3.1. National Agricultural Research Systems
3.2. Private Sector Research
3.3. The IARCs
West African NARS have grown substantially since 1980 (Table 2). The 17 countries now spend more of their agricultural GDP on research, have more PhDs and other graduate degree holders, and manage larger and better facilities (stations, labs, vehicles, information management and communications). In seven of the eight largest countries (no information is available on Cameroon) the number of scientists per farmer has grown at least 17% with an average growth of 28%. Some programs (eg, Mali, Senegal, Niger, Nigeria) have recently reorganized and decentralized in an effort to lower management costs.
West African research investment is still unsatisfactory. Spending is less than that of competing countries in such key import substitutes as rice, maize, and sugarcane; livestock and perennial crop exports (coffee, cocoa, oil palm, rubber, pineapples, fruits), and annual crop exports (cotton, groundnut, vegetables). Funding depends excessively on foreign donors. One cost of expansion has been a decline in operational funding per scientist with detrimental effect on the rate of capacity utilization of trained personnel in research.
TABLE 2: Salient Features of the NARS in West Africa in 1990
|
Country
|
National Agricultural Scientists |
Foreign Agricultural Scientists |
Scientists per million farmers
|
Spending Total
|
Operating/scientist
|
||
|
All |
Agronomists |
All |
Agronomists |
||||
|
(1) |
(2) |
(3) |
(4) |
(5) |
(6) |
(7) |
|
|
Burkina Faso |
73.0 |
15 |
18 |
1 |
22% |
7.6 |
46.0 |
|
Chad |
33.0 |
n.a. |
26 |
n.a. |
|
7.1 |
n.a. |
|
Côte d'Ivoire |
246.8 |
n.a. |
104 |
n.a. |
23% |
36.3 |
131.0 |
|
Gambia |
41.0 |
23 |
n.a. |
n.a. |
|
n.a. |
n.a. |
|
Ghana |
235.7 |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
17% |
33.2 |
n.a. |
|
Guinea-Bissau |
19.0 |
5 |
3 |
0 |
|
1.0 |
n.a. |
|
Mali |
198.0 |
55 |
39 |
9 |
37% |
6.0 |
n.a. |
|
Mauritania |
5.0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
|
0.5 |
n.a. |
|
Niger |
37.0 |
11 |
21 |
1 |
52% |
n.a. |
n.a. |
|
Nigeria |
937.9 |
n.a. |
18 |
n.a. |
23% |
89.6 |
94.0 |
|
Senegal |
104.0 |
16 |
35 |
5 |
19% |
|
33.3 |
Note: Information unavailable for Benin, Cameroon, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Togo.Changes in numbers of scientists are ((1986-90) - (1976-80))/(1976-1980)
Source: Data in columns (1)-(4), (6), and (7) for Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritani, Niger, Senegal in 1990 are from Weijenberg et al, 1993, pp. 71-88
Data in column (5) for Mali from Mazzucato, 1994b, p. 9; for Senegal from Mazzucato and Ly, 1994, p.9;
for Niger from Mazzucato and Ly, 1993, p.8; for Côte d'Ivoire from Roseboom and Pardey, 1994, p. 10;
for Nigeria from Roseboom et al, 1994, p. 17; for Ghana from Roseboom and Pardey, 1994, p. 10; for Burkina Faso from Mazzucato, 1994a, p. 10.Data in columns (1)-(7) for Côte d'Ivoire in 1986-90 are from Roseboom and Pardey, 1994, p.10.
Data in columns (1)-(7) for Nigeria in 1986-90 are from Roseboom, Beintema, Pardey and Oyedipe, 1994, pp. 17-18.
ISNAR has provided more detail on Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal which are the major programs in the region. The ISNAR data do not give the precise share of basic research in the major countries, but it is clear that it is very small. Panel interviews with NARS staff in eight countries also indicate that they do little, if any, basic and strategic research. The ISNAR statistical briefs report subsector shares of research as follows: crops, 44.2%; livestock, 18.9%; forestry, 6.9%; fisheries, 8.1%; natural resources, 4.5%; other (including post-harvest and economics), 17.3%. It is not possible to determine the commodity or ecoregional focus of the major NARS from available information.
Problems with effective public research in the independent NARS. The return to additional investment on food crops has been poor since independence after 1958. Technologies from national research - planting materials, crop and land management practices, fertilizer and pest control recommendations, forage crops, livestock breeds and animal management practices-are not widely used. Examples of research failures are noted in Matlon (1985) for millet and sorghum in the semiarid zone; McIntire, Bourzat, and Pingali (1992) for crop and livestock technology in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria; IITA (1992) for sole crop cowpea and sorghum in northern Nigeria. Exceptions are modem varieties of mangrove rice in Sierra Leone and Guinea (Zinnah et al, 1993), the replacement of traditional floating rices in the Niger Delta of Mali by modem rice varieties (McIntire, 1980), the Florido yam cultivar in Côte d'Ivoire (personal communication of Dr Sekou Doumbia) maize cultivars in Mali, and cowpea in Senegal (Oehmke and Crawford, 1992). The basic explanation for low and inconsistent impact is historical underinvestment in staff and in the financial resources that would allow national staff to use their skills, compounded by the weaknesses of the national extension services.
The national programs have often been poorly managed in addition to lacking qualified staff and operational funds. There is excessive bureaucracy, little scientific autonomy, weak accountability, and poor incentives for good science. The national programs concentrate on crops, not on livestock or forestry, and rarely consider the interactions among system components that are prominent features of regional farming systems.
To summarize, the national programs have not produced widely applicable results. However, at least six (Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina, Niger, Mali, Senegal) have become much stronger in capacity since the late 1970s. While the research output in those countries is still behind their research capacity, they might soon produce useful results despite various growing pains. A group of small countries (Mauritania, the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Togo, Benin, and Chad) - has little capacity to do independent work. Nigeria is unique. Both the small countries and Nigeria present special challenges to the IARCs and these are discussed immediately below.
West Africa is one of five regions in the world with many small national programs. Gilbert et al (1992) have discussed the problem of small NARS, including those of Mauritania, the Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Togo, Benin, and Chad. In addition to the defining criterion of size Gilbert identified lack of a core institution, vulnerability to external influence, instability, "narrow scientific base and isolation" as particular afflictions. Those programs illustrate the kinds of institutional problems that most IARCs, with the exception of ISNAR, cannot deal with efficiently. Benin is the only country in the group with a significant Center presence; the others have one or two IARC scientists and limited other collaboration.
The IARCs alone obviously cannot provide a solution to the institutional and scientific problems of these countries. Where selected national capacities in large or small countries - e.g. in farming systems research - are not strong, the Centers can provide assistance. But where national institutions are so weak as to be almost completely ineffective - as is the case of practically all the countries in this group - then the basis of a sustainable solution is to have a focussed bilateral project, tied to a foreign university because of the importance of adequate academic training in developing national capacity, that seeks to create a core national institution. The reason that a Center should not be the lead institution is that the size of the required commitment is so great as to detract from Center efforts in other countries of the region. The IARCs would complement this effort where they have a comparative advantage in doing so, but would not be the leading institution because of the size and duration of the necessary commitments. It should be apparent that this recommendation does not exclude direct collaboration by many different means between IARC scientists and colleagues in small national programs and that it sees a strong role for non-CGIAR regional organizations in assisting the small countries.
In 1992, Nigeria absorbed 56 percent of IARC resources in West Africa, an increase from the 23 percent of 1986. This change reflects the closing of the IITA bilateral program in the Cameroon (16.5 % in 1986 and 2.4 % in 1992) and the Nigerian devaluations beginning in November, 1986.
Nigeria has 54% of the region's population, 46% of its cropped area, more-than three quarters of its irrigated cropland and uses 70% of the mineral fertilizer (Table 1). It is the region's social and intellectual leader, the major market and will eventually be the pole of economic growth. Its research problems are of unique importance. Nigerian agriculture represents the main ecoregions, crops, and farming systems. It is the world's leading producer of cowpea and yam. The variability in its farming systems - crop type, prevalence of irrigation, the variety of intercropping, disease and pest pressure, population density, mechanization, and fertility management - make the country an uncommonly rich site. Nigerian research has produced useful knowledge on many topics and the national program, despite its current dilapidation, is still a strong partner.
The political and economic difficulties of Nigeria have retarded the evolution of research in West Africa. Had Nigeria grown more rapidly, it is likely that it would now produce world class research and be the regional pole on yam, cowpea, and production systems management, at the least. That it has not done so has swollen the Center's overall effort in the region and maintained it in areas that might otherwise have been devolved.
Nigeria's agricultural, economic, and political importance lead the Panel to conclude that the Centers' focus on it is appropriate and has to continue. The short-term aspects of the work should be the subject of constant internal review in the major Centers, but the country's long-term importance is undeniable.
We note that the argument that Nigeria is too expensive is dated. Nigeria was much cheaper than the CFA countries before the devaluation of the CFA in January 1994. The IITA MTP (IITA 1992, p. 102) reported that costs per position at Mbalmayo were 48% more expensive than those at Kano. The Panel's estimate of the difference after the devaluation is 23% in view of the dollar and local currency fractions in costs and the local currency cost increases expected by the Centers. Nigerian costs are expected to be less than in non-African Centers; The CGIAR Secretariat informed the Panel that IITA's unit dollar costs (consisting mainly of Nigeria) decreased 31 % from 1988 through 1992, compared to a decrease of 7.4% for ICRISAT and to increases of 44.8%, 29.4% and 11.6 % for CIMMYT, IRRI, and all Centers, respectively.
The Panel perceives two chief weaknesses in the IARC effort in Nigeria. First, IFPRI has neglected Nigeria. There have been IFPRI farm or consumer surveys in Niger, the Gambia, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Rwanda, but the only research on Nigeria has been aggregate analysis of trade and fertilizer policy, and a paper on growth linkages that is more than a decade old. The Panel recognizes the difficulties of working in Nigeria, but notes that IITA, ILCA, and ICRISAT have surmounted those difficulties. The Panel recommends that IFPRI develop a permanent presence of two staff in Nigeria, preferably at Kano or Ibadan, with the staff having suitable close links to the major Nigerian universities like the ones that IITA and ICRISAT have. One of those staff would be the regional director of a joint social sciences program across all Centers working in West Africa (section 4.6).
Second, the ILCA presence in Nigeria has recently weakened. Given the importance of ruminant livestock in most Nigerian farming systems, and the complex interactions among crops, animals, pastures, and trees, research on animal agriculture is necessary to raise productivity. Though Nigerian scientists should be able to supply much of this research there will be a significant international component. The ILCA program in Nigeria has been unable to provide it in the past because of the neglect of senior management and now because of the uncertainty concerning management, staff, and resources of ILRI. The Panel recommends that: (i) the ILCA Kaduna program be transferred to Ibadan in order to give adequate size and stability to international livestock research in Nigeria; and (ii) ILRI commit itself to a long-term, stable, substantial (at least 5 principal staff) group working in close collaboration with IITA and ICRAF at Ibadan.
The Centers' efforts in West Africa conform in principle to the traditional division of labor between the public and private sectors in agricultural research and extension. The Centers recognize the primacy of the private sector in transferring profitable technologies where the value added of incremental research is low and in generating technologies where the value added of research is appropriable by private agents. Accordingly, they do little on patentable innovations, such as machines, tools, and specialized livestock. They do some work on hybrids (maize and sorghum), but little compared to varieties (millet, sorghum, maize, rice, cowpea, groundnut and others) or vegetatively propagated crops 3.
3 Other hybridizable crops of importance in West Africa, such as oilpalm and vegetables, are outside the Centers' mandates.
Do feasible private alternatives now exist to compensate for the lack of effective public agricultural research? Are these alternatives likely to assist growth much in the near term? Would these alternatives indicate any change in the role of the Centers?
Natural intensification and farmer experimentation. An important alternative is the natural process of intensification and farmer experimentation with novel practices in adopting new crops, animals, and farming methods. In West Africa, this has been a major form of technology generation and transfer in perennial and semiperennial crops (coffee, cocoa, oilpalm, cassava), annual crops (maize, cotton and groundnut), trypanotolerant livestock (N'Dama and Baoule cattle), processed livestock feeds (oil cakes and molasses in many countries), and mechanization (hand tools, grain mills, oil presses, animal traction). While this experimentation is valuable, some of its stimulus to growth is already spent (e.g., the introduction of novel rainfed crops) or will simply stimulate extension of agriculture onto new land (e.g., mechanization and trypanotolerant livestock) without necessarily raising yields. Natural intensification is likely to continue, but as a complement for public research, not as a substitute.
Organized Private Research. Panel observations and other evidence indicate that private research whether foreign or domestic, is now negligible. There is some research embodied in farm inputs, such as veterinary drugs. Other inputs with research content are fertilizer, pesticide, and machinery use (including tools drawn by animals) in which applicability, rates, timing, and other recommendations to farmers reflect information derived from public research done in national programs or in their colonial antecedents. Private research cannot dramatically assist agricultural growth in the near term without improbably large new investments.
Barriers to International Trade in Agricultural Technology. The weakness of private sector research in West Africa is due in part to public policy. David Gisselquist's research on policy barriers to international trade affecting private generation and transfer of agricultural technology has important implications for the IARCs because it dulls the traditional public/private division of labor (Gisselquist, 1992).
Gisselquist observed that many countries interfere with the private generation and transfer of agricultural technology by excluding imported inputs, failing to defend intellectual property, setting up nettlesome standardization requirements, and restricting domestic and foreign movement of even simple innovations. He argued that such barriers:
slow the transfer of finished technologies, such as seeds, machines, fertilizers and other chemicals, and irrigation equipment across farming situations;
His general conclusion is that elimination of those barriers would accelerate agricultural growth without additional research, public or private. These findings are highly relevant to West Africa. We make the following recommendations based on them.
The IARCs spent in 1992 some US$55 million on about 2,157 senior-staff months (SSM) in West Africa. Of the total SSM, roughly half was at IITA, 14% at ICRISAT, and nearly 11% at WARDA. While practically all IARCs are active in West Africa, 80% of the spending (Table 3) was in only four Centers: IITA (40.9%), ICRISAT (17.0%), WARDA (13.0%), and ILCA (8.9%).
The 1992 breakdown in SSM by CGIAR activity category (Table 4) is: 1) natural resources, 20.3%; 2) germplasm enhancement and breeding, 22.0%; 3) production systems and management, 35.1%; 4) public policy and management, 3.6%; and 5) institution building, 19.0% (Table 3). Those are substantial changes from 1986 (Table 5) when the breakdown was: 1) 13.5%; 2) 19.8%; 3) 49.3%; 4) 7.7%; and 5) 9.7%. The IARCs have also become more centralized since 1986, though this is perhaps transitory; we cannot necessarily infer that greater centralization means coverage of fewer ecoregions and fewer farming systems.
What does the Impact Study (Jahnke et al, 1985, nine country studies and other relevant thematic chapters) teach us about feasible and efficient reforms in CGIAR commitments in Africa?
The Impact Study found the production effect of agricultural research in Sub-Saharan Africa to have been weak. It concluded "that the discussion of center impacts on agricultural production in tropical Africa cannot focus on any obvious success stories (p. 118)". It did observe that: (i) that many "varieties released... can be related to center material (cassava, cowpea, millet, pigeon pea, and potato)" (p. 118); (ii) benefits from IITA work in Nigeria on farming systems with intercropping and "the identification of herbicides, insecticides, and fungicides" for the farming systems (p. 119); (iii) animal production innovations such as artificial insemination, pasture species, and pasture seeding techniques; (iv) cassava varieties and the yam minisett technique; (v) hybrids and improved open-pollinated varieties of maize; and (vi) better rice and sorghum cultivars. Some impacts have not been confirmed subsequently, notably those of millet cultivars, intercropping research, animal production innovations, and sorghum cultivars.
TABLE 3: African, West African, and Worldwide Allocations of IARCs, 1992
|
Center |
Total |
SSA |
% SSA in total |
West Africa |
% share of SSA |
% share of West Africa total |
|
CIAT |
27.1 |
5.7 |
21.0% |
0.4 |
1.5% |
0.7% |
|
CIMMYT |
28.4 |
5.1 |
18.0% |
0.6 |
2.1% |
1.1% |
|
CIP |
16.1 |
3.1 |
19.3% |
1.8 |
11.2% |
3.3% |
|
ICLARM |
4.2 |
0.4 |
9.5% |
0.2 |
4.8% |
0.4% |
|
ICRAF |
11.8 |
11.6 |
98.3% |
1.6 |
13.6% |
2.9% |
|
ICRISAT |
27.3 |
12.2 |
44.7% |
9.4 |
34.4% |
17.0% |
|
IFPRI |
9.6 |
3.9 |
40.6% |
2.4 |
25.0% |
4.3% |
|
IIMI |
6.7 |
0.7 |
10.4% |
0.9 |
13.4% |
1.6% |
|
IITA |
22.7 |
22.7 |
100.0% |
22.6 |
99.6% |
40.9% |
|
ILCA |
19.0 |
14.3 |
75.3% |
4.9 |
25.8% |
8.9% |
|
ILRAD |
13.7 |
7.3 |
53.3% |
0.2 |
1.5% |
0.4% |
|
INIBAP |
2.5 |
0.9 |
36.0% |
0.4 |
16.0% |
0.7% |
|
IPGRI |
8.2 |
2.2 |
26.8% |
0.4 |
4.9% |
0.7% |
|
IRRI |
28.8 |
1.2 |
4.2% |
0.8 |
2.8% |
1.4% |
|
ISNAR |
7.1 |
2.8 |
39.4% |
1.4 |
19.7% |
2.5% |
|
WARDA |
6.3 |
6.3 |
100.0% |
7.2 |
114.3% |
13.0% |
|
Total |
239.5 |
100.4 |
41.9% |
55.2 |
23.0% |
100.0% |
Source: Desk Study, p. 27.
TABLE 4: Activities of Major CGIAR Centres in West Africa, 1992 (Senior Staff-Months)
CGIAR ACTIVITY CATEGORY
|
Country |
Conservation and management of natural resources |
Germplasm enhancement and breeding |
Production systems and management |
Economics and public policy |
Institution building |
Total |
% of AEZ |
% of West Africa |
|
|
HUMID LOWLANDS (HULWA) |
|||||||||
|
|
Benin |
24.0 |
|
60.0 |
|
|
84.0 |
8.8% |
6.5% |
|
Cameroon |
30.0 |
|
|
|
|
30.0 |
3.1% |
2.3% |
|
|
Ghana |
|
|
|
|
12.0 |
12.0 |
1.3% |
0.9% |
|
|
Côte d'Ivoire |
10.8 |
25.9 |
38.4 |
4.9 |
36.0 |
116.0 |
12.1% |
8.9% |
|
|
Nigeria |
107.9 |
192.7 |
244.0 |
13.5 |
146.1 |
704.2 |
73.5% |
54.2% |
|
|
Sierra Leone |
1.8 |
4.3 |
5.2 |
0.7 |
|
12.0 |
1.3% |
0.9% |
|
|
Sub-total |
174.5 |
222.9 |
347.6 |
19.1 |
194.1 |
958.2 |
1.0 |
0.7 |
|
|
% of HULWA |
18.2% |
23.3% |
36.3% |
2.0% |
20.3% |
100.0% |
|
n.a. |
|
|
% of West Africa total |
13.4% |
17.1% |
26.7% |
1.5% |
14.9% |
73.7% |
|
|
|
|
SEMIARID LOWLANDS (SALWA) |
|||||||||
|
|
Burkina Faso |
|
|
12.0 |
|
|
12.0 |
3.5% |
0.9% |
|
Gambia |
|
|
2.2 |
0.9 |
|
3.1 |
0.9% |
0.2% |
|
|
Mali |
36.7 |
8.4 |
6.0 |
12.0 |
18.4 |
81.5 |
23.9% |
6.3% |
|
|
Niger |
49.2 |
45.8 |
77.7 |
14.0 |
34.4 |
221.1 |
64.7% |
17.0% |
|
|
Senegal |
3.6 |
8.6 |
10.4 |
1.4 |
|
24.0 |
7.0% |
1.8% |
|
|
Sub-total |
89.5 |
62.8 |
108.3 |
28.3 |
52.8 |
341.7 |
100.0% |
26.3% |
|
|
% of SALWA |
26.2% |
18.4% |
31.7% |
8.3% |
15.5% |
100.0% |
|
n.a. |
|
|
% of West Africa total |
6.9% |
4.8% |
8.3% |
2.2% |
4.1% |
26.3% |
|
|
|
|
TOTAL |
264.0 |
285.7 |
455.9 |
47.4 |
246.9 |
1,299.9 |
|
n.a. |
|
|
% of WA |
20.3% |
22.0% |
35.1% |
3.6% |
19.0% |
100.0% |
|
n.a. |
|
Source: Desk Study, Table 3a.
TABLE 5: Activities of Major CGIAR Centres in West Africa, 1986 (Senior Staff - Months)
CGIAR ACTIVITY CATEGORY
|
Country |
Conservation and management of natural resources |
Germplasm enhancement and breeding |
Production systems and management |
Economics and public policy |
Institution building |
Total |
|
|
HUMID LOWLANDS (HULWA) |
|||||||
|
|
Benin |
8.3 |
4.0 |
6.5 |
0.2 |
9.1 |
28.0 |
|
Cameroon |
13.8 |
107.8 |
140.8 |
12.9 |
29.1 |
304.4 |
|
|
Ghana |
15.6 |
53.1 |
54.4 |
7.4 |
44.3 |
174.7 |
|
|
Côte d'Ivoire |
39.3 |
8.0 |
82.9 |
18.3 |
6.2 |
154.7 |
|
|
Nigeria |
37.6 |
99.3 |
202.2 |
29.3 |
60.5 |
428.8 |
|
|
Sierra Leone |
20.6 |
|
81.1 |
0.5 |
2.7 |
105.0 |
|
|
Sub-total |
135.1 |
272.1 |
568.0 |
68.5 |
151.8 |
1,195.6 |
|
|
% of HULWA |
11.3% |
22.8% |
47.5% |
5.7% |
12.7% |
100.0% |
|
|
% of West Africa total |
7.3% |
14.7% |
30.7% |
3.7% |
8.2% |
64.7% |
|
|
SEMIARID LOWLANDS (SALWA) |
|||||||
|
|
Burkina Faso |
39.7 |
33.8 |
36.6 |
2.6 |
10.8 |
123.5 |
|
Gambia |
1.2 |
6.2 |
75.3 |
35.2 |
1.5 |
119.4 |
|
|
Mali |
14.9 |
11.7 |
99.0 |
0.9 |
7.7 |
134.2 |
|
|
Niger |
23.6 |
27.4 |
46.7 |
13.0 |
1.0 |
111.6 |
|
|
Senegal |
34.8 |
14.0 |
86.5 |
21.6 |
7.3 |
164.2 |
|
|
Sub-total |
114.2 |
93.0 |
344.0 |
73.3 |
28.3 |
652.9 |
|
|
% of SALWA |
17.5% |
14.2% |
52.7% |
11.2% |
4.3% |
100.0% |
|
|
% of West Africa total |
6.2% |
5.0% |
18.6% |
4.0% |
1.5% |
35.3% |
|
|
TOTAL |
249.3 |
365.1 |
912.1 |
141.9 |
180.2 |
1,848.5 |
|
|
% of WA |
13.5% |
19.8% |
49.3% |
7.7% |
9.7% |
100.0% |
|
Source: Desk Study, Table 3B.Note: Data for Guinea, Liberia, Equatorial Guinea, Togo, Chad, Cape Verde and Mauritania have been excluded from the 1986 data because they were unavailable for 1992, reducing the 1986 total by about 8%
TABLE 6: Activities of All CGIAR Centres in West Africa, 1992 (Senior Staff-Months)
CGIAR ACTIVITY CATEGORY
|
Country |
Conservation and management of natural resources |
Germplasm enhancement and breeding |
Production systems and management |
Economics and public policy |
Institution building |
Total |
% of AEZ |
% of West Africa |
|
|
HUMID LOWLANDS (HULWA) |
|||||||||
|
|
Benin |
24.0 |
|
60.0 |
|
|
84.0 |
9.1% |
6.6% |
|
Cameroon |
30.0 |
|
|
|
|
30.0 |
3.2% |
2.4% |
|
|
Ghana |
|
|
|
|
12.0 |
12.0 |
1.3% |
0.9% |
|
|
Côte d'Ivoire |
10.8 |
25.9 |
4.0 |
4.9 |
36.0 |
81.6 |
8.8% |
6.4% |
|
|
Nigeria |
107.9 |
192.7 |
244.0 |
13.5 |
146.1 |
704.2 |
76.2% |
55.6% |
|
|
Sierra Leone |
1.8 |
4.3 |
5.2 |
0.7 |
|
12.0 |
1.3% |
0.9% |
|
|
Sub-total |
174.5 |
222.9 |
313.2 |
19.1 |
194.1 |
923.8 |
100.0% |
73.0% |
|
|
% of HULWA |
18.9% |
24.1% |
33.9% |
2.1% |
21.0% |
100.0% |
|
n.a. |
|
|
% of West Africa total |
13.8% |
17.6% |
24.7% |
1.5% |
15.3% |
73.0% |
|
|
|
|
SEMIARID LOWLANDS (SALWA) |
|||||||||
|
|
Burkina Faso |
|
|
12.0 |
|
|
12.0 |
3.5% |
0.9% |
|
Gambia |
|
|
2.2 |
0.9 |
|
3.1 |
0.9% |
0.2% |
|
|
Mali |
36.7 |
8.4 |
6.0 |
12.0 |
18.4 |
81.5 |
23.9% |
6.4% |
|
|
Niger |
49.2 |
45.8 |
77.7 |
14.0 |
34.4 |
221.1 |
64.7% |
17.5% |
|
|
Senegal |
3.6 |
8.6 |
10.4 |
1.4 |
|
24.0 |
7.0% |
1.9% |
|
|
Sub-total |
89.5 |
62.8 |
108.3 |
28.3 |
52.8 |
341.7 |
100.0% |
27.0% |
|
|
% of SALWA |
26.2% |
18.4% |
31.7% |
8.3% |
15.5% |
100.0% |
|
n.a. |
|
|
% of West Africa total |
7.1% |
5.0% |
8.6% |
2.2% |
4.2% |
27.0% |
|
|
|
|
TOTAL |
264.0 |
285.7 |
421.5 |
47.4 |
246.9 |
1,265.5 |
|
n.a. |
|
|
% of WA |
20.9% |
22.6% |
33.3% |
3.7% |
19.5% |
100.0% |
|
n.a. |
|
TABLE 7: Fixed Assets of the IARCs in West Africa, Net Book Value, 1992 (US$ '000)
CENTERS
|
|
ICRAF |
ICRISAT |
IITA |
ILCA |
WARDA |
OTHER |
Total |
% of AEZ |
% of West Africa |
|
|
HUMID LOWLANDS (HULWA) |
||||||||||
|
By country: |
||||||||||
|
|
Benin |
|
|
4,268 |
|
|
|
4,268 |
9.5% |
6.6% |
|
Cameroon |
118 |
|
962 |
|
|
73 |
1,153 |
2.6% |
1.8% |
|
|
Ghana |
|
|
|
|
|
|
0 |
0.0% |
0.0% |
|
|
Côte d'Ivoire |
|
|
373 |
|
11,158 |
221 |
11,752 |
26.2% |
18.3% |
|
|
Nigeria |
6 |
1,319 |
25,496 |
598 |
39 |
|
27,458 |
61.1% |
42.6% |
|
|
Sierra Leone |
|
|
2 |
|
293 |
|
295 |
0.7% |
0.5% |
|
|
Sub-total |
125 |
1,319 |
31,101 |
598 |
11,490 |
294 |
44,927 |
100.0% |
69.8% |
|
|
% of HULWA |
0.3% |
2.9% |
69.2% |
1.3% |
25.6% |
0.7% |
100.0% |
|
|
|
|
% of West Africa total |
0.2% |
2.0% |
48.3% |
0.9% |
17.3% |
0.5% |
69.8% |
|
|
|
|
By asset category: |
||||||||||
|
|
Buildings/infrastructure |
6 |
|
24,156 |
321 |
8,846 |
47 |
33,376 |
74.3% |
51.8% |
|
Vehicles |
74 |
|
1,278 |
132 |
738 |
111 |
2,333 |
5.2% |
3.6% |
|
|
Farm equipment |
2 |
|
927 |
57 |
660 |
|
1,646 |
3.7% |
2.6% |
|
|
Laboratory equipment |
31 |
|
2,694 |
35 |
813 |
|
3,573 |
8.0% |
5.5% |
|
|
Office equipment |
25 |
|
1,052 |
53 |
|
|
1,130 |
2.5% |
1.8% |
|
|
Housing |
6 |
|
236 |
|
433 |
|
675 |
1.5% |
1.0% |
|
|
SEMIARID LOWLANDS (SALWA) |
||||||||||
|
By country: |
||||||||||
|
|
Burkina Faso |
98 |
|
|
|
|
35 |
133 |
0.7% |
0.2% |
|
Gambia |
|
|
|
|
|
|
0 |
0.0% |
0.0% |
|
|
Mali |
42 |
2,472 |
|
247 |
|
|
2,761 |
14.2% |
4.3% |
|
|
Niger |
29 |
15,966 |
|
164 |
|
14 |
16,173 |
83.1% |
25.1% |
|
|
Senegal |
82 |
|
|
|
251 |
65 |
398 |
2.0% |
0.6% |
|
|
Sub-total |
250 |
18,438 |
0 |
411 |
251 |
114 |
19,465 |
100.0% |
30.2% |
|
|
% of SALWA |
1.3% |
94.7% |
0.0% |
2.1% |
1.3% |
0.6% |
100.0% |
|
|
|
|
% of West Africa total |
0.4% |
28.6% |
0.0% |
0.6% |
0.4% |
0.2% |
30.2% |
|
|
|
|
By asset category: |
||||||||||
|
|
Buildings/infrastructure |
9 |
17,326 |
|
260 |
140 |
|
17,735 |
91.1% |
27.5% |
|
Vehicles |
184 |
187 |
|
19 |
47 |
66 |
503 |
2.6% |
0.8% |
|
|
Farm equipment |
2 |
281 |
|
47 |
12 |
|
342 |
1.8% |
0.5% |
|
|
Laboratory equipment |
3 |
976 |
|
43 |
34 |
26 |
1,082 |
5.6% |
1.7% |
|
|
Office equipment |
52 |
987 |
|
42 |
|
61 |
1,143 |
5.9% |
1.8% |
|
|
Housing |
|
|
|
|
18 |
|
18 |
0.1% |
0.0% |
|
|
TOTAL |
375 |
19,757 |
31,101 |
1,009 |
11,741 |
408 |
64,391 |
|
|
|
|
% of WA |
1% |
31% |
48% |
2% |
18% |
1% |
100% |
|
|
|
Source: Desk Study, Annexes 5 and 6.
Potential impact in West Africa in 1985
The Study described innovations that it believed to have the potential for impact 4. These were: (i) IITA cowpea varieties; (ii) IITA zero tillage practices for the humid zone; (iii) IITA maize varieties resistant to maize streak virus and downy mildew; (iv) IITA cassava clones; (v) IITA biological control of cassava mealybug and green mite; (vi) ICRISAT, new sorghum and millet varieties; and (vii) ILCA, enhanced knowledge of African livestock production systems, addition of forage legumes to farming systems, and crossbred dairy cows.
4 We stress that we are reporting here what Jahnke's study said about the potential for impact to give the accepted 1985 view on the subject. We are not here discussing what the Centers actual impact was in 1985 or now.
Biological control of cassava mealybug (CM) has been profitable and would carry the entire cost of IITA for many years under certain assumptions (Norgaard, 1988) 5. IITA varieties resistant to maize streak virus have had a strong economic impact, as have IITA cassava materials.
5 IITA has now derived better field estimates of the benefits of biological control, that confirm Norgaard's results (Neuenschwander and Hammond, 1989).
A major impact not foreseen in Jahnke's study was scientific impact through publications and training, in which IITA and ICRISAT have been very strong. A strong impact is now visible in ISNAR assistance to national programs, which has helped to improve the political commitment to, and the organization and efficiency of, national research 6.
6 A related benefit will eventually derive from ICRISAT and WARDA application of quantitative economic criteria in research priority setting.
Some projected impacts have not materialized.
Crop improvement. IITA cowpea varieties, of interest in the early 1980s, have not been adopted by farmers and the IITA cowpea program has since been redesigned in consequence (IITA, 1993). ICRISAT sorghum and millet varieties are used on a small area and have produced no major economic benefits in West Africa (ICRISAT, 1992a).
Mechanization and land management. The Impact Study mentioned only zero tillage, on which research has had no measurable effect. Other research initiatives - a sand fighting tool and a wheeled tool carrier in the semiarid tropics, watershed management, strip cropping with Andropogon in dry areas, alley farming, animal traction for valley bottoms-have produced no measured incremental benefits.
Legumes in the farming system. Alley farming, an Asian innovation studied and promoted in Africa by IITA, has not been adopted by farmers (for mulch, fodder, weed control, or labor savings) despite promising experimental evidence and economic analysis indicating that it would be profitable. Fodder banks, which at one time were projected to have economic benefits sufficient to pay for the total cost of the ILCA subhumid zone program in Nigeria, have not been adopted widely in that country (Hassan, 1993).
The Impact Study adduced three general lessons.
The Study argued that several basic changes were needed to have more impact.
7 NARS scientists met by the Panel made the same observation on several occasions.
Are these basic changes really novel and are they likely to have impact?
However, local materials are often of limited potential for crop improvement. For example, the variability in millet cultivars native to western Niger is small.
The Panel argues that the Centers, and other historic or current research, have long put these basic changes into practice or that they are not natural science research issues. This is not to denigrate those changes as sources of gain. It is to say that the gains would now be marginal, do not always require international research, and do not suggest any obvious reforms of the IARCs in West Africa.
Effects of IARC spending on the national programs
One Impact Study paper (Evenson, 1987) asked "whether the CGIAR Centers have influenced the size and character of the national research programs"; and whether CGIAR and national research have had any impact on crop productivity (p. v). He answered these questions with a 25 country sample, of which six are African and Ghana and Nigeria are West African. While his results are somewhat dated (1962-82) and were not derived from a wide sample of West African countries they are relevant because they: (i) include the biggest nation, Nigeria; and (ii) have predictive value about the evolution of NARS-IARCs relations in West Africa based on the experience of Asia and Latin America.
His relevant findings about the first question were: (i) "IARC investment stimulated national research investment in most commodities" (p. 56); (ii) IARC investment stimulated African research on cereals in general and on maize, millets, and sorghum specifically, but reduced it on staples; (iii) some negative effects of IARC investment on national research investment were observed and require further research; (iv) "investment in IARCs stimulates more national system investment than will a comparable amount of direct aid" (p. 57); (v) IARC impacts tended to lower the marginal effect of national research in the same climate, indicating some substitution between IARC and national research; and (vi) IARC results were both substitutes and complements for national research outside the climate of their central location.
Estimated interactions (p. 53) between IARC research and national research were always negative for cereals in general and for maize, millets, and sorghum specifically in Asia and Latin America, while they were positive in both groups of commodities for Africa. This means that interactions between IARC and national research became negative in the more developed low-income countries. It bears the possible implication that the positive marginal effect of the IARCs on African national research in cereals, maize, millets, and sorghum may turn negative as African national programs become stronger 8.
8 Evenson's analysis included none of the francophone countries of West Africa, so it cannot be used to speculate about the effects of CIRAD support to agricultural research there.
His findings about the second question are: (i) IARC investments have been highly productive; (ii) those investments have been more productive than national research; (iii) IARC impacts are greater for countries in the same climate as the IARC central location (p. 55); (iv) IARC research was productive in Africa on maize, millets, and sorghum and on cereal crops in general, though not on staples in general; the latter result is apparently due to lack of impact on cassava and yam (p. 53).
