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46. This chapter is organized to follow, to a large extent, the components of Strategic Objective A3:
47. The assessment is not fully exhaustive, but covers most of the activities carried out under the RP and the FP during the review period.
48. Two of the four strategy components of Strategic Objective A3 deal with strengthening disaster preparedness, and forecasting and providing early warning, respectively. These components are supported under both the RP and the FP, but are the main area for RP activities under this Strategic Objective.
49. GIEWS is aimed at alerting the international donor community and governments to impending food crises. The system includes the FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions (CFSAMs) conducted in countries or subregions experiencing particular food supply difficulties, the Special Reports produced by the missions and the Special Alerts produced from other (non-mission) sources of information for countries or subregions where the food crop or supply situation gives rise to particular concern.17 CFSAMs are generally conducted jointly by FAO and WFP. Their objective is to assess the food supply situation over a marketing year at the national or subregional level, the level of food deficit, if any, and the amount of food aid required to meet emergency needs. From an average of about 18 missions per year in the early 1990s, about 35 missions are now conducted each year. This increase is linked to the rise in food emergencies during the 1990s and reflects the international community’s interest in FAO continuing with this work.
50. The increased demand for missions has put a heavy burden on GIEWS financial and staff resources, which have not kept up with the pace of demand, despite cost-cutting measures (e.g. increased use of Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries [TCDC] experts and retirees) and increased extra-budgetary funding. The expected shortfall for 2002 amounts to US$220 000. In the past, funding problems have been partially relieved by requests for TCP funding. However, recently there has been a decline in this as the conditions for approval of TCP projects are now regarded as being too time-consuming to fulfil.
51. Great progress have been achieved on GIEWS information analysis and management capacity in the past few years thanks to further improvement of the GIEWS integrated information system, the “GIEWS workstation”, use of the Advanced Real-Time Environmental Monitoring System (ARTEMIS), additional Agromet data and the expansion of the information sharing network of institutions (UN organizations, regional organizations and NGOs). However, these improvements have not necessarily been translated into higher-quality field assessments. There are two resource-related reasons for this: i) the short duration of the missions (two to three weeks) compared with the tasks to be undertaken; and ii) the lack of time and training given to consultants at headquarters for preparatory work, including use of the workstation.
52. With CFSAMs having become a key activity of GIEWS and with the increasing use of TCDC consultants, GIEWS has prepared Guidelines for Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions (published in January 1996) for food security evaluations in countries where there are few hard data. The guidelines present an inventory of approaches and methods and constitute a good reference document. However, their utility is decreased by the failure to provide practical step-by-step instructions that could assist experts during short field missions.
53. Both governments and the international donor community recognize FAO’s assessments as valuable in raising awareness of impending food crises. Special Alerts and Special Reports contributed considerably to the mobilization of emergency food aid and other humanitarian assistance during the reporting period, e.g. the food crisis in Indonesia following the severe economic slump in mid-1997. However, the linkages between alert and response do not occur systematically. For example, in the drought that hit the Horn of Africa in 2000, in particular Ethiopia, FAO conducted a CFSAM and issued Special Reports and Special Alerts on the impending food crisis. Despite these efforts, donors’ response remained limited.
54. FAO uses the results of CFSAMs in several ways. They form the basis for FAO’s proposed contribution to the UNCAP, when there is one. They may also lead to, or incorporate, an agricultural needs assessment mission by TCE when crop production shortages are expected. TCE and the Global Information and Early Warning Service (ESCG) work in close collaboration, in particular in countries where an agricultural Emergency Co-ordination Unit (ECU) has been established. These units are involved in the preparatory work for the CFSAM. Reports from the CFSAM and the needs assessment missions are distinct as their respective deadlines and purposes are different. However, TCE and ESCG have now agreed that a section on emergency agricultural input requirements should be systematically integrated into the Special Reports.
55. There are some issues regarding FAO’s early warning work. In a few cases, the accuracy of results has been questioned. In 2001, following an exceptionally good harvest combined with massive rice imports, a rice surplus situation in Madagascar may have been partly due to the alarming situation depicted in the CFSAM carried out that same year. In Burundi, the CFSAM that was carried out in June 2000 did not foresee the major food crisis that took place during the second half of the year in the south of the country.
56. In countries where government institutions have collapsed, statistics units have been dismantled and hard data are scarce, it is difficult to arrive at an accurate crop and food supply assessment. A two- to three-week mission by an external team can hardly be expected to compensate for this information gap.
57. An important priority for early warning is to ensure that food assistance is received by those who need it most. In this regard, there are limits to the usefulness of the information provided in Special Reports. The objective of a CFSAM is to provide a national perspective, so the information it contains is of limited use for the precise targeting of interventions in terms of area and beneficiaries. In this respect, the missions are conducting assessments increasingly at the subnational level in order to allow a better identification of population groups most susceptible to food shortages, especially through WFP’s Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) units. On a few occasions, an FAO nutritionist has also been associated to the mission to focus on household food security and nutrition issues.
58. While GIEWS has been valuable within its mandate, further work is needed in early warning. Areas to be addressed include:
59. FAO has been providing technical assistance in support of early warning systems in countries and subregions since 1978, particularly through projects lasting from between 2 and 12 years. The objective has been to develop sufficient local- and/or regional-level capacity to enable national governments and subregional organizations to monitor the food supply and demand situation closely and to provide timely notice of impending food problems.
60. Towards the end of the 1980s, there was a growing realization that concern for food security should move from the aggregate level (national, sub-national) to the household level. Furthermore, the fact that large food-insecure population groups did not have access to sufficient quantities of food meant that national early warning systems should also collect information that would measure people’s physical and economic access to a well-balanced diet. In the 1990s, this realization led to a drive to integrate EWFIS. FAO gave considerable support to comprehensive information systems with an early warning function, particularly in Africa. Many operational and technical manuals of high professional quality were produced. This support continued into the early part of the period covered by the evaluation, essentially through projects (e.g. the setting up of regional and national EWFIS in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries, which had ended by 1997).
61. While FAO was a major actor in fostering the development of EWFIS in the past, more recently NGOs and bilateral donors have supported and developed information systems. WFP (VAM), SCF-UK (food economy analysis), CARE (livelihood approach), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (Famine Early Warning System [FEWS]) and the European Community (EC), through NGOs, have become major actors in the field of food security information, particularly in emergency and post-emergency situations. While FAO’s efforts were directed at creating or strengthening government EWFIS units, many NGOs and donors have developed such systems essentially for their own purposes, outside of government structures. There are several reasons for this:
62. During the review period, FAO has moved towards meeting evolving needs in the field of early warning and food information. FAO hosts the secretariat of the inter-agency FIVIMS initiative. In addition to developing and harmonizing tools for localized food security monitoring, FIVIMS aims at fostering decentralization and concerted action among all the different actors in food security, thus linking information to action. Several FAO technical divisions, mainly from the Economic and Social Department (ES), are involved in developing methodologies and materials. However, FIVIMS does not tackle the specific information problems faced in the complex situations in which FAO has to carry out much of its emergency work. As FIVIMS is meant to focus on structural aspects of vulnerability, potentially it has a key role to play in prevention and preparedness, providing that the disaster vulnerability dimension is integrated into the analysis.
63. A major normative activity during the evaluation period was the production and publication in 2000 of a Handbook for defining and setting up a food security information and early warning system. The handbook, prepared with input from many FAO technical divisions, promoted a low-cost approach with the “ownership” of information going to nationals (through the setting up and management of information by national teams), based on existing structures and linking information to national and subnational decision-makers. However, the handbook is not well adapted to emergency situations where national institutions have collapsed and information resources have been lost. Ownership and sustainability are more difficult to achieve in complex emergencies, where the timely production of accurate and reliable information prevails over other objectives.
64. During the review period, there were two innovative examples (Somalia and Kosovo) of FAO attempting to develop EWFIS in complex emergency situations (see Boxes 1 and 2).
65. Perhaps the most interesting example is a project that is currently under implementation. The EC-funded project GCP/RAF/360/EC (Improving Early Warning and Food Security Information in Countries Subject to Complex Emergencies) is a very relevant attempt to develop a conceptual and methodological framework that focuses on how to improve early warning and food security information in complex emergencies, with particular emphasis on the institutional roles of FAO and its partners at the national, regional and international levels. The project aims at improving the quality of, and access to, crucial information relating to the food security and nutrition of vulnerable population groups in complex and protracted emergencies. An addendum to the original project document in March 2001 introduced substantial changes to the project operational set-up and work plan with a view to its becoming a central tool for implementing collaborative arrangements under PAIA-REHAB.
For more than a decade, the people of Somalia have suffered from the effects of a protracted civil war. Today, Somalia has no central government, and the country has many diverse clan-based and regional factions with conflicting interests. In central and southern regions of Somalia, periodic drought, flood, pest infestation and crop failure, combined with continuous civil war, have undermined household food security and caused the displacement of thousands of families towards urban centres and across borders into neighbouring countries. At the same time, relative stability and the emergence of local administrations in the north of the country have created a more positive environment for economic growth and rehabilitation. In this situation of protracted conflict and chronic food security problems, the provision of timely and reliable information on the food security and nutrition situation is crucial for the planning of short- and medium-term interventions. The project Support to the Food Security Assessment Unit (FSAU, Somalia) Phase III (OSRO/SOM/002/EC) became operational in May 2000 (budget: €4 million; duration: three years), following a four-month bridging phase funded by FAO. The purpose of the project is to provide readily available and relevant information for better decision-making on food security interventions by a broad spectrum of information users. This is to be achieved through the development of an efficient early warning and food security information system, providing data and information for short-term interventions, as well as for longer-term programming and improved coping strategies. A mid-term evaluation mission was mounted towards the end of the second year of the project (April 2002). The achievement of results, as assessed by the evaluation team, is reproduced in the following paragraph.
Phase III of FSAU has extended the depth and breadth of understanding of food access issues in Somalia through the use of the household food economy approach. The project in support of FSAU remains highly relevant given the protracted complex emergency context of Somalia. The FSAU field team has the capacity to monitor evolving situations on the ground, and the resulting information has contributed to improving the efficiency of the humanitarian response. The cost-effectiveness of the project is evident in terms of the savings made in avoiding unneeded food aid deliveries. Information provided by FSAU has had an impact by contributing to a reduction in the effects of transient food insecurity. To date, the use of FSAU information in the design of medium-term interventions to strengthen coping strategies is less visible. While FSAU in its current form is highly dependent on donor finance, the information that is being produced by the project will continue to remain relevant in the medium term. Moreover, the training provided to the field monitors is making a contribution to the sustainability of food security and nutrition information activities, in whatever institutional setting these may take place in the future. There will continue to be a high demand for information for early warning purposes; for the planning of short-term food and non-food emergency responses; and for the planning of medium-term interventions for strengthening livelihood strategies. The challenges for FSAU in the final year of this phase are to consolidate key activities; increase confidence in the reliability of FSAU information; ensure wider access to the wealth of information that it has collected; and build a common vision with partners for the next phase. |
In Kosovo, the USAID Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) financed a joint WFP/FAO project to be implemented over 12 months starting in January 2000 for a total of US$628 425. The project objectives were to: i) provide timely, accurate and reliable information on the rapidly changing conditions of the food security situation; ii) establish up-to-date information, through regular monitoring of the food and agricultural situation, required for the formulation and execution of appropriate rehabilitation/reconstruction programmes; and iii) serve all those involved in short- and medium-term planning and programming. The project was to be managed and implemented by FAO in close cooperation with the Department of Statistics of the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), with an FAO project manager and a vulnerability assessment specialist provided by WFP. The project was one of 17 reviewed during the Joint Multi-donor Evaluation of the Kosovo Emergency Agriculture Programme, carried out in November 2000. This evaluation drew very positive conclusions about the project. The project supported the creation of a Food Security Surveillance Unit (FSSU) within the FAO ECU, with technical capacity to design and implement a food database and an agricultural information system providing updated information of the food and agricultural situation in Kosovo, including land use maps and a price monitoring system for the main commodity items of household consumption in the province. FSSU was the sole entity to have updated basic information on the food and agricultural situation of Kosovo. All the data collected and processed by FSSU were communicated to the major agencies involved in emergency assistance to Kosovo agriculture and, as such, served as a key tool for decision-making relating to interventions in the sector, including the planning of agricultural assistance campaigns. The main project features that contributed to its success were the establishment of a solid network of monitoring officers from the different implementing agencies for information feedback from the ground, and the location of FSSU within ECU, thus ensuring linkages and synergies between information functions and coordination. Networking has been established within the broader framework of FAO-WFP collaboration in the agricultural and food aid sectors in Kosovo Province. Regular weekly meetings were held. The project officers systematically integrated the feedback on food security, received from the field by different partners and local government bodies, into an analysis of the agricultural and vulnerability situation in Kosovo. FSSU also established a solid network with the main actors operating in Kosovo and participated in the main task forces and working groups organized in relevant sectors of the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. At the institutional level, the FSSU project collaborated with the Department of Agriculture for both central- and municipal-level agricultural monitoring, the Statistical Office in Kosovo for the set-up and implementation of the price monitoring system and the Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) and with the Action Against Hunger technical assistance team and the Institute for Social Policy (ISP) for the monitoring of social assistance schemes. |
66. FAO’s EMPRES includes elements relating to prevention, preparedness and disaster response. It was evaluated in 2001 as part of an evaluation of the Animal Health component of Programme 2.1.3: Livestock and a separate evaluation of EMPRES-Desert Locusts (DL). These evaluations were presented to the FAO Programme Committee at its May 2002 session (documents PC 87/4 b and c). Because of the recent evaluation, EMPRES activities were not re-examined in the present exercise, although they represent some of FAO’s most important emergency-related activities.
67. EMPRES-Livestock includes components for early warning, early reaction, enabling research and coordination. Under early warning, the main activity has been the development of Transboundary Animal Disease Information System (TADinfo) software, which is being used by several countries for their animal disease databases. This is considered a particularly valuable and successful activity, since FAO is responsible for updating the system. Thus, countries can adopt TADinfo at relatively low cost. Through an FAO/IFAD partnership, the Regional Animal Disease and Surveillance Control Network for North Africa, the Middle East and the Arab Peninsula (RADISCON) has been established. For early reaction, guides to contingency planning and good emergency management practices have been prepared and workshops held. However, contingency planning was identified as a weak area that requires improvement in the future. In many developing countries, the benefits of contingency planning are not well appreciated, and it is therefore difficult for them to commit resources to contingency planning when there are so many known and pressing problems. The keystone programme of EMPRES-Livestock, the Global Rinderpest Eradication Programme (GREP), has been successful in meeting targets towards the elimination of rinderpest, although the programme for verification of worldwide freedom still lacks funding. Such funding will be necessary in order to confirm worldwide freedom by 2010.
68. EMPRES-DL aims at strengthening national and regional locust survey and effective early control capacities, as well as international cooperation. Its work originally focused on the area around the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden (the Central Region of the DL area) because many locust plagues originated there in the past. In 1995, the FAO Conference decided that the EMPRES approach should be extended to countries of the Western Region of the DL area, although expansion has been constrained by lack of funds. EMPRES-DL is funded by TF donors (about 79 percent) and from the FAO RP.
69. The major achievements of EMPRES-DL are increased regional cooperation, including in the carrying out of joint surveys, the upgrading of communications networks, the development of contingency plans in some countries, and increased cooperation between EMPRES-DL and the FAO Commission for Controlling the Desert Locust in the Central Region (CRC) through joint work planning and training activities.
70. EMPRES-DL has made progress in achieving its objectives, although progress has varied among countries. The evaluation cited the Sudan and Mauritania as particularly good cases of institutional capacity development. However, donor funding has reduced in recent years, probably because there has not been a major DL outbreak for some time. This may imperil future progress and is constraining the expansion of the programme to the Western Region.
71. Besides EMPRES-DL, FAO also deals with other types of plant pests, including other types of locusts (migratory, red, brown, Moroccan, Italian), quelea birds and armyworm. Evaluation missions found that FAO had provided effective assistance to Kazakhstan in implementing a major programme to control locusts, particularly in the use of less-polluting barrier spraying. Similar assistance was also provided to Georgia.
72. During the review period, work on several technical issues has been initiated, largely under the framework of PAIA-REHAB: i) the seed production and seed security scheme; ii) the promotion of participatory approaches to the inclusion of nutrition considerations in emergency preparedness, relief and rehabilitation; iii) improved disaster assessment methodologies; iv) improved preparedness for forest fires; and v) institutional and organizational aspects of preparedness for extreme cold-related disasters.
Seed production and seed security scheme
73. The TP on Strengthening National Seed Production and Security Schemes is based on the need for varieties to be adapted to farmers’ biophysical and socio-economic environments and managed through low-input systems in order to be sustainable. In 1998, an international workshop on Developing Institutional Agreements and Capacity to Assist Farmers in Disaster Situations to Restore Agricultural Systems and Seed Security Activities was held in Rome under a Norwegian-funded project18 aimed at facilitating the implementation of the Global Plan of Action for the Conservation and Sustainable Utilization of Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. This workshop concluded that the impacts of disasters on farmer seed systems are complex and varied, disaster responses are often deficient owing to lack of preparedness, important crop genetic resources can be lost as a result of a disaster, and disaster responses require collaborative and coherent actions to restore seed systems. It made a number of recommendations to overcome the constraints identified, several of which were directly aimed at FAO. This TP was included in the FAO RP in response to these recommendations. During the project (through 2007), FAO, inter alia, is expected to prepare a global strategy and materials on sustainable seed production and seed security (including regional networks to promote national application). In particular, regional and national seed security programmes and mechanisms are to include seed information and early warning systems, in order to improve the reaction capacities of countries in disaster-prone areas.
Participatory approaches for better preparedness
74. One TP, on Nutrition and Household Food Security in Emergencies, is exclusively and directly addressed to Strategic Objective A3. Aimed at including nutrition considerations in emergency preparedness, response and rehabilitation, this TP promotes a participatory approach to the inclusion of nutrition considerations in development programmes. The approach is considered to be particularly relevant in emergency relief/rehabilitation programmes, in drought-prone areas and in HIV/AIDS-affected communities. The approach has been followed in several countries during the review period (e.g. Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, Mauritania), and a manual, which could easily be adapted for other countries, has been produced for field workers in Somalia. While the approach is interesting, there have been no studies as yet on whether the methods used have been continued in countries. Follow-up of this kind would be an important issue for this TP during the rest of its implementation period (through 2007).
Improving disaster assessment
75. Through its Environment and Natural Resources Service (SDRN) in the Sustainable Development Department (SD), FAO has begun work on a Rapid Agricultural Disaster Assessment Routine (RADAR). RADAR is intended to provide fast assessments of disaster impact on agriculture in order to facilitate the planning of emergency and relief operations. The methodology uses satellite imagery and Geographical Information System (GIS) techniques. It relies on three types of geo-referenced inputs: information on the system that has suffered the impact; information on the geo-physical event that caused the impact; and a database of comparable impacts, which is used to calibrate the methodology. The methodology has been developed on the basis of the impact of Hurricane Mitch in Honduras. It is currently being written up and will be transferred to interested countries.
76. SDRN is also developing an operational routine for identifying agricultural-environmental “hotspots”. Work is under way to prepare a global map of water stress (deficit and excess) on world agriculture, with a view to developing an information system showing current and future (two to five years) tension areas between agriculture and the environment.
Improving preparedness for forest fire emergencies
77. FAO’s work on Sustainable Management of Natural Forests and Woodlands has included a component on forest fires. During the review period, much of this work consisted of information exchange, i.e. the publication of Global Forest Fire Assessment 1990-2000 and International Forest Fire News and the establishment of an International Forest Fire Management Network. More directly relevant to Strategic Objective A3 was the work that was carried out to review and analyse 15 Emergency Response Agreements, which have been entered into by countries for mutual assistance in combating forest fires, and support – including the preparation of guidelines – on how to enter into such agreements.
Improving preparedness for extreme cold-related disasters
78. Stimulated by the snow emergency that struck Mongolia in 1999/2000, FAO has carried out research on risk prevention measures to reduce the damage due to extreme cold in Central Asia. The research found, inter alia, that institutional and organizational dimensions, in particular capacity building, coordination among actors and a favourable policy and legal environment, were the key factors for sustainable pastoral development and improved risk management. While technological approaches were important, they were found to be less significant. Mongolia has requested assistance from international financial institutions (IFIs) in making livestock production more sustainable and less vulnerable to natural disasters. However, the need to develop comprehensive risk management frameworks and plans of action at the provincial level remains.
79. Several activities funded by TCP were carried out in two areas with direct relevance to preparedness: i) support to the preparation of comprehensive preparedness plans at the regional and national levels; and ii) in the fisheries sector, support to community-based disaster preparedness, with emphasis on sea safety. The common features of these projects are their regional dimensions and the fact that both focused on methodological development, thus linking field experience to normative work.
Support to comprehensive regional preparedness plans
80. From 1995 to 1997, FAO supported the Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s (IGAD) implementation of a project aimed at developing a detailed subregional disaster preparedness strategy.19 This project was essentially based on reports, refined over a two-year period, by national consultants from IGAD member states and resulted from an extensive consultative process, including national and international agencies. The strategy was discussed at a workshop held in Addis Ababa in January 1998. Despite difficulties encountered in the implementation of the project, it achieved some important results: i) through the consultative process, high sensitization on preparedness issues among policy decision-makers in the IGAD countries; ii) capacity building of national experts in the field of preparedness; and iii) a subregional strategy document which touches on important issues of disaster management.
81. Another case was TCP support20 to the Eastern Caribbean States in developing the details of national and regional hurricane disaster preparedness and impact mitigation strategies related to the agriculture, forestry and fisheries sectors. The project, initially planned for 18 months, was ambitious and included hurricane vulnerability assessment and risk mapping; national disaster preparedness and hurricane impact mitigation plans; preparation of training manuals; and organization of a national and subnational workshops on hurricane disaster preparedness and impact mitigation. The project was implemented by the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA).21 Its overall performance was poor, however. Major problems were: i) confusion among participants concerning their responsibilities with respect to project funding, execution and implementation; ii) insufficient management of national consultants’ work and outputs; and iii) poor timing of international expert and technical support inputs.
82. The experience of these two regional projects shows that support to the preparation of comprehensive regional preparedness plans is a complex endeavour. A regional preparedness strategy touches on issues that are sensitive (e.g. regional food reserves, food aid charter, regional collaboration for emergency response) and it therefore requires a strong consultation and sensitization process , which is difficult to achieve within TCP’s relatively short time frame. Additionally, in both projects, there were technical and management difficulties with weak regional organizations.
Community-based preparedness in the fisheries sector
83. In fisheries, the most important emergency preparedness activity was carried out in a TCP project in India.22 This project was approved after the disastrous cyclone of 6 November 1996 in East Godavari district of Andhra Pradesh, in which 2 560 people died – more than 55 percent of whom were fishers at sea. A post-cyclone study showed that information about the storm was not effectively transmitted or received. The project involved the installation of a shore-to-vessel communication system, the provision of life-saving equipment and a comprehensive programme for community-based disaster preparedness in fishing villages. Since 1997, when the project was implemented, there have been five cyclones that came close to shore and, on each occasion, it was possible for boats to return quickly. The Andra Pradesh Government has followed up by establishing more shore stations and making handsets available to boat owners at subsidized prices. Building on this, FAO organized a regional workshop on Sea Safety for Artisanal and Small-scale Fishermen in October 2001, which adopted the Chennai Declaration pledging countries in the Bay of Bengal to make a series of improvements designed to enhance sea safety.
84. FAO’s work on agricultural relief has been by far the fastest-growing aspect of its field activities since the early 1990s. The evaluation missions found that, at the country level, FAO’s work on agricultural relief is better known than its other emergency-related activities are. FAO has provided inputs (primarily seeds, hand tools, fertilizer, veterinary medicines and, sometimes, fish for aquaculture and small livestock), often with some amount of technical assistance. In the countries visited, only a very limited number of FAO emergency-related interventions were not for the supply of inputs.
85. Emergencies (whether natural or human-induced) generally cause large-scale displacements and insecurity, leading to increased poverty. For example, farmers may not be able to keep sufficient seed from the previous crop or buy it in the market, as the priority is normally to feed the family in the short term at the expense of investing in crop production. The aim of free agricultural input distribution is thus to secure food crop production at the first available opportunity. This would also lessen the requirements for long-term food aid.
86. Input distribution is a valid intervention when, as a result of a disaster, farmers have lost the means of production, and input supply is a means to rebuild productive capacity. The choice of agricultural inputs is critical. Considerations include the agricultural input marketing conditions in the country, local transport systems, and farmer preferences. Staple food seeds should be appropriate to local agro-ecological conditions. They should preferably be of local varieties. Most important, they should reach the beneficiaries in good condition and in time for the right cropping season. Vegetable seeds can be important for nutritional considerations and also as a cash crop, if there is surplus for sale. In many countries, vegetable cropping is primarily a women’s activity, and distribution of vegetable seeds thus permits agricultural relief to be directed to this large and particularly vulnerable group. Where appropriate, fish and small livestock may also be critical for input supply activities.
87. Evaluation missions awarded scores to 70 individual project interventions in terms of their relevance, quality of design, effectiveness of implementation and quality of overall results. Scoring was on a three-point system, with three being the highest score.
88. Missions assessed relevance against the apparent need for the project and the appropriateness of the solution at the time the project was approved. In some cases, the score for relevance at project approval was lower than it had been when the project was first proposed. Quality of design was assessed against standard parameters: clarity and realism of objectives; clear specification of outputs, activities and inputs; specification of target beneficiaries; and appropriateness of work plan. Scores for implementation reflect how well the operations were carried out compared with the plan of operations in the project document. For relief projects, the timeliness of input delivery was a large element in this score. Quality of results was assessed in terms of whether inputs were used as foreseen, whether the project assisted the intended beneficiaries and whether inputs led to food production and the restoration of productive capacity. The information on quality of results that was available to missions was weaker than it was for other aspects of the projects, owing largely to poor monitoring and evaluation.
89. The overall scores were:
o Relevance 2.7
o Quality of design 2.1
o Implementation 2.3
o Quality of results 2.1
90. Overall, relief interventions were found to be relevant, but the quality of project design and results were only slightly above satisfactory. Although the evidence is limited, discussions and observations during the field visits created the general impression that, on the whole, the inputs supplied were used as intended, thus contributing to food production and supply in the local communities. Implementation overall was satisfactory to good. Some of the key issues emerging from this assessment are discussed in the following paragraphs.
91. Nearly all of the interventions reviewed in the evaluation were characterized by a threat to food security that emerged quickly and often with little time for supplies to arrive in time to “catch the next crop”. However, performance in terms of the delivery of inputs in a timely fashion was mixed. In some countries (e.g. Viet Nam, Honduras), assistance requests were formulated and approved and implementation carried out largely on time. However, in many cases, projects suffered delays such that inputs were not available in time for the intended crop, as indicated by questionnaires to countries and implementing partners. In some cases, where farmers plant different crops in different seasons, this meant that the inputs intended to be provided by the project had to be changed (e.g. rice instead of beans in Costa Rica). In the most extreme cases seen (e.g. Cambodia), inputs were provided one year after the emergency that provoked the response.
92. The reasons for delays varied, some were within the control of FAO and others were not. Often, the most important reasons were outside FAO control. Sometimes, requests for assistance were received with little lead-time for input tendering, supply and distribution before the next cropping season. In such cases, despite the best efforts of all parties, inputs may arrive late. A second factor was donors’ late response to appeals for assistance. This was generally a less important problem when funding was through FAO-TCP. TCP funding, however, is small and can provide only limited amounts of inputs. In addition, some suppliers proved to be unreliable in their delivery schedules.
93. On the FAO side, the lack of authority delegated to the field for the purchase of emergency input supplies was clearly a contributing factor. At present, there is a US$25 000 limit on local procurement by FAO representations. This low limit, which is less than the input supplies budget of virtually any project, means that most procurement must be done by headquarters. Delays are caused by correspondence and the need for the field office to perform certain tasks, such as identification of suppliers. Headquarters procurement also increases the chance of errors in the tendering documents, as happened in one project in Bangladesh. In some cases, procurement missions were mounted from headquarters to countries, and these usually facilitated matters. However, local tendering with an increased limit for emergency activities may be a more cost-effective answer to the problem. Local procurement generally offers better prospects for speedy purchasing, as the delivery capacity of invited bidders can be better assessed and there is less chance of protracted correspondence over substandard goods or time-consuming identification of alternative supply sources. Local tendering would require a re-examination of procedures and the training of representation staff who would eventually carry out the task. It would also have to be done as local conditions warrant.
94. In-country follow-up by FAO Representatives (FAORs) was identified as a key performance factor in relief projects. In the best-implemented projects, FAORs actively helped in the formulation of the request, and followed up through approval of the requests and implementation of the activity. However, in some cases there was insufficient follow-up at various stages of the project cycle, resulting in serious delays in implementation. Particularly in Central America, FAORs were absent from several countries when the projects took place, and donors and implementing partners pointed this out as a weakness. In complex emergency situations, where there was an FAO Emergency Coordinator, this was not a problem because follow-up was a key responsibility of the person filling that role.
In several of the countries visited, an ECU was set up. In Rwanda, Burundi, Sierra Leone and, to a lesser extent, Eritrea, the establishment of an ECU and/or the fielding of an Emergency Coordinator was an important prerequisite for FAO to play a key role in the overall humanitarian assistance to the country. The following were the major achievements:
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95. Beneficiary identification was found to be weak in nearly all interventions. The normal situation was to describe the intended target beneficiaries in project documents as the “poorest and most affected” by the emergency situation, but interpretation of what this meant had to be left to the local bodies responsible for input delivery. For example, the “most affected” in terms of the damage caused by a disaster (percentage of crop lost) may not necessarily be the people whose livelihoods are most affected. In a few countries, efforts were made to determine who the beneficiaries should be, but only rarely was there a poverty focus in the beneficiary selection process. This is not surprising since, in many cases, those responsible for compiling beneficiary lists do not have the skills or time to determine who are the most deserving recipients and, in most countries, there is no readily available information as to who the poorest are.
96. Beneficiaries were selected according to many different patterns and, in many cases, all those who were in affected areas were eligible to receive inputs. In only a few cases was an attempt made to correlate the amount of input granted with the recipient farmer’s capacity to use it. However, because projects had limited quantities of inputs, it was not common to find farmers receiving more inputs than they could use on their own farms. In fact, in many projects, local authorities decreased the quantities of inputs per farmer in order to increase the number of beneficiaries.
97. There may be trade-offs between improving the beneficiary identification process and timely input delivery. Identification of the most needy beneficiaries depends on the quality of disaster impact and needs assessment, which in turn depends on the information available and the methods used. In this regard, greater emphasis should be given to the development of pre-disaster information and rapid assessment methodologies.
98. FAO is not able to ensure directly the proper targeting of intended beneficiaries. It must rely on its partners in the field and various stakeholders, including the beneficiaries themselves. Beneficiary targeting will be better when: i) the criteria for targeting are well-established and understood by all stakeholders; ii) the selection process has been decentralized to the local level; and iii) several institutions/stakeholders have participated in the selection process, including the villagers themselves. Stakeholder participation contributes to limiting biases in the selection of beneficiaries against established criteria. These steps require time, and need to be planned in the agricultural input delivery cycle. If this is not done, the tendency is to relegate beneficiary identification to secondary importance.
99. Most of the projects did not have detailed needs assessments at the design stage. Most commonly, a “standard package” of inputs was provided. Standard packages do not take into account the diversity of the farming situation, with different farm sizes, farming systems and management abilities among households. It must be recognized that the limited time available when carrying out major input distribution activities immediately after a crisis (e.g. massive population movement) do not facilitate the optimal allocation of inputs.
100. Overall, the quality of the inputs delivered varied. For major operations (e.g. Rwanda during the 1994-1998 period), quantity tended to prevail over quality, and imported inputs were the most common modalities for procurement. Inevitably, there were cases in which seed varieties were not adapted to local systems or were contaminated by disease. In Central America, evaluation missions also raised questions about the appropriateness of the choice of seeds and the composition of the input package. More positive examples were found in some countries in Asia, where it proved possible to obtain locally varieties that were already known and used by farmer beneficiaries.
Seeds are commonly distributed to beneficiaries through tendering operations involving national or international seed companies; transportation of the procured seed by government agencies to subdistrict boundaries or centres; and collection of seeds by the designated households according to criteria established by local authorities/community representatives (usually reflecting the extent of household loss during the emergency, the level of poverty and the ability to put the planting material to good use). In response to protracted drought in eastern and northern Kenya in 1999-2000, an alternative approach was attempted in three districts on the eastern side of Mount Kenya. Under this scheme, recipient farmers could exchange vouchers for seed of their own choice at one of 14 seed fairs arranged prior to the beginning of the rainy season. The scheme was coordinated by FAO, in conjunction with the Ministry of Agriculture and local authorities, with US$250 000 funding by Sweden (SIDA). The Catholic Relief Service (CRS) was contracted to distribute the vouchers and to arrange the seed fairs. The criteria applied by the local authorities to identify the recipients of the seed vouchers were similar to those employed in conventional seed distribution schemes. The designated beneficiaries also received food aid to ensure that the seed would not be consumed and to provide the necessary impetus for them to adopt basic soil and water conservation practices on their farms. The seed voucher-fair scheme was scheduled to serve the selected locations in a carefully worked out sequence in order to minimize administration while still offering seed in time for early planting. CRS promoted the novel concept of seed fairs among the intended beneficiaries, more than 275 (mostly female) local seed traders and commercial seed companies. Before the opening of each fair, the seeds brought by the traders were inspected for pest damage, cleanliness and purity by three farmer representatives together with the Ministry of Agriculture and CRS before determining the appropriate prices. The average mark-up agreed between the sellers and the representatives was 20 percent above the price of the corresponding food commodity quality. The vouchers –each worth K Sh 600 to 800 (approximately US$10) and sufficient to cover most of the planting needs of an average-size farm in the area – were handed out to the selected beneficiaries at the start of the fair.
During the fairs, a total of 200 tonnes of mainly locally-produced seed were exchanged between the sellers and the voucher holders. About half of this volume was accounted for by beans, one-quarter by maize, one-quarter by traditional cereals and a small proportion by cowpeas and pigeon peas. The three participating commercial seed companies, primarily offering hybrid maize, were less successful than the local traders since the voucher holders considered their mark-ups too high. At the end of the fair, the seed sellers presented the vouchers to the CRS representative, who exchanged them for cash. The benefiting farmers particularly appreciated the fact that they could obtain the varieties and quantities that suited their requirements instead of being allocated seeds in uniform quantities. They also greatly appreciated the opportunity to inspect the seed and to buy from local vendors with whom they were familiar. The voucher-fair scheme was considered to have made seed available to the recipients more rapidly than a conventional seed distribution scheme since no tendering procedure was required and prices could be set through face-to-face negotiations with the traders at the beginning of the fairs. The scheme had the additional effect of injecting cash into the local economy since the seed traders frequently used their proceeds to buy other inputs and goods. It was also observed that many traders reduced local seed prices as a result of the benchmark levels established at the fairs. However, the evaluations also revealed that both farmers and seed traders initially found it difficult to understand the voucher-fair concept. The fair approach may also discourage distant traders from bringing in novel varieties since their costs tend to be higher than those of the local seed sellers. |
101. Generally, TCP projects provided a certain amount of technical assistance (e.g. extension support) for agricultural input distribution projects, while projects funded by bilateral donors usually did not. The quality of technical assistance in emergency projects was generally good; in several cases it was provided by FAO projects already present in the country (e.g. Bangladesh, Honduras). This proved to be an excellent and highly cost-effective method of operation.
102. Many emergency field projects have been approved under EMPRES-Livestock, nearly all of which have been funded by FAO TCP. These projects typically supply vaccines to combat outbreaks of transboundary animal diseases (e.g. rinderpest, contagious bovine pleuropneumonia, Newcastle disease, foot-and-mouth disease) or set up control programmes (e.g. African swine fever), and usually also include elements for improving surveillance (early warning) and training. The 2001 evaluation found that most of the projects achieved their objectives, with those on rinderpest being particularly successful.
103. The evaluation found that activities were more successful when they provided inputs that farmers were already using in the pre-emergency situation. A few projects distributed novel inputs and generally provided technical assistance support. However, the availability of technical assistance was not a sufficient condition to ensure success in some activities (e.g. fruit trees, duck rearing) if the management requirements were beyond what the farmers could handle.
104. The missions found that project documents for agricultural relief projects could be improved in at least two ways. Operational responsibilities for project implementation are generally not sufficiently clear. In particular, project documents call for the appointment of a National Project Director (NPD), but NPDs had no terms of reference and no clear responsibility or authority. Similarly, work plans could be improved by defining planned tasks and responsibility for their implementation, tied to the crop calendar. This would make the urgency of completing activities prior to scheduled planting time clearer to all parties.
105. Overall, project monitoring and evaluation was weak. Only in one of the cases reviewed by the mission (Georgia) was a monitoring report clearly used in the design of subsequent activities. However, TCE now recognizes the need for more systematic use of monitoring and evaluation, and some improvements are being made; more recent projects now have specific components for this, which is usually carried out by national consultants or NGOs.
106. Transition is the period of a disaster cycle during which primary attention begins to turn from saving lives to the rehabilitation of livelihoods.
107. This aspect (often referred to as “connectedness”) is of particular relevance to post-conflict and post-complex emergency situations where: i) the emergency has led to large-scale humanitarian assistance that has replaced or completely overshadowed development aid; and ii) government institutions have collapsed and governance is weak or non-existent.
108. Identification of the beginning and the end of the “transition phase” is not always clear. In protracted emergencies, transition has a spatial aspect (the simultaneous presence of emergency and transition phases in different areas of the country) and temporal meanings (a protracted emergency usually sways between periods of relative peace and the resumption of conflict). Eventually, the commencement of the transition phase is defined from political analysis, and is not controlled or influenced by a technical agency such as FAO.
109. Until recently, FAO’s transition-related activities have been through ongoing relief projects. The evaluation missions found many projects that attempted to diversify the emergency programme by promoting interventions aimed at more sustainable results: seed multiplication schemes, rehabilitation of veterinary clinics, rehabilitation of marshlands, etc. The field missions concluded that, in the countries visited, the scope of these activities and their impact on rehabilitation were limited and that emergency-related work does not necessarily prepare the ground for longer-term rehabilitation.
110. There are several reasons for this, relating to funding aspects and to internal management. Emergency funding is rarely adequate to accommodate more complex and time-consuming activities, first because of its time frame (usually less than a year) and second because the budget allocation for technical support, particularly in Trust Fund activities, is usually limited. Furthermore, rehabilitation activities necessitate stronger and more diversified technical support, and TCE has not always been able to mobilize other divisions’ expertise and capacity. Despite the reimbursement mechanism for technical services put into place in December 2000, the contribution and technical support from technical divisions still remain low and are dependent on the interest of individuals, who are often subject to other pressing demands. Another factor is that funding that enters through TCE is necessarily controlled by TCE itself, even when it relates to transition activities. In a bureaucracy, control over financial resources is the key to stimulating involvement and participation; technical units will not work for someone else without being given a degree of control.
111. In transition situations, one of the first tasks is to define the policies and investment frameworks that will trace the path for recovery and development. FAO’s technical expertise in these areas, together with its neutrality, give the Organization a comparative advantage in carrying out this work. However, carrying out policy work in a transition context is a relatively new activity for FAO, having emerged in the past decade with the recognition that transition is a particular phase of emergencies and the occurrence of increased numbers of conflicts and complex emergencies.
112. As a result, over the evaluation period, there were relatively few examples of FAO taking (or attempting to take) the lead in formulating policies and investment frameworks aimed at linking relief to rehabilitation and development, although such work may increase now that it is enshrined in the Strategic Framework. Some examples include Kosovo and East Timor – where FAO attempted to take the lead – together with its more recent ongoing strategic and programming work in Afghanistan, from which some positive lessons can be drawn.
113. The evaluation identified several constraints that complicate FAO’s leading role in the formulation of agriculture sector policy and the development of a sector investment framework during transition. These relate to:
114. The transition phase in countries that have been affected by a conflict is characterized by a gradual build-up of national government institutions, first through a period of transitory governance by a UN Mission (e.g. UNMIK in Kosovo), an interim government (e.g. East Timor Transitional Authority, Afghan Interim Administration), or both. This transitory period is followed by an election from which a recognized government emerges, along with incipient national institutions. Policy assistance work, as traditionally conducted by FAO, is difficult when government structures are weak or temporary. The lack of strong counterparts in Kosovo is stated as one of the reasons for FAO not having been able to play a lead role in this domain. Furthermore, the lack of a clearly defined counterpart institution has led to uncoordinated development of proposals by various agencies present, with no single leader – government or other – clearly accepted by all. On the other hand, in Afghanistan the national interim institutions seem to be driving the rehabilitation process effectively, thus greatly facilitating the policy and strategic work conducted by international organizations, including FAO (see Box 5).
115. FAO needs to be recognized and accepted as a lead institution in the transition phase if it is going to exercise this function. Thus, it must have the support of other important stakeholders in the transition process. These include: i) the government (if there is one); ii) other UN agencies and IFIs; and iii) donors. This has been a problem in Kosovo, where initial recognition of FAO’s leadership in agriculture during the relief phase quickly eroded after the dismantling of the ECU and the consequent lack of FAO presence (see Box 6).
116. Funding for rehabilitation to support the agriculture sector, including policy work, may be the most striking bottleneck during the transition phase. In post-conflict situations, there is a recognized phenomenon called “donor fatigue” after a long period of involvement in protracted emergencies. When the emergency phases out, priority for assistance turns quickly to other areas. Furthermore, donors themselves often suffer from a lack of any substantive connection between the work of their emergency and non-emergency agencies. When a donor’s humanitarian branch withdraws, there is often a gap before development assistance (which usually has slower procedures and a longer political decision-making process) is fully re-established, without any fund bridging mechanism for the transition phase.
117. There are, nevertheless, cases of ongoing donor-funded development projects switching to emergency activity, then moving back to development work when the emergency has passed.23 These are ideal examples of transition, since the emergency response is integrated with the previous development activity, and the transition back to development is carried out by the same people who dealt with the emergency. In such cases, donors have been quite flexible about moving funding back and forth between emergency and development, adding more funding to the project budget from their emergency allocations.
118. Another funding constraint during the transition phase is the tendency for donors to accord priority to non-agricultural sectors such as justice, governance, health and infrastructure (roads, bridges, ports, houses). When there is funding for the rehabilitation of agriculture and food security, it is supported by a limited number of donors (the World Bank, the European Union [EU], UNDP), and in many instances FAO has not been able to associate itself with these activities. A partial exception was in Kosovo, where the World Bank agreed to recognize FAO’s capacity in rehabilitation by entrusting it with implementation of the Emergency Farm Reconstruction Project, although not on the institutional/policy side (the Capacity Building Component) in which FAO has a limited supporting role.
119. In conclusion, there is a dichotomy between fundraising mechanisms and strategies that support them within the UN system. Emergency funds are often raised through UNCAPs, which are characterized by a strict time frame and a prevalence of life-saving objectives (e.g. for food, housing, medical supplies). FAO has participated in UNCAPs, which often include project proposals for agricultural rehabilitation interventions – but these components usually receive far fewer funds than the others do. The UNDP-led United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) usually follows the UNCAP and is often prepared during the transition phase, laying the ground for reconstruction and development. However, reconstruction and development are more complex and require degrees of consultation and coordination among agencies that are difficult to achieve within a short time period. As a result, there is often a lack of integration and continuity between the humanitarian assistance framework and the medium- and long-term options for development. The existence of two parallel strategic documents and associated funding mechanisms creates competition for resources. A more positive recent development is the UN Plan for 2002 for the Congo (Brazzaville). The document is well prepared, and both integrates expected humanitarian needs following the possible resurgence of emergencies and lays the ground for reconstruction and development.
120. A major weakness within FAO is its lack of continued presence when emergency operations cease and ECUs are phased out. This is particularly true in countries where no FAOR was present during the emergency, including new countries emerging from conflict (e.g. Kosovo, East Timor). There is a clear need for an interim measure to ensure a strong FAO presence between the end of the emergency coordination function and the establishment of more permanent representation functions.
121. In countries where there is already FAO representation, the emergency and development assistance programmes are often run without synergy between them, partly owing to different modes of operating. This might be overcome if FAORs were given operating responsibilities for emergency activities, on the condition – of course – that the FAO representations have the necessary capacity to manage such activities. An FAOR works first and foremost with the government and its institutions. Emergency coordinators work more with the international community, including NGOs, and rather less with government institutions. During the transition phase, it is important to re-establish stronger links with the government, thus suggesting a stronger role for FAORs in this phase.
122. For FAO to take the lead in policy formulation requires the Organization to set its own vision on the future of the sector in the country concerned and to have a more proactive attitude in this respect. The strategic planning and programming approach developed in Afghanistan places FAO in a lead role in the sector (see Box 5).
123. The model currently being developed is for TCE to take on the responsibility of designing the transition strategy through its new Rehabilitation and Humanitarian Policies Unit (TCER). The logic is that TCE has already built up valuable in-country knowledge and experience, including relationships with donors, which ought to be used in designing the transition phase. In this scenario, once the rehabilitation strategy has been agreed, TCE would phase out, and programme design and implementation would be turned over to the Policy Assistance Division (TCA), the Investment Centre Division (TCI) and/or FAORs, depending on country circumstances. These arrangements are still at an early stage and the modalities of operation are not yet fully clear.
Ø High-level profile of national stakeholders
Ø Availability of donor funding
Ø History of FAO’s presence in Afghanistan and its proactive attitude
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Until the Afghanistan crisis, Kosovo was the complex emergency for which FAO had gone the furthest towards reflecting on a strategy for transition. As Kosovo emergency activities under the Special Relief Operations Service (now TCE) were coming to an end in early 2001, it was decided to assign responsibility for management of the rehabilitation phase to TCE. TCE already had responsibility for a few longer-term (transition) projects which had begun operation late in the emergency phase. The main one of these was the World Bank-funded Emergency Farm Reconstruction Project (EFRP). While the two major components of EFRP – distribution of imported cows and tractor repair – were closely related to emergency relief, the third and much smaller Capacity Building Component (CBC) was more of a government institution-building, rehabilitation component. However, as required by the World Bank, the implementation of the CBC was sub-contracted to a consulting firm. Other projects included a seed multiplication project, projects on forest inventory and forestry institution capacity building and a farmers’ group formation/income-generating activity project called Support to Agricultural Rehabilitation in Kosovo (SARK). Under this new responsibility for rehabilitation, TCE’s first activity was to fund a short exploratory mission by the Policy Assistance Branch of the Regional Office for Europe (REU) and the Investment Centre in March 2001. The mission coincided with the departure of the FAO Emergency Coordinator and the dismantling of the ECU (final closure was in June). The results of that mission were minimal, however, and provided no strategy and only two minor project proposals. TCE also provided support to a CFSAM in July 2001. During this period, REU began to be more substantively involved in programming rehabilitation under its own RP funding, starting with participation in the Kosovo UNDAF exercise in August 2001. Following this, REU fielded identification missions for two projects in September and November and a Field Programme Development mission, also in November. It is understood that TCA was originally reluctant to work under emergency funding and direction from TCE. At present (mid-2002, three years after the initial emergency intervention), all FAO activity in Kosovo is still based entirely on emergency funding, with TCE’s operational responsibility stretched in time well into the rehabilitation phase. The remaining FAO activities are being coordinated by a TCE Coordinator located in Belgrade under a Luxembourg-funded project (Coordination of Emergency Agricultural Relief Operations in Countries Affected by the Kosovo Crisis, started in September 2000). Planning and programming of agricultural rehabilitation, however, has not progressed very far. There is a strong request from the UN in Kosovo (UNMIK, UNDAF agencies) for FAO to take the lead in the agriculture sector, but FAO still lacks non-emergency staff on the ground. However, it is understood that some funds from the Luxembourg project will soon be used to fund a policy adviser (to be backstopped by REU) in the Kosovo Ministry of Agriculture. It should be noted that the absence of a national government and the slow process of its creation have been major impediments for FAO in the transition out of emergency. The interim UNMIK Government is, by its very nature, structured for emergency assistance, while the newly elected Kosovo Government has yet to take over fully (at writing there was still no Minister of Agriculture). In this context, a weak point in FAO’s transition was its difficulty in moving from a role of overall coordinator for the agriculture sector (a virtual Ministry of Agriculture) in the emergency phase to that of an agency at the service of government (FAO’s usual – and mandated – role) for the rehabilitation phase. Evolution of FAO’s role in Kosovo With regard to FAO’s role in rehabilitation activities, it is striking that under the World Bank-funded EFRP, FAO-TCE was given the implementation of the two relief components, but not of the institution-building rehabilitation component – the CBC. The main reason appears to have been that the World Bank lacked confidence in FAO’s capacities in the area of agricultural institution building. The implication is that FAO is recognized as being more suitable for the distribution of animals and tractor parts than for the rehabilitation of agricultural institutions. This is an example of the insufficient “connectedness” within FAO, where the emergency unit (TCE) was far more effective at offering the World Bank its own project execution capacities than the rest of FAO was.
Thus, in Kosovo, FAO is still searching for ways to be involved in transition, including the mobilization of external funding support. TCE expects to terminate its own work when the money from the UNCAP comes to an end. In Kosovo, no further activities were initiated after this point (but several activities were, and are still, ongoing with funds raised during the UNCAP). This is not a formal position, however. The implication is that donors determined the switch from emergency to development according to their funding decisions with regard to FAO; FAO could only follow the money. REU is gradually taking over programming responsibility, but the technical divisions are not yet closely involved. FAO’s Yugoslavia experience indicates that the placement of a full-time policy adviser in Kosovo will be a key to this transition.
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124. In countries or regions with repeated natural disasters, such as storm-affected countries in Central America and the Caribbean, flood-affected countries in Asia (e.g. Bangladesh, the Mekong River delta) or drought-prone regions in the Horn of Africa, it makes little sense to talk of a transition out of emergency into development, since a non-emergency situation is actually only an inter-emergency period. In such countries, a key element of FAO’s emergency response should be to strengthen people’s resilience to future disasters through local capacity building and the strengthening of coping mechanisms. This is the concern addressed by the fourth strategy component of Strategic Objective A3 (“strengthening local capacities and coping mechanisms, through guiding the choice of agricultural practices, technologies and support services, to reduce vulnerability and enhance resilience”).
125. This issue was particularly important for the evaluation missions that visited Central America and Asia, where natural disasters are common (see Box 7). The two missions came to similar conclusions about FAO’s work with respect to this part of the Strategic Objective:
Ø Almost all of the interventions were for input distribution, responding to immediate problems, and thus were generally not geared to bringing a sustainable and effective response to recurrent disasters.
Ø Some agricultural input distribution projects had impacts beyond a single growing season, and therefore increased people’s resilience, at least for a certain period. For example, projects for improved seed distribution can have an impact on increased production for two to three years, until genetic purity deteriorates.
Ø Improving resilience to disaster requires a knowledge and understanding of people’s livelihoods and their vulnerability to food insecurity and disaster. FAO has a comparative advantage in this domain because of its longstanding work in support of food information systems, including FIVIMS.
Ø Experiences in disaster-prone regions make the case for FAO to emphasize disaster mitigation measures, not only during the post-disaster phase – when this may be difficult because of time constraints – but also in its development programmes. All work related to agricultural production should strengthen the resilience of production systems in the face of sudden calamity. Such strengthening might be achieved through:
In the flood-prone countries visited by the evaluation mission in Asia, nearly all of the individual project interventions were for input supply – mostly seeds (rice, maize, vegetables) but also fish fingerlings, fruit tree saplings, fertilizer and, in one case, small livestock. Overall, the impact of these projects on improving people’s resilience to future disasters and coping mechanisms was limited. Some seed distribution projects had potential for increasing resilience beyond one growing season by providing improved planting material that was well adapted but not available locally. Seed produced from this material could be multiplied, with increased production for several years. Diversification was also attempted as a resilience strategy, but the issue of how to reconcile the husbandry demands of, say, cloned fruit tree saplings with the management capabilities of the poorer households was not always effectively addressed. The mission identified several areas in which FAO could make a contribution to increasing resilience in the face of recurrent disasters. FAO would be well-equipped to streamline and disseminate methodologies for identifying the most needy beneficiaries for agricultural relief through assessments undertaken by the community members themselves. A second potential area for future support to agricultural rehabilitation would be to develop and disseminate models of how particularly vulnerable farmers, as identified after flood emergencies, could be organized as contact points for intensified attention by the agricultural extension service during a defined post-flood period, benefiting from on-farm group-oriented visits by the extension field staff as well as from pamphlets and audiovisual material. FAO could develop and introduce management models of how national seed security stocks for meeting the needs after emergencies could be incorporated into the regular stocks of planting material held by the various actors in the seed industry, at least for those crops that have a well-developed formal seed system. As with regular seeds, security seed stocks need to be turned over regularly to ensure that germination rates remain high. The incorporation of the management of security seed stocks into overall seed management, while not violating minimum stock level requirements, presents a particular challenge that is difficult to resolve for inexperienced actors in the seed industry.
Similarly, for livestock vaccines, the requirement to keep emergency stocks potent through phased turnover presents a challenge to the veterinary authorities and the commercial sector providing animal health services. By preparing guidelines on stock turnover and providing a management model of where and how different types of vaccines should be stored to fulfil these requirements and still be available in places where livestock disease outbreaks may occur after flood emergencies, FAO could become a valuable technical partner in improving preparedness for emergencies. |
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17 The evaluation is concerned only with GIEWS activities relating to early warning.
18 GCP/INT/660/NOR.
19 TCP/RAF/6720 Phase II of TCP/RAF/4558: Assistance to Develop a Drought and Disaster Preparedness Strategy in the IGADD region.
20 TCP/RLA/6616: Emergency Assistance for the Formulation of National Hurricane Disaster Preparedness and Impact Mitigation Plans for the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Sectors.
21 CDERA is an inter-governmental regional disaster management organization established in 1991 by an Agreement of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).
22 TCP/IND/6712 – Training in Sea Safety Development Programmes.
23 E.g. Netherlands funding in Honduras during the Hurricane Mitch emergency, UNDP/FAO work in Afghanistan.
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