Map 1. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential observed since 1 October 2025 (i.e. current wave)

Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.

Notes: Refer to the disclaimer available on this webpage for the names and boundaries in this map. The final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. The final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Source: United Nations Geospatial. 2020. Map of the World. [Cited January 2026]. Modified with GLW 4 data and Emergency Prevention System Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i), WOAH and National Authorities data, 2025.

Map 2. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential* observed in the period 1 October 2024 to 30 September 2025 (i.e. previous wave)

Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.

Notes: Refer to the disclaimer available on this webpage for the names and boundaries in this map. Final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Source: United Nations Geospatial. 2020. Map of the World. [Cited October 2025]. Modified with GLW 4 data and Emergency Prevention System Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i), WOAH and National Authorities data, 2024.

Recent publications

Wild

Crespo-Bellido, A. Trovão, N.S., Maksiaev,  A., Baele, G., Dellicour,  S. & Nelson, M.I. 2025. Emergence of D1.1 reassortant H5N1 avian influenza viruses in North America. BioRxiv, [reference] Preprint

Zhang, P. & MacIntyre, C.R. 2025. An overview of HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b and its emerging threat in mainland Australia: Identified knowledge gaps. One Health, 22:101292. [reference]

Ross, T.A., Ryding, S., Lisovski, S., Driessen, J., Mowat, E., Todd, S., Purnell, C., Spence, A., Vitali, S., Yu, H. & Klaassen. M. 2026. AviFluMap: An interactive tool to assess H5N1 avian influenza incursion risk in Australia via migratory birds. Ecological Informatics, 103603. [reference - reference]

Mursel, S., Davison, B.D., McAndrew, T., Khan, B. & Bocchini, P. 2025. Spatiotemporal Dynamics of Avian Influenza: Understanding Avian Influenza Transmission via Mallard Migration Data. Interdiscip Perspect Infect Dis, 2025:5555858. [reference]

Si, Y.-J., Lee, S-H., Lee, H.-E., Kim, D.-J., Jeong, H., Lee, S. & Lee, D.-H. 2026. Early Detection and Genetic Characterization of Clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 and H5N9 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Viruses at the Onset of Fall Migration in Wild Birds during October 2025 in South Korea. Front Cell Infect Microbiol, [reference]

Veldhuis Kroeze, E.J.B., Bellido Martin, B., Mols, V.C., Begeman, L., Fouchier, R.A.M. & Kuiken, T. 2025. Pathology and virology of natural high pathogenicity avian influenza A(H5N1) Gs/GD genotype BB virus infection in wild black-headed gulls (Chroicocephalus ridibundus). Vet Res, 56(1):234. [reference]

Hjulsager, C.K., Liang, Y., Thorup, C., Larsen, L.E., Jensen, T.K., Breum, S. & Bregnballe, T. 2025. Mass mortalities caused by different genotypes of HPAIV H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b in colony breeding Black-headed Gulls and Sandwich Terns in Denmark 2022 and 2023. Can J Microbiol, 2026 Jan 10. [reference]

Rahman, I., Wight, J., Cunningham, J.T., Ochoa, P.S., Wallace, H.L., Ward, C.R., Hedd, A., et al. 2026. Surveillance of live birds for active and past infections reveals the impact of highly pathogenic H5N1 on seabird populations in Atlantic Canada. Can J Microbiol, 2026 Jan 16. [reference]

Rimondi, A., Vanstreets, R., Nelson, M., Olivera, V., Gallo, L., Durant, A., Quintana, F., et al. 2025. Persistence and spillback of mammal-adapted H5N1 genotype B3.2 viruses among South American seabirds and marine mammals. Res Sq, 2025 Nov 4:rs.3.rs-7960151. [reference] Preprint

Couty, M., Guinat, C., Fornasiero, D., Briand, F.X., Henry, P.Y., Grasland, B., Palumbo, L. & Le Loc'h, G. 2026. The role of wild birds in the global highly pathogenic avian influenza H5 panzootic, 2020-2023. NPJ Biodivers, 5(1):1. [reference]

Iervolino, M., Günther, A., Begeman, L., Aguado, B., Bestebroer, T.M., Bellido-Martin, B., Coerper, A., et al. 2026. The expanding H5N1 avian influenza panzootic causes high mortality of skuas in Antarctica.  Sci Rep, 2026 Jan 14. [reference]

Domestic

Freier, L., Breithaupt, A., Kuryshko, M., Palme, D.I., Weigend, S., Abdelwhab, E.M. & Blohm, U. 2026. Host genetics, lung T-cell immunity, and laying activity determine the disease outcome in avian influenza virus-infected chickens. Vet Res, 2026 Jan 2. [reference]

Wu, S.X., Davis, C.N., Arnold, M. & Tildesley, M.J. 2026. The role of ducks in detecting Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in small-scale backyard poultry farms. PLoS Comput Biol, 2026 Jan 9;22(1):e1013357. [reference]

Nyarko, S.O., Asante, I.A., Sarpong, G.M., Boatemaa, L., Kwasah, L., Awuku-Larbi, Y., Magnusen, V., et al. 2026. Evidence of High Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 Clade 2.3.4.4b Among Poultry in Ghana From 2021 to 2022. Vet Med Sci, 12(1):e70744. [reference]

Leonard, M., Bonney, P., Cardona, C., Ssematimba, A., St Charles, K.M., Martin, S.W., Alexander, C. & Marusak, R. 2025. Movements of poultry product off HPAI-infected premises: using science-based standards for achieving confidence in risk. Can J Microbiol, 2025 Dec 23. [reference]

Niel, K.R., St Charles, K.M., Elissa, J.Y., Lighty, M.E., Ssematimba, A., Culhane, M., Crespo-Bellido, A., Trovão, N.S., Nelson, M.I. & Cardona, C. 2025. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI H5N1, Clade 2.3.4.4b, genotype C2.1) in Commercial Ring-Necked Pheasants During the 2022 Outbreak in the United States. Can J Microbiol, 2025 Dec 22. [reference]

St Charles, K.M., Ssematimba, A., Bonney, P. & Cardona, C. 2025. Evaluation of transmission metrics in a slow-spreading highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreak in a commercial upland game bird system. Can J Microbiol, 2025 Dec 22. [reference]

Ibrahim, M., Said, A., Wahba, M.A. & Yehia, N. 2025. Genetic and antigenic analysis of the highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N8 virus clade 2.3.4.4b isolated from waterfowl in Egypt during 2022; evidence of brain-specific HA mutations. Br Poult Sci, 2026 Jan 7:1-10. [reference]

Adachi, K., Handharyani, E., Ueno, S. & Tsukamoto, Y. 2026. Comparative Hemagglutination of Avian Influenza A/H5N1 Viruses by Erythrocytes from Ostrich, Emu, Japanese Quail, Chicken and Horse. Open Journal of Veterinary Medicine, 16:1-15. [reference]

Ahn, J.J., Yu, T.C., Dadonaite, B., Radford, C.E. & Bloom, J.D. 2026. Influenza hemagglutinin subtypes have different sequence constraints despite sharing extremely similar structures. BioRxiv, [reference] Preprint

Mammals

Larsen, S.V., Israelson, R., Torp, C., Larsen, L.E., Jensen, H.E. & Kristensen, C. 2025. Transmission, Pathological and Clinical Manifestations of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A Virus in Mammals with Emphasis on H5N1 Clade 2.3.4.4b. Viruses, 17(12):1548. [reference]

Panova, A.S., Gudymo, A.S., Kolosova, N.P., Danilenko, A.V., Shadrinova, K.N., Danilchenko, N.V., Perfilieva, O.N., et al. 2025. Genotype A3 influenza A(H5N1) isolated from fur seals shows high virulence in mammals, but not airborne transmission. Sci Rep, 15(1):44463. [reference]

Pérez-Sánchez, T., Báez, J.C. & Johnstone, C. 2025. Concern for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Spillover into Cetaceans. Viruses, 17(12):1536. [reference]

Gwon, S.-H., Park, S.-I., Jeong, H., Kim, D., Son, Y., Lee, M.-a., Lee, K., et al. 2026. Fatal H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza with Retrograde Neuroinvasion in a Free-Ranging Leopard Cat (Prionailurus bengalensis) During a Wild Bird Outbreak in South Korea. Animals, 16(2):200. [reference]

Butt, S.L., de Oliveira, P.S.B., Rani, R., Nooruzzaman, M., Diaz, A.N., Glover, S., Young, A.J., Sharma, B. & Diel, D.G. 2026. Novel recombinant H5-based vaccine provides effective protection against H5N1 influenza virus in cats. NPJ Vaccines, 2026 Jan 12. [reference]

Dairy

Tarbuck, N.N., Cochran, H.J., Martin, E.A., Liu, M., Kulchytsky, K.S., Leone, W.M., Webby, R.J., Warren, C.J., Bowman, A.S. 2026. Natural H5N1 immunity in dairy cows is durable and cross-protective but non-sterilizing. BioRxiv, [reference] Preprint

Dholakia, V., Quantrill, J.L., Richardson, S.A.S., Pankaew, N., Brown, M.D., Yang, J., Capelastegui, F., et al. 2026. Polymerase mutations underlie early adaptation of H5N1 influenza virus to dairy cattle and other mammals. Nat Commun, 2026 Jan 16. [reference]

Eales, O., McCaw, J.M. & Shearer, F.M. 2025. Modeling of H5N1 influenza virus kinetics during dairy cattle infection suggests the timing of infectiousness. PLoS Biol, 24(1):e3003586. [reference]

Olthof, L., Krogstad, K.C. & Bradford, B.J. 2025. Cow-level factors associated with risk of clinical highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 infection and impacts on health and productivity in lactating dairy cattle. J Dairy Sci, 2025 Dec 31:S0022-0302(25)01054-9. [reference]

EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (AHAW); Alvarez, J., Boklund, A.E., Dippel, S., Dórea, F., Figuerola, J., Herskin, M.S., et al. 2025. Risk of infection of dairy cattle in the EU with highly pathogenic avian influenza virus affecting dairy cows in the United States of America (H5N1, Eurasian lineage goose/Guangdong clade 2.3.4.4b. genotype B3.13). EFSA J, 23(12):e9801. [reference]

Virus

Bi, Z. 2026. Adaptation differences and mechanisms of influenza viruses to ANP32 proteins across species. J Virol, 2026 Jan 5:e0190025. [reference]

Zhu, W., Xu, Z., Wang, X., Li, X., Li, Z., Dong, G., Yang, L., et al. 2025. Low-replication influenza virus mediates high pathogenicity through an inflammation-driven lung-heart-brain axis in mice. Emerg Microbes Infect. 2026 Dec;15(1):2608406. [reference]

Mei, M., Zhang, X., Wu, Q., Xu, M. & Zhao, Y. 2026. Virulence and transmission characteristic of H3N8 avian influenza virus circulating in chickens in China. Virulence, 2026 Jan 7:2613516. [reference]

Jin, Y., Cui, H., Jiang, L., Li, L., Zheng, J., Zhang, Y., Wang, H., et al. 2025. From Surfaces to Spillover: Environmental Persistence and Indirect Transmission of Influenza A(H3N8) Virus. Microorganisms, 2025 Dec 6;13(12):2782. [reference]

Silaban, J., Ogada, S., Naseem, M.N., Baek, Y.H., Song, M.S. & Ommeh, S.C. 2025. Phylogenetic Analysis of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H7 Viruses in Australia and New Zealand Suggests Local Viral Evolution. Vet Sci, 2025 Dec 17;12(12):1208. [reference]

Luo, Y., Dong, M., Shen, Y., Xiang, X., Lv, J., Sun, Y., Li, Y., et al. 2025. Impact of viral ribonucleoprotein complex genetic stability on pathogenicity in H9N2 and H6N2 avian influenza viruses. Dev Comp Immunol, 2025 Dec 27;175:105544. [reference]

Han, J., Chang, W., Jing, Z., Xiao, D., Ji, T., Fang, J., Song, M., Li, W., Wang, J. & Deng, W. 2025. Synergistic virulence of H9N2 AIV and APEC co-infection in laying hens involves a critical role for macrophage-mediated hyper-inflammation via the MAPK/NF-κB axis. Vet Microbiol, 2025 Dec 24;313:110846. [reference]

Bhavsar, D., León, A.N., Hsu, W.L., Puente-Massaguer, E., Ferguson, J.A., Han, J., Wilson, P., Ward, A.B. & Krammer, F. 2026. Structural and functional characterization of the antigenicity of influenza A virus hemagglutinin subtype H15. Cell Rep, 2026 Jan 2;45(1):116773. [reference]

Falsini, A., Fiori, A., Montomoli, E., Muzyka, N., Muzyka, D. & Trombetta, C.M. 2026. Circulation of influenza D virus in Ukraine: A multi-species serological study. Acta Trop, 2026 Jan 13;274:107980. [reference]

Trombetta, C.M., Fiori, A., Falsini,A., Pellegrini, F., Le Poder, S., Eichenbaum, A., Cardona, V., et al. 2026. Serological investigation of influenza D virus in cats and dogs in Europe. 2026. BioRxiv, Preprint [reference]

Li, H., Yan, W., Liu, X., Gao, B., Peng, J., Jiang, F., Cui, Q., et al. 2026. Emergence and Phylodynamics of Influenza D Virus in Northeast China Reveal Sporadic Detection and Predominance of the D/Yamagata/2019 Lineage in Cattle. Viruses, 18(1), 93. [reference]

Xue, L., Guo, T., Feng, Y., San, Z., Wang, D. & Guo, L. 2026. An influenza D virus in D/Yama2019 lineage from stillbirth fetus of cattle in China. J Vet Med Sci, 2026 Jan 14. [reference]

Shen, M., Yu, J., Fu, B., Yu, C., Cui, C., Chen, S., Liu, C., Wang, K. & Wang, Z. 2025. Influenza D Virus in Black Donkeys, Northern China. Emerg Infect Dis, 31(12):2339-2340. [reference]

Assessment/Modelling

Guo, D. & Pu, H. 2025. Factors Influencing the Willingness of Layer Specialized Households to Participate in Cooperative Avian Influenza Prevention and Control: Evidence from China. Vet Sci, 12(12):1194. [reference]

Whitlow, H., Gokool, S., Clapp, G., Bueno, I., Logunleko, M., Moore, P., Masterton, S, et al. 2026. Biosecurity Uptake and Perceived Risk of Avian Influenza Among People in Contact With Birds. Zoonoses Public Health, 2026 Jan 6. [reference]

Davis, C.N., Hill, E.M., Jewell, C.P., Rysava, K., Thompson, R.N. & Tildesley, M.J. 2026. A modelling assessment of the impact of control measures on highly pathogenic avian influenza transmission in poultry in Great Britain.　PLoS Comput Biol, 2026 Jan 5;22(1):e1013874. [reference]

FAO's support to countries

Global level

• Under the Global Framework for the Progressive Control of Transboundary Animal Diseases (GF-TADs), FAO is organizing a joint webinar with the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) on 5 February 2026 to present updates on the latest initiatives to address avian influenza. [registration link -  event page]
• FAO released ALERT “Increased risk of high pathogenicity avian influenza introduction and spread in Africa” on 22 December 2025. [link]
• A HPAI Global Situation Update Webinar was organized on 18 December 2025 under the umbrella of the Global Framework for the Progressive Control of Transboundary Animal Diseases (GF-TADs). [link]
• FAO released “Improving poultry health and productivity - Practical training materials for veterinarians and farmers for better farm management”. These materials support veterinarians, advisors and farmers in strengthening biosecurity, hygiene, animal health and management practices that are directly relevant to the prevention and control of avian influenza. By promoting improved husbandry and health practices, the materials contribute to more resilient poultry production systems and reduced risk at the human–animal interface. [link]

Regional/country level

• Americas
• During the first part of November 2025, FAO attended a working group meeting of the Intersectoral Technical Commission for the Prevention and Control of Zoonotic Influenza in the Americas (CIPCIZA) held in Brasilia to present OFFLU’s contributions to genomic surveillance of influenza in animals and support the development of technical recommendations for zoonotic influenza control.
• In November, four workshops were held in Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, prioritized zoonotic diseases and shape policy using the One Health Approach. 72 officials from the Public Health, Agriculture, and Environment ministries, members of academic institutions and the private sector participated in the workshops on the Prioritization of Zoonotic Diseases. Using the adapted Pan American Center for Foot-and-Mouth Disease and Veterinary Public Health (PANAFTOSA) prioritization methodology, participants from the Ministries of Health and Agriculture reviewed 40 zoonotic diseases. The workshops also served to define the next steps for coordinated national action. This will improve cross-sector collaboration, streamline institutional coordination and guide better public health decisions and resource use.
• FAO made steps to advance digital animal health surveillance and traceability in Grenada and Dominica through EMA-i+ and NAITS scoping missions on 19–21 November and 28 November–3 December respectively. The missions assessed the status of animal disease surveillance, reporting mechanisms, and data flow between animal and public health authorities as well as national digital infrastructure. The scoping mission contributed to: establish technical groundwork for phased implementation of EMA-i+/EMPRES-i+ and NAITS; strengthen disease early warning systems; traceability, outbreak management, and interoperability with public health systems; and legislative updates for animal identification and farm registration.
• FAO conducted a biosecurity and epidemiological surveillance workshop in Santa Cruz, Chile, from 24 to 27 November, training 43 professionals from the Agricultural and Livestock Service (SAG). A second biosecurity and epidemiological surveillance workshop was held in December in Arica, Chile, to train additional SAG professionals.
• On 27 November, a Workshop for the Development of the One Health Plan was held in Paraguay. Coordinated by the National Zoonosis Control Program and the National Rabies Center (PNCZCAN), with technical cooperation from FAO, an action plan for the National Intersectoral Technical Committee on One Health was developed.
• FAO RLC participated in the UK–Brazil One Health International Symposium held on 25–27 November, presenting examples of One Health approaches in agricultural systems, as well as One Health initiatives in the region.
• FAO RLC participated in the 1st Latin American Congress on One Health held in Peru on 4 December, presented examples of One Health approaches in agricultural systems, as well as One Health initiatives in the region.
• A hybrid event to implement EMA-i was carried out in Venezuela from 2 to 4 December, to train professionals from the Instituto Nacional de Salud Agrícola Integral (INSAI) at the national and regional levels.
• On 3 December, the second meeting of the GF-TADs Americas Interagency Group was held, during which the actions of each agency in relation to the 5 priority diseases in the region (New world screwworm, African and Classical Swine fever, Food and Mouth Disease and Highly pathogenic Avian Influenza) were reviewed. This group meets twice a year to coordinate actions. Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), International Regional Organization for Plant and Animal Health (OIRSA), Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)/PANAFTOSA, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), WHO, and FAO participated.

• Africa
  • FAO Burundi has signed a Letter of Agreement (LoA) with the African Field Epidemiology Network (AFENET) for training in Field Epidemiology (FETP frontline with the updated version) to strengthen surveillance. Letter of Agreement (LoA) with the African Field Epidemiology Network (AFENET) for Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP frontline with the updated version incorporating the One Health approach [link]) for 20 actors in animal health (11), environmental health (1) and human health (8). Training for the first cohort is underway: the first workshop completed; initial fieldwork supervised by "mentors" completed; the second workshop is scheduled for 15-19 December.
  • FAO Central Africa Republic trained 18 trainers from the ministries responsible for livestock, wildlife and the environment on reporting suspected cases of animal diseases, including HPAI, using the EMA-i+ and provided 10 tablets to the Directorate-General of Veterinary Services for real-time notification of health events using EMA-i+.
  • FAO Ghana has provided diagnostic reagents/consumables for Avian Influenza for the veterinary laboratory under the Pandemic Fund to enhance early detection capabilities; and through the Early Warning project, supported the Accra Veterinary Laboratory in Ghana in sending its samples to Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venezie (IZSVe), a FAO Reference Centre laboratory in Padua, Italy for confirmation and genetic characterization. The results showed the presence of HPAI H5N1 viruses, belonging, as expected, to clade 2.3.4.4b. The whole-genome sequencing revealed two distinct genotypes: one was the usual (already identified in Ghana in 2024) and the other was genotype EA-2024-DI.2, which was predominant among HPAI H5N1 viruses in Europe during the period 2024–2025. This European-origin genotype could represent a new introduction to West Africa. In addition, H9N2 viruses were also identified and were found to be very similar to viruses previously detected in Ghana in 2024, indicating likely continued circulation in the country and/or region.

• North Africa and Middle East
• Within the framework of the Pandemic Fund Tunisia project, a training workshop dedicated to Biosafety, Biosecurity, and biological risk assessment will take place in Tunis on February 2–3, 2026.
• FAO Egypt is planning a One Health simulation exercise on HPAI for 2026 supported by the Pandemic Fund project.

• Asia and the Pacific
• FAO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (RAP) participated in the One Health Workshop on the Multi-Sectoral Prevention and Control of Avian Influenza for the Southeast Asia region held on 20-22 January 2026 in Singapore. [link]
• FAO Indonesia conducted the annual Integrated Virus Monitoring (IVM) networking and management meetings on 18 and 19 December 2025 to review and consolidate national surveillance findings on circulating AIV for the period of July to December 2025. During the meeting, national veterinary health laboratories, private sector partners, and universities presented updates on avian influenza detection, genetic and antigenic characterization, and environmental surveillance. Based on reports shared, no detections of HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b were identified in Indonesia in 2025. The dominant circulating strain remained HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.2.1g, with occasional detections of LPAI H9N2 clade B4.5. These viruses were detected in poultry and environmental samples, including live bird markets (LBM), across multiple provinces, particularly from Java, Lampung, South Sulawesi, and Kalimantan. Environmental and animal surveillance data continue to demonstrate widespread circulation of AIV among chickens, quail, ducks, and Muscovy ducks. Antigenic characterization, including hemagglutination inhibition testing and antigenic cartography, suggests increasing antigenic drift between recent field isolates and the A/chicken/Tanggamus/2017 vaccine strain, as reflected by reduced heterologous HI titres. This finding indicates a potential reduction in vaccine coverage and highlights the need for continued antigenic monitoring and vaccine matching assessment. FAO Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal Disease (ECTAD) Indonesia also facilitated the sharing of human influenza surveillance updates during the IVM meeting. An ILI/SARI cluster reported in Riau Province between September and November 2025 with five fatalities among toddlers was investigated. Laboratory testing confirmed influenza A(H1)pdm09, with no detections of avian influenza subtypes H5 or H7, indicating no evidence of zoonotic avian influenza transmission during the reporting period.
• FAO Subregional Office for the Pacific Islands (SAP) will conduct a poultry value chain assessment in the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) during the second week of November 2025. As part of the mission, avian influenza awareness-raising and preparedness training will be provided to relevant stakeholders.
• FAO Viet Nam will conduct cross-border poultry value chain analysis in four border provinces including Tuyen Quang, Ha Tinh, Dong Thap and An Giang. The activity is also supported by Japan through IOM, with the goal to identify hotspot for AI transmission in conjunction with human movement. The results will be used to guide the training of commune animal health workers and establishing provincial One Health zoonoses response teams.
• From 19-23 January 2026, FAO Cambodia and FAO Viet Nam, in partnership with the General Directorate of Animal Health and Production (GDAHP) of Cambodia and the Department of Animal Health and Production (DAHP) of Viet Nam, are organizing a technical exchange mission in Viet Nam to strengthen preparedness against transboundary animal diseases (TADs). With funding from the Pandemic Fund and IOM, the exchange aims to enhance diagnostic capacity, biosafety practices, and laboratory collaboration under the One Health approach. The mission focuses on priority diseases including HPAI, African swine fever and foot-and-mouth disease, which pose ongoing risks to animal and public health across borders. Through hands-on learning, peer-to-peer exchange, and field visits, the initiative aims to improve early detection and coordinated response in border areas, reinforcing regional health security in the Greater Mekong Sub-region.

• Europe and Central Asia
• A webinar entitled “Estimating the costs of disease outbreaks: Application of the OutCost tool” was held on 13 November. [recording]

Recommendations for affected countries and those at risk

FAO recommends intensified surveillance and awareness raising by national authorities.

General recommendations
It is important to report sick or dead birds – both wild birds and poultry - or wild mammals to local authorities (veterinary services, public health officials, community leaders etc.). These should be tested for avian influenza viruses.

Recommendations to poultry producers
Farmers and poultry producers should step up their biosecurity measures in order to prevent potential virus introduction from wild birds or their faeces.

Recommendations to hunters
Hunting associations and wildlife authorities should be aware that avian influenza viruses might be present in waterfowl and some other species hunted and that hunting, handling and dressing of shot game carries the risk of spreading avian influenza viruses to susceptible poultry.

Recommendations to national authorities
Increase surveillance efforts for the early detection of influenza viruses in poultry and dead wild species including certain mammals.

For full recommendations including non-avian species please see [link].

Important links

• FAO & WOAH Global strategy for the prevention and control of high pathogenicity avian influenza (2024–2033) - Achieving sustainable, resilient poultry production systems
• FAO/WHO/WOAH Updated joint FAO/WHO/WOAH public health assessment of recent influenza A(H5) virus events in animals and people - July 2025
• FAO HPAI website [link]
• FAO Iguaçu statement from the 'Global Science, Policy and Private Sector Dialogue ― Tackling HPAI Together’
• FAO Improving poultry health and productivity - Practical training materials for veterinarians and farmers for better farm management
• FAO Global Farmer Field School Platform
• FAO webinar series on pandemic prevention and response
• FAO Outbreak Costing Tool (OutCosT)
• FAO An evidence-based approach towards improving poultry biosecurity in Ashaiman Municipal District (Greater Accra Region, Ghana)
• FAO Emergencia y respuesta a la influenza aviar de alta patogenicidad H5N1 en América Central, América del Sur y el Caribe - Informe técnico regional para el período octubre de 2022 a septiembre de 2024
• EFSA Avian influenza overview September - November 2025
• OFFLU website
• OFFLU Guidelines for High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus Risk Mitigation in Cattle
• PAHO Epidemiological Update Avian Influenza A(H5N1) in the Americas Region, 24 November 2025
• Scientific Task Force on Avian Influenza and Wild Birds H5N1 High pathogenicity avian influenza in wild birds - Unprecedented conservation impacts and urgent needs
• WHO Influenza at the human-animal interface summary and assessment, 19 December 2025
• WOAH High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza (HPAI) Situation Report 77 - November 2025
• WOAH Wildlife Diseases Situation Report 02/25, Jul–Sep 2025
• The list of wild bird and mammalian species which have been infected with H5Nx HPAI [link]

Note: many publication links have been moved into ‘More important links’ below.

Disclaimer

Information provided herein is current as of the date of issue. Information added or changed since the last Global AIV with Zoonotic Potential situation update appears in orange. Human cases are depicted in the geographic location of their report. For some cases, exposure may have occurred in one geographic location but reported in another. For cases with unknown onset date, reporting date was used instead. FAO compiles information drawn from multiple national (Ministries of Agriculture or Livestock, Ministries of Health, Provincial Government websites; Centers for Disease Prevention and Control [CDC]) and international sources (World Health Organization [WHO], World Organisation for Animal Health [WOAH]), as well as peer reviewed scientific articles. FAO makes every effort to ensure, but does not guarantee, accuracy, completeness or authenticity of the information. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these map(s) do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of FAO concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers and boundaries. Dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.