ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

M.C.W. PINTO

Dr Pinto is Secretary-General of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, The Hague, Netherlands.

In 1971 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a declaration making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. The author points to its ultimate purpose, which is the conclusion of an international agreement on the maintenance of such a zone and its shorter term political aim of focusing attention on the Indian Ocean region. The author refers to the categories of states to which the declaration is addressed and the somewhat fruitless efforts made in the United Nations toward the preparation of an international conference on the Indian Ocean. He goes on to describe the military pressure in the zone exercised by the major military powers which forms the backdrop to the action taken by the countries in the region themselves, parallel to that taken in the United Nations, to bring about demilitarization of the zone.

The author then gives a detailed analysis of the steps leading up to the First Conference on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation in Marine Affairs in the Indian Ocean (known as IOMAC-I), the final ministerial-level phase of which was held in January 1987; the deliberations of the Conference; and the Final Document that was adopted. He points out that despite the defects that are frequently found in instruments negotiated by states pursuing varying policies and goals, the Final Document clearly demonstrates the wish of the participating states to initiate the cooperation envisaged in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and, above all, to take concrete action. The results of IOMAC-I stress the importance of institutions when states carry out activities in cooperation with each other and the urgent need of most states in the region for basic information on marine affairs.

In conclusion, the author states that, in terms of the objectives of IOMAC-I, a modest degree of success may be claimed by the participants, but stresses the need to maintain the momentum and to broaden cooperation to include not only states in the Indian Ocean region but also those that are active in that region.

There are many facets of Jean Carroz for which he will be remembered: his gentle nature, generous and humane, but also just; his sensitivity, expressed so beautifully through his love of the piano and photography; his many professional capacities, effectively disguised under a mild and seemingly unruffled exterior, and attended by a humour that was always benign. But it is the sum of all this in a friendship that survived long separations, that leaves the mind aglow, even when saddened by an end that came so suddenly. This article is an attempt to illustrate one of his many professional concerns.

THE DECLARATION OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A ZONE OF PEACE

At the initiative of Sri Lanka,* later joined by Tanzania, the United Nations General Assembly, at its twenty-sixth regular session in 1971, declared the Indian Ocean "within limits to be determined, together with the air space above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto... for all time... a zone of peace" (A/RES/2832 (XXVI)). While preserving free and unimpeded use of the zone by the vessels, whether military or not, for all nations in accordance with international law, the Declaration called on the "great powers" to halt "further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean", and to eliminate from the Indian Ocean "all bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great power military presence... conceived in the context of great power rivalry". (Operative paragraph 2).

The previous year, at its twenty-fifth anniversary session, the General Assembly had adopted Resolution 2749 (XXV), the Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, which in part called for reservation of the sea-bed beyond national jurisdiction for use "exclusively for peaceful purposes" in accordance with international law, with the Charter of the United Nations, and with a new international regime to be established (paragraphs 4-6 and 8). The General Assembly had, at the same session, by Resolution 2660 (XXV), commended to member states a treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond a 12-mile zone, as defined in Part II of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. The Seabed Declaration, while including reservation for peaceful purposes as an essential principle, was aimed at the establishment of a resource regime, and was unlikely to lead to detailed formulations on "peaceful purposes". The Sea-bed Treaty was, however, in the words of one writer, of low arms control value, in effect binding only the superpowers and permitting "the use of the sea-bed for facilities servicing free-swimming nuclear weapons systems".¹

¹ Goldblatt, J. 1978. The Sea-bed Treaty. In Borgese, E.M. and Ginsburg, N., eds. Ocean Yearbook, 1. Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago. pp. 388-9.

The Peace Zone Declaration, with its roots in the ferment of the sixties that inspired these resolutions, was an initiative of a different order. While directed at ultimately achieving formal international agreement on the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace (paragraph 3(c)), the Declaration was, at least in the medium term, of an essentially political character: it was designed to compel political focus on a region with shared apprehensions regarding its traditional interest to the great powers, and a sense of vulnerability in the context of the latter's global schemes for maintaining a balance of military capability. It would serve as a rallying point, as a regular call to action in the years ahead, as the states of the region grappled with the issues involved in translating the peace zone concept into regulatory norms and rules capable of being administered at the national and international level.

Adopted by the General Assembly by 61 votes in favour with none against, but with some 55 abstentions (including all of the permanent members of the Security Council with the exception of China), the Declaration addresses itself to three categories of states:

(1) the "great powers", a term that must surely subsume the "permanent members of the Security Council", which are, nevertheless, mentioned separately;

(2) the "major maritime users of the Indian Ocean", or those states whose ships or goods frequently traverse the area; and

(3) the "littoral" (perhaps more generally referred to as "coastal") states and the "hinterland" states of the Indian Ocean. The fact that there is a substantial overlap in categories - for example France, in the category of "great power", also claims through its Indian Ocean territories, to be considered a "littoral State", and some littoral states may well be categorized as "major maritime users" - appears to be of little significance. The categories essentially counterpoised to one another are the "great powers", on the one hand, and the "littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean", on the other.

The Declaration makes its fundamental appeal for action to the "great powers" which are required (a) to halt expansion of their "military presence" in the Indian Ocean, and (b) to remove from the area all manifestations of their military rivalry. Such manifestations include fixed elements such as military bases, installations and logistical supply facilities, as well as mobile elements, such as ships and aircraft, to the extent that they maintain a "military presence" and are not merely engaged in transit on their lawful occasions. It is important to note that the Declaration speaks of "military presence", which implies a situation subsisting in time of peace. The Declaration's primary aim is the elimination of any warlike presence in time of peace; the elimination of a menace to the security of a region at peace - the menace of a response to perceived threats from outside the region and unrelated to its communities; a menace that places innocent bystanders at risk and, to that extent, lacks justification on moral or legal grounds; a menace that could contribute to destabilizing or aggravating existing situations in the area, with attendant economic consequences.

The Declaration makes its second, more generalized, appeal at the same time to the "great powers", to the "littoral and hinterland states" and to the "major maritime users"; it calls on all of them to enter into consultations with a view to implementing the Declaration. Implementation of the Declaration is contemplated through the elaboration of an international agreement, which must bring into balance two elements: (1) the prohibition, addressed principally to the great powers, of the use of ships and aircraft against the littoral and hinterland states in contravention of the UN Charter, and (2) the right of ships and aircraft, whether military or other, of all nations, to "free and unimpeded use" of the Indian Ocean and its air space, in accordance with international law.

The Declaration finds a legal basis in the right of the states of the region to take such measures of self-defence as are appropriate in an era when the speed of ships, aircraft and weapons delivery systems make obsolete the rigid adherence to any principle that such measures may only be legitimized in the face of armed attack. It is not open to the usual criticism of such a thesis, since establishment of the peace zone does not itself imply the use of force but, on the contrary, the recognition of an agreed status and procedures negotiated in advance and operated in a spirit of openness and cooperation, with due regard to the legitimate rights of all states in the use of seas beyond national jurisdiction, and the air space above them. The proposal was the result of an early concentration by the non-aligned movement on the military perils of "great power rivalry"; another proposal by Iran and Pakistan claimed that the West and South Asian regions should be nuclear-weapon-free zones; and the countries of ASEAN in 1971 called for recognition of Southeast Asia as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers.

But the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, more specific in its thrust than any similar initiative, called for a firm response from countries with global strategic concerns; and that response was far from encouraging.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PEACE ZONE

The Peace Zone Declaration is directed as much to the "great powers" as to the coastal and hinterland states, and since 1971 the principal forum for concerted action has been the United Nations. The non-aligned countries gave the peace zone concept general support from the outset, as will be seen from the declarations issued every four years by meetings of their heads of state or government.² While many of them, as coastal and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean, maintain close relations with one or other of the great powers, a tilt in one direction or the other does not appear to compromise a country's non-alignment, provided that it is not perceived by the majority of the membership as being overtly partisan in a military sense exclusively in the context of "great power rivalry". The attitudes of the great powers, however, have with few exceptions, ranged between scepticism and scarcely-veiled hostility. At its twenty-seventh regular session in 1972, the General Assembly decided to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean consisting of 15 members (Resolution 2992 (XXVII)). But, while the Ad Hoc Committee has met regularly each year, and while its membership had expanded to 47 states by 1983, the objectives of the original peace zone concept seem as remote as ever.

² See, for example, Political Declaration of the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries, Harare, 1-6 September 1986, section XXI, paras 194-7.

Since the General Assembly's thirty-third session in 1978, the Ad Hoc Committee's efforts have been concentrated on convening a conference of the littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean, as an essential step toward defining responses to various clauses in the Declaration, and determining the feasibility of obtaining commitments worthy of inclusion in an international agreement. At its meeting in 1979, the Ad Hoc Committee reviewed developments since the adoption of the Declaration in 1971, set out seven "Principles of Agreement for the Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace", and outlined steps to be taken to implement the Declaration.³ Having been designated by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session as the "preparatory committee for the convening of a conference", the Ad Hoc Committee continues its efforts toward that end. General Assembly Resolution 38/185, adopted without vote on 20 December 1983, called for "renewal of genuinely constructive efforts through the exercise of the political will necessary for the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration", requested the Ad Hoc Committee to "make decisive efforts in 1984 to complete preparatory work relating to the Conference on the Indian Ocean" with a view to enabling the conference to open in Colombo, in the first half of 1985. At its first session in 1984, the Ad Hoc Committee authorized the Secretariat to prepare draft Rules of Procedure for the conference stipulating, however, that those rules should provide for the taking of decisions by consensus. While agreement on decision-making by consensus may well have eased some of the basic apprehensions of the great powers, and thus enhanced prospects for holding the conference, it may well have diminished the possibility of resolving issues of substance in the foreseeable future. The March 1984 session of the Ad Hoc Committee also received, but did not fully consider, a draft agenda for the conference which was proposed by Sri Lanka on behalf of the non-aligned countries. The proposed agenda called for "Consideration of principal elements of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace", as well as the adoption of "Modalities and Programme of Action for finalizing an international agreement and...other practical measures for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace".

³ United Nations, Official Records: thirty-fourth session, Suppl. No. 45 (A/34/45). The "Principles" covered: (1) Limits of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace; (2) Halting further escalation and expansion and eliminating the military presence of the great powers in the Indian Ocean, conceived in the context of great power rivalry; (3) Elimination of military bases and other military installations of the great powers from the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great power rivalry; (4) Denuclearization of the Indian Ocean in the context of the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace; (5) Non-use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes; (6) Strengthening of international security through regional and other cooperation in the context of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, and (7) Free and unimpeded use of the Indian Ocean zone of peace by the vessels of all nationals in accordance with the norms and principles of international law and custom.

The problems that would confront a conference convened to deal with the "principal elements of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace", are of a formidable order. One can only conjecture at how representatives, with diverse and firmly held positions believed to touch vital security interests, will grapple with the meaning of terms like "bases", "military" and "manifestation of great power military presence...conceived in the context of great power rivalry"; with determining the geographical limits of the Indian Ocean as a peace zone; with satellites as an aspect of "military presence" in the zone; and perhaps, with establishing a system of verification, regarded by many as an essential element of any practical disarmament measure - all with a view to reaching a consensus on the rules to govern the conduct of states in the region.

The most recent resolution, adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-first session in 1986, calls for holding the long-contemplated conference "not later than 1988", and for completion in 1987 of the organizational and substantive aspects of the necessary preparatory work, including the rules of procedure.⁴ The tone of conclusiveness that has characterized UN resolutions on the peace zone in recent years has not been borne out in practice, and it seems unlikely that the terms of this resolution would leave observers any the more sanguine regarding prospects for actually convening the conference.

⁴ Resolution 41/87 of 4 December 1987, operative paragraph 5. See also the report of the First Committee on the item, document A/41/843.

If there was a lack of significant progress at the United Nations, reflected there in an embarrassed ritualization of the demilitarization effort, the actual situation in the Indian Ocean was marked not merely by stagnation, but even by an escalation of "great power rivalry".

MILITARY PRESENCE OF THE GREAT POWERS

A great power would maintain a military presence in the Indian Ocean in time of peace for one or more of the purposes that are now part of the political tradition of such countries: (1) to assure the security of military, commercial or fishing fleets; (2) as a measure of national defence against possible attacks against its territories and associated interests; (3) as a strategic deterrent in relation to other powers competing for military supremacy in the region or globally; (4) as a visual threat or show of force, by way of support for the political penetration of a foreign country, or for the maintenance of hegemony over it; (5) for the gathering - often clandestine - of information relevant to policy decisions concerning the foregoing; and (6) for carrying out scientific research for commercial, military or other purposes. The purpose for which a particular military presence manifests itself at a particular time in the area may well be lost in the convoluted military-bureaucratic processes of the power concerned. The purpose may be publicized - indeed, making the purpose public may well be essential to its achievement, the purpose may remain secret, or the purpose made public may not be the true purpose of the presence. All that the outside world may be certain of is that, in the view of the power concerned, its military presence in the area is necessary for the protection either of its own direct interests, or of the interests of friendly states which it deems essential to protect in order to safeguard its own interests. The peace zone concept which, in essence, is a manifestation of the right of collective self-defence evolving in response to the development of modern weaponry and the complex shifting patterns of derived political tensions, here meets squarely the claim of powers outside the region to defend their own interests which appear to be not the less vital for being far from their shores. The greater the power, the wider the range of its interests and their geographical scope.

The British military presence in the Indian Ocean, by far the most significant for over a century, declined after the Second World War with the diminishing of the Empire and withdrawal from long-held bases such as those in Aden, Colombo and Singapore. A decision by the British labour government in 1968 resulted in a drastic cut-back of its presence in the area so that a naval force that had comprised some 43 ships in 1968 had diminished to 14 by 1981.

The United States presence in the Indian Ocean, however, has shown a steady increase. Under a complex arrangement with the Government of Mauritius, the United Kingdom, by an exchange of letters with the United States in 1976, felt able to grant the latter the right to establish a "naval support facility" on the island of Diego Garcia - currently some 1 300 men at the heart of the Indian Ocean. Talks between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States under President Carter in 1977-8 which were aimed at a staged reduction of their forces in the Indian Ocean, accomplished little and were suspended in February 1978. The increase of Soviet influence in the area through Afghanistan and Ethiopia, and the loss of a military ally following the Islamic revolution in Iran, seemed to call for a consolidation of its own position. According to some sources, the United States currently has military agreements with Pakistan, Oman, Bahrain, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya and South Africa on the western border of the Indian Ocean, and with Australia in the east; the core of United States forces in the Indian Ocean in 1982-83 comprised detachments of its second and seventh fleets, including two aircraft carriers with some 150 combat aircraft; two squadrons of B-52 aircraft cover the Indian Ocean from a base in Darwin, and note has been taken of the presence since the middle of 1980 of Phantom F-4 aircraft at airports in Egypt and Kenya.

According to another source, the United States by 1983/84 had deployed in the Indian Ocean one carrier group (some six surface combatants), nine stores ships, as well as a Middle East force (Bahrain/Gulf) of one command ship and four destroyers/frigates, and a marine amphibious unit comprising four to seven amphibious ships, with a reinforced infantry battalion group including tanks, artillery and a composite air squadron with helicopters and logistics group.

Various motives have been suggested for the presence of the USSR in the Indian Ocean. Some suggest that it perceives the four main entry points to the Indian Ocean, namely, the Suez Canal, the Straits of Malacca, the Australian coast and the South African Cape as being under the influence of the western industrialized countries, intent on maintaining their supplies of oil and raw materials, and therefore feels compelled to react by maintaining a force to protect its own interests in the area. With the nearest home base at Vladivostok some 20 000 km away, the USSR has found it necessary to set up its own network of military agreements in the area. In 1967 the USSR was granted port facilities by Somalia, and in 1969 by the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. In 1970 the USSR was reported to have had three submarines and six surface ships in the area. The conflict which brought Bangladesh into being saw Soviet naval strength increased to some 20 ships, and by the time of the Arab-Israeli war in 1973 to 30 ships. Following reverses in its political fortunes in Egypt and Somalia, its centre of operations shifted to Ethiopia (Dahlak Island). In 1979 and 1980 the strength of its Indian Ocean fleet was augmented by the aircraft carriers Minsk and Kiev and several support vessels which were reported as comprising some 25 military ships (including three to four destroyers, two to three troop carriers and four to five submarines) and a number of scientific research vessels. By 1983/84 the USSR had deployed in the Indian Ocean a detachment of its Pacific fleet providing an average of two to three submarines, eight surface combatants, two amphibious and 12 support ships. In addition, it is said to maintain other forces in the area: 105 000 troops and air and armoured divisions in Afghanistan, and various military personnel in Democratic Yemen (1 500), Ethiopia (2 400), Iraq (2 000), Mali (200), Mozambique (300), Syria (7 000) and the Yemen Arab Republic (500).

While anchoring and food supply facilities are provided by India at Vishakhapatnam, Bombay, Madras and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and by Bangladesh at Chittagong, important Soviet facilities are said to be located in Africa: at Assab and Massawa on the Red Sea in Ethiopia; at Aden and the island of Socotra, 250 km from Capo Guardafui, and thus strategically placed with respect to traffic passing through the Straits of Bab al Mandab; at Nacala, Beira and Maputo in Mozambique; at Mahé in Seychelles; and Port Louis in Mauritius. Madagascar has reportedly permitted the location of three Soviet radar stations on its west coast, and may consider granting other facilities in small islands strategically located in the Mozambique Channel (Europa, Bassas da India, Juan de Nova and Tromelin).

While the interests of France in the Indian Ocean date from colonial times, its concerns today appear to be based primarily on the assessment that the safe transport of 70 percent of Europe's oil depends on the region's stability. With the granting of independence to its Indian Ocean territories, France's military presence has shifted away from Madagascar, Djibouti and the Comoros, and since 1973 has centred on the Island of Réunion. However, some seven treaties of friendship and cooperation with its former colonies permit it to maintain a strategic position with respect to the Straits of Bab al Mandeb as well as in and around the Horn of Africa. In Djibouti alone, France is reported to have deployed two regiments of its land forces, three combat companies, four patrol boats, and two detachments of its air force comprising twelve "F-100", nine "Jaguar" and eleven "Mirage" aircraft. From a relatively modest force of three corvettes, three patrol boats, one troop carrier, one support ship, a tanker, a helicopter carrier and escort ship in 1976, the French military presence in the Indian Ocean is said to have increased to some 20 vessels, including ships equipped with sophisticated missile systems, and some 3 000 men.⁵

⁵ For descriptions of the British, French, US and USSR military presence in the Indian Ocean, see, generally, The Military Balance 1983-4 and subsequent issues of this annual publication, Institute of Strategic Studies, London; KAUFMAN, M. The New York Times, 19, 20 and 21 April 1981; CHAIGNEAU, P. Défense Nationale, vol. 39, April 1983; BARBOZA, V.E.C. 1986. The Development of the Indian Ocean as a Naval Theatre. Naval Forces. Mönch (UK) Ltd, Farnborough, pp. 32-41; The Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: Report on a Workshop organized by the International Peace Academy, Dhaka, 23-25 November 1985, Martinus Nijhoff (1986): 28-33. (Report No. 24 of the International Peace Academy)

On the basis of the information available, one seems obliged to conclude that the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace has been reduced to a pious wish, or to go even further and suggest that what was conceived as a zone of peace has actually become a zone of confrontation. By 1981, nothing had been achieved in the way of practical measures toward implementing the "Peace Zone" that had been declared a decade before.

EVOLUTION OF THE PEACE ZONE CONCEPT: PEACEFUL COOPERATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

It is against this background that one should examine the proposal of the leader of the Sri Lankan delegation to the Twenty-first Session of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee in 1981, H.W. Jayawardene, for exploring a new approach to regional activity in the Indian Ocean. That approach is best expressed in his own words:

"The littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean share a common history of colonial exploitation and today, perhaps as a result of that common history, a relatively low level of economic development. It was in order to remove the area from great power rivalries, and ensure the Indian Ocean states the peace and security needed for their economic development, that the idea of a Zone of Peace was first conceived. It is the same goal of economic development, that motivates our idea for a study of the ways and means of promoting cooperation in the management of the marine resources of this area".

In essence, Sri Lanka was proposing that, parallel with the efforts being made at the United Nations to realize the demilitarization thrust of the peace zone concept, the countries of the region, whether coastal or land-locked, should begin to explore a different, and hitherto neglected aspect of that concept - the idea of a community of states working together in a spirit of cooperation and self-reliance fostered by the emerging new Law of the Sea, to establish and maintain the institutions of peace. The deliberate organization of peaceful cooperation by means of establishing the institutions of peace in the area was considered as having a derived arms control value when seen from at least two points of view. The first is best expressed in the words of the writer on disarmament Elizabeth Young. Writing in 1973, she said:

"The activities of the various existing and planned United Nations bodies and of an ocean regime's own organization are bound to result in a considerable international presence in ocean space... This presence, of itself, would have an arms control effect, proportionate to its scale and the range of its activities, and at some point it will be necessary to consider how this effect can be enlarged and enhanced... Any inspectorate, research exercise, monitoring body, is part of a de facto international verification system. In setting them up, the arms control significance of the information they are to acquire should be kept in view and eventually concerted."

From the second point of view, organizing peaceful cooperation in the region cannot but have the effect of promoting, through social, economic, scientific and technical contacts and exchanges, the region's sense of cohesiveness and security. Such an effect would contribute to dampening, and ultimately reducing, the tensions between individual states in the region - tensions which are the cause of arms build-up and nuclear proliferation, of the draining of slender resources into military budgets and, finally, of the subversion and weakening of the development process.⁶

⁶ The Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, Preamble, paragraph 2, reads:

"Conscious that in an increasingly interdependent world, the objectives of peace, freedom, social justice and economic prosperity are best achieved in the South Asian region by fostering mutual understanding, good neighbourly relations and meaningful cooperation among the Member States which are bound by ties of history and culture..."

and The Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, Report on a Workshop organized by the International Peace Academy (above, note 5), p. XX, reads:

"(iii) Programmes of economic and social advancement are important contributions to the maintenance of peace..."; and at p. XXIII:

"(v) Every step taken by the governments and peoples of the region, individually and collectively, to strengthen a regime of peace, and economic and social advancement, brings the goal set out in the 1971 Declaration closer to ultimate attainment".

States outside the region could contribute to this sense of security through offering guarantees, as they have done, for example, in Latin America by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and through participation in a future international agreement on the Indian Ocean. Such guarantees and participation would, it seems, be more likely to be forthcoming if the states outside the region were to increase their own stake in the region's fortunes by providing finance and expertise aimed at enhancing and accelerating the organization of cooperation, through jointly-established marine-related projects and institutions. A channelling of funds into endeavours of this type could be seen as an investment in the demilitarization of the area, quite apart from its more obvious economic development aspects.

But the proposal and its timing also seemed appropriate for a more immediate reason: nearly a decade of intensive negotiations at the United Nations aimed at agreement on a new Law of the Sea was drawing to a close. An unprecedented number of the provisions of the new Convention would require parties to undertake a "duty of cooperation" toward one another, often on the regional and subregional levels.⁷ The time seemed ripe to explore the practical implications of those provisions, and evaluate their potential to make a real contribution to economic development.

⁷ For a discussion of several of those provisions, see PINTO, M.C.W. 1986. The duty of cooperation and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. In Bos & Siblesz, eds. Realism in Law-making: essays in honour of Wilhelm Riphagen. Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 131-154.

FIRST CONFERENCE ON ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN (IOMAC-I)

OBJECTIVES

As a first step, Sri Lanka asked the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee (AALCC) at its Twenty-first session in 1981, through a study of the Indian Ocean area, to

(1) "determine its limits for the purpose of identifying it a special area for development;"

(2) "compile a list of national, subregional, regional and international institutions with competence or expertise in marine activities that are or could be operative in the area, as a basis for initiating cooperation and exchange of information among the States concerned or their nationals;"

(3) "consider the feasibility of establishing a consultative institutional framework for promoting the peaceful uses of the Indian Ocean, including cooperation in activities such as marine scientific research, management of living and non-living marine resources, assessment and management of environmental problems; and possibly dispute settlement mechanisms;"

(4) "carry out a survey of legal and institutional developments taking place at a national, subregional, regional or global level which have a bearing on marine activities, and are of relevance to the States of the Indian Ocean".

After presentation by AALCC of a preliminary report and supplementary information at its meetings in 1983 and 1985,⁸ Sri Lanka, having consulted the states of the Indian Ocean region, proposed the convening of a conference which would have as its objectives:

(1) creating an awareness regarding the Indian Ocean, its resources and potential for the development of the states of the region, and furthering cooperation among them, as well as among them and other states active in the region, bearing in mind the new ocean regime embodied in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea;

(2) providing a forum where Indian Ocean states and other interested states could review the state of the economic uses of the Indian Ocean and its resources and related activities, including those undertaken within the framework of intergovernmental organizations, and identify fields in which they could benefit from enhanced international cooperation, coordination and concerted action; and

(3) adopting a strategy for enhancing the national development of the Indian Ocean states through integration of ocean-related activities in their respective development processes, and a policy of integrated ocean management through a regular and continuing dialogue and cooperative international/regional action with particular emphasis on technical cooperation among developing countries....

⁸ Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, documents XXIII/3 and XXIV/18.

The conference, conceived as the first of a series of such conferences, was to comprise (a) a consultative phase attended by officials and experts, and (b) a final phase at ministerial level, to be held as soon as possible thereafter.⁹

⁹ For a description of the objectives of the conference and an outline of the structure envisaged for it, see the Report of the Consultative Meeting, Colombo, 15-20 July 1985, Vol. I, IOMAC-l/A/22 Rev. 3, pp. 1-4.

REPRESENTATION

In the event, the First Conference on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation in Marine Affairs in the Indian Ocean in the Context of the New Ocean Regime (to give it its formal title) or IOMAC-I, convened in Colombo, at the invitation of the Government of Sri Lanka, and comprised the following: (1) a preparatory meeting at official level, 4-5 June 1985; (2) a consultative meeting attended by officials and experts, 15-20 July 1985, which took place in two stages, the first attended by representatives of the Indian Ocean states only, and a second stage in which they were joined by representatives of other states active in the region, that is the major user-states of the Indian Ocean; and (3) a final phase consisting of a meeting of officials and experts, 20-23 January 1987, which prepared the "Final Document", and a meeting at ministerial level, 26-28 January 1987, at which the Final Document was adopted.

Some 65 states, comprising 46 "littoral and hinterland" states of the Indian Ocean (LHS) and 19 "major maritime user" states (MMU) were invited to attend.¹⁰ Of these, a total of 48 states (33, or more than two-thirds of LHS and 15, or approximately three-quarters of MMU) were represented at one or more stages of the conference. Eighteen states were represented at the preparatory meeting, 35 at the consultative meeting and 39 in the final phase.¹¹ Of those which participated to some degree, only two states (India and Seychelles) were not represented beyond the preparatory meeting, while six others (Bhutan, Ethiopia, Kuwait, Mauritius, Singapore and Zimbabwe) did not attend the final phase of the conference. Some 18 states were not represented at any stage of the conference: 13 littoral and hinterland states - Afghanistan, Bahrain, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Democratic Yemen, Lesotho, Oman, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Swaziland, United Arab Emirates and Zambia; and four major maritime user states - Bulgaria, Liberia, Panama and the USSR.

¹⁰ Ibid., Annex, part I. The terms "littoral states" and "major maritime users", originally taken over from their UN peace zone context, were later abandoned in favour "coastal states" and "states active in the region".

¹¹ See footnote¹⁰.

The United Nations and several of its subsidiary organs, regional commissions and specialized agencies which had made available expertise and financial support for organizing the conference were represented, as were several other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations active in the field of marine affairs.¹²

¹² Ibid., Annex, part II.

India's nonparticipation was the most notable, not only because of the country's dominant technological and political position in the region, which seemed to make a "conference on the Indian Ocean" without "India" tantamount to a contradiction in terms, but also because of reported attempts to persuade prospective participants not to attend the conference, and not to give it support or encouragement. This initiative, which does not seem to have deterred most countries from sending delegations to one or more of the earlier meetings, may, however, have resulted in a reduction in the level of representation of participating countries at the final phase.

Various reasons have been adduced for India's nonparticipation - e.g. (1) the conference was too ambitious in scope, and thus not likely to succeed; (2) there had not been adequate consultation in preparation for the conference, in particular with India; (3) cooperation in marine affairs was already handled within the competences of several international organizations, so that IOMAC would only duplicate those activities; (4) cooperation should, in any event, begin within a subregion, and then move to the regional level; (5) the great powers and "major maritime users" should not have been invited at the current early stage of attempts to develop regional cohesion as a foundation for a cooperation framework; (6) such a conference might have the effect of diverting concentration from, and therefore further impeding, work at the United Nations aimed at implementing the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace; and, finally, (7) India's participation in IOMAC, a conference convened by Sri Lanka, might somehow be thought to impair the Indian Government's impartiality, and hence effectiveness, in its efforts to mediate in delicate negotiations which were taking place between the Government of Sri Lanka and the leaders of some secessionist groups in that country.

The factor of "duplication of activities" may well have gained in significance because negotiations to establish a South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) were in an advanced stage at the time of IOMAC's first meeting.¹³ On the other hand, IOMAC was aimed primarily at making a reality of technical and scientific cooperation in a now familiar (if limited) field, i.e. marine affairs, without prejudicing how the initiative might eventually be thought to fit within some broader framework, such as that provided by SAARC. In any event, Article II of SAARC's Charter itself emphasises that:

"Cooperation within the framework of SAARC shall not be a substitute for bilateral and multilateral cooperation but shall complement them. - Such co-operation shall not be inconsistent with international obligations".

¹³ SAARC's Charter was signed on 8 December 1985.

Representation at IOMAC-I

INDIAN OCEAN STATES AND OTHER STATES ACTIVE IN THE REGION

Country or Area invited to attend	Member	Phase attended
		Preparatory	Consultative	Final (Ministerial)
Afghanistan	No	-	-	-
Australia	Yes	x	x	x
Bahrain	No	-	-	-
Bangladesh	Yes	x	x	x
Bhutan	No	-	-	-
Botswana	No	-	-	-
Brunei Darussalam	No	-	-	-
Bulgaria	Yes	-	-	-
Burma	No	x	x	x
Burundi	No	-	-	x
Canada	Yes	-	x	x
China	Yes	-	x	x
Comoros	No	-	x	x
Democratic Yemen	Yes	-	-	-
Djibouti	Yes	-	-	x
Egypt	Yes	x	x	x
Ethiopia	Yes	-	x	-
France	Yes	-	-	x
German Democratic Rep.	Yes	-	-	x
Germany, Fed. Rep.	Yes	-	x	x
Greece	Yes	-	-	x
India	Yes	x	-	-
Indonesia	Yes	x	x	x
Iran, Islamic Rep.	Yes	x	x	x
Iraq	Yes	x	x	x
Italy	Yes	-	x	x
Japan	Yes	-	x	x
Kenya	Yes	x	x	x
Kuwait	No	-	x	-
Lesotho	No	-	-	-
Liberia	Yes	-	-	-
Madagascar	Yes	-	x	x
Malawi	No	-	-	x
Malaysia	Yes	x	x	x
Maldives	Yes	x	x	x
Mauritius	Yes	-	x	-
Mozambique	Yes	-	-	x
Nepal	No	x	x	x
Netherlands	Yes	-	x	x
Norway	Yes	-	x	x
Oman	Yes	-	-	-
Pakistan	Yes	x	x	x
Panama	Yes	-	-	-
Poland	Yes	-	-	x
Qatar	No	-	-	-
Romania	Yes	-	x	x
Rwanda	No	-	-	-
Saudi Arabia	No	-	-	-
Seychelles	Yes	x	-	-
Singapore	Yes	-	x	-
Somalia	Yes	x	x	x
Sri Lanka	Yes	x	x	x
Sudan	Yes	-	-	x
Swaziland	No	-	-	-
Thailand	Yes	x	x	x
Uganda	Yes	-	x	x
USSR	Yes	-	-	-
United Arab Emirates	Yes	-	-	-
United Kingdom	Yes	-	x	x
Tanzania	Yes	x	x	x
United States	Yes	-	x	x
Yemen	Yes	-	-	x
Yugoslavia	Yes	-	-	x
Zambia	Yes	-	-	-
Zimbabwe	No	-	x	-

Whatever the reasons for India's nonparticipation, it was the subject of several expressions of regret and appeals for reconsideration in the closing stages of IOMAC-I.¹⁴ There can be no doubt that, if India had participated, she would have assumed a position of leadership befitting a country of such outstanding intellectual resources and scientific and technological achievement, and that this would have been as beneficial to the outcome of the conference, as it would have been warmly welcomed by all those present.

¹⁴ "[Consultations at the Conference] impressed upon us the need for the fuller participation in the work of this Conference of all the states in the Indian Ocean region and we should spare no efforts to ensure that those states which are not present today, for whatever reason, join with us in our future endeavours...". Closing statement of A.C.S. Hameed, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka, 28 January 1987, reproduced in Annex 4 to the Final Document of the Conference.

ORGANIZATION

Officials and experts attending the Preparatory Meeting which took place in Colombo, 4-5 June 1985, carried out a survey of the most urgent needs of the states of the Indian Ocean region in the field of marine affairs, and drew up a "Tentative List of Major Items"¹⁵ for consideration by high level officials at an anticipated consultative meeting. The Consultative Meeting, which was convened in Colombo from 15 to 20 July 1985, dealt with the subjects on the list (1) in plenary sessions under the guidance of Hiran Jayawardene who, as the principal architect of the conference, was elected president; and (2) through eight committees on each of which all of the coastal and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean were invited to be represented.

¹⁵ Report of the Consultative Meeting, Colombo, 15-20 July 1985, Vol. I, Annex 2, IOMAC-1/A/22 Rev. 3.

Committee	Subjects	Chairman
I	Marine science and ocean service (including oceanography, hydrography and remote-sensing)	A.F. Bayoumi (Egypt)
II	Technology and training	A.F. Bayoumi (Egypt)
III	Living resources	R.A. Mrope (Tanzania)
IV	Non-living resources	Said Abdi (Somalia)
V	Transport (including the trade, economic and safety aspects of shipping, and submarine pipelines)	A. Timbe (Zimbabwe)
VI	Communications (including submarine cables, and satellite communications and maritime safety)	A. Timbe (Zimbabwe)
VII	Management (including legislation, policy, surveillance, enforcement, and the legal aspects of cooperation such as institutional and joint venture arrangements)	J. Hamid (Pakistan)
VIII	Marine environment	S. Blaber (Australia)

In addition to the "Tentative List", the conference had before it a working paper entitled "Basic principles for economic, scientific and technological cooperative action in the context of the New Ocean Regime",¹⁶ and several sectoral papers prepared by the United Nations and its specialized agencies and other international organizations.¹⁷ United Nations agencies, in addition to assisting in the financing of the conference and preparing a very large volume of useful background material on the resource potential of the Indian Ocean and possible approaches to cooperative management, provided personnel to augment the secretariat of the conference.

¹⁶ Ibid., para. 10.

¹⁷ Ibid., Vol. II, parts 1 and 2.

The results of the work of the committees was considered at plenary sessions in which the coastal and hinterland states were joined by the "major maritime users" of the Indian Ocean. Their report, containing a summary of possible cooperative activities in specific subject areas, then became the principal basis for discussion at the final or ministerial-level phase of the conference which convened in Colombo from 20 to 28 January 1987.¹⁸ In its final phase, the conference, having reviewed, in some seven working groups between 20 to 23 January, the range of possible cooperative activities reported on by the consultative meeting, drew up its own report containing the draft of a final document. The Final Document was then considered and adopted at a series of meetings at ministerial level from 26 to 28 January, under the chairmanship of A.C.S. Hameed, Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka.¹⁹

¹⁸ Ibid., Vol. I, para. 11, pp. 7-23.

¹⁹ Final Document of the Conference, IOMAC-I/A/27 of 28 January 1987, Introduction, pp. 1-4.

FINAL DOCUMENT

The Final Document adopted by IOMAC-I, which takes the form (if not in express terms) of a declaration, comprises the following sections:

I Introduction
II Preamble and Framework of Cooperation
III Programme of Cooperation
IV Plan of Action
V Implementation and Follow-up Arrangements

The introduction amounts to no more than a protocol or chronological record of work along the lines of the final act of a conference. The rest of the document may be dealt with conveniently under three broad headings:

(i) Preamble
(ii) Modalities of co-operation (Sections II and V)
(iii) Subject matter of cooperation (sections III and IV).

Preamble

The preamble refers to the resources of the Indian Ocean, and the need to adopt a strategy for enhancing the economic development of the region through proper management of those resources. As part of that strategy, the preamble foresees the establishment of a "consultative forum" which would assist states of the region to implement and further develop the strategy, in collaboration with other states active in the region and the competent international organizations, through "enhanced international cooperation, coordination and concerted action". With a view to dispelling any doubts that might have arisen regarding the essentially complementary and supportive aims of IOMAC-I in relation to the peace zone concept, the preamble concludes by reaffirming the commitment of states participating in the conference to the actual establishment of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace as early as possible, and under the auspices of the United Nations.

Modalities of cooperation

The Final Document deals with the modalities of cooperation in several provisions of section II (Framework of Cooperation) and of section V (Implementation and Follow-up Arrangements). These provisions may be classified as (a) principles of administrative or legislative action, and (b) IOMAC's institutional framework.

Principles of administrative and legislative action. Section II (Framework of Cooperation) is an elaboration of the draft of "Basic Principles" of cooperative action²⁰ which had been before the conference as a basis for discussion. The framework interprets, in terms of the practical measures required to be taken by states, the duty of cooperation imposed by the relevant provisions of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Thus the duty of cooperation in this regional context involves principles regarding internal preparatory measures, such as giving the marine affairs sector a measure of priority in the national development plan; the acquisition and dissemination of information on marine affairs, and promotion of marine scientific research and application of marine technologies; the establishment of marine affairs institutions as a preferred means of achieving long-term regular cooperation; and the designation and notification of national "focal points" or offices which would be invested with competence to plan and implement cooperative undertakings at the national and international level. The duty of cooperation also requires certain measures to be implemented externally, including harmonizing and strengthening international arrangements for managing marine resources, to be achieved through a network of national institutions and "focal points"; and cooperation expressed through solidarity at the diplomatic level to ensure that development assistance donor states and organizations accord high priority to marine affairs projects, and to secure support for marine affairs initiatives at international conferences. As a foundation for such action, section V of the document contains a joint appeal to such organizations to "lend their strongest support" to the Programme of Cooperation and Plan of Action set out in sections III and IV.

²⁰ Above, note 16.

The document recognizes that the obligation to cooperate is essentially an obligation to act, through inclusion of the principle that, where a state has undertaken a duty of cooperation:

"it should at the request of another State in the region, and in any event as soon as practicable, commence consultations... with a view to harmonizing, strengthening or making any other necessary adjustments in existing arrangements, or agreeing upon new arrangements for the adoption or application of appropriate standards and measures...".²¹

²¹ Final Document, para. 2.2.4.

The duty to act proprio motu in implementing an obligation to co-operate receives further emphasis in the final paragraph of the section, which invites states of the region:

"in a timely manner, to take such measures of a policy-making, legal or administrative nature as may be necessary for the purpose of effective action in accordance with these principles".²²

²² Final Document, para. 2.2.12.

IOMAC's institutional framework. The Final Document lays emphasis on institutions, both national and international, as "preferred means of organizing and coordinating long-term regular cooperation in marine affairs".²³ IOMAC itself, as the "consultative forum" foreseen in the preamble, is conceived as being at the centre of a network of institutions forming an essential feature of the modalities of regional cooperation. IOMAC's institutional framework is outlined in section II, and further elaborated in section V. IOMAC's terms of reference are:

"to keep under review developments concerning marine affairs, particularly within the Indian Ocean region, to facilitate implementation of the new legal regime for the seas and oceans, and provide guidelines for coordinated, joint or cooperative action at the subregional, regional and global level, as well as to endorse specific plans and programmes and hear reports on progress in implementing plans and programmes previously endorsed by the Conference".²⁴

²³ Final Document, para. 2.2.7. cf.: "Regional institutions can and should play an important role in improving political relationships and economic strength of participating countries". The Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, Report on a Workshop... (p. XX). (above, note 6)

²⁴ Final Document, para. 2.2.10.

In order to fulfil its functions and achieve its aims, IOMAC is authorized to establish a standing committee constituted on a "representative basis", as well as:

"such other subsidiary organs as it deems necessary and general or special groups for the study of specific questions as well as such other mechanisms as may be necessary for the follow-up or coordination of cooperative activities".²⁵

²⁵ Final Document, para. 2.2.11.

The document subsequently calls on the Government of Sri Lanka to continue to provide the facilities and services of a secretariat.²⁶

²⁶ Final Document, para. 5.9.4.

In section V of the Final Document, IOMAC, in the exercise of its authority under section II, establishes a Standing Committee of ten members nominated by the Conference. Interpreting the term "representative basis" used in section II, the text calls for representation on the committee of both "the major geographical areas" and principal ocean-related interests "(i.e. land-locked, geographically disadvantaged, mainland coastal and archipelagic states)".²⁷ Although this list of interests is introduced by the abbreviation "i.e.", there can be little doubt that what follows is intended to be an illustrative rather than exhaustive list of ocean-related interests. The intention of the drafters in specifying a membership of ten appears to have been to ensure that the responsibilities of the Standing Committee were clearly conferred upon, and accepted by, a representative core group, and not in any way to restrict participation, since the text goes on to declare that the "Committee shall be open-ended", thus apparently inviting participation by all Indian Ocean states and states active in the region.²⁸

²⁷ Final Document, para. 5.9.2.

²⁸ The members of the Standing Committee are currently: Comoros, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mozambique, Nepal, Pakistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda and Yemen Arab Republic.

The Standing Committee is to have "primary responsibility for taking such action as may be necessary for policy-level guidance for the implementation of the Programme of Cooperation and Plan of Action and for furthering cooperation through the framework of IOMAC".²⁹ Members will hold office for the period (generally two years) between conferences, and will meet inter-sessionally "as often as necessary for the performance of the Committee's functions".³⁰ The Committee, which is authorized to determine its procedure and agenda and the venue of its meetings, held its inaugural meeting immediately following the concluding session of the Conference on 28 January 1987. The Conference directed the Committee to make arrangements to convene the next meeting of the Conference (IOMAC-II) "preferably within two years but no later than January 1990".³¹

²⁹ Final Document, para. 5.9.1.

³⁰ Final Document, para. 5.9.2.

³¹ Final Document, para. 5.9.3.

The institutional structure of IOMAC is intended to be simple and embryonic in the sense that it could develop in accordance with the needs and policies of the membership of the Conference. No financial provisions were thought to be necessary, since members would bear their own expenses of travel and accommodation connected with meetings (to some extent offset by host state hospitality), projects would be funded from external sources, and the Sri Lankan Government had agreed, for the time being at any rate, to undertake the costs of maintaining a small secretariat, subject to reimbursement on a voluntary basis for any special service.³²

³² Final Document, para. 5.9.4.

Subject matter of cooperation

The specific areas in which cooperation is envisaged are set out in section III (Programme of Cooperation) and section IV (Plan of Action) of the Final Document. In both sections, subjects are dealt with under the headings which were used at the consultative meeting to define the competence of its eight committees: marine science and ocean services, marine technology and training, living resources, nonliving resources, maritime transport, communications, management (including the law of the sea, marine law and policy, surveillance, enforcement, legal aspects of cooperation including institutional arrangements and joint ventures) marine environment. The "Programme of Cooperation" follows closely the findings of committees at the consultative stage and is therefore an assessment in broad terms of the needs of the region and a reservoir of subjects from which specific projects may be derived for inclusion in the "Plan of Action".

The "Plan of Action" represents the current thinking of the participants as to the priorities of project preparation, described as "short term", "medium term" and "long term". However, it is essentially a guide. The more specific recommendations listed according to priority in the Plan of Action, need considerable refinement and elaboration before they become projects ready for financing and implementation; and it would be open to the membership to return at any time to the Programme pf Cooperation and select from it, for early elaboration, some subject not currently included in the Plan of Action.³³

³³ Final Document, the concluding note to which reads, in part, as follows: "Elements of the Programme of Cooperation would be drawn on from time to time in the context of implementation of the Plan of Action for purposes of further elaboration and augmentation (sic) thereof under the aegis of Standing Committee and in the context of the Framework of Cooperation".

"Baseline studies" aimed at gathering and evaluating essential oceanographic and meteorological data pertaining to the region, as well as information concerning available management and technological skills, and existing national and international regulatory mechanisms, figure prominently under several subject headings. So wide is the range of subjects on which cooperation is contemplated in sections III and IV of the Final Document, that no more than a selection can be mentioned here.

Projects for augmenting capabilities within the region in the field of oceanographic and meteorological data collection, in particular by the use of advanced remote-sensing, and in the field of hydrography, receive emphasis under the heading "Marine science and ocean services".³⁴ Emphasis on the theme of data and information collection and dissemination within the region continues under the heading "Marine technology and training". A project aimed at establishing what could become a regional "technology bank" with subregional centres, is presented in outline. The functions of such a technology bank would not only include collecting and providing up-to-date information on available technologies, but would also extend to project-evaluation, and assistance in negotiating with suppliers of technology and in obtaining the necessary finance. Recognizing that technology is primarily a subject engaging the interest of the private sector, the project sees such a technology bank as an honest broker in achieving the transfer of marine technology to the states of the region under fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions.³⁵ Also emphasized under this heading is a recommendation of the UN Regional Meeting of Experts in Space Technology Applications in the Indian Ocean Region³⁶ to establish a Standing Group of Regional Experts of the Indian Ocean states in Space Technology Applications under the aegis of IOMAC.³⁷

³⁴ Programme of Cooperation, para. 3.0.7; Plan of Action, paras 4.1.1, 4.1.2.

³⁵ Programme of Cooperation, para. 3.1.2(iv); Plan of Action, para. 4.2.2.

³⁶ Colombo, 15-19 September 1986. See the Report presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations, document A/AC.105/374 of 19 November 1986.

³⁷ Ibid., para. 10: "A standing group of regional experts of the Indian Ocean region countries in space technology applications should be established under the umbrella of IOMAC to prepare sectoral programmes of action in order to implement the recommendations set out below and to monitor the progress thereon...".

Projects referred to under the heading "Living resources" include those for the upgrading of basic scientific and technical capabilities in the region, cooperation in stock assessment, and in the use of fishery research vessels, the urgent collection of data and adoption of measures aimed at preventing large-scale tuna-catching operations from adversely affecting regional artisanal and long-line fisheries, as well as the negotiation of appropriate terms for grant of access to fisheries by coastal states: (1) to other coastal states in the region, and (2) to neighbouring land-locked and geographically disadvantaged states.³⁸

³⁸ Programme of Cooperation, paras 3.2.3; Plan of Action, para. 4.3.1, 4.3.2.

Cooperation in the investigation of offshore mineral resource potential, and sharing equipment and expertise for conducting offshore bathymetric and seismic surveys are among the projects contemplated under the heading "Non-living resources".³⁹

³⁹ Programme of Cooperation, paras 3.3.1, 3.3.4, 3.3.5, Plan of Action, para. 4.4.1-4.

"Maritime transport" was a subject considered to be of such importance that it was dealt with in a separate paragraph in section II, Framework of Cooperation. The central recommendation on the subject in the Plan of Action is for the establishment of regional institutional arrangements in areas such as ship ownership and investment, financing, ship management, operations and manning and, in particular, the creation, with assistance from the competent international organizations, of a regional "shipping forum" at which experts from the region could discuss questions affecting shipping, ports and related maritime industries.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Framework of Cooperation, para. 2.2.6; Programme of Cooperation, para. 3.4.10; Plan of Action, para. 4.5.2.

Under the heading "Communications" the Final Document envisages the installation of advanced submarine cable (fibre optics) systems on a cooperative basis, as well as training programmes for personnel who would operate and maintain these and other advanced systems, and suggests cooperation in communications projects recommended by the UN Regional Meeting of Experts on Space Technology Applications.⁴¹

⁴¹ Programme of Cooperation, paras 3.5.1, 3.5.5-7, Plan of Action, paras 4.6.1, 4.6.4.

Projects in the area of management include arrangements for harmonizing the various national laws and regulations of states in the region, coordination of a regional network of marine affairs institutions, training workshops for policy-makers, the introduction into pre-university and university curricula of oceanography and other subjects of direct relevance to marine resource management, and the negotiation of appropriate arrangements between land-locked and geographically disadvantaged states, on the one hand, and neighbouring coastal states, on the other.⁴²

⁴² Programme of Cooperation, paras 3.6.5, 3.6.6, Plan of Action, paras 4.7.1, 4.7.6, 4.7.9.

On the subject "Marine environment" the Final Document contemplates, inter alia, cooperative action: (1) to provide, on an urgent basis, assistance and training for the development and implementation of coastal zone environment management plans through regional, subregional and national workshops, and (2) to ensure stringent monitoring and control of pollution from bilge pumping, dumping and other harmful activities.⁴³

⁴³ Programme of Cooperation, para. 3.7.4, sub-paras (vi), (ix), (x) and (xi); Plan of Action, paras 4.8.2, 4.8.3.

CONCLUSION

Like most documents negotiated among several states pursuing varying policies and goals, the Final Document of IOMAC-I is untidy and frequently repetitive. However, it does clearly demonstrate the desire of the participating states to commence the type of international cooperative activity so frequently enjoined by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and to explore together the possible modalities and subject areas of such cooperation. If IOMAC develops along the lines currently foreseen by the participants, such cooperation will not be confined to the states of the Indian Ocean, but will be complemented by substantial inputs in the way of finance, equipment or expertise brought about through partnership with "states active in the region", inspired by, and carried out in accordance with, the new Law of the Sea and the terms of the IOMAC Declaration.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Note, in connection with partnership with states outside the region, the words of President J.R. Jayawardene of Sri Lanka urging that the new modalities should ensure that cooperation concerning the ocean and its resources "take place in a mutually beneficial, economic and non-dependent way ..." (emphasis added). Address at the opening of the ministerial-level meeting of IOMAC on 26 January 1987, Annex 2 to the Final Document.

The results of IOMAC underline: (1) the importance of institutions in the conduct of cooperative activity, as shown by the Declaration's call for the establishment of national marine affairs institutions, the designation of national "focal points" which, by forming a regional network, are to coordinate internal marine affairs activities and receive and respond to external cooperative initiatives - and, indeed, by the creation of IOMAC and its Standing Committee; and (2) the urgent need of most states in the region for basic information concerning marine affairs, from oceanographic data to technological and managerial capabilities, as well as the means of sharing such information so as to make it available as the basis for initiating and conducting cooperative activity.

The Declaration seems to lend support to an important principle of interpretation relative to the provisions on cooperation which form an important part of the new Law of the Sea. In the words of Sri Lanka's President J.R. Jayawardene, "An undertaking to cooperate would be nothing, if we did not acknowledge that it was also an undertaking to act".⁴⁵ Thus, cooperation is, in a word, action and the duty to cooperate is the duty to act. Accordingly, the request of a state that consultations commence with a view to implementing a duty of cooperation could not be ignored or refused, if the requested state wished to avoid the risk of being held to be in breach of its international obligations.⁴⁶ States embarking upon such consultations might be expected to explore and assess potential for cooperation among them across a whole range of marine affairs questions, taking into account the regional cooperative framework already in place. Such consultations could be followed by negotiation and the conclusion of subregional arrangements. A conciliatory role might be foreseen for IOMAC's Standing Committee in the event that difficulties or serious disagreements should arise in the course of such interactions.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Compare the proposals of the late R.Q. Quentin Baxter, Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission on the topic "International liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law", on implementation of the obligation to cooperate with a view to reducing the risk of transboundary harm, or to arriving at a fair distribution of costs and benefits of a harmful activity. See the Special Rapporteur's third and fourth Reports (and especially the "Schematic Outline" annexed) UN documents A/CN.4/360, A/CN.4/373.

Evaluated in terms of the objectives stated when convening IOMAC-I, i.e. "creating an awareness", "providing a forum" and "adopting a strategy",⁴⁷ a modest degree of success may, it seems, be claimed by the participants. It remains a matter of high priority, however, not only to maintain momentum through the promotional and steering role of the Standing Committee, but also to widen participation in IOMAC to include all the states concerned - those of the region as well as those active in the region - so that the initiative may fulfil to the maximum its long-term developmental goals and thereby make a major contribution toward bringing peace to the peoples of a region so often torn by conflict.

⁴⁷ Report of the Consultative Meeting, Colombo, 15-20 July 1985, Vol. I, IOMAC-1/A/22 Rev.3, p. 1.

ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTED AT IOMAC-I

United Nations and its Subsidiary Organs and Regional Commissions

United Nations

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)

United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNEPA)

United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)

United Nations University (UNU)

Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)

Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP)

Specialized Agencies of the United Nations

Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO)

International Maritime Organization (IMO)

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Unesco/Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC))

World Meteorological Organization (WMO)

Intergovernmental Organizations

Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee (AALCC)

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

International Hydrographic Bureau

South Asia Cooperative Environment Programme (SACEP)

Non-governmental Organizations

Arthur C. Clarke Centre, Sri Lanka

International Centre for Ocean Development, Canada

International Ocean Institute, Malta

Law of the Sea Institute, Hawaii