1) From your knowledge and experience how have trade agreements and rules affected the four dimensions of food security (availability, access, utilization, stability)?
In our experience, trade agreements and rules have a mixed affect on all four dimensions of food security. Jennifer Clapp’s 2014 paper provides an excellent survey of the literature both pro and con regarding cross-border trade agreements vs. free markets
The problem with much of the well-intentioned trade agreements and rules is the unintended consequences on local food production, storage, and markets that most global policy approaches tend to ignore until after the fact.
A better approach to global food security would be to focus more efforts on all aspects of the local food security value chain (see question #3 below), and then determine how national and regional trade agreements and rules can be applied to support the local food security value chain.
2) What is your knowledge and experience with creating coherence between food security measures and trade rules? Can rights-based approaches play a role?
Coherence between food security measures and trade rules is achievable, if the local food security value chain (FSVC) is addressed first. Rights-based approaches can and should play a role, but must first be addressed from the “bottom up” of the local FSVC.
One of the missing elements in the global food security, malnutrition, and trade agreements debate seems to be an understanding of what motivates farmers (including smallholder farmers) to grow a specific quantity and type of food. Farmers are rational producers in our experience, and will not grow more food than they can use themselves, or can profitably sell. Long-term food security depends upon all aspects of the Food Security Value Chain working in harmony. When “blockages” occur in the FSVC, whether from lack of the right seed (farming), or onerous trade rules that force prices to be too high or too low (markets), food security is diminished.
Similarly, if the participants in all aspects of the FSVC are not treated with dignity and respect, i.e., treated with basic human rights, then the FSVC and food security will be reduced because inefficiencies are introduced into the system. Thus, we would again argue that a “bottom up” approach to the local FSVC, including the rights of all stakeholders for fair pricing, should then lead to a regional and national approach that is more supportive of the FSVC “system”.
3) How can a food security strategy, including components that explicitly support small-scale farmers in agro-biodiverse settings, be implemented in ways that might be compatible with a global market-based approach to food security?
At AfriGrains, we believe the “Food Security Value Chain” (FSVC) includes the entire food security "system". This includes: 1) field preparation; 2) farming; 3) storage and handling; 4) transportation; and 5) markets. Without attention to all elements of the Value Chain, and unless they are viewed as a comprehensive "system" (or as a "complex adaptive system"), food security will only be minimally improved. International trade agreements and cross-border rules are only one small aspect of the Food Security Value Chain.
Policy makers should continually ask: “why would a farmer produce more food than they can store, transport and sell at a price that is greater than the cost of production-storage-transportation-sale?” If there is no way for the farmer to adequately store produce after harvest, resulting in post-harvest-losses due to disease, mold, or animal destruction, then the farmer is irrational to grow more food than can be safely stored prior to sale. If the farmer has only a donkey for transport to market, or can only transport food to market on his/her back/head, then there is little incentive to grow more food than can be consumed by the family. If the final price for the food at the market is less than the cost of storage, or cost of transport (even by donkey-back), or cost to produce, then the farmer is likewise irrational to grow more food than that needed to feed his/her family for the next year.
We believe that most farmers are rational, all else being equal. If farmers are rational producers, then they will only produce surplus food to the extent that they can reasonably expect to realize value from their efforts. If that food is expected to be lost during storage, is unlikely to be transported to market at a reasonable cost, or cannot be expected to be sold at a profit after expenses, then the rational farmer will not grow surplus food. Change that equation to correct the storage, transport or market incentives/prices, and the farmer will rationally grow as much grain as he/she is able to ultimately sell.
If our goal is to feed the 800million people who are food insecure today as well as the expected 2 billion more people by 2050, then we need to identify what systemic blockages exist within the FSVC that restrict the profitable production, storage, transportation and sale of food from farm to the consumer. Crossing national borders is only one small element of the entire FSVC. This assessment must be done at all levels: local, regional, national and international.
Historically, we see that it was not until the combination of farm mechanization, storage innovations, transportation improvements, and the creation of markets, that farmers in the Midwest United States transitioned from being subsistence-level farmers to food surplus producers. This transformation occurred in approximately the fifty years between1825-1875 and required all 4 sufficient conditions to be present before the region became food secure. The John Deere steel plow, the McCormick harvester, the steam-powered grain elevator, the Erie Canal, railroads, the telegraph, and the Chicago Board of Trade futures markets are just some of the changes that contributed to the transformation from subsistence level to food surplus farming over that time frame. It was also during this time frame that the increased production of food enabled the formerly subsistence-level farmers to produce enough surpluses to feed the growing urban populations of New York, Boston, Chicago, etc.
These same challenges face us today in Africa and Asia. Before addressing the trans-national trade agreement questions, we need to ask how x country is to grow enough food to feed its own urban population. Are there blockages within the local FSVC that restrict local farmers from providing the amount of food to the end consumer within the urban centers in their own country? If so, have they been identified, and what solutions are available to remove those blockages? Only after we have addressed the local FSVC issues can we then address the trans-national issues and blockages.
For example, in our experience, farmers in East Africa have the capacity to produce more food than what the family/household needs to feed itself. The growing urban populations are an easy market for local (smallholder) farmers to sell into. The demand is there. However, storage facilities are lacking, transportation systems (roads, railroads, trucks, trains) are not adequate, or not cost-effective, and thus the final price to the consumer is either too high, or locally produced food is simply not available. Until the local storage, transportation, and pricing issues are resolved, local farmers will not increase food production because why should farmers grow something that will spoil in storage, not be transported, or not be sold because the local FSVC system is too inefficient.
If the local FSVC of production, storage, transportation and markets can be more adequately addressed, then local (smallholder) farmers will successfully be able to compete with alternative sources of food. This levels the playing field between farm, storage, transportation, and merchants globally. Sorghum produced in the US is much more efficiently produced than in East Africa. However, capital costs of production are also higher in the US. Storage is more efficient in the US than East Africa. But the cost of transport should be much less from local producers in East Africa to urban centers than the cost of transport from the US. Except that donkey-back is not an efficient means of transport, and cannot provide enough quantity of food to market. Hence, the “blockage” to the local FSVC chain is the inefficiency of transportation, combined with poor (or non-existent) storage facilities. Solve the “donkey-back” transportation issue, and local smallholder farmers will be more than competitive with global, more efficient but very distant (cost of transportation) farmers, in terms of “delivered cost of food”.
In conclusion, achieving global food security is possible if policy makers such as FAO and Committee on Food Security change the paradigm, and address the entire FSVC systemically from the “bottom up”. Private companies such as AfriGrains can profitably address FSVC in East Africa, through purchasing from local smallholders and its own production, fixing the local storage and transport issues in a way that allows us to compete against the large multi-nationals. The solution is not more trade agreements and rules, but rather investors and companies willing to solve the world’s hunger challenge in creative, sustainable, and new ways, with human dignity and respect for all stakeholders.
Dennis Bennett
CEO
AfriGrains, Inc.
M. Dennis Bennett