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4. 1. Bangladesh: The rodent control campaigns


4.1.1 Evaluation methods
4.1.2 Evaluation results
4.1.3 Costs and benefits of the campaigns


In 1983 and 1984, the Bangladesh's Department of Agricultural Extension (DOAE) in collaboration with Bangladesh-German Plant Protection Programme (BGPPP) and FAO/UNDP project (BGD/79/034), which provided the technical assistance, launched two nation-wide Rodent Control Campaign programmes. The 1983 Campaign was aimed at wheat farmers and its general objective was to increase their rat control practice from 10 percent to 25 percent in one year. The decision to focus the campaign on wheat crop was due to the higher rat-related damage in wheat fields as compared to other crops. In addition, wheat has become an increasingly important food crop in Bangladesh, earning it a high priority in agricultural policy and production. The Campaign was conducted during the winter crop season (Jan.-March, 1983). It covered 11 districts as its primary target area, which accounted for about 91 percent (1,500 acres) of the total wheat acreage, and about 90.7 percent of the total wheat production in Bangladesh. Due to some political considerations (i.e., "equity" issue, etc.), the other 10 districts in the country were considered as a "secondary" target area of the campaign. However, only minimal campaign inputs were provided to these "secondary" districts, and for evaluation purposes it could thus be considered as a "control" group.

The campaign's target beneficiaries were segmented according to their levels of knowledge, attitudes and practices concerning rat control. Positioning of motivational messages included the use of various appeals such as religious incentive, fear arousal, guilt feeling, as well as a ridicule appeal that served as a discussion point. The multi-media strategy plan for the 1983 Campaign is shown in Figure 4-2. Radio and posters were used to provide general information and motivational messages. Extensive training sessions were conducted to motivate and educate campaign workers on their specific tasks before the campaign. Interpersonal support was provided by extension workers who conducted small group discussions, field demonstrations and farmers training sessions. Teachers, school dren and agricultural supply/inputs retailers were involved to augment the extension workers. For example, comics were distributed through rural schools by teachers and were taken home by school children to discuss with their parents, most of whom are illiterate. This component was complemented by an essay contest for school children whose topic was "My Parents' Problems and Experience in Fighting Rats". Family and/or community level discussion was generated as rural school children had to consult the rat problem issue with their parents to enable them to write the essay. Figure 4-3a shows the complete campaign inputs.

FIGURE 4-2 Strategic Multi-Media Plan of the 1983 Rat Control Campaign

FIGURE 4-3a

Various Inputs into the 1983 Campaign

Districts

Mass Communication Inputs

Motivational Posters

Instructional Posters

Comic Sheets

Leaflets

Radio

Television

Newspapers/Magazines

Primary Targets (11 districts)

15,000 copies

15,000 copies

375,000 copies

100,000 copies

87.5 minutes scheduled air time (20 different programmes) and news reports

21 minutes scheduled air time (spread over 7 days) and news reports

Features, news reports and 4 advertisements on essay competition

Secondary Targets (10 districts)

10,000 copies

-

-

15,000 copies

Unplanned, but possible spill-over effects

Unplanned, but possible spill-over effects

Unplanned, but possible spill-over effects

Districts

Personal Communication/Influence Inputs

Special Events

Technology Inputs

Extension workers

School children's parents

Community/Local leaders

Pesticide/Seed dealers

Pesticide/Seed clients

Campaign inauguration ceremony

Essay competition for school children

Extension workers

Commercial retail outlets/ pesticides or seed dealers

Primary Targets (11 districts)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

At national, districts and upazila levels

At national, districts, upazila and union levels

80,000 packets

At least 140,000 packets

Secondary Targets (10 districts)

Unplanned, but possible

-

-

-

-

-

Unplanned, but possible spill-over (due to newspaper advertisements)

-

Not monitored, but possible spill-over effects

FIGURE 4-3b

Costs of the 1983 Campaign

Expenses for

Taka

%

Design, development and production of printed materials (including paper)

204,187

59

Newspaper advertisements

5,850

2

Campaign inauguration ceremony (national level)

18,000

5

Campaign inauguration ceremonies (district and upazila levels)

41,800

12

Incentives for essay competition

34,650

10

Distribution of campaign materials

6,000

2

Evaluation studies

33,000

10

Miscellaneous

4,700

1

Total

Taka

348,187


(US $ 17,409 equiv.)

Note: 20 Taka = US $ 1 (1983 exchange rate)

Extension campaign planning and pretesting of materials sessions

Samples of the Bangladesh rat control campaign printed materials

Motivational poster

Instructional poster

Comic sheet

Motivational Poster

Logo before pre-testing

Logo after pre-testing

Encouraged by the 1983 Campaign results, DOAE repeated the Campaign in 1984. Its scope was expanded to reach all farmers, thus not limited to wheat farmers. While the 1983 campaign succeeded in increasing the number of farmers who practice rat control, evaluation data indicated that the increase was accounted mainly by large farmers (cultivating more than 5 acres) and medium farmers (with 2 to 5 acres of land). The 1984 Campaign was thus to give special emphasis on reaching small farmers, and minimize the campaign "drop-outs" rate (farmers who discontinued practicing rat control).

4.1.1 Evaluation methods

As shown in Figure 4-4, three types of evaluation studies were employed to assess the Campaigns' performance and effectiveness: (a) Management Monitoring Survey (MMS), (b) Information Recall & Impact Survey (IRIS), and (c) Field Damage Assessment Survey (FDAS).

The purpose of a Management Monitoring Survey (MMS) is to spot check whether a campaign strategy plan has been properly followed during implementation. It also investigates if the required inputs to support campaign activities have been made available and delivered as planned. MMS is useful in identifying management or implementation problems, and in analyzing alternative solutions or strategy changes which might be needed to improve campaign implementation before an activity is completed. In addition, MMS findings can help in validating the conclusion of an impact evaluation or information recall survey. For in stance, in the 1983 Campaign, the IRIS found that comics were rarely cited by survey respondents as one of the sources of rat control information. However, MMS findings indicated that there was a problem in comics distribution. Therefore, it could be argued that the failure of comics as a campaign information source was primarily due to a management problem, and not necessarily due to a problem of message design or medium-selection strategy.

The Field Damage Assessment Survey (FDAS) is a means to assess the degree of damage caused by rats in a given area, and to determine the type/method used by farmers to control the extent of such a damage. The FDAS results, together with answers from farmers' interviews regarding the type of control method utilized, permit a comparison to be made of the relative efficiency of different control methods. Information on field damage reduction can be used to estimate the economic savings due to improved efficiency of rat control applications, and to measure the costs and benefits of campaign activities.

FIGURE 4-4

Evaluation Procedures of 1983 and 1984 Campaigns

Year

Type of evaluation

Timing (after campaign started)

Survey coverage

Location

1983

1. Management Monitoring Survey (MMS)

2 to 3 weeks

10 district officers
29 upazila officers
43 union officers
305 farmers

10 primary districts only

2. Field Damage Assessment Survey (FDAS)

2 months

851 plots (266 acres)

7 primary and 3 secondary districts

3. Information Recall and Impact Survey (IRIS)

2 to 3 months

1,149 wheat farmers

6 primary (775 farmers) and 3 secondary (374 farmers) districts

1984

1. Management Monitoring Survey (MMS)

2 to 3 weeks

12 district officers
31 upazila officers
62 union officers
94 block supervisors

12 districts

2. Field Damage Assessment Survey (FDAS)

2 months

866 plots (269 acres)

10 districts

3. Information Recall and Impact Survey (IRIS)

2 to 3 months

1,089 farmers

9 districts

The Information Recall & Impact Survey (IRIS) is one of the most common evaluation tools used to examine the effectiveness of an extension or public education intervention programme such as a campaign. One of its purposes is to assess how campaign messages have been perceived, understood or accepted by target beneficiaries. Another important purpose is to determine whether target beneficiaries' levels of knowledge, attitude and practice regarding the campaign suggestions have changed as compared to their pre-campaign levels.

4.1.2 Evaluation results

As can be seen from Figures 4-5a to 4-5d, evaluation findings indicated that the 1983 Campaign was successful in increasing the proportion of wheat farmers who conducted rat control. About 32 percent of wheat farmers in the survey reported to have practiced rat control compared with only 10 percent before the campaign commenced (Fig. 4-5a). Although the 1983 Campaign was focused on rat control for wheat farmers, a limited spill-over effect, was also noted among non-wheat farmers. Such a marginal increase from 45 percent to 49 percent among all farmers (Fig. 4-5b), however, was not surprising, as the 1983 campaign was mainly designed to benefit wheat farmers.

After the 1984 Campaign, 67 percent of all farmers surveyed (including wheat farmers) reported to have practiced rat control as compared with 49 percent before the campaign (Fig. 4-5b). Among wheat farmers, rat control practice increased from 32 percent in 1983 to 40 percent in 1984 (Fig. 4-5a). Since the 1984 Campaign was aimed at all types of farmers, a more substantial increase in rat control practice was noted among those farmers as compared to the increase among wheat farmers only. Such a case was expected, since most wheat farmers might already have been practicing rat control as a result of the 1983 Campaign. Moreover, the 1984 Campaign was not specifically aimed at wheat farmers, but at all farmers. It was thus not surprising that the 1984 Campaign effects were more noticeable among all farmers as a group than just among the wheat farmers.

During the 1983 Campaign, the 11 wheat-growing districts (referred to as primary districts) were given more-intensive campaign treatment (i.e., information exposure) as compared with the remaining 10 non-wheat-growing districts (or secondary districts). As expected, the 1983 Campaign was more effective in increasing rat control practice among farmers in primary districts from 9 percent before the campaign to 33 percent after the campaign (Fig. 4-5c). In the secondary districts, it only increased from 14 percent to 29 percent. The data also showed that rat control prior to the 1983 Campaign was practiced more in non-wheat-growing districts than in wheat-growing districts. The 1983 Campaign strategy of positioning campaign messages to wheat farmers as the primary target beneficiaries was thus appropriate and successful in increasing rat control practice among these farmers.

As shown in Figure 4-5d, the 1983 Campaign was more successful in increasing rat control practice among large farmers (with more than 5 acres of land), and to a small extent, among medium farmers (with 2-5 acres of land). No increase was noted among small farmers (with less than 2 acres). The 1983 Campaign appeared to have widened the rat control practice gap between small farmers and large or medium farmers which was only 6 percent before the campaign. After the campaign, the gap widened to 17 percent between the small and the large farmers, and to 8 percent between the small and the medium farmers. Likewise, the gap also widened between medium and large farmers, from 0 percent to 9 percent (Fig.4-5d).

In recognition of such problems, the 1984 Campaign devised additional strategies for narrowing the campaign effects gap between small farmers and large or medium farmers. Among others, message "redundancy" and/or "ceiling-effects" strategies were used. These strategies seemed to have worked quite satisfactorily, as indicated in the results of the 1984 Campaign. For instance, rat control practice among small farmers was reported to have increased considerably, from 41 percent to 63 percent after the 1984 Campaign. Among the large farmers, the increase (14 percent) was significantly less than that of the small farmers (22 percent).

FIGURE 4-5a Percentage of Adoption of Rat Control Practices by Wheat Farmers on Wheat Fields Only

FIGURE 4-5b Percentage of Adoption of Rat Control Practices by All Farmers in All Locations

FIGURE 4-5c Percentage of Adoption of Rat Control Practices by Wheat Farmers on Wheat Fields Primary and Secondary Districts

FIGURE 4-5d Percentage of Adoption of Rat Control Practices by Large, Medium and Small Farmers in All Locations

The 1984 Campaign was able to increase the number of farmers who practiced rat control and to reduce the widening gap created during the 1983 Campaign between large and small farmers in terms of rat control practice. Nevertheless, such a gap after the 1984 Campaign (9 percent) was still wider than before the 1983 Campaign (6 percent). This gap may have been due not only to socioeconomic disadvantages accruing to small farmers, but perhaps also because the adoption of rat control practices depends on the extent of rat problems they faced. Farmers who own or cultivate large parcels of land are likely to have more rat problems than do small farmers. Thus the need for rat control is felt more keenly among large farmers than small farmers.


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