convention Area’s size. To an unquantifiable extent, such failings may be ameliorated by the "moral imperative" implicit in the inclusive nature of CCAMLR’s consensus-based decision-making^[261]. Having agreed to be bound by a specific Conservation Measure, it is likely to be morally difficult for any individual CCAMLR Member to then intentionally undermine such a measure.

A second concern is the perceived threat posed to the effective implementation of CCAMLR Conservation Measures by NCPs activities such as IUU fishing (Molenaar 2001). This allows Measures to be circumvented, or "undermined" while also providing an incentive to flag, or reflag, vessels to Non-CCAMLR flag states. This concern appears well justified given the number of CCAMLR NCPs involved either as flag states in fishing for, or as port states in the trade of, IUU-caught toothfish (Table 5).

TABLE 5
Non-CCAMLR Members involved in IUU fishing for, or trade of, Toothfish166

a. CCAMLR contracting parties but not commission members
b. Voluntary participants in the CDS
c. Subject to control under European Union’s Common Fisheries Policy
d. Falls under Netherlands responsibility as a CCAMLR contracting party

The potential absence of effective enforcement on the high seas within the Convention Area has forced CCAMLR to develop alternative methods to augment flag state enforcement, apart from unilateral extension of coastal state jurisdiction (Molenaar 2001). Three complementary approaches have been pursued. The first is clearly illustrated by the suite of CCAMLR measures aimed at eliminating IUU fishing. The second is CCAMLR’s development of inspection and observation provisions. The third is illustrated by development of the CDS (Section 4).

5.2.5 CCAMLR System of inspection

CCAMLR’s progressive development of fishery control measures has required collection of fisheries data and information on fish biology, ecology, demography and productivity. Such information is crucial to monitoring fishing activity and in assessing stock status. In 1989, CCAMLR introduced its own System of Inspection to provide at-sea control of Contracting Party vessels fishing in the Convention Area by inspectors specifically designated by CCAMLR member states. Details of the Inspection System are provided in CCAMLR Basic Documents (CCAMLR 2002a).

The CCAMLR Inspection System operates nationally with inspectors being appointed by their national authorities and reporting to CCAMLR via the member state which designated them. CCAMLR inspectors usually operate from designated Member vessels on the high seas within the Convention Area. However, inspections may be carried out from any vessel [Article III of the CCAMLR System of Inspection in CCAMLR (2002a)]. The scheduling of inspections is a matter for the flag and designating state. Inspectors are permitted to board fishing, or fisheries research vessels, on the high seas in the CCAMLR Convention Area at will with the understanding that such vessels are flagged to CCAMLR Contracting Parties.^[262] Finally, the Inspection System provides for reporting sightings of NCP-flagged fishing vessels.

While the total number of at-sea CCAMLR inspections undertaken annually remains small, inspection efforts have tended to concentrate on areas of most intensive fishing activity. The outcomes of these efforts have been summarized in other publications (Agnew 2000, Sabourenkov and Miller 2004). Many of the perceived failings of the CCAMLR System of Inspection highlighted by Rayfuse (1998) have been rectified. For example, both the number and extent of inspections have increased while Members have greatly improved the submission of information on their vessels intending to fish in the Convention Area during any particular season as well as on sanctions imposed for transgressions (Sabourenkov and Miller 2004).

The prevailing and positive perception of the CCAMLR’s System of Inspection’s effectiveness has prompted at least one other "new generation" fisheries arrangement, the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Fishery Resources in the South East Atlantic (SEAFC) (Anon. 2001a, Miller 2005), to build on the System. Combined with the application of some of the provisions of UNFSA Article 22 (Anon. 1998a), the interim SEAFC interim inspection procedures are not too dissimilar to those applied by CCAMLR.^[263]

Nevertheless, a number of distinct and interrelated factors still impede the CCAMLR Inspection System’s efficacy. Rayfuse (1998) attributes these to the system’s physical and practical limitations, its inherent design deficiencies, and legal and political considerations associated with flag state enforcement being implemented nationally. However, at-sea inspection is only one, albeit vital, tool in a range of CCAMLR measures aimed at combating IUU fishing. Consequently, many of the recent measures presented in Table 14 greatly contribute to enhancing CCAMLR’s enforcement efforts within the Convention Area when compared with requirements stipulated in the FAO IPOA-IUU (FAO 2001). The mandatory deployment of VMS on toothfish vessels, the strengthening of both port and flag state controls and development of the CDS in particular have achieved much in this regard (e.g. Tables 3 and 6).

TABLE 6
CCAMLR conservation measures (CMs) aimed at eliminating IUU fishing in the Convention Area

5.2.6 CCAMLR Scheme of International Scientific Observation

In 1992, the CCAMLR Scheme of International Scientific Observation (CCAMLR 2002a) was introduced and did much to augment the System of Inspection. Under the Scheme, international scientific observers are deployed on vessels undertaking fisheries research or commercial fishing in the Convention Area. The designation of international scientific observers under the Scheme is arranged bilaterally between the Member wishing to place an observer aboard a vessel and the flag state of the vessel concerned [Section B of the CCAMLR Scheme of International Scientific Observation (CCAMLR 2002a)].

A scientific observer’s primary task under the CCAMLR Scheme is to collect essential scientific data and to promote the Convention’s objectives. To ensure scientific impartiality, observers designated under the Scheme are confined to nationals of CCAMLR Members other than the flag state of the vessel on which they are assigned. Deployment of observers under the Scheme is a mandatory requirement for all CCAMLR-sanctioned toothfish and icefish fisheries, particularly in areas outside national jurisdiction. A recent requirement has also directed observers to provide factual data on sightings of activities by vessels other than those on which they are deployed [Paragraphs 4.10-4.11 of Annex 5 in CCAMLR (1998)]. To date, observers have provided much needed scientific data, especially for "new" and "exploratory" fisheries (Section 2).

Despite the above, the most effective deterrent of toothfish IUU fishing in the Convention Area probably remains coastal state action (Kirkwood and Agnew 2004). A key factor appears attributable to the punitive fines that coastal states have imposed (in some cases in excess of US$1 million), coupled with their seizure of vessels, and, or, catch, and an increased risk of apprehension. An example of effective coastal state action is apparent from the recent ruling by the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea’s on Australia’s prosecution of the Russian flagged Volga for fishing in the Australian FZ around Heard and McDonald Islands.^[264] Further examples of effective action are evident from the levels of international cooperation exhibited by a number of CCAMLR Members. These resulted in apprehension of the South Tomi in 2001 [Paragraph 2.15 in CCAMLR (2001)] and the Viarsa in August 2003. In both cases, Australia exercized its right under LOSC Article 111.(2) (Anon. 1983) to chase vessels illegally fishing in its waters around the above Islands. With the assistance of South Africa, it was able to intercept the South Tomi south of the Cape of Good Hope, and with the assistance of South Africa and the United Kingdom the Viarsa was intercepted in the midsouth Atlantic.

Kirkwood and Agnew (2004) have acknowledged that effective deterrence depends largely on the extent to which any imposed sanctions are comparable from one jurisdiction to another. This is a complex consideration that depends on factors such as the equivalence of judicial, or regulatory, procedures between states (Joyner 1998). In its broadest terms, CAMLR Convention Article XI may be interpreted as implying that any harmonization of conservation measures for species occurring in both the Convention Area and in adjacent areas under national jurisdiction may necessitate consideration of equivalence in any imposed sanctions. However, CCAMLR has never specifically discussed the matter, and it is suggested that there may be merit in pursuing a similar course of action to that outlined in Article 4.(b) of the South African Development Community Protocol on Fisheries (SADC) (Anon. 2001b) which urges cooperation in the: "establishment of region-wide comparable levels of penalties imposed for illegal fishing by non-SADC vessels and with respect to illegal fishing by SADC vessels in the waters of other State Parties". It is easy to visualize the potential benefits of such an approach being consistently applied by all CCAMLR Contracting Parties.

Furthermore, it has to be recognized that any significant reduction in unacceptable fishing practices by CCAMLR constitutes an essential element in improving and assessing its enforcement capabilities (Kirkwood and Agnew 2004). For example, an FAO report (FAO 1981) has stated that: "There will always be a relationship between the probability of detection and the level of compliance with a regulation. The more severe the penalty faced, the greater the likelihood of compliance, provided that a reasonable probability of detection exists." It follows especially in CCAMLR’s case that the absence of severe penalties combined with limited enforcement capability could result in the potential lucrative rewards of IUU fishing outweighing the penalties. Such fishing thus becomes more cost-effective than legitime practices (Levy 1997). Consequently, effective enforcement should take account of where, and by whom, the benefits of IUU fishing are being enjoyed. In these terms, and like Rayfuse (1998), we acknowledge the potential shortcomings inherent in flag state enforcement.

While it may be argued that references to "nationals" in the LOSC^[265] are perfunctory rather than obligatory, it would appear that there is a growing awareness that some control is necessary over natural and legal persons to allow states to fulfil their obligations to cooperate effectively through RFMOs (Rayfuse 2000). Clear evidence of this intent is found in UNFSA Article 10.(l) (Anon. 1998a)^[266] and in various initiatives by states to exert direct control over the activities of their nationals as a means of ensuring compliance with both third party and international fisheries management measures.^[267] The control of "nationals" is therefore obviously a question worth exploring as an important element of CCAMLR’s efforts to combat IUU fishing.

5.2.7 Control measures

The initial expansion of Toothfish IUU fishing in the Convention Area during the mid-1990s coincided with expansion of legitimate fishing activity approved by either CCAMLR or by coastal states in the Indian Ocean (Sabourenkov and Miller 2004). The levels of IUU fishing at that time were unprecedented with more than 40 fishing vessels being sighted within the South African EEZ at the Prince Edward Islands alone during 1997/98 (Agnew 2000). Since then, CCAMLR has been constantly revising its Conservation Measures [Pages (xxiv) to (xxix) in CCAMLR (2002b)] in an effort to eliminate IUU fishing (see Footnote 2) (Table 6). These efforts promote cooperation between CCAMLR Contracting Parties to improve compliance, implement at-sea inspections of Contracting Party vessels, ensure marking of all vessels and fishing gear, and introduction of VMS, to verify catch location. Additional measures address mandatory port state inspections by Contracting Parties of their vessels licensed to fish in the Convention Area and developing ties with NCPs involved in toothfish fishing or trade. Most recently, CCAMLR has established a vessel database to facilitate information exchange between Members on vessels known to have fished in contravention of its Conservation Measures [Conservation Measure 10-06 in CCAMLR (2002b) Sabourenkov and Miller (2004)].

As highlighted in Section 4, IUU fishing for toothfish clearly undermines CCAMLR’s Conservation Measures. It also violates the principles in UNFSA Articles (Anon. 1998a) addressing flag state duties (Article 18), the obligations of Non-Members, or Non-Participants, in regional fisheries arrangements (Article 17) and LOSC Articles 116-119 (Anon. 1983). Given its economic value, toothfish remains in high demand and continues to attract high prices internationally (Section 4.1). With fishable stocks straddling the Convention Area’s boundaries, it has been difficult to trace IUU-caught fish through global trade avenues on account of uncertainties attached to the exact origin of catches. As a result, undetermined quantities of toothfish have enjoyed non-restricted access to international markets to the benefit of IUU fishing operators (Agnew 2000, Sabourenkov and Miller 2004).

By developing the CDS, CCAMLR has clearly indicated its resolve to adopt innovative, contemporary and legitimate measures to avoid undermining its conservation efforts by IUU fishing. We should emphasize that all the measures highlighted in this paper are fully consistent with the provisions of LOSC Articles 116 to 119 (Anon. 1983), UNFSA Articles 21 to 23 (Anon. 1998a) and Articles III to VIII of the Compliance Agreement (Anon. 1998b). In reaction to UNFSA Articles 8 (particularly paragraphs 3 and 4) and 17, CCAMLR has encouraged its Members to accept and promote the Agreement’s entry into force^[268], along with the Compliance Agreement (Anon. 1998b), and to accept the FAO Code of Conduct (Anon. 1998c) [Paragraph 6.32 in CCAMLR (1998)]).

5.2.8 International cooperation

International cooperation is one of the Antarctic Treaty’s most enduring features (Vicuna 1986). Like many other aspects of the Treaty this has been carried over to the CAMLR Convention.^[269] From a practical perspective, CCAMLR has done much to advance such cooperation. For example, a number of the CCAMLR Conservation Measures identified in this paper are obviously dependent on institutionalizing international cooperation (Lutgen 1999) as a means to combat IUU fishing in the Convention Area. Together with UNFSA’s recent entry into force^[270], there is every expectation that CCAMLR will benefit from enhanced international cooperation to the extent that its capacity to meet the Convention’s objectives will be improved (Dodds 2000).

CCAMLR has frequently acknowledged that the entry into force of both the UNFSA and the FAO Compliance Agreement (Anon. 1998b) are likely to contribute significantly to the Commission’s work in reducing and eliminating IUU fishing in the Convention Area. In particular, [e.g. Paragraphs 5.11 and 5.32 in CCAMLR (1997)] CCAMLR Members have actively contributed to the FAO’s work on implementing the above agreements - most notably the development of their IPOA-Seabirds (FAO 1999) and the IPOA-IUU (FAO 2001). Institutionally, CCAMLR actively participates as an observer at the meetings of the FAO Committee on Fisheries (COFI) and its sub-committees, especially the biennial meetings of Regional Fisheries Management Bodies that the CCAMLR Executive Secretary currently chairs.

CCAMLR actively cooperates with various regional fisheries organizations, particularly those managing fisheries in waters adjacent to the Convention Area such as ICCAT, the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) and the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT).^[271] This cooperation includes, inter alia, the exchange of information on IUU fishing on the high seas and efforts to combat its effects and consideration of incidental seabird mortality arising from longline fishing.

As emphasized in Section 4, the CDS is a serious effort by CCAMLR to promote multilateral cooperation in combating toothfish IUU fishing. In contrast to other Conservation Measures that are limited to the Convention Area and to CCAMLR Members, the CDS is global in application. Further, its implementation is consistent with provisions of UNFSA Articles 7, 8 and 17 (Anon. 1998a).

A final point concerns the CDS’ performance and its legitimacy. As the CDS is aimed at minimizing any potential for national bias (Larson 2000), its effectiveness should benefit as a consequence of enhanced international cooperation. In this respect, and following an Australian proposal to list toothfish under Appendix II of the Convention on Trade of Endangered Species (CITES), the recent decisions by CCAMLR and the Twelfth Conference of CITES Parties (COP-12)^[272] [Paragraphs 10.72 to 10.75 in CCAMLR (2002c)] to improve cooperation and the exchange of information aims at broadening the CDS’ global application. As highlighted in Section 4.2, this could reduce any possible WTO scrutiny arising from a perception that relatively few parties participate in the Scheme. Consequently, the CDS would more effectively qualify as a "multilateral solution based on international cooperation and consensus" to combat an environmental problem of a transboundary or global nature.

5.2.9 Balancing flag, port and export/import state duties and responsibilities

Table 6 outlines some of the significant measures that CCAMLR has developed to ensure that the duties, responsibilities and obligations of flag and port states are fulfilled in support of the obligations that its Contracting Parties have assumed under the Convention, particularly Articles II, VIII, IX, XXI and XXII (CCAMLR 2002a).

Under these Articles, CCAMLR Contracting Parties are mandated to:

• support the Convention’s objectives (Article II)

• underwrite the Commission’s legal personality (Article (VIII)

• contribute to the Commission’s functions, including formulation of Conservation Measures (Article IX)

• take measures to ensure compliance with appropriate measures (Article XXI) and

• exert appropriate effort to counteract and discourage, activities contrary to the Convention’s objectives (Article XXII).

The impact of both the Measures outlined in Table 6 and Contracting Party obligations under the Convention has been augmented through the introduction of the CDS. Table 6 also illustrates how recent measures have promoted the synergy of CCAMLR’s efforts to promote compliance and improve enforcement with its Conservation Measures. The introduction of the CDS for enforcement efforts extends responsibility to exporting and importing states participating in the Scheme (Table 3).

CCAMLR has taken care to ensure that its measures are consistent with international law in the development of the CDS (Larson 2000). However, evolution of CCAMLR’s enforcement regime has been more reactive than prescriptive and has not followed a predesignated process. By contrast, UNFSA and SEAFC are more prerogative in nature and explicitly set out flag state duties and port state measures. As the complexity of the legal, sovereign and political issues addressed by CCAMLR continue to grow, there may be considerable benefit from revisiting the duties, rights and obligations of various categories of states under the Convention and from developing explanatory provisions to better define their different requirements following the various UNFSA and SEAFC articles^[273]. We are not suggesting that the CAMLR Convention be renegotiated, rather it may be helpful to develop some interpretative policies to guide the Commission’s interaction with different categories of the states involved in the implementation of Conservation Measures.

5.2.10 CAMLR non-contracting parties (NCPs)

The status of NCPs (Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4) under the CAMLR Convention remain an issue for many RFMOs, including CCAMLR in particular (Rayfuse 2000, Molenaar 2001). This is illustrated by CDS-derived data that clearly show considerable NCP and CCAMLR Non-Member involvement in toothfish fishing and trade (Table 5). Molenaar (2001) has indicated that NCP involvement in activities such as IUU fishing has implications for RFMOs such as CCAMLR and is often "constrained by the consensual nature of international law as reflected in the principle of pacta tertiis". He suggests that at a global level every effort should be made to enhance flag state performance and responsibility. These were major objectives of the Compliance Agreement (Anon. 1998b), UNFSA (Anon. 1998a) and the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (Anon. 1998c). At the regional level, CCAMLR has found several ways to overcome the restrictions imposed by pacta tertiis. These have been outlined by Molenaar (2001) and include institutional, organizational and political initiatives, most notably the 1999 adoption of a comprehensive Policy to Enhance Cooperation between CCAMLR and NCPs [Annex. 8 in CCAMLR (1999b)]. This Policy provides the basis for many of the measures outlined in Tables 3 and 6.

Molenaar (2001) suggests that the above Policy, and the CDS, treat NCPs in a way that is consistent with international law. In particular, the key element of port state control is in harmony with UNFSA Article 23 by virtue of the fact that its is agreed multilaterally and is not subject to the crucial issues of participation and allocation (Molenaar 2001). Although CCAMLR has not indicated any intention to avail itself of the non-flag state powers envisaged under UNFSA Articles 21 and 22 and, as suggested for the various categories of states in Section 5.2.5, there be some utility in considering whether these specific Articles could facilitate CCAMLR’s management of transboundary stocks such as toothfish. The groundwork for such consideration was outlined ten years ago in CCAMLR Resolution 10/XII (Box 9). Nevertheless, characterization of the CAMLR Convention along the lines suggested by Molenaar (2001) may still be necessary.

6. Conclusions

6.1 CCAMLR’s achievements

Table 7 summarizes some of CCAMLR’s more noteworthy achievements in respect of the various topics discussed here. First, we emphasize that CCAMLR’s achievements may be favourably viewed as those of a successful "new generation" i.e. post-LOSC, agreement, a point supported by the consistency between CCAMLR, LOSC and UNFSA provisions. Second, CCAMLR continues to make progress in developing its adaptable and decision-based management approach (Section 5.2.1). In this respect, the development of management measures that take account of krill as a target resources, as well as its status as an important ecosystem component is revolutionary (Constable et al. 2000, Constable 2002, Miller 2002). Third, CCAMLR has remained responsive to international developments, such as improving cooperation between Parties and NCPs. Internationally, CCAMLR has served as a trend-setting organization through its development of seabird incidental mortality mitigation measures and the CDS.

TABLE 7
Summary of CCAMLR "strategic" achievements "CM" - Conservation measure

Finally, in dealing with the problem of IUU fishing CCAMLR has addressed the practical and jurisdictional issues encountered in preserving the balance between the "right to fish" and the attendant responsibilities described by LOSC Articles 116-119. In this regard, both CCAMLR’s Policy to Enhance Cooperation between CCAMLR and NCPs and its elaboration of an interconnected suite of control measures (Table 5) are noteworthy.

6.2 Future challenges

In an ever-changing world, it is reasonable to assume that like many other RFMOs, CCAMLR will continue to face a variety of challenges, and threats, in addressing its objectives whilst it must remain responsive and flexible to changing circumstances. Table 8 provides some examples as well as some suggested solutions for their resolution. (Lutgen 1999).

TABLE 8
Some challenges to CCAMLR’s future and suggested solutions

As Table 8 shows, a common theme running through the threats that CCAMLR faces is the political uncertainty and shifting priorities of a world characterized by changes and shifts in the balance of power, both economic and social. Taking such uncertainty into account, we suggest that its impacts on CCAMLR’s operational integrity may be ameliorated through improving cooperation and enhanced education on CCAMLR matters. Similarly, care needs to be given to nurturing CCAMLR’s successes and promoting its operational efficiency. This will allow CCAMLR to set an example for other regional and sub-regional fisheries organizations to follow (Rayfuse 1998).

The CAMLR Convention has been described as "a model of the ecological approach (Freestone 1996). On this basis CCAMLR has notably performed in both promoting and advancing such an approach. Time and history will reveal how successful it has ultimately been.

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