Animal health

Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update

23 October 2025, 08:30 hours; Rome

Overview

This update covers avian influenza viruses (AIV) with zoonotic potential occurring worldwide, i.e. H5Nx, H7Nx high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) viruses and H3N8, H5Nx, H6N1, H7Nx, H9N2, H10Nx and H11 low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI).

Specific information is available for Avian Influenza A(H7N9) virus viruses and Sub-Saharan Africa HPAI in related FAO Avian Influenza situation updates.

HPAI outbreaks in animals officially reported since last update (25 September 2025): in total, 954 outbreaks/events have been reported in 38 countries/territories caused by H5Nx (661), H5N1 (286), H5N5 (4), H7Nx (1) and HxNx (2) (see Table 1 for details).

LPAI events in animals officially reported since the last update: 1 new event was reported. [ref]

Number of human cases officially reported since the last update: 9 new events were reported. [ ref1, ref2, ref3]

Map 1. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential observed since 1 October 2025 (i.e. current wave)

Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.

Notes: Refer to the disclaimer available on this webpage for the names and boundaries in this map. The final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. The final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Source: United Nations Geospatial. 2020. Map of the World. [Cited October 2025]. Modified with GLW 4 data and Emergency Prevention System Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i), WOAH and National Authorities data, 2025.

Map 2. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential* observed in the period 1 October 2024 to 30 September 2025 (i.e. previous wave)

Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.

Notes: Refer to the disclaimer available on this webpage for the names and boundaries in this map. Final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Source: United Nations Geospatial. 2020. Map of the World. [Cited October 2025]. Modified with GLW 4 data and Emergency Prevention System Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i), WOAH and National Authorities data, 2024.

October – December 2024


January – March 2025


April – June 2025


July – September 2025


Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.

Notes: Refer to the disclaimer available on this webpage for the names and boundaries in this map. Final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Source: United Nations Geospatial. 2020.  Map of the World. [Cited October 2025]. Modified with GLW 4 data and Emergency Prevention System Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i), WOAH and National Authorities data, 2024.

 

Table 1. High pathogenicity avian influenza viruses with zoonotic potential reported since the last update

VirusCountry/AreaLast observed outbreak# events reported since the last updateTotal # events reported since 1 October 2025Species affected during the reporting preiod

H5

Argentina

06/10/2025

1

1

Non-poultry domestic birds

France

14/10/2025

2

2

Poultry

Iceland

28/09/2025

1
(in W)

1
(in W)

Common Raven

Republic of Korea

21/10/2025

1

1

Goose, poultry

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland6

Week 41

1
(in W)

1
(in W)

Peregrine falcon

United States of America7

20/10/2025

655
(incl.
W653, M1, DF1)

480
(incl.
W478, M1, DF1)

Chicken, Duck, Turkey, WOAH Poultry, WOAH Non-Poultry; American white pelican, American wigeon, Bald eagle, Black vulture, Blue-winged teal, Canada goose, Cinnamon teal, Double-crested cormorant, Duck, Gadwall, Goose, Great horned owl, Green-winged teal, Hermit thrush, Mallard, Mallard/Black duck hybrid, Mottled duck, Muscovy duck, Northern pintail, Northern shoveler, Owl, Pelican, Peregrine falcon, Redhead duck, Red-tailed hawk, Ring-necked duck, Sandhill crane, Swan, Teal, Trumpeter swan, Turkey vulture, Vulture, Wild turkey, Wood duck; Black bear, Cattle

H5N1

Austria

20/10/2025

10
(in W)

8
(in W)

Greylag Goose, Mallard, Mute Swan

Belgium

21/10/2025

2
(incl. W1)

2
(incl. W1)

Non-poultry birds; Wild Turkey

Bulgaria

14/10/2025

3

3

Chicken, Duck

Cambodia

16/10/2025

3

3

Chicken, Duck

Canada

09/10/2025

6

6

Chicken, Turkey, Non-commercial non-poultry

China

13/10/2025

1

1

Quail

Czech Republic

26/09/2025

1

0

Chicken, Duck, Goose

Denmark

21/10/2025

11
(incl. W6)

11
(incl. W6)

Chicken, Turkey; Black-headed Gull, Common pheasant, Eurasian buzzard, Eurasian Wigeon, Greylag Goose, Mallard, Mute Swan

France

19/10/2025

13
(incl. W10)

13
(incl. W10)

Pheasant, Turkey; Eurasian Spoonbill, Geese, Herring Gull, Mute Swan

Germany

21/10/2025

28
(incl. W7)

26
(incl. W5)

Chicken, Duck, Goose, Pheasant, Turkey, Poultry; Anatidae, Gruidae, Swan

Guatemala

20/08/2025

1
(in W)

0

Anatidae

Hungary

10/10/2025

2
(in W)

1
(in W)

Common Teal, Great Cormorant

India

24/08/2025

5
(incl. C1)

5
(incl. C1)

Poultry, Live Bird Market; Painted Stork

Iran

29/09/2025

1

1

Poultry

Iraq

12/10/2025

1

1

Poultry

Ireland

13/10/2025

1
(in C)

1
(in C)

Greylag Goose

Italy

17/10/2025

7
(incl. W2)

6
(incl. W2)

Chicken, Turkey, Poultry; Canada Goose, Common Teal, Mallard

Japan

15/10/2025

1
(in W)

1
(in W)

Northern Goshawk

Latvia

08/10/2025

3
(in W)

2
(in W)

Whooper swan

Lithuania

12/10/2025

1

1

Turkey

Mexico

18/09/2025

2

2

Chicken (for fighting)

Netherlands
(Kingdom of the)

06/10/2025

1

1

Poultry

North Macedonia

08/10/2025

1
(in C)

1
(in C)

Black Swan

Norway

08/10/2025

3
(in W)

2
(in W)

Arctic Jaeger, Eurasian Wigeon, Glaucous Gull, Great black-backed Gull

Poland

17/10/2025

12
(incl. W2)

9
(incl. W1)

Duck, Goose, Turkey; Mute swan

Portugal

10/10/2025

3
(in W)

2
(in W)

Lesser Black-backed Gull, Little Egret, White Stork

Slovakia

20/10/2025

3

3

Chicken, Duck, Goose, Poultry

South Africa

30/09/2025

1

1

Poultry

South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands

26/06/2025

11

11

Gentoo penguin, South polar skua; Harbor Seal, Southern elephant seal

Spain

14/10/2025

23
(incl. W15 C1)

22
(incl. W14, C1)

Chicken, Turkey; American Flamingo, Caspian Gull, Common Kestrel, Glossy Ibis, Greylag Goose, Marbled duck, Roseate Spoonbill, Yellow-legged Gull

Sweden

14/10/2025

2
(incl. W1)

2
(incl. W1)

Chicken, (Duck); Mediterranean Gull

United Kingdom6

Week 42

26
(incl. W21)

20
(incl. W16)

Canada Goose, Common Gull, Gannet, Greylag Goose, Herring Gull, Kestrel, Mute Swan, Pink Footed Goose, Guillemot, Swan

United States of America7

21/10/2025

87
(incl. W28, DF1)

71
(incl. W21, DF1)

Chicken, Turkey, WOAH Poultry, WOAH Non-Poultry; Bald eagle, Blue-winged teal, Canada goose, Great horned owl, Gull, Mallard, Peregrine falcon, Turkey vulture

Viet Nam

19/10/2025

10

10

Chicken, duck

H5N5

Iceland

13/09/2025

2
(in W)

0

Black-headed Gull, Mew Gull

Norway

24/09/2025

1
(in W)

1
(in W)

Glaucous Gull, Great black-backed Gull

United Kingdom6

Week 41

1
(in W)

1
(in W)

Great Black Backed Gull

H7

Portugal

6/10/2025

1
(in W)

1
(in W)

Yellow-legged Gull

HxNx

Indonesia11

September 2025

1

1

Chicken

Japan

22/10/2025

1

1

Layer chicken

Data was retrieved from WOAH WAHIS portal and Sharing other important animal health information with WOAH page [link], government websites. Data cutoff time: reported on 23 October 2025, 8:30 CET. $:estimate. ‡: date of confirmation, R: reported date, §: counting Izumi Wintering Habitat of Cranes (Ramsar) as 1 event. Notes: Only those reporting events in animals since the last update are listed in the table. Codes: D:domestic, C:captivity, W:Wild birds, DF: Dairy farm, E:Environment, M: mammalian species other than humans. For more information, consult dedicated webpage of the: 1: British Antarctic Survey (BAS) [link], 2: Australian Government [link], 3: Canada Food and Inspection Agency dashboard [link], 4: TierSeuchenInformationsSystem - Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut [link], 5: Ministry of the Environment [link] 6: Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) [link], 7: USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA/APHIS) [link], 8: Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) [link], 9: The Philippines: Bureau of Animal Industry [link], 10: Brazil: Ministério da Agricultura e Pecuária [link], 11: Indonesia: Laporan Perkembangan Avian Influenza – HPAI [link]. Bold: the first report of infection in the species. The full list of bird and mammalian species affected by H5Nx HPAI are here.

Table 2.  Low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses with zoonotic potential reported since the last update

VirusCountry/AreaLast observed outbreak# events reported since the last updateTotal # events reported since 1 October 2025Species affected during the reporting period

H5N3

United Kingdom

09/08/2025

1

0

(on premises in Wales, reported in the last wave)

Recent publications

Overview

Shanta, R.N., Akther, M., Prodhan, M.A., Akter, S.H., Annandale, H., Sarker, S., Abraham, S. & Uddin, J.M. 2025. Adaptation and Outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Dairy Cattle: An Emerging Threat to Humans, Pets, and Peridomestic Animals. Pathogens, 14(9):846. reference

Roperto, S. & Di Guardo, G. 2025. One health, one earth, one life: The overlooked role of veterinarians in the fight against COVID-19 and other public health emergencies in Italy. One Health, 2025 Sep 18;21:101207. reference

Domestic

Golpasand, S., Ghovvati, S. & Pezeshkian, Z. 2025. Exploring the molecular and biological mechanisms of host response in chickens infected with highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (H5N1): An integrative transcriptomic analysis. PLoS One, 20(10):e0332689. reference

Bui, V.N., Oguzie, J.U., Dao, T.D., Bui, A.N., Tran, S.D., Nguyen, Q.D., Nguyen, H.Q., et al. 2025. Active Surveillance for Emerging Influenza A Viruses - Findings from a One Health Study in Vietnam's Live Bird Markets. Int J Infect Dis, 2025 Oct 15:108132. reference

Shakeel, I., Rashid, H.B., Ain, Q.U., Inayat, A., Shakeel, U., Awoniyi, A.M. & Chaudhry, M. 2025. Prevalence and risk factors of Influenza Avian Virus in backyard pigeons, ducks, and chickens in Toba Tek Singh District, Pakistan. PLoS One, 20(10):e0314186. reference

Iancu, I., Bărbuceanu, F., Tîrziu, E., Pascu, C., Costinar, L., Degi, J., Badea, C., Gligor, A., et al. 2025. Determination of H5N1 Avian Influenza Virus Persistence Following a 2024 Backyard Poultry Outbreak in Romania. Veterinary Sciences, 12(10):922. reference

Kamel, M.N., Moatasim, Y., Aboulhoda, B.E., Gomaa, M., El Taweel, A., Kutkat, O., El Sayes, M., et al. 2025. Genetic Characterization and Pathogenesis of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus A (H5N1) Isolated in Egypt During 2021–2023. Viruses, 17:1370. reference

Puga-Torres, B., Navarrete, H. & de la Torre, D. 2025. Molecular surveillance confirms absence of avian influenza virus type A in Ecuadorian poultry: A retrospective reverse transcription quantitative polymerase chain reaction study from April 2023 to June 2024. Vet World, 18(8):2287-2294. reference

Biosecurity

Vougat Ngom, R., Leite, M., Tilli, G., Laconi, A., Mahmood, Q., Prodanov-Radulović, J., Allepuz, A., Chantziaras, I. & Piccirillo, A. 2025. Biosecurity implementation in poultry farms across Europe and neighboring countries: a systematic review. Front Vet Sci, 12:1653543. reference

Oettler, M.J., Stumpf, G., Schulz, K., Todte, M., Hüttner, K., Heyne, H., Mettenleiter, T.C., Conraths, F.J. & Sauter-Louis, C.. 2025. Strict Biosecurity and Epidemiological Segmentation Enable Partial Culling During a Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak. Vet Med (Auckl), 16:25-37. reference

Grant, M., Jansson, D.S., Comin, A., Jacobson, M. & Nöremark, M. 2025. Strengths, challenges, and variations - insights into biosecurity practices in Swedish poultry production following HPAI outbreaks. Poult Sci, 104(12):105871. reference

Forleo, M.B., Di Renzo, P., Romagnoli, L., Giaccio, V. & Scardera, A. 2025. The Efficiency of Poultry Farms: A Dynamic Analysis Based on a Stochastic Frontier Approach and Panel Data. Animals (Basel), 15(19):2806. reference

Wild

Teitelbaum, C.S., Casazza, M.L., Overton, C.T., Matchett, E.L. & Prosser, D.J. 2025. Host responses and viral traits interact to shape the impacts of climate warming on highly pathogenic avian influenza in migratory waterfowl. PLoS Comput Biol, 21(10):e1013451. reference

Clessin, A., Briand, F.X., Tornos, J., Lejeune, M., De Pasquale, C., Fischer, R., Souchaud, F., et al. 2025. Circumpolar spread of avian influenza H5N1 to southern Indian Ocean islands. Nat Commun,16(1):8463 reference

Xu, R., Gao, M., Zhang, N., Wei, Z., Wang, Z., Zhang, L., Liu, Y., et al. 2025. Transcontinental Spread of HPAI H5N1 from South America to Antarctica via Avian Vectors. Viruses, 17:1365. reference

Isoda, N., Hew, L.Y., Nishikawa, K., Takaya, F., Shimazu, Y., Kobayashi, D., Nabeshima, K., et al. 2025. Genetic Diversity of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Viruses Isolated in Hokkaido, Japan, During Winter 2024-2025. Pathogens, 14(9):951. reference

Li, X., Lv, X., Li, Y., Fei, M., Liu, S. & Chai, H. 2025. Zoonotic threat: Emergence of mammalian-adapted H5N1 virus in migratory birds at Qinghai Lake. Journal of Infection, 91(5): reference

Verma, A.K., Kumar, M., Murugkar, H.V., Nagarajan, S., Tosh, C., Namdeo, P., Singh, R., et al. 2025. Evaluation of In-Contact Transmission Potential of H5N1 Avian Influenza Virus in House Crows (Corvus splendens). Avian Dis, 69(3):237-242. reference

Hancock, G., Kirkeby, C., Kjær, L.J., Nyegaard, T., Boklund, A.E. & Ward, M.P. Ward. 2025. Predator–Prey Trophic Interactions and Seasonality of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus in Denmark, 2016–2023. Zoonoses and Public Health, 14 October 2025. reference

Djurdjević, B., Samojlović, M., Lupulović, D., Petrović, T., Polaček, V., Knežević, S. & Pajić, M. 2025. Temporal Dynamics and Surveillance of Highly Pathogenic H5 Avian Influenza in Wild Birds in Northern Serbia (2016-2025). Vet Sci, 12(9):894. reference

Hancock, G., Kirkeby, C., Kjær, L.J., Nyegaard, T., Boklund, A.E. & Ward, M.P. 2025. Predator-Prey Trophic Interactions and Seasonality of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus in Denmark, 2016-2023. Zoonoses Public Health, 2025 Oct 14. reference

Knief, U., Ahrens, A.K., Allendorf, V., Behringer, C.J., Bertram, J., Bouwhuis, S., Fiedler, W., et al. 2025. Outbreak dynamics of high pathogenicity avian influenza virus H5N1, clade 2.3.4.4b euBB, in black-headed gulls and common terns in Germany in 2023. bioRxiv, 2025 September 17: 2025.09.17.676714. reference PREPRINT

Ewing, D.A. & Bouwhuis, S. 2025. Estimating epidemiological parameters of highly pathogenic avian influenza in common terns using exact Bayesian inference. J Anim Ecol, 2025 Oct 8. reference

Mariacher, A., Di Nicola, M.R., Senese, M., Mariottini, F., Maestrini, M., Bellagamba, F., Donnini, C., et al. 2025. Detection of avian influenza virus in the alien invasive African sacred ibis (Threskiornis aethiopicus) in Italy. Front Vet Sci, 12:1661089. reference

Joly, D.O., Berhane, Y., Bowman, J., Giacinti, J.A., Goldsmith, D., Hentze, N., Jones, M.E.B., et al. 2025. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) Detected in 41 Species at Risk in Canada. J Wildl Dis, 2025 Oct 6. reference

Cullen, J.A., Masto, N.M., Sullivan, J.D., Highway, C.J., Patyk, K.A., McCool, M.J., Torchetti, M.K., et al. 2025. Spatiotemporal Overlap of Mallards With Poultry Farms Is Associated With Greater Risk of Avian Influenza Wild Bird Spillover Events. Ecol Evol, 15(10):e72221. reference

Sánchez-Rodríguez, F., Diaz-Gavidia, C., Ruíz, S., Jimenez-Bluhm, P. 2025. Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in South America, 2022-2025: temporality, affected species, and the southwards expansion to the Antarctic region. bioRxiv, 2025 October 03: 2025.10.03.680239. reference PREPRINT

Plaza, P., Santangeli, A., Rosciano, N., Cancellario, T., Girardello, M., Wikelski, M. & Lambertucci, S.A. 2025. Wild Birds Affected by Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Worldwide: Epidemiological Insights Into the Recent Panzootic. Glob Chang Biol, 31(10):e70523. reference

Mammals

Chrzastek, K., Lieber, C.M. & Plemper, R.K. 2025. H5N1 Clade 2.3.4.4b: Evolution, Global Spread, and Host Range Expansion. Pathogens, 14(9):929. reference

Alkie, T.N., Embury-Hyatt, C., Signore, A.V., Ramos, D., Moffat, E., Raj, S., Gebrebrhan, H., et al. 2025. Dairy cow- and avian-origin clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 induce severe mastitis in lactating goats and transmission to suckling goats. Cell Rep, 44(10): 116346. reference

Günther, A., Wassermann, J., Heck, J., Bussi, M., Aebischer, A., Staubach, C., Bergmann, H., et al. 2025. Opportunity Drives Spillover: Serological Surveillance across Carnivores, Omnivores and Herbivores in an HPAIV H5 Hotspot in North-East Germany, 2023–2025. bioRxiv, 2025 September 30: 2025.09.30.678011. PREPRINT reference

Kim, Y.I., Jang, S.G., Kwon, W., Kim, J., Park, D., Choi, I., Choi, J.H., et al. 2025. PB2 and NP of North American H5N1 virus drive immune cell replication and systemic infections. Sci Adv, 11(39):eady1208. reference

Schlachter, A.D., Bruno-McClung, E., Díaz-Delgado, J., Odom, M., Banyard, A.C. & Núñez, A. 2025. Feline high pathogenicity avian influenza H5N1 infection: past and present. J Feline Med Surg, 27(10):1098612X251370695. reference

Kim, C.T., Lee, D.W., Kim, D.W., Kim, J.Y., Lee, Y.J., Kim, H.S., Bae, S. & Kwon, J.H. 2025. Detection of H9N2 Avian Influenza Virus in commercial raw meat-based diets for dogs and cats in South Korea. Vet Microbiol, 311:110741. reference

Gomez, J.F., Bemis, I.G., Shittu, I., Gray, G.C. & Coleman, K.K. 2025. Outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza a(H5N1) among house cats: A case series involving oseltamivir treatment. One Health, 21:101211. reference

Dairy & Occupational health

Shannon C. Beard, Mark E. Carson, B. Mallard, M. Lohuis, F. Malchiodi. 2025. High immune responder cows have lower treatment risk and reduced milk loss during highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 outbreaks. JDS Communications, 2025: reference

Shittu, I., Rodriguez, J., Oguzie, J.U., Trujillo-Vargas, C.M., Marushchak, L.V., Nguyen-Tien, T., Schneider, N.E., Lednicky, J.A., & Gray, G.C. 2025. Sustained High Levels of Antibodies to Avian Influenza Virus H5N1 Clade 2.3.4.4b in Naturally Infected Cattle. Research Square, 10 September 2025: rs.3.rs-7274486. reference PREPRINT

Nooruzzaman, M., de Oliveira, P.S.B., Butt, S.L., Martin, N.H., Alcaine, S.D., Walker, S.P. & Diel, D.G. 2025. H5N1 influenza virus stability and transmission risk in raw milk and cheese. Nat Med, 2025 Oct 8. reference

Brigleb, P.H., Roubidoux, E.K., Lazure, L., Livingston, B., Meliopoulos, V.A., Sharp, B., Ripperger, T., et al. 2025. Repeated oral exposure to H5N1 influenza virus in pasteurized milk does not cause adverse responses to subsequent influenza infection. Sci Adv, 11(39):eaeb3906. reference

Su, A., Yan, M., Herrler, G. & Becher, P. 2025. Efficient replication of avian, porcine and human influenza A viruses in well-differentiated bovine airway epithelial cells. Emerg Microbes Infect, 2025 Oct 8:2572697. reference

Zhu, B., Fung, K., Feng, H.H., Beatty, J.A., Hill, F., Tse, A.C.N., Brackman, C.J., et al. 2025. The hemagglutinin proteins of clades 1 and 2.3.4.4b H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses exhibit comparable attachment patterns to avian and mammalian tissues. J Virol, 2025 Sep 23:e0097625. reference

Smith, L.E., Martin, A.F., Pae, R., Denford, S., Humphreys, C., Weston, D., Amlôt, R., Oliver, I., Yardley, L. & Rubin, G.J. 2025. Co-producing public health advice for people working on premises infected with highly pathogenic avian influenza. Public Health, 248:105976. reference

Lim, A., Poulsen, K., Caserta, L.C., Guan, L., Opgernorth, E., Beal, M., Eisfeld, A.J., Kawaoka, Y. & Diel, D. 2025. Unexpected Detection of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus in bovine Semen. bioRxiv, 2025 October 17: 2025.10.16.682947. reference PREPRINT

Viruses

Wang, H., Meng, Y., Chen, X., Cui, X., Zuo, Q., Han, N., Liang, X., et al. 2025. Unveiling Novel Viral Diversity, Biogeography, and Host Networks in Wildlife Through High-Throughput Sequencing Data Mining. Adv Sci (Weinh), 2025 Sep 23:e11920. reference

Chen, W., Yang, P., Hu, J., Liu, X., Jiang, C., Wu, H., Wang, Y., et al. 2025. Echoes in the Deep: Revealing Influenza A Viruses' Persistence and Microbial Associations in Aquatic Ecosystems. Transbound Emerg Dis, 2025:5586400. reference

Klivleyeva, N., Glebova, T., Saktaganov, N. & Webby, R. 2025. Cases of Interspecies Transmission of Influenza A Virus from Swine to Humans. Vet Sci, 12(9):873. reference

Truong, A.D., Tran, H.T.T., Khac, D.L., Nguyen, U.T., Dang, H.V., Chu, N.T., Nguyen, H.M., Nguyen, L.T., Le, K.V. & Dang, H.V. 2025. Phylogenetic analysis of swine influenza viruses circulating in slaughterhouses in Thanh Hoa province, Vietnam, during 2024 and early 2025. Open Vet J, 15(8):3888-3898. reference

Soliani, L., Mescoli, A., Zanni, I., Baioni, L., Alborali, G., Moreno, A., Faccini, S., et al. 2025. Human-Derived H3N2 Influenza A Viruses Detected in Pigs in Northern Italy. Viruses, 17(9):1171. reference

Wang, Y., Gao, Y.D., Jiang, C.H., Xi, Y., Yang, M.X., Zhang, W., Pan, Y.Y. & Zeng, Q.Y. 2025. Characterisation of a novel chicken-derived H3N3 avian influenza virus detected in China in 2023: Pathogenicity and immunogenicity. PLoS One, 20(9):e0332213. reference

Janzen, G.M., Inderski, B.T., Chang, J., Arendsee, Z.W., Janas-Martindale, A., Torchetti, M.K., Baker, A.L. & Anderson, T.K. 2025. Sources and sinks of influenza A virus genomic diversity in swine from 2009 to 2022 in the United States. J Virol, 99:e00541-25. reference

Gao, X., Dong, J., Wang, L., Zhao, C., Li, X., Zhang, S., Li, Y., et al. 2025. Hemagglutinin of Emerging Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza Viruses Underpins High Pathogenicity to Mammals. J Med Virol, 97(10):e70615. reference

Mao, Q., Zhu, J., Liu, S., Peng, C., Wu, T., Tian, J., Li, X., et al. 2025. Epidemiological, Phylogenetic, and Pathogenicity Analysis of H4 Subtype Avian Influenza Viruses in China, 2011-2022. Virol Sin, 2025 Sep 23:S1995-820X(25)00131-2. reference

Kok, A., Wilks, S.H., Tureli, S., James, S.L., Bestebroer, T.M., Burke, D.F., Funk, M., et al. 2025. A vaccine central in A(H5) influenza antigenic space confers broad immunity. Nature, 2025 Oct 15. reference

Canadian Food Inspection Agency. 2025. Update on Canadian Food Inspection Agency operations and custody of ostriches at Edgewood, British Columbia. reference

Zhu, B., Fung, K., Feng, H.H., Beatty, J.A., Hill, F., Tse, A.C., Brackman, C.J., et al. 2025. The hemagglutinin proteins of clades 1 and 2.3.4.4b H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses exhibit comparable attachment patterns to avian and mammalian tissues. J Virol, 2025 Sep 23:e0097625. reference

Yang, J., Sun, J., Zhao, D., Liu, J., Ma, M., Wang, Q. & Bi, Y. 2025. Reassortment risk of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 with avian H9N2 and human H3N2 and H1N1 influenza A viruses. Sci Bull (Beijing), 2025 Sep 23:S2095-9273(25)00976-4. reference

Ayora-Talavera, G., López-Martínez, I., Barrera-Badillo, G., Aparicio-Antonio, R., Aréchiga-Ceballos, N., Aguirre-Barbosa, A., Wong-Chew, R. M., Canul-Canul, D., & Solís-Hernández, M. 2025. Genetic and Serological Analysis of H7N3 Avian Influenza Viruses in Mexico for Pandemic Risk Assessment. Viruses, 17(10):1376. reference

Chen, L.L., Ip, J.D., Chan, W.M., Lam, S.J., Leung, R.C., Yip, C.C., Zhang, X., et al. 2025. Enhanced replication of a contemporary avian influenza A H9N2 virus in human respiratory organoids. Emerg Microbes Infect, 2025 Oct 16:2576574. reference

Kadja, M.C., Bako, A.B.I., Onidje, E., Cissé, A.K., Sourokou Sabi, S. & Fellahi, S. 2025. Molecular Detection and Genetic Characterization of H9N2 Avian Influenza Virus in Laying Hen and Broiler Farms in Dakar and Thies Regions, Senegal. Vet Ital, 2025 Sep 4;61(4). reference

Sajjad, N., Maarouf, M., Wang, Y., Shrestha, P., Rai, K.R., Chi, X., Wang, S. & Chen, J.L. 2025. A chicken lncRNA is identified as a critical regulator that increases influenza virus replication by impairing innate antiviral responses. Vet Res, 56(1):195. reference

Rachmawati, K., Santoso, K.P., Kurnijasanti, R. & Khairullah, A.R. 2025. Isolation and identification of the H9N2 virus that caused the decline in poultry egg production in Indonesia from 2011 to 2018 using the RT-PCR-sequencing method. Open Vet J, 15(6):2815-2822. reference

Assessments

Fornasiero, D., Mulatti, P., Fusaro, A., Monne, I., Gambaro, F., Dellicour, S., Scolamacchia, F., et al. 2025. Continuous phylogeography reveals shifting environmental drivers of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5 spread. Research Square, 17 September 2025:rs.3.rs-7636570. reference PREPRINT

Sangrat, W., Sajapitak, S., Boonyawiwat, V., Thongratsakul, S. & Poolkhet, C. 2025. Integrating systematic review, meta-analysis, and secondary data for spatial and temporal risk analysis of avian influenza in poultry: A comparative evaluation of OLS, GWR, and MGWR models. Prev Vet Med, 245:106693. reference

Huang, S., Bragazzi, N.L., Nia, Z.M., Gillies, M., Gardner, E., Leung, D., Gizo, I. & Kong, J.D. 2025. A systematic review of mathematical and machine learning models of Avian Influenza. One Health, 21:101203. reference

Puttahonnappa, S.K., Anandakumar, J., Barman, N.N., Rajkumar, R., Paramanandham, K., Patil, S.S., Lamba, S., Patil, A.V. & Gulati, B.R. 2025. Investigating environmental determinants and spatiotemporal dynamics of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 outbreaks in India through machine learning. Sci Rep, 15(1):36132. reference

Zhuang, Y.R., Liu, Y., Li, Q.F., Zhang, H.Q., Wang, C.Y., Ding, L.Y., Liu, A.Q., He, J., Meng, R. & Yu, L.G. 2025. An intelligence framework for the early warning of avian influenza in Chinese laying farms. Poult Sci, 104(11):105822. reference

Tools

Sosa Drouville, A., Trobbiani, G.A., Barandiaran, S., Ponce, L.C., Ebmer, D. & Leonardi, M.S. 2025. The multipurpose stick: A complete and low-cost technique for remote sample collection in pinnipeds. Res Vet Sci, 2025 Oct 10;197:105928. reference

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2025. Personal Protective Equipment for Influenza A (H5N1) in High-Risk Farm Settings: A Workshop. reference

FAO's support to countries

Global level
  • OFFLU (WOAH/FAO network of expertise on animal influenza) released the Guidelines for High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus Risk Mitigation in Cattle. [link]
  • The second Global Conference on Sustainable Livestock Transformation was held at FAO Rome on 29 September – 1 October [the recording is available at link], recording of some side events are also shared e.g. Biosecurity for a sustainable livestock transformation – a shared responsibility to impact at scale. [link]
  • OFFLU contributed information on the genetic and antigenic characteristics of currently circulating avian and swine influenza viruses to the WHO Consultation on the Composition of Influenza Virus Vaccines for Use in the 2026 Southern Hemisphere Influenza Season in September 2025, which will help inform decisions on updating candidate vaccine viruses (CVVs) for pandemic preparedness. [link1] Reports are now available [link2, link3, link4, link5].
  • FAO organized 'Global Science, Policy and Private Sector Dialogue ― Tackling High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Together’ in Brazil from 9 to 11 September 2025. [link1, link2] The outcome, Iguaçu statement, is now available [link].
Regional/country level
  • Americas
    • FAO-led Community of Practice on Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) organized a Learning dialogue webinar: ICT-enabled intersectoral collaboration to tackle Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) in Latin America and the Caribbean Region on 6 August, more than 500 registered and 250 actively participated from worldwide. [link]
    • A regional training course on HPAI diagnosis was organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), FAO RLC and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil from 18 to 23 August, with participation from 19 countries in the region. [link1, link2, link3]
  • Africa
    • FAO's Farmer Field School (FFS) approach is being utilized in Ethiopia, Kenya, and the United Republic of Tanzania to improve on-farm biosecurity, vaccination practices, and links with animal health services in small-scale poultry farms. Across the three countries, 21 FFSs have been implemented with approximately 600 broiler farmers graduating after successful completion of the 18-week school. The skills gained, aid the producers to identify and report poultry disease symptoms - for example in Kenya some of the FFS participants had raised some concerns on the possibilities of their flocks being infected by HPAI, as some chickens had shown persistent torticollis. This had triggered epidemiologic investigation, which turned out to be Newcastle disease.
    • In Burundi, Training for animal health workers in the field and those at the National Veterinary Laboratory on sampling and sample management is planned to improve the collection and secure sample transport to the laboratory. This will enable those trained in bioinformatics at Mohammed VI Polytechnic University in Morocco to use their new skills in molecular diagnostics and bioinformatics.
    • In Cote d’Ivoire, the results of the biosecurity assessment in poultry farms and markets in the main poultry farming areas of Agnibilekro and Abidjan to the veterinary services were presented as a part of avian influenza prevention efforts following initiatives led by FAO. The study also explored the factors influencing the adoption of biosecurity measures and identified corrective actions. The Government has developed an illustrated guide to biosecurity in poultry farming, through the enzootic diseases project supported by FAO.
    • In Ghana, FAO supported the training of poultry farmers and veterinary professionals on effective biosecurity practices and compliance with the farm-level biosecurity checklist; and feed suppliers and waste collectors on reducing the risk of environmental and farm-to-farm contamination. FAO provided the veterinary laboratory with laboratory reagents and consumables for the diagnosis of Avian Influenza to enhance early detection capabilities with support from the Pandemic Fund,
    • In Guinea, active surveillance for HPAI by the veterinary services has been underway since August in high- and very high-risk areas, technically support by FAO. To date, 7 822 samples have been analysed by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) at the central veterinary diagnostic laboratory, and none tested positive. Alongside, the Progressive Management Pathway for Terrestrial Animal Biosecurity (PMP-TAB) approach to good biosecurity practices has been implemented on poultry farms in the prefectures of Coyah, Dubréka and Forécariah.
    • Facing the persistent threat of HPAI and increased circulation of the virus in the region, Madagascar, through the Directorate of Veterinary Services (DSV), commits to updating its contingency plan in order to have a strategic, operational and intersectoral tool. The new plan focuses on three priority areas: Strengthening preventive measures to limit the risks of introducing the virus into national territory; Improving early detection of the disease, at all levels of intervention and in each sector concerned; The optimization of emergency response capacities in case of outbreaks, − to implement a coherent and coordinated response, based on the "One Health" approach, promoting synergy between animal, human and environmental health sectors. To concretize this commitment, a technical workshop was organized from 15 to 18 September 2025, bringing together national experts as well as technical partners, including FAO, lead to the development of a strategic reference document, integrating the prevention strategy, the national monitoring system (including early detection mechanisms), as well as the rapid response plan.
    • In Nigeria, in view of future HPAI vaccination recommended by the Ministerial Advisory Committee, FAO Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal Diseases (ECTAD) team worked along with the Federal Department of Veterinary and Pest Control Services to develop and apply the biosecurity measures requires for the vaccination on pilot farms.
    • FAO ECTAD Senegal through Fleming Fund project, held a workshop to develop curricula on farmer field school (FFS) focused on biosecurity related to poultry farming from 29 September to 3 October. This 5-day workshop brought together (25 participants) experts in poultry farming, veterinary services to promote knowledge sharing in order to adapt the program according to the field needs but also to promote the proper use of antimicrobials to prevent diseases through the implementation of biosecurity measures on poultry farms. The next steps is to use the curricula on biosecurity training for poultry farmers in order to scale up the biosecurity and good practice in poultry farming.
  • North Africa and Middle East
    • FAO Regional Office for Near East and North Africa (RNE) has initiated two training events through FAO Virtual Learning Center (VLC) platform as part of the One Health technical cooperation programme (TCP) project. The Avian Influenza Preparedness Course opened on 16 September and will run until 20 October, with the closing webinar on 14 October. The course has already brought on board around 300 participants. Preparations are also underway for the Farm Animal Biosecurity: Progressive Management Pathways for Terrestrial Animals Course, tentatively scheduled from 5 November to early December 2025.
    • In Libya, FAO participated in the One Health Rapid Response Team Training of trainer course organized by WHO in Tripoli, Libya from 14 to 18 September 2025. This training aimed to strengthen national and subnational capacities for responding to zoonotic and vector-borne diseases through a coordinated, multisectoral approach.
    • In Tunisia, under the Pandemic Fund project, FAO plans to train official veterinarians on the Event Mobile Application (EMA-i) tool to facilitate its adoption by veterinary services. Four media training sessions are also scheduled by the end of the year for communication focal points.
  • Asia and the Pacific
    • In Cambodia, H5N1 HPAI in poultry has been confirmed in 15 out of 25 provinces namely Battambang, Kampong Chhnang, Kampong Chhnang, Kampong Speu, Kampot, Kandal, Kratie, Oddar Meanchey, Preah Sihanouk, Prey Veng, Pursat, Siem Reap, Svay Rieng, Takeo and Tboung Khmum provinces [link] while 17 cases of human infections with influenza A (H5N1) virus were confirmed this year, with the latest reported on 16 October [link], H5N1 clade 1.2.3.2e virus has been confirmed in some of these cases [link]. FAO ECTAD Cambodia is collaborating with National Animal Health and Production Institute (NAHPRI) / General Directorate of Animal Health and Production (GDAHP) and Institute du Pasteur Cambodge (IPC) to support the Cambodian Government.
    • FAO signed a Letter of Intent (LOI) with the Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department (AFCD) of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China to strengthen knowledge exchanges, to achieve common objectives such as One Health approach, prevention and control of transboundary animal diseases especially avian influenza and African Swine Fever, reducing the need for antimicrobials on farms, enhance capacity development, as well as to promote regional co-operation.
    • In Indonesia, recent detections of avian influenza viruses in poultry farms and live bird markets show continued dominance of HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.2.1g and LPAI H9N2 clades B4.5 and B4.7. Genetic reassortment has been identified in the internal genes (PB2, PB1, PA, MP, NS) of H5N1 clade 2.3.2.1g viruses, with PB2 and MP genes likely originating from LPAI H9N2, and PB1, PA, and NS genes from other LPAI subtypes such as H11N9, H7N3, H7N7, and H6N8, while the NP gene remains unchanged. The current HPAI H5N1 challenge strain (A/chicken/Semarang/ 04141225-7/2014/H5N1) and vaccine strain (A/chicken/Tanggamus/031711076-65/2017/H5N1) remain effective against circulating viruses, however, updating the challenge strain is recommended to better match the prevailing HPAI clade 2.3.2.1g. According to the regular Avian Influenza situation report [link] based on the passive reporting in Indonesia’s national animal health and production information system ISIKHNAS; in September, a HPAI outbreak was confirmed in chickens in Kampar Regency, Riau Province. [link]
    • FAO ECTAD Indonesia provided technical assistance to the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture in conducting National Avian Influenza Simulation Exercise with cross sectoral ministries and agencies from 24-26 September 2025 in Jakarta. This tabletop exercise aimed to assess the national preparedness and response capacity for Avian Influenza using Preparedness and Resilience for Emerging Threats (PRET) frameworks, identify strengths, lesson learned, gaps, and areas for improvement in emergency coordination, surveillance, response across the human, animal, and environmental health sectors, and to facilitate cross-sectoral learning for improved collaboration in pandemic-prone zoonotic. In addition, a similar tabletop exercise at the sub-national level involving eight provinces, was conducted from 9 to 10 September.
    • FAO ECTAD Indonesia is providing technical support on Integrated Avian Influenza Surveillance. In Deli Serdang Regency, North Sumatera Province, a cross-sectoral pilot integrated surveillance in the districts using a One Health approach from 22 to 25 September, to enhance early warning systems for zoonotic influenza in high-risk areas through cross-sector collaboration. FAO presented Joint Outbreak Investigation (JOIN) tool, supported the development of avian influenza surveillance design, utilizing surveillance data to develop action plan, to improve the effectiveness of avian influenza prevention and control measures. In Surakarta City, Central Java and Bekasi District, West Java, FAO supported the cross-sectoral ministries on review and evaluation of the integrated surveillance implementation from 22 to 24 September focused on the findings from the surveillance implementation, including sample collection in live bird markets and poultry slaughterhouses, laboratory testing, and lessons learned from the implementation of the integrated avian influenza surveillance. The initial evaluation will be a baseline to enrich the comprehensive evaluation after the completion of all piloting activities in five districts/cities.
    • FAO ECTAD Indonesia organized a Bioinformatics Analysis Workshop on 20–21 October 2025, focusing on priority animal diseases such as Avian Influenza and African Swine Fever. The workshop brings together representatives from animal health laboratories, including the Disease Investigation Centers, to strengthen their capacity in using bioinformatics tools such as MEGA and UGENE for sequence alignment and phylogenetic analysis. The main objective is to update existing phylogenetic trees to better understand the evolution and genetic diversity of circulating pathogens in Indonesia. Through this activity, participants are expected to produce updated data that illustrate the spread, evolution, and genetic variation patterns more comprehensively. They also practice summarizing analytical results, exporting trees, and preparing figures for reports or publications, as well as uploading sequence data to the Integrated Virus Monitoring (IVM) online platform for further analysis.
    • OFFLU Scientist from FAO participated in the WHO Consultation on the Composition of Influenza Virus Vaccines for Use in the 2026 Southern Hemisphere Influenza Season was held in Hokkaido, Japan in September 2025.
    • In Lao People's Democratic Republic, FAO has been actively collaborating with national counterparts on avian influenza preparedness and response. Most recently, FAO participated and made a presentation at an event held on 14–15 October 2025 in Xekong Province. The event aimed to disseminate the revised Joint National and Contingency Plan for Zoonotic Influenza in Lao PDR and to strengthen coordination between the human and animal health sectors, along with other relevant agencies. It also served to clarify the roles and responsibilities of each sector in preparing for and responding to zoonotic influenza, and included a tabletop exercise to assess the effectiveness of coordination and collaboration in the event of an outbreak.
    • FAO ECTAD Nepal conducted a series of biosecurity trainings targeting small and medium holder poultry farmers through the pandemic fund project. From June to October 2025, 598 poultry farmers were trained focusing on biosecurity measures on the farms including awareness on major poultry diseases such as avian influenza. Farmers were also provided with the biosecurity kits, a manual on biosecurity and a brochure on avian influenza.
    • FAO Subregional Office for the Pacific Islands (SAP) will conduct a poultry value chain assessment in the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) during the second week of November 2025. As part of the mission, avian influenza awareness-raising and preparedness training will be provided to relevant stakeholders.
    • FAO Viet Nam collaborates with Department of Animal Health and Production to expand Farmer School Community (FSC) in Thai Nguyen and Bac Giang provinces. Developed using Farmer Field School (FFS) concept, FSC is a group of farmers with similar production conditions to learn, share experiences, and apply good farming practices towards prudent use of antibiotics. FSC goal is to reduce poultry diseases, increased farmers income, and reduce antimicrobial use.
  • Europe and Central Asia
    • A meeting of the Standing Group of Experts (SGE) under GF-TADs took place in September 2025 in Serbia. Presentations on avian influenza available HERE [France, the Netherlands, Serbia, WHO].

FAO Alerts
  • On 14 September 2022, FAO issued an alert to Chief Veterinary Officers and FAO offices in Central America and South America regions on the risk of introduction and spread of H5NX HPAI [in EnglishFrench, and Spanish].
  • On 8 April 2022, FAO issued an alert to Chief Veterinary Officers and FAO offices in Asia and the Pacific Region on the risk of a surge and spread of HPAI through increased poultry trade prior to and during Traditional New Year festivities in Asia.
  • On 4 March 2022, FAO an alert to Chief Veterinary Officers and FAO offices in the Americas Region on the risk of introduction and spread of H5NX HPAI [in English, French, and Spanish].
  • On 18 February 2022, FAO issued an alert to Chief Veterinary Officers, FAO offices, and wild bird partner organizations on the increased risk of HPAI outbreaks in wild bird populations in Africa.
  • On 29 October 2021, FAO sent an alert message on the risk of H5Nx HPAI (re-)introduction along migratory flyways to Chief Veterinary Officers globally.
  • On 13 November 2020, FAO sent an alert message on the risk of H5Nx HPAI re-introduction to Chief Veterinary Officers and FAO offices of at-risk countries in Africa region.
  • On 09 October 2020, FAO sent an alert message on the risk of H5N8 HPAI re-introduction to Chief Veterinary Officers of at-risk countries in Europe, Middle East, and Western and Central Asia regions.
  • On 17 January 2020, FAO released an alert on H5N8 HPAI in Eastern Europe to warn the Chief Veterinary Officers and FAO offices about the potential spread of the disease and advise on measures to take for prevention and control.
OFFLU
  • Information on the OFFLU avian influenza matching pilot project. [link]
  • OFFLU held an online discussion on 5 December 2022 to discuss the avian influenza situation in poultry and wild birds for experts to share experiences on the most recent wave of outbreaks in different countries. A summary is available. [link]
  • The OFFLU published reports for the Vaccine Composition Meeting on avian influenza and swine influenza for February – September 2022.
  • The Tripartite (FAO- WHO -WOAH) together with the WOAH/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza (OFFLU) has conducted a joint rapid risk assessment addressing the recent influenza A(H3N8) human infection in China in May 2022. [link]
  • The OFFLU annual report for 2021 is now available. [link]
  • Avian influenza report of the WOAH/FAO Network of expertise on animal influenzas (OFFLU) covering the period September 2021 – February 2022. [link]
  • The OFFLU Network issued a statement on 24 December 2021 addressing the recent introduction of H5N1 HPAI in Canada. [link]
  • The OFFLU network issued an avian influenza statement on 10 November 2021 addressing recent H5Nx high pathogenicity avian influenza virus reassortments. [link]
  • The OFFLU Network issued the summary of the OFFLU call for avian influenza global situation held on 8 November 2021. [link]
  • Avian influenza report of the OIE/FAO Network of expertise on animal influenzas (OFFLU) covering the period March – September 202. [link]
  • As part of the OIE/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenzas, FAO attended the Zoonotic Influenza Sessions of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting held from 2 to 4 March 2021. The report is now available online. [link]
  • On 26 February 2021, the OFFLU issued a statement on High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza in the Russian Federation relating to its detection in poultry workers. [link]
  • On 26 October 2020, the OFFLU issued a report on Highl Pathogenicity Avian Influenza in Kazakhstan describing the genetic characteristics of the latest H5N8 HPAI viruses detected recently in the country. [link]
WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting (VCM)
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – February 2023. [link]
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – September 2022. [link]
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – February 2022. [link]
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – September 2021. [link]
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – February 2021. [link]
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – Sept/Oct 2020. [link]
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – February 2018. [link]
Global level
  • International Alliance for Biological Standardization (IABS) held a meeting on 25-26 October 2022 addressing High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Vaccination Strategies to prevent and control HPAI: Removing unnecessary barriers for usage. Conclusions and recommendations are now available. [link]
Regional/country level

America

  • FAO organized a webinar on HPAI laboratory testing, under the framework of the GF-TADs and ‘Ask the experts’ for animal health laboratory staff in the region in March 2023. [link]
  • Between 21 and 23 March 2023, FAO held a meeting in Santiago, Chile with the participation of the heads of official veterinary services from 8 Latin American countries that are part of the TCP project, as well as specialists, discussed the epidemiological situation of HPAI in their territories and the control measures implemented.
  • The GF-TADs for the Americas hosted a technical meeting on HPAI vaccination: Approach, tools, knowledge and experience for the Americas held virtually in March 2023. [link]
  • The first virtual meeting of the Standing Group of Experts on Avian Influenza (SGE-IA) took place online on 14 December 2022. Recommendations from this meeting can be found here. [link]
  • FAO’s emergency Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) project provides support to manage the outbreak of avian influenza in the region, as well as its impact on the most vulnerable households in the affected countries.
  • FAO collated risk communication materials available at FAO in other regions globally and shared with FAO RLC.
  • The first virtual meeting of the Standing Group of Experts on Avian Influenza (SGE-IA) took place in December 2022. Recommendations available [link] Dec 2022.
  • FAO activated coordination and response protocols for the avian influenza outbreaks in the region. [link]
  • FAO conducted a qualitative risk assessment for introduction of the H5N1 HPAI clade 2.3.4.4b virus from currently known infected countries in the Americas has been conducted.
  • FAO is monitoring the situation closely through its network of decentralized offices and Reference Centers for Influenza to maintain close communication with members in Latin America and the Caribbean providing technical assistance and support as well as risk communication strategies and collaborating with resource partners to enhance preparedness and control of AI in the region. [link]

Asia

  • FAO participated to the 7th World One Health Congress held on 8-11 November 2022 and presented preliminary results of the Qualitative Risk Assessment addressing H5 HPAI risk of introduction in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. [link]
  • International Alliance for Biological Standardization (IABS) held a meeting on 25-26 October 2022 addressing High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Vaccination Strategies to prevent and control HPAI: Removing unnecessary barriers for usage. Conclusions and recommendations are now available [link].
  • FAO ECTAD RAP organized a quarterly coordination call on 16 February 2023 with ECTAD countries in Asia to discuss progresses and challenges around avian influenza surveillance in the region.
  • FAO RAP organized a quarterly coordination call on 8 December 2022 with ECTAD countries in Asia to discuss progresses and challenges around avian influenza surveillance in the region.
  • The FAO-ECTAD Team in Viet Nam prepared a report entitled Economic analysis of enhanced biosecurity practices in three types of chicken farms in Northern Viet Nam [link].
  • FAO RAP organized a regional Avian Influenza virtual meeting in November 2021. A summary can be found [link].
  • FAO ECTAD RAP organized a quarterly coordination call on 16 February 2023 with ECTAD countries in Asia to discuss progresses and challenges around avian influenza surveillance in the region.
  • FAO ECTAD RAP and IPC developed practical guidelines for field sequencing using MinIon.
  • FAO ECTAD Indonesia held a Joint Risk Assessment (JRA) training on zoonotic priority diseases in West Java Province and in West Kalimantan Province.
  • FAO ECTAD Cambodia organized AI surveillance review to share data from AI surveillance implementing partners, i.e. the results of AI surveillance in live bird markets, influenza-like illness (ILI) and severe acute respiratory infections (SARI) carried from 2020-2022 by CCDC, FAO, IPC, NAHPRI, NIPH and USCDC, to understand the challenges, lesson-learnt, and to do the AI surveillance resource mapping.
  • FAO ECTAD Lao organized a refresher training on avian influenza surveillance and response in Louangprabang Province with participants from various partners i.e. provincial livestock and fisheries section involved in the avian influenza surveillance, Central Veterinary Services and laboratory, Division of Veterinary Legislation, public health sector including the Department of Communicable Disease Control, Information Education and Communication Department, and other development partners namely US CDC, WHO, Wildlife Conservation Society.
  • FAO ECTAD Viet Nam organized a joint risk assessment (JRA) workshop for H5N6 (Dong Nai Province) and H5N8 (Lang Son Province).
  • FAO RAP organized a regional Avian Influenza virtual meeting in November 2021 [report].

North Africa and Middle East

  • FAO ECTAD Egypt and General Organization for Veterinary Services (GOVS) epidemiology unit updated the AI surveillance plan for January – December 2023 based on surveillance finding and risk mapping in 2022.
  • FAO organized a workshop on Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Libya [link].

Sub-Saharan Africa

  • FAO ECTAD assisted Gambia sending samples to the reference laboratory (IZSVe-Italy) for sequencing. H5N1 2.3.4.4b was detected and the phylogenetic analyses confirmed that the H5N1 virus clusters with genotype BB recently detected in northern Italy in June 2023, suggesting a possible back-and-forth movement of viruses between Europe and Africa.
  • FAO Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal Diseases (ECTAD) regional offices in Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) and West and Central Africa (WCA) organized 5 day regional training courses on Infectious Substances Shipment in Nairobi (June), Abidjan (July), Abuja (August). A total of 32 particpants from 13 countries successfully completed the training and were certified to ship infectious substances by air, in compliance with the applicable international regulations.
  • FAO Ethiopia in collaboration with the Ethiopian Agricultural Research Institute has prepared a biosecurity brochure covering three key areas - conceptual, structural, and operational biosecurity measures. The brochure provides guidance to small and medium commercial poultry farms on implementing effective biosecurity measures for increased productivity, and a more sustainable and profitable industry, and is aimed to be used by Farmers Field School (FFS).
  • In Kenya, FAO is supporting Kenya Animal Biosurveillance system (KABS) disease reporting platform roll-out for syndromic surveillance and the refresher trainings.
  • FAO Burkina Faso trained 175 staff on HPAI epidemiological surveillance; conducted Training of Trainers (ToT) course on on good poultry farming practices, hygiene and biosecurity measures on farms; the 46 trainers conducted sensitization of 300 model poultry farmers from 10 regions, and also 30 communicators and journalists of the press on HPAI under TCP project.
  • In Togo, FAO is supported HPAI outbreak response by providing technical assistance and supporting field outbreak investigation missions. A training of 25 agents on disease reporting / early warning using FAO Event Mobile Application (EMA-i) takes place soon.
  • FAO Emergency Management Center (EMC-AH) expert mission in May 2023 visited Saint-Louis as a part of support to control HPAI emergency.
  • FAO ECTAD Côte d’Ivoire supported the disinfection of poultry markets in Abidjan.
  • FAO EMC-AH conducted field mission in Gabon from 4 to 8 July 2022 in response to the recent H5N1 HPAI outbreaks in Estuaire Province.
  • FAO ECTAD continues supporting annual proficiency testing schemes of national and sub-national level laboratories for AI diagnosis in Central East, and West Africam countries through USAID funded GHSA programme.
  • FAO ECTAD West and Central Africa Region, in collaboration with EMC-AH, supported the Government of Guinea to undertake a HPAI risk assessment mission to identify risk factors for introduction and spread.
  • FAO participated in the 2nd virtual meeting of Regional Incident Coordination Group (ICG) for West Africa on HPAI organized by FAO ECTAD-WCA in collaboration with ECOWAS Regional Animal Health Centre (RAHC) held in March 2022.
  • Taking stock of FAO-USAID partnership to control health threats in Kenya [link].
  • Stopping Avian Influenza in Togo [link].

 

Figure 1. Number of countries reported HPAI since 1 October 2025 by subtype (left) and by region (right) as of 21 October 2025 (territory/area or sub/Antarctic zone)

Source: WOAH WAHIS portal, government and publications.

Table 3. Epidemiological overview for avian influenza viruses viruses known to have caused zoonotic infections in the past 20 years

Subtype

Epidemiological situation overview

H5Nx Gs/GD HPAI (1996)

High pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) of the H5N1 subtype were detected in geese in Guangdong Province, China in 1996. Viruses related to but not directly descended from A/Goose/Guangdong/1/96 (Gs/GD), the virus identified in China at the time have persisted, as high pathogenicity viruses Gs/GD-related HPAIVs have caused outbreaks in poultry across all regions globally other than Oceania. The initial viruses in this lineage were of the A(H5N1) subtype but other subtypes (including H5N2, H5N3 H5N5, H5N6, H5N8) have emerged, mainly in the past 10 years, as a result of reassortment with other avian influenza viruses. The common feature of these viruses is an HA gene related back to the original Gs/GD/96 virus. The HA gene of these viruses has evolved over the past 28 years, initially into 10 clades (clade 0 to 9) of which descendents of clade 2 viruses are the only ones that continue to circulate. Multiple 5th order clades persist such as the one that is currently dominant globally – clade 2.3.4.4b - whereas others have emerged and disappeared.

Multiple genotypes carrying different combinations of the eight influenza A segmented genes have emerged in Gs/GD-related viruses, as a result of co-infection of birds with different avian influenza viruses that facilitated reassortment. Of considerable significance in the past has been reassortment with enzootic A(H9N2) viruses.

Eurasian lineage clade 2.3.4.4b viruses formed multiple genotypes and those that crossed to North America have reassorted with North American wild bird avian influenza viruses to produced additional genotypes. Two separate systems for naming genotypes of clade 2.3.4.4b have been developed for Eurasian and North American viruses (Fusaro, et al., 2024, Youk, et al., 2023). The clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1) viruses detected in dairy cattle in North America in 2024 fell initially within genotype B3.13 [link] and more recently genotype D1.1 [link] using the North American naming system.

Some Gs/GD-related viruses have produced severe zoonotic infections in humans, first identified in 1997 when an A(H5N1) clade 0 virus in Hong Kong SAR, China caused disease outbreaks in poultry in farms and markets as well as severe disease in humans. In several cases there was some evidence of limited onward transmission in humans and this event raised concerns that it might be the beginning of a human influenza pandemic. Despite the successful efforts to eradicate this particular strain, other Gs/GD-related viruses persisted and evolved in China, becoming more adept at infecting domestic ducks. By 2003 spread of these viruses via wild birds and live bird trade occurred across East and Southeast Asia, resulting in additional zoonotic infection in humans [link].

The important role of wild birds in the transmission of these viruses over long distances became apparent in 2005 when Gs/GD-related HPAIVs (clade 2.2) spread, primarily via wild birds, across Eurasia, and parts of Africa from western China. Most high-income countries eliminated this virus from poultry, but it persisted in several low and middle- income countries. Gs/GD-related viruses continued to evolve and spread. Additional intercontinental waves of transmission have occurred with the two most significant being those in 2014 (clade 2.3.4.4c) and from 2016 onwards (clade 2.3.4.4b). The clade 2.3.4.4b wave commenced in Asia and spread to Europe and Africa. In 2020, that also resulted in spread of these viruses to North America (2014-15 and 2021-22), with the latest outbreak extending through central and South America and to sub-Antarctic islands. In 2022/2023, H5N1 2.3.4.4b caused extensive infection in coastal seabirds and mass die-offs of numerous ecologically important wild bird species.

Since 2024, H5N1 2.3.4.4b caused infection in goats (1 farm), alpaca (1 backyard farm), swine (1 farm) and dairy cattle (1 081 farms as of 22 October 2025) in the United States of America, see HERE.

In 2025, H5N1 2.3.4.4b caused infection in sheep in the United Kingdom, see HERE; and H5 antibodies were also found in sheep in Norway. [link1, link2]

Clade 2.3.4.4b A (H5N1) viruses have caused few human cases but have resulted in multiple mammalian cases including aquatic mammals.

For an updated list of bird and mammalian species affected with A(H5Nx) see HERE.

Among the other Gs/GD-related virus clades that remain endemic in specific areas are clade 2.3.2.1a H5N1 viruses that have persisted in South Asia since 2010 and rarely associated with disease in humans.

Clade 2.3.2.1g viruses have been present in Indonesia since 2012 and clade 2.3.2.1c/e viruses are still circulating in Cambodia, Viet Nam and Lao People’s Democratic Republic. A novel reassortant influenza A(H5N1) virus has been detected in poultry in Cambodia (since 2023), Lao People's Democratic Republic and Viet Nam (since 2022) and was also detected in the human cases reported from Cambodia since late 2023 and Viet Nam in 2024. This virus contains the surface proteins from clade 2.3.2.1c that has circulated locally, but internal genes from a more recent clade 2.3.4.4b virus. [link]

For an updated list of confirmed human cases with A(H5N1) see HERE and HERE.

In addition, 91 human cases have been associated with clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5Nx/y) and 2.3.4.4h A(H5N6) viruses with most of these occurring in 2021 and 2022.

Avian origin H3N8 LPAI

An Influenza A(H3N8) virus lineage emerged in live bird markets in southern China in mid-2021. Since then, three human cases of Influenza A(H3N8) have been reported: In April 2022, the first human clinical case associated with this lineage was reported in Henan Province, China and was associated with severe disease [link]. In May 2022, a 5-year-old boy was diagnosed with a mild influenza A(H3N8) infection in Changsha City, Hunan Province, China. On 27 March 2023, a third human case was reported from Guangdong Province, China in a 56-year-old female with underlying illness who subsequently died.

One of the A(H3N8) viruses isolated from a human was found to be transmissible by air in ferrets [link] but no evidence of sustained human transmission has been reported.

H7N4 LPAI (2017)

One human case in China with reported exposure to poultry. [link]

H7N9 LPAI (2013) & HPAI (2017)

Reported only in China with over 1 000 human cases between 2013 and 2017 with a marked increase in 2017 compared to previous waves.

Most human cases exposed in live bird markets.

Nation-wide vaccination campaign in poultry since Sep 2017: Last reported human case in 2019 [link]. See FAO H7N9 situation update Figure 5.

H9N2 LPAI

First human case reported in 1998.

To date, more than 140 influenza A(H9N2) human cases diagnosed worldwide, many of them were reported from China since December 2015. Most cases mild and involving children. Only two fatal cases reported. [link]

Endemic in multiple countries in Africa and Asia, a cause of significant production losses and mortalities in poultry production systems.

Three major lineages and multiple genotypes.

H10Nx LPAI

To date, three influenza A(H10N3) human infections have been reported globally [link]. In May 2021, the first case in Jiangsu Province, China [link], then in Zhejiang (2022), Yunnan and Guangxi (2024) and Shaanxi (2025) provinces in China.

The first influenza A(H10N5) human infection was reported in Zhejiang Province, China [link].
Influenza A(H10N7) infection have been reported in humans in 2004 in Egypt [link] and in 2010 in Australia [link].

Since 2013, three influenza A(H10N8) human infections have been reported in Jiangxi Province, China. [link]

Recommendations for affected countries and those at risk

FAO recommends intensified surveillance and awareness raising by national authorities.

General recommendations
It is important to report sick or dead birds – both wild birds and poultry - or wild mammals to local authorities (veterinary services, public health officials, community leaders etc.). These should be tested for avian influenza viruses.

Recommendations to poultry producers
Farmers and poultry producers should step up their biosecurity measures in order to prevent potential virus introduction from wild birds or their faeces.

Recommendations to hunters
Hunting associations and wildlife authorities should be aware that avian influenza viruses might be present in waterfowl and some other species hunted and that hunting, handling and dressing of shot game carries the risk of spreading avian influenza viruses to susceptible poultry.

Recommendations to national authorities
Increase surveillance efforts for the early detection of influenza viruses in poultry and dead wild species including certain mammals.

For full recommendations including non-avian species please see [link].

FAO publication
EMPRES Watch/Focus On 
Online course/webinar
  • Avian Influenza Preparedness Course was held in April/May 2023 [link].
  • FAO RNE launched bilingual training course on Avian Influenza preparedness for NENA region on 17 January 2023 [link].
  • FAO through its Virtual Learning Center developed an Avian Influenza Preparedness Course in 2022 [link].
  • FAO, in collaboration with WOAH, organized a webinar on H5 HPAI occurrence and prevention in North Africa on 20 May 2021.
  • WHO developed an online training course entitled “Strengthening collaboration between human and animal health sectors for improved health security”. The course covers the Tripartite Zoonosis Guide and associated tools in Module 2 [link].
  • FAO held a webinar entitled Managing HPAI in wild birds on 10 February 2022 – recording part 1 & part 2.
  • FAO Webinar: Pros and cons on AI vaccination, presented by Leslie Sims, Ian Brown, Sergei Khomenko, Sophie von Dobschüetz (2018) [link].
  • FAO Webinar: Intercontinental spread of H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza – Analysis of the current situation and recommendations, for preventive action (2016) [link].
Risk Assessment
Joint Risk Assessment
Wild birds/mammals
Socio-economic / PPP
GF-TADs/Tripartite/Quadripartite plan, guide, tool
Other useful links

Next issue: 27 Nov 2025

The disease situation updates are produced by the FAO Emergency Prevention System for Animal Health (EMPRES-AH) as part of its mission to increase global disease intelligence.
Disclaimer

Information provided herein is current as of the date of issue. Information added or changed since the last Global AIV with Zoonotic Potential situation update appears in orange. Human cases are depicted in the geographic location of their report. For some cases, exposure may have occurred in one geographic location but reported in another. For cases with unknown onset date, reporting date was used instead. FAO compiles information drawn from multiple national (Ministries of Agriculture or Livestock, Ministries of Health, Provincial Government websites; Centers for Disease Prevention and Control [CDC]) and international sources (World Health Organization [WHO], World Organisation for Animal Health [WOAH]), as well as peer reviewed scientific articles. FAO makes every effort to ensure, but does not guarantee, accuracy, completeness or authenticity of the information. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these map(s) do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of FAO concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers and boundaries. Dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.

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