Map 1. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential* observed since 1 October 2024 (i.e. current wave)

Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.

Notes: Refer to the disclaimer available on this webpage for the names and boundaries in this map. Final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Source: United Nations Geospatial. 2020. Map of the World. [Cited March 2025]. Modified with GLW 4 data and Emergency Prevention System Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i), WOAH and National Authorities data, 2025.

Map 2. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential* observed in the period 1 October 2023 to 30 September 2024 (i.e. previous wave)

Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.

Notes: Refer to the disclaimer available on this webpage for the names and boundaries in this map. Final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Source: United Nations Geospatial. 2020. Map of the World. [Cited January 2025]. Modified with GLW 4 data and Emergency Prevention System Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i), WOAH and National Authorities data, 2024.

Recent publications

Domestic

Zikibayeva, K.B., Svanbayev, A.A., Akhmetsadykov, N.N., Kudaibergenova, K.N., Akhmetsadykova, S.N., Nurolda, E.N. & Kydyrmanov, A.I. 2025. Epidemiological investigation of poultry infectious in Kazakhstan (2021-2024). Front Vet Sci, 2025 Feb 11;11:1520606. [reference]

Pawar, S.D., Keng, S.S., Tare, D.S., Balakrishnan, A.S.S, Koshy, J., Potdar, V. & Vipat, V, et al. 2025. Evidence of novel reassortment in clade 2.3.4.4b avian influenza H5N1 viruses, India, 2024. Virology, 606:110482. [reference]

Wild bird

Moutinho, S. 2025. H5N1 avian flu is spreading rapidly in Antarctica. Science, 387(6739):1130-1131. [reference]

Indykiewicz, P., Przymencki, M., Minias, P., Jakubas, D., Litwiniak, K., Zieliński, P., Janiszewski, T, et al. 2025. Impact of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) on Black-headed Gulls Chroicocephalus ridibundus population in Poland in 2023. Avian Pathol, 2025 Mar 5:1-14. [reference]

McLaughlin, A., Giacinti, J., Sarma, S.N., Brown, M.G.C., Ronconi, R.A., Lavoie, R.A. Eng M.L., et al. 2025. Examining avian influenza virus exposure in seabirds of the northwest Atlantic in 2022 and 2023 via antibodies in eggs. Conserv Physiol, 13(1):coaf010. [reference]

Rayment, K.M., Franzen-Klein, D., Kurimo-Beechuk, E., Poulson, R.L., Brown, J., Mendoza, K., Etterson, M, et al. 2025. Exposure and survival of wild raptors during the 2022-2023 highly pathogenic influenza a virus outbreak. Sci Rep, 15(1):6574. [reference]

Mammal

Kwon, T., Trujillo, J.D., Carossino, M., Machkovech, H.M., Cool, K., Lyoo, E.L., Singh, G, et al. 2025. Pathogenicity and transmissibility of bovine-derived HPAI H5N1 B3.13 virus in pigs. bioRxiv, 2025 Mar 7:2025.03.04.641414. Preprint [reference]

Ramey, A.M., Beckmen, K.B., Saalfeld, D.T., Nicholson, K.L., Mangipane, B.A., Scott, L.C., Stallknecht, D.E. & Poulson, R.L. 2025. Exposure of Wild Mammals to Influenza A(H5N1) Virus, Alaska, USA, 2020-2023. Emerg Infect Dis, 31(4):804-808. [reference]

Turner, H.M., Fuller, A.K., Twining, J.P., Hitchener, G.R., Fadden, M.A., Stallknecht, D.E., Poulson, R.L, et al. 2025. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus Exposure and Infection in Free-Ranging Bobcats (Lynx rufus) in New York, USA. J Wildl Dis, 2025 Mar 19. [reference]

Pardo-Roa, C., Nelson, M.I., Ariyama, N., Aguayo, C., Almonacid, L.I., Gonzalez-Reiche, A.S., Muñoz, G, et al. 2025. Cross-species and mammal-to-mammal transmission of clade 2.3.4.4b highly pathogenic avian influenza A/H5N1 with PB2 adaptations. Nat Commun, 2025 Mar 6;16(1):2232. [reference]

Le Sage, V., Werner, B.D., Merrbach, G.A., Petnuch, S.E., O'Connell, A.K., Simmons, H.C., McCarthy, K.R, et al. 2025. Influenza A(H5N1) Immune Response among Ferrets with Influenza A(H1N1) pdm09 Immunity. Emerg Infect Dis, 31(3):477-487. [reference]

Mahmoud, S.H., Khattab, M.S., Yehia, N., Zanaty, A., Arafa, A.E.S. & Khalil, A.A. 2025. Pathogenicity of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A/H5Nx Viruses in Avian and Murine Models. Pathogens, 2025 Feb 4;14(2):149. [reference]

Dairy

Octaviani, C.P., Huang, P., Bi-Hung, P., Gray, G.C. & Tseng, C.K. 2025. Superior replication, pathogenicity, and immune evasion of a Texas dairy cattle H5N1 virus compared to a historical avian isolate. Sci Rep, 15(1):8797. [reference]

Lang, Y., Shi, L., Roy, S., Gupta, D., Dai, C., Khalid, M.A., Zhang, M.Z, et al. 2025.Detection of antibodies against influenza A viruses in cattle. J Virol, 2025 Mar 25:e0213824. [reference]

Levine, M.Z., Liu, F., Bagdasarian, N., Holiday, C., Jefferson, S., Li, Z.N., Pappas, C, et al. 2025. Neutralizing Antibody Response to Influenza A(H5N1) Virus in Dairy Farm Workers, Michigan, USA. Emerg Infect Dis, 31(4):876-878. [reference]

Paravinja, N., Herrmann, L., Dzijan, I., Rinder, M. & Neubauer-Juric, A. 2025. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus in Mammals: Lack of Detection in Cattle With Respiratory Tract Infections and Genetic Analysis of Sporadic Spillover Infections in Wild Mammals in Bavaria, Southern Germany, 2022-2023. Zoonoses Public Health, Mar 11. [reference]

Zhu, S., Harriman, K., Liu, C., Kraushaar, V., Hoover, C., Shim, K., Brummitt, S.I, et al. 2025. Human Cases of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) - California, September-December 2024. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep, 74(8):127-133. [reference]

Kaiser, F., Cardenas, S., Yinda, K.C., Mukesh, R.K., Ochwoto, M., Gallogly, S., Wickenhagen, A, et al. 2025. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus Stability in Irradiated Raw Milk and Wastewater and on Surfaces, United States. Emerg Infect Dis, 31(4):833-837. [reference]

Viruses

Ort, J.T., Zolnoski, S.A., Lam, T.T., Neher, R. & Moncla, L.H. 2025. Development of avian influenza A(H5) virus datasets for Nextclade enables rapid and accurate clade assignment. bioRxiv, 2025 Feb 3:2025.01.07.631789. Preprint.  [reference]

Yan, M., Ma, T., Shi, X., Chen, Q., Li, L., Xu, B., Pan, X, et al. 2025. Isolation and Characterization of H1 Subtype Swine Influenza Viruses Recently Circulating in China. Viruses, 17(2):185. [reference]

He, F., Yu, H., Liu, L., Li, X., Xing, Y., Yang, L., Yang, P., Zhu, L. & Li, Z. 2025. Antigenicity and genetic properties of an Eurasian avian-like H1N1 swine influenza virus in Jiangsu Province, China. Biosaf Health, 6(6):319-326. [reference]

Wasik, B.R., Damodaran, L., Maltepes, M.A., Voorhees, I.E.H., Leutenegger, C.M., Newbury, S., Moncla, L.H., Dalziel, B.D., Goodman, L.B. & Parrish CR. 2025. The evolution and epidemiology of H3N2 canine influenza virus after 20 years in dogs. Epidemiol Infect, 153:e47. [reference]

Zhang, C., Zhao, C., Huang, J., Wang, Y., Jiang, B., Zheng, H., Zhuang, M, et al. 2025. Emergence of a novel reassortant H3N3 avian influenza virus with enhanced pathogenicity and transmissibility in chickens in China. Vet Res, 56(1):56. [reference]

Hermann, E. & Krammer, F. 2025. Clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 neuraminidase has a long stalk, which is in contrast to most highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses circulating between 2002 and 2020. mBio. 2025 Feb 26:e0398924. [reference]

Vázquez-Pérez, J.A., Wong-Arámbula, C., Solís-Hernández, M., Becerril-Vargas, E., Barrera-Badillo, G., Ahumada-Topete, V.H., Avila-Rios, S. 2025, et al. Mexico's Laboratory-Confirmed Human Case of Infection with the Influenza A(H5N2) Virus. Viruses, 17(2):205. [reference]

Wang, X., Wang, X., Hao, X., Gao, R., Lu, X., Yang, W., Chen, Y, et al. 2025. The Novel H10N3 Avian Influenza Virus Triggers Lethal Cytokine Storm by Activating Multiple Forms of Programmed Cell Death in Mammalian Lungs. Int J Mol Sci, 26(5):1977. [reference]

Yang, J., Zheng, S., Sun, J., Wu, H., Zhang, D., Wang, Y., Tian, T, et al. 2025. A human-infecting H10N5 avian influenza virus: Clinical features, virus reassortment, receptor-binding affinity, and possible transmission routes. J Infect, 90(4):106456. [reference]

Li, X., Li, A., Qu, F., Li, Y., Chen, F., Lv, X., An, Q, et al. 2025. Evaluation of Global Distribution, Genetic Evolution, and Mammalian Infectivity and Pathogenicity of H13 and H16 Avian Influenza Viruses. Emerg Microbes Infect, 2025 Mar 25:2482695. [reference]

Review

Jindal, M., Stone, H., Lim, S. & MacIntyre, C.R. 2025. A Geospatial Perspective Toward the Role of Wild Bird Migrations and Global Poultry Trade in the Spread of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1. Geohealth. 9(3):e2024GH001296. [reference]

Galli, M., Giacomelli, A., Lai, A. & Zehender, G. 2025. H5N1 influenza A virus: lessons from past outbreaks and emerging threats. Infez Med, 33(1):76-89. [reference]

The Lancet. 2025. H5N1 avian influenza: technical solutions, political challenges. Lancet, 405(10480):671. [reference]

Epidemiological surveillance / Risk assessment / Tools

Arınık, N., Interdonato, R., Roche, M. & Teisseire, M.2025. Linked avian influenza epidemiological and genomic data in EMPRES-i for epidemic intelligence (2012-2021). Data Brief, 59:111410. [reference]

Branda, F., Mohapatra, R.K., Tuglo, L.S., Ciccozzi, M. & Scarpa, F. 2025. Real-time epidemiological surveillance data: tracking the occurrences of avian influenza outbreaks around the world. BMC Res Notes, 18(1):95. [reference]

Goujgoulova, G. & Koev, K. 2025. Risk Assessment of Spread of the Influenza A Virus in Cows in South Bulgaria. Viruses, 17(2):246. [reference]

Hoyos-Cerón, T., Albarrán-Tamayo, F., Bañuelos-Hernández, B. & Londoño-Avendaño, M.A. 2025. Disparities in Influenza Control and Surveillance in Latin America and the Caribbean. Viruses, 17(2):225. [reference]

Hosseini, P., Syndicus, I., Houghton, E., Alarcon, P., Fournie, G., Guitian, J., Paterson, A., et al. Qualitative studies on farm managers perception of risk from HPAIV and implementation of biosecurity measures on UK poultry farms. Prev Vet Med, 2025 Feb 15;239:106445. [reference]

Giussani, E., Sartori, A., Salomoni, A., Cavicchio, L., de Battisti, C., Pastori, A., Varotto, M., et al. 2025. FluMut: a tool for mutation surveillance in highly pathogenic H5N1 genomes. Virus Evol, 11(1):veaf011. [reference]

Robertson, H., Han, B.A., Castellanos, A.A., Rosado, D., Stott, G., Zimmerman, R., Drake, J.M. & Graeden, E. 2025. Understanding ecological systems using knowledge graphs: an application to highly pathogenic avian influenza. Bioinform Adv, 5(1):vbaf016. [reference]

Modelling

Ford, C.T., Yasa, S., Obeid, K., Jaimes, R. 3rd, Tomezsko, P.J., Guirales-Medrano, S., White, R.A. 3rd & Janies, D. 2025. Large-scale computational modelling of H5 influenza variants against HA1-neutralising antibodies. EBioMedicine, 114:105632. [reference]

Takekawa, J.Y., Choi, C.Y., Prosser, D.J., Sullivan, J.D., Batbayar, N. & Xiao, X. 2025. Perpetuation of Avian Influenza from Molt to Fall Migration in Wild Swan Geese (Anser cygnoides): An Agent-Based Modeling Approach. Viruses, 17(2):196. [reference]

Kjær, L.J., Kirkeby, C.T., Boklund, A.E., Hjulsager, C.K., Fox, A.D. & Ward, M.P. 2025. Prediction models show differences in highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreaks in Japan and South Korea compared to Europe. Sci Rep, 15(1):6783. [reference]

FAO's support to countries

Global level

• FAO organized a Special Session "Update for FAO Members on the Avian Influenza Situation and the Pandemic Fund (3rd call)" on 17 March 2025 [recording].
• FAO and WOAH released the Global strategy for the prevention and control of high pathogenicity avian influenza (2024–2033) - Achieving sustainable, resilient poultry production systems [link]; the introductory webinar was held on 3 March 2025 [link].
• FAO Progressive Management Pathway for Terrestrial Animal Biosecurity (PMP-TAB) Community of Practice (CoP) collaborated with World Animal Biosecurity Association to conduct a webinar on “What recent highly pathogenic avian influenza epidemics tell us about biosecurity” on 12 March 2025 with 736 registered attendees [link].
• FAO Virtual Learning Centres are collaborating with the Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut (FLI) to update the existing avian influenza course with elements of the increasing incidents of HPAIV infections in mammals.
• FAO published the Recommendations for the surveillance of influenza A(H5N1) in cattle, with broader application to other farmed mammals. [link] The Spanish version is now available [link].
• OFFLU (WOAH/FAO network of expertise on animal influenza) contributed information on the genetic and antigenic characteristics of currently circulating avian and swine influenza viruses for pandemic preparedness purposes at the WHO Consultation on the Composition of Influenza Virus Vaccines for Use in the 2025-2026 Northern Hemisphere Influenza Season [link]. At this consultation, new description ‘clade 2.3.2.1e’ was adopted for so-called recombinant H5N1 2.3.2.1c strain which has been detected in some parts of Indochinese Peninsula [link].
• OFFLU released summary report from the WHO vaccine composition meeting held in February 2025 [link], avian data package for zoonotic influenza [link] and swine influenza report [link].

Regional/country level

• Americas
  
  • FAO Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean (RLC) published the ‘Emergency and response to highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 in Central America, South America and the Caribbean - Regional Technical Report for the period October 2022 to September 2024’ [Emergencia y respuesta a la influenza aviar de alta patogenicidad H5N1 en América Central, América del Sur y el Caribe - Informe técnico regional para el período octubre de 2022 a septiembre de 2024] which gathered regional experiences on the collaborative efforts undertaken by 15 countries in the region between 2022 and 2024 [link].
  • The third meeting of the Standing Group of Experts on Avian Influenza (SGE-AI) of GF-TADs in the Americas was held virtually on 19 February 2025.
  • FAO, in collaboration with OIRSA (Organismo Internacional Regional de Sanidad Agropecuaria), SICA (Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana), and SE-CAC (Secretaría Ejecutiva del Consejo Agropecuario Centroamericano), held a regional virtual workshop on 6 February to update and strengthen the diagnosis, control, and prevention of HPAI. FAO presented recommendations for countries in the region to prevent and control the disease, as well as the document 'Recommendations for the Surveillance of Influenza A(H5N1) in Cattle’.
  • FAO has provided Colombia with some laboratory consumables, test reagents and personal protective equipment to support HPAI outbreak response.
  • FAO at regional and country (Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Peru) levels are supporting HPAI response e.g. simulations exercises, diagnostic trainings, information materials.

• Africa
  • Under a FAO technical cooperation programme project “Strengthening the prevention and control of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) epizootics in four West African countries” (TCP/SFW/4002), activities have been conducted in Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Togo. A risk-based assessment of the evolution of avian influenza over the last five years (2019-2023) in West Africa is being conducted, to update the regional HPAI prevention and control strategy, including enhancement of wildlife surveillance. Support has been provided to conduct HPAI risk assessments at country level and mapping along the poultry value chain. To strengthen laboratory capacity for rapid diagnosis and identification of HPAI virus strains, an on-site training was conducted for laboratory personnel in the Gambia, and discussions are also ongoing to train laboratory personnel of Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau at the Laboratoire National de l'élevage et de recherches vétérinaires (LNERV) in Dakar, Senegal. In Cabo Verde, a regional training workshop on good emergency management practice (GEMP) was conducted from 10 to 13 March 2025 in Portuguese, aiming to strengthen HPAI emergency management capabilities and reinforce with human resources trained in animal health emergency management in Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau. In Guinea-Bissau, a national training workshop covering disease recognition, biosecurity, sample collection and shipping and surveillance was organized from 18 to 20 February 2025. A total of 26 participants from the veterinary services (central and decentralized), wildlife sector and public health sector attended.
  • FAO presented the Revision of the HPAI Global Strategy at the 12th Meeting of the Regional Steering Committee (RSC12) of the GF-TADs for Africa has been held in Mbabane, Eswatini [link].
  • In Ethiopia, a total of 104 poultry/dairy farmers from Tigray, Benishangul-Gumuz, Oromia, and Amhara regions received training on biosecurity and good farming practices along the value chains. The sessions focused on poultry farm biosecurity measures, covering disease prevention strategies, farm access control, sanitation procedures, and animal health management. The training aimed to reduce disease risks and prevent economic losses from common poultry diseases, while also enhancing farm productivity and health along the value chains.
  • In Liberia, PCR reagent optimization and testing of the historical samples has been conducted as part of the mentorship/training of 10 laboratory staff on PCR.
  • Nigeria reported 14 H5N1 HPAI outbreaks that occurred between 7 December 2024 and 16 March 2025 in Kaduna State, in Kano State, Katsina State, Plateau State and in Federal Capital Territory [link]. FAO supported the Ministry of Livestock Development deploying a field mission to evaluate situation and take action to control the outbreak and stop the spread of the disease. After a field visit in February 2025 led by FAO ECTAD team, the State Government has conducted awareness and sensitisation exercise. More actions are needed specifically on application of biosecurity and control measures.
  • In Niger, an H5N1 HPAI outbreak in a backyard flock in Niamey was confirmed on 6 February 2025 by LABOCEL (Laboratoire Central de l'Élevage). Of the 57 birds (guinea fowls and chickens), 4 died and the rest was depopulated.
  • Togo reported four HPAI outbreaks in poultry farms in Centre (2) and Maritime (2), of which H5N1 confirmed in three. FAO deployed emergency mission and is providing supports through Pandemic Funds including sending samples to FAO Reference Centre (IZSVe-Italy) for further confirmation and sequencing. Furthermore, FAO has also conducted training of 150 new community animal health workers and 50 para-veterinary professionals on early warning and community animal health.
  • In Uganda, FAO facilitated a training of trainers of community animal health outreach practitioners on surveillance and reporting of priority zoonotic diseases. Twenty-six (26) animal health practitioners were equipped with skills and techniques on HPAI and other priority zoonotic diseases case definition, participatory disease search, sample collection and reporting, surveillance, outbreak response, one health approach, outbreak investigation and case management. All participants were drawn from the Lake Victoria Epizone.

• North Africa and Middle East
• FAO Regional Office for Near East and North Africa (RNE) co-organized with FAO Animal Production and Health Division (NSA) a 5-days training on Regional Infectious Substance Shipment in February. The online training, attended by eight participants from Iraq, Sudan, Egypt and Jordan, aimed to provide participants training to become knowledgeable about the Dangerous Goods Regulations (DGR) produced by The International Air Transport Association (IATA), which serves as a "field manual" for air transport of all dangerous goods, therefore availing them with the required information to safely ship infectious substances.
• In Egypt, FAO supported the Veterinary services in implementation of the risk-based surveillance plan in 2024 to understand the prevalence of Avian Influenza sub-types currently circulating in Egypt and to detect incursion of new subtypes as early as possible and provided kits and reagents to support Avian influenza diagnosis, isolation and sequencing.
• FAO Jordan supported Joint Risk Assessment (JRA) Group to assess the Avian Influenza H5N1 introduction possibility into Jordan to increase the readiness of relevant sectors to mitigate the risk of HPAI. FAO also provided technical support to Ministry of Agriculture in updating avian influenza contingency and outbreak response plans, and SOPs on sampling and specimen referral, and testing protocols.

• Asia and the Pacific
• FAO has organized a Regional Proficiency Test for AI diagnosis in collaboration with Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP), Geelong.
• In Bhutan, HPAI is one of the priority diseases under the ongoing Pandemic Fund Project (2023–2026). Key areas of support include enhancing diagnostic capacities, procuring rapid diagnostic kits, conducting surveillance and training, and strengthening veterinary information systems.
• In Cambodia, a human infection with influenza A (H5N1) virus were confirmed in a 28-year-old man from Kampong Cham Province in January [link], a 2 year 7 month old boy from Prey Veng Province in February [link], and a 3 year 6 month old boy from Kratie Province in March [link]. The 1st and the 2nd cases reportedly had exposure to sick poultry prior to the onset. FAO Cambodia is collaborating with National Animal Health and Production Institute (NAHPRI)/ General Directorate of Animal Health and Production (GDAHP) and Institute du Pasteur Cambodge (IPC) to support the Cambodian Government.
• FAO ECTAD Indonesia, along with various ministries and institutions, held an Avian Influenza Virus Preparedness meeting on 16 January 2025. The FAO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific participated virtually, presenting the global and regional zoonotic Influenza situation. Cross-sector ministries and agencies shared updates on Indonesia's situation, surveillance, disease reporting, vaccination, and future strategies. The meeting agreed to strengthen coordination between ministries, enhance AIV surveillance in public health sectors, and monitor the spread of avian influenza in poultry, livestock, wildlife, and migratory birds as well as keep vigilance on occupational health of farm workers.
• From 21 February to 5 March 2025, FAO ECTAD Indonesia launched an Instagram campaign to raise public awareness about the growing threat of avian influenza. Through five informative posts, the campaign highlights not only the current situation, both globally and nationally, but also emphasized the zoonotic nature of the disease. In addition to raising awareness, the posts educated the public on best prevention practices and encouraged reporting of any suspected cases. The campaign aimed to inform the public about the risks of avian influenza and its potential impact on both human and animal health. By emphasizing the "One Health" approach, the posts underscore the importance of collaboration among stakeholders in human, animal, and environmental health to prevent the spread of zoonotic diseases. The campaign garnered 270 likes and reached up to 7 820 accounts, effectively spreading information on joint prevention efforts to mitigate risks to a wide audience.
• In Myanmar, 40 sessions of one-day community-level training on farm biosecurity principles and the safe, effective use of disinfectants were conducted between October and December 2024 in Bago Region, Mandalay Region, and Shan State, supported by a FAO project. Some 2 000 livestock households learned how to identify and manage biohazards, implement preventive measures and reduce disease transmission risks and received biosecurity kits containing disinfectant, masks, gloves, boots, sanitizer, a measuring cup, training materials.
• Avian influenza bio-surveillance program is ongoing during February-March in 16 high-risk districts of Nepal by mobilizing Central Veterinary Laboratory and sub-national veterinary laboratories. Sample collection has been completed, and laboratory testing will follow through. Likewise, provincial workshops on poultry value chain have been conducted in all seven provinces of Nepal as a part of the poultry value chain study in Nepal.
• In the Pacific, as part of the FAO technical cooperation programme project (TCP/SAP/4003), FAO will be hosting stakeholder consultations and capacity- building training workshop in Nauru and Vanuatu from 13-24 April 2025. The training will focus on poultry management, covering topics such as poultry feed formulation, sustainable feeding practices, poultry health, avian influenza awareness, and biosecurity. The training is designed to equip extension officers, paravets, lead farmers, and key stakeholders with practical skills to enhance local poultry feed production, optimize flock nutrition, and implement effective disease prevention and biosecurity measures.

• Europe and Central Asia
• The Outbreak Costing Tool (OutCosT) to estimate the cost of outbreaks and their control is being adapted to poultry diseases and is being validated with real HPAI outbreak data from countries in three continents. A webinar to present the results will be organized in the first quarter of 2025. The Excel-based tool is now available online here.
• In Tajikistan, H5N1 avian influenza laboratory training using molecular diagnosis was conducted in October 2024 in One Health approach in collaboration with the Local Health System Sustainability Project (LHSS) at a Ministry of Public Health facility under a FAO project. The workshop brought together 21 participants from the Ministry of Public Health, the National Veterinary Diagnostic Center, and central and regional laboratories. The training focused on real-time RT-PCR techniques for AIV diagnosis. Not only the participants equipped with skills on avian influenza diagnosis, also gained knowledge on its zoonotic potential, and the threats to human health. A similar training workshop will be held in March 2025, in 13 districts in collaboration with Epidemic Control (EpiC).

Recommendations for affected countries and those at risk

FAO recommends intensified surveillance and awareness raising by national authorities.

General recommendations
It is important to report sick or dead birds – both wild birds and poultry - or wild mammals to local authorities (veterinary services, public health officials, community leaders etc.). These should be tested for avian influenza viruses.

Recommendations to poultry producers
Farmers and poultry producers should step up their biosecurity measures in order to prevent potential virus introduction from wild birds or their faeces.

Recommendations to hunters
Hunting associations and wildlife authorities should be aware that avian influenza viruses might be present in waterfowl and some other species hunted and that hunting, handling and dressing of shot game carries the risk of spreading avian influenza viruses to susceptible poultry.

Recommendations to national authorities
Increase surveillance efforts for the early detection of influenza viruses in poultry and dead wild species including certain mammals.

For full recommendations including non-avian species please see [link].

Important links

• The list of wild bird and mammalian species which have been infected with H5Nx HPAI [link]
• FAO & WOAH Global strategy for the prevention and control of high pathogenicity avian influenza (2024–2033) - Achieving sustainable, resilient poultry production systems
• FAO ALERT :: Avian influenza risk of upsurge and regional spread through increased poultry trade before and during Lunar New Year festivities in Asia
• FAO/WHO/WOAH Updated joint public health assessment of recent influenza A(H5) virus events in animals and people
• FAO Recommendations for the surveillance of influenza A(H5N1) in cattle – with broader application to other farmed mammals
• EFSA Avian influenza overview September–December 2024, Bird Flu Rader and Migration Mapping Tool
• FAO HPAI website [link]
• FAO EMPRES Watch - A(H5N1) influenza in dairy cattle in the United States of America
• FAO Preliminary rapid risk assessment of foodborne avian influenza A (H5N1) virus
• FAO Carcass management guidelines
• FAO Guidelines for veterinary laboratory testing protocols for priority zoonotic diseases in Africa
• GF-TADs Global strategy for the prevention and control of highly pathogenic avian influenza (2024-2033). In brief
• OFFLU website
• OFFLU Diagnostic guidance: HPAI dairy cattle
• OFFLU Avian influenza matching (OFFLU-AIM) report & AIM webinar
• OFFLU summary report from the WHO vaccine composition meeting - 5 March 2025
• Scientific Task Force on Avian Influenza and Wild Birds H5N1 High pathogenicity avian influenza in wild birds - Unprecedented conservation impacts and urgent needs
• SCAR Updated Biological Risk Assessment and Recommendations for Highly Pathogenicity Avian Influenza in Antarctica
• WHO Influenza at the human-animal interface summary and assessment, 12 December 2024
• WHO Public health resource pack for countries experiencing outbreaks of influenza in animals
• WOAH High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza (HPAI) in Cattle
• WOAH High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza (HPAI) Situation Report 67 - January 2025

Updates on avian influenza infection in dairy cattle have been shared by USDA, US CDC and US FDA through the following sites:

• USDA Detections of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) in Livestock
• USDA HPAI H5N1 Genotype B3.13 in Dairy Cattle: National Epidemiologic Brief (23/08/2024)
• CDC H5 Bird Flu: Current Situation
• US FDA Updates on Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI)
• USDA APHIS Confirms D1.1 Genotype in Dairy Cattle in Nevada

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Information provided herein is current as of the date of issue. Information added or changed since the last Global AIV with Zoonotic Potential situation update appears in orange. Human cases are depicted in the geographic location of their report. For some cases, exposure may have occurred in one geographic location but reported in another. For cases with unknown onset date, reporting date was used instead. FAO compiles information drawn from multiple national (Ministries of Agriculture or Livestock, Ministries of Health, Provincial Government websites; Centers for Disease Prevention and Control [CDC]) and international sources (World Health Organization [WHO], World Organisation for Animal Health [WOAH]), as well as peer reviewed scientific articles. FAO makes every effort to ensure, but does not guarantee, accuracy, completeness or authenticity of the information. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these map(s) do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of FAO concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers and boundaries. Dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.