AG index page FAO homepage
Print this page | Close

ARCHIVE H7N9 situation update

06 November 2019, 17:00 hours; Rome

The next update will be issued on 04 December 2019

Disclaimer

Information provided herein is current as of the date of issue. Information added or changed since the last H7N9 situation update appears in red. Human cases are depicted in the geographic location of their report. For some cases, exposure may have occurred in one geographic location but reported in another. For cases with unknown onset date, reporting date was used instead. FAO compiles information drawn from multiple national (Ministries of Agriculture or Livestock, Ministries of Health, Provincial Government websites; Centers for Disease Prevention and Control [CDC]) and international sources (World Health Organization [WHO], World Organisation for Animal Health [OIE]) as well as peer-reviewed scientific articles. FAO makes every effort to ensure, but does not guarantee, accuracy, completeness or authenticity of the information. The designation employed and the presentation of material on the map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of FAO concerning the legal or constitutional status of any country, territory or sea area, or concerning the delimitation of frontiers.

 

 Overview

Hazard: Influenza A(H7N9) virus with pandemic potential.
Country: China; imported cases in Malaysia (1) and Canada (2).
Number of human cases: 1,568 confirmed; 616 deaths (since February 2013).
New findings in birds / environment since last update (02 October 2019): 0

New human cases since last update (02 October 2019): 0

Map. Human cases and positive findings in birds or the environment in China

Human cases and positive findings in birds or the environment
Click to enlarge - Note: Human cases are depicted in the geographic location where they were reported; for some cases, exposure may have occurred in a different geographic location. During period 7 (October 2018-September 2019), 8 positive samples were detected in the exact same location in Liaoning Province (see map). For 14 samples from Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region the precise geographic location is currently unknown; these findings are therefore not shown on the map.

 

Provinces/municipalities affected: Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai and Tianjin Municipalities; Anhui, Fujian, Gansu, Guangdong, Guizhou, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, Liaoning, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Shandong, Sichuan, Taiwan, Yunnan and Zhejiang Provinces; Hong Kong SAR, Macao SAR; Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia Hui, Tibet and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Regions (China); Sabah (Malaysia); British Columbia (Canada).

Highly pathogenic virus findings: Since 10 January 2017, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) type H7N9 virus was detected in a total of 66 poultry or environmental samples (46 chickens, 8 peacocks, 2 duck and 10 environmental samples); H7N9 virus isolates from 32 human cases were found to be HPAI virus.

 

Table 1. Number of locations testing positive for H7N9 HPAI virus (n=44) in birds and/or the environment, by province and sampling site as of 06 November 2019.

Province

LBM*

Farm

Backyard

Others**

Total

Anhui

0

1

0

0

1

Fujian

1

0

0

0

1

Guangdong

22

0

0

0

22

Guangxi

0

1

0

0

1

Hebei

0

1

0

0

1

Heilongjiang

0

1

0

0

1

Henan

0

1

0

0

1

Hunan

3

1

1

0

5

Liaoning 0 1 0 1 2

Inner Mongolia

0

2

0

0

2

Ningxia Hui

0

2

0

0

2

Shaanxi

0

2

0

0

2

Shanxi

0

1

0

0

1

Tianjin

0

1

0

0

1

Unknown

0

0

0

1

1

TOTAL

26

15

1

2 44

*LBM: live bird market; **Others include one airport and one zoo.

 

 Situation update

Animals

  • 1 November: MARA published the results of Monthly post vaccination surveillance for the month of July and August 2019. In July 2019, 131 819 serum and 26 035 virological samples were collected from 6 107 locations in 28 provinces. Overall 94.54% of serum samples tested positive for H7 antibodies. No virology samples tested positive for H7N9 virus. [reference; p.35]. In August 2019, 100 529 serum and 16 525 virological samples were collected from 3 421 locations in 28 provinces. Overall 96.07% of serum samples tested positive for H7 antibodies. No virology samples tested positive for H7N9 virus. [reference; p.35]

 

Table 2. Post vaccination monitoring results in China during the period January to August 2019, by month.

Reporting period (2019)

#serum samples collected

Average post-vaccination monitoring immunization rate (target 70%)

#virological samples collected

#H7N9 positive virological samples

January

126 998

92.36

34 815

0

February

66 572

94.84

17 042

0

March

85 973

94.19

21 975

8

April

87 940

93.03

16 980

14

May

96 152

95.39

13 029

0

June

189 453

95.34

26 767

0

July 131 819 94.54 26 035 0
August 100 529 96.07 16 525 0

 

Animal/environmental findings: Since 4 April 2013 around 2500 virological samples from the environment, chickens, pigeons, ducks, turkeys, peacocks, a tree sparrow and a magpie robin tested positive; positives mainly from live bird markets, vendors and some commercial or breeding farms.

Figure 1. Number of positive virological samples from birds or the environment, by province and origin as of 06 November 2019

Number of positive virological samples from birds or the environment, by province and origin. Data include both high and low pathogenic H7N9 viruses
Click to enlarge - Data include both high and low pathogenic H7N9 viruses.

Figure 2. Distributions of low* and highly pathogenic H7N9 virologically positive samples (nLPAI=246; nHPAI=44) collected from birds or the environment, by sampling location, between October 2016 and 06 November 2019. Samples from the same location and time are grouped.

Phylogenetic relationships of A(H7) Eurasian HA genes, including Chinese-origin H7N9
Click to enlarge - Note: * May contain unconfirmed HPAI at the time of publishing.

Figure 3. Distributions of low* and highly pathogenic H7N9 virologically positive samples (nLPAI=281; nHPAI=50) collected from birds or the environment, by sample origin between October 2016 and 06 November 2019. Samples from the same origin, location and time are grouped.

Phylogenetic relationships of A(H7) Eurasian HA genes, including Chinese-origin H7N9
Click to enlarge - Note: * May contain unconfirmed HPAI at the time of publishing.

 

Humans

  • Since the last update (04 September 2019), no human cases were reported.
  • For detailed information on human cases, please refer to WHO report.

Figure 4. Number of officially reported human cases since February 2013, as of 06 November 2019

Phylogenetic relationships of A(H7) Eurasian HA genes, including Chinese-origin H7N9
Click to enlarge - Data include both high and low pathogenic H7N9 viruses.

Figure 5. Incidence of officially reported human cases by month, based on onset date from October 2014 (beginning of period 3) to 06 November 2019

Phylogenetic relationships of A(H7) Eurasian HA genes, including Chinese-origin H7N9
Click to enlarge - Note: For cases with unknown onset dates from period 2 (n=2), period 3 (n=146), period 4 (n=27) and period 5 (n=55), reporting dates were used instead. Both high and low pathogenic H7N9 viruses are included.

 

 Publications

  • Wu L, Mitake H, Kiso M, Ito M, Iwatsuki-Hirimoto K, Yamayoshi S, Lopes TJS, Feng H, Sumiyoshi R, Shibata A, Osaka H, Imai M, Watanabe T, Kawaoka Y. Characterization of H7N9 avian influenza viruses isolated from duck meat products. Transbound Emerg Dis. 2019 Oct 25. doi: 10.1111/tbed.13398. [reference] In this study, study authors assessed the biological features of two HPAI H7N9 virus isolates from duck meat products carried illegally and relinquished voluntarily at the border by passengers on flights from China to Japan between 2016 and 2017.The results indicate that HPAI H7N9 viruses with potential to cause severe diseases in mammals have been illegally introduced to Japan.
  • Bao L, Bi Y, Wong G, Qi W, Li F, Lv Q, Wang L, Liu F, Yang Y, Zhang C, Liu WJ, Quan C, Jia W, Liu Y, Liu W, Liao M, Gao GF, Qin C. Diverse biological characteristics and varied virulence of H7N9 from Wave 5. Emerg Microbes Infect. 2019;8(1):94-102. doi: 10.1080/22221751.2018.1560234. PubMed PMID: 30866763; PubMed Central PMCID: PMC6456849. [reference] In order to determine whethe H7N9 had become more infectious and pathogenic in relation to the increase of human infections with H7N9 avian influenza virus (AIV) during Wave 5 (2016-2017), study authors characterized the receptor binding and experimentally infected ferrets with highly pathogenic (HP)- and low pathogenic (LP)-H7N9 isolates selected from Wave 5, and compared their pathogenicity and transmissibility with a Wave 1 isolate from 2013. Given the Varied virulence and transmissibility observed in circulating H7N9 viruses from Wave 5, the authors concluded that the current public health risk of H7N9 has not substantially increased compared to 2013 and the circulating viruses are quite diverse.

 FAO actions

  • The Tripartite Zoonoses Guide is now available in all UN languages [link]
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – February 2019 [link]
  • FAO published a risk assessment update entitled, “Chinese-origin H7N9 avian influenza: spread in poultry and human exposure” [link]
  • A webinar entitled “Pros and cons of avian influenza vaccination” was presented by Leslie Sims on 14 May 2018 with technical support from FAO HQ. A recording of the webinar is available [link].
  • FAO guidance and risk assessments are available on a dedicated website [link]
  • Liaise with China and partners, monitor situation, monitor virus evolution, conduct market chain analysis, risk assessment, surveillance guidance and communication.

FAO’s support to countries