Map 1. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential* observed since 1 October 2024 (i.e. current wave)

Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.

Notes: Refer to the disclaimer available on this webpage for the names and boundaries in this map. Final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Source: United Nations Geospatial. 2020. Map of the World. [Cited January 2025]. Modified with GLW 4 data and Emergency Prevention System Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i), WOAH and National Authorities data, 2024.

Map 2. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential* observed in the period 1 October 2023 to 30 September 2024 (i.e. previous wave)

Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.

Notes: Refer to the disclaimer available on this webpage for the names and boundaries in this map. Final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Source: United Nations Geospatial. 2020. Map of the World. [Cited January 2025]. Modified with GLW 4 data and Emergency Prevention System Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i), WOAH and National Authorities data, 2024.

Recent publications

REVIEW/OVERVIEW

Enkirch, T., Gervelmeyer, A., Hallmaier-Wacker, L., Melidou, A.& Willgert, K. 2025. Coordinated One Health investigation and management of outbreaks in humans and animals caused by zoonotic avian influenza viruses. EFSA J, 23(1):e9183. [reference]

EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Animal Welfare (AHAW); ECDC; Alvarez, J., Boklund, A., Dippel, S., Dórea, F., Figuerola, J., et al. 2025. Preparedness, prevention and control related to zoonotic avian influenza. EFSA J, 23(1):e9191. [reference]

Krammer, F., Barclay, W.S., Beer, M., Brown, I.H., Cox, R.J., de Jong, M.D., Fodor, E., et al. 2025. Europe needs a sustainably funded influenza research and response network. Lancet Infect Dis, 2025 Feb 17:S1473-3099(25)00068-4. [reference]

WILD

Clessin, A., Briand, F.-X., Tornos, J., Lejeune, M., De Pasquale, C., Fischer, R., Souchaud, F., et al. 2025. Mass mortality events in the sub-Antarctic Indian Ocean caused by long-distance circumpolar spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b. bioRxiv 2025.02.25.640068; doi: [reference] [Preprint]

Sheikh, M.O.B., Rashid, P.M.A., Rahim, Z.H., Marouf, A.S. & Saeed, S.S. 2025. Molecular characterization and genetic analysis of highly pathogenic H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b in seagulls from Dukan Lake, Iraq. Virus Genes, 2025 Jan 22. [reference]

Caliendo, V., Bellido Martin, B., Fouchier, R.A.M., Verdaat, H., Engelsma, M., Beerens, N. & Slaterus, R. 2025. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Contributes to the Population Decline of the Peregrine Falcon (Falco peregrinus) in The Netherlands. Viruses, 17(1):24. [reference]

Le Gall-Ladevèze, C., Vollot, B., Hirschinger, J., Lèbre, L., Aaziz, R., Laroucau, K., Guérin, J.L., Paul, M., Cappelle, J. & Le Loc'h, G. 2025. Limited transmission of avian influenza viruses, avulaviruses, coronaviruses and Chlamydia sp. at the interface between wild birds and a free-range duck farm. Vet Res, 56(1):36. [reference]

Harvey, J., Sullivan, J.D., Poulson, R.L., Carter, D.L., Driscoll, C.P., McGowan, P.C., Callahan, C.R., et al. 2025. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus H5N1 in Double-crested Cormorants (Nannopterum auritum) of the Chesapeake Bay, USA. J Wildl Dis, 2025 Feb 6. [reference]

Cha, R.M., Park, M.J., Baek, Y.G., Lee, Y.N., Jang, Y., Kang, Y.M., Heo, G.B., et al. 2025. Genetic characteristics and pathogenesis of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 high pathogenicity avian influenza virus isolated from poultry in South Korea, 2022-2023. Virus Res, 353:199541. [reference]

Si, Y.J., Kim, D.J., Lee, S.H., Seo, Y.R., Jeong, H., Lee, S. & Lee DH. 2025. New incursions of H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses in wild birds, South Korea, October 2024. Front Vet Sci, 2025 Jan 10;11:1526118. [reference]

DOMESTIC

Signore, A.V., Joseph, T., Ranadheera, C., Erdelyan, C.N.G., Alkie, T.N., Raj, S., Pama, L., et al. 2025. Neuraminidase reassortment and oseltamivir resistance in clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1) viruses circulating among Canadian poultry, 2024. Emerg Microbes Infect, 2025 Feb 18:2469643. [reference]

European Food Safety Authority (EFSA); Abrahantes, J.C., Aznar, I., Catalin, I., Kohnle, L., Mulligan, K.F., Mur, L., Stoicescu, A., van Houtum, A. & Zancanaro, G. 2025. Avian influenza annual report 2023. EFSA J, 23(1):e9197. [reference]

Kim, Y.W., Jeong, S., Yang, J.H., Tark, D., Kim, W.H., Yang, H.S., Mun, S.H., Kang, S.H., Ko, E.A. & Ko, J.H. 2025. Genetic insights into avian influenza resistance in Jeju Island chickens: the roles of Mx1 and oligoadenylate synthetase-like single nucleotide polymorphisms. J Anim Sci Technol, 67(1):69-85. [reference]

DAIRY

Abousenna, M.S., Shafik, N.G. & Abotaleb, M.M. 2025. Evaluation of humoral immune response and milk antibody transfer in calves and lactating cows vaccinated with inactivated H5 avian influenza vaccine. Sci Rep, 15(1):4637. [reference]

Zhirnov, O.P. & Chernyshova, A.I. 2025. The uncleaved viral hemagglutinin HA0 increases influenza A virus resistance to thermal pasteurization. Virology, 604:110389. [reference]

Schafers, J., Warren, C.J., Yang, J., Zhang, J., Cole, S.J., Cooper, J., Drewek, K., et al. 2025. Pasteurisation temperatures effectively inactivate influenza A viruses in milk. Nat Commun, 16(1):1173. [reference]

Crossley, B.M., Miramontes, C.C., Rejmanek, D., Gallardo, R. & Pereira, R. 2025. In laboratory inactivation of H5N1 in raw whole milk through milk acidification: results from a pilot study. J Dairy Sci. 2025 Jan 29:S0022-0302(25)00051-7. [reference]

Naraharisetti, R., Weinberg, M., Stoddard, B., Stobierski, M.G., Dodd, K.A., Wineland, N., et al. 2025. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus Infection of Indoor Domestic Cats Within Dairy Industry Worker Households - Michigan, May 2024. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep, 74(5):61-65. [reference]

Leonard, J., Harker, E.J., Szablewski, C.M., Margrey, S.F., Gingrich, K.F.2nd, Crossley, K., Fletcher, E., et al. 2025. Notes from the Field: Seroprevalence of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5) Virus Infections Among Bovine Veterinary Practitioners - United States, September 2024. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep, 74(4):50-52. [reference]

OTHER VIRUS

Kobayashi, D., Hiono, T., Arakawa, H., Kaji, H., Ohkawara, A., Ichikawa, T., Ban, H., Isoda, N. & Sakoda, Y. 2025. Deglycosylation and truncation in the neuraminidase stalk are functionally equivalent in enhancing the pathogenicity of a high pathogenicity avian influenza virus in chickens. J Virol, 2025 Feb 14:e0147824. [reference]

Wallace HL. 2025. The True Extent of Avian Influenza Virus Infections: Knowns and Unknowns. Viral Immunol. 2025 Feb 14. [reference]

Ryt-Hansen, P., George, S., Hjulsager, C.K., Trebbien, R., Krog, J.S., Ciucani, M.M., Langerhuus, S.N., et al. 2025. Rapid surge of reassortant A(H1N1) influenza viruses in Danish swine and their zoonotic potential. Emerg Microbes Infect, 14(1):2466686. [reference]

Richard, G., Hervé, S., Chastagner, A., Quéguiner, S., Beven, V., Hirchaud, E., Barbier, N., Gorin, S., Blanchard, Y. & Simon, G. 2025. Major change in swine influenza virus diversity in France owing to emergence and widespread dissemination of a newly introduced H1N2 1C genotype in 2020. Virus Evol, 11(1):veae112. [reference]

Yang, F., Cheng, L., Liu, F., Yao, H., Wu, N., Xu, L. & Wu, H. 2025. Genetic and molecular characterization of a novel reassortant H3N2 influenza virus from a sick pig in Eastern China in 2019. Vet Res. 2025 Feb 10;56(1):38. [reference]

Ge, Y., Liu, J., Li, Y., Peng, P., Zhou, Y., Yu, J., Huo, M., Liang, X., Gao, Y. & Yao, Q. 2025. Geographical distribution and evolutionary dynamics of H4Nx avian influenza viruses. Front Microbiol. 2025 Jan 7;15:1505203. [reference]

El-Shesheny, R., Gomaa, M., Sayes, M.E., Kamel, M.N., Taweel, A.E., Kutkat, O., GabAllah, M., et al. 2025. Emergence of a novel reassortant highly pathogenic avian influenza clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N2) Virus, 2024. Emerg Microbes Infect, 14(1):2455601. [reference]

Postel, A., Gremmel, N., Lydersen, C., Kovacs, K.M., Schick, L.A., Siebert, U., Nymo, I.H. & Becher, P. 2025. Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (H5N5) detected in an Atlantic walrus (Odobenus rosmarus rosmarus) in the Svalbard Archipelago, Norway, 2023. Emerg Microbes Infect. 2025 Dec;14(1):2456146. [reference]

Zhang, Y., Wu, J., Lin, Q., Ou, J., Qi, X., Zheng, Y., Li, F. & Weng, Y. 2025. Infection Tracing and Virus Genomic Analysis of Two Cases of Human Infection with Avian Influenza A(H5N6) - Fujian Province, China, April-May 2024. China CDC Wkly. 2025 Jan 17;7(3):107-112. [reference]

Sun, R., Feng, X., Huang, J., Zheng, F., Xie, R., Zhang, C., Zhang, H., et al. 2025. Characterization of novel highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N6) clade 2.3.4.4b virus in wild birds, East China, 2024. Virol Sin, 2025 Jan 21:S1995-820X(25)00002-1. [reference]

Duong, M.H., Phan, T.N.U., Nguyen, T.H., Ho, N.H.N., Nguyen, T.N., Nguyen, V.T., Cao, M.T., Luong, C.Q., Nguyen, V.T. & Nguyen, V.T. 2025. Human Infection with Avian Influenza A(H9N2) Virus, Vietnam, April 2024. Emerg Infect Dis. 2025 Feb;31(2):388-392. [reference]

Hu, J., Xu, Y., Ma, M., Zhao, C., Yuan, Y. & He, G. 2025. Research Note: Novel reassortant avian influenza A(H9N2) Viruses in Wild Birds in Shanghai, China, 2020-2023. Poult Sci, 104(3):104860. [reference]

Jallow, M.M., Diagne, M.M., Ndione, M.H.D., Barry, M.A., Ndiaye, N.K., Kiori, D.E., Mendy, M.P., et al. 2025. Genetic and Molecular Characterization of Avian Influenza A(H9N2) Viruses from Live Bird Markets (LBM) in Senegal. Viruses, 17(1):73. [reference]

Wu, J., Zhang, X., Zhao, Y., Zhang, S., Wang, Y., Yang, W., Liu, H., et al. 2025. North American-Origin Influenza A (H10) viruses in Eurasian Wild Birds (2022-2024): Implications for the Emergence of Human H10N5 Virus. Emerg Microbes Infect. 2025 Feb 17:2465308. [reference]

Ren, P., Gao, Z., Li, X., Tang, J., Li, P., Huang, Z., Guo, J., et al. 2025. Phylogeography and biological characterization of H12N2 virus isolated from whooper swan in Central China. Front Microbiol. 2025 Jan 9;15:1536876. [reference]

Peng, P., Shen, J., Shi, W., Guo, J., Wang, M., Li, W., Yue, Z., et al. 2025. Novel H16N3 avian influenza viruses isolated from migratory gulls in China in 2023. Front Microbiol, 15:1543338. [reference]

Echeverri-De la Hoz, D., Martínez-Bravo, C., Gastelbondo-Pastrana, B., Rivero, R., López, Y., Bertel, V., Alemán-Santos, M., et al. 2025. Genomics of novel influenza A virus (H18N12) in bats, Caribe Colombia. Sci Rep. 2025 Feb 22;15(1):6507. [reference]

MODELLING/SURVEILLANCE/ASSESSMENT

Llanos-Soto, S.G., Yaffy, D., Pavlak, M. & Ivanek, R. 2025. Transmission dynamics of highly pathogenic avian influenza among multiple waterfowl species and backyard poultry: the impact of the stopover period. Sci Rep, 15(1):5861. [reference]

Artois, J., Vergne, T., Fourtune, L., Dellicour, S., Scoizec, A., Le Bouquin, S., Guérin, J.L., Paul, M.C. & Guinat, C. 2025. Spatial risk modelling of highly pathogenic avian influenza in France: Fattening duck farm activity matters. PLoS One. 2025 Feb 4;20(2):e0316248. [reference]

Cronin, P., Siegers, J., Heang, V., Tok, S., Sin, S., Sievers, B., Omondi, V., et al. 2025. Air sampling accurately captures circulating zoonotic viral diversity emerging from poultry live-animal markets. Res Sq, 2025 Feb 13:rs.3.rs-5682962. [reference] [Preprint]

Dhakal, A., Devkota, S., Jethara, S.B., Yadav, R.K. & Phuyal, P. 2025. Assessment of Biosecurity in Poultry Farms in Chitwan, Nepal. Vet Med Sci, 11(2):e70232. [reference]

FAO's support to countries

Global level

• FAO and WOAH released the Global strategy for the prevention and control of high pathogenicity avian influenza (2024–2033) - Achieving sustainable, resilient poultry production systems [link], and the introductory webinar is scheduled for 3 March 2025 [register].
• OFFLU (WOAH/FAO network of expertise on animal influenza) contributed information on the genetic and antigenic characteristics of currently circulating avian and swine influenza viruses for pandemic preparedness purposes at the WHO Consultation on the Composition of Influenza Virus Vaccines for Use in the 2025-2026 Northern Hemisphere Influenza Season [link1, link2, link3].
• OFFLU released statement on the Development of a Global Consensus H5 Influenza Genotyping Framework [link]
• FAO Virtual Learning Centres are collaborating with the Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut (FLI) to update the existing avian influenza course with elements of the increasing incidents of HPAIV infections in mammals.
• The FAO/WHO/WOAH released Updated joint public health assessment of recent influenza A(H5) virus events in animals and people on 20 December 2024. [link]
• FAO published the Recommendations for the surveillance of influenza A(H5N1) in cattle, with broader application to other farmed mammals. [link]
• OFFLU is conducting a stakeholder survey on its Avian Influenza Matching (AIM) for poultry vaccines project. Share your feedback here.

Regional/country level

• Americas
  
  • The third meeting of the Standing Group of Experts on Avian Influenza (SGE-AI) of GF-TADs in the Americas was held virtually on 19 February 2025.
  • FAO, in collaboration with OIRSA (Organismo Internacional Regional de Sanidad Agropecuaria), SICA (Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana), and SE-CAC (Secretaría Ejecutiva del Consejo Agropecuario Centroamericano), held a regional virtual workshop on 6 February to update and strengthen the diagnosis, control, and prevention of HPAI. FAO presented recommendations for countries in the region to prevent and control the disease, as well as the document 'Recommendations for the Surveillance of Influenza A(H5N1) in Cattle’.
  • FAO has provided Colombia with some laboratory consumables, test reagents and personal protective equipment to support HPAI outbreak response from its emergency stockpile supported by a FAO project.
  • The Global Framework for the Progressive Control of Transboundary Animal Diseases (GF-TADs) for Americas organized a Webinar “Update of the Avian Influenza situation of in cattle and humans” on 22 November 2024.
  • FAO at regional and country (Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Peru) levels are supporting HPAI response e.g. simulations exercises, diagnostic trainings, information materials.
  • FAO Guatemala held a workshop on biosecurity protocols for the safe handling and disposal of bird carcasses in November. [link]
  • Trainings on Laboratory mapping tools (LMT) were been conducted in Colombia [link], El Salvador [ link] and Honduras [link]; and on One Health assessment tool in Peru [link].

• Africa
  • FAO's Event Mobile App (EMA-i+) has been rolled out by FAO Ghana and the Veterinary Services Directorate; 96 field officers in Ghana have been trained for real-time animal disease reporting through the mobile phone-based system to detect and respond to disease outbreaks faster. [link]
  • Nigeria reported 13 H5N1 HPAI outbreaks that occurred between 7 December 2024 and 12 February 2025 in Kano State (farms and backyard poultry in Gwale, Gaya, Kabo, Nassaraw, Tofa LGAs [Local Government Area] and in a live bird market in Ungogo LGA), Katsina State (Katsina LGA), Plateau State (Bassa and Jos North LGAs) and in Federal Capital Territory (Bwari LGA). [link] FAO supported the Ministry of Livestock Development deploying a field mission to evaluate situation and take action to control the outbreak and stop the spread of the disease.
  • In Niger, an H5N1 HPAI outbreak in a backyard flock in Niamey was confirmed on 6 February 2025 by LABOCEL (Laboratoire Central de l'Élevage). Of the 57 birds (guinea fowls and chickens), 4 died and the rest was depopulated.
  • In Rwanda, FAO supported the National One Health platform in conducting a multisectoral surveillance in December 2024 to prevent the introduction and spread of avian influenza, and also supported national efforts to raise awareness across different sectors including wildlife, domestic animals, and public health to understanding and mitigating the risks associated with Avian Influenza. A series of Webex meetings and radio talks were organized, 662 poultry farms and other HPAI risk areas were visited. FAO also supported the One Health platform in establishing an electronic community-based surveillance system for self-reporting avian influenza-like observation.
  • In Senegal, FAO supported logistics and consumables, and an Epi expert from FAO participated in the HPAI active surveillance which was conducted in three at-risk regions (Saint Louis, Fatick and Ziguinchor) in mid-December; a total of 650 swab samples were collected.
  • In Uganda, FAO facilitated a training of trainers of community animal health outreach practitioners on surveillance and reporting of priority zoonotic diseases. Twenty-six (26) animal health practitioners were equipped with skills and techniques on HPAI and other priority zoonotic diseases case definition, participatory disease search, sample collection and reporting, surveillance, outbreak response, one health approach, outbreak investigation and case management. All participants were drawn from the Lake Victoria Epizone.

• North Africa and Middle East
• In Egypt, FAO supported the Veterinary services in implementation of the risk-based surveillance plan in 2024 to understand the prevalence of Avian Influenza sub-types currently circulating in Egypt and to detect incursion of new subtypes as early as possible and provided kits and reagents to support Avian influenza diagnosis, isolation and sequencing.
• FAO Jordan supported Joint Risk Assessment (JRA) Group to assess the Avian Influenza H5N1 introduction possibility into Jordan to increase the readiness of relevant sectors to mitigate the risk of HPAI. FAO also provided technical support to Ministry of Agriculture in updating avian influenza contingency and outbreak response plans, and SOPs on sampling and specimen referral, and testing protocols.

• Asia and the Pacific
• FAO has organized a Regional Proficiency Test for AI diagnosis in collaboration with Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP), Geelong.
• In Cambodia, a human infection with influenza A (H5N1) virus was confirmed in a 28-year-old man from village no. 22 (Maphey Pii), Chamkar Andong Commune, Camkar Leu District, Kampong Cham Province in January. The case reportedly had exposure to sick poultry prior to the onset. FAO Cambodia is collaborating with National Animal Health and Production Institute (NAHPRI)/ General Directorate of Animal Health and Production (GDAHP) and Institute du Pasteur Cambodge (IPC) to support the Cambodian Government. On 25 February, another case (fatal) was confirmed by the government. A 2 year 7 months old boy from Ta Ngok village, Romchek commune, Preah Sdach district, Prey Veng province tested positive for A(H5N1) virus [link].
• FAO ECTAD Indonesia, along with various ministries and institutions, held an Avian Influenza Virus Preparedness meeting on 16 January 2025. The FAO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific participated virtually, presenting the global and regional zoonotic Influenza situation. Cross-sector ministries and agencies shared updates on Indonesia's situation, surveillance, disease reporting, vaccination, and future strategies. The meeting agreed to strengthen coordination between ministries, enhance AIV surveillance in public health sectors, and monitor the spread of avian influenza in poultry, livestock, wildlife, and migratory birds as well as keep vigilance on occupational health of farm workers.
• In Myanmar, 40 sessions of one-day community-level training on farm biosecurity principles and the safe, effective use of disinfectants were conducted between October and December 2024 in Bago Region, Mandalay Region, and Shan State, supported by a FAO project. Some 2 000 livestock households learned how to identify and manage biohazards, implement preventive measures and reduce disease transmission risks and received biosecurity kits containing disinfectant, masks, gloves, boots, sanitizer, a measuring cup, training materials.

• Europe and Central Asia
• The Outbreak Costing Tool (OutCosT) to estimate the cost of outbreaks and their control is being adapted to poultry diseases and is being validated with real HPAI outbreak data from countries in three continents. A webinar to present the results will be organized in the first quarter of 2025. The Excel-based tool is now available online here.
• FAO Virtual Learning Center (VLC) is currently delivering a 4-week tutored course on avian influenza preparedness in English. In total, 375 participants, both nominated by the veterinary services and self-registered based on their interest are taking part of the course, which will end in November 2024. In addition, the course has been certified with credits towards continuous professional development through the Veterinary Continuing Education in Europe (VetCEE).
• In Tajikistan, H5N1 avian influenza laboratory training using molecular diagnosis was conducted in October 2024 in One Health approach in collaboration with the Local Health System Sustainability Project (LHSS) at a Ministry of Public Health facility under a FAO project. The workshop brought together 21 participants from the Ministry of Public Health, the National Veterinary Diagnostic Center, and central and regional laboratories. The training focused on real-time RT-PCR techniques for AIV diagnosis. Not only the participants equipped with skills on avian influenza diagnosis, also gained knowledge on its zoonotic potential, and the threats to human health. A similar training workshop will be held in March 2025, in 13 districts in collaboration with Epidemic Control (EpiC).

Recommendations for affected countries and those at risk

FAO recommends intensified surveillance and awareness raising by national authorities.

General recommendations
It is important to report sick or dead birds – both wild birds and poultry - or wild mammals to local authorities (veterinary services, public health officials, community leaders etc.). These should be tested for avian influenza viruses.

Recommendations to poultry producers
Farmers and poultry producers should step up their biosecurity measures in order to prevent potential virus introduction from wild birds or their faeces.

Recommendations to hunters
Hunting associations and wildlife authorities should be aware that avian influenza viruses might be present in waterfowl and some other species hunted and that hunting, handling and dressing of shot game carries the risk of spreading avian influenza viruses to susceptible poultry.

Recommendations to national authorities
Increase surveillance efforts for the early detection of influenza viruses in poultry and dead wild species including certain mammals.

For full recommendations including non-avian species please see [link].

Important links

• The list of wild bird and mammalian species which have been infected with H5Nx HPAI [link]
• FAO & WOAH Global strategy for the prevention and control of high pathogenicity avian influenza (2024–2033) - Achieving sustainable, resilient poultry production systems
• FAO ALERT :: Avian influenza risk of upsurge and regional spread through increased poultry trade before and during Lunar New Year festivities in Asia [link TBA]
• FAO/WHO/WOAH Updated joint public health assessment of recent influenza A(H5) virus events in animals and people
• FAO Recommendations for the surveillance of influenza A(H5N1) in cattle – with broader application to other farmed mammals
• EFSA Avian influenza overview September–December 2024, Bird Flu Rader and Migration Mapping Tool
• FAO HPAI website [link]
• FAO EMPRES Watch - A(H5N1) influenza in dairy cattle in the United States of America
• FAO Preliminary rapid risk assessment of foodborne avian influenza A (H5N1) virus
• FAO Carcass management guidelines
• FAO Guidelines for veterinary laboratory testing protocols for priority zoonotic diseases in Africa
• GF-TADs Global strategy for the prevention and control of highly pathogenic avian influenza (2024-2033). In brief
• OFFLU website
• OFFLU Diagnostic guidance: HPAI dairy cattle
• OFFLU Avian influenza matching (OFFLU-AIM) report & AIM webinar
• OFFLU summary report from the WHO vaccine composition meeting - 27 September 2024
• Scientific Task Force on Avian Influenza and Wild Birds H5N1 High pathogenicity avian influenza in wild birds - Unprecedented conservation impacts and urgent needs
• WHO Influenza at the human-animal interface summary and assessment, 12 December 2024
• WHO Public health resource pack for countries experiencing outbreaks of influenza in animals
• WOAH High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza (HPAI) in Cattle
• WOAH High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza (HPAI) Situation Report 65 - November 2024

Updates on avian influenza infection in dairy cattle have been shared by USDA, US CDC and US FDA through the following sites:

• USDA Detections of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) in Livestock
• USDA HPAI H5N1 Genotype B3.13 in Dairy Cattle: National Epidemiologic Brief (23/08/2024)
• CDC H5 Bird Flu: Current Situation
• US FDA Updates on Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI)
• Johns Hopkins University Risk Assessment HPAI A(H5) Scenario-Based Human Health Risk Assessment

Avian influenza risk of upsurge and regional spread through increased poultry trade before and during Lunar New Year festivities in Asia

FAO calls for increased vigilance and preparedness for avian influenza (AI) during the traditional New Year festivities that will take place across Asia on the week of 27 January 2025.

In the past year, outbreaks of AI have continued to be reported in domestic poultry, wild birds and mammals in Asia. Several AI virus subtypes including H5N1, H5N2, H5N3, H5N5, H5N6, H5N8, H7N3, H7N6, H7N8, H7N9, H10N5, and H3N2 are currently well-established in both wild and domestic bird populations in the region. In addition, subtype H5N1 subclade 2.3.4.4b continues to circulate in both wild and domestic birds worldwide.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) can lead to heavy losses for the poultry industry, in particular to the livelihoods of vulnerable small-scale producers. Poultry trade and related activities play a key role in AI spread and amplification in domestic bird populations, including the trade of infected live poultry and their products, handling or slaughtering infected poultry, and limited biosecurity along the poultry value chain. Before and during New Year festivities, the risk is further exacerbated by high demand for poultry meat and products, triggering increased and intensified poultry trade and movements as well as visits to live poultry markets.

In addition, a rise in mammalian species infected with HPAI has been recorded globally including outbreaks in farmed mink in Europe, marine mammals in the Americas, cats in the Republic of Korea, and more recently in red foxes and raccoon dogs in Japan, and in captive wild felids in Viet Nam. Notably in 2024, HPAI H5N1 has been found in raw milk of dairy cows – the animals experienced clinical signs including decreased milk production, thickened colostrum-like milk, reduced food intake, lethargy, fever, loose manure and dehydration.

Importantly, AI virus subtypes have demonstrated their zoonotic potential, i.e. the ability to transmit between birds and humans. During 2024, in the Region of Asia and the Pacific, human cases of influenza A(H5N1) were detected in Australia, Cambodia, and Viet Nam. HPAI A(H5N6) was also reported in China. Other subtypes have also been associated with zoonotic transmission in Asia in the past year, including influenza, A(H3N8), and A(H9N2).

Most of these cases reported exposure through close contact with infected live poultry. While human infections with AI viruses remain sporadic events and do not currently spread easily from person to person, they warrant attention since symptoms observed in humans range from asymptomatic to severe and can be fatal.

INCREASED AVIAN INFLUENZA RISK

There is an increased risk of AI spread in Asia due to intensified in-country travel around Lunar New Year (January-February 2025), specifically considering the following:

• millions of people are expected to travel for the New Year (starting late January 2025);
• vast majority of traffic will be within countries of the Asian region, but also to and from Asia;
• poultry trade is increasing to serve the high demand for poultry meat and other products consumed during these festivities;
• travel and trade increase the risk of spreading AI, since the virus can be transmitted via contact with infected animals as well as contaminated clothing, vehicles and other equipment.

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

In light of the elevated risk, FAO is calling on all Chief Veterinary Officers (CVOs) in Asia to increase AI prevention and preparedness activities to reduce the likelihood of poultry outbreaks and subsequent impacts on livelihoods, economies, and human infections.

Specifically, FAO recommendscountries to:

• Enhance controls at national borders and along traffic routes based on risk analyses to minimize the risk of introduction of potentially infected live poultry and poultry products.
• Promote improved biosecurity measures along the value chain, including at farms, live bird markets, slaughter points, etc. to limit further spread of the disease and mitigate the risk of human exposure.
• Implement measures for early detection, timely reporting and rapid containment of infection, as delays can lead to rapid spread. In addition, the adoption of policies that encourage disease reporting, such as providing adequate compensation following animal culling, can help mitigate these threats.
• On infected premises (e.g. farms or live bird markets including associated vehicles), conduct appropriate cleaning and disinfection and take action on carcasses, slurry and faecal waste to ensure they do not pose a risk for further transmission and spread of virus. Where possible, use the period immediately following the Lunar New Year festivities for short closures of live bird markets for decontamination after all birds have been sold and processed.
• Upon detection of outbreaks, timely alert neighbouring countries as well as international organizations, including the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). This includes rapid sharing of virus sequences with relevant partners to ensure appropriate actions are taken by countries in the region (e.g. ensuring the use of adapted vaccines in countries that implement vaccination programmes against AI). The OFFLU Avian Influenza Vaccine Matching (AIM) for poultry vaccines is available for guidance.
• Implement surveillance schemes that support the detection of HPAI viruses in both domestic and wild birds. Provide mechanisms for reporting sick or dead birds (hotlines, collection points) and raise awareness about the importance of reporting. Farmers, hunters, or rangers should be encouraged to report to veterinary authorities once they see unusual clinical signs in birds including: sudden increase in mortalities; swelling of the head, eyelids, comb, wattles, and hocks; purple discoloration of the wattles, comb, and legs; gasping for air (difficulty breathing); coughing, sneezing, and/or nasal discharge (runny nose); stumbling or falling; or ruffled feathers or neurological disease in water birds.
• Expand surveillance to relevant mammals, for better early detection of HPAI viruses, and to understand their role in the epidemiology, spread and transmission of avian influenza, including in dairy cattle. FAO Recommendations for the surveillance of influenza A(H5N1) in cattle and A list of mammalian species affected by H5Nx are available for guidance.
• Ensure laboratories have adequate capacities to diagnose circulating H5Nx HPAI viruses and deploy point-of-need rapid tests as appropriate.
• Implement targeted sampling of animals with a higher likelihood of detecting the virus. Targeting sick or freshly dead birds as well as sampling their environment will increase the probability of detecting AI viruses.
• Shift to active surveillance, differential diagnosis, and increased virological screening. Active surveillance in key hotspots of the poultry value chain such as live bird markets allows for early detection of AI virus incursion/amplification.
• Collaborate closely with forestry/environment sector and wetland, or bird reserve management authorities in contact with wild bird populations to foster information-sharing and joint AI surveillance and prevention activities well ahead of the potential introduction or spread of the virus.
• Facilitate early reporting and response by consulting closely with the private sector (i.e. producers, traders and related businesses). Preparing and sharing communication materials prior to AI virus introduction will help minimize misunderstandings and rumours.
• Reinforce awareness campaigns. High level of awareness should be maintained among poultry keepers, the general population, traders, market workers, hunters, and any other relevant stakeholder about AI, precautionary and personal protection measures as well as reporting and collection mechanisms for sick or dead birds.
• Action against wild birds, particularly indiscriminate hunting or disturbances of habitat, should not be undertaken. Guidance is available to respond to HPAI in wild birds.

WHAT FAO IS DOING

• Tracking disease rumours in Asia and the Pacific and sharing relevant information with stakeholders in the region on a bi-weekly basis. Please see FAO ECTAD event-based surveillance in Asia and the Pacific bi-weekly update for more information.
• Conducting consultations with AI experts in Asia and the Pacific to identify innovative approaches to respond to emerging AI threats. Published consultation reports are available at this link.
• Conducting public health assessments jointly with Tripartite partners (FAO/WHO/WOAH) of recent influenza A(H5) virus events in animals and people.
• Monitoring and assessing the evolving disease situation. To share updates on your country's situation, please contact FAO at [email protected].
• Liaising with FAO/WOAH Reference Laboratories and partner organizations to assess virus characteristics and provide laboratory protocols for detection.
• Raising awareness about important epidemiological and virological findings and their implications.
• Providing recommendations for affected countries and those at risk addressing preparedness, prevention and disease control.
• Providing support for risk assessment and mapping to identify hot spots for risk mitigation and the implementation of risk-based surveillance.
• Offering support in the provision of diagnostic reagents and personal protective equipment, provided certain conditions are met (contact: [email protected]).
• Offering assistance to national authorities for shipment of samples as well as virus sub-typing and sequencing, provided certain conditions are met (contact: [email protected]).

Disclaimer

Information provided herein is current as of the date of issue. Information added or changed since the last Global AIV with Zoonotic Potential situation update appears in orange. Human cases are depicted in the geographic location of their report. For some cases, exposure may have occurred in one geographic location but reported in another. For cases with unknown onset date, reporting date was used instead. FAO compiles information drawn from multiple national (Ministries of Agriculture or Livestock, Ministries of Health, Provincial Government websites; Centers for Disease Prevention and Control [CDC]) and international sources (World Health Organization [WHO], World Organisation for Animal Health [WOAH]), as well as peer reviewed scientific articles. FAO makes every effort to ensure, but does not guarantee, accuracy, completeness or authenticity of the information. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these map(s) do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of FAO concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers and boundaries. Dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.