
12 January 2023, 17:00 hours; Rome
Situation: Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (H5N1, H5N2, H5N6 and H5N8 subtypes) with pandemic potential in countries of Sub-Saharan Africa since February 2017.
Confirmed countries (H5): Lesotho.
Confirmed countries (H5N1): Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Réunion (France)*, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritania, Namibia, Niger*, Nigeria*, Senegal, South Africa*, and Togo.
Confirmed countries (H5N6): Nigeria.
Confirmed countries (H5N2): Nigeria, South Africa*.
Confirmed countries (H5N8): Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
Animal/environmental findings: 13 new events since last update on 14 December 2022.
Number of human cases: 0 new events since last update (Last reported case:10 November 2021).
* Countries reporting cases in current wave (since 1 October 2022).
Map. Officially reported HPAI outbreaks (H5N1, H5N2 and H5N8 subtypes) in sub-Saharan Africa, by onset date (1 October 2021 – 12 January 2023)
Note: Map A shows confirmed HPAI events observed from 1 October 2022 to 12 January 2023 (current wave). Map B shows HPAI events observed from 01 October 2021 to 30 September 2022 (previous wave).
Table 1. High pathogenicity avian influenza events reported in animals since 1 October 2022 (i.e. previous wave)
Virus | Country (administrative regions affected) |
Last event observed | #Events since last update | Total #events since 1 October 2022 | Species affected during last observed events |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
H5N1 |
Réunion (France) |
02/10/2022 |
0 |
2 |
Unspecified domestic birds |
South Africa |
21/11/2022 |
5 |
7 |
Unspecified domestic birdsDomestic chickens, ostriches, and other unspecified domestic birds, and various wild bird species1Domestic chickens |
|
Niger (Tahoua, Tillaberi) |
18/12/2022 |
2 |
2 |
Domestic birds |
|
Nigeria (Bayelsa, Delta, Niger, Oyo, Sokoto) |
19/12/2022 |
10 |
10 |
Domestic birds |
|
H5N2 |
South Africa |
29/11/2022 |
1 |
2 |
Unspecified domestic birds |
For a summary of H5N1, H5N6, and H5N8 HPAI events reported in sub-Saharan African countries in previous waves (i.e. before 1 October 2022) please contact EMPRES-Animal Health
Mosaad Z, Elhusseiny MH, Zanaty A, Fathy MM, Hagag NM, Mady WH, Said D, Elsayed MM, Erfan AM, Rabie N, Samir A, Samy M, Arafa A-S, Selim A, Abdelhakim AM, Lindahl JF, Eid S, Lundkvist Å, Shahein MA, Naguib MM. Emergence of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A Virus (H5N1) of Clade 2.3.4.4b in Egypt, 2021–2022. Pathogens. 2023; 12(1):90. [reference] It was confirmed detection of (H5N1) of Clade 2.3.4.4b in Egypt through swab and tissue samples collected from migratory birds in the period of Oct-2021 and March-2022. The study concluded that detection of the HPAI H5N1 strain of clade 2.3.4.4b in wild birds in Egypt underlines the risk of the introduction of this strain into the local poultry population. Which is the case in the 2nd half of 2022.
Levy, S., Abd Alhadi, M., Azulay, A., Kahana, A., Bujanover, N., Gazit, R., McGargill, M. A., Friedman, L. M., & Hertz, T. (2022). FLU-LISA: High throughput antibody profiling using antigen microarrays. Immunology and cell biology, 10.1111/imcb.12618. Advance online publication. [reference] This study offers an alternative to the traditional ELISA which can be used for profiling IgG, IgA and IgM responses to multiple antigens simultaneously.
Letsholo, S. L., James, J., Meyer, S. M., Byrne, A. M. P., Reid, S. M., Settypalli, T. B. K., Datta, S., Oarabile, L., Kemolatlhe, O., Pebe, K. T., Mafonko, B. R., Kgotlele, T. J., Kumile, K., Modise, B., Thanda, C., Nyange, J. F. C., Marobela-Raborokgwe, C., Cattoli, G., Lamien, C. E., Brown, I. H., Banyard, A. C. (2022). Emergence of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus H5N1 Clade 2.3.4.4b in Wild Birds and Poultry in Botswana. Viruses, 14(12), 2601. [reference] Botswana reported its first outbreak of HPAI to the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) in 2021. An H5N1 virus was detected in a fish eagle, doves, and chickens which showed high similarity to those clade 2.3.4.4b viruses which have been identified across a broad range of locations. The detection of H5N1 in Botswana has important implications for disease management, wild bird conservation, tourism, public health, economic empowerment of vulnerable communities and food security in the region.
Nemeth, N. M., Ruder, M. G., Poulson, R. L., Sargent, R., Breeding, S., Evans, M. N., Zimmerman, J., Hardman, R., Cunningham, M., Gibbs, S., & Stallknecht, D. E. (2023). Bald eagle mortality and nest failure due to clade 2.3.4.4 highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza a virus. Scientific reports, 13(1), 191. [reference] This study shows an alarming rate of bald eagle nest failure and mortality attributed to HP IAV along the southeastern U.S. coast. It is likely that bald eagles become infected through consumption of infected waterfowl. These results and similar reports of raptor mortality in Europe, Asia, and Africa, indicate a clear threat to raptor health and warrants continued efforts to understand these potential impacts.
Cousins, T., Pentecost, M., & VAN Helden, L. (2022). Containment and conversion: Urban livelihoods and the circulation of value amid South Africa's avian influenza outbreak. American ethnologist, 49(3), 413–426. [reference] This study discusses the anthropological considerations around avian influenza outbreaks and response in South Africa.
Elfeil, W. K., Youssef, H., Sedeek, A., El-Shemy, A., Abd-Allah, E. M., Elkady, M. F., El Sayed, E. K., Bazid, A. I., & Abdallah, M. S. (2022). Protective Efficacy of Inactivated H9N2 Vaccine in Turkey Poults under Both Experimental and Field Conditions. Vaccines, 10(12), 2178. [reference] This study evaluates the efficacy of a whole inactivated H9N2 vaccine in turkey poults kept under laboratory and commercial farm conditions.
Information provided herein is current as of the date of issue. Information added or changed since the last Sub-Saharan HPAI situation update appears in orange. For poultry cases with unknown onset dates, reporting dates were used instead. FAO compiles information communicated by field officers on the ground in affected countries, from regional offices, and from the World Organisation for Animal Health [WOAH], as well as peer-reviewed scientific articles. FAO makes every effort to ensure, but does not guarantee, accuracy, completeness or authenticity of the information. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these map(s) do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of FAO concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers and boundaries. Dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.
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