24 October 2024, 08:30 hours; Rome
This update covers avian influenza viruses (AIV) with zoonotic potential occurring worldwide, i.e. H5Nx, H7Nx high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) viruses and H3N8, H5Nx, H6N1, H7Nx, H9N2, H10Nx and H11 low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI).
Specific information is available for Avian Influenza A(H7N9) virus viruses and Sub-Saharan Africa HPAI in related FAO Avian Influenza situation updates.
HPAI outbreaks in animals officially reported since last update (26 September 2024): in total, 364 outbreaks/events have been reported in five geographic regions caused by H5Nx (16), H5N1 (314), H5N3 (1), H5N5 (29) and HxNx (4). (see Table 1 for details)
LPAI events in animals officially reported since the last update (26 September 2024): 0 new event was reported.
Number of human cases officially reported since last update (26 September 2024): 14 new events were reported.1,2
1 https://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/2024_avian_influenza_report_vol20_wk41.pdf
2 https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/situation-summary/index.html
Map 1. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential* observed since 1 October 2024 (i.e. current wave)
Note: Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.
Map 2. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential* observed in the period 1 October 2023 to 30 September 2024 (i.e. previous wave)
Note: Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.
Table 1. High pathogenicity avian influenza viruses with zoonotic potential reported since the last update
Virus | Country/Area | Last observed outbreak | # events reported since the last update | # events reported since xxx | Species affected during the reporting preiod |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
H5 |
Belgium |
05/10/2024 |
1 |
1 |
Mew Gull |
France |
12/10/2024 |
2 |
1 |
Poultry |
|
Peru |
20/09/2024 |
6 |
6 |
Duck, non-poultry poultry birds |
|
United States of America3 |
27/09/2024 |
7 |
6 |
American wigeon, Eurasian collared dove, Green-winged teal, Snow goose, Red Fox |
|
H5N1 |
Austria |
14/10/2024 |
6 |
6 |
Poultry, non-poultry birds; Greylag Goose, Mute Swan |
Bulgaria |
15/10/2024 |
2 |
2 |
Poultry |
|
Canada |
01/07/2024 |
1 |
1 |
American Crow, Canada Goose, Red-tailed Hawk |
|
Czech Republic |
08/10/2024 |
4 |
4 |
Duck, mallards, partridges, pheasants, Non-poultry birds |
|
Denmark |
08/09/2024 |
1 |
0 |
Mallard |
|
France |
18/09/2024 |
3 |
2 |
Poultry, Non-poultry birds; Cygnus, Laridae |
|
Germany Δ |
11/10/2024 |
8 |
6 |
Anatidae, Cygnus, Laridae, Pelecanidae, various zoo birds |
|
Hungary |
19/10/2024 |
26 |
26 |
Duck, Goose, Turkey, Domestic poultry; Eurasian Blackcap, Greylag Goose, Mute Swan |
|
Israel |
14/10/2024 |
6 |
6 |
Domestic Poultry; Common Teal, Great White Pelican, Peregrin falcon |
|
Italy |
11/10/2024 |
13 |
12 |
Chicken, Turkey, Common Teal, Eurasian Wigeon, Mallard |
|
Japan |
17/10/2024 |
3 |
3 |
Chicken, Peregrine falcon, Eurasian wigeon faeces |
|
Moldova |
17/10/2024 |
23 |
13 |
Non-poultry domestic birds; Greylag Goose |
|
Poland |
18/10/2024 |
4 |
4 |
Poultry |
|
Republic of Korea |
14/10/2024 |
1 |
1 |
Mandarin duck |
|
Serbia |
21/10/2024 |
5 |
4 |
Mute Swan |
|
Slovakia |
16/10/2024 |
3 |
2 |
Poultry; Grey Heron, Mute Swan |
|
Slovenia |
16/10/2024 |
4 |
4 |
Non-poultry birds; Mute Swan |
|
Spain |
08/10/2024 |
9 |
9 |
Herring Gull, Yellow-legged Gull |
|
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland |
Week 42 |
1 |
1 |
Greylag Goose |
|
United States of America3 |
14/10/2024 |
187 |
154 |
Chicken, WOAH Poultry, WOAH Non-Poultry; American wigeon, Bald eagle, Black scoter, Black vulture, Blue-winged teal, Brewer's blackbird, Canada goose, Eurasian collared dove, European starling, Gadwall, Green-winged teal, Hooded merganser, Lesser scaup, Mallard, Northern pintail, Northern shoveler, Peregrine falcon, Red-shouldered hawk, Ring-necked duck, Rock pigeon, Ross's goose, Royal tern, Snow goose, Willet, Wood duck; Bottlenose dolphin, Cattle, Red fox |
|
Viet Nam |
08/09/2024 |
4 |
4 |
Domestic poultry; Leopard, Lion, Tiger |
|
H5N3 |
Republic of Korea |
02/10/2024 |
1 |
1 |
Wild bird faeces |
H5N5 |
Belgium |
05/10/2024 |
1 |
1 |
Mew Gull |
Canada |
01/07/2024 |
1 |
1 |
Great black-backed Gull, Herring Gull |
|
Denmark |
20/09/2024 |
1 |
0 |
Common Raven |
|
Germany |
01/10/2024 |
1 |
1 |
Alcidae |
|
Iceland |
23/09/2024 |
2 |
2 |
Black-headed Gull, Common Raven |
|
United Kingdom |
Week 42 |
23 |
23 |
Black-headed Gull, Common Gull, Cormorant, Fulmar, Gannet, Great Black-backed Gull, Great Skua, Herring Gull, Kestrel, Mew Gull, White-tailed Eagle |
|
HxNx |
Norway |
27/09/2024 |
4 |
4 |
Herring Gull, Great Black-headed Gull, White-tailed Eagle |
Data was retrieved from WOAH WAHIS portal, government websites. Data cutoff time: reported on 24 October 2024, 8:30 CEST. $:estimate. ‡: date of confirmation. The full list of bird and mammalian species affected by H5Nx HPAI are available HERE. Notes: Only those reporting events in animals since the last update are listed in the table, those reporting for the first time since 1 October 2023 in orange. Codes: D:domestic, C:captivity, W:Wild birds, DF: Dairy farm, E:Environment, M: mammalian species other than humans, example: W123 indicates 123 wild birds affected. x: confirmation date.
1: the total includes events with sample collection date since 1 October 2023 data issued from the Canada Food and Inspection Agency dashboard [link]
2: a detailed list of wild bird species affected, consult weekly findings report on avian influenza in wild birds from Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) [link]
3: for more information, consult dedicated webpage of the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA/APHIS) [link]
4: for more information, consult dedicated webpage of the Australian Government [link] §: British Antarctic Survey (BAS) [link]. Δ: TSTS/FLI [link]
Dairy
Halwe, N.J., Cool, K., Breithaupt, A., Schön, J., Trujillo, J.D., Nooruzzaman, M., Kwon, T., et al. 2024. H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b dynamics in experimentally infected calves and cows. Nature, 2024 Sep 25. reference
Baker, A.L., Arruda, B., Palmer, M.V., Boggiatto, P., Davila, K.S., Buckley, A., Zanella, G.C., et al. 2024. Dairy cows inoculated with highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1. Nature, 2024 Oct 15. reference
Giménez-Lirola, L.G., Cauwels, B., Mora-Díaz, J.C., Magtoto, R., Hernández, J., Cordero-Ortiz, M., Nelli, R.K., Gorden, P.J., Magstadt, D.R. & Baum, D.H.024. Detection and Monitoring of Highly Pathogenic Influenza A Virus 2.3.4.4b Outbreak in Dairy Cattle in the United States. Viruses, 16(9):1376. reference
Ríos Carrasco, M., Gröne, A., van den Brand, J.M.A., de Vries, R.P. 2024. The mammary glands of cows abundantly display receptors for circulating avian H5 viruses. J Virol, 2024Oct10:e0105224 reference
Butt, S.L., Nooruzzaman, M., Covaleda, L.M. & Diel, D.G. 2024. Hot topic: Influenza A H5N1 virus exhibits a broad host range, including dairy cows. JDS Commun, 5(Suppl 1): S13-S19. reference
Lang, J., Helke, D., Kuryshko, M. & Abdelwhab, E.M. 2024. Survivability of H5N1 Avian Influenza Virus in Homemade Yogurt, Cheese and Whey. Emerg Microbes Infect, 2024 Oct 22:2420731. reference
Lee, A.J., Carson, S., Reyne, M.I., Marshall, A., Moody, D., Allen, D.M., Allingham, P., et al. 2024. Wastewater monitoring of human and avian influenza A viruses in Northern Ireland: a genomic surveillance study. Lancet Microbe, 2024Oct9:100933. reference
Kaiser, F., Cardenas, S., Yinda, K.C., Mukesh, E., Ochwoto, M., Gallogly, S., Wickenhagen, A., et al. 2024. Environmental stability of HPAIV H5N1 in raw milk, wastewater and on surfaces. bioRxiv 2024.10.22.619662. reference [Preprint]
Kwon, T., Gebhardt, J.T., Lyoo, E.L., Nooruzzaman, M., Gaudreault, N.N., Morozov, I., Diel, D.G. & Richt, J.A. 2024. Bovine Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus Stability and Inactivation in the Milk Byproduct Lactose. Viruses, 16(9):1451. reference
Caceres, C.J., Gay, L.C., Faccin, F.C., Regmi, D., Palomares, R. & Perez, D.R. 2024. Influenza A(H5N1) Virus Resilience in Milk after Thermal Inactivation. Emerg Infect Dis, 30(11). reference
Domestic
Bossers, A., de Rooij, M.M., van Schothorst, I., Velkers, F.C. & Smit, L.A. 2024. Detection of airborne wild waterbird-derived DNA demonstrates potential for transmission of avian influenza virus via air inlets into poultry houses, the Netherlands, 2021 to 2022. Euro Surveill, 29(40):2400350. reference
Gross, J., Volmer, R. & Bessière, P. 2024. High pathogenicity avian influenza virus emergence: Blame it on chickens or on humans raising chickens? PLoS Pathog, 20(10):e1012608. reference
Vergne, T., Paul, M.C., Guinat, C., Delpont, M., Hayes, B.H., Lambert, S., Vaillancourt, J.P. & Guérin, J.L. 2024. Highly pathogenic avian influenza management policy in domestic poultry: from reacting to preventing. Euro Surveill, 29(42):2400266. reference
Vagnozzi, A.E. 2024. Review of the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Argentina in 2023: Chronicle of Its Emergence and Control in Poultry. Pathogens, 13(9):810. reference
Bin Aslam, H., Häsler, B., Iqbal, M., Yaqub, T. & Alarcon, P. 2024. Financial impact of low pathogenic avian influenza virus subtype H9N2 on commercial broiler chicken and egg layer production systems in Pakistan. Prev Vet Med, 233:106346. reference
Munyua, P., Osoro, E., Jones, J., Njogu, G., Yang, G., Hunsperger, E., Szablewski, C.M., et al. 2024. Characterization of Avian Influenza Viruses Detected in Kenyan Live Bird Markets and Wild Bird Habitats Reveal Genetically Diverse Subtypes and High Proportion of A(H9N2), 2018-2020. Viruses, 16(9):1417. reference
Wild
Michalska-Smith, M., Clements, E., Rasmussen, E., Culhane, M.R. & Craft, M.E. 2024. Location, Age, and Antibodies Predict Avian Influenza Virus Shedding in Ring-Billed and Franklin's Gulls in Minnesota. Animals (Basel), 14(19):2781. reference
Lisovski, S., Günther, A., Dewar, M., Ainley, D., Aldunate, F., Arce, R., Ballard, G., et ai. 2024. Unexpected Delayed Incursion of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 (Clade 2.3.4.4b) Into the Antarctic Region. Influenza Other Respir Viruses, 18(10):e70010. reference
Klim, H., William, T., Mellors, J., Brady, C., Rajahram, G.S., Chua, T.H., Brazal Monzó, H., et al. 2024. Serological analysis in humans in Malaysian Borneo suggests prior exposure to H5 avian influenza near migratory shorebird habitats. Nat Commun, 15(1):8863. reference
Hsueh, C.S., Fasina, O., Piñeyro, P., Ruden, R., El-Gazzar, M.M. & Sato, Y. 2024. Histopathologic Features and Viral Antigen Distribution of H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus Clade 2.3.4.4b from the 2022-2023 Outbreak in Iowa Wild Birds. Avian Dis, 68(3):272-281. reference
Alava, J.J., Tirapé, A., Denkinger, J., Calle, P., Rosero, R.P., Salazar, S., Fair, P.A. & Raverty, S. 2024. Endangered Galapagos sea lions and fur seals under the siege of lethal avian flu: a cautionary note on emerging infectious viruses in endemic pinnipeds of the Galapagos Islands. Front Vet Sci, 11:1457035. reference
Paz, M., Franco-Trecu, V., Szteren, D., Costábile, A., Portela, C., Bruno, A., Moratorio, G., Moreno, P. & Cristina, J. 2024. Understanding the emergence of highly pathogenic avian influenza A virus H5N1 in pinnipeds: An evolutionary approach. Virus Res, 350:199472. reference
Usui, T., Uno, Y., Tanaka, K., Tanikawa, T., Yamaguchi T. Susceptibility of Synanthropic Rodents (Mus musculus, Rattus norvegicus and Rattus rattus) to H5N1 Subtype High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Viruses. Pathogens, 2024 Sep 5;13(9):764. reference
Other viruses
Ohlopkova, O.V., Goncharov, A.E., Aslanov, B.I., Fadeev, A.V., Davidyuk, Y.N., Moshkin, A.D., Stolbunova, K.A., et al. 2024. First detection of influenza A virus subtypes H1N1 and H3N8 in the Antarctic region: King George Island, 2023. Vopr Virusol, 69(4):377-389. reference
Song, X., Tian, J., Li, M., Bai, X., Zhao, Z., Shi, J., Zeng, X., et al. Epidemiology and Biological Characteristics of Influenza A (H4N6) Viruses from Wild Birds. Emerg Microbes Infect, 2024 Oct 17:2418909. reference
Wille, M., Broz, I., Cherrington, T., Crawley, A., Farrugia, B., Ford, M., Frost, M., et al. 2024. Contrasting dynamics of two incursions of low-pathogenicity avian influenza virus into Australia. Virus Evol, 10(1): veae076. reference
Khatun, M.N., Tasnim, S., Hossain, M.R., Rahman, M.Z., Hossain, M.T., Chowdhury, E.H. & Parvin, R. 2024. Molecular epidemiology of avian influenza viruses and avian coronaviruses in environmental samples from migratory bird inhabitants in Bangladesh. Front Vet Sci, 11:1446577 reference
Cueno, M.E., Kamio, N. & Imai, K. 2024. Avian influenza A H5N1 hemagglutinin protein models have distinct structural patterns re-occurring across the 1959-2023 strains. Biosystems, 246:105347. reference
Nooruzzaman, M., Mumu, T.T., Hossain, I., Kabiraj, C.K., Begum, J.A., Rahman, M.M., Ali, M.Z., et al. 2024. Continuing evolution of H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses of clade 2.3.2.1a G2 genotype in domestic poultry of Bangladesh during 2018-2021. Avian Pathol, 2024 Oct 9:1-14. reference
Li, F., Sun, Z., Tao, M., Song, K., Wang, Z. & Ren, X. 2024. Epidemiological characterization of human infection with H5N6 avian influenza. Front Public Health, 12:1398365. reference
Elhusseiny, M.H., Elsayed, M.M., Mady, W.H., Mahana, O., Bakry, N.R., Abdelaziz, O., Arafa, A.S., Shahein, M.A., Eid, S. & Naguib, M.M. 2024. Genetic features of avian influenza (A/H5N8) clade 2.3.4.4b isolated from quail in Egypt. Virus Res, 350:199482. reference
Degtyarev, E., Feoktistova, S., Volchkov, P. & Deviatkin, A. 2024. Bottom of Form Complex Evolutionary Dynamics of H5N8 Influenza A Viruses Revealed by Comprehensive Reassortment Analysis. Viruses, 16(9):1405. reference
Ahrens, A.K., Pohlmann, A., Grund, C., Beer, M. & Harder, T.C. 2024. Out of the blue: Detection of a unique highly pathogenic avian influenza virus of subtype H7N5 in Germany. Emerg Microbes Infect, 2024 Oct 22:2420723. reference
Yuan, Z., Zhang, J., Jiang, D., Huang, G. & Qi, W.2024. Epidemiology and evolution of human-origin H10N5 influenza virus. One Health, 19:100893. reference
Assay
Snoeck, C.J., Sausy, A., Bourg, M. & Hübschen, J.M. 2024. Comparison of Extraction Methods for the Detection of Avian Influenza Virus RNA in Cattle Milk. Viruses, 2024 Sep 10;16(9):1442. reference
Chaves, M., Hashish, A., Osemeke, O., Sato, Y., Suarez, D.L. & El-Gazzar, M. 2024. Evaluation of Commercial RNA Extraction Protocols for Avian Influenza Virus Using Nanopore Metagenomic Sequencing. Viruses, 16(9):1429. reference
Sobhy, N.M., Muñoz, A.Q., Youssef, C.R.B. & Goyal, S.M. 2024. Comparative Inactivation of Three Different Subtypes of Avian Influenza Virus by Ozonized Water. Avian Dis, 68(3):225-230. reference
Assessment
Musa, E., Nia, Z.M., Bragazzi, N.L., Leung, D., Lee, N. & Kong, J.D. 2024. Avian Influenza: Lessons from Past Outbreaks and an Inventory of Data Sources, Mathematical and AI Models, and Early Warning Systems for Forecasting and Hotspot Detection to Tackle Ongoing Outbreaks. Healthcare (Basel), 12(19):1959. reference
Alberts, F., Berke, O., Maboni, G., Petukhova, T. & Poljak, Z. 2024. Utilizing machine learning and hemagglutinin sequences to identify likely hosts of influenza H3Nx viruses. Prev Vet Med, 233:106351. reference
Pittman Ratterree, D.C., Dass, S.C. & Ndeffo-Mbah, M.L. 2024. Mechanistic Models of Influenza Transmission in Commercial Swine Populations: A Systematic Review. Pathogens, 13(9):746. reference
America
Asia
North Africa and Middle East
Sub-Saharan Africa
Figure 1. Number of countries reported HPAI since 1 October 2024 by subtype (left) and by region (right) as of 21 October 2024 (territory/area for sub/Antarctic zone)
Source: WOAH WAHIS portal, government and publications.
Table 2. Epidemiological overview for avian influenza viruses viruses known to have caused zoonotic infections in the past 20 years
Subtype | Epidemiological situation overview |
---|---|
H5Nx Gs/GD* HPAI (1996) | High pathogenicity avian influenza viruses within the Goose/Guangdong/1/96- lineage (Gs/GD) were first detected in geese in Guangdong Province, China in 1996. They have persisted, as high pathogenicity viruses, since then and have caused outbreaks in poultry across all regions globally other than Oceania. The initial viruses in this lineage were of the A(H5N1) subtype but other subtypes (including H5N2, H5N3 H5N5, H5N6, H5N8) have emerged, mainly in the past 10 years, as a result of reassortment with other avian influenza viruses. The common feature of these viruses is an HA gene related back to the original Gs/GD/96 virus. The HA gene of these viruses has evolved over the past 28 years, initially into 10 clades (clade 0 to 9) of which descendents of clade 2 viruses are the only ones that continue to circulate. Multiple 5th order clades persist such as the one that is currently dominant globally – clade 2.3.4.4b - whereas others have emerged and disappeared. Multiple genotypes carrying different combinations of the eight influenza A segmented genes have emerged, as a result of co-infection of birds with different avian influenza viruses that facilitated reassortment. Of considerable significance in the past has been reassortment with enzootic A(H9N2) viruses. Eurasian lineage clade 2.3.4.4b viruses formed multiple genotypes and those that crossed to North America have reassorted with North American wild bird avian influenza viruses to produced additional genotypes. Two separate systems for naming genotypes of clade 2.3.4.4b have been developed for Eurasian and North American viruses (Fusaro, et al., 2024, Youk, et al., 2023). The clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1) virus detected in dairy cattle in North America in 2024 falls within genotype 3.13 using the North American naming system. [link] Some Gs/GD viruses have produced severe zoonotic infections in humans, first identified in 1997 when an A(H5N1) clade 0 virus in the Gs/GD lineage in Hong Kong SAR, China caused disease outbreaks in poultry in farms and markets as well as severe disease in humans. In several cases there was some evidence of limited onward transmission in humans and this event raised concerns that it might be the beginning of a human influenza pandemic. Despite the successful efforts to eradicate this particular strain, other viruses within this lineage persisted and evolved in China, becoming more adept at infecting domestic ducks. By 2003 spread of these viruses via wild birds and live bird trade occurred across East and Southeast Asia, resulting in additional zoonotic infection in humans [link]. The important role of wild birds in the transmission of these viruses over long distances became apparent in 2005 when a Gs/GD virus (clade 2.2) spread, primarily via wild birds, across Eurasia, and parts of Africa from western China. Most high-income countries eliminated this virus from poultry, but it persisted in several low- and middle-income countries. Viruses within the Gs/GD lineage continued to evolve and spread. Additional intercontinental waves of transmission have occurred with the two most significant being those in 2014 (clade 2.3.4.4c) and from 2016 onwards (clade 2.3.4.4b) that also resulted in spread of these viruses to North America (2014-15 and 2021-22), with the latest outbreak extending through central and South America and to sub-Antarctic islands. These waves involved multiple N subtypes. In 2022/2023, H5N1 2.3.4.4b caused extensive infection in coastal seabirds and mass die- offs of numerous ecologically important wild bird species. For an updated list of bird species affected with A(H5Nx) see HERE In 2024, H5N1 2.3.4.4b caused infection in goats (1 farm) and dairy cattle (334 farms, as of 23 October) in the United States of America. See HERE. USDA shared the Whole Genome Sequences, see HERE. Among the other Gs/GD virus clades that remain endemic in specific areas are clade 2.3.2.1a H5N1 viruses that have persisted in South Asia since 2010 and rarely associated with disease in humans. Clade 2.3.2.1c/e viruses have been present in Indonesia since 2012 and related viruses are still circulating in Cambodia, Viet Nam and Lao People’s Democratic Republic. A novel reassortant influenza A(H5N1) virus has been detected in poultry in Cambodia (since 2023), Lao People's Democratic Republic and Viet Nam (since 2022) and was also detected in the human cases reported from Cambodia since late 2023 and Viet Nam in 2024. This virus contains the surface proteins from clade 2.3.2.1c that has circulated locally, but internal genes from a more recent clade 2.3.4.4b virus [link]. Of the 15 recent human cases, seven of which were fatal, recorded in Cambodia (6) and Viet Nam (1). For an updated list of confirmed human cases with A(H5N1) see HERE In addition, 91 human cases have been associated with clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5Nx/y) and 2.3.4.4h A(H5N6) viruses with most of these occurring in 2021 and 2022. Clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1) viruses have caused few human cases but have resulted in multiple mammalian cases including aquatic mammals. For an updated list of mammalian species affected with A(H5Nx) see HERE |
Avian origin H3N8 LPAI | An Influenza A(H3N8) virus lineage emerged in live bird markets in southern China in mid 2021 [link]. Since then, three human cases of Influenza A(H3N8) have been reported: In April 2022, the first human clinical case associated with this lineage was reported in Henan Province, China and was associated with severe disease. In May 2022, a 5-year-old boy was diagnosed with a mild influenza A(H3N8) infection in Changsha City, Hunan Province, China. On 27 March 2023, a third human case was reported from Guangdong Province, China in a 56-year-old female with underlying illneses who subsequently died. One of the A(H3N8) viruses isolated from a human was found to be transmissible by air in ferrets [link] but no evidence of sustained human transmission has been reported. |
H7N4 LPAI (2017) | One human case in China with reported exposure to poultry. |
H7N9 LPAI (2013) & HPAI (2017) | Reported only in China with over 1 000 human cases between 2013 and 2017 with a marked increase in 2017 compared to previous waves. Most human cases exposed in live bird markets. Nation-wide vaccination campaign in poultry since Sep 2017: Last reported human case in 2019 [link]. See FAO H7N9 situation update |
H9N2 LPAI | First human case reported in 1998. To date, about 100 influenza A(H9N2) human cases diagnosed worldwide, many of them were reported from China since December 2015. Most cases mild and involving children. Only two fatal cases reported [link] Endemic in multiple countries in Africa and Asia, a cause of significant production losses and mortalities in poultry production systems. Three major lineages and multiple genotypes. |
H10Nx LPAI | To date, three influenza A(H10N3) human infections have been reported globally [link]. In May 2021, the first case in Jiangsu Province, China [link], in September 2022, a second case in Zhejiang Province, China [link], in February 2024, the third case in Yunnan Province, China [link]. The first influenza A(H10N5) human infection was reported in Zhejiang Province, China [link]. |
FAO recommends intensified surveillance and awareness raising by national authorities.
General recommendations
It is important to report sick or dead birds – both wild birds and poultry - or wild mammals to local authorities (veterinary services, public health officials, community leaders etc.). These should be tested for avian
influenza viruses.
Recommendations to poultry producers
Farmers and poultry producers should step up their biosecurity measures in order to prevent potential virus introduction from wild birds or their faeces.
Recommendations to hunters
Hunting associations and wildlife authorities should be aware that avian influenza viruses might be present in waterfowl and some other species hunted and that hunting, handling and dressing of shot game carries the risk
of spreading avian influenza viruses to susceptible poultry.
Recommendations to national authorities
Increase surveillance efforts for the early detection of influenza viruses in poultry and dead wild species including certain mammals.
For full recommendations including non-avian species please see [link].
Updates on avian influenza infection in dairy cattle have been shared by USDA, US CDC and US FDA through the following sites:
Next issue: 24 Oct. 2024
Information provided herein is current as of the date of issue. Information added or changed since the last Global AIV with Zoonotic Potential situation update appears in orange. Human cases are depicted in the geographic location of their report. For some cases, exposure may have occurred in one geographic location but reported in another. For cases with unknown onset date, reporting date was used instead. FAO compiles information drawn from multiple national (Ministries of Agriculture or Livestock, Ministries of Health, Provincial Government websites; Centers for Disease Prevention and Control [CDC]) and international sources (World Health Organization [WHO], World Organisation for Animal Health [WOAH]), as well as peer reviewed scientific articles. FAO makes every effort to ensure, but does not guarantee, accuracy, completeness or authenticity of the information. The designation employed and the presentation of material on the map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of FAO concerning the legal or constitutional status of any country, territory or sea area, or concerning the delimitation of frontiers.
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