Rapid risk assessment: foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) virus serotype SAT1
Date of publication: 4 December 2025
Assessment period (data as of): 5 November - 21 November 2025
Version of the assessment: 1
Geographical coverage: North Africa; Central, South and Western Asia; and South-Eastern Europe
Objective: To rapidly assess the likelihood and impact of further spread of the FMD serotype SAT1 epidemic that was first reported in Iraq in March 2025 and provide recommendations for Members on risk mitigation. This work follows the publication of two regional alerts for FMD SAT1.
Scope: This assessment evaluates the risk of further spread of FMD serotype SAT1 within the next 3 months. Countries and territories are included in the assessment if they are adjacent or in close proximity to affected countries as follows: Afghanistan, Armenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Georgia, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Yemen.
Affected countries are those in which SAT1 has been reported since March 2025, either through the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH), the World Reference Laboratory for Foot-and-Mouth Disease (WRLFMD) or through media reports citing national governments. Since the initial detection in Iraq, there have been reports from Azerbaijan, a quarantine station in Bahrain, Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kuwait, and Türkiye.
Contact
For any queries on this assessment, please contact [email protected]
Disclaimer
Document information: This risk assessment draws on a comprehensive review of official information, technical documents, and expert input to evaluate the risk of FMDV SAT1 infection among susceptible livestock in currently unaffected countries over a three-month horizon. The assessment separately examines the likelihood of exposure and the potential impact of an epidemic.
Aim of the RRA: To provide a rapid, evidence-based evaluation of the likelihood and impact of FMD serotype SAT1 introduction, raise awareness among Members, and inform the planning and implementation of risk-mitigation measures.
Statement: This assessment reflects information available as of 21 November 2025 and may be updated as new findings emerge from field investigations, laboratory analyses, and epidemiological studies.
Overall risk assessment statement on likelihood, impact and uncertainty
Likelihood: very likely
SAT1 is very likely to infect livestock in one or more currently unaffected countries/territories in the next 3 months. Informal animal movement is the pathway most likely to be responsible for this spread, as FMD virus (FMDV) transmits readily between infectious and susceptible animals and no sanitary measures are applied to informal animal movements. Informal movements of small ruminants may pose a particular threat, as they can be subclinically infected but still shed FMDV. Weak veterinary services and lack of SAT1 vaccine also contribute to the high likelihood of spread.
Impact: moderate to severe
The expected economic impact is moderate to severe, depending on how many and which countries/territories become affected with SAT1.
Across the studied regions, there is a wide spectrum of scale and dependence in livestock systems.
In several countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, the Syrian Arab Republic, Palestine and Yemen), livestock contribute 30-50 percent to agricultural gross domestic product (GDP) and small ruminants are central to household income and local food supplies. These systems are dominated by smallholders, where milk, meat and live-animal sales form a major share of rural cash flow, and where national food security already is under pressure.
In contrast, other countries included in the assessment (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates) have comparatively smaller livestock sectors, with livestock representing only a minor share of agricultural GDP and, in several cases, there is a heavy reliance on imported animal products. These countries are also supported by effective veterinary services.
FMDV serotype SAT1 incursions are expected to result in substantial socio-economic impacts where domestic ruminant production is a key livelihood pillar. The reported high morbidity, and in some cases mortality, in naïve herds, together with the known propensity for affecting dairy cattle, would sharply reduce short-term milk availability in countries where fresh domestic dairy plays an important role, such as Armenia, Jordan, Lebanon and Pakistan. Food-security stress would intensify in fragile contexts like Libya, the Syrian Arab Republic, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Yemen. In these latter settings, any reduction in animal productivity immediately increases market prices, weakens purchasing power, tightens local markets and disrupts informal and cross-border trade channels. In more diversified or commercially structured economies, the socio-economic consequences would remain localised, with national markets better able to absorb production losses through substitution and stronger veterinary infrastructure.
Uncertainty: moderate to high
The assessment is subject to moderate-high uncertainty due to lack of surveillance/reporting, the importance of informal animal movements in FMD spread and the intrinsic lack of data concerning such movements.
Table 1. Results of rapid risk assessment of FMD-susceptible livestock in unaffected countries/territories being exposed to FMDV serotype SAT1 (number of countries by likelihood–impact score combinations).
| Likelihood ↓ / Impact → | Neglibile | Low | Moderate | Severe |
| Extremely unlikely | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Unlikely | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Likely | 0 | 6 | 6 | 2 |
| Very likely | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
Summary of the event and hazard profile
Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD)
Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is a highly contagious viral disease affecting cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, and other cloven-hoofed animals. SAT1 is one of seven FMDV serotypes, and immunity is serotype-specific, meaning infection or vaccination against other serotypes does not confer protection. Infected animals typically develop fever and painful blisters/sores on their feet, in the mouth, nose, snout, and teats, often accompanied by depression, loss of appetite, weight loss, lameness, and significant drop in milk production. Mortality can be observed in young animals due to acute heart failure. Small ruminants often show few or no clinical signs, complicating the detection of infection.
While FMD poses no direct risk to human health, the disease has severe economic consequences, disrupting food security, livelihoods, and trade. The economic impact of FMD outbreaks can be substantial, especially for countries that are free of disease, or if there is an incursion of a novel serotype for which there is no population immunity. These impacts are through reduced production, trade restrictions and the cost of control measures such as vaccination or culling.
FMDV transmission occurs mainly through respiratory and oral routes, with the virus shed in all excretions and secretions (saliva, urine, faeces, milk). The spread of FMDV is facilitated by animal movements, but can also be spread by contaminated clothing, footwear, equipment, and vehicles. The virus can survive in the environment and animal products, making control challenging.
Summary of the epidemic
The FMDV serotype SAT1 epidemic in Western Asia unfolded rapidly in 2025. The first reported confirmation occurred in Iraq in March, affecting cattle and water buffalo, prompting FAO to issue an alert. Soon after, Kuwait reported cases in cattle in April and May, followed by Türkiye, where FMD outbreaks were reported throughout April-August. In July, Egypt detected SAT1, marking its spread into North Africa. By October, Azerbaijan reported an outbreak in its northern region near the Georgian border which prompted a second alert from FAO. Media sources quoting government officials suggest additional circulation in other parts of Asia, notably the Islamic Republic of Iran, with impacts on dairy production (see references).
Context and major risk pathways
FMD has been a long-standing challenge in Africa and Asia, with multiple serotypes usually circulating. FMD outbreaks in these regions are often linked to transboundary animal movements, informal livestock trade, and inadequate vaccination coverage. While FMDV serotypes SAT1, SAT2 and SAT3 are usually confined to sub-Saharan Africa, FMDV SAT2 was detected in Western Asia in 2022 and now FMDV SAT1 has been reported in several countries. These detections are linked to virus strains commonly found in East Africa. Although vaccines for FMD are widely used in most countries included in this assessment, livestock remain highly susceptible to SAT1 infection because these vaccines do not typically include SAT1 strains.
While FMD is not present in South-East Europe, it is particularly vulnerable to FMDV incursions due to its proximity to endemic areas in Anatolia and lack of vaccination.
Risk questions
1. What is the risk of FMDV SAT1 infection among FMD-susceptible livestock in unaffected countries/territories in the next three months?
1a. What is the likelihood of FMD-susceptible livestock in unaffected countries/territories being exposed to FMDV serotype SAT1?
1b. What is the potential impact of FMD-susceptible livestock being exposed to FMDV serotype SAT1 on food security, trade revenue and livelihoods in unaffected countries/territories?
Methodology
The risk assessment was initiated on 5 November 2025 and considers the expected risk to early February 2026, with information available up to 21 November 2025. The assessment is based on major epidemiological pathways for FMD transboundary spread, which are illustrated in the scenario tree below. Information on risk factors for each target country/territory was retrieved from multiple sources (see below). In addition, experts from FAO decentralized offices in the targeted regions were consulted to share their knowledge and provide input on the risk assessment.
Four levels were used to qualitatively assess the likelihood of introduction (Table 2) and the level of impact if the introduction occurs in each country/territory (Table 3). Three levels of uncertainty were applied when interpreting the available data, based on data quality and quantity (Table 4).
Table 2. Likelihood levels used for the risk assessment of FMD-susceptible livestock in unaffected countries/territories being exposed to FMDV serotype SAT1 (adapted from FAO Technical guidelines on rapid risk assessment for animal health threats).
Level | Definition |
Extremely unlikely | May only occur in exceptional circumstances. |
Unlikely | May occur, but not in the majority of instances. |
Likely | May occur in the majority of instances. |
Very likely | Can be expected to occur frequently. |
Table 3. Impact levels used for the risk assessment of FMD-susceptible livestock in unaffected countries/territories being exposed to FMDV serotype SAT1 (from FAO Technical guidelines on rapid risk assessment for animal health threats).
Level | Description |
Negligible | Few herds infected and animals suffering from mild disease. Very small decrease in production and productivity of the herd. |
Low | Few herds and animals infected suffering from severe disease resulting in both significant production losses and high morbidity. Loss of few animals due to the event and decrease in productivity. |
Moderate | Several herds and livestock value chains affected and animals suffering severe disease resulting in significant production losses and high mortality. Farmers incurring loss of livestock income and herds becoming unsustainable (herds cannot reproduce themselves). Significant direct economic losses. |
Severe | Most herds infected and animals suffering severe disease resulting in significant production losses, high mortality and case fatality. High socio-economic impact with additional losses due to trade restrictions, loss of consumer confidence and impact on tourism and biodiversity. |
Table 4. Uncertainty levels used for the risk assessment of FMD-susceptible livestock in unaffected countries/territories being exposed to FMDV serotype SAT1.
| Level | Description |
| Low | Information and data that are relevant to the RRA, consistent and not conflicting are available. No subjective judgement is introduced. Published data can be used. |
Moderate | Some information and data are lacking, incomplete, inconsistent or conflicting. Subjective judgement with supporting evidence is introduced. Published data can sometimes be used. |
High | Most information and data are lacking, incomplete, inconsistent or conflicting. Subjective judgement may be introduced without supporting evidence. Unpublished data are frequently used. |
Summary data or evidence supporting the assessment
Sources consulted included FAO databases (EMPRES Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i+), FAOSTAT), the World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS) of the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH), reports of the WRLFMD, the dashboard of the Progressive Control Pathway for FMD (PCP-FMD), national reports, and peer-reviewed publications.
The likelihood assessment considered: several well-established risk pathways for transboundary FMDV transmission (formal and informal trade in live animals and animal products and common grazing practices); the existence of shared borders; current and retrospective data on the epidemiological situation and endemicity of FMD serotypes; and previously observed patterns of transboundary animal disease incursions in the region with common risk pathways (e.g. peste des petits ruminants, lumpy skin disease, and sheep/goat pox). Additionally, information on the FMD vaccination status, veterinary services capacity, surveillance and control measures at borders, and their stage in the PCP-FMD were considered. Experts at FAO headquarters and in the different regions were consulted to verify and complete the evidence gathered, and their opinions were incorporated in the assessment.
The impact assessment focused on the size of susceptible livestock populations and the contribution of livestock production to agricultural GDP and animal protein supply. Production system characteristics, such as the predominance of smallholder versus commercial operations, were considered alongside trade orientation (net importer or exporter) and the scale of meat and milk production. These indicators provide a basis for estimating potential consequences for food security, trade, and livelihoods should FMDV serotype SAT1 be introduced into the livestock population of currently unaffected countries/territories.
Key assumptions
- Exposure of susceptible livestock to FMD SAT1 virus will lead to infection.
- FMDV serotype SAT1 is not circulating in countries/territories that have not reported through either WAHIS, the WRLFMD or through media reports citing national governments (see references and data sources).
- This assessment does not consider the introduction of other strains of FMDV from Eastern Africa, Southern Africa, or Southern Asia.
- Countries/territories previously declaring infection continue to be a risk to other countries.
Recommendations for Members
Risk mitigation measures tailored to each at-risk country/territory should be identified and implemented by public and private stakeholders. Those at higher risk should prioritize implementing these interventions. Countries/territories should review risk pathways that have previously resulted in the introduction and spread of FMDV and plan mitigation interventions. This may include initiating or updating risk assessments and preparing for procurement and emergency deployment of a vaccine that protects against the circulating strain of SAT1 virus.
General recommendations
To reduce the risk of entry of SAT1:
- Enhance inspections at international borders, within national administrative borders, and on high-risk traffic routes to minimize the risk of introduction of potentially infected animals and contaminated products (including but not limited to fresh meat, milk, semen/embryos, feed/forage, manure). Consider increases in penalties for non-compliance.
- Engage with neighbouring countries/territories to establish the location of current outbreaks and other relevant information such as current surveillance and control measures.
- Closely monitor the wider regional situation and implement a detailed risk assessment specific to the country or territory.
- Raise stakeholder awareness about:
- the risk posed by informal cross-border movements of animal and animal products,
- biosecurity measures that can reduce the risk of cross-border movements (e.g. ensuring animals are healthy and vaccinated, cleaning and disinfection of transport vehicles).
To reduce the risk of exposure/spread of SAT1 following entry:
- Implement awareness campaigns that:
- Inform farmers and communities about the increased threat of FMD and measures they can take to protect their livestock, particularly in areas at high risk of FMDV SAT1 introduction.
- Encourage farmers and private veterinarians to promptly report any suspicious clinical signs to the veterinary services. Such reporting should be facilitated by the veterinary services as much as possible (e.g. through a dedicated telephone number).
- Ensure laboratory capacity to test for FMD or outsource confirmatory testing from reference laboratories with necessary agreements in place
- Consider implementing surveillance and vaccination in high-risk areas, particularly those with known links to FMD-affected countries.
- Submit samples from suspected outbreaks to the laboratory for confirmatory testing and to determine the causative serotype. A subset of representative samples should be sent to an FMD Reference Laboratory for full viral characterization and vaccine matching.
- Review FMD contingency plans, as well as standard operating procedures (SOPs) for surveillance and outbreak control including vaccination.
- Ensure outbreak response strategies and capacity are in place to implement effectively control measures, e.g. zoning, market and movement restrictions.
- If FMD vaccine is used, it should be of high quality and administered according to the manufacturer’s specifications. The viral strain(s) in the vaccine must antigenically match those circulating in the field.
- Strengthen biosecurity measures on farms and throughout livestock value chains:
- Sick animals should be separated from other livestock and examined by an animal health professional. They should never be sold or moved to areas where other animals may get infected.
- Movement and mixing animals should be minimized.
- Do not feed animals untreated food waste, especially from ships, aircraft, hotels or restaurants, which may use meat products of foreign origin.
- Avoid introducing animals from unknown sources. Conduct a thorough health check before integrating any new stock into your herd or flock. It is recommended to observe a quarantine period of at least five days (ideally extending to 14 days), before allowing the new animals to mix with the rest of the herd or flock.
- Clean footwear and clothing should be worn when handling livestock, and visitors should not be permitted to have contact with livestock.
- Mixing of different livestock consignments should be avoided during transport and at markets. Markets, vehicles and transport hubs should be thoroughly cleaned and emptied between sales with rest days. A livestock standstill should be considered, especially if there is suspicion of FMD SAT1 in the country/territory.
Results of the RRA
Risk question: 1. What is the risk of FMDV SAT1 infection among FMD-susceptible livestock in unaffected countries/territories in the next three months?
- Likelihood: Very likely
- Impact: Moderate to severe
- Uncertainty: Moderate to high
Rationale
SAT1 is very likely to infect livestock in one or more currently unaffected countries/territories in the next 3 months. Informal animal movement is the pathway most likely to be responsible for this spread, as FMDV transmits readily via infected and susceptible animals and no or limited sanitary measures are applied to informal animal movements. Informal movements of small ruminants may pose a particular threat, as they can be subclinically infected but still shed FMDV. Weak veterinary services and lack of SAT1 vaccine also contribute to the high likelihood of spread.
The expected impact is moderate to severe, depending on how many and which countries/territories become affected with SAT1. There is a diversity in the level of food security and importance of livestock in the economies of the countries/territories included in the assessment.
The assessment is subject to moderate-high uncertainty due to lack of surveillance/reporting, the importance of informal animal movements in FMD spread and the intrinsic lack of data concerning such movements.
Risk questions:
1a. What is the likelihood of FMD-susceptible livestock in unaffected countries/territories being exposed to FMDV serotype SAT1?
1b. What is the potential impact of FMD-susceptible livestock being exposed to FMDV serotype SAT1 on food security, trade revenue and livelihoods in unaffected countries/territories?
Likelihood: Likely | Uncertainty: High
Afghanistan shares a border with the Islamic Republic of Iran, but formal movements of live animals from the Islamic Republic of Iran into Afghanistan appear limited. However, the country has very low veterinary service coverage, and its porous borders likely enable informal transboundary animal movements, including pastoral movements (across the border regions between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan) as part of local traditional seasonal transhumance (mainly small ruminants). Afghanistan is at PCP-FMD Stage 1 and reported FMDV circulation in 2024 to WOAH. It hosts significant cattle and small ruminant populations that are naïve to FMD SAT1, with no SAT1 vaccination implemented.
Impact: Severe | Uncertainty: Moderate
Livestock contributes roughly two-thirds of agricultural GDP and dominates dietary protein supply. Any SAT1 outbreak would have national food-security and livelihood repercussions. Data gaps and limited recent statistics increase uncertainty.
Likelihood: Likely | Uncertainty: Moderate
Armenia borders three countries affected by FMD SAT1 including Azerbaijan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Türkiye and has a livestock population of roughly 1.4 million cattle, small ruminants, and pigs. Although no FMD outbreaks have been reported since 2015 (serotype A), the region has previously experienced progressive lumpy skin disease (LSD) virus spread from Türkiye and the Islamic Republic of Iran through the Caucasus and Eastern Europe between 2014 and 2017, despite the absence of vector transmission. Starting in September 2025, the Government of Armenia launched a vaccination campaign using the monovalent FMD SAT1 vaccine. The entire large ruminant population was vaccinated while a vaccine coverage of 35 percent was achieved in the small ruminant population. This vaccination targeted high-risk areas such as administrative divisions bordering Azerbaijan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Turkey, or with a high level of population movement for trade. Armenia remains at PCP-FMD Stage 2.
Impact: Low | Uncertainty: Moderate
Trade in animals and their products with countries affected by FMD SAT1 is minimal. There is no trade between Armenia and Azerbaijan or Türkiye, and the borders are militarized. Livestock contributes 40 percent of agricultural GDP; small-ruminant systems are widespread. Localized dependence implies moderate national consequences. Moderate uncertainty about the consequences as export and value-chain data are partial.
Likelihood: Unlikely | Uncertainty: Low
Bulgaria borders one FMD SAT1-affected country, Türkiye, although the Thrace region is officially FMD-free. The last confirmed FMD outbreak in Bulgaria occurred in 2011 near the Turkish border and involved serotype O. The region also experienced the progressive spread of LSD virus from Türkiye and the Islamic Republic of Iran into the Caucasus and Eastern Europe during 2014–2017. Bulgaria does not apply SAT1 vaccination and is officially recognized as FMD-free without vaccination. Trade with Türkiye is mostly informal and limited, involving small, sporadic volumes of live animals, animal products (dairy and meat), and fodder. Historical instances of transboundary disease introductions such as peste des petits ruminants (PPR), FMD in wild boar, and sheep/goat pox, may suggest potential pathways for future incursions from Türkiye. European Union (EU)-level surveillance and control capacity is in place.
Impact: Low | Uncertainty: Low
Livestock accounts for roughly 24 percent of agricultural production in Bulgaria. Agriculture itself contributes only 2-4 percent of national GDP, so livestock’s share of the national economy is relatively small. Consequences are largely contained. Data reliability is high.
Likelihood: Likely | Uncertainty: Moderate
Cyprus is officially recognized as FMD-free without vaccination. The last suspicion of FMD in Cyprus was in 2007 based on serological evidence involving serotype O. In 2014, LSD virus was also detected on the island, as part of a regional epidemic which also affected Türkiye, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Caucasus and Eastern Europe between 2014 and 2017. FAOSTAT 2023 records suggest that Türkiye exported animal products to the island including small volumes of cattle meat (67 tonnes of boneless meat; 1.6 tonnes of meat with bone), 653 tonnes of raw cow milk and 1 635 tonnes of cheese from whole cow milk. The proximity and potential connections to Anatolia enhance the likelihood of introduction.
Impact: Low | Uncertainty: Moderate
Intensive but small livestock base; strict island biosecurity. Short-term output losses possible, long-term impact minimal. Reliable data.
Likelihood: Very likely | Uncertainty: Moderate
No FMD outbreaks have been reported since 2011 but a recent outbreak in Azerbaijan near the border, combined with Georgia’s shared borders with two infected countries—Türkiye and Azerbaijan—highlights ongoing likelihood of exposure. Georgia declared LSD infection as part of the broader regional spread into the Caucasus and Eastern Europe during 2014–2017 from the Islamic Republic of Iran and Türkiye. Georgia is mobilizing SAT1 vaccination. The country is currently at PCP-FMD Stage 3. Formal trade in live animals and their products are potential exposure pathways: live animals, meat, dairy products (including 6 317 tonnes of raw cattle milk in 2023) and fodder from Azerbaijan, as well as shared grazing areas; animals and dairy products from the Islamic Republic of Iran; live animals from Iraq; and meat and dairy products, including 1 576 tonnes of raw cattle milk in 2023, from Türkiye. Informal cross-border movements also occur along the Georgia–Türkiye border, further contributing to potential risk.
Impact: Moderate | Uncertainty: Moderate
Livestock contributes to 30–35 percent of agricultural GDP; smallholders are dependent on ruminants for daily nutrition, seasonal income, and as their main buffer against economic shocks. Limited capacity to control animal movements raises risk but overall production scale is moderate. Data coverage on consequences is fair but not recent.
Likelihood: Likely | Uncertainty: Moderate
Greece borders one FMD SAT1-affected country, Türkiye, although the Thrace region is officially FMD-free. The country has not reported any FMD outbreaks since 2000, when serotype Asia-1 was detected. The broader region experienced the progressive spread of LSD virus from Türkiye and the Islamic Republic of Iran into the Caucasus and Eastern Europe between 2014 and 2017. Greece is officially recognized as FMD-free without vaccination. Trade involving potentially relevant products is limited, including very small volumes of dairy and meat imports from Bahrain in 2021 (at import quarantine facility, with no subsequent reports), dairy and meat imports from Türkiye in 2023, and cheese imports from Egypt in 2023. Several Greek islands lie only a few kilometres from Türkiye, creating additional proximity-related considerations for potential disease introduction such as through informal movements.
Impact: Low | Uncertainty: Low
Diversified economy, strong EU veterinary network. Limited macro-economic sensitivity. High data confidence.
Likelihood: Likely | Uncertainty: Moderate
Israel is not participating in the PCP-FMD framework and has consistently reported FMD outbreaks including in 2025 detecting serotype O. Trade-related exposure pathways include dairy imports from Türkiye—such as 700 tonnes of cheese made from whole cow’s milk and 152 tonnes of raw milk in 2023—as well as cheese imports from Egypt in 2023. Israel shares a significant land border with Egypt through the Sinai, and the situation in Gaza Strip includes substantial military presence. Historically, FMD has entered Israel through neighbouring countries including the Gaza Strip.
Impact: Low | Uncertainty: Moderate
Robust animal-health system and vaccination capacity. Any outbreak likely localized. Reliable, up-to-date data.
Likelihood: Likely | Uncertainty: High
Jordan has previously experienced transboundary animal diseases concurrently with neighbouring countries, including SAT2 in 2023 and LSD in 2013 alongside Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Türkiye, making it a useful reference for regional risk prediction. Susceptible livestock species are common, and FMD SAT1 vaccination is available and used by dairy cattle owners. The country does not import live animals from currently affected countries (FAOSTAT, 2023). Jordan is at PCP-FMD Stage 2, reflecting moderate surveillance and a structured but still developing control capacity. While the absence of direct legal imports reduces immediate risk, regional circulation and informal movements—such as livestock entry from Iraq, agricultural workers from Egypt, and tourists or trucks from Türkiye—create plausible short-term pathways for disease introduction.
Impact: Moderate | Uncertainty: High
A predominantly small-ruminant sector with moderate reliance on animal protein (about 35 percent of the total dietary protein supply). Data availability is adequate, though several key datasets have not been updated since 2017–2020, hence increasing the level of uncertainty.
Likelihood: Likely | Uncertainty: High
Lebanon has previously experienced transboundary animal diseases concurrently with neighbouring countries, including LSD in 2012 alongside Egypt and Türkiye. The country does not formally import live animals from currently affected countries (FAOSTAT, 2023), and susceptible species are common across mixed smallholder systems. However, porous borders, informal livestock movements from Syria, and human mobility—including religious travel to Iraq and cross-border movements from Türkiye—create plausible short-term pathways for disease introduction. Lebanon’s ongoing political and economic crises have undermined veterinary capacity, weakening surveillance, vaccination, and related services, while reporting gaps further elevate uncertainty in risk assessment.
Impact: Moderate | Uncertainty: High
Dairy and small-ruminant sectors are central to rural incomes, and the ongoing economic crisis heightens their vulnerability. Production data are generally reasonable, but recent updates are limited.
Likelihood: Very likely | Uncertainty: High
Libya has experienced concurrent transboundary animal diseases with neighbouring Egypt, including SAT2 in 2013, reflecting strong cross-border epidemiological links. The country has historically imported live cattle from Egypt (FAOSTAT, 2023). Susceptible livestock species are common, with large and widespread ruminant populations. Libya is at PCP-FMD Stage 1, indicating early-stage control with limited systematic surveillance. Recent and ongoing FMD activity, combined with porous borders and informal livestock movements from Egypt, create a plausible short-term risk of disease introduction. Other serotypes and lineages of FMDV are considered endemic, with several 2024 World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH)-reported outbreaks, though serotype data are incomplete. Instability and fragmented veterinary capacity, including political instability, further reduce surveillance and control effectiveness, contributing to high uncertainty.
Impact: Severe | Uncertainty: High
Veterinary governance remains limited, within a fragile economy and a highly import-dependent system. The food-security implications are significant. Available data is sparse and largely outdated.
Likelihood: Likely | Uncertainty: Moderate
Oman has historically imported live cattle, sheep, and goats from affected countries, including the Bahrain and Islamic Republic of Iran (FAOSTAT, 2023), and previously from Türkiye, creating potential pathways for virus introduction. The country is at PCP-FMD Stage 2, with susceptible livestock species common and SAT1 vaccination routinely applied, providing a moderate mitigating barrier. FMD infection has been confirmed in wild species (e.g. oryx) and farmed wild species (e.g. oryx and gazelle) which graze in proximity to free-ranging cattle, adding uncertainty to disease dynamics. The impact of FMD is assessed as moderate due to proactive vaccination.
Impact: Low | Uncertainty: Moderate
A moderate livestock base with strong import buffering. Data reliability is moderate.
Likelihood: Likely | Uncertainty: Moderate
Pakistan hosts large populations of susceptible livestock including buffalo, cattle, camels, and small ruminants. No SAT1 vaccination is implemented, and FMD remains endemic, with multiple serotypes reported over the past decade, highlighting persistent challenges in disease control and elimination. The country is at PCP-FMD Stage 2. Formal trade of animal products is limited, with small volumes of cattle and sheep meat imported from countries in the region. However, informal movements across borders cannot be ruled out, including pastoral movements in the Pakistan-Iran border region, as part of the local traditional seasonal transhumance system (mainly small ruminants). According to the report of the FAO surveillance evaluation tool mission conducted in 2023, underreporting, heterogenous and limited field-level capacity, and lack of standardized procedures were identified as critical gaps.
Impact: Severe | Uncertainty: Moderate
Significant livestock population and production with strong export orientation. Past FMD outbreaks in the country resulted in high production and trade losses. Moderate uncertainty due to varying provincial data quality.
Likelihood: Likely | Uncertainty: Low
Historically Qatar has imported live sheep from at least one affected country, including Türkiye (FAOSTAT, 2023). The country is at PCP-FMD Stage 3, indicating a structured control system with moderate capacity. Susceptible livestock species are common, and SAT1 vaccination is routinely applied. Although FMDV SAT1 was reported in 2023, based on the phylogenetics this was a separate incursion to the current regional epidemic.
Impact: Low | Uncertainty: Low
Generally, very small domestic herds with some large dairy farms present though a high reliance on imports, supported by strong biosecurity. Data confidence is very high.
Likelihood: Likely | Uncertainty: High
The Russian Federation does not participate in the PCP-FMD framework, although its southern regions are officially recognized as FMD-free with vaccination. The country reported FMD outbreaks in 2021 involving serotype O. Trade-related exposure pathways include imports from Azerbaijan (510 tonnes of cheese from whole cow’s milk in 2023, 250 tonnes of raw milk in 2022, and 106 goats in 2021); Egypt (3 200 tonnes of cheese from whole cow milk in 2023); and Türkiye (4.74 tonnes of boneless cattle meat in 2023, along with small volumes of cattle meat with bone, small ruminant meat, and 94 tonnes of cheese from whole cow milk). Cross-border movement of people between Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation may also contribute to potential disease introduction.
Impact: Moderate | Uncertainty: Moderate
It has a large ruminant population with regional disparities in control capacity. Moderate impact at national level; moderate confidence in data completeness.
Likelihood: Likely | Uncertainty: High
In Saudi Arabia, there are no recent imports of live animals from currently affected countries/territories (FAOSTAT, 2023), and the country is at PCP-FMD Stage 2. SAT1 vaccination is not widely used, increasing the potential impact if FMD were introduced. Despite the absence of direct imports, the presence of large national herds, seasonal livestock movements, and informal trade—for example with Bahrain, Kuwait, and Yemen —along with cross-border movement of people and vehicles, create plausible pathways for disease entry. The likelihood of introduction is considered likely, mitigated by well-resourced veterinary services and established biosecurity at ports.
Impact: Moderate | Uncertainty: Moderate
Large ruminant sectors with partial vaccination coverage; disruptions are notable but manageable. Data are generally reliable.
Likelihood: Very likely | Uncertainty: High
The Syrian Arab Republic shares borders with affected countries, including Türkiye, and has porous and largely uncontrolled borders. Susceptible livestock species are common, and no SAT1 vaccination is applied. Suspected outbreaks of FMD have been reported in 2025 though sequences shared with the WRLFMD suggest serotype O. Trade data are lacking, and veterinary capacity is severely weakened. Cross-border movement of animals, people, and cargo trucks, combined with endemic FMD and unregulated livestock movements, make short-term entry and rapid spread of SAT1 highly likely. Reporting gaps and limited surveillance further contribute to high uncertainty in assessing risk.
Impact: Severe | Uncertainty: High
Conflict and fragile infrastructure sharply reduce control capacity. Livelihood losses would be extensive. Data reliability is low.
Likelihood: Likely | Uncertainty: High
Turkmenistan is currently at PCP-FMD Stage 1, with the last reported FMD outbreak occurring in 1999 involving serotype O. Trade-related risk pathways include imports from Türkiye (last reported in 2023 on FAOSTAT) and from the Islamic Republic of Iran (last reported in FAOSTAT in 2021), which consisted of cheese made from whole cow’s milk and raw milk. Veterinary capacity in the country is not considered strong, and FMD serotype O is thought to be endemic.
Impact: Moderate | Uncertainty: High
Livestock contribute roughly 45–50 percent of agricultural GDP. Veterinary service capacity is constrained, and surveillance coverage is limited. Severe local impacts are likely, although uncertainty remains high due to gaps in official data.
Likelihood: Unlikely | Uncertainty: Moderate
The United Arab Emirates does not import live animals from currently affected countries, according to the approved list from the Ministry of Agriculture (MOCCAE, 2025) and is at PCP-FMD Stage 2. SAT1 vaccination is not applied. Strong import controls, well-resourced veterinary services, and strict border biosecurity reduces the short-term likelihood of introduction, though regional circulation means a non-zero risk remains. Intra-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) livestock trade is limited, but informal movements cannot be ruled out, and cross-border movement of people and cargo trucks could provide additional pathways.
Impact: Low | Uncertainty: Low
A highly biosecure setting with a small livestock base and extensive import reliance. Data quality is strong.
Likelihood: Likely | Uncertainty: High
In West Bank and Gaza Strip, susceptible livestock species are common except in Gaza Strip where losses of cattle, goats and sheep have reached 99.5, 66.9 and 80.3 percent respectively during the recent conflict. The latest reported FMD outbreak occurred in 2024, involving serotype O and affecting sheep in Ramallah and Al-Bireh in the West Bank. Veterinary services are currently fragile with no ongoing vaccination against SAT1.
Impact: Moderate | Uncertainty: High
Small-ruminant herds are essential for household income, but vaccine access and movement control remain limited. Data are sparse and carry considerable uncertainty.
Likelihood: Very likely | Uncertainty: High
Yemen has historically imported live cattle from affected countries, including Egypt (FAOSTAT, 2023). Susceptible livestock species are common, and no SAT1 vaccination is applied. Fragile veterinary services, large small-ruminant populations, and informal cross-border movement of livestock and people—particularly with neighboring GCC countries such as Oman and Saudi Arabia—make short-term FMD entry likely. Fragile veterinary services and uncontrolled borders further increase the risk, while reporting gaps contribute to high uncertainty in assessing disease introduction.
Impact: Severe | Uncertainty: High
Livestock are central to livelihoods, but veterinary coverage is limited, creating very high vulnerability. Data are limited and affected by ongoing conflict.
References and data sources
- Asriran. 2025. Mutant strain of foot-and-mouth disease; livestock losses and reduced milk production (published on 13 November 2025). Accessed on 25 November 2025. Link.
- FAO. 2024. Pakistan: Evaluation for action – Assessing animal disease surveillance capacities, August 2023. Bangkok. Accessed on 20 November 2025. Link.
- FAO. 2021. Technical guidelines on rapid risk assessment for animal health threats. FAO Animal Production and Health Guidelines No. 24. Rome. Accessed on 20 November 2025. Link.
- FAO. 2025. EMPRES-i Global Animal Disease Information System. In: FAO Animal Production and Health Division [online]. Rome. Accessed on 20 November 2025. Link.
- FAO. 2025. Herders’ needs and FAO’s response in the Gaza Strip. Rome. Accessed 25 November 2025. Link.
- FAOSTAT. 2025. FAOSTAT. In: Statistics Division [online]. Rome. Accessed on 20 November 2025. Link.
- FAO, OIE, GF-TADs, and EuFMD. 2018. The Progressive Control Pathway for Foot and Mouth Disease control (PCP-FMD) – Second Edition: Principles, Stage Descriptions and Standards. Accessed on 20 November 2025. Link.
- Jahanesanat News. 2025. Foot-and-mouth disease spreads from Tehran to 4 other provinces; Alborz, Qazvin, Qom and Markazi involved in livestock crisis. Accessed 19 November 2025. Link.
- McLaws, M., Ahmadi, B.V., Condoleo, R., Limon, G., Kamata, A., Arshed, M., Rozstalnyy, A., Rosso, F. & Dhingra, M. 2023. Risk of foot-and-mouth disease SAT2 introduction and spread in countries in the Near East and west Eurasia – FAO Qualitative Risk Assessment, October 2023. Rome, FAO. Accessed on 20 November 2025. Link.
- Iranian Students’ News Agency (ISNA). 2025. New strain of foot-and-mouth disease identified in the Islamic Republic of Iran after 42 years. An Interview with the CVO of Islamic Republic of Iran (Published on 29 October 2025). Accessed 25 November 2025. Link.
- Borna News. 2025. Control foot-and-mouth disease by implementing widespread vaccination and veterinary health quarantine measures. An interview with the CVO of Islamic Republic of Iran (Published on 12 November 2025). Accessed 25 November 2025. Link.
- Hakimemehr News. 2025. Livestock farmers should not worry about the spread of foot-and-mouth disease/This disease will end soon in the near future. An interview with the CVO of Iran (Published on 24 November 2025). Accessed on 25 Nov 2025. Link.
- United Arab Emirates Ministry of Climate Change and Environment (MOCCAE). 2025. List of approved/disapproved countries for import. Last updated on 8 September 2025. Accessed 20 November 2025. Link.
- World Reference Laboratory for foot-and-mouth disease. 2025. Country reports. Accessed 20 November 2025. Link.
- World Reference Laboratory for foot-and-mouth disease. 2025. Quarterly reports. Accessed 26/11/2025. Link.
- World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). 2025. World Animal Health Information Database (WAHIS) Interface. WOAH, Paris. Accessed 20 November 2025. Link.