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1.2.4 Anticipatory- and countermeasures
The first and essential conditions for a successful programme of anticipatory- and counter-measures for minimising and reversing the effects on agriculture etc. are prompt notification of the accident and activation of the available networks for monitoring significant changes in radiation levels of potentially vulnerable agricultural, forestry, fisheries areas at a distance. The need for maps in this context has already been indicated (Section 1.1.5).
"Chernobyl" has already prompted, with exemplary support by the USSR a major step towards an effective international agreement on prompt notification (41; 42) of a nuclear accident.
The IAEA has traditionally played a leading role in the development and testing of sampling and monitoring methodology for radiation and radioactivity. These programmes (based on the IAEA Laboratory at Seibersdorf in Austria, and Monaco) are now being expanded with improved cooperation and coordination among other U.N. Agencies including FAO (86).
Post "Chernobyl" experience has suggested one possibility of improvement in anticipating and implementing preventative actions on animal farms. Post accident weather and precipitation events played a critical role in radioactive fallout episodes - especially at the greater distances from the accident site (e.g. in parts of Austria, North Wales, Sweden). The role of precipitation in this context is well recognised (e.g. see pp. 1,955 et seq of ref. 74). This suggests that if post-accident meteorological conditions indicate the possibility of precipitated fallout, dairy and possibly, other livestock (lambs) could be rounded up and transferred to temporary or standing shelter, (a practice common in Europe in cold winter latitudes anyway), and provided with stored feed and water. This would need a permanent infra-structure for:
- rapid weather warning communication to farmers within range;
- standing or easily erected temporary shelter or cover with permanently maintained emergency feed and water resources;
- local monitoring advice to obviate unnecessary disruptions, or to indicate a return to normal conditions.
The recent expansion of remote sensing for meteorological forecasting, and land-based rain-storm radar warning systems (e.g. as in U.K.) suggest a potential for their emergency mobilization on notification of an accident.
Post-accident countermeasures (193) in the context of food and agriculture include the following:
- Interception of harvest, product movement and trade when post-accident Derived Intervention Levels (DILs) so indicate (see Section 3).
- Decontamination, dilution, processing, or simple storage (to allow for effective radioactive decay) to the extent of reducing contamination to acceptable levels.
- Containment, isolation, or disposal or equivalent restrictions on land and water use, even permanently in the case of serious contamination, e.g., sufficiently near the accident site as, indeed, occurred near the Chernobyl site (14, 46).
- Reclamation or use-recovery of exposed soil and water resources - the problems of soil-crop exposure are addressed in more detail in Part 2.
It would be the third kind of countermeasure that would have the most serious impact upon the dependent communities since situations could arise which would leave families or communities with no alternative to changes in habitation or occupation. Temporary switching to useful farm maintenance tasks, fence repairs, etc. could also be constrained by external radiation levels. However, it is stressed that these extreme constraints are most unlikely to be more than temporary, local, and probably within kilometres of the accident site. The accident itself would have to be a very serious one in the environmental sense. But the possibility must be recognized. These considerations also underline the importance of some kind of insurance and compensation provision (see Section 1.4.9).
Many reports refer to the problems of decontamination. An important aspect of "effective" decontamination by dilution or mixing the contaminated product or its processed derivatives with unaffected products (e.g., milk, cereals, processed meats, fish) is to ensure uniformity of the mixture. This to obviate the possible problem of "hot-spots" persisting in the final mix which could finish up in the diet of just a few individuals.
In relation to dilution or mixing it must be recognized that this would only reduce the individual dose to the normally exposed population. If, however, dilution or mixing resulted in a wider or time-extended consumption of the contaminated food fraction the collective dose equivalent commitment in total man-sieverts (54; see also Section 4) would remain little changed except for the effects of radioactive decay with time.
Some recent reports on the problems of decontamination of freshly harvested vegetable or fruit crops also suggest the need for investigation. For example, while ''washing'' fresh vegetables and fruit was widely recommended in Europe after "Chernobyl" (87) some observations indicated very different levels of effectiveness. "Useless" (Professor Hohenemser, et al. in a proposal dated 1 July '86 for an International meeting to be sponsored by IIASA and communicated to FAO?; iodine-131 activity reduced by "approximately 30 % and cesium-137 to "approximately one third" (87); "careful washing practices removed only half the activity and only 10 % of cesium-137 activity" (Professor Buchtela, Vienna - personal communication). Likewise, direct plant absorption from experimental foliar deposits of cesium-137, at low concentrations to simulate fallout conditions, has been reported as low 1.2 - 3.4 % according to species (63). Both classical (2) and post-"Chernobyl" observations have indicated, however, that "a large part of direct cesium-137 deposited on the leaves of growing plants ... was taken up ... and a fraction transported to fruits and grain" (88). Discarding the outer leaves or skin of freshly harvested vegetables and fruit will, of course, remove recent deposits (89). Likewise, discarding the bran and outer layers of cereal grains would be expected to reduce strontium-90 levels (2).
A problem highlighted by "Chernobyl" was the uptake of iodine-131 and cesium-137 from recent deposits on pasture. This has prompted current research on feeding exposed sheep with suitable suspensions to reduce intestinal absorption of cesium-137 (Dr. Chesters, Rowett Research Institute, U.K. - personal communication). Iodine administration would also be expected to reduce iodine-131 accumulation in livestock but this might not be justified on economic grounds - at least not before investigation. While iodine administration would be expected to reduce the fraction of total body iodine - 131 in livestock thyroid it might actually increase the fraction appearing in the milk of lactating mammals (77, Vol. 3, pp. 341 et seq.).
Countermeasures directly related to public health are not within the scope of this appraisal (see paragraph above) such as the administration of iodine to reduce thyroid uptake of iodine-131 by members of the public. Such countermeasures are authoritatively reviewed elsewhere (e.g., refs. 90; 91).
As mentioned earlier, radionuclides deposited on the soil move down the profile more slowly than many plant nutrients, especially nitrogen in the form of nitrates (92). This would be expected on the basis of their generally cationic nature and the extremely low chemical concentrations involved (see below). This implies greater availability for uptake by shallow rooted crops as well as for further spreading as a result of surface erosion. For these reasons, ploughing (to a depth of about 30 cm) is recognized as a useful and practicable countermeasure at farm level (2; 58; 90). Serious levels of contamination (e.g., because of proximity to the accident site) may dictate actual removal of the topsoil and dumping in a protected site as anticipated for the case of nuclear warfare (89) and as actually implemented around Chernobyl (14, 46).
Uptake of strontium-90 can be reduced by liming when soil pH and calcium levels do not contra-indicate (58). The addition of gypsum (calcium sulphate) has also been suggested for reducing strontium-90 uptake from saline or alkaline soils (2).
Contamination of marine and inland fisheries (ponds, lakes, rivers, etc.) by fallout is not considered a serious problem because of confinement, dilution, and sedimentation. However, within freshwater fisheries and lakes of low nutrient status cesium-137 levels were expected to reach levels of 1,000 Bq Kg-1 or more in fish in parts of Europe following "Chernobyl" (88). This suggests the possibility of adding appropriate nutrients to small inland fisheries as a countermeasure.
The administration of suitable ion exchange resins (e.g., containing ferric ferrocyanide), alginates, etc. for decreasing gastro-intestinal uptake of ingested radionuclides is well recognized (93; 94; 91) and suggests potentially useful application to farm livestock in certain post-accident situations.
Notwithstanding the evidently variable effectiveness of simply washing freshly harvested products (see above), food processing 'beyond the farm gate' may also involve mixing, peeling, cereal extraction, canning, drying, etc. etc. as described in many classical publications (e.g., 95; 96; 97). This, likewise, will affect the derivation and application of appropriate DIL's (see Section 3) and the relation to the level of radionuclide in the final plate of food or drink to the initial level after exposure under field conditions. Overall effects of food processing on the fractions remaining of "external contamination" of freshly harvested fruit and vegetables and those of "internal contamination" have been studied. Quantification of these effects as well as the effect of time itself will also dictate the DIL to be applied at some initial, intermediate, or final stage of food processing to allow for the corresponding changes in level of radioactive contaminant.
Some effects of processing on fruit and vegetables are briefly illustrated in Table III below (see also Section 3.3).
Some of the apparently differing implications of decontamination and weathering studies during the last three decades may have arisen because of two factors: The critical factor of time between deposition and attempted decontamination by experimental washing or by the effects of natural precipitation. Secondly, the extremely low chemical concentrations of fallout radionuclides which might not be simulated effectively in experimental studies. The chemical weights of the effectively "carrier-free" (i.e., as the isotopically pure radionuclide) fission products within a reactor core have been indicated (11). Likewise, the levels of radioactivities released in the Chernobyl accident (88). These considerations indicate that, in the case of cesium-137 for example, considerably less than 100 kg weight of the radionuclide was deposited over an area of not less than 10 million km2. This implies an average surface deposit of less than 1 picogram per square centimetre, and a concentration less than .0001 parts per 109 in the top 10 cm of soil. Classical adsorption and diffusion theory (166) indicates that the removal of surface contamination by simple washing would be difficult, especially after much delay after deposition. Moreover, some radionuclides such as iodine-131 might undergo "isotopic exchange" with trace iodine compounds likely to be present naturally in soils and plants. This means the fallout radionuclide would effectively become incorporated into chemical structures near the plant or soil surface.
TABLE III
Illustration of radionuclide levels of processed fruit
and vegetables for consumption expressed as fractions of the
levels of "internal" leaf or flesh before washing,
peeling, canning, etc. (from ref. 81, pp. 68 & 70).
| Strontium-89/90 | Cesium-134/137 | ||
| Spinach | 0.36 | 0.12 | |
| Tomatoes | 0.35 | - - - | |
| Peaches | ~ 0 | ~0 | |
| Broccoli | 0.28 | 0.11 | |
However, for these same reasons, the addition of suitable carrier
of non-radioactive cationic salts (e.g., of calcium, potassium,
or even natural cesium) to the washing medium would be expected
greatly to improve the effectiveness of sample decontamination
(e.g. of freshly exposed and harvested vegetables) by rinsing, a
long and well-recognized radiochemical laboratory practice.
Research workers familiar with rinsing out glassware which has
merely contained a solution of some "carrier-free"
radioisotope will be fully aware of these problems!
The problems of the safe disposal of seriously contaminated soils, crops, or livestock must be the responsibility of the national or local authority and will, surely, need expert guidance (85; 98; 99).
To conclude this section: Despite the body of research and publication (e.g., 1-5; 16; 18; 21; 22; 52; 57-66; 77; 88; ) there remains a need for clear and simple guidelines on preventative measures (i.e., in anticipation of possible future accidents), for an evaluation of existing countermeasures, and a suitable publication for use at the agricultural college, extension service or farm levels.
Finally, while existing guidelines have been, understandably, mainly concerned with public health (90; 100), the indirect effects of a possible accidental release upon agricultural, forestry and fisheries-dependent communities had been relatively neglected before "Chernobyl" (see Sections 1.4.2 and 2.8).
1.3 Chernobyl and other accidents
1.3.1
Chernobyl
1.3.2
Other accidents
1.3.3 The international situation in Europe
after "Chernobyl"
In the context of the nuclear industry, the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station on 26 April 1986 has, undoubtedly, been the most serious and one with consequences for agriculture, etc. on an international scale (see Section 2.7 for discussion in the agricultural context).
As a result of the prompt and exemplary gesture by the Soviet Government to communicate and to cooperate through the U.N. system with IAEA as the focal point, full and technically-detailed reports on the accident rapidly became available (14, 46; 148).
Sufficient here to mention that the accident involved an explosive emission of some 50 MCi (approx. 2 x 1018 Bq) of radioactive substances (excluding krypton - 85 and xenon - 133) equivalent to 3-4 % of the total radioactive content of the reactor core likely to have been present at the time. This, in turn, led to significant radioactive fallout episodes in many countries of Europe outside the USSR and to detectable fallout up to many thousands of kilometers distant within days - e.g., in the USA (101, see also Section 2.3.4).
Radiological protection measures involving constraints on agriculture, food products, etc. were imposed in many countries (88; 87). In the critical area around Chernobyl acute effects of radiation exposure were diagnosed in some 200 people with some 30 fatalities to the end of July, 1986. With regard to possible late stochastic effects (see note on terminology in Section 4) it was estimated that some 200 cases of late cancer fatalities might result. This would add less than 1 % to the expected cancer mortality of the affected population which will be expected in the normal course of events. Additionally, it was "conservatively" estimated that the "average" person of the 75 million living in the most exposed Western region of the USSR will have received a total dose equivalent commitment which, on the base of the then currently recognized ICRP risk factors, would result in an increase of less than 0.3 % in the cancer deaths expected to occur in the population during the next 70 years and corresponds to less than an increase of 0.1 % in the corresponding expected total mortality (46).
On the continental scale, Europe as a whole experienced the greatest impact on food and agriculture as distinct from direct effects or risks for human health. An assessment on the CEC's behalf of stochastic risks of late cancer as a result of Chernobyl in the EC countries has indicated a possible additional 1,000 cancer deaths over the next 50 years. It was pointed out that it can be expected that "30 million people in these European countries will die from cancer of one type or another" over the same period in any event (102). In the same connexion it might also be noted that on the basis of annual road accident statistics (103), at least 3 million people may expect to lose their lives with a further 60 million injuries within the EC countries over the same period.
A recent estimate has indicated a possible 39,000 cancer deaths worldwide as a consequence of 'Chernobyl' over the next 50 years. However, this figure will be lost in a "sea of 630 million cancer deaths" expected globally in the same period (104).
Notwithstanding the gravity of the Chernobyl accident it is important to view it in the context of all technology-based accidents (105).
There have been a number of minor nuclear accidents which, understandably, tend to attract media attention because of public sensitivity to any kind of "radiation threat" associated with nuclear war (see Section 2.7.6).
The more notable accidents include that of Windscale (U.K.) in 1957 which involved the release into the atmosphere of some 20kCi (1015 Bq) of iodine-131 and 13 kCi (5 x 1014 Bq) of other radionuclides. The releases were detected on the mainland of Europe. Emergency countermeasures dictated by this accident were temporary constraints on local dairy production and the withdrawal of milk supplies in an area of 500 square kilometers (5).
Another accident occurred at the Three-Mile Island reactor site in Pennsylvania (USA) in 1979 involving serious damage to the reactor core and plumbing. However, radioactive material was almost entirely confined within the outer containment structures. Some 43 kCi (1.6 x 1015 Bq) of radioactive krypton-85 (a chemically inert gas) were deliberately vented later to facilitate safe operation around the damaged reactor (106, 107, 108).
Marine accidents of potential radiological and fisheries significance have occurred. The cargo ship "Mont-Louis", carrying 350 tons of uranium hexa-fluoride destined for enrichment in the USSR and later use in Western European nuclear power plants, sank in the North Sea in 1984. The "nuclear" nature of the cargo attracted a good deal of media attention although at no time was a nuclear release involved. All the uranium hexa-fluoride was recovered intact (109).
An accident occured when a Soviet nuclear submarine sank in deep water in the North Atlantic on 6 October, 1986 following an obviously serious explosion or fire within the submarine. According to later reports the nuclear power unit was itself not involved and "there was no danger of a nuclear explosion or radioactive contamination of the environment" (110).
There have been many reports of minor accidental increases or discharges of radioactive wastes generated as part of the "nuclear fuel cycle". E.g., in processing plants such as Sellafield (formerly Windscale) in the U.K., where plutonium, and fission products are separated from "spent" reactor fuel elements. In early studies of discharges into the Irish Sea from the Sellafield plant, ruthenium-106 evidently comprised about half the radioactive discharge into the sea and was the "critical" radionuclide. Ruthenium-106 undergoes bioconcentration by the edible seaweed Porphyra umbilicus which is a dietary constituent ("laverbread") of local importance to coastal communities (37).
1.3.3 The international situation in Europe after "Chernobyl"
"Chernobyl" prompted a great deal of media attention, the usual proliferation of "instant experts", and an escalation of publications, and proposals for meetings and new programmes. Reference has been made to the prompt action of both the Government of the USSR and the IAEA in the global context (14; 46; 41; 86; 111-115; 116; 117, 43). This note briefly mentions responses of the WHO-ACE, the CEC on the basis of the EURATOM treaty, and COE.
The WHO-ACE convened a meeting of experts as early as 6 Hay 1986 to appraise the immediate problems across Europe (118). This prompted a useful meeting and report of the situation at Bilthoven 25 - 27 June 1986 (88). Meanwhile, WHO not only collected information on fallout levels, locations, and implied dose-equivalent commitments but made this information rapidly available to international and national authorities (87). A concise summary of the situation for Europe after the first two or three critical months is available (118). Maps have been prepared indicating the levels of cesium-137 and iodine-131 deposition.
Deposition of cesium-137 varied from effectively zero (e.g., Southern Spain) to more than 3,000 Bq m-2 over large areas of Europe and exceeding 100,000 Bq m-2 within hundreds of kilometers of the Chernobyl accident zone.
An important and significant (but not surprising) observation was "hot-spot" deposition associated with local rainfall. Likewise, deposition maxima for iodine-131 were indicated.
Models were especially useful in this exercise in rationalizing the distribution of fallout and displaying comparative and expected deposition as a function of weather conditions, air flow, etc. It was concluded that around the "periphery of Europe" the total dose-equivalent commitment as a result of the current year of exposure (due to all external and internal sources) would be some 100 m Sv for adults (i.e., approx. 10 % above existing background level - see Table II) but up to 30 % above background levels for children (118).
The CEC likewise acted promptly. For example, on 6 Hay 1986 circulated and recommended member states to observe "maximum tolerances" for levels of radioactivity in milk, milk products, fruit and vegetables for home marketing and trade (119). As with the UN organizations the CEC was also consulted about a range of problems, e.g., by the CIPF on the effects on international trade as a result of the accumulation of radionuclides in post-fallout harvested straw and fodder (16).
Recent announcements (120; 84) drew attention to the vital commitment to nuclear power within the EC, and the need for observing common internationally agreed radiation protection standards. Under normal conditions these should be based on the ALARA - principle. This is, basically, the ICRP recommendation that "all exposure to ionizing radiations must be kept at a level that is as "low as reasonably achievable" (121).
A later communication (84) stressed the need for the harmonization of "limits on foodstuff contamination". A useful map indicating the locations of nuclear installations in the EC and in neighbouring countries illustrated the potential value of a related map in the context of FAO's responsibilities (see Section 1.1.5).
It is significant that "Chernobyl" has demonstrated that, despite the relatively sophisticated technical infra-structure of Europe for handling nuclear accidents, there still remain serious and urgent problems of international communication, cooperation, and harmonization. Within the CEC "Chernobyl" had prompted "very disquieting conclusions" in that respect (122).
Parliamentary hearings convened in Paris (8-9 January 1987) by the Council of Europe provided for brief technical reports on the nature and magnitude of the 'Chernobyl' impact upon European agriculture, and for discussions by representatives of the many national and international authorities present (123, pp. 137-193; 132).
Since 'Chernobyl' there has been a continuing stream of national and international meetings, symposia, reports, publications, media presentations, etc. However, their monitoring by the writer to the end of July 1988 has not indicated the need for significant changes in this review except to underline that considerable time may have to elapse, before a full and balanced appraisal will become possible. Similar caution is implied by the Secretariat of UNSCEAR (124) in their assessment of the long-term impact (mainly upon public health in Europe) of the Chernobyl accident (likewise in relation to the behaviour of 'Chernobyl' fallout cesium-137 in affected hill sheep-farm areas continuing studies will be needed for longer than originally thought (125).
1.4. Some international implications
1.4.1 Joint FAD/IAEA programmes
1.4.2 Lessons for the future
1.4.3 Collection of information
1.4.4 Autonomous monitoring facilities
1.4.5
Laboratory activities
1.4.6 Training and education
1.4.7 Communication and cooperation
1.4.8 International insurance system
1.4.1 Joint FAD/IAEA programmes
Many of the problems reviewed here are of mandatory concern to FAO (126). On the basis of their Joint Division facilities, FAO and IAEA are in a unique position to address many which have emerged since April, 1986. This Division was created in 1964 by a formal agreement between the two organizations. "Technical fields of responsibility" of the new Joint Division included "Radiation protection in food and agriculture, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the then IAEA Division of "Health, Safety and Waste Disposal" (127). The IAEA Division was traditionally concerned with safety in the nuclear industry and with radioactive waste management.
As indicated in the explanatory notes, FAO's concern with radiation problems parallels the "atomic energy era" itself. This continued through the Joint FAD/IAEA Division with representation at IAEA and UNSCEAR meetings, organizations of international meetings and symposia on the comparative aspects of chemical and radioactive contaminants, specific research under contract, publication of "Joint FAD/IAEA Comparative Summaries of Information" on radioactive contaminants, etc. (1-5; 7; 26; 36; 37; 58; 59; 63; 64; 128).
The Director General of FAO's statement at the .12th Session of the World Food Council in Rome, 16 June 1986 (129), and the establishment of the FAO Inter-departmental Standing Committee on Radiation Effects, 19 June 1986 (130) reflect FAO's current concern with these problems.
In terms of the range of radionuclides released, their widespread dispersion, transport and behaviour in exposed ecosystems; all these were largely as would have been expected from previous studies. Scientifically, very little new has emerged so far. The local emergency measures taken in terms of fire-fighting at the Chernobyl reactor site, containment of the damaged reactor, evacuation of the local community, and medical treatment of the casualities appeared to have been remarkably prompt, well organized, and effective.
The first lesson was, that in order to ensure full public health protection in affected countries across Europe, serious constraints were imposed upon agricultural activities, product and livestock movement, and trade. These with little or no warning, explanation, or indication of possible compensation, guidance about the future to the communities concerned.
The second lesson was an exposure of the need for an improvement in international communication, cooperation and coordination under the conditions of a nuclear emergency. The IAEA has taken some prompt action with the support of member states (2; 43).
The third lesson is the need for simplifying and harmonizing, internationally, the evidently superfluous and often confusing terminology, jargon, units, limits, intervention levels and, above all, scientifically sound guidelines. Guidelines for use at national or even local authority level for what is now, clearly, a potential problem of international or even global proportions. This would facilitate effective protective measures, international trade and understanding and, therefore, public acceptance of nuclear technology in what also appears to be in the public interest for the immediate decades ahead.
The "lessons" identified above have been based mainly on studies of reports (e.g., 111-132; 150; 157; 204; 212) issued during the first post -"Chernobyl" biennium.
1.4.3 Collection of information
Post-Chernobyl experience suggests that the most important needs in the context of this review are:
(a) Feasibility study of early warning networks for possible fallout episodes over agriculture and fisheries (see Section 1.2.4).
(b) Preparation of a global map showing the juxtapositions of nuclear installations and agricultural, forestry, and fishery areas, together, if feasible, of the products and destinations, e.g., fish for local consumption, cereals or meat for export (see Section 1.1.5).
(c) Information on capacity for anticipatory or "preventative" measures to protect livestock, etc. should a fallout event materialize, e.g., by international questionnaire to Member States (see Section 1.2.4).
1.4.4 Autonomous monitoring facilities
Reference has been made to the importance of early notification and action taken by IAEA (41; 43). However, "Chernobyl" experience has also indicated a need for improved communication to farm level. This, in turn, suggests scope for wider independent facilities for local monitoring, especially within the 150-km range of nuclear installations. In trained hands, and with relatively simple portable equipment, it is not difficult to detect a significant rise in radioactivity level, e.g., in rainfall over pasture or crops. Such provision might also obviate unnecessary suspicion or alarm. In many countries the available expertise and simple monitoring facilities already exist and it should not be difficult to set up small highly mobile units to visit worried communities and to communicate in simple language (e.g., several agricultural nuclear research facilities have already been created in "less developed" countries).
In planning future laboratory activities (e.g., on simple vegetable decontamination by washing with suitable water solutions) or investigations it could be wasteful to ignore the range of data and information already available, as reviewed here and in Part 2.
There would otherwise be a danger of mistaking priorities or "reinventing the wheel". In this connexion improved cooperation and information exchange between the U.N. Agencies and other international bodies such as the CEC, COE, OECD-NEA, and IUR would be of value since these organizations have been especially concerned with the post-Chernobyl situation in Europe and where the effects upon agriculture have, undoubtedly, been greatest.
It is one thing successfully to prepare a non-technical description of the nature and consequences for agriculture etc. of a major nuclear accident. It is another thing to communicate it to those who may need it at farm, extension service, or agricultural training levels.
The Joint FAD/IAEA Division has successfully organized training courses in many countries and established nuclear research and training centres, e.g., in Bangladesh, Brazil, India and Yugoslavia. These have been mainly concerned with stable, radioactive isotopes and irradiation applications for agricultural development (133).
The information here reviewed suggests a need for new training courses in post-accident fallout monitoring, countermeasures, etc. applicable in the context of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. Such courses should also include monitoring procedures for fallout or accidental release episodes, and the radioecological background to the development and application of DIL's at farm or fisheries levels.
1.4.7 Communication and cooperation
"Chernobyl" has certainly demonstrated the urgent need for improved international communication and cooperation. The situation is complicated by the proliferation of national and international organizations concerned with applied nuclear science, safety, radiological protection and radioecology. This has led to duplication of effort, sometimes contradictory or confusing recommendations and, above all, an expanding universe of publications and reports already beyond the specialist's telescope (see also 1.4.5 above)!
1.4.8 International insurance system
A major international consequence of "Chernobyl' was economic loss and psychological stress as a result of constraints imposed by national authorities on agriculture in the interests of public health protection. These constraints involved land use, livestock movement and trade - especially in relation to milk, meat, and fresh vegetables (see also Section 2.1.2).
There is a need for an internationally agreed system of farm and fisheries insurance against such losses as earlier foreseen (26) when nuclear power was on a very much smaller scale than it is today. Many reports in the European media have illustrated disparities in various Government reactions to this problem after 'Chernobyl". Such an insurance scheme would certainly obviate some of the stress problems affecting the agricultural and, possibly, fisheries communities in future. It would seem logical to set it up as an international scheme sustained by national subscriptions based on their relative scales of nuclear power production.
The number of significant accidents in this context has clearly been very small in the past (see Section 1.3.2). Allowing for the obvious difficulties of reliable forecast (117), the probability of significant accident in future would also appear to be low (45). These considerations suggest that the costs of sustaining such an insurance scheme per GW(e)-year would be relatively low. However, the benefits in terms of confidence and sense of security among agricultural and fisheries communities, especially those near nuclear installations, would surely be high.
The natural occurence of radionuclides, and radiation exposure as a fact of life in the human environment, are indicated. Exposure to ionizing radiation from natural and man-made sources are compared (see also Part 2).
The behaviour and significance of radionuclides in ecosystems (radioecology) are briefly illustrated (see also Part 2).
Land-based nuclear power stations and nuclear-powered ships and submarine are identified as the mayor potential accident hazards to agriculture or fisheries under peacetime conditions.
"Chernobyl" has high-lighted several problems of concern to FAO and her member states. To ensure the protection of human health serious constraints were imposed by national authorities upon agricultural practices, harvest and movement of crops and livestock in many countries across Europe with adverse financial and psychological problems for the dependent communities concerned. These consequences had been largely unforeseen or prepared for.
There is scope for the development of more effective anticipatory, protective, and countermeasures for agriculture, etc. and for their dependent communities in the event of a possible mayor radioactive release in future. Likewise, for international guidelines for insurance and compensation. There is also scope for improved international harmonization of guidelines, terminology, and acceptability of post-accident food and feed moving internationally.
In connexion with the behaviour of radioactive fallout from 'Chernobyl' over agriculture, forestry, and fisheries further years of study and data collection may be needed before a full and balanced appraisal will become possible (see also Part 2).
Finally, "Chernobyl" has not affected the international priorities implied by the statement attributed to Soviet Academician Velikhov at a U.N. Conference in Vienna in 1979 - "people should worry about the bombs, not power stations" (134).