6.1 Single or multiple purpose?
6.2 Single or multiple donor?
6.3 The scale of the project
6.4 Scale of agency
6.5 Changing fashions in lending
6.6 Incentives, subsidies and FFW
Soil conservation projects with a single limited objective appear to be more effective. Some examples are:
- strengthening a soil conservation agency such as FAO projects in Ethiopia and SIDA projects in Kenya;- strengthening research capacity in soil erosion like the Swiss project in Ethiopia;
- problem-solving studies such as TCP projects in the Seychelles (impact of water development schemes) and Lesotho (assistance in formulating national policy).
The better track record of projects of this kind may be due to some extent to the difficulty of evaluating the effectiveness in quantitative terms.
A trend towards this type of project can be detected, but it is not apparent whether this is a positive move towards them or a move away from the more operational projects of the past. ODA thinking is that "UK aid should be more narrowly focused... This would imply the avoidance of large multi-sectoral rural development projects and projects in marginal areas" Balacs (1985). FAO reports increasing emphasis on institution-building and less on the uptake of new technology (FAO 1987).
In the sub-sector of soil conservation this move is welcome. The new philosophy of soil conservation through land husbandry means there is less need for the projects of the last decade where the main intervention was physical earth-moving.
Another noticeable change is that where agencies have some flexibility to choose between directing their funds to emergency relief or long-term development, there is clearly a move towards long-term development. Oxfam, Band-Aid, CARE and the International Red Cross are all increasing their efforts towards prevention rather than cure.
Multi-sector projects deserve some discussion. Reviewing a small sample of projects in Africa, ODA reports: "It appeared to be generally the case that the incorporation of non-agricultural components into the projects overloaded management so that the project's implementation suffered. The integrated approach of many of the projects appeared to be based on the assumption that it was necessary to have all the components in the development of a particular area not only under one particular project, but also under one management umbrella.... The reviews concluded that non-agricultural components should be planned and implemented concurrently if necessary, but that this need not be within a single project management or indeed a single project" (Morris 1981). The same arguments apply to the question of more than one sub-sector in agriculture, and this is particularly relevant to soil conservation which nearly always involves activity in several sub-sectors.
There was a great vogue in the early and mid-seventies for Integrated Rural Development Projects (IRDPs). Cassen's explanation is "They were therefore the product of expanding aid budgets, and of an intensified commitment to distributing the benefits of aid among rural populations and low-income groups in particular. The projects represented a bold effort to attack rural poverty by addressing simultaneously the multiple obstacles in the way of rural development; they set out to improve productive services, provide infrastructure, and sometimes to provide health and education. They therefore tended to be large, multi-sectoral, and administratively complex."
Many IRDPs were disappointing and Cassen suggests two common reasons:
- inherently weak organization and management structures which rely in good measure on coordination between diverse public sector agencies, most of which gave higher priority to projects for which they were fully responsible;- technical recommendations for farmers that were insufficiently profitable, too risky, or too demanding of labour at peak times of year;
- unduly high expectations of the capacity of implementing entities to handle greatly increased funds.
Another analysis of IRDPs is made by Morris (1985) who lists ten common weaknesses:
- inhospitable economic situation, i.e. governments not really able to bear the burden of expenditure involved;- insufficient knowledge of the crop system; insufficient testing of new crop systems;
- over-optimistic yield assumptions;
- under-assessment of the cost of increased farm labour;
- proposals not attractive enough to farmers;
- marketing and pricing policies;
- increased size of extension staff;
- overloaded management of complex projects;
- management divorced from institutions.
Few projects of this type have been implemented in recent years.
In the past there have been projects where several donors shared the funding, but there is no doubt that this can lead to problems, particularly where there is a difference of objectives, operating procedures and financial procedures. The usual reasons for multiple funding are either a programme so costly that no single donor wishes to support the whole programme, or a national programme which comprises a number of separate projects in different provinces each managed by a separate agency. The problem with all such schemes is that the procedures of different agencies seldom mesh together. A typical example is the Rural Development Areas Programme (RDAP) in Swaziland which involved funding from World Bank, UK, AfDB, EDF, and USAID. The different rules about procurement of equipment were an administrative nightmare.
There are ways that shared support can work. One is for donors to put money into a pool with no strings attached and then operate the project through a single agency. Alternatively a funding organization may sub-contract the operation of the project to another agency. Neither of these is popular. Funding agencies are reluctant to relinquish control of their funds, and sub-contracting operators do not welcome having conditions imposed by their bankers.
The record suggests that projects which have a significant component of technical assistance, tend to be more effective when small. The reason is that one or two international experts find it easy to work themselves into the local institution, whereas projects which have a large international staff tend to remain more independent, more separate, and less approachable in the eyes of the local officers. There are examples of technical assistance programmes which are so heavily staffed with expatriates that they dominate the local agencies and inhibit their growth and development.
In 1973 the World Bank announced new directions for agricultural lending specifically to target the poor which automatically led to a shift towards agricultural lending. However the main instruments selected to help execute the new strategy, area development and integrated rural development projects, have a poor performance record. The Bank's twelfth audit reports that this was largely because of over-optimistic assumptions about available technologies for rainfed smallholder agriculture. There does seem to be statistical evidence that over the six years 1980-1985 the success rate of Bank projects has declined as the average size of projects has increased. The present move away from multiple-donor, multiple-purpose, multiple-sector projects reduces the average size of projects.
Another issue affecting the scale of soil conservation projects is whether they should be approached on a catchment (watershed) basis, or should the emphasis be placed on the individual farm and farmer, or should projects be planned to coincide with the administrative boundaries? This question was addressed at the Puerto Rico Workshop on Conservation Farming on Steep Lands, 1988, where all three views were supported by different participants. A few years ago the concept of watershed planning was very popular, and some countries, for example Lesotho, decided that their whole soil conservation programme should be implemented through the catchment approach. Today support is more restrained, but as Sanders pointed out: "In conclusion, it should perhaps be said that if emphasis is placed on biological and agronomic measures, rather than physical practices, to achieve soil and water conservation, these approaches need not be mutually exclusive. The aim may ultimately be to treat a whole catchment, but this may best be done by working progressively from the individual farm units" (Sanders 1988).
The relative advantages and disadvantages of non-government organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs) have been compared with bilateral and other medium-sized agencies, and large multi-lateral institutions in several studies (Cassen 1986, Fowler 1988, Harrison 1987). A few selected points relevant to agricultural projects including soil conservation are given.
The case for small agencies:
- NGOs and CBOs are in close contact with the beneficiaries, often acting virtually as additional extension staff. They therefore have a strong local involvement and are able to identify the felt needs and are better able to associate with minorities such as the landless, ethnic minorities and also women, etc.- They are better able to test, advise, develop, and help implement local techniques. Because they have limited resources they have to focus on low-cost ventures and are able to test innovations which could not be attempted on a bigger scale.
- Being independent they can often bypass bureaucratic problems, and overcome problems of inter-departmental cooperation. Being small and inoffensive their activities are unlikely to be seen as a threat by the establishment.
- They tend to be cost-effective for several reasons. "Their personnel are low paid, so more work is achieved for less money. Because of the low pay, only the dedicated apply for jobs..." (Harrison 1987). This applies to both field workers and headquarters staff, so overheads are low.
- They are particularly able to operate projects which depend on a large input from the farmers such as farmer-centred research and the local adaption of imported technologies.
- In addition to the international NGOs, there is much hitherto undeveloped potential in local NGOs. Sometimes these are difficult to approach and work with. when the initiative comes from projects associated with officialdom. Examples of international NGOs being able to mobilize and stimulate local NGOs are in Ethiopia, where there is an effective consortium of international and national NGOs all working together, and the International Red Cross which also works effectively with local branches, particularly in its new and growing programme of disaster prevention.
NGOs are ideally placed to be used as subcontractors by aid agencies to carry out pilot schemes or pilot trials. The problems caused by untested technology, or innovations which might have been locally adapted before introduction, have been clearly recognized as a major problem of design and implementation. In the case of introducing new ideas, smallness does not matter - a winner will be picked up and expanded by bigger agencies. A good example is the Oxfam one-man project of a simple method of water conservation using stone lines in Burkina Faso, started by Oxfam in 1979. It was very successful and picked up by IFAD as part of a larger national programme in 1986.
Some limitations:
- The characteristics of NGO projects are usually that they are small, directed towards a small target of people in a small area, dependent on highly motivated leaders, and linked only loosely, or not at all, to national programmes. This makes them less likely to spread or act as a catalyst. The water-spreading project using stone lines in Burkina Faso is an exception.- The overall effect of NGO and CBO activities is inevitably affected by the size of their resources compared with the problem. As Chambers puts it: "In some cases bilateral agencies could usefully increase the amount of funds disbursed via NGOs, but this should not be seen as a substitute for the agencies improving their own performance in this area. NGO aid flows are insignificant compared with the volume of official aid, and international NGOs could absorb only a limited additional amount.
- But only governments and governmental donors have the resources for the giant task ahead".
- Another aspect of interaction between NGOs and bigger agencies is that NGOs usually do not have the skills and experience to design and manage agricultural development projects but can be greatly helped by a bigger agency playing the role of helpful elder brother. An example is FAO's long history of productive cooperation with local NGOs particularly through the Freedom from Hunger Campaign/Action for Development Programme (FFHC/AD) (FAO 1987, p 121 - p 124).
Some advantages are unique to large agencies:
- the ability to handle large ambitious programmes;- maintaining a sustained dialogue and policy analysis with borrowing governments. This may include the possibility of influencing borrowers' economies and policies, although there is a continuing debate as to whether the provision of aid or loan funds confers the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of a sovereign government. IMF assume this right as a condition of lending; World Bank make programmes conditional upon changes when they believe that they are essential for the success of the project; and bilateral agencies may have a political or commercial dimension in their goals;
- large agencies may be making a big enough intervention so that general economic development of the receiving country may be seen as their principal priority;
- and finally, in many countries the size of the problem of agricultural development and food self-sufficiency is so huge that only large-scale intervention can make a significant impact.
Africa is presently the focus of attention in technical assistance and aid, and agriculture is the most favoured sector. This is probably the result of the series of droughts and resulting famines. It was not always so; other regions and other sectors have in earlier times been in the limelight, and sometimes the reasons for the changes are not apparent.
Some countries seem to be immune to assistance projects, with a long record of projects of disappointing performance. Africa seems to suffer more than other continents, and it was pointed out earlier that World Bank audits show a higher rate of failed projects in Africa than elsewhere, particularly East Africa.
It would be helpful if some common factors for countries with a high rate of failed projects could be identified such as political system, civil disorder, lack of political stability, or general low capacity of administration and management. This might be worth pursuing elsewhere.
There are also changing fashions in countries considered aid worthy. In the 1970s Thailand was deluged with aid programmes, in the late '70s it was Indonesia, and by 1980 Sri Lanka. In the '80s it has been Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan. Some other countries seemed destined to be permanent recipients of aid projects.
There are also fashions in the chosen subsector within agriculture. In the '60s and '70s mechanization was out in front as the most popular solution to food shortages. Later the top subjects were integrated rural development projects, large scale irrigation projects, and livestock improvement. All of these presently attract little interest, and the topics of the late '80s were extension, agricultural research, and afforestation. The most likely choice for the next fashion appears to be the building of managerial capacity and local institutions.
There are several arguments for financial incentives or subsidies by a project or by the government:
- if conservation works are held to be in the interest of the State, then it is reasonable that the State should pay the whole or part of the cost. There are many examples of State intervention, for example flood control, river draining, reclamation of public lands, and perhaps pricing policy to increase or reduce crop production might be included. So the argument is why not extend this to soil conservation activities on private land?- subsidies are commonly used to encourage or speed up actions which require a farmer input, e.g. building terraces;
- the expenditure by project or government may be seen as a demonstration of their commitment to the project.
There are also some arguments against incentives:
- subsidies may undermine the extent that the farmers identify with the works, and may encourage the idea that soil conservation is something you are paid to do by government;- a decreased sense of involvement and responsibility can lead to poor standards of work and to poor maintenance.
Some analysts reject all forms of subsidy, for example: "All forms of paternalism should be avoided, including giving things away, subsidising farmer activities for inputs, or doing anything for the people. All work should be accomplished for the sole reason that villages have seen success achieved and have become enthusiastic enough to work towards achieving it for themselves" (Bunch 1988).
This view is supported by Harrison (1987): "Wherever people are paid for their labour contribution, as for cut-off drains in Kenya or soil conservation in Ethiopia, this feeling of identification is weakened. In both these cases payment fostered the attitude that work would only be done if payment was forthcoming, and that maintaining installations built by paid labour was the government's responsibility".
The most popular view seems to be that it is better to do without incentives if possible, but that there are cases when it has a place.
Food For Work is a special case because the primary objective is food distribution, and using it to do useful work such as soil conservation is an additional benefit. The trouble is that standards of design and construction are variable, and maintenance problems acute. Some soil conservation programmes have achieved huge physical results, e.g. the terracing programme in Ethiopia. It needs the wisdom of Solomon to balance the pros and cons of this work. It could never have been achieved without FFW, and it must have slowed down erosion to some extent. But much of the work was technically poor, the potential benefit was wasted because there was no improved farming package to go with the terraces, and it has given many people in government and many farmers the idea that building terraces is all there is to soil conservation.
Another example shows the difficulty of assessing Food For Work programmes. The visiting forestry specialist at an afforestation project said, "But you are planting the wrong species at the wrong time in the wrong place, and the survival rate will be almost zero". The local forester in charge of the project said, "I know. It hurts my professional pride too. But there are people starving in this District, and this project brings them food".
Like other incentives, it would be nice to do without FFW but there are times when it is useful. A comprehensive review of all aspects of Food Aid is given by Singer et al. (1987).
