Animal health

Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update

24 September 2026, 08:30 hours; Rome

Overview

This update covers avian influenza viruses (AIV) with zoonotic potential occurring worldwide, i.e. H5Nx, H7Nx high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) viruses and H3N8, H5Nx, H6N1, H7Nx, H9N2, H10Nx and H11 low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI).

Specific information is available for Avian Influenza A(H7N9) virus viruses and Sub-Saharan Africa HPAI in related FAO Avian Influenza situation updates.

HPAI outbreaks in animals officially reported since last update (27 August 2026): in total, 624 outbreaks / events have been reported in 25 countries/territories caused by H5Nx (544), H5N1 (75), H7N3 (1) and HxNx (4) (see Table 1 for details).

LPAI events in animals officially reported since the last update: 0 new events were reported.

Number of human cases officially reported since the last update: 3 new events were reported caused by H5N1 (1) and H9N2 (2). [ref1, ref2, ref3]

Map 1. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential observed since 1 October 2025 (i.e. current wave)

Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.

Notes: Refer to the disclaimer available on this webpage for the names and boundaries in this map. The final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. The final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Source: United Nations Geospatial. 2020. Map of the World. [Cited August 2026]. Modified with GLW 4 data and Emergency Prevention System Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i), WOAH and National Authorities data, 2025.

Map 2. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential* observed in the period 1 October 2024 to 30 September 2025 (i.e. previous wave)

 

Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.

Notes: Refer to the disclaimer available on this webpage for the names and boundaries in this map. Final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Source: United Nations Geospatial. 2020. Map of the World. [Cited October 2025]. Modified with GLW 4 data and Emergency Prevention System Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i), WOAH and National Authorities data, 2025.

October – December 2024


January – March 2025


April – June 2025


July – September 2025


Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.

Notes: Refer to the disclaimer available on this webpage for the names and boundaries in this map. Final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Source: United Nations Geospatial. 2020.  Map of the World. [Cited October 2025]. Modified with GLW 4 data and Emergency Prevention System Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i), WOAH and National Authorities data, 2024.

 

Table 1. High pathogenicity avian influenza viruses with zoonotic potential reported since the last update

Virus Country/Area Last observed outbreak # events reported since the last update Total # events reported since
1 Oct. 2025
Species affected since the last update

H5

Argentina

14/09/2026

1

1

Chicken, duck

Australia2

24/09/2026R

369
(incl. W354, M15)

640
(incl. W624, M16, excl. Heard Isle)

Australasian Gannet, Australian Magpie, Australian Pelican,  Australian Raven, Black Kite, Black-faced Cormorant, Brown Falcon, Brown Goshawk, Brown Skua, Common Myna, Fluttering Shearwater, Forest Raven, Great Pied Cormorant, Greater Crested Tern, Little Black Cormorant, Little Penguin, Little Raven, Pacific Gull, Peregrine Falcon, Raven sp., Shearwater sp., Shy Albatross, Silver Gull, Sooty Oystercatcher, Southern Boobook, Swamp Harrier, Tern sp., Wedge-tailed Shearwater, Whistling Kite, White-berried sea eagle, White-faced Storm-Petrel, White-fronted Tern; Australian fur seal, Australian sea lion, Common Bottlenose Dolphin, Common Dolphin, Dolphins, Long-nosed fur seal, Red Fox

Finland

12/08/2026

1
(in M)

3
(incl. W2 M1)

European pine marten

Iceland

29/04/2026

2
(in W)

5
(incl. W4, M1)

Common Raven, Pink-footed Goose

The Philippines

09/06/2026

1
(in W)

3
(incl. W1)

Lowland white-eye, Yellow-vented bulbul

Uruguay

04/09/2026

1

1

Non-poultry birds

United States of America7

10/09/2026R

169
(incl. W167, C1, M1)

1 894
(incl. W1846, C5, M43)

American white pelican, Bald eagle, Black vulture, Canada goose, Cinnamon teal, Gadwall, Golden eagle, Great horned owl, Hooded merganser, Mallard, Mute swan, Redhead duck, Red-tailed hawk, Sandhill crane, Trumpeter swan, Wood duck; Racoon

H5N1

Bulgaria

14/09/2026

2

20
(incl. W2, C1)

Farmed mallard

Canada

09/09/2026

1

129
(incl. W11, M3)

Turkey

Chile

31/08/2026

5

52
(incl. W10)

Non-poultry birds

Denmark

24/08/2026

1
(in W)

263
(incl. W232)

Common Pheasant

France

07/09/2026

3

486
(incl. W327, C4)

Duck

Netherlands (Kingdom of the)

20/08/2026

2
(in W)

486
(incl. W419, C12)

Greylag Goose, Mute Swan

New Zealand

12/08/2026

1
(in W)

3
(in W)

Northern Giant Petrel

Nigeria

02/08/2026

1

31

Poultry

Norway

04/09/2026

5
(in W)

85
(incl. W84)

Greylag Goose, Mute Swan

Peru

31/08/2026

13
(incl. W2)

106
(incl. W20)

Chicken, Duck, Turkey, Non-poultry birds; Peruvian Pelican

The Philippines9

15/09/2026

1
(in W)

45
(incl. W1)

Eurasian Tree Sparrow, Pied triller, Zebra Dove

South Africa

08/06/2026

1
(in W)

48
(incl. W33)

Greater Crested Tern

Sweden

26/08/2026

2
(in W)

135
(incl. W118, M6)

Greylag Goose, White-tailed Eagle

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland6

Week 37

4
(in W)

872
(incl. M1, W771)

Herring Gull, Mallard

United States of America7

21/09/2026R

28
(incl. W8, DF4)

3 331
(incl. W2574, C15, M134, DF92)

Commercial Breeder, Turkey, WOAH Poultry, WOAH Non Poultry; Canada goose, Mallard, Peregrine falcon, Wood duck; Cattle

Viet Nam

06/09/2026

5

115

Duck

H7N3

Mexico

08/07/2026

1
(in W)

10
(incl. W3)

Plain Chachalaca

HxNx

Egypt

1st semester

2

2

Poultry

Indonesia11

August 2026

1

22

Duck

Suriname

19/09/2026R

1

1

Chicken

 Data was retrieved from WOAH WAHIS portal and Sharing other important animal health information with WOAH page [link], government websites. Data cutoff time: reported on 27 August 2026, 8:30 CEST. $:estimate. ‡: date of confirmation, R: reported date, §: counting Izumi Wintering Habitat of Cranes (Ramsar) as 1 event. Notes: Only those reporting events in animals since the last update are listed in the table. Codes: D:domestic, C:captivity, W:Wild birds, DF: Dairy farm, E:Environment, M: mammalian species other than humans. For more information, consult dedicated webpage of the: 1: British Antarctic Survey (BAS) [link], 2: Australian Government [link], 3: Canada Food and Inspection Agency [link], 4: TierSeuchenInformationsSystem - Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut [link], 5: Ministry of the Environment [link] 6: Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) [link], 7: USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA/APHIS) [link], 8: Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) [link], 9: The Philippines: Bureau of Animal Industry [link], 10: Brazil: Ministério da Agricultura e Pecuária [link], 11: Indonesia: Laporan Perkembangan Avian Influenza – HPAI [link]. 12: Chile SAG dashboard [link]. 13: Argentina Senasa [link]. 14: Veterinærinstitutte [link]. Bold: the first report of infection in the species. The full list of bird and mammalian species affected by H5Nx HPAI are here.

Recent publications

Domestic

Reassortment of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza as a Driver for Zoonotic Spillover, Asia. Emerg Infect Dis, 32(10). [reference]

Genetic Diversity of Clade 2.3.4.4b H5Nx High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Viruses Detected in Korea During the 2025-2026 Winter Season and Pathogenicity of H5N1 and H5N9 Viruses. Virus Res, 2026 Sep 22:199807. [reference]

Emergence of Novel Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus A(H5N1) Clade 2.3.4.4b in Commercial Poultry, Bangladesh. Influenza Other Respir Viruses, 20(9):e70324. [reference]

Role of biosecurity practices in antimicrobial use on commercial poultry farms: One health implications for AMR mitigation in Bangladesh. One Health, 23:101555. [reference]

H5N1 clade 2.3.2.1e lineage transition in Lao PDR during 2023-2024 associated with regional spread and human infection risk-associated receptor-binding features. Front Public Health, 14:1923867.  [reference]

An outbreak of H7N7 high pathogenicity avian influenza in Victoria, Australia, in 2020. Aust Vet J, 2026 Sep 8. [reference]

Wild

Circulation of avian influenza viruses in migratory birds in Europe and in Africa: a systematic review. Emerg Microbes Infect, 15(1):2728774. [reference]

Genomic detection of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 in Antarctic seabirds reveals connectivity with South American viral lineages. Braz J Microbiol, 57(1):273. [reference]

Serological Evidence of Widespread Exposure to H5 Avian Influenza Virus in Arctic Foxes in Svalbard, Norway. BioRxiv, 2026.09.17.752278. [reference] Preprint

Emergence of novel highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza in slender-billed gulls (Chroicocephalus genei) and gull-billed terns (Gelochelidon nilotica) at Dukan Lake, Iraq. Open Vet J, 16(2):788-801. [reference]

The first high pathogenicity avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b incursions in the Hunter New England region, New South Wales, Australia, June-July 2026. Commun Dis Intell, 50. [reference]

Mammal

Experimental Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Clade 2.3.4.4b Virus Infection in Alpacas, 2026. Emerg Infect Dis, 32(10). [reference]

Viral community structure in New Zealand's aquatic birds is associated with scavenging behavior. Curr Biol, 2026 Sep 9:S0960-9822(26)01087-0. [reference]

Molecular Surveillance Finds No Influenza A Infection in Domestic Cats in Dhaka. Ecohealth, 2026 Sep 13. [reference]

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) in domestic cats: epidemiology, clinical manifestations, and One Health implication. Vet Ital, 62(3). [reference]

H5N1 Clade 2.3.4.4b Infections in Domestic Cats During an Avian Influenza Outbreak in Italy: Implications for One Health Surveillance. Influenza Other Respir Viruses, 20(9):e70311. [reference]

Exposure of dogs to influenza A and B viruses. One Health, 23:101537. [reference]

Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses in mammals: host-range expansion and implications of milk-borne viral shedding. Clin Microbiol Rev, 2026 Aug 31:e0021126. [reference]

Dairy

Susceptibility of calves fed unpasteurized milk from cows infected with highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1. Nat Commun, 17(1):10036. [reference]

Trimester-dependent vertical transmission of H5N1 influenza virus through placental and mammary routes impairs offspring development. Nat Commun, 17(1):9968. [reference]

Bovine mammary tissues are susceptible to infection by viruses bearing panzootic H5N1 influenza A virus glycoproteins. J Gen Virol, 107(9):002338. [reference]

Virus

HA1-T138A and HA1-Q226L substitutions in H3N2 canine influenza virus contribute to binding to human-type alpha2,6-linked sialic acid receptors. Virology, 625:111071. [reference]

A Multi-Reassortant H3N8 Avian Influenza Virus Derived From Migratory Birds in Eastern China Exhibits Cross-Species Transmission Potential. Transbound Emerg Dis, 2026(1):e9889145. [reference]

Comprehensive pathological, immunohistochemical, and apoptotic analysis of the highly pathogenic avian influenza a virus H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b in poultry in Taiwan. Poult Sci, 105(12):107614. [reference]

Novel emerging reassortant H6 avian influenza viruses with internal genes from G57 genotype of H9N2 pose potential zoonotic risk. Emerg Microbes Infect, 15(1):2732846. [reference]

Genetic Diversity, Reassortment Patterns, and Antigenic Characterization of Two H9N2 Avian Influenza Viruses Isolated from Quails in China. Viruses, 18(8):919. [reference]

Genetic and Pathogenicity Studies of Avian Influenza (H9N2) Virus Isolated from Chickens in Jiangsu Province, China, in 2025. Microorganisms, 14(8):1667. [reference]

Molecular epidemiological characteristics of H9N2 subtype avian influenza virus in the external environment of western Zhejiang, China, 2014-2025. Front Public Health, 14:1839754. [reference]

Single-cell transcriptomic landscape of avian influenza H9N2 virus infection in human and chicken cells. Virology, 625:111070. [reference]

Re-emergence of H10N3 Avian Influenza Viruses in China: Evolutionary Dynamics and Emerging Zoonotic Risk. J Infect, 2026 Sep 7:106848. [reference]

Sampling & Assay

Water-Wheat-Wait: Monitoring wild mallards (Anas platyrhynchos) for avian influenza and ESBL-E. coli using feed-baited water bins, Germany, 2022 to 2023. One Health, 23:101548. [reference]

Evaluating sampling strategies for the detection of avian influenza viruses in the environment. Virology, 625:111069. [reference]

Divergent avian strains drive an off-season influenza A peak in municipal wastewater. Microbiol Spectr, 2026 Sep 8:e0202726. [reference]

Tradeoffs between targeted and expanded testing strategies for influenza A(H5N1). ASM Case Rep, 2(5):e00053-26. [reference]

Quadruplex real-time RT-qPCR for simultaneous detection and subtyping of avian influenza viruses and avian coronaviruses. Poult Sci, 105(12):107732. [reference]

Development and Analytical Validation of a Multiplex Real-Time RT-PCR Assay for Simultaneous Detection of Avian Influenza A Virus and Newcastle Disease Virus. Pathogens, 15(8):802. [reference]

An interface-engineered signal-on electrochemical aptasensor for H5N2 avian influenza virus detection. Analyst, 2026 Sep 8. [reference]

Assessment

Using high frequency GPS data to assess wintering goose proximity to commercial poultry facilities on the Delmarva peninsula for avian influenza risk management and surveillance. PLoS One, 21(9):e0355415. [reference]

Spatiotemporal clustering of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 at the wild waterfowl-poultry interface: Vector-specific spillover risks in the U.S., 2022-2025. PLoS One, 21(9):e0345354. [reference]

Production-Type-Specific Spatial and Space-Time Clustering of High-Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Outbreaks in Layer and Duck Farms in the Republic of Korea, 2020-2026. Animals (Basel), 16(16):2543. [reference]

District-Level Risk Mapping of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Poultry in Kazakhstan Using a Multi-Criteria Decision Model. Pathogens, 15(8):796. [reference]

Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices Related to Avian Influenza Among Poultry Workers in Cambodia. Influenza Other Respir Viruses, 20(9):e70321. [reference]

Lessons learnt & Overview

Lessons Learned During the 2024-2025 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus Outbreak Response in the United States: The Experience of State and Local Public Health Departments. Am J Public Health, 2026 Sep 3:e1-e7. [reference]

From fragmentation to coordination: strengthening One Health research to support H5N1 preparedness in Cambodia. IJID Reg, 20:100967. [reference]

Surveillance without silos: a One Health data imperative for avian influenza in West Africa. Front Cell Infect Microbiol, 16:1927565. [reference]

Respiratory pandemic risk in the Anthropocene: A One Health framework and GISRS+ agenda. One Health, 23:101553. [reference]

FAO's support to countries

Global level
  • Jointly with WHO, WOAH and the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS), FAO launched the Global framework to accelerate action on avian influenza that provides a strategic direction for collaboration, advocacy and resource mobilization while supporting countries in strengthening a coordinated One Health approach to avian influenza. [link]
  • FAO hosted the Global Conference for Actions on One Health in Agrifood Systems on 21-23 September 2026 at FAO Headquarters in Rome, Italy. [link]
  • FAO participated in the VETLAB Network Coordination Meeting with directors of African and Asian veterinary laboratories organized by the Joint FAO/IAEA Centre (Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture) (CJN) hosted at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) headquarters on 17-21 August 2026 in Vienna, Austria.
  • OFFLU (WOAH/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza) released a statement entitled Incursion of HPAI H5 into Australia and New Zealand with potential impact on wildlife populations and to spread further in Oceania. [link]
  • FAO participated to the third KAPPA-FLU annual meeting held on 30 June – 2 July in Kalmar, Sweden, where participants presented their progress on research projects addressing various topics related to avian influenza. [link]
  • FAO and OFFLU participated in the WHO Global Influenza Programme polymerase chain reaction (PCR), next-generation sequencing (NGS) and antiviral working group meetings in June 2026.
Regional/country level
  • Americas
    • The project “Preventing Infections through Vigilance at the Origin of Transmission in Latin America and the Caribbean (PIVOT)” was approved under the third call of the Pandemic Fund. The project will have a strong focus on avian influenza, support the strengthening of surveillance and laboratory capacities for early detection and response, facilitate cross-sector collaboration and boost preparedness. [link]
    • In September a field mission was deployed to support Honduras´ response to HPAI following national request. Activities to support field laboratory and the One Health approach during HPAI emergency were implemented and coordinated with the Servicio Nacional de Sanidad e Inocuidad Agroalimentaria (SENASA), the regional and subregional offices. [link1; link2]
    • The Quadripartite (FAO, WOAH, PAHO/WHO and UNEP), together with regional partners (Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture [IICA] and Organismo Internacional Regional de Sanidad Agropecuaria [OIRSA]), signed a Joint Declaration on One Health in the Americas in July 2026, marking the first regional agreement to strengthen coordination and collaborative action on zoonotic diseases, antimicrobial resistance, food safety, and environmental health threats with a One health approach. The Joint Declaration reinforces commitment to the One Health approach in the Americas. [link]
    • FAO and the veterinary services of Peru (Servicio Nacional de Sanidad Agraria - SENASA) carried out on 4 September the first of a series of online training concerning the compartmentalization of domestic birds in relation to HPAI and Newcastle disease, and other areas of animal health preparedness and disease prevention. The regional office gave technical support and more than 85 personnel participated in the webinar. [link]
    • In Chile, a workshop on risk communication during animal health threats and emergencies was held on 11-12 August in Santiago to strengthen veterinary services technical capacities under a project on epidemiological intelligence and biosecurity (GCP/GLO/1140/USA). Other countries were invited to share their experiences in risk communication, e.g. Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago in Mesoamerica region. And a technical meeting was held on 24-25 August, discussed experiences, lesson learned and improvements to be done to the emergency response process for HPAI in the country, followed by the official closing ceremony with the national authorities.
    • An HPAI simulation exercise was conducted in Trinidad and Tobago from 27 to 31 August under the Technical Cooperation Programme: Animal Disease Outbreak Response in Trinidad and Tobago. The activities included a tabletop simulation on both islands, field and laboratory drills as well as emergency communicational training. Around 100 participants actively participated in the activities. [link]
  • Africa
    • As part of the World Bank Pandemic Fund project in Africa, FAO is supporting some veterinary laboratories in Sub-Saharan African countries namely Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Sierra Leone, United Republic of Tanzania, and Zambia in their participation in the proficiency testing for the diagnosis of avian influenza (AI), Newcastle disease (ND), and rabies, coordinated by the Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venezie (IZSVe, FAO Reference Centre for avian influenza) in Padua, Italy.
    • FAO is organizing a regional training workshop on transport of infectious substances in accordance with the International Air Transport Association (IATA) Dangerous Goods Regulations (DGR) as part of the World Bank Pandemic Fund project in Africa. The training course, to be held in Rwanda from 7 to 11 September 2026, will train participants from veterinary laboratories in 10 sub-Saharan African countries namely Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
    • FAO Burundi has recently supported several initiatives aiming at strengthening surveillance, diagnosis and preparedness for health emergencies, as part of efforts to early detect, prevent and control HPAI. These initiatives include the development, updating, validation and harmonisation of standard operating procedures for the safe handling of biological samples for the benefit of the National Veterinary Laboratory.
    • In the Gambia, with support from FAO and the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Department of Livestock Services has validated a new HPAI contingency plan, upgraded its laboratory to run PCR tests and deployed rapid test kits for field testing. Personnel continue to be trained to use FAO Event Mobile Application (EMA-i) and KoboCollect for real-time reporting.
    • FAO is leading field missions in Ghana under the Ghana Pandemic Fund project to plan infrastructure renovations at its seven regional veterinary laboratories to boost their diagnostic capacities. The renovation would enhance capacity of laboratories in high-density poultry zones which is critical to effectively detecting and characterize infectious agents including avian influenza.
  • North Africa and Middle East
    • Regional One Health Coordination Mechanism (ROHCM) continues to function as the ongoing regional governance structure, bringing together the Quadripartite Regional One Health Coordination Group and its three technical working groups (Zoonoses, antimicrobial resistance [AMR], Food Safety). The mechanism is guided by the endorsed Regional One Health Action Plan (2025–2027) and remains the backbone for coordinated One Health implementation across the region. The current conflict situation in the region is adding substantial complexity to the implementation of ongoing activities across multiple sectors; however, efforts continue at regional and country levels to limit its impact and maintain progress wherever possible.
    • In Tunisia, FAO trained 30 veterinarians from 11 to 13 August 2026 under the ASCO (Appui aux Services de Contrôles Officiels des Produits Animaux et Végétaux) project to strengthen the prevention, early detection and management of health risks in poultry farms. This three-day training combined biosecurity, inspection procedures, regulatory knowledge, crisis management and practical exercises to harmonize veterinary controls and enhance the resilience of the poultry sector, with a second session scheduled from 1 to 3 September 2026.
  • Asia and the Pacific
    • In Cambodia, FAO continued strengthening technical field capacity to the animal health officers at sub-national level including: In July, the After Action Review (AAR) for A/H5N1 Outbreak Response was conducted in Svay Rieng province on 23 July, co-organized with the General Directorate of Animal Health and Production (GDAHP), attended by officers from the OAHP of Svay Rieng province, as well as representatives from the Ministry of Health (MoH), Ministry of Environment (MoE), General Directorate of Forestry and Wildlife (GDFo), WHO and several development partners including Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), Agronomes & vétérinaires sans frontières (AVSF) and local authorities from the province. In August, the second-round training on HPAI virus Decontamination in the Field was held on 19–20 August, trained 33 national and provincial animal health and production offices from 9 provinces on practical knowledge based on FAO and GDAHP’s updated Technical Guidelines for HPAI Decontamination. Besides the technical guidance, participants are putting knowledge into practice through hands-on exercises, including preparing disinfectants, correctly using PPE and applying decontamination procedures in practical settings.
    • In Lao PDR, FAO supported Rapid Response Team training in Bokeo Province from 30 June to 2 July 2026 to strengthen provincial preparedness for avian influenza outbreaks, including surveillance, outbreak investigation, biosafety, risk communication, and sample collection.
    • In Nepal, FAO supported to conduct 2 slots of rapid response team (RRT) trainings during 16-17 July and 21-22 July 2026 in Kathmandu valley reaching to 60 animal health professionals to tackle with the increasing highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreaks in the country. Likewise, an emergency supply of PCR kits was provided to the Central Veterinary Laboratory to aid in rapid diagnosis of HPAI.
    • On 11 August, FAO supported a poultry sector assessment workshop in Niue to better understand the current state of the poultry sector, including its key challenges and opportunities. The consultation workshop brought together village council representatives, government agencies, poultry producers, and other stakeholders to validate assessment findings, identify priority issues, and develop practical recommendations to strengthen poultry production across Niue. [link]
    • In Pakistan, FAO has developed the National Guidelines for Sample Collection and Referral Mechanism. A Consultative Workshop was held on 29–30 July 2026 in Islamabad, under the FAO-implemented component of the Pakistan Pandemic Fund project, brought together animal health laboratory’s dedicated personnel from the federal reference laboratories and provincial veterinary diagnostic laboratories, together with academia, the University of Veterinary and Animal Sciences (UVAS), University of Sargodha, and Pir Mehr Ali Shah Arid Agriculture University, Rawalpindi. The main objective was to review current field practices, refine national guidelines, and specific requirements for implementation and training plan for zoonotic disease sample collection, transportation and referral mechanism.
    • FAO Pakistan and Pakistan National Veterinary Laboratory (NVL) organized the Animal Health Laboratory Networking Group (#NLNG, established since 2020) on 31 July 2026 in Islamabad with support from Pakistan Pandemic Fund project. The meeting brought together animal health laboratories, provincial livestock authorities, academia, and development partners to discuss and find consensus on national strategic laboratory priorities that will strengthen animal health laboratory systems for pandemic prevention, preparedness and response, while promoting coordinated networking among federal and provincial veterinary laboratories.
    • In the Philippines, FAO conducted Local Animal Disease Detection and Emergency Response (LADDER) in August, including Tabletop Simulation Exercise on Avian Influenza in Regions 5, 10, and 13, to increase awareness and strengthen local preparedness on avian influenza and other transboundary animal diseases.
    • FAO is planning to conduct an HPAI awareness and preparedness training in Solomon Islands in early October. In addition to staff from Biosecurity, Livestock, and Extension services, selected provincial staff will also participate in the training. The training will strengthen Solomon Islands’ capacity for HPAI prevention and preparedness, including the early identification, reporting, and communication of suspected cases, as well as an understanding of the basic procedures and actions to be undertaken in response to a suspected HPAI incident.
    • In July, FAO supported a poultry capacity-building mission in Tuvalu, to help strengthen local egg production through practical farm management training, enhanced government–farmer collaboration, and improved disease preparedness. The mission provided hands-on training in Funafuti, Tuvalu on poultry production, biosecurity, animal welfare, record-keeping, and cost-of-production analysis. Participants also received training on avian influenza awareness and preparedness to support disease prevention and early detection. [link]
    • In Viet Nam, FAO, in collaboration with the Department of Animal Health and Production (DAHP) of the Ministry of Agriculture and Environment is conducting active surveillance for avian influenza along the poultry value chain between September and December 2026.

FAO Alerts
  • On 14 September 2022, FAO issued an alert to Chief Veterinary Officers and FAO offices in Central America and South America regions on the risk of introduction and spread of H5NX HPAI [in English, French, and Spanish].
  • On 8 April 2022, FAO issued an alert to Chief Veterinary Officers and FAO offices in Asia and the Pacific Region on the risk of a surge and spread of HPAI through increased poultry trade prior to and during Traditional New Year festivities in Asia.
  • On 4 March 2022, FAO an alert to Chief Veterinary Officers and FAO offices in the Americas Region on the risk of introduction and spread of H5NX HPAI [in English, French, and Spanish].
  • On 18 February 2022, FAO issued an alert to Chief Veterinary Officers, FAO offices, and wild bird partner organizations on the increased risk of HPAI outbreaks in wild bird populations in Africa.
  • On 29 October 2021, FAO sent an alert message on the risk of H5Nx HPAI (re-)introduction along migratory flyways to Chief Veterinary Officers globally.
  • On 13 November 2020, FAO sent an alert message on the risk of H5Nx HPAI re-introduction to Chief Veterinary Officers and FAO offices of at-risk countries in Africa region.
  • On 09 October 2020, FAO sent an alert message on the risk of H5N8 HPAI re-introduction to Chief Veterinary Officers of at-risk countries in Europe, Middle East, and Western and Central Asia regions.
  • On 17 January 2020, FAO released an alert on H5N8 HPAI in Eastern Europe to warn the Chief Veterinary Officers and FAO offices about the potential spread of the disease and advise on measures to take for prevention and control.
OFFLU
  • Information on the OFFLU avian influenza matching pilot project. [link]
  • OFFLU held an online discussion on 5 December 2022 to discuss the avian influenza situation in poultry and wild birds for experts to share experiences on the most recent wave of outbreaks in different countries. A summary is available. [link]
  • The OFFLU published reports for the Vaccine Composition Meeting on avian influenza and swine influenza for February – September 2022.
  • The Tripartite (FAO- WHO -WOAH) together with the WOAH/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza (OFFLU) has conducted a joint rapid risk assessment addressing the recent influenza A(H3N8) human infection in China in May 2022. [link]
  • The OFFLU annual report for 2021 is now available. [link]
  • Avian influenza report of the WOAH/FAO Network of expertise on animal influenzas (OFFLU) covering the period September 2021 – February 2022. [link]
  • The OFFLU Network issued a statement on 24 December 2021 addressing the recent introduction of H5N1 HPAI in Canada. [link]
  • The OFFLU network issued an avian influenza statement on 10 November 2021 addressing recent H5Nx high pathogenicity avian influenza virus reassortments. [link]
  • The OFFLU Network issued the summary of the OFFLU call for avian influenza global situation held on 8 November 2021. [link]
  • Avian influenza report of the OIE/FAO Network of expertise on animal influenzas (OFFLU) covering the period March – September 202. [link]
  • As part of the OIE/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenzas, FAO attended the Zoonotic Influenza Sessions of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting held from 2 to 4 March 2021. The report is now available online. [link]
  • On 26 February 2021, the OFFLU issued a statement on High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza in the Russian Federation relating to its detection in poultry workers. [link]
  • On 26 October 2020, the OFFLU issued a report on Highl Pathogenicity Avian Influenza in Kazakhstan describing the genetic characteristics of the latest H5N8 HPAI viruses detected recently in the country. [link]
WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting (VCM)
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – February 2023. [link]
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – September 2022. [link]
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – February 2022. [link]
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – September 2021. [link]
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – February 2021. [link]
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – Sept/Oct 2020. [link]
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – February 2018. [link]
Global level
  • International Alliance for Biological Standardization (IABS) held a meeting on 25-26 October 2022 addressing High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Vaccination Strategies to prevent and control HPAI: Removing unnecessary barriers for usage. Conclusions and recommendations are now available. [link]
Regional/country level

America

  • FAO organized a webinar on HPAI laboratory testing, under the framework of the GF-TADs and ‘Ask the experts’ for animal health laboratory staff in the region in March 2023. [link]
  • Between 21 and 23 March 2023, FAO held a meeting in Santiago, Chile with the participation of the heads of official veterinary services from 8 Latin American countries that are part of the TCP project, as well as specialists, discussed the epidemiological situation of HPAI in their territories and the control measures implemented.
  • The GF-TADs for the Americas hosted a technical meeting on HPAI vaccination: Approach, tools, knowledge and experience for the Americas held virtually in March 2023. [link]
  • The first virtual meeting of the Standing Group of Experts on Avian Influenza (SGE-IA) took place online on 14 December 2022. Recommendations from this meeting can be found here. [link]
  • FAO’s emergency Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) project provides support to manage the outbreak of avian influenza in the region, as well as its impact on the most vulnerable households in the affected countries.
  • FAO collated risk communication materials available at FAO in other regions globally and shared with FAO RLC.
  • The first virtual meeting of the Standing Group of Experts on Avian Influenza (SGE-IA) took place in December 2022. Recommendations available [link] Dec 2022.
  • FAO activated coordination and response protocols for the avian influenza outbreaks in the region. [link]
  • FAO conducted a qualitative risk assessment for introduction of the H5N1 HPAI clade 2.3.4.4b virus from currently known infected countries in the Americas has been conducted.
  • FAO is monitoring the situation closely through its network of decentralized offices and Reference Centers for Influenza to maintain close communication with members in Latin America and the Caribbean providing technical assistance and support as well as risk communication strategies and collaborating with resource partners to enhance preparedness and control of AI in the region. [link]

Asia

  • FAO participated to the 7th World One Health Congress held on 8-11 November 2022 and presented preliminary results of the Qualitative Risk Assessment addressing H5 HPAI risk of introduction in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. [link]
  • International Alliance for Biological Standardization (IABS) held a meeting on 25-26 October 2022 addressing High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Vaccination Strategies to prevent and control HPAI: Removing unnecessary barriers for usage. Conclusions and recommendations are now available [link].
  • FAO ECTAD RAP organized a quarterly coordination call on 16 February 2023 with ECTAD countries in Asia to discuss progresses and challenges around avian influenza surveillance in the region.
  • FAO RAP organized a quarterly coordination call on 8 December 2022 with ECTAD countries in Asia to discuss progresses and challenges around avian influenza surveillance in the region.
  • The FAO-ECTAD Team in Viet Nam prepared a report entitled Economic analysis of enhanced biosecurity practices in three types of chicken farms in Northern Viet Nam [link].
  • FAO RAP organized a regional Avian Influenza virtual meeting in November 2021. A summary can be found [link].
  • FAO ECTAD RAP organized a quarterly coordination call on 16 February 2023 with ECTAD countries in Asia to discuss progresses and challenges around avian influenza surveillance in the region.
  • FAO ECTAD RAP and IPC developed practical guidelines for field sequencing using MinIon.
  • FAO ECTAD Indonesia held a Joint Risk Assessment (JRA) training on zoonotic priority diseases in West Java Province and in West Kalimantan Province.
  • FAO ECTAD Cambodia organized AI surveillance review to share data from AI surveillance implementing partners, i.e. the results of AI surveillance in live bird markets, influenza-like illness (ILI) and severe acute respiratory infections (SARI) carried from 2020-2022 by CCDC, FAO, IPC, NAHPRI, NIPH and USCDC, to understand the challenges, lesson-learnt, and to do the AI surveillance resource mapping.
  • FAO ECTAD Lao organized a refresher training on avian influenza surveillance and response in Louangprabang Province with participants from various partners i.e. provincial livestock and fisheries section involved in the avian influenza surveillance, Central Veterinary Services and laboratory, Division of Veterinary Legislation, public health sector including the Department of Communicable Disease Control, Information Education and Communication Department, and other development partners namely US CDC, WHO, Wildlife Conservation Society.
  • FAO ECTAD Viet Nam organized a joint risk assessment (JRA) workshop for H5N6 (Dong Nai Province) and H5N8 (Lang Son Province).
  • FAO RAP organized a regional Avian Influenza virtual meeting in November 2021 [report].

North Africa and Middle East

  • FAO ECTAD Egypt and General Organization for Veterinary Services (GOVS) epidemiology unit updated the AI surveillance plan for January – December 2023 based on surveillance finding and risk mapping in 2022.
  • FAO organized a workshop on Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Libya [link].

Sub-Saharan Africa

  • FAO ECTAD assisted Gambia sending samples to the reference laboratory (IZSVe-Italy) for sequencing. H5N1 2.3.4.4b was detected and the phylogenetic analyses confirmed that the H5N1 virus clusters with genotype BB recently detected in northern Italy in June 2023, suggesting a possible back-and-forth movement of viruses between Europe and Africa.
  • FAO Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal Diseases (ECTAD) regional offices in Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) and West and Central Africa (WCA) organized 5 day regional training courses on Infectious Substances Shipment in Nairobi (June), Abidjan (July), Abuja (August). A total of 32 particpants from 13 countries successfully completed the training and were certified to ship infectious substances by air, in compliance with the applicable international regulations.
  • FAO Ethiopia in collaboration with the Ethiopian Agricultural Research Institute has prepared a biosecurity brochure covering three key areas - conceptual, structural, and operational biosecurity measures. The brochure provides guidance to small and medium commercial poultry farms on implementing effective biosecurity measures for increased productivity, and a more sustainable and profitable industry, and is aimed to be used by Farmers Field School (FFS).
  • In Kenya, FAO is supporting Kenya Animal Biosurveillance system (KABS) disease reporting platform roll-out for syndromic surveillance and the refresher trainings.
  • FAO Burkina Faso trained 175 staff on HPAI epidemiological surveillance; conducted Training of Trainers (ToT) course on on good poultry farming practices, hygiene and biosecurity measures on farms; the 46 trainers conducted sensitization of 300 model poultry farmers from 10 regions, and also 30 communicators and journalists of the press on HPAI under TCP project.
  • In Togo, FAO is supported HPAI outbreak response by providing technical assistance and supporting field outbreak investigation missions. A training of 25 agents on disease reporting / early warning using FAO Event Mobile Application (EMA-i) takes place soon.
  • FAO Emergency Management Center (EMC-AH) expert mission in May 2023 visited Saint-Louis as a part of support to control HPAI emergency.
  • FAO ECTAD Côte d’Ivoire supported the disinfection of poultry markets in Abidjan.
  • FAO EMC-AH conducted field mission in Gabon from 4 to 8 July 2022 in response to the recent H5N1 HPAI outbreaks in Estuaire Province.
  • FAO ECTAD continues supporting annual proficiency testing schemes of national and sub-national level laboratories for AI diagnosis in Central East, and West Africam countries through USAID funded GHSA programme.
  • FAO ECTAD West and Central Africa Region, in collaboration with EMC-AH, supported the Government of Guinea to undertake a HPAI risk assessment mission to identify risk factors for introduction and spread.
  • FAO participated in the 2nd virtual meeting of Regional Incident Coordination Group (ICG) for West Africa on HPAI organized by FAO ECTAD-WCA in collaboration with ECOWAS Regional Animal Health Centre (RAHC) held in March 2022.
  • Taking stock of FAO-USAID partnership to control health threats in Kenya [link].
  • Stopping Avian Influenza in Togo [link].

 

Figure 1. Number of countries reported HPAI since 1 October 2025 by subtype (left) and by region (right) as of 21 September 2026

Source: WOAH WAHIS portal, government and publications.

Table 2. Epidemiological overview for avian influenza viruses viruses known to have caused zoonotic infections in the past 20 years

Subtype

Epidemiological situation overview

H5Nx Gs/GD HPAI (1996)

High pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) of the H5N1 subtype were detected in geese in Guangdong Province, China in 1996. Viruses related to but not directly descended from A/Goose/Guangdong/1/96 (Gs/GD), the virus identified in China at the time have persisted, as high pathogenicity viruses Gs/GD-related HPAIVs have caused outbreaks in poultry across all regions globally other than Oceania. The initial viruses in this lineage were of the A(H5N1) subtype but other subtypes (including H5N2, H5N3 H5N5, H5N6, H5N8) have emerged, mainly in the past 10 years, as a result of reassortment with other avian influenza viruses. The common feature of these viruses is an HA gene related back to the original Gs/GD/96 virus. The HA gene of these viruses has evolved over the past 28 years, initially into 10 clades (clade 0 to 9) of which descendents of clade 2 viruses are the only ones that continue to circulate. Multiple 5th order clades persist such as the one that is currently dominant globally – clade 2.3.4.4b - whereas others have emerged and disappeared.

Multiple genotypes carrying different combinations of the eight influenza A segmented genes have emerged in Gs/GD-related viruses, as a result of co-infection of birds with different avian influenza viruses that facilitated reassortment. Of considerable significance in the past has been reassortment with enzootic A(H9N2) viruses.

Eurasian lineage clade 2.3.4.4b viruses formed multiple genotypes and those that crossed to North America have reassorted with North American wild bird avian influenza viruses to produced additional genotypes. Two separate systems for naming genotypes of clade 2.3.4.4b have been developed for Eurasian and North American viruses (Fusaro, et al., 2024, Youk, et al., 2023). The clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1) viruses detected in dairy cattle in North America in 2024 fell initially within genotype B3.13 [link] and more recently genotype D1.1 [link] using the North American naming system.

Some Gs/GD-related viruses have produced severe zoonotic infections in humans, first identified in 1997 when an A(H5N1) clade 0 virus in Hong Kong SAR, China caused disease outbreaks in poultry in farms and markets as well as severe disease in humans. In several cases there was some evidence of limited onward transmission in humans and this event raised concerns that it might be the beginning of a human influenza pandemic. Despite the successful efforts to eradicate this particular strain, other Gs/GD-related viruses persisted and evolved in China, becoming more adept at infecting domestic ducks. By 2003 spread of these viruses via wild birds and live bird trade occurred across East and Southeast Asia, resulting in additional zoonotic infection in humans [link].

The important role of wild birds in the transmission of these viruses over long distances became apparent in 2005 when Gs/GD-related HPAIVs (clade 2.2) spread, primarily via wild birds, across Eurasia, and parts of Africa from western China. Most high-income countries eliminated this virus from poultry, but it persisted in several low and middle- income countries. Gs/GD-related viruses continued to evolve and spread. Additional intercontinental waves of transmission have occurred with the two most significant being those in 2014 (clade 2.3.4.4c) and from 2016 onwards (clade 2.3.4.4b). The clade 2.3.4.4b wave commenced in Asia and spread to Europe and Africa. In 2020, that also resulted in spread of these viruses to North America (2014-15 and 2021-22), with the latest outbreak extending through central and South America and to sub-Antarctic islands. In 2022/2023, H5N1 2.3.4.4b caused extensive infection in coastal seabirds and mass die-offs of numerous ecologically important wild bird species. . In 2026, H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b virus reached Australia and New Zealand, with evidence suggesting introduction through migratory wild birds originating from sub‑Antarctic/Antarctic zones.

Since 2024, H5N1 2.3.4.4b caused infection in goats (1 farm), alpaca (1 backyard farm), swine (1 farm) and dairy cattle (1 177 farms in 20 states, as of 23 September 2026) in the United States of America, see HERE.

In 2025, H5N1 2.3.4.4b caused infection in sheep in the United Kingdom, see HERE; and H5 antibodies were also found in sheep in Norway. [link1, link2]

Clade 2.3.4.4b A (H5N1) viruses have caused few human cases but have resulted in multiple mammalian cases including aquatic mammals.

For an updated list of bird and mammalian species affected with A(H5Nx) see HERE.

Among the other Gs/GD-related virus clades that remain endemic in specific areas are clade 2.3.2.1a H5N1 viruses that have persisted in South Asia since 2010 and rarely associated with disease in humans.

Clade 2.3.2.1g viruses have been present in Indonesia since 2012 and clade 2.3.2.1c/e viruses are still circulating in Cambodia, Viet Nam and Lao People’s Democratic Republic. A novel reassortant influenza A(H5N1) virus has been detected in poultry in Cambodia (since 2023), Lao People's Democratic Republic and Viet Nam (since 2022) and was also detected in the human cases reported from Cambodia since late 2023 and Viet Nam in 2024. This virus contains the surface proteins from clade 2.3.2.1c that has circulated locally, but internal genes from a more recent clade 2.3.4.4b virus. [link]

For an updated list of confirmed human cases with A(H5N1) see HERE and HERE.

In addition, since the first human case of A(H5N6) was reported in Sichuan, China in 2014, 94 human cases have been associated with clade 2.3.4.4b and 2.3.4.4h A(H5N6) viruses with most of these occurring in 2021 and 2022 [link]. The first human cases (asymptomatic) of A(H5N8) were reported in Astrakhan Oblast, Russian Federation [link] in adults who engaged in depopulation on a layer farm due to H5N8 HPAI in December 2020 [link]. The influenza A(H5N8) viruses isolated from this poultry outbreak in Astrakhan belonged to clade 2.3.4.4b [GISAID EPI_ISL_1038924]; the first human case (fatal) of A(H5N5) was reported in November 2025 in the United States of America with reported exposure to poultry. [link]

Avian origin H3N8 LPAI

An Influenza A(H3N8) virus lineage emerged in live bird markets in southern China in mid-2021. Since then, three human cases of Influenza A(H3N8) have been reported: In April 2022, the first human clinical case associated with this lineage was reported in Henan Province, China and was associated with severe disease [link]. In May 2022, a 5-year-old boy was diagnosed with a mild influenza A(H3N8) infection in Changsha City, Hunan Province, China. On 27 March 2023, a third human case was reported from Guangdong Province, China in a 56-year-old female with underlying illness who subsequently died.

One of the A(H3N8) viruses isolated from a human was found to be transmissible by air in ferrets [link] but no evidence of sustained human transmission has been reported.

H5N5 HPAI (2025)

One human case in China with reported exposure to poultry. [link]

H7N4 LPAI (2017)

The first human case (fatal) was reported in November 2025 in the United States of America with reported exposure to poultry. [link]

H7N7 LPAI

One human case of H7N7 was reported in a duck farmer in Taiwan Province of China. More than 90 cases have been reported since 1959, mostly mild with one fatal case. [link]

H7N9 LPAI (2013) & HPAI (2017)

Reported only in China with over 1 000 human cases between 2013 and 2017 with a marked increase in 2017 compared to previous waves.

Most human cases exposed in live bird markets.

Nation-wide vaccination campaign in poultry since Sep 2017: Last reported human case in 2019 [link]. See FAO H7N9 situation update Figure 5.

H9N2 LPAI

First human case reported in 1998.

To date, 181 influenza A(H9N2) human cases diagnosed worldwide, many of them were reported from China since December 2015. Most cases mild and involving children. Only two fatal cases reported. [link]

Endemic in multiple countries in Africa and Asia, a cause of significant production losses and mortalities in poultry production systems.

Three major lineages and multiple genotypes.

H10Nx LPAI

To date, seven influenza A(H10N3) human infections have been reported globally [link]. In May 2021, the first case in Jiangsu Province, China [link], then in Zhejiang (2022), Yunnan and Guangxi (2024) and Shaanxi and Guangdong (2025) provinces in China.

The first influenza A(H10N5) human infection was reported in Zhejiang Province, China [link].
Influenza A(H10N7) infection have been reported in humans in 2004 in Egypt [link] and in 2010 in Australia [link].

Since 2013, three influenza A(H10N8) human infections have been reported in Jiangxi Province, China. [link]

Recommendations for affected countries and those at risk

For high-level, the recommendations from the FAO Global Dialogue - Tackling high pathogenicity avian influenza together provide a clear framework for coordinated science-based actions on Early detection, Rapid response, Biosecurity, Vaccination, Business and trade dimensions, One Health and systems-based approaches, Public-private partnerships.

For grass root level. the practical recommendations for day-to-day activities are suggested below to mitigate risk and reduce impact of HPAI.

General recommendations
It is important to report sick or dead birds – both wild birds and poultry - or wild mammals to local authorities (veterinary services, public health officials, community leaders etc.). These should be tested for avian influenza viruses.

Recommendations to poultry producers
Farmers and poultry producers should step up their biosecurity measures in order to prevent potential virus introduction from wild birds or their faeces.

For full recommendations including non-avian species please see [link].

Important links

Note: many publication links have been moved into ‘More important links’ below.

FAO publication
EMPRES Watch/Focus On 
Online course/webinar
  • Avian Influenza Preparedness Course was held in April/May 2023 [link].
  • FAO RNE launched bilingual training course on Avian Influenza preparedness for NENA region on 17 January 2023 [link].
  • FAO through its Virtual Learning Center developed an Avian Influenza Preparedness Course in 2022 [link].
  • FAO, in collaboration with WOAH, organized a webinar on H5 HPAI occurrence and prevention in North Africa on 20 May 2021.
  • WHO developed an online training course entitled “Strengthening collaboration between human and animal health sectors for improved health security”. The course covers the Tripartite Zoonosis Guide and associated tools in Module 2 [link].
  • FAO held a webinar entitled Managing HPAI in wild birds on 10 February 2022 – recording part 1 & part 2.
  • FAO Webinar: Pros and cons on AI vaccination, presented by Leslie Sims, Ian Brown, Sergei Khomenko, Sophie von Dobschüetz (2018) [link].
  • FAO Webinar: Intercontinental spread of H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza – Analysis of the current situation and recommendations, for preventive action (2016) [link].
Risk Assessment
Joint Risk Assessment
Wild birds/mammals
Socio-economic / PPP
GF-TADs/Tripartite/Quadripartite plan, guide, tool
Other useful links

Next issue: 22 Oct. 2026

The disease situation updates are produced by the FAO Emergency Prevention System for Animal Health (EMPRES-AH) as part of its mission to increase global disease intelligence.
Disclaimer

Information provided herein is current as of the date of issue. Information added or changed since the last Global AIV with Zoonotic Potential situation update appears in orange. Human cases are depicted in the geographic location of their report. For some cases, exposure may have occurred in one geographic location but reported in another. For cases with unknown onset date, reporting date was used instead. FAO compiles information drawn from multiple national (Ministries of Agriculture or Livestock, Ministries of Health, Provincial Government websites; Centers for Disease Prevention and Control [CDC]) and international sources (World Health Organization [WHO], World Organisation for Animal Health [WOAH]), as well as peer reviewed scientific articles. FAO makes every effort to ensure, but does not guarantee, accuracy, completeness or authenticity of the information. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these map(s) do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of FAO concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers and boundaries. Dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.

Contact

If interested in a previous issue please send an email to EMPRES-Animal Health specifying the intended use of the document.