Animal health

Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update

24 October 2024, 08:30 hours; Rome

Overview

This update covers avian influenza viruses (AIV) with zoonotic potential occurring worldwide, i.e. H5Nx, H7Nx high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) viruses and H3N8, H5Nx, H6N1, H7Nx, H9N2, H10Nx and H11 low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI).

Specific information is available for Avian Influenza A(H7N9) virus viruses and Sub-Saharan Africa HPAI in related FAO Avian Influenza situation updates.

HPAI outbreaks in animals officially reported since last update (26 September 2024): in total, 364 outbreaks/events have been reported in five geographic regions caused by H5Nx (16), H5N1 (314), H5N3 (1), H5N5 (29) and HxNx (4). (see Table 1 for details)

LPAI events in animals officially reported since the last update (26 September 2024): 0 new event was reported.

Number of human cases officially reported since last update (26 September 2024): 14 new events were reported.1,2

1 https://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/2024_avian_influenza_report_vol20_wk41.pdf
2 https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/situation-summary/index.html

Map 1. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential* observed since 1 October 2024 (i.e. current wave)

Note: Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.

Map 2. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential* observed in the period 1 October 2023 to 30 September 2024 (i.e. previous wave)

Note: Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.

Table 1. High pathogenicity avian influenza viruses with zoonotic potential reported since the last update

Virus Country/Area Last observed outbreak # events reported since the last update # events reported since xxx Species affected during the reporting preiod

H5

Belgium

05/10/2024

1
(in W)

1
(in W)

Mew Gull

France

12/10/2024

2

1

Poultry

Peru

20/09/2024

6

6

Duck, non-poultry poultry birds

United States of America3

27/09/2024

7
(W6, M1)

6
(W5, M1)

American wigeon, Eurasian collared dove, Green-winged teal, Snow goose, Red Fox

H5N1

Austria

14/10/2024

6
(incl. W4)

6
(incl. W4)

Poultry, non-poultry birds; Greylag Goose, Mute Swan

Bulgaria

15/10/2024

2

2

Poultry

Canada

01/07/2024

1
(in W)

1
(in W)

American Crow, Canada Goose, Red-tailed Hawk

Czech Republic

08/10/2024

4

4

Duck, mallards, partridges, pheasants, Non-poultry birds

Denmark

08/09/2024

1

0

Mallard

France

18/09/2024

3
(incl. W1)

2
(incl. W1)

Poultry, Non-poultry birds; Cygnus, Laridae

Germany Δ

11/10/2024

8
(incl. W6, C1)

6
(incl. W5, C1)

Anatidae, Cygnus, Laridae, Pelecanidae, various zoo birds

Hungary

19/10/2024

26
(incl. W11)

26
(incl. W11)

Duck, Goose, Turkey, Domestic poultry; Eurasian Blackcap, Greylag Goose, Mute Swan

Israel

14/10/2024

6
(incl. W4)

6
(incl. W4)

Domestic Poultry; Common Teal, Great White Pelican, Peregrin falcon

Italy

11/10/2024

13
(incl. W5)

12
(incl. W4)

Chicken, Turkey, Common Teal, Eurasian Wigeon, Mallard

Japan

17/10/2024

3
(incl. W1, E1)

3
(incl. W1, E1)

Chicken, Peregrine falcon, Eurasian wigeon faeces

Moldova

17/10/2024

23
(incl. W1)

13

Non-poultry domestic birds; Greylag Goose

Poland

18/10/2024

4

4

Poultry

Republic of Korea

14/10/2024

1
(in W)

1
(in W)

Mandarin duck

Serbia

21/10/2024

5
(in W)

4
(in W)

Mute Swan

Slovakia

16/10/2024

3
(incl. W2)

2
(in W)

Poultry; Grey Heron, Mute Swan

Slovenia

16/10/2024

4
(incl. W1)

4
(incl. W1)

Non-poultry birds; Mute Swan

Spain

08/10/2024

9
(in W)

9
(in W)

Herring Gull, Yellow-legged Gull

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Week 42

1
(in W)

1
(in W)

Greylag Goose

United States of America3

14/10/2024

187
(incl. W74, C8,M4. DF95)

154
(incl. W53, C2, M4, DF90)

Chicken, WOAH Poultry, WOAH Non-Poultry; American wigeon, Bald eagle, Black scoter, Black vulture, Blue-winged teal, Brewer's blackbird, Canada goose, Eurasian collared dove, European starling, Gadwall, Green-winged teal, Hooded merganser, Lesser scaup, Mallard, Northern pintail, Northern shoveler, Peregrine falcon, Red-shouldered hawk, Ring-necked duck, Rock pigeon, Ross's goose, Royal tern, Snow goose, Willet, Wood duck; Bottlenose dolphin, Cattle, Red fox

Viet Nam

08/09/2024

4
(incl. M2)

4
(incl. M2)

Domestic poultry; Leopard, Lion, Tiger

H5N3

Republic of Korea

02/10/2024

1
(in E)

1
(in E)

Wild bird faeces

H5N5

Belgium

05/10/2024

1
(in W)

1
(in W)

Mew Gull

Canada

01/07/2024

1
(in W)

1
(in W)

Great black-backed Gull, Herring Gull

Denmark
(Faroe Islands)

20/09/2024

1
(in W)

0

Common Raven

Germany

01/10/2024

1
(in W)

1
(in W)

Alcidae

Iceland

23/09/2024

2
(in W)

2
(in W)

Black-headed Gull, Common Raven

United Kingdom

Week 42

23
(in W)

23
(in W)

Black-headed Gull, Common Gull, Cormorant, Fulmar, Gannet, Great Black-backed Gull, Great Skua, Herring Gull, Kestrel, Mew Gull, White-tailed Eagle

HxNx

Norway

27/09/2024

4
(in W)

4
(in W)

Herring Gull, Great Black-headed Gull, White-tailed Eagle

Data was retrieved from WOAH WAHIS portal, government websites. Data cutoff time: reported on 24 October 2024, 8:30 CEST. $:estimate. ‡: date of confirmation. The full list of bird and mammalian species affected by H5Nx HPAI are available HERE. Notes: Only those reporting events in animals since the last update are listed in the table, those reporting for the first time since 1 October 2023 in orange. Codes: D:domestic, C:captivity, W:Wild birds, DF: Dairy farm, E:Environment, M: mammalian species other than humans, example: W123 indicates 123 wild birds affected. x: confirmation date.
1: the total includes events with sample collection date since 1 October 2023 data issued from the Canada Food and Inspection Agency dashboard [link]
2: a detailed list of wild bird species affected, consult weekly findings report on avian influenza in wild birds from Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) [link]
3: for more information, consult dedicated webpage of the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA/APHIS) [link]
4: for more information, consult dedicated webpage of the Australian Government [link] §: British Antarctic Survey (BAS) [link]. Δ: TSTS/FLI [link]

Recent publications

Dairy

Halwe, N.J., Cool, K., Breithaupt, A., Schön, J., Trujillo, J.D., Nooruzzaman, M., Kwon, T., et al. 2024. H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b dynamics in experimentally infected calves and cows. Nature, 2024 Sep 25. reference

Baker, A.L., Arruda, B., Palmer, M.V., Boggiatto, P., Davila, K.S., Buckley, A., Zanella, G.C., et al. 2024. Dairy cows inoculated with highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1. Nature, 2024 Oct 15. reference

Giménez-Lirola, L.G., Cauwels, B., Mora-Díaz, J.C., Magtoto, R., Hernández, J., Cordero-Ortiz, M., Nelli, R.K., Gorden, P.J., Magstadt, D.R. & Baum, D.H.024. Detection and Monitoring of Highly Pathogenic Influenza A Virus 2.3.4.4b Outbreak in Dairy Cattle in the United States. Viruses, 16(9):1376. reference

Ríos Carrasco, M., Gröne, A., van den Brand, J.M.A., de Vries, R.P. 2024. The mammary glands of cows abundantly display receptors for circulating avian H5 viruses. J Virol, 2024Oct10:e0105224 reference

Butt, S.L., Nooruzzaman, M., Covaleda, L.M. & Diel, D.G. 2024. Hot topic: Influenza A H5N1 virus exhibits a broad host range, including dairy cows. JDS Commun, 5(Suppl 1): S13-S19. reference

Lang, J., Helke, D., Kuryshko, M. & Abdelwhab, E.M. 2024. Survivability of H5N1 Avian Influenza Virus in Homemade Yogurt, Cheese and Whey. Emerg Microbes Infect, 2024 Oct 22:2420731. reference

Lee, A.J., Carson, S., Reyne, M.I., Marshall, A., Moody, D., Allen, D.M., Allingham, P., et al. 2024. Wastewater monitoring of human and avian influenza A viruses in Northern Ireland: a genomic surveillance study. Lancet Microbe, 2024Oct9:100933. reference

Kaiser, F., Cardenas, S., Yinda, K.C., Mukesh, E., Ochwoto, M., Gallogly, S., Wickenhagen, A., et al. 2024. Environmental stability of HPAIV H5N1 in raw milk, wastewater and on surfaces. bioRxiv 2024.10.22.619662. reference [Preprint]

Kwon, T., Gebhardt, J.T., Lyoo, E.L., Nooruzzaman, M., Gaudreault, N.N., Morozov, I., Diel, D.G. & Richt, J.A. 2024. Bovine Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus Stability and Inactivation in the Milk Byproduct Lactose. Viruses, 16(9):1451. reference

Caceres, C.J., Gay, L.C., Faccin, F.C., Regmi, D., Palomares, R. & Perez, D.R. 2024. Influenza A(H5N1) Virus Resilience in Milk after Thermal Inactivation. Emerg Infect Dis, 30(11). reference

Domestic

Bossers, A., de Rooij, M.M., van Schothorst, I., Velkers, F.C. & Smit, L.A. 2024. Detection of airborne wild waterbird-derived DNA demonstrates potential for transmission of avian influenza virus via air inlets into poultry houses, the Netherlands, 2021 to 2022. Euro Surveill, 29(40):2400350. reference

Gross, J., Volmer, R. & Bessière, P. 2024. High pathogenicity avian influenza virus emergence: Blame it on chickens or on humans raising chickens? PLoS Pathog, 20(10):e1012608. reference

Vergne, T., Paul, M.C., Guinat, C., Delpont, M., Hayes, B.H., Lambert, S., Vaillancourt, J.P. & Guérin, J.L. 2024. Highly pathogenic avian influenza management policy in domestic poultry: from reacting to preventing. Euro Surveill, 29(42):2400266. reference

Vagnozzi, A.E. 2024. Review of the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Argentina in 2023: Chronicle of Its Emergence and Control in Poultry. Pathogens, 13(9):810. reference

Bin Aslam, H., Häsler, B., Iqbal, M., Yaqub, T. & Alarcon, P. 2024. Financial impact of low pathogenic avian influenza virus subtype H9N2 on commercial broiler chicken and egg layer production systems in Pakistan. Prev Vet Med, 233:106346. reference

Munyua, P., Osoro, E., Jones, J., Njogu, G., Yang, G., Hunsperger, E., Szablewski, C.M., et al. 2024. Characterization of Avian Influenza Viruses Detected in Kenyan Live Bird Markets and Wild Bird Habitats Reveal Genetically Diverse Subtypes and High Proportion of A(H9N2), 2018-2020. Viruses, 16(9):1417. reference

Wild

Michalska-Smith, M., Clements, E., Rasmussen, E., Culhane, M.R. & Craft, M.E. 2024. Location, Age, and Antibodies Predict Avian Influenza Virus Shedding in Ring-Billed and Franklin's Gulls in Minnesota. Animals (Basel), 14(19):2781. reference

Lisovski, S., Günther, A., Dewar, M., Ainley, D., Aldunate, F., Arce, R., Ballard, G., et ai. 2024. Unexpected Delayed Incursion of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 (Clade 2.3.4.4b) Into the Antarctic Region. Influenza Other Respir Viruses, 18(10):e70010. reference

Klim, H., William, T., Mellors, J., Brady, C., Rajahram, G.S., Chua, T.H., Brazal Monzó, H., et al. 2024. Serological analysis in humans in Malaysian Borneo suggests prior exposure to H5 avian influenza near migratory shorebird habitats. Nat Commun, 15(1):8863. reference

Hsueh, C.S., Fasina, O., Piñeyro, P., Ruden, R., El-Gazzar, M.M. & Sato, Y. 2024. Histopathologic Features and Viral Antigen Distribution of H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus Clade 2.3.4.4b from the 2022-2023 Outbreak in Iowa Wild Birds. Avian Dis, 68(3):272-281. reference

Alava, J.J., Tirapé, A., Denkinger, J., Calle, P., Rosero, R.P., Salazar, S., Fair, P.A. & Raverty, S. 2024. Endangered Galapagos sea lions and fur seals under the siege of lethal avian flu: a cautionary note on emerging infectious viruses in endemic pinnipeds of the Galapagos Islands. Front Vet Sci, 11:1457035. reference

Paz, M., Franco-Trecu, V., Szteren, D., Costábile, A., Portela, C., Bruno, A., Moratorio, G., Moreno, P. & Cristina, J. 2024. Understanding the emergence of highly pathogenic avian influenza A virus H5N1 in pinnipeds: An evolutionary approach. Virus Res, 350:199472. reference

Usui, T., Uno, Y., Tanaka, K., Tanikawa, T., Yamaguchi T. Susceptibility of Synanthropic Rodents (Mus musculus, Rattus norvegicus and Rattus rattus) to H5N1 Subtype High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Viruses. Pathogens, 2024 Sep 5;13(9):764. reference

Other viruses

Ohlopkova, O.V., Goncharov, A.E., Aslanov, B.I., Fadeev, A.V., Davidyuk, Y.N., Moshkin, A.D., Stolbunova, K.A., et al. 2024. First detection of influenza A virus subtypes H1N1 and H3N8 in the Antarctic region: King George Island, 2023. Vopr Virusol, 69(4):377-389. reference

Song, X., Tian, J., Li, M., Bai, X., Zhao, Z., Shi, J., Zeng, X., et al. Epidemiology and Biological Characteristics of Influenza A (H4N6) Viruses from Wild Birds. Emerg Microbes Infect, 2024 Oct 17:2418909. reference

Wille, M., Broz, I., Cherrington, T., Crawley, A., Farrugia, B., Ford, M., Frost, M., et al. 2024. Contrasting dynamics of two incursions of low-pathogenicity avian influenza virus into Australia. Virus Evol, 10(1): veae076. reference

Khatun, M.N., Tasnim, S., Hossain, M.R., Rahman, M.Z., Hossain, M.T., Chowdhury, E.H. & Parvin, R. 2024. Molecular epidemiology of avian influenza viruses and avian coronaviruses in environmental samples from migratory bird inhabitants in Bangladesh. Front Vet Sci, 11:1446577 reference

Cueno, M.E., Kamio, N. & Imai, K. 2024. Avian influenza A H5N1 hemagglutinin protein models have distinct structural patterns re-occurring across the 1959-2023 strains. Biosystems, 246:105347. reference

Nooruzzaman, M., Mumu, T.T., Hossain, I., Kabiraj, C.K., Begum, J.A., Rahman, M.M., Ali, M.Z., et al. 2024. Continuing evolution of H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses of clade 2.3.2.1a G2 genotype in domestic poultry of Bangladesh during 2018-2021. Avian Pathol, 2024 Oct 9:1-14. reference

Li, F., Sun, Z., Tao, M., Song, K., Wang, Z. & Ren, X. 2024. Epidemiological characterization of human infection with H5N6 avian influenza. Front Public Health, 12:1398365. reference

Elhusseiny, M.H., Elsayed, M.M., Mady, W.H., Mahana, O., Bakry, N.R., Abdelaziz, O., Arafa, A.S., Shahein, M.A., Eid, S. & Naguib, M.M. 2024. Genetic features of avian influenza (A/H5N8) clade 2.3.4.4b isolated from quail in Egypt. Virus Res, 350:199482. reference

Degtyarev, E., Feoktistova, S., Volchkov, P. & Deviatkin, A. 2024. Bottom of Form Complex Evolutionary Dynamics of H5N8 Influenza A Viruses Revealed by Comprehensive Reassortment Analysis. Viruses, 16(9):1405. reference

Ahrens, A.K., Pohlmann, A., Grund, C., Beer, M. & Harder, T.C. 2024. Out of the blue: Detection of a unique highly pathogenic avian influenza virus of subtype H7N5 in Germany. Emerg Microbes Infect, 2024 Oct 22:2420723. reference

Yuan, Z., Zhang, J., Jiang, D., Huang, G. & Qi, W.2024. Epidemiology and evolution of human-origin H10N5 influenza virus. One Health, 19:100893. reference

Assay

Snoeck, C.J., Sausy, A., Bourg, M. & Hübschen, J.M. 2024. Comparison of Extraction Methods for the Detection of Avian Influenza Virus RNA in Cattle Milk. Viruses, 2024 Sep 10;16(9):1442. reference

Chaves, M., Hashish, A., Osemeke, O., Sato, Y., Suarez, D.L. & El-Gazzar, M. 2024. Evaluation of Commercial RNA Extraction Protocols for Avian Influenza Virus Using Nanopore Metagenomic Sequencing. Viruses, 16(9):1429. reference

Sobhy, N.M., Muñoz, A.Q., Youssef, C.R.B. & Goyal, S.M. 2024. Comparative Inactivation of Three Different Subtypes of Avian Influenza Virus by Ozonized Water. Avian Dis, 68(3):225-230. reference

Assessment

Musa, E., Nia, Z.M., Bragazzi, N.L., Leung, D., Lee, N. & Kong, J.D. 2024. Avian Influenza: Lessons from Past Outbreaks and an Inventory of Data Sources, Mathematical and AI Models, and Early Warning Systems for Forecasting and Hotspot Detection to Tackle Ongoing Outbreaks. Healthcare (Basel), 12(19):1959. reference

Alberts, F., Berke, O., Maboni, G., Petukhova, T. & Poljak, Z. 2024. Utilizing machine learning and hemagglutinin sequences to identify likely hosts of influenza H3Nx viruses. Prev Vet Med, 233:106351. reference

Pittman Ratterree, D.C., Dass, S.C. & Ndeffo-Mbah, M.L. 2024. Mechanistic Models of Influenza Transmission in Commercial Swine Populations: A Systematic Review. Pathogens, 13(9):746. reference

FAO's support to countries

Global level
  • FAO participated in the International Alliance for Biological Standardization (IABS) meeting on "Vaccination and Surveillance for High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza in poultry: Current Situation and Perspectives" held in Paris on 22-23 October 2024 and presented 'Cost benefit assessment of surveillance (affordable/sustainable, who pays)' [link]
  • Webinar featuring 'Update on the origin, changing path and response to the 2022-2024 HPAI outbreak in the United States of America' was held on 26 September as a part of 'Progressive Management Pathway for Terrestrial Animal Biosecurity' (PMP-TAB) monthly webinar series, presented by Dr Julianna Lenoch, National Wildlife Disease Program, USDA APHIS Wildlife Services. [recording]
  • OFFLU is conducting a stakeholder survey on its Avian Influenza Matching (AIM) for poultry vaccines project. Share your feedback here.
  • OFFLU has provided with information on influenza in animals and participated in the WHO Information Meeting on the Composition of Influenza Virus Vaccines for Use in the 2025 Southern Hemisphere Influenza Season [link]. The report is available here.
  • FAO organized the Global Conference on Animal Health Innovation, Reference Centres and Vaccines from 23 to 25 September at FAO Rome [link], the webcast is accessible [link].
  • FAO, WOAH and OFFLU are participating WHO’s Tool for Influenza Pandemic Risk Assessment (TIPRA).
  • FAO released Empres Watch - A(H5N1) influenza in dairy cattle in the United States of America. [link]
Regional/country level
  • Americas
    • FAO presented “Biosecurity measures in populations at risk” at the webinar on epidemiological surveillance of HPAI organized by Organismo Internacional Regional de Sanidad Agropecuaria (OIRSA) on 19 September 2024.
    • FAO will collaborate in the workshop organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the genomics and bioinformatics of HPAI, which will be held in Santiago de Chile, from 7 to 18 October 2024.
    • FAO Emergency Center for Transboundary Animal Disease Control (ECTAD) at regional and country (Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Peru) levels are supporting activities to respond to HPAI outbreaks e.g. simulations exercises, HPAI diagnostic trainings, information materials.
    • FAO ECTAD Peru organized a Biosecurity Workshop from 19 to 21 August, covering biosecurity, biocustody, biocontainment, etc.
    • FAO conducted Surveillance Evaluation Tool (SET) mission in Honduras and El Salvador to develop national contingency plans under One Health approach (September/October).
    • Trainings on Laboratory Mapping Tool (LMT) has been conducted in Colombia [link], El Salvador (October) and Honduras (October/November). One health assessment tool training will be held in Peru (October).
    • Good Emergency Management Practice (GEMP) training also took place in Colombia [link] and Honduras [link].
    • In Guatemala, FAO and Animal Health Directorate conducted an HPAI simulation exercise in August 2024 [link].
    • FAO Outbreak Costing Tool (OutCosT) has been implemented in Bolivia, Chile and Panama to estimate the economic impact of HPAI outbreaks.
    • Currently, Bolivia, Dominican Republic (for prophylaxis; no outbreak reported), Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay are using vaccines to prevent and/or control HPAI, while some other countries are evaluating implementation.
  • Africa
    • In Cameroon, following the notification of HPAI in Gabon, ECTAD Cameroon supported Veterinary Services to conduct active surveillance in the South Region bordering Gabon from 9 to 18 September 2024. The investigation aimed to assess the risk of introducing and spillover of avian influenza virus from Gabon. ECTAD Cameroon to support LANAVET (Laboratoire National Vétérinaire) in conducting active surveillance at the end of October 2024 in North, Far North and West Regions.
    • Ghana has recorded 13 H5N1 outbreaks in 4 out of 16 regions, namely Eastern, Greater Accra, Western and Volta regions since 10 January 2024 to date. Active surveillance for avian influenza was conducted with support from the Ghana One Health team resulted in 3 regions reporting H5 and 13 regions reporting H9 i.e. all the regions except North East, Northern and Savannah regions recorded H9. FAO ECTAD Ghana in collaboration with Veterinary Service Directorate (VSD) of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) organised an online course on Farm Biosecurity and One health (FBOH) for 529 veterinary paraprofessionals (VPPs) through the FAO virtual learning centre (VLC)-West Africa.
    • In Somalia, FAO has trained 80 Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs) in community-based surveillance and disease reporting to strengthen their ability to detect poultry diseases, provide timely reports, and contribute to early warning systems.
    • FAO Zimbabwe, with support from the Fleming Fund and Multi-partner Trust Fund projects, has been implementing Broiler Farmer Field Schools (FFS) in eight districts to prevent major poultry diseases on farms. This comprehensive and proactive approach emphasizes core biosecurity measures, disease prevention practices, and focused efforts for the rationale use of antimicrobials, promoting healthier, more resilient poultry farming systems; the activity is being expanded to four additional districts. National guidelines on biosafety and biosecurity, a training manual on biosafety and biosecurity, and National Veterinary Waste Management Guidelines were also developed.
    • FAO ECTAD WCA supported specimen transport to FAO Reference Centre (IZSVe), where complete genome sequencing has been performed. Results from genomic characterization of H5N1 viruses from Benin, Burkina Faso and Guinea indicated the persistent circulation in West Africa of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 viruses belonging to two distinct genotypes: genotype EA-2020-C (identified in Benin and Burkina Faso; Fusaro et al., 2023), originally introduced into the region from Europe at the beginning of 2021, and the EA-2020-C/H9N2 reassortant strain (identified in Guinea), which emerged in West Africa in 2021 (Ouba et al., 2022). This finding suggest that these two variants continue to circulate and evolve in an unknown and unsampled hosts and locations. In 2024, introduction of a novel 2.3.4.4b H5N1 reassortant virus, containing six genes clustering with H5N1 viruses from East and South Europe, and two genes originating from reassortment events with Eurasian LPAI viruses, has been identified. Based on the data available, this novel genotype has been detected only in West Africa (Benin and Nigeria) globally to date. In addition, influenza A(H9N2) lineage G5.5 (Fusaro et al., 2024) viruses were also detected in Guinea, which cluster with H9N2 viruses previously detected in poultry in West Africa in 2021.
  • North Africa and Middle East
    • FAO ECTAD Egypt in the Regional office for Near East and North Africa (RNE) is supporting the implementation of the targeted risk-based surveillance plan for 2024 to understand the prevalence of Avian Influenza sub-types currently circulating in Egypt and to detect incursion of new subtypes as early as possible. A Consultative meeting was held in Cairo brought together governmental and international organizations representatives to discuss the global situation, the risk related to the recent finding on avian influenza H5N1 infection in dairy cows and the required way forward for the preparedness and response measures required to face the current situation of H5N1 influenza in Dairy Cows.
  • Asia and the Pacific
    • FAO ECTAD in the Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (RAP) organized a quarterly influenza coordination call on 17 October 2024 with ECTAD countries in Asia and the Pacific to discuss progress and challenges around avian influenza surveillance in the region.
    • FAO ECTAD RAP provided a webinar on Field detection and new technologies: Asian perspective and regional cross-fertilization [link].
    • FAO ECTAD Indonesia and Directorate of Animal Health, Ministry of Agriculture will conduct Joint Risk Assessment of HPAI H5N1 in Sukabumi District, West Java Province in October 2024.
    • FAO ECTAD Indonesia in collaboration with Directorate of Animal Health, Ministry of Agriculture, is developing the Avian Influenza National Surveillance Technical Guidelines. This guideline will be a reference document for all Animal Health Laboratory in Indonesia in conducting Avian Influenza surveillance both in domestic animal and wild bird populations.
    • FAO ECTAD Lao supports the avian influenza surveillance at live bird markets in six provinces scheduled to resume in November. Implemented by the National Animal Health Laboratory under the Department of Livestock and Fisheries of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, this initiative aims to strengthen disease monitoring and biosecurity measures for avian influenza in Lao People’s Democratic Republic.
    • FAO ECTAD Nepal has initiated a bio-surveillance program in September 2024 where samples from 16 districts of Nepal will be collected and tested. Sample collections as per the avian influenza bio-surveillance have been completed and will be tested soon. A handbook on biosecurity and prudent use of antibiotics in poultry farming – 2 500 copies were printed. Around 1 000 pcs have been distributed through different FAO and government trainings and awareness programs and remaining copies will be distributed in the coming weeks. Revised version of Manual for recognition and reporting of Transboundary Animal Disease is published – 5 000 copies published. A total of 560 books has been distributed to field practicing veterinarians and paraprofessionals to support the recognition of different animal diseases including avian influenza diagnosis and remaining copies will be distributed in coming weeks.
    • FAO ECTAD Viet Nam support Department of animal health to conduct field and laboratory investigation of H5N1 outbreaks in captive tiger, lion and leopard in Long An and Dong Nai provinces. Laboratory experts from Institute Pasteur Cambodia (IPC) visited National Veterinary Diagnostic Center in Ha Noi from 14 to 17 October 2024 to provide training on third generation sequencing using the samples collected from the affected animals. Initial results showed that the virus contains the surface proteins from clade 2.3.2.1, but internal genes from a more recent clade 2.3.4.4 virus, similar to other outbreaks in Cambodia, Lao PDR and Viet Nam. Field investigation is planned from 24 to 25 October to collect epidemiology data and additional samples from the outbreak sites and surrounding communities.
  • Europe and Central Asia
    • The Outbreak Costing Tool (OutCosT) to estimate the cost of outbreaks and their control is being adapted to poultry diseases and is being validated with real HPAI outbreak data from countries in three continents. The results will be shared in due course.
    • FAO Virtual Learning Center (VLC) is currently delivering a 4-week tutored course on avian influenza preparedness in English. In total, 375 participants, both nominated by the veterinary services and self-registered based on their interest are taking part of the course, which will end in November 2024. In addition, the course has been certified with credits towards continuous professional development through the Veterinary Continuing Education in Europe (VetCEE).
    • The Second Standing Group of Experts on Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (SGE HPAI-2) took place on 30 September 2024 as a side event of the 31st Conference of the Regional Commission for Europe [link] took place in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. The meeting reviewed the global and regional epidemiological situation on avian influenza, best practices in surveillance and vaccination, and discussed the future strategy on controlling the disease in Europe. The recommendations of the SGE HPAI-2 will be published in the GF-TADs website for Europe.

FAO Alerts
  • On 14 September 2022, FAO issued an alert to Chief Veterinary Officers and FAO offices in Central America and South America regions on the risk of introduction and spread of H5NX HPAI [in EnglishFrench, and Spanish].
  • On 8 April 2022, FAO issued an alert to Chief Veterinary Officers and FAO offices in Asia and the Pacific Region on the risk of a surge and spread of HPAI through increased poultry trade prior to and during Traditional New Year festivities in Asia.
  • On 4 March 2022, FAO an alert to Chief Veterinary Officers and FAO offices in the Americas Region on the risk of introduction and spread of H5NX HPAI [in English, French, and Spanish].
  • On 18 February 2022, FAO issued an alert to Chief Veterinary Officers, FAO offices, and wild bird partner organizations on the increased risk of HPAI outbreaks in wild bird populations in Africa.
  • On 29 October 2021, FAO sent an alert message on the risk of H5Nx HPAI (re-)introduction along migratory flyways to Chief Veterinary Officers globally.
  • On 13 November 2020, FAO sent an alert message on the risk of H5Nx HPAI re-introduction to Chief Veterinary Officers and FAO offices of at-risk countries in Africa region.
  • On 09 October 2020, FAO sent an alert message on the risk of H5N8 HPAI re-introduction to Chief Veterinary Officers of at-risk countries in Europe, Middle East, and Western and Central Asia regions.
  • On 17 January 2020, FAO released an alert on H5N8 HPAI in Eastern Europe to warn the Chief Veterinary Officers and FAO offices about the potential spread of the disease and advise on measures to take for prevention and control.
OFFLU
  • Information on the OFFLU avian influenza matching pilot project. [link]
  • OFFLU held an online discussion on 5 December 2022 to discuss the avian influenza situation in poultry and wild birds for experts to share experiences on the most recent wave of outbreaks in different countries. A summary is available. [link]
  • The OFFLU published reports for the Vaccine Composition Meeting on avian influenza and swine influenza for February – September 2022.
  • The Tripartite (FAO- WHO -WOAH) together with the WOAH/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza (OFFLU) has conducted a joint rapid risk assessment addressing the recent influenza A(H3N8) human infection in China in May 2022. [link]
  • The OFFLU annual report for 2021 is now available. [link]
  • Avian influenza report of the WOAH/FAO Network of expertise on animal influenzas (OFFLU) covering the period September 2021 – February 2022. [link]
  • The OFFLU Network issued a statement on 24 December 2021 addressing the recent introduction of H5N1 HPAI in Canada. [link]
  • The OFFLU network issued an avian influenza statement on 10 November 2021 addressing recent H5Nx high pathogenicity avian influenza virus reassortments. [link]
  • The OFFLU Network issued the summary of the OFFLU call for avian influenza global situation held on 8 November 2021. [link]
  • Avian influenza report of the OIE/FAO Network of expertise on animal influenzas (OFFLU) covering the period March – September 202. [link]
  • As part of the OIE/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenzas, FAO attended the Zoonotic Influenza Sessions of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting held from 2 to 4 March 2021. The report is now available online. [link]
  • On 26 February 2021, the OFFLU issued a statement on High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza in the Russian Federation relating to its detection in poultry workers. [link]
  • On 26 October 2020, the OFFLU issued a report on Highl Pathogenicity Avian Influenza in Kazakhstan describing the genetic characteristics of the latest H5N8 HPAI viruses detected recently in the country. [link]
WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting (VCM)
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – February 2023. [link]
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – September 2022. [link]
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – February 2022. [link]
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – September 2021. [link]
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – February 2021. [link]
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – Sept/Oct 2020. [link]
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – February 2018. [link]
Global level
  • International Alliance for Biological Standardization (IABS) held a meeting on 25-26 October 2022 addressing High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Vaccination Strategies to prevent and control HPAI: Removing unnecessary barriers for usage. Conclusions and recommendations are now available. [link]
Regional/country level

America

  • FAO organized a webinar on HPAI laboratory testing, under the framework of the GF-TADs and ‘Ask the experts’ for animal health laboratory staff in the region in March 2023. [link]
  • Between 21 and 23 March 2023, FAO held a meeting in Santiago, Chile with the participation of the heads of official veterinary services from 8 Latin American countries that are part of the TCP project, as well as specialists, discussed the epidemiological situation of HPAI in their territories and the control measures implemented.
  • The GF-TADs for the Americas hosted a technical meeting on HPAI vaccination: Approach, tools, knowledge and experience for the Americas held virtually in March 2023. [link]
  • The first virtual meeting of the Standing Group of Experts on Avian Influenza (SGE-IA) took place online on 14 December 2022. Recommendations from this meeting can be found here. [link]
  • FAO’s emergency Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) project provides support to manage the outbreak of avian influenza in the region, as well as its impact on the most vulnerable households in the affected countries.
  • FAO collated risk communication materials available at FAO in other regions globally and shared with FAO RLC.
  • The first virtual meeting of the Standing Group of Experts on Avian Influenza (SGE-IA) took place in December 2022. Recommendations available [link] Dec 2022.
  • FAO activated coordination and response protocols for the avian influenza outbreaks in the region. [link]
  • FAO conducted a qualitative risk assessment for introduction of the H5N1 HPAI clade 2.3.4.4b virus from currently known infected countries in the Americas has been conducted.
  • FAO is monitoring the situation closely through its network of decentralized offices and Reference Centers for Influenza to maintain close communication with members in Latin America and the Caribbean providing technical assistance and support as well as risk communication strategies and collaborating with resource partners to enhance preparedness and control of AI in the region. [link]

Asia

  • FAO participated to the 7th World One Health Congress held on 8-11 November 2022 and presented preliminary results of the Qualitative Risk Assessment addressing H5 HPAI risk of introduction in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. [link]
  • International Alliance for Biological Standardization (IABS) held a meeting on 25-26 October 2022 addressing High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Vaccination Strategies to prevent and control HPAI: Removing unnecessary barriers for usage. Conclusions and recommendations are now available [link].
  • FAO ECTAD RAP organized a quarterly coordination call on 16 February 2023 with ECTAD countries in Asia to discuss progresses and challenges around avian influenza surveillance in the region.
  • FAO RAP organized a quarterly coordination call on 8 December 2022 with ECTAD countries in Asia to discuss progresses and challenges around avian influenza surveillance in the region.
  • The FAO-ECTAD Team in Viet Nam prepared a report entitled Economic analysis of enhanced biosecurity practices in three types of chicken farms in Northern Viet Nam [link].
  • FAO RAP organized a regional Avian Influenza virtual meeting in November 2021. A summary can be found [link].
  • FAO ECTAD RAP organized a quarterly coordination call on 16 February 2023 with ECTAD countries in Asia to discuss progresses and challenges around avian influenza surveillance in the region.
  • FAO ECTAD RAP and IPC developed practical guidelines for field sequencing using MinIon.
  • FAO ECTAD Indonesia held a Joint Risk Assessment (JRA) training on zoonotic priority diseases in West Java Province and in West Kalimantan Province.
  • FAO ECTAD Cambodia organized AI surveillance review to share data from AI surveillance implementing partners, i.e. the results of AI surveillance in live bird markets, influenza-like illness (ILI) and severe acute respiratory infections (SARI) carried from 2020-2022 by CCDC, FAO, IPC, NAHPRI, NIPH and USCDC, to understand the challenges, lesson-learnt, and to do the AI surveillance resource mapping.
  • FAO ECTAD Lao organized a refresher training on avian influenza surveillance and response in Louangprabang Province with participants from various partners i.e. provincial livestock and fisheries section involved in the avian influenza surveillance, Central Veterinary Services and laboratory, Division of Veterinary Legislation, public health sector including the Department of Communicable Disease Control, Information Education and Communication Department, and other development partners namely US CDC, WHO, Wildlife Conservation Society.
  • FAO ECTAD Viet Nam organized a joint risk assessment (JRA) workshop for H5N6 (Dong Nai Province) and H5N8 (Lang Son Province).
  • FAO RAP organized a regional Avian Influenza virtual meeting in November 2021 [report].

North Africa and Middle East

  • FAO ECTAD Egypt and General Organization for Veterinary Services (GOVS) epidemiology unit updated the AI surveillance plan for January – December 2023 based on surveillance finding and risk mapping in 2022.
  • FAO organized a workshop on Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Libya [link].

Sub-Saharan Africa

  • FAO ECTAD assisted Gambia sending samples to the reference laboratory (IZSVe-Italy) for sequencing. H5N1 2.3.4.4b was detected and the phylogenetic analyses confirmed that the H5N1 virus clusters with genotype BB recently detected in northern Italy in June 2023, suggesting a possible back-and-forth movement of viruses between Europe and Africa.
  • FAO Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal Diseases (ECTAD) regional offices in Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) and West and Central Africa (WCA) organized 5 day regional training courses on Infectious Substances Shipment in Nairobi (June), Abidjan (July), Abuja (August). A total of 32 particpants from 13 countries successfully completed the training and were certified to ship infectious substances by air, in compliance with the applicable international regulations.
  • FAO Ethiopia in collaboration with the Ethiopian Agricultural Research Institute has prepared a biosecurity brochure covering three key areas - conceptual, structural, and operational biosecurity measures. The brochure provides guidance to small and medium commercial poultry farms on implementing effective biosecurity measures for increased productivity, and a more sustainable and profitable industry, and is aimed to be used by Farmers Field School (FFS).
  • In Kenya, FAO is supporting Kenya Animal Biosurveillance system (KABS) disease reporting platform roll-out for syndromic surveillance and the refresher trainings.
  • FAO Burkina Faso trained 175 staff on HPAI epidemiological surveillance; conducted Training of Trainers (ToT) course on on good poultry farming practices, hygiene and biosecurity measures on farms; the 46 trainers conducted sensitization of 300 model poultry farmers from 10 regions, and also 30 communicators and journalists of the press on HPAI under TCP project.
  • In Togo, FAO is supported HPAI outbreak response by providing technical assistance and supporting field outbreak investigation missions. A training of 25 agents on disease reporting / early warning using FAO Event Mobile Application (EMA-i) takes place soon.
  • FAO Emergency Management Center (EMC-AH) expert mission in May 2023 visited Saint-Louis as a part of support to control HPAI emergency.
  • FAO ECTAD Côte d’Ivoire supported the disinfection of poultry markets in Abidjan.
  • FAO EMC-AH conducted field mission in Gabon from 4 to 8 July 2022 in response to the recent H5N1 HPAI outbreaks in Estuaire Province.
  • FAO ECTAD continues supporting annual proficiency testing schemes of national and sub-national level laboratories for AI diagnosis in Central East, and West Africam countries through USAID funded GHSA programme.
  • FAO ECTAD West and Central Africa Region, in collaboration with EMC-AH, supported the Government of Guinea to undertake a HPAI risk assessment mission to identify risk factors for introduction and spread.
  • FAO participated in the 2nd virtual meeting of Regional Incident Coordination Group (ICG) for West Africa on HPAI organized by FAO ECTAD-WCA in collaboration with ECOWAS Regional Animal Health Centre (RAHC) held in March 2022.
  • Taking stock of FAO-USAID partnership to control health threats in Kenya [link].
  • Stopping Avian Influenza in Togo [link].

Figure 1. Number of countries reported HPAI since 1 October 2024 by subtype (left) and by region (right) as of 21 October 2024 (territory/area for sub/Antarctic zone)

Source: WOAH WAHIS portal, government and publications.

Table 2. Epidemiological overview for avian influenza viruses viruses known to have caused zoonotic infections in the past 20 years

Subtype

Epidemiological situation overview

H5Nx Gs/GD* HPAI (1996)

High pathogenicity avian influenza viruses within the Goose/Guangdong/1/96- lineage (Gs/GD) were first detected in geese in Guangdong Province, China in 1996. They have persisted, as high pathogenicity viruses, since then and have caused outbreaks in poultry across all regions globally other than Oceania. The initial viruses in this lineage were of the A(H5N1) subtype but other subtypes (including H5N2, H5N3 H5N5, H5N6, H5N8) have emerged, mainly in the past 10 years, as a result of reassortment with other avian influenza viruses. The common feature of these viruses is an HA gene related back to the original Gs/GD/96 virus. The HA gene of these viruses has evolved over the past 28 years, initially into 10 clades (clade 0 to 9) of which descendents of clade 2 viruses are the only ones that continue to circulate. Multiple 5th order clades persist such as the one that is currently dominant globally – clade 2.3.4.4b - whereas others have emerged and disappeared.

Multiple genotypes carrying different combinations of the eight influenza A segmented genes have emerged, as a result of co-infection of birds with different avian influenza viruses that facilitated reassortment. Of considerable significance in the past has been reassortment with enzootic A(H9N2) viruses. Eurasian lineage clade 2.3.4.4b viruses formed multiple genotypes and those that crossed to North America have reassorted with North American wild bird avian influenza viruses to produced additional genotypes. Two separate systems for naming genotypes of clade 2.3.4.4b have been developed for Eurasian and North American viruses (Fusaro, et al., 2024, Youk, et al., 2023). The clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1) virus detected in dairy cattle in North America in 2024 falls within genotype 3.13 using the North American naming system. [link]

Some Gs/GD viruses have produced severe zoonotic infections in humans, first identified in 1997 when an A(H5N1) clade 0 virus in the Gs/GD lineage in Hong Kong SAR, China caused disease outbreaks in poultry in farms and markets as well as severe disease in humans. In several cases there was some evidence of limited onward transmission in humans and this event raised concerns that it might be the beginning of a human influenza pandemic. Despite the successful efforts to eradicate this particular strain, other viruses within this lineage persisted and evolved in China, becoming more adept at infecting domestic ducks. By 2003 spread of these viruses via wild birds and live bird trade occurred across East and Southeast Asia, resulting in additional zoonotic infection in humans [link].

The important role of wild birds in the transmission of these viruses over long distances became apparent in 2005 when a Gs/GD virus (clade 2.2) spread, primarily via wild birds, across Eurasia, and parts of Africa from western China. Most high-income countries eliminated this virus from poultry, but it persisted in several low- and middle-income countries. Viruses within the Gs/GD lineage continued to evolve and spread. Additional intercontinental waves of transmission have occurred with the two most significant being those in 2014 (clade 2.3.4.4c) and from 2016 onwards (clade 2.3.4.4b) that also resulted in spread of these viruses to North America (2014-15 and 2021-22), with the latest outbreak extending through central and South America and to sub-Antarctic islands. These waves involved multiple N subtypes.

In 2022/2023, H5N1 2.3.4.4b caused extensive infection in coastal seabirds and mass die- offs of numerous ecologically important wild bird species.

For an updated list of bird species affected with A(H5Nx) see HERE

In 2024, H5N1 2.3.4.4b caused infection in goats (1 farm) and dairy cattle (334 farms, as of 23 October) in the United States of America. See HERE.

USDA shared the Whole Genome Sequences, see HERE.

Among the other Gs/GD virus clades that remain endemic in specific areas are clade 2.3.2.1a H5N1 viruses that have persisted in South Asia since 2010 and rarely associated with disease in humans.

Clade 2.3.2.1c/e viruses have been present in Indonesia since 2012 and related viruses are still circulating in Cambodia, Viet Nam and Lao People’s Democratic Republic. A novel reassortant influenza A(H5N1) virus has been detected in poultry in Cambodia (since 2023), Lao People's Democratic Republic and Viet Nam (since 2022) and was also detected in the human cases reported from Cambodia since late 2023 and Viet Nam in 2024. This virus contains the surface proteins from clade 2.3.2.1c that has circulated locally, but internal genes from a more recent clade 2.3.4.4b virus [link]. Of the 15 recent human cases, seven of which were fatal, recorded in Cambodia (6) and Viet Nam (1).

For an updated list of confirmed human cases with A(H5N1) see HERE

In addition, 91 human cases have been associated with clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5Nx/y) and 2.3.4.4h A(H5N6) viruses with most of these occurring in 2021 and 2022.

Clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1) viruses have caused few human cases but have resulted in multiple mammalian cases including aquatic mammals.

For an updated list of mammalian species affected with A(H5Nx) see HERE

Avian origin H3N8 LPAI

An Influenza A(H3N8) virus lineage emerged in live bird markets in southern China in mid 2021 [link]. Since then, three human cases of Influenza A(H3N8) have been reported: In April 2022, the first human clinical case associated with this lineage was reported in Henan Province, China and was associated with severe disease. In May 2022, a 5-year-old boy was diagnosed with a mild influenza A(H3N8) infection in Changsha City, Hunan Province, China. On 27 March 2023, a third human case was reported from Guangdong Province, China in a 56-year-old female with underlying illneses who subsequently died.

One of the A(H3N8) viruses isolated from a human was found to be transmissible by air in ferrets [link] but no evidence of sustained human transmission has been reported.

H7N4 LPAI (2017)

One human case in China with reported exposure to poultry.

H7N9 LPAI (2013) & HPAI (2017)

Reported only in China with over 1 000 human cases between 2013 and 2017 with a marked increase in 2017 compared to previous waves.

Most human cases exposed in live bird markets.

Nation-wide vaccination campaign in poultry since Sep 2017: Last reported human case in 2019 [link]. See FAO H7N9 situation update

H9N2 LPAI

First human case reported in 1998.

To date, about 100 influenza A(H9N2) human cases diagnosed worldwide, many of them were reported from China since December 2015. Most cases mild and involving children. Only two fatal cases reported [link]

Endemic in multiple countries in Africa and Asia, a cause of significant production losses and mortalities in poultry production systems.

Three major lineages and multiple genotypes.

H10Nx LPAI

To date, three influenza A(H10N3) human infections have been reported globally [link]. In May 2021, the first case in Jiangsu Province, China [link], in September 2022, a second case in Zhejiang Province, China [link], in February 2024, the third case in Yunnan Province, China [link].

The first influenza A(H10N5) human infection was reported in Zhejiang Province, China [link].
Influenza A(H10N7) infection have been reported in humans in 2004 in Egypt [link] and in 2010 in Australia [link].

Since 2013, three influenza A(H10N8) human infections have been reported in Jiangxi Province, China.

Recommendations for affected countries and those at risk

FAO recommends intensified surveillance and awareness raising by national authorities.

General recommendations
It is important to report sick or dead birds – both wild birds and poultry - or wild mammals to local authorities (veterinary services, public health officials, community leaders etc.). These should be tested for avian influenza viruses.

Recommendations to poultry producers
Farmers and poultry producers should step up their biosecurity measures in order to prevent potential virus introduction from wild birds or their faeces.

Recommendations to hunters
Hunting associations and wildlife authorities should be aware that avian influenza viruses might be present in waterfowl and some other species hunted and that hunting, handling and dressing of shot game carries the risk of spreading avian influenza viruses to susceptible poultry.

Recommendations to national authorities
Increase surveillance efforts for the early detection of influenza viruses in poultry and dead wild species including certain mammals.

For full recommendations including non-avian species please see [link].

FAO publication
EMPRES Watch/Focus On 
Online course/webinar
  • Avian Influenza Preparedness Course was held in April/May 2023 [link].
  • FAO RNE launched bilingual training course on Avian Influenza preparedness for NENA region on 17 January 2023 [link].
  • FAO through its Virtual Learning Center developed an Avian Influenza Preparedness Course in 2022 [link].
  • FAO, in collaboration with WOAH, organized a webinar on H5 HPAI occurrence and prevention in North Africa on 20 May 2021.
  • WHO developed an online training course entitled “Strengthening collaboration between human and animal health sectors for improved health security”. The course covers the Tripartite Zoonosis Guide and associated tools in Module 2 [link].
  • FAO held a webinar entitled Managing HPAI in wild birds on 10 February 2022 – recording part 1 & part 2.
  • FAO Webinar: Pros and cons on AI vaccination, presented by Leslie Sims, Ian Brown, Sergei Khomenko, Sophie von Dobschüetz (2018) [link].
  • FAO Webinar: Intercontinental spread of H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza – Analysis of the current situation and recommendations, for preventive action (2016) [link].
Risk Assessment 
Wild birds/mammals
Socio-economic / PPP
Tripartite/Quadripartite plan, guide, tool

Next issue: 24 Oct. 2024

The disease situation updates are produced by the FAO Emergency Prevention System for Animal Health (EMPRES-AH) as part of its mission to increase global disease intelligence.
Disclaimer

Information provided herein is current as of the date of issue. Information added or changed since the last Global AIV with Zoonotic Potential situation update appears in orange. Human cases are depicted in the geographic location of their report. For some cases, exposure may have occurred in one geographic location but reported in another. For cases with unknown onset date, reporting date was used instead. FAO compiles information drawn from multiple national (Ministries of Agriculture or Livestock, Ministries of Health, Provincial Government websites; Centers for Disease Prevention and Control [CDC]) and international sources (World Health Organization [WHO], World Organisation for Animal Health [WOAH]), as well as peer reviewed scientific articles. FAO makes every effort to ensure, but does not guarantee, accuracy, completeness or authenticity of the information. The designation employed and the presentation of material on the map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of FAO concerning the legal or constitutional status of any country, territory or sea area, or concerning the delimitation of frontiers.

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