5. WIN-CAMBODIA CASE STUDY

5.1 Introduction

In Cambodia, the introduction of diversification activities tended to be undertaken in a top-down manner, which led to weaker LDED outcomes. Although PRAs were undertaken at the beginning of the project, they were oriented to the Structured In-Service Training and Participatory Extension (SISTAPE) methodology and any diversification activities identified tended to have been initiated under the FAO Special Programme for Food Security (SPFS). This effectively represented an extension of the SPFS workplan using the WIN budget.

Between 2000 and 2001, the WIN and SPFS national coordinators identified better-off farmers and offered them one of the LDED activities on the PRA list. They were expected to demonstrate these activities on their land, and were periodically given free in-kind inputs, such as seeds, latrines and fertilizers, by WIN and SPFS. This was the result of the national coordinator’s belief that financially stable farmers perform at a higher level. It was expected that the farmers could then be seen as models by visiting missions as well as other farmers, and that they would produce significant results for the progress reports. Poorer farmers were not identified or targeted unless the issue was raised by the chief technical officer (CTA) or other backstopping officers.

Further WIN sites were identified by the national coordinator, between 2002 and 2003, with farmer seasonal planning and PRA activities undertaken. During this time, missions fielded by FAO HQ (microfinance and food processing/storage) identified two additional diversification activities. These followed the same process as the previous activities.

There is currently no data available to confirm whether any of the LDED activities undertaken through WIN-Cambodia led to increased incomes, value-added production, or sustained growth of micro-enterprises although there are some anecdotal reports which suggest diversification has occurred, primarily through the introduction of vegetables and livestock to the farming system. It would be premature to conclude that these activities have led to a sustained increase in income for a majority of the WIN participants.

5.2 LDED activities:

• Cash crop production (vegetables and fruit trees)

• Livestock production

• Food processing activities

Cash crop production (vegetables and fruit trees)

Since the 1990s, the SPFS Farmer Field Schools (FFS) have been promoting crop diversification to supplement traditional rice farming in Cambodia. During the WIN project, the FFS provided technical training for household food production and cash crop production using efficient irrigation schemes. The focus was largely on vegetable gardens, including watermelons, muskmelons, water spinach and long beans.

SPFS and WIN promoted and trained local people in agricultural diversification, reporting significant increases in output. Production data was never made available in English^[23], although, in August 2003, there were anecdotal reports that farmers were producing more on the same land area as a result of the inputs and training. However, the WIN national coordinator noted that government pricing policies were preventing adequate marketing of the increased output^[24]. Farmers in Doung Village, Takeo, reported that middlemen came to the village to buy long beans and watermelons, but pricing information was neither recorded nor available^[25]. In fact, the May 2000-December 2003 Progress Report states:

This corresponded to a general economic improvement in Cambodia, which may be due to improved rainfall, economic recovery, price policies and other factors. An accurate assessment of LDED outcomes is not possible due to a lack of specific crop production, marketing, and income data in English. Rouillard^[26] noted that references to financial issues are almost non-existent in progress reports. The transition from accompanied development to more business-like approaches remains a challenge for WIN-Cambodia and the SPFS^[27].

Livestock Production

Technical training in livestock production was a key activity for WIN-Cambodia, undertaken through the FFSs. Between 2000 and 2003, both WIN and SPFS distributed livestock (pigs, poultry, fish, and cattle) to farmers in two ways:

• As a complimentary input-to motivate selected farmers

• Through a livestock bank, operated by the two programmes.

In August 2003, the farmers reported an increased income due to more intensive livestock production. This information was verified by the national gender counterpart but could not be triangulated by monitoring data nor could the impact be ascertained.

Food processing activities

A gap in post-harvest technologies and food processing was identified by the CTA in June 2002. An international mission was sent by the project core team, in November 2002, which assessed the area, making recommendations for diversifying crop production, improved storage facilities, establishing market linkages, introducing value-added activities and gender orientation of the project^[28]. However, the mission noted that the capacity of the WIN-Cambodia national team to implement the recommendations was very limited. Their minimum recommendations were to conduct training in food processing and to prepare a topic-oriented gender action plan.

WIN-Cambodia then set up food processing training centers in Siem Reap and Takeo. Training-of-trainers (TOT) workshops in food processing were run in March 2003, in collaboration with the Ministry of Women’s and Veterans’ Affairs. Nineteen participants (13 men and 6 women) came from Takeo, Siem Reap and Kampot provinces. The eleven-day training covered theory and practice, preparation of fifteen value-added products, and a brief unit on setting up a small business. The training centers have since encountered problems due to lack of funds for maintenance and continued training^[29].

Photo: A WIN training workshop, Cambodia, K. Eckman, May 2003

5.3 Micro-finance and Credit

Prior to the initiation of WIN, the SPFS considered ways to provide credit to farmers and WIN then followed SPFS’s lead. In-kind credit was provided to selected farmers, generally through the SPFS-WIN livestock banks. Farmers were expected to give offspring to the district teams for redistribution to other participant farmers. Other inputs were provided free-of-charge, such as food, biogas digesters, latrines, treadle pumps, agricultural chemicals, seeds and others.

In October 2002, an international credit consultant visited Cambodia, with the corresponding mission report^[30] noting that revolving funds were established in all WIN-SPFS villages based on in-kind donations from the project to the village. Funds have been used to grant loans to individual villagers to purchase agricultural equipment and, to some extent, can be seen as a capacity building tool. However, bookkeeping and find management have been weak and the real situation of the funds in many villages is unknown^[31].

WIN’s national credit counterpart noted^[32], in 2003, that the national coordinator was focused on revolving funds at the expense of creating local assets, such as savings. By August 2003, there were 67 villages, each with at least 30 farmers involved in various revolving funds and the livestock bank. No data was available as to the gender composition of participants. In some cases, some farmers refused to pay the fund for livestock as others had been given free animals. Furthermore, the national credit counterpart observed that the participants were used to receiving inputs for free from the SPFS^[33] and saw no reason to repay loans from the revolving fund^[34].

The sustainability of the WIN and SPFS revolving funds has emerged as a key issue. For instance, SPFS and the WIN project staff manage the funds in lieu of local infrastructure as the technical ministry (MAFF) cannot actually implement credit schemes but can only give information about them to farmers. There is a real need for a fund infrastructure and management plan when WIN and SPFS are no longer operational.

5.4 Key successes

In spite of the less people-centered nature of the activities undertaken in Cambodia to identify key diversification activities, the WIN project was successful in adding value to the livelihoods of some of its participants.

• The diversification of vegetable production took place in many households, with nutritional benefits and surpluses created for markets.

• Livestock production increased among households, resulting in income from livestock sales

• Some individuals gained technical knowledge in food processing techniques

This success was due to a number of reasons, which have been outlined below:

• General economic recovery and the absence of conflict enabled farmers to resume production.

• A very intensive training programme oriented toward technical production and irrigation, which increased the farmers’ know-how.

• The technical orientation of the national team meant that most project resources were invested in an ambitious SISTAPE programme.

• Technical training provided by WIN-SPFS improved farmers’ knowledge of rearing livestock.

• Animals provided by the project as an incentive were sold.

• New training facilities and curricula were made available to district governments and selected farmers.

Another positive factor noted was the gender sensitization for staff and villagers provided by WIN. While gender sensitization did not directly lead to LDED activities being taken up by women, it did serve to raise the awareness of project and government staff regarding the economic and productive roles of women. It was also reported that male villagers came to regard women as important productive actors as a result of the training.

The role of multidisciplinary district teams was key for all activities (including IGAs) introduced through WIN. District-based extensionists were provided with considerable training in agricultural production through the SISTAPE methodology, and their capacities built in providing technical extension support to farmers.

5.5 What didn’t work?

Although some LDED activities were taken-up through WIN, they were not all successful in achieving improved livelihoods outcomes for the participants.

• Farmers’ knowledge of markets, business skills, record keeping and IGA planning were not significantly improved.

• Successful IGAs failed to emerge on a group or individual basis.

• Unclear intra-household allocation of labor and incomes derived from sales.

• Limited level of off-farm sales due to weak market links

• Involvement of women in irrigation management at scheme level was very limited

• Food processing IGAs failed to take off.

• Uncertain outcome and sustainability of all IGAs

• Microfinance provided by SPFS and WIN Cambodia did not appear to build local resources or to create an effective local resource pool.

Some of the key reasons for this lack of success are outlined:

• Training needs assessments were not carried out.

• Major investment in training was based on a standardized production-oriented SISTAPE curriculum.

• SISTAPE training did not address skills needed to foster the emergence of small enterprises.

• Lack of IGA/LDED expertise at district, provincial and national levels to support farmers.

• The national team was unaware of the normative work in LDED at FAO HQ and other organizations.

• Project staff did not have access to ‘how-to’ training materials and curricula on LDED.

• Weak entry-point (standardized PRAs and top-down selection of IGAs.

• Top-down targeting.

• Weak analysis of PRA data.

• No business planning was done by stakeholders.

• Insufficient PRA data analysis so that there was a limited understanding of the productive roles and responsibilities (according to age and gender)

• Gender impact assessment was not done.

• No market analysis was done prior to the introduction of LDED activities.

• A lack of support and leadership on the part of the project management

• IGA was imposed in a top-down manner with unclear targeting and lack of follow-up support.

• The incipient nature of the activities and project termination meant that follow-up support and backstopping were not forthcoming.

• Poor record keeping and accounting practices.

• Weak, centralized management of funds and insufficient government infrastructure.

• Lack of national and district level experience.

• Confusion among participants about repayment of inputs distributed by the project.