Since social protection and smallholder agricultural interventions often cover the same geographic space and target the same households, there are opportunities for synergies and complementarities that strengthen livelihoods of poor rural households.
Social protection policies aim to reduce socio-economic risks, vulnerability, extreme poverty and deprivation, while smallholder agricultural policies focus on improving productivity in crops, fisheries, forestry and livestock and access to markets. Both areas of policy are important elements in poverty reduction strategies, but little attention has been paid to the interaction between them and the implications for design and implementation of related policies and programmes.
Poor rural households that mostly rely on agriculture for their livelihoods are often affected by limited access to resources, low agricultural productivity, poorly functioning markets and repeated exposure to risks. Social protection can help alleviate credit, savings and liquidity constraints by providing cash and in-kind support. In addition, the regularity and predictability of social protection instruments help households to manage risks better and to engage in more profitable livelihood and agricultural activities. Agricultural policies and programmes can help smallholder households manage risk by stimulating farm output, income and overall household welfare.
Payments for environmental services (PES) are increasingly discussed as appropriate mechanisms for matching the de mand for environmental services with the incentives of land users whose actions m odify the supply of those environmental services. While there has been considerable discussion of the institutional mechanisms for PES, relatively little attention has been given to the inter-relat ionships between PES institutions and other rural institutions. This paper presents and builds upon the proposition that both the function and welfare effects of PES institutions depend crucially on the co-institutions of collective action (CA) and property rights (PR).
The project reviews Payments for Environmental Services (PES) schemes and other instruments to remunerate positive externalities in agriculture with the purpose of establishing the basis for informed decision-making on ecosystem services and food security, as a contribution to sustainable agriculture and rural development.
By: José Graziano da Silva; Mauro Eduardo Del Grossi; Caio Galvão de França.
The launching of the “Zero Hunger Project – a proposal for a food security policy for Brazil” in October 2001 by the then candidate for the presidency Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva reflected the maturing of discussions and proposals on food security and fighting hunger, which became national priorities to be addressed through planned and decisive actions of the State with social participation. With the electoral victory of President Lula in 2003, the Zero Hunger project became the main governmental strategy guiding economic and social policies in Brazil and marked the beginning of an inflection that left behind an old dichotomy between them. Actions began to be taken to integrate structural policies into emergency policies to fight hunger and poverty. New, differentiated policies for family farming were implemented and basic legislation was built for the national food and nutrition security policy. This book is part of the NEAD Debate Series (Série NEAD Debate) and it presents some fundamental texts for one to understand the Brazilian experience with the Zero Hunger Program at different moments of its implementation over an eight-year period as a Government Program, bringing together reflections on different aspects of the process, such as the mobilization of different segments of society around it, the role of family farming, advances and challenges, among others.