24 September 2026, 08:30 hours; Rome
This update covers avian influenza viruses (AIV) with zoonotic potential occurring worldwide, i.e. H5Nx, H7Nx high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) viruses and H3N8, H5Nx, H6N1, H7Nx, H9N2, H10Nx and H11 low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI).
Specific information is available for Avian Influenza A(H7N9) virus viruses and Sub-Saharan Africa HPAI in related FAO Avian Influenza situation updates.
HPAI outbreaks in animals officially reported since last update (27 August 2026): in total, 624 outbreaks / events have been reported in 25 countries/territories caused by H5Nx (544), H5N1 (75), H7N3 (1) and HxNx (4) (see Table 1 for details).
LPAI events in animals officially reported since the last update: 0 new events were reported.
Number of human cases officially reported since the last update: 3 new events were reported caused by H5N1 (1) and H9N2 (2). [ref1, ref2, ref3]
Map 1. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential observed since 1 October 2025 (i.e. current wave)

Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.
Notes: Refer to the disclaimer available on this webpage for the names and boundaries in this map. The final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. The final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Source: United Nations Geospatial. 2020. Map of the World. [Cited August 2026]. Modified with GLW 4 data and Emergency Prevention System Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i), WOAH and National Authorities data, 2025.
Map 2. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential* observed in the period 1 October 2024 to 30 September 2025 (i.e. previous wave)

Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.
Notes: Refer to the disclaimer available on this webpage for the names and boundaries in this map. Final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.
Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Source: United Nations Geospatial. 2020. Map of the World. [Cited October 2025]. Modified with GLW 4 data and Emergency Prevention System Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i), WOAH and National Authorities data, 2025.
October – December 2024

January – March 2025

April – June 2025

July – September 2025

Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.
Notes: Refer to the disclaimer available on this webpage for the names and boundaries in this map. Final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Source: United Nations Geospatial. 2020. Map of the World. [Cited October 2025]. Modified with GLW 4 data and Emergency Prevention System Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i), WOAH and National Authorities data, 2024.
Table 1. High pathogenicity avian influenza viruses with zoonotic potential reported since the last update
| Virus | Country/Area | Last observed outbreak | # events reported since the last update | Total # events reported since 1 Oct. 2025 |
Species affected since the last update |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
H5 |
Argentina |
14/09/2026 |
1 |
1 |
Chicken, duck |
Australia2 |
24/09/2026R |
369 |
640 |
Australasian Gannet, Australian Magpie, Australian Pelican, Australian Raven, Black Kite, Black-faced Cormorant, Brown Falcon, Brown Goshawk, Brown Skua, Common Myna, Fluttering Shearwater, Forest Raven, Great Pied Cormorant, Greater Crested Tern, Little Black Cormorant, Little Penguin, Little Raven, Pacific Gull, Peregrine Falcon, Raven sp., Shearwater sp., Shy Albatross, Silver Gull, Sooty Oystercatcher, Southern Boobook, Swamp Harrier, Tern sp., Wedge-tailed Shearwater, Whistling Kite, White-berried sea eagle, White-faced Storm-Petrel, White-fronted Tern; Australian fur seal, Australian sea lion, Common Bottlenose Dolphin, Common Dolphin, Dolphins, Long-nosed fur seal, Red Fox |
|
Finland |
12/08/2026 |
1 |
3 |
European pine marten |
|
Iceland |
29/04/2026 |
2 |
5 |
Common Raven, Pink-footed Goose |
|
The Philippines |
09/06/2026 |
1 |
3 |
Lowland white-eye, Yellow-vented bulbul |
|
Uruguay |
04/09/2026 |
1 |
1 |
Non-poultry birds |
|
United States of America7 |
10/09/2026R |
169 |
1 894 |
American white pelican, Bald eagle, Black vulture, Canada goose, Cinnamon teal, Gadwall, Golden eagle, Great horned owl, Hooded merganser, Mallard, Mute swan, Redhead duck, Red-tailed hawk, Sandhill crane, Trumpeter swan, Wood duck; Racoon |
|
H5N1 |
Bulgaria |
14/09/2026 |
2 |
20 |
Farmed mallard |
Canada |
09/09/2026 |
1 |
129 |
Turkey |
|
Chile |
31/08/2026 |
5 |
52 |
Non-poultry birds |
|
Denmark |
24/08/2026 |
1 |
263 |
Common Pheasant |
|
France |
07/09/2026 |
3 |
486 |
Duck |
|
Netherlands (Kingdom of the) |
20/08/2026 |
2 |
486 |
Greylag Goose, Mute Swan |
|
New Zealand |
12/08/2026 |
1 |
3 |
Northern Giant Petrel |
|
Nigeria |
02/08/2026 |
1 |
31 |
Poultry |
|
Norway |
04/09/2026 |
5 |
85 |
Greylag Goose, Mute Swan |
|
Peru |
31/08/2026 |
13 |
106 |
Chicken, Duck, Turkey, Non-poultry birds; Peruvian Pelican |
|
The Philippines9 |
15/09/2026 |
1 |
45 |
Eurasian Tree Sparrow, Pied triller, Zebra Dove |
|
South Africa |
08/06/2026 |
1 |
48 |
Greater Crested Tern |
|
Sweden |
26/08/2026 |
2 |
135 |
Greylag Goose, White-tailed Eagle |
|
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland6 |
Week 37 |
4 |
872 |
Herring Gull, Mallard |
|
United States of America7 |
21/09/2026R |
28 |
3 331 |
Commercial Breeder, Turkey, WOAH Poultry, WOAH Non Poultry; Canada goose, Mallard, Peregrine falcon, Wood duck; Cattle |
|
Viet Nam |
06/09/2026 |
5 |
115 |
Duck |
|
H7N3 |
Mexico |
08/07/2026 |
1 |
10 |
Plain Chachalaca |
HxNx |
Egypt |
1st semester |
2 |
2 |
Poultry |
Indonesia11 |
August 2026 |
1 |
22 |
Duck |
|
Suriname |
19/09/2026R |
1 |
1 |
Chicken |
Data was retrieved from WOAH WAHIS portal and Sharing other important animal health information with WOAH page [link], government websites. Data cutoff time: reported on 27 August 2026, 8:30 CEST. $:estimate. ‡: date of confirmation, R: reported date, §: counting Izumi Wintering Habitat of Cranes (Ramsar) as 1 event. Notes: Only those reporting events in animals since the last update are listed in the table. Codes: D:domestic, C:captivity, W:Wild birds, DF: Dairy farm, E:Environment, M: mammalian species other than humans. For more information, consult dedicated webpage of the: 1: British Antarctic Survey (BAS) [link], 2: Australian Government [link], 3: Canada Food and Inspection Agency [link], 4: TierSeuchenInformationsSystem - Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut [link], 5: Ministry of the Environment [link] 6: Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) [link], 7: USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA/APHIS) [link], 8: Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) [link], 9: The Philippines: Bureau of Animal Industry [link], 10: Brazil: Ministério da Agricultura e Pecuária [link], 11: Indonesia: Laporan Perkembangan Avian Influenza – HPAI [link]. 12: Chile SAG dashboard [link]. 13: Argentina Senasa [link]. 14: Veterinærinstitutte [link]. Bold: the first report of infection in the species. The full list of bird and mammalian species affected by H5Nx HPAI are here.
Domestic
Reassortment of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza as a Driver for Zoonotic Spillover, Asia. Emerg Infect Dis, 32(10). [reference]
Genetic Diversity of Clade 2.3.4.4b H5Nx High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Viruses Detected in Korea During the 2025-2026 Winter Season and Pathogenicity of H5N1 and H5N9 Viruses. Virus Res, 2026 Sep 22:199807. [reference]
Emergence of Novel Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus A(H5N1) Clade 2.3.4.4b in Commercial Poultry, Bangladesh. Influenza Other Respir Viruses, 20(9):e70324. [reference]
Role of biosecurity practices in antimicrobial use on commercial poultry farms: One health implications for AMR mitigation in Bangladesh. One Health, 23:101555. [reference]
H5N1 clade 2.3.2.1e lineage transition in Lao PDR during 2023-2024 associated with regional spread and human infection risk-associated receptor-binding features. Front Public Health, 14:1923867. [reference]
An outbreak of H7N7 high pathogenicity avian influenza in Victoria, Australia, in 2020. Aust Vet J, 2026 Sep 8. [reference]
Wild
Circulation of avian influenza viruses in migratory birds in Europe and in Africa: a systematic review. Emerg Microbes Infect, 15(1):2728774. [reference]
Genomic detection of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 in Antarctic seabirds reveals connectivity with South American viral lineages. Braz J Microbiol, 57(1):273. [reference]
Serological Evidence of Widespread Exposure to H5 Avian Influenza Virus in Arctic Foxes in Svalbard, Norway. BioRxiv, 2026.09.17.752278. [reference] Preprint
Emergence of novel highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza in slender-billed gulls (Chroicocephalus genei) and gull-billed terns (Gelochelidon nilotica) at Dukan Lake, Iraq. Open Vet J, 16(2):788-801. [reference]
The first high pathogenicity avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b incursions in the Hunter New England region, New South Wales, Australia, June-July 2026. Commun Dis Intell, 50. [reference]
Mammal
Experimental Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Clade 2.3.4.4b Virus Infection in Alpacas, 2026. Emerg Infect Dis, 32(10). [reference]
Viral community structure in New Zealand's aquatic birds is associated with scavenging behavior. Curr Biol, 2026 Sep 9:S0960-9822(26)01087-0. [reference]
Molecular Surveillance Finds No Influenza A Infection in Domestic Cats in Dhaka. Ecohealth, 2026 Sep 13. [reference]
Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) in domestic cats: epidemiology, clinical manifestations, and One Health implication. Vet Ital, 62(3). [reference]
H5N1 Clade 2.3.4.4b Infections in Domestic Cats During an Avian Influenza Outbreak in Italy: Implications for One Health Surveillance. Influenza Other Respir Viruses, 20(9):e70311. [reference]
Exposure of dogs to influenza A and B viruses. One Health, 23:101537. [reference]
Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses in mammals: host-range expansion and implications of milk-borne viral shedding. Clin Microbiol Rev, 2026 Aug 31:e0021126. [reference]
Dairy
Susceptibility of calves fed unpasteurized milk from cows infected with highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1. Nat Commun, 17(1):10036. [reference]
Trimester-dependent vertical transmission of H5N1 influenza virus through placental and mammary routes impairs offspring development. Nat Commun, 17(1):9968. [reference]
Bovine mammary tissues are susceptible to infection by viruses bearing panzootic H5N1 influenza A virus glycoproteins. J Gen Virol, 107(9):002338. [reference]
Virus
HA1-T138A and HA1-Q226L substitutions in H3N2 canine influenza virus contribute to binding to human-type alpha2,6-linked sialic acid receptors. Virology, 625:111071. [reference]
A Multi-Reassortant H3N8 Avian Influenza Virus Derived From Migratory Birds in Eastern China Exhibits Cross-Species Transmission Potential. Transbound Emerg Dis, 2026(1):e9889145. [reference]
Comprehensive pathological, immunohistochemical, and apoptotic analysis of the highly pathogenic avian influenza a virus H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b in poultry in Taiwan. Poult Sci, 105(12):107614. [reference]
Novel emerging reassortant H6 avian influenza viruses with internal genes from G57 genotype of H9N2 pose potential zoonotic risk. Emerg Microbes Infect, 15(1):2732846. [reference]
Genetic Diversity, Reassortment Patterns, and Antigenic Characterization of Two H9N2 Avian Influenza Viruses Isolated from Quails in China. Viruses, 18(8):919. [reference]
Genetic and Pathogenicity Studies of Avian Influenza (H9N2) Virus Isolated from Chickens in Jiangsu Province, China, in 2025. Microorganisms, 14(8):1667. [reference]
Molecular epidemiological characteristics of H9N2 subtype avian influenza virus in the external environment of western Zhejiang, China, 2014-2025. Front Public Health, 14:1839754. [reference]
Single-cell transcriptomic landscape of avian influenza H9N2 virus infection in human and chicken cells. Virology, 625:111070. [reference]
Re-emergence of H10N3 Avian Influenza Viruses in China: Evolutionary Dynamics and Emerging Zoonotic Risk. J Infect, 2026 Sep 7:106848. [reference]
Sampling & Assay
Water-Wheat-Wait: Monitoring wild mallards (Anas platyrhynchos) for avian influenza and ESBL-E. coli using feed-baited water bins, Germany, 2022 to 2023. One Health, 23:101548. [reference]
Evaluating sampling strategies for the detection of avian influenza viruses in the environment. Virology, 625:111069. [reference]
Divergent avian strains drive an off-season influenza A peak in municipal wastewater. Microbiol Spectr, 2026 Sep 8:e0202726. [reference]
Tradeoffs between targeted and expanded testing strategies for influenza A(H5N1). ASM Case Rep, 2(5):e00053-26. [reference]
Quadruplex real-time RT-qPCR for simultaneous detection and subtyping of avian influenza viruses and avian coronaviruses. Poult Sci, 105(12):107732. [reference]
Development and Analytical Validation of a Multiplex Real-Time RT-PCR Assay for Simultaneous Detection of Avian Influenza A Virus and Newcastle Disease Virus. Pathogens, 15(8):802. [reference]
An interface-engineered signal-on electrochemical aptasensor for H5N2 avian influenza virus detection. Analyst, 2026 Sep 8. [reference]
Assessment
Using high frequency GPS data to assess wintering goose proximity to commercial poultry facilities on the Delmarva peninsula for avian influenza risk management and surveillance. PLoS One, 21(9):e0355415. [reference]
Spatiotemporal clustering of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 at the wild waterfowl-poultry interface: Vector-specific spillover risks in the U.S., 2022-2025. PLoS One, 21(9):e0345354. [reference]
Production-Type-Specific Spatial and Space-Time Clustering of High-Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Outbreaks in Layer and Duck Farms in the Republic of Korea, 2020-2026. Animals (Basel), 16(16):2543. [reference]
District-Level Risk Mapping of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Poultry in Kazakhstan Using a Multi-Criteria Decision Model. Pathogens, 15(8):796. [reference]
Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices Related to Avian Influenza Among Poultry Workers in Cambodia. Influenza Other Respir Viruses, 20(9):e70321. [reference]
Lessons learnt & Overview
Lessons Learned During the 2024-2025 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus Outbreak Response in the United States: The Experience of State and Local Public Health Departments. Am J Public Health, 2026 Sep 3:e1-e7. [reference]
From fragmentation to coordination: strengthening One Health research to support H5N1 preparedness in Cambodia. IJID Reg, 20:100967. [reference]
Surveillance without silos: a One Health data imperative for avian influenza in West Africa. Front Cell Infect Microbiol, 16:1927565. [reference]
Respiratory pandemic risk in the Anthropocene: A One Health framework and GISRS+ agenda. One Health, 23:101553. [reference]
America
Asia
North Africa and Middle East
Sub-Saharan Africa
Figure 1. Number of countries reported HPAI since 1 October 2025 by subtype (left) and by region (right) as of 21 September 2026

Source: WOAH WAHIS portal, government and publications.
Table 2. Epidemiological overview for avian influenza viruses viruses known to have caused zoonotic infections in the past 20 years
Subtype | Epidemiological situation overview |
|---|---|
H5Nx Gs/GD HPAI (1996) | High pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) of the H5N1 subtype were detected in geese in Guangdong Province, China in 1996. Viruses related to but not directly descended from A/Goose/Guangdong/1/96 (Gs/GD), the virus identified in China at the time have persisted, as high pathogenicity viruses Gs/GD-related HPAIVs have caused outbreaks in poultry across all regions globally other than Oceania. The initial viruses in this lineage were of the A(H5N1) subtype but other subtypes (including H5N2, H5N3 H5N5, H5N6, H5N8) have emerged, mainly in the past 10 years, as a result of reassortment with other avian influenza viruses. The common feature of these viruses is an HA gene related back to the original Gs/GD/96 virus. The HA gene of these viruses has evolved over the past 28 years, initially into 10 clades (clade 0 to 9) of which descendents of clade 2 viruses are the only ones that continue to circulate. Multiple 5th order clades persist such as the one that is currently dominant globally – clade 2.3.4.4b - whereas others have emerged and disappeared. Multiple genotypes carrying different combinations of the eight influenza A segmented genes have emerged in Gs/GD-related viruses, as a result of co-infection of birds with different avian influenza viruses that facilitated reassortment. Of considerable significance in the past has been reassortment with enzootic A(H9N2) viruses. Eurasian lineage clade 2.3.4.4b viruses formed multiple genotypes and those that crossed to North America have reassorted with North American wild bird avian influenza viruses to produced additional genotypes. Two separate systems for naming genotypes of clade 2.3.4.4b have been developed for Eurasian and North American viruses (Fusaro, et al., 2024, Youk, et al., 2023). The clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1) viruses detected in dairy cattle in North America in 2024 fell initially within genotype B3.13 [link] and more recently genotype D1.1 [link] using the North American naming system. Some Gs/GD-related viruses have produced severe zoonotic infections in humans, first identified in 1997 when an A(H5N1) clade 0 virus in Hong Kong SAR, China caused disease outbreaks in poultry in farms and markets as well as severe disease in humans. In several cases there was some evidence of limited onward transmission in humans and this event raised concerns that it might be the beginning of a human influenza pandemic. Despite the successful efforts to eradicate this particular strain, other Gs/GD-related viruses persisted and evolved in China, becoming more adept at infecting domestic ducks. By 2003 spread of these viruses via wild birds and live bird trade occurred across East and Southeast Asia, resulting in additional zoonotic infection in humans [link]. The important role of wild birds in the transmission of these viruses over long distances became apparent in 2005 when Gs/GD-related HPAIVs (clade 2.2) spread, primarily via wild birds, across Eurasia, and parts of Africa from western China. Most high-income countries eliminated this virus from poultry, but it persisted in several low and middle- income countries. Gs/GD-related viruses continued to evolve and spread. Additional intercontinental waves of transmission have occurred with the two most significant being those in 2014 (clade 2.3.4.4c) and from 2016 onwards (clade 2.3.4.4b). The clade 2.3.4.4b wave commenced in Asia and spread to Europe and Africa. In 2020, that also resulted in spread of these viruses to North America (2014-15 and 2021-22), with the latest outbreak extending through central and South America and to sub-Antarctic islands. In 2022/2023, H5N1 2.3.4.4b caused extensive infection in coastal seabirds and mass die-offs of numerous ecologically important wild bird species. . In 2026, H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b virus reached Australia and New Zealand, with evidence suggesting introduction through migratory wild birds originating from sub‑Antarctic/Antarctic zones. Since 2024, H5N1 2.3.4.4b caused infection in goats (1 farm), alpaca (1 backyard farm), swine (1 farm) and dairy cattle (1 177 farms in 20 states, as of 23 September 2026) in the United States of America, see HERE. In 2025, H5N1 2.3.4.4b caused infection in sheep in the United Kingdom, see HERE; and H5 antibodies were also found in sheep in Norway. [link1, link2] Clade 2.3.4.4b A (H5N1) viruses have caused few human cases but have resulted in multiple mammalian cases including aquatic mammals. For an updated list of bird and mammalian species affected with A(H5Nx) see HERE. Among the other Gs/GD-related virus clades that remain endemic in specific areas are clade 2.3.2.1a H5N1 viruses that have persisted in South Asia since 2010 and rarely associated with disease in humans. Clade 2.3.2.1g viruses have been present in Indonesia since 2012 and clade 2.3.2.1c/e viruses are still circulating in Cambodia, Viet Nam and Lao People’s Democratic Republic. A novel reassortant influenza A(H5N1) virus has been detected in poultry in Cambodia (since 2023), Lao People's Democratic Republic and Viet Nam (since 2022) and was also detected in the human cases reported from Cambodia since late 2023 and Viet Nam in 2024. This virus contains the surface proteins from clade 2.3.2.1c that has circulated locally, but internal genes from a more recent clade 2.3.4.4b virus. [link] For an updated list of confirmed human cases with A(H5N1) see HERE and HERE. In addition, since the first human case of A(H5N6) was reported in Sichuan, China in 2014, 94 human cases have been associated with clade 2.3.4.4b and 2.3.4.4h A(H5N6) viruses with most of these occurring in 2021 and 2022 [link]. The first human cases (asymptomatic) of A(H5N8) were reported in Astrakhan Oblast, Russian Federation [link] in adults who engaged in depopulation on a layer farm due to H5N8 HPAI in December 2020 [link]. The influenza A(H5N8) viruses isolated from this poultry outbreak in Astrakhan belonged to clade 2.3.4.4b [GISAID EPI_ISL_1038924]; the first human case (fatal) of A(H5N5) was reported in November 2025 in the United States of America with reported exposure to poultry. [link] |
| Avian origin H3N8 LPAI | An Influenza A(H3N8) virus lineage emerged in live bird markets in southern China in mid-2021. Since then, three human cases of Influenza A(H3N8) have been reported: In April 2022, the first human clinical case associated with this lineage was reported in Henan Province, China and was associated with severe disease [link]. In May 2022, a 5-year-old boy was diagnosed with a mild influenza A(H3N8) infection in Changsha City, Hunan Province, China. On 27 March 2023, a third human case was reported from Guangdong Province, China in a 56-year-old female with underlying illness who subsequently died. One of the A(H3N8) viruses isolated from a human was found to be transmissible by air in ferrets [link] but no evidence of sustained human transmission has been reported. |
H5N5 HPAI (2025) | One human case in China with reported exposure to poultry. [link] |
H7N4 LPAI (2017) | The first human case (fatal) was reported in November 2025 in the United States of America with reported exposure to poultry. [link] |
H7N7 LPAI | One human case of H7N7 was reported in a duck farmer in Taiwan Province of China. More than 90 cases have been reported since 1959, mostly mild with one fatal case. [link] |
H7N9 LPAI (2013) & HPAI (2017) | Reported only in China with over 1 000 human cases between 2013 and 2017 with a marked increase in 2017 compared to previous waves. Most human cases exposed in live bird markets. Nation-wide vaccination campaign in poultry since Sep 2017: Last reported human case in 2019 [link]. See FAO H7N9 situation update Figure 5. |
| H9N2 LPAI | First human case reported in 1998. To date, 181 influenza A(H9N2) human cases diagnosed worldwide, many of them were reported from China since December 2015. Most cases mild and involving children. Only two fatal cases reported. [link] Endemic in multiple countries in Africa and Asia, a cause of significant production losses and mortalities in poultry production systems. Three major lineages and multiple genotypes. |
| H10Nx LPAI | To date, seven influenza A(H10N3) human infections have been reported globally [link]. In May 2021, the first case in Jiangsu Province, China [link], then in Zhejiang (2022), Yunnan and Guangxi (2024) and Shaanxi and Guangdong (2025) provinces in China. The first influenza A(H10N5) human infection was reported in Zhejiang Province, China [link]. Since 2013, three influenza A(H10N8) human infections have been reported in Jiangxi Province, China. [link] |
For high-level, the recommendations from the FAO Global Dialogue - Tackling high pathogenicity avian influenza together provide a clear framework for coordinated science-based actions on Early detection, Rapid response, Biosecurity, Vaccination, Business and trade dimensions, One Health and systems-based approaches, Public-private partnerships.
For grass root level. the practical recommendations for day-to-day activities are suggested below to mitigate risk and reduce impact of HPAI.
General recommendations
It is important to report sick or dead birds – both wild birds and poultry - or wild mammals to local authorities (veterinary services, public health officials, community leaders etc.). These should be tested for avian
influenza viruses.
Recommendations to poultry producers
Farmers and poultry producers should step up their biosecurity measures in order to prevent potential virus introduction from wild birds or their faeces.
For full recommendations including non-avian species please see [link].
Note: many publication links have been moved into ‘More important links’ below.
Next issue: 22 Oct. 2026
Information provided herein is current as of the date of issue. Information added or changed since the last Global AIV with Zoonotic Potential situation update appears in orange. Human cases are depicted in the geographic location of their report. For some cases, exposure may have occurred in one geographic location but reported in another. For cases with unknown onset date, reporting date was used instead. FAO compiles information drawn from multiple national (Ministries of Agriculture or Livestock, Ministries of Health, Provincial Government websites; Centers for Disease Prevention and Control [CDC]) and international sources (World Health Organization [WHO], World Organisation for Animal Health [WOAH]), as well as peer reviewed scientific articles. FAO makes every effort to ensure, but does not guarantee, accuracy, completeness or authenticity of the information. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these map(s) do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of FAO concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers and boundaries. Dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.
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