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Price transmission in food markets










Kozlowska, K. & Awantang, A. 2023. Price transmission in food markets. Trade Policy Briefs, No. 55. Rome, FAO.




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    Book (series)
    A preliminary value chain analysis of shark fisheries in Madagascar 2014
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    Madagascar’s extensive (~6,500 km) coastline comprises the most diverse and extensive shallow marine habitats in the Western Indian Ocean, supporting an estimated 123 shark and ray species. Sharks have featured in Madagascar’s fisheries for at least 100 years, with exports recorded as early as the 1920’s. Globally, shark fins are one of the most highly valued seafood items and represent a critical and significant source of cash for some of Madagascar’s isolated fishing communities. The global sh ark fin trade is estimated to be worth between US$400-500 million a year. Increases in the shark trade over the last two decades is closely linked to economic growth in China, where the market is concentrated, and the ripple effects of this increase in demand have been felt worldwide. Scientific estimates for the number of sharks killed annually can be up to 100 million individuals and sharks are on the whole overexploited. Today, thirty percent of all shark and ray species are now classified as ‘Threatened’ or ‘Near Threatened’ with extinction according to the IUCN Red List, although this number is likely to be higher given that the status of almost half (47%) of shark species cannot be scientifically assessed due to a lack of data. There is strong evidence that shark overexploitation occurs in Malagasy waters and that shark populations in the area are declining rapidly. Although reliable figures on Madagascar’s domestic shark fishery are sparse, anecdotal observations report declines in shark numbers within the last two decades. According to national studies based only on official export data, recorded shark fin exports stood at approximately 32 tonnes in 2010, a decrease from 65 tonnes in 1994. Lack of data on catches, particularly from artisanal fisheries, bycatch by licensed industrial vessels, and by illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing by foreign industrial vessels, means these official export figures are likely to be gross underestimates of the actual pro duction. Madagascar’s shark fishery is comprised of three main fisheries according to Malagasy legislation: artisanal, traditional and industrial fisheries. Madagascar’s artisanal and traditional shark fisheries extend along the entire west coast, with the most important traditional fisheries along the southwest coast. Overfishing has led to fisher migration, spreading the fishery along the entire west coast and also much of the north. There is no established traditional shark fishery along the east coast due to adverse sea conditions, whilst the south is the least developed of all sites surveyed for this report. Throughout the country, surveyed fishers report catching shark for the purposes of income from selling fins (88%) and meat (77%), and as a source of food (31%), demonstrating the important link to the international shark fin trade. Shark fin exports reach the international market mostly through two principal buyers and exporters, namely the Sea Reine and Sin Hing, Chinese comp anies based in Antananarivo. The supply chain for shark fins is both complex and rather fluid with fishers selling either fresh (wet) or dried fins to collectors and fins graded in value according to size and quality. Some fishers bypass the local collectors and sell dried fins directly to main buyers in larger towns to obtain a better price, which can be a mark-up of 40% for high quality fins. The value of shark fins during the study period (2012) varies according to their condition (wet or dri ed), quality (four recognised grades) and their position in the supply chain. Robust data was collected for the first two levels of the supply chain but was lacking for the higher levels (main buyer to exporter). Guitarfish fins were on the whole, twice as valuable as shark fins and therefore both in demand and a fishing target. Since 2012 the average value of shark fins has dropped. Trade in shark meat is also well establishedin Madagascar, with meat sold into a supply chain that serves mainly local and national (provincial) markets but can also be exported to the Comoros. Shark meat does not fetch a high price compared to other fish or meats but can be an important supplementary source of income or nutrition in some cases. Generally fresh meat is sold and consumed locally whilst dried salted meat is bought by collectors and transported to inland urban markets in Madagascar. Some dried shark meat is also exported. ANGAP Association Nationale pour la Gestion des Aires Protégées ASH Aut orité Sanitaire Halieutique BAD Banque Africaine de Dévelopement CBD Convention on Biological Diversity CCPS Cellule de la Coordination de la Politique Sectorielle/MPRH CLB/VOI Communauté Locale de Base/Vondron’Olona Ifatony CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora COI Commission de l’océan Indien COS Certificat d’Origine et de Salubrité CSP Centre de Surveillance des Pêches CMS Convention on Migratory Species DGRH Direction de la Gestion des Ressourc es Halieutiques/MPRH DPRH Direction de la Pêche et des Ressources Halieutiques/MPRH DRPR Direction Régionale de la Pêche et des Ressources Halieutiques FAO Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations RFMO Regional Fishery Management Organization GEF Global Environnement Facility GTZ Gesellschaft Für Technische Zusammenarbeit IPOA Sharks – International Plan of Action for the Conservation and Management of Sharks IOTC Indian Ocean Tuna Commission IUU Illegal, Unregulated and Unreport ed JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency, Agence Japonaise de Coopération Internationale MAEP Ministère de l’Agriculture, de l’Elevage et de la Pêche MGA Malgasy Ariary MNP Madagascar National Parks (previously ANGAP) MPRH Ministère de la Pêche et des Ressources Halieutiques NGO Non Governmental Organisations SWIOFP/OISO South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Project, Programme de l’Océan Indien Sud- Occidental UNGA United Nations General Assembly WIO Western Indian Ocean WWF World Wild Fund fo r Nature 6 A preliminary value chain analysis of shark fisheries in Madagascar 7 8 A preliminary value chain analysis of shark fisheries in Madagascar Foreign commercial fishing fleets have also been prevalent in Malagasy waters since at least the 1980’s and primarily target shark and larger pelagic fish, with significant shark bycatch for those fisheries not directly targeting sharks. Almost none of the sharks caught are landed in Madagascar. IUU fishing within Madagascar’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is a well-established issue, with the shark fishery specifically targeted by both licensed and unlicenced vessels. Despite the significant pressures on Madagascar’s shark fishery and the enormous socio-ecological and economic value of the trade, the country has no coherent or functioning shark conservation strategy or legislation. The lack of a national strategy is largely due to deficiencies in data on fishing effort, catches, landings and discards in all commercial fisheries for sh ark. This is compounded by a paucity of information on shark ecology, fisheries status and the socioeconomic value of the trade throughout Madagascar. Furthermore, in isolated coastal areas with little infrastructure, the sale of high value dried shark fins has been one of the few ways local Malagasy fishermen can earn cash. In this context, the diverse and unconnected stakeholders have no basis or motivation to enact meaningful conservation measures, particularly when economic imperatives outwe igh any other consideration. In a country as poor as Madagascar, even minor poverty relief is important, leading fishers to continue shark fishing despite low catches and diminishing returns for fishing effort, further threatening the future of the fishery. There is an urgent need to actively and aggressively manage Madagascar’s shark fishery. The rapid decline of sharks is likely to have several negative socioeconomic and ecological impacts, including the loss of livelihoods and protein for tho se people who rely on them and potentially altering the trophic structure of marine and coastal ecosystems. However, putting in place conservation measures and enforcing regulations remains a formidable challenge. Much of Madagascar’s fishery takes place in remote fishing grounds scattered over thousands of kilometres of coastline; the fishers are highly mobile and move great distances to seek productive fishing grounds; the government lacks the means to monitor these fisheries and enforce regul ations; and the markets are informal and closed. Significant steps must be taken in order to effectively prevent the collapse of Madagascar’s shark fishery. A widespread campaign to regulate both international and local shark fishing must occur simultaneously for any significant positive change to occur. For this to take place scientifically robust data must be collected over the long term. For any national conservation strategies to be implemented effectively, they should be based on data colle cted through participative monitoring and implemented at the national level. Such strategies should apply to artisanal and traditional fisheries, as well as to international commercial fishing vessels operating within the EEZ. Madagascar’s existing locally-managed marine areas are a vehicle through which coastal shark management strategies could be implemented. However an increase in both technical and logistical capacity will be required for effective management at the local, regional and natio nal level, together with strong enforcement support to LMMAs. Although it is recommended that the government develops appropriate national legislation and put in place proper monitoring and export restrictions, the onus remains heavily on the international community, with global legislation driving the regulation or lack of regulation of the global shark trade. Particular attention needs to be paid to those countries with distant water fleets / vessels operating within Madagascar’s EEZ, both leg ally and illegally. Without proper regulation of their shark fishing effort, partly through RFMO’s, little progress can be made.
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    Book (stand-alone)
    Operationalization of fish auction market feasibility study 2011
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    With an EEZ of 1.9 km2, the Government of Mauritius envisions the land based oceanic industries as a strategy for extracting more value from the ocean to spearhead sustainable economic growth. Development of the seafood hub, the marine fisheries and aquaculture are the landmarks of the aforesaid strategy. In 2007 the Ministry of Fisheries and Rodrigues (MOFR) has precipitated the development of an electronic fish auction market at Fort William without any feasibility study and/or a business mode l. Actually construction works are completed and installation of electro-mechanical and refrigeration equipment is underway at a total cost of Rs 35 million. An additional capital investment of about Rs 15 million would be required for the acquisition of an electronic fish auction system and associated equipment to enable the operationalization of the facility. The parent Ministry reckons that it is not within its prerogative to be directly involved in the operationalization of the fish auction market on account the commercial / business orientation of the latter. It intends to procure a private operator-cum-investor to operationalize the facility through a Public-Private Partnership model. The present study has been commissioned by the MOFR to perform a techno-economic appraisal of the project in view to chart out appropriate operationalization strategies for the project. The fish auction at Fort William is designed to deal in fresh / chilled fish harvested by the domestic fisheries b ut an in- depth supply analysis has concluded that this is not feasible for various reasons. All the same, the facility is not adequately located and equipped to auction frozen by-catch of foreign tuna long line vessels which is available in sufficiently large quantities at the fishing port. Therefore the project is techno-economically unsustainable unless it is overhauled. According to the By-catch regulation 2004, all licensed foreign tuna long line vessels have an obligation to land their by- catch at the Agricultural Marketing Board (AMB) Cold Storage Facility at the fish docks while non-licensed visiting vessels have no obligation whatsoever unless the market conditions are attractive. The total annual supply of frozen by-catch in Mauritius estimated between 4000 and 9000 metric tonnes. To take advantage the market opportunities, the business model of fish auction facility to be adjusted to frozen by-catch trade and in this process the 300 tonne AMB cold storage facility at the fis h docks of Fanfaron will have to be amalgamated with the FAM. The refrigeration system installed at the FAM will be operated as an Ice-flakes Production Unit on a commercial basis. It will cater for effective demand of ice-flakes arising from the artisanal and semi-industrial (chilled) fisheries as well as fish marketing structures in its surrounding. However the administrative centre including the electronic backbone of the auction system will stay at Fort William. S.W.O.T analysis of the proje ct has concluded on two critical points which are: -The frozen by-catch is a secured business under the By-catch Regulations and the Licensing Policies of foreign tuna long line vessels. Government commitment to this project is a key determinant for the success of the project. -The major weakness of the project is the lack of local expertise and familiarity in electronic fish auction that can be obviously compensated by a proven foreign operator –cum-investor through a suitable PPP model or a st rategic alliance by means of a Joint Venture. investment The feasibility study of the FAM is prepared in a conservative approach. The total Public Investment is re- adjusted at Rs 25 million to reflect its actual market value. Additional Private Investment is estimated at Rs 15 million. The opportunity cost of long term public borrowings is taken at 6%, which is slightly higher than current financial market rates and that of the private project loans, at 10%. A weighted mean discounting factor o f 7.75 % is used to examine the Net Present Value (NPV), Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and Break-Even (B/E) points of the project. The life cycle of the project is assumed at 15 years. Supply of by-catch supply for the first year of operation is projected at 1500 metric tonnes with and increment of 10% per year for the consecutive years. The mean market price of by-catch fish species is taken at prevailing international ex-vessel price including a price inflation rate of 5% per annum. Auction fe e is projected at 10 % of the primary sale price. The Ice-flakes Production Unit (IPU) will operate at 50% of its installed capacity which is minimal.
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    Book (stand-alone)
    Assessment of IUU activities on Lake Victoria 2012
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    Fishing all over the world is a major source of food for humanity and a provider of employment and economic benefits to those engaged in the activity. However, with increased knowledge and the dynamic development of fisheries, it should be known that world living aquatic resources, although renewable, are not infinite and need proper management, if their continued contribution to the nutritional, economic and social well-being of the growing world’s population is to be sustained. Lake Victoria i s Africa’s largest and most important inland water body with a total water surface area of 68,800km2. Lake Victoria contributes significantly through its fishery and generation of electricity to the economic benefits of not only the riparian states, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, but also to the neighboring countries and the world at large. Lake Victoria is arguably the most important single source of freshwater fish on the African continent, contributing significantly to national and regional econ omies and livelihoods of the regions inhabitants. Although not often associated with inland fisheries, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing and the trade of illegal fish has threatened the biological, social, financial and cultural integrity of the lakes resources and those that depend on them. Given that Lake Victoria’s living resources are shared amongst the three riparian states, a regional fisheries body, the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization (LVFO) was formed in 1994 though the technical assistance of the FAO to manage the fisheries resources in Lake Victoria as a single ecological entity. Within the LVFO mandate, the identified areas of IUU fishing are considered in the form of: Illegal or misuse of fishing gears; illegal fishing, fish landing, processing and trading; unregulated fishing number of boats, fishers and gears (capacity); unregulated, unreported or undocumented domestic and regional fish trade; fishing and landing undersize fish in undesignated landing sites; and fishing during closed seasons or in the closed breeding areas or critical habitats. The decline of Nile perch stocks suggest that fisheries management and compliance structures within the three riparian states and at LVFO at the moment are at various levels of disarray, hence allowing IUU fishing to continue thriving unabated. Since the introduction of Nile perch into Lake Victoria in the 1950’s it has been the focus of an intensifying commercial fishery. In 1980, a total of 4 439 to ns of Nile perch were harvested, a decade later over 338 115 tons of Nile perch were landed annually. From 2000 to 2010, and average of 253 404 tons of Nile perch are caught. Despite relatively consistent landings reported by the LVFO, total biomass of Nile perch decreased from 1.4 million tons (92% of total biomass in Lake Victoria) in 1999 to it lowest recorded estimate of 298 394 tons in 2008 (14.9% of total biomass in Lake Victoria). Currently, as of 2010, the Nile perch biomass was estimate d at 18% of total biomass in Lake Victoria, which equates to 367 800 tons. Although a slight increase in biomass between 2008 and 2010 was observed, Nile perch biological indicators suggest that the fish is in a critical survival state. The average size of Nile perch has decreased from 51.7 cm TL to 26.6 cm TL, according to hydro acoustic surveys suggesting that a significant portion of total Nile perch biomass is less than 50 cm TL (legal size for export). It was reported by the LVFO stock asse ssment team that in 2006 and 2008, less than 2% of the Nile perch biomass was in fact greater than 50 cm TL. The size at first maturity of male and female Nile perch is also decreasing, this common amongst fish populations that are stressed (or overexploited). Despite the biological indicators, which suggest legal size Nile perch are less than 2% of total Nile perch biomass, the average number of fishermen increased by 33% between 2000 and 2008. During the same period, Frame survey and MCS compl iance missions noted a marked increase in the number of illegal gears being deployed to target undersize Nile perch. The number of vessels increased by 37% and the use of outboard engines increased by approximately 50%. It has been reported that motorized boats are more efficient, catching about 25 kg of fish per day, compared to 10 kg caught by non-motorized vessels. The increase in use of illegal gears, motorized vessels and fishermen suggests that fishing for Nile perch is still profitable. P reviously driven by lucrative export prices for Nile perch, fishers now target undersize illegal Nile perch for the lucrative domestic and regional trade, which is estimated to exceed the export trade by volume and value. This shift in fishing for undersize Nile perch will effect government revenues earned from the export fishery. The Nile perch fishery over the last decade contributed 0.6% less to the Tanzanian GDP, similarly, a decrease in export trade of Nile perch from Uganda of 14% occurred between 2007 and 2008, resulting in a 0.1% decrease in GDP contribution. By not controlling fishing effort targeting illegal, undersized and immature Nile perch, economic and social hardships will worsen. Current fisheries management both regionally through the LVFO, and nationally amongst the riparian states is inadequate, with respect to Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS). MCS is a collection of activities and tools intended to support fisheries management in fighting IUU fishing, and forms the framework on which accurate, informative and dynamic fisheries management decisions can be made. MCS is critical at all levels of fisheries management. Within the Lake Victoria region, co-management has been implemented through the establishment of Beach Management Units (BMU’s). A BMU is a community-based organization, which is legally accepted as a representative of a fishing community and is mandated on a voluntary basis to engage in MCS initiatives. Lake Victoria has 1 087 registe red BMU’s according to the harmonized BMU guidelines, agreed upon amongst the member states and the LFVO. Although the inclusion of community based management and MCS is critical in contributing to effective management of Lake Victoria’s fisheries resources, many challenges exist, including amongst others; geographical isolation of fishing communities, social issues (families of BMU members may partake in illicit activities), political interference (revenue collections, or election voting), corr uption, conflict of interests (BMU members are often fishmongers and fish traders) and lack of representation in higher management committees. Although advances in MCS technology have revolutionized fisheries management amongst many ESA-IO countries, the sharing of regional resources and capacity is fragmented and not effectively harnessed by the LVFO. Database management systems are not working effectively, data collecting, analyzing and dissemination are unreliable and time inefficient, respec tively and appropriate MCS tools for example net gauges are not available. The RWG-MCS reported that between 2004 and the end of 2008, a total of 4 605 suspects were apprehended, 12 126 beach seines, 9 550 small seine nets, 27 703 monofilament nets, 248 843 kilograms of immature Nile perch (249 tons) and 254 589 illegal gillnets were confiscated. These data are unreliable; furthermore they were not quantified in terms of definition of the item (how long were the nets that were confiscated 80 met er, or one kilometer, this has a profound effect on CPUE), of financial loss to fishers and traders versus the opportunity costs of MCS. The valve of court fines are insignificant especially if one considers the amount of uncontrolled fishing effort, uncontrolled illegal gears used in Lake Victoria, and the increasing value in the trade of immature fish on domestic markets. Also, there is no indication as to whether the court penalties and fines imposed on the same offences in the three partner states have any reference to the same severity across the region, or are recycled back into MCS initiatives. It is therefore difficult to determine whether the RWG-MCS interventions from 2004 to the end of 2008 were beneficial, as little to no comparative data exists. The LVFO depends highly on donor funds to support MCS and management initiatives, including training, capacity building and technical expertise. When donor funds are not available, regional MCS stagnates, which is a major concern. Operation Save the Nile perch is one such example. The EAC Council of Ministers in 2009 launched the ‘Operation Save the Nile Perch’ (OSNP), which required each of the three member states to contribute US$ 600 000. The goal of the initiative was to target illegal fishing and to curb the trade in undersize Nile perch currently threatening the economic integrity of Lake Victoria. The target of OSNP, as ratified by the Council of Ministers was to have fisheries illegalities in the lake, based on th e 2008 frame survey data as bench mark, reduced by 50% in June and 100% by December 2009. Currently as of 2011, Kenya has paid the required funds, with Tanzania only contributing 31% and Uganda zero resulting in less than half of the required funds paid in by from the member states. This undermines the legitimacy of ‘Operation Save the Nile Perch’ and political will and MCS operational capacity. The aim of this report was to assess the state of IUU in Lake Victoria, and to support the SMARTFISH programme in assisting the LVFO and established MCS committees to implement joint regional MCS trainings, by conducting a short cost benefit analysis of enhancing existing regional MCS initiatives and by evaluating past and present regional action plans to deter IUU fishing on Lake Victoria. An action plan was developed through a participatory workshop between the LVFO, national states and the MCS-RWG, held in Jinja, Uganda from the 5th to the 7th of October 2011.

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