Contract Farming Resource Centre

A Contract Farming Agreement for Potato Seed Multiplication in India

Country/region: India

Commodity: Potato

Key words: contract analysis; legal protection; legal obligations; power imbalances; contract elements; bad practice

A bit of history…

Potato has its origin in the border between Peru and Bolivia, and it became the main food staple in the Andes and in southern Chile. By the end of the 16th century, potatoes were introduced in several European countries and from there arrived to India in the early 17th century. Potato cultivation prospered in colonial home gardens of northern Indian, particularly in the Shimla and Nilgiri hills (Singh and Rana, 2014).

However, until 1941, potato production did not reach a prosperous growth in India due to:

  • the unsuitability of potato varieties;
  • inadequate storage that did not preserved the quality of the product during the hot Indian summers; and
  • the fast degeneration of seed stocks caused by virus accumulation that contributed to low yields.

In the late 1990s, globalization brought significant changes to potato production and marketing in India, which became the second largest potato producer in the world, after China.

Contract farming for potato seed production in India

In India, a large number of small-scale farmers grow potatoes for self-consumption, rather than as a business. Potato cultivation requires intensive capital and inputs, which in most cases are not available to smallholder farmers. Potatoes are often produced in low productive areas with soil problems. Moreover, production inputs, such as fertilizers and agrochemicals, are expensive, so farmers tend to use inferior quality input, particularly inferior potato seeds (Singh and Rana, 2014).

Contract farming can help overcoming the unavailability of inputs and capital, especially when the buyer provides inputs to farmers (notably good quality seeds), credit and technical assistance, as a means to ensure a steady supply of good quality products. This way, farmers can produce more for self-consumption, but also to sell to local or foreign buyers.

The present case study analyses the contract (see Annex, pp. 5 and ff.) used in a contract farming operation between an international processing company and individual growers in northern India for the multiplication of potato seeds [for producing chips], whose names have been kept anonymous.

However, this contract is not the best example of a sound and fair contract farming agreement. It rather highlights how power unbalance between farmer and buyer can, sometimes, translate into uneven contractual obligations.

Obligation of the parties

The contract shows that growers have many responsibilities, but fewer rights compared to the buyer, which does not provide significant support in the production process.

Among other things, growers are responsible for:

  • Selling the chip grade multiplied potatoes to the company [2.5; 4.3 ii); 4.4] according to the quality and quantity requirements specified [Annexures A and B], such as size, colour, potatoes defects, as well as the expected yield in relation to the delivered planting materials [2.1];
  • Using the planting materials provided by the company only for the purposes of the contract (i.e. they cannot use or sell them or use them for other purposes) and paying for them before they are delivered [1.1; 1.2];
  • All farming activities, including land preparation, irrigation, planting, plant protection measures and harvesting [2.1];
  • Buying and using all other production inputs including agrochemicals and water. [2.2; 2.7];
  • Strictly following the contractor’s technical instructions [2.3] and allowing supervision at all times by the buyer’s representatives [2.4] to ensure the production and delivery of the agreed quality and quantity of multiplied potatoes;
  • Ensuring adequate land titling and paying all taxes and levies related to the land where the production activity takes place [4.1; 4.2].
  • The activity carried out by their working force (i.e. the contract clearly states that the grower’s working force are not considered direct employees of the company) [4.5].

 

On the other hand, the buyer is responsible for:

  • Buying the product (chip grade multiplied potatoes) from the producers [2.5; 3.2];
  • Paying a fix price plus an incentive when applicable, according to the contract annexes [3.3; 3.4]
  • Supplying potato planting materials to the growers [1.1];

Evidence of power imbalance in the contract

By signing the contract farming agreement, growers have an assured market for their production, but on the other hand, the uneven contractual conditions do not provide adequate protection to them as it does to the company. This is exemplified by the following:

1) The buyer requires exclusivity (growers have to sell 100 percent of their production to the company and if they wish to enter into an agreement with another party, they are obliged to receive prior consent by the company [2.5; 4.3.i)]) and can supervise and monitor at its sole discretion all farming activities, but does not finance any input. Only planting materials of the variety required by the company are provided, but only after the farmer has settled the payment [1.1; 1.2].

2) The fact that the payment of the planting materials delivered by the company must be settled before their actual delivery, for instance, expose growers to the following risks:

  • A late delivery may negatively affect the production process and thus the money they receive (in terms of volumes and grades).
  • Should the inputs provided by the company be defective, e.g. infected seeds, the grower still is requested to meet the quality and quantity requirements stipulated in the contract. Conversely, rejections of multiplied potatoes delivered by growers would be on their account [2.5].
  • It appears that the price of the planting materials provided to the growers is unilaterally determined by the company.

3) As mentioned in 1), the company has the right to visit the production site and monitor all farming activities, which means that growers have to agree to the broad control over production that the company exercises, without gaining much in exchange [2.3; 2.4]. In contract farming operations such instructions normally come with certain correlated obligations, such as providing inputs, technical assistance and training on safe input use, record keeping and complying with administrative obligations, among others; but not in this case. This broad control over the production seems to diminish growers’ independence and make them and their working force de facto employees of the contractor, rather than an independent party, contrary to what stated in the contract [4.5] (UNIDROIT, FAO and IFAD, 2015).

4) Agricultural activity normally takes place over a certain portion of land that growers have actual ownership over or right to use. In some cases, the grower may lease the land from a private or public entity. There are also situations where individuals or communities do not hold any formal title on land under customary forms of tenure (ibid). Because of the risk related to secure tenure rights, the company considers the grower responsible for any damage that the company suffers with respect to inadequate land titling [4.1; 4.2].

5) The contract indicates the cases where the company is entitled to terminate the contract, but this right is not foreseen for the grower in case of company default. 

References

FAO. 2017. Contract Farming Resource Centre available at www.fao.org/contract-farming

FAOSTAT available at http://faostat.fao.org/

Singh, BP and Rana, Rajesh K. 2014. History of Potato and its Emerging Problems in India. Central Potato Research Institute, Shimla, India.

UNIDROIT/FAO/IFAD. 2015. Legal Guide on Contract Farming. Available at http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4756e.pdf