22 October 2026, 08:30 hours; Rome
This update covers avian influenza viruses (AIV) with zoonotic potential occurring worldwide, i.e. H5Nx, H7Nx high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) viruses and H3N8, H5Nx, H6N1, H7Nx, H9N2, H10Nx and H11 low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI).
Specific information is available for Avian Influenza A(H7N9) virus viruses and Sub-Saharan Africa HPAI in related FAO Avian Influenza situation updates.
HPAI outbreaks in animals officially reported since last update (24 September 2026): in total, 912 outbreaks / events have been reported in 23 countries/territories caused by H5Nx (386), H5N1 (513) and H5N5 (13) (see Table 1 for details).
LPAI events in animals officially reported since the last update: 0 new events were reported.
Number of human cases officially reported since the last update: 6 new events were reported caused by H5N1 (2) and H9N2 (4). [ref1, ref2, ref3]
Map 1. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential observed since 22 July 2026

Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.
Notes: Refer to the disclaimer available on this webpage for the names and boundaries in this map. The final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. The final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Source: United Nations Geospatial. 2020. Map of the World. [Cited October 2026]. Modified with Emergency Prevention System Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i), WOAH and National Authorities data, 2025.
Map 2. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential* observed in the period 1 October 2025 to 30 September 2026

Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.
Notes: Refer to the disclaimer available on this webpage for the names and boundaries in this map. Final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Source: United Nations Geospatial. 2020. Map of the World. [Cited October 2025]. Modified with Emergency Prevention System Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i), WOAH and National Authorities data, 2025.
October – December 2024

January – March 2025

April – June 2025

July – September 2025

Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.
Notes: Refer to the disclaimer available on this webpage for the names and boundaries in this map. Final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Source: United Nations Geospatial. 2020. Map of the World. [Cited October 2025]. Modified with Emergency Prevention System Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i), WOAH and National Authorities data, 2024.
Table 1. High pathogenicity avian influenza viruses with zoonotic potential reported since the last update
| Virus | Country/Area | Last observed outbreak | # events reported since the last update | Total # events reported since 1 Oct. 2026 | Species affected since the last update |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
H5 |
Australia |
17/10/2026 |
65 |
W39 |
Australian Magpie, Australian Raven, Black-faced Cormorant, Common Tern, Flinders Island Black Currawong, Fluttering Shearwater, Forest Raven, Greater Crested Tern, Ibis, Kelp Gull, Little Penguin, Pacific Gull, Raven sp., Shy Albatross, Silver Gull, Terns, White-bellied Sea-Eagle, White-fronted Tern; Australian fur seal, Dolphin, Red Fox, Southern elephant seal |
Belgium |
02/12/2025 |
1 |
1 |
Mallard |
|
China |
07/05/2026 |
1 |
1 |
Unknown species |
|
Republic of Korea |
12/10/2026 |
1 |
1 |
Wild bird faeces |
|
Norway |
25/09/2026 |
1 |
1 |
Greylag Goose |
|
United States of America7 |
14/10/2026R |
317 |
253 |
American black duck, American white pelican, Bald eagle, Black vulture, Blue-winged teal, California gull, Canada goose, Cinnamon teal, Gadwall, Great horned owl, Green-winged teal, Mallard, Northern pintail, Northern shoveler, Peregrine falcon, Redhead duck, Red-tailed hawk, Trumpeter swan, Turkey vulture, Wood duck |
|
H5N1 |
Albania |
09/10/2026 |
1 |
1 |
Duck, goose |
Australia |
18/08/2026 |
351 |
351 |
Australasian Gannet, Australian Magpie, Australian Raven, Black-faced Cormorant, Brown skua, Common Raven, Fluttering Shearwater, Greater Crested Tern, Little Penguin, Little Raven, Pacific Gull, Peregrine Falcon Procellariidae, Silver Gull, Southern Giant Petrel, White-fronted Tern |
|
Belgium |
01/10/2026 |
2 |
2 |
Unknown species |
|
Brazil |
01/10/2026 |
1 |
1 |
Non-poultry birds (multi-species) |
|
Bulgaria |
15/10/2026 |
2 |
2 |
Chicken |
|
Cambodia |
21/09/2026 |
1 |
1 |
Chicken, duck |
|
Canada |
28/09/2026 |
9 |
9 |
Chicken, duck, goose, turkey |
|
Chile |
26/09/2026 |
1 |
1 |
Non-poultry birds |
|
China |
19/10/2026 |
1 |
1 |
Goose |
|
Cyprus |
23/09/2026 |
1 |
1 |
Greylag Goose |
|
Denmark |
14/10/2026 |
5 |
4 |
Common Pheasant, Eurasian Jay, Greylag Goose |
|
Germany |
24/09/2026 |
10 |
9 |
Anatidae, Anserinae, Common Eider, Greater Scaup, Gruidae, Hooded Merganser, Mandarin Duck, Smew, Swan Goose, Wood Duck; Red fox |
|
Honduras |
22/07/2026 |
1 |
1 |
American Black Vulture |
|
Netherlands (Kingdom of the) |
10/09/2026 |
80 |
79 |
Barnacle Goose, Black Swan, Black-headed Gull, Brent Goose, Common Buzzard, Common Redshank, Common Teal, Common Tern, Eurasian Collared-dove, Eurasian Curlew, Eurasian Sparrowhawk, Eurasian Spoonbill, Eurasian Wigeon, Great black-backed Gull, Greater white-fronted Goose, Greylag Goose, Herring Gull, Mallard, Mute Swan, Peregrine Falcon, Pied Avocet, Pink-footed Goose, Sanderling, White Stork |
|
Norway |
12/10/2026 |
7 |
4 |
Anserinae, Greylag Goose, Pink-footed Goose, Whooper Swan |
|
Peru |
05/10/2026 |
1 |
1 |
Chicken |
|
Serbia |
08/10/2026 |
1 |
1 |
Common Buzzard |
|
Sweden |
21/09/2026 |
1 |
1 |
Grey Heron |
|
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland6 |
03/10/2026 |
5 |
5 |
Poultry; European greenfinch, Common pheasant, Red Kite, Sparrow Hawk |
|
United States of America7 |
20/10/2026R |
30 |
28 |
Duck, Turkey, Gamebird, WOAH Non-Poultry, WOAH Poultry; cattle |
|
Viet Nam |
09/10/2026 |
2 |
2 |
Poultry |
|
H5N5 |
Canada |
10/09/2026 |
1 |
1 |
Canada Goose, Common Eider, Glaucous Gull, Iceland Gull |
Iceland |
08/07/2026 |
8 |
8 |
Black-headed Gull, Great black-backed Gull, Great Skua, Laridae, Lesser Black-backed Gull |
|
Norway |
07/10/2026 |
2 |
2 |
Herring Gull; Arctic fox |
|
United Kingdom of Great Britain and NorthernIreland |
03/10/2026 |
2 |
2 |
Poultry; Corvidae |
Data was retrieved from WOAH WAHIS portal and Sharing other important animal health information with WOAH page [link], government websites. Data cutoff time: reported on 22 October 2026, 8:30 CEST. $:estimate. ‡: date of confirmation, R: reported date, §: counting Izumi Wintering Habitat of Cranes (Ramsar) as 1 event. Notes: Only those reporting events in animals since the last update are listed in the table, and those detected since 1 October but did not detect any in September. Codes: D:domestic, C:captivity, W:Wild birds, DF: Dairy farm, E:Environment, M: mammalian species other than humans. For more information, consult dedicated webpage of the: 1: British Antarctic Survey (BAS) [link], 2: Australian Government [link], 3: Canada Food and Inspection Agency [link], 4: TierSeuchenInformationsSystem - Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut [link], 5: Ministry of the Environment [link] 6: Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) [link], 7: USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA/APHIS) [link], 8: Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) [link], 9: The Philippines: Bureau of Animal Industry [link], 10: Brazil: Ministério da Agricultura e Pecuária [link], 11: Indonesia: Laporan Perkembangan Avian Influenza – HPAI [link]. 12: Chile SAG dashboard [link]. 13: Argentina Senasa [link]. 14: Veterinærinstitutte [link]. Bold: the first report of infection in the species. The full list of bird and mammalian species affected by H5Nx HPAI are here.
Domestic
Public health risks and control measures associated with live animal and animal product trade in traditional food markets in low- and middle-income countries: a scoping review. BMJ Public Health, 4(4):e006159. reference
Negotiating security and resilience: planning conundrums for avian influenza control in Great Britain's poultry systems. Environ Res Food Syst, 3(3):035025-35025. reference
Biosecurity risk factors associated with outbreaks of high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) on poultry farms in Lower Saxony (Germany) - A case-control-study. Prev Vet Med, 257:107049. reference
Biosecurity implementation in indoor and outdoor-access broiler production systems in the Netherlands. Poult Sci, 105(12):107951. reference
Highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) in a backyard flock in Serbia: implications of low biosecurity. Front Public Health, 14:1920924. reference
Mobility Network Analysis of the Poultry Sector in Morocco: A Tool for the Surveillance and Prevention of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza. Vet Sci, 13(9):858. reference
Probiotics as a Strategy for Mitigating Viral Infections in Poultry: Immunomodulatory Mechanisms and Therapeutic Potential. Vet Med Sci, 12(6):e71298. reference
Wild
Genomic characterization of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b into wild seabirds from coastal Ecuador. Front Microbiol, 17:1953002. reference
Detection of Divergent Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Clade 2.3.4.4b Virus, Sao Paulo, Brazil, 2025. Emerg Infect Dis, 32(10):1707-1711. reference
Multiple introductions and spread of novel reassortant highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses via wild birds, South Korea, 2024-2025. Vet Res, 57(1):178. reference
Mallard super-shedders of avian influenza exhibit distinct cloacal microbial abundance profiles.Microbiol Spectr, 2026 Oct 6:e0208926. reference
Quantifying iris pigmentation irregularities following an avian influenza outbreak: implications for population-level disease surveillance in a colonial seabird. Conserv Physiol, 14(1):coag069. reference
Avian cholera causes mass mortality at penguin mega-colonies amid H5N1 HPAI outbreaks in Antarctica. Proc Biol Sci, 293(2080):20261271. reference
Avian influenza overview June-August 2026. EFSA J, 24(9):e10369. reference
The Role of Wildlife and Climate Change in the Emergence of One Health-Related Viral Diseases in Australia. Viruses, 18(9):1001. reference
Avian Influenza Panzootic Calls for Integrating Available Movement Data Into Epidemiological Management. Influenza Other Respir Viruses, 20(10):e70330. reference
Mammal
Evidence of Exposure to Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5 Viruses in East Greenland Polar Bears. Emerg Infect Dis, 32(11). reference
Evidence for exposure to and infection with H5 clade 2.3.4.4b highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses among polar bears inhabiting Alaska. iScience, 29(10):117736. reference
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus Subtype 5 in Cetaceans, Brazil. Emerg Infect Dis, 32(10):1746-1749. reference
Whole genome sequences of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza viruses detected in felines in Bangladesh. Microbiol Resour Announc, 2026 Oct 16:e0083526. reference
Clinical Course, Laboratory Findings, and Tissue Distribution of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus in a Naturally Infected Domestic Cat. Viruses, 18(9):1031. reference
Detection of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus in Cat and Rats during Outbreak in Backyard Poultry, United States, 2025. Emerg Infect Dis, 32(10):1721-1725. reference
Infection and transmission dynamics of bovine and human influenza A H5N1 viruses in mouse and hamster models. J Virol, 2026 Oct 6:e0104426. reference
How can veterinary personnel recognize and protect themselves from domestic cats infected with highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses? J Am Vet Med Assoc, 2026 Oct 2:1-4. reference
A caprine mammary infection model for highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1. Sci Adv, 12(42):eaei3111. reference
Dairy & human
Detection of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus, clade 2.3.4.4b, genotype B3.13 in placentas from aborted bovine fetuses. J Vet Diagn Invest, 2026 Sep 30:10406387261483207. reference
H5N1 epidemiology and production impact in eight California dairy herds at the outbreak epicenter. Prev Vet Med, 257:107022. reference
Dairy producers' perceptions of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 and their influence on implementation of biosecurity changes. J Dairy Sci, 2026 Oct 9:S0022-0302(26)03357-6. reference
Livestock production intensity and mucosal IgA and IgG responses to H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza A virus, North Carolina, 2021-2022. medRxiv, 2026 Aug 10:2026.08.06.26359901.Preprint reference
Distinct influenza interfaces in cattle: repeated spillovers of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) from wild birds and enzootic circulation of influenza D virus. Front Cell Infect Microbiol, 16:1957795. reference
Diminished sialoside binding in novel H5N1 influenza hemagglutinin variants identified in a human patient. Nat Commun, 17(1):9972. reference
Virus
Avian influenza A virus polymerase gene leads to temperature-resistant genome replication. J Virol, 2026 Oct 13:e0097826. reference
Genetic Characteristics and Pathogenicity of Recent G4 Eurasian Avian-like H1N1 Swine Influenza Viruses in China. Vet Sci, 13(9):936. reference
Molecular Epidemiology and Evolution of Swine Influenza A Viruses, Vietnam, 2020-2024. Emerg Infect Dis, 32(10):1609-1620. reference
Nomenclature Updates to the Hemagglutinin Gene Clade Designations Resulting From the Continued Evolution of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza A(H5) Virus Clades 2.3.2.1c and 2.3.4.4. Influenza Other Respir Viruses, 20(10):e70317. reference
In silico analysis of pH stabilising mutations of hemagglutinin of influenza A virus H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b. Npj Viruses, 4(1):44. reference
Genetic characterization of highly similar H9N2 viruses isolated from swine and poultry in China. Microb Pathog, 221:108868. reference
H9N2 avian influenza virus in Muscovy ducks: a nationwide epidemiological survey and vaccine efficacy assessment. Vet Res, 57(1):183. reference
Global Patterns of Geographic Distribution, Temporal Trends, Host Spectrum, and Molecular Variation of H9N2 Avian Influenza Virus, 1966-2023. Viruses, 18(9):977. reference
Epidemiological and Phylogenetic Analysis of Reassorted H10Nx Avian Influenza Viruses in Guangdong Province, China. Influenza Other Respir Viruses, 20(9):e70320. reference
Pattern recognition receptors and divergent disease severity in zoonotic viral infections. J Biol Chem, 2026 Oct 8:113618. reference
Influenza virus research in an era of emerging respiratory threats: host-virus interactions, surveillance technologies, antiviral management and resistance, and vaccine preparedness. Front Microbiol, 17:1949447. reference
Self-amplifying RNA technology: a breakthrough in veterinary medicine for livestock and wildlife. Sci Tech Rev, 45:3789. reference
Assay, Assessment & disinfectant
DNA triangular prism-engineered multicolor chemiluminescence capsules for multiplexed visual detection of nucleic acid biomarkers. J Mater Chem B, 2026 Oct 9. reference
Streamlined CRISPR-based assays for detection and subtyping of H5 and H7 avian influenza. iScience, 29(10):117556. reference
Establishment and preliminary evaluation of an RT-ERA combined with CRISPR/Cas12a assay for detection of H5 and H7 influenza viruses. Front Cell Infect Microbiol, 16:1922968. reference
Breaking the channel barrier: same-fluorescence, different-Tm probe strategy enables seven-target respiratory virus detection on a six-channel PCR platform within 20 minutes. Anal Chim Acta, 1423:346181. reference
Species-Agnostic Tools for HPAI H5N1 Antibody and Antigen Detection in Dairy Cows, Chickens, and Humans. Res Sq, 2026 Sep 13:rs.3.rs-10656302. reference Preprint
Environmental surveillance: harnessing environmental sample data to protect animal health. Front Vet Sci, 13:1965480. reference
Leakage-safe weekly risk mapping of highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreaks in domestic poultry in Japan using open outbreak, meteorological, and geospatial data. Prev Vet Med, 257:107024. reference
Virus-Dependent Relative Contributions of Citric Acid and Benzalkonium Chloride to the Virucidal Efficacy of Combination Disinfectants. Microorganisms, 14(9):1873. reference
Overview & opinion
The Risk of an H5N1 Influenza Pandemic. Annu Rev Med, 2026 Oct 16. reference
Zoonotic Viral Spillover: From Reservoir Ecology and Viral Evolution to Pandemic Prevention. Virus Res, 2026 Oct 15:199818. reference
If the EU is serious about One Health, it must ban fur farming. Lancet Reg Health Eur, 69:101848. reference
America
Asia
North Africa and Middle East
Sub-Saharan Africa
Figure 1. Number of countries reported HPAI since 1 October 2026 by subtype (left) and by region (right) as of 21 October 2026

Source: WOAH WAHIS portal, government and publications.
Table 2. Epidemiological overview for avian influenza viruses viruses known to have caused zoonotic infections in the past 20 years
Subtype | Epidemiological situation overview |
|---|---|
H5Nx Gs/GD HPAI (1996) | High pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) of the H5N1 subtype were detected in geese in Guangdong Province, China in 1996. Viruses related to but not directly descended from A/Goose/Guangdong/1/96 (Gs/GD), the virus identified in China at the time have persisted, as high pathogenicity viruses Gs/GD-related HPAIVs have caused outbreaks in poultry across all regions globally other than Oceania. The initial viruses in this lineage were of the A(H5N1) subtype but other subtypes (including H5N2, H5N3 H5N5, H5N6, H5N8) have emerged, mainly in the past 10 years, as a result of reassortment with other avian influenza viruses. The common feature of these viruses is an HA gene related back to the original Gs/GD/96 virus. The HA gene of these viruses has evolved over the past 28 years, initially into 10 clades (clade 0 to 9) of which descendents of clade 2 viruses are the only ones that continue to circulate. Multiple 5th order clades persist such as the one that is currently dominant globally – clade 2.3.4.4b - whereas others have emerged and disappeared. Multiple genotypes carrying different combinations of the eight influenza A segmented genes have emerged in Gs/GD-related viruses, as a result of co-infection of birds with different avian influenza viruses that facilitated reassortment. Of considerable significance in the past has been reassortment with enzootic A(H9N2) viruses. Eurasian lineage clade 2.3.4.4b viruses formed multiple genotypes and those that crossed to North America have reassorted with North American wild bird avian influenza viruses to produced additional genotypes. Two separate systems for naming genotypes of clade 2.3.4.4b have been developed for Eurasian and North American viruses (Fusaro, et al., 2024, Youk, et al., 2023). The clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1) viruses detected in dairy cattle in North America in 2024 fell initially within genotype B3.13 [link] and more recently genotype D1.1 [link] using the North American naming system. Some Gs/GD-related viruses have produced severe zoonotic infections in humans, first identified in 1997 when an A(H5N1) clade 0 virus in Hong Kong SAR, China caused disease outbreaks in poultry in farms and markets as well as severe disease in humans. In several cases there was some evidence of limited onward transmission in humans and this event raised concerns that it might be the beginning of a human influenza pandemic. Despite the successful efforts to eradicate this particular strain, other Gs/GD-related viruses persisted and evolved in China, becoming more adept at infecting domestic ducks. By 2003 spread of these viruses via wild birds and live bird trade occurred across East and Southeast Asia, resulting in additional zoonotic infection in humans [link]. The important role of wild birds in the transmission of these viruses over long distances became apparent in 2005 when Gs/GD-related HPAIVs (clade 2.2) spread, primarily via wild birds, across Eurasia, and parts of Africa from western China. Most high-income countries eliminated this virus from poultry, but it persisted in several low and middle- income countries. Gs/GD-related viruses continued to evolve and spread. Additional intercontinental waves of transmission have occurred with the two most significant being those in 2014 (clade 2.3.4.4c) and from 2016 onwards (clade 2.3.4.4b). The clade 2.3.4.4b wave commenced in Asia and spread to Europe and Africa. In 2020, that also resulted in spread of these viruses to North America (2014-15 and 2021-22), with the latest outbreak extending through central and South America and to sub-Antarctic islands. In 2022/2023, H5N1 2.3.4.4b caused extensive infection in coastal seabirds and mass die-offs of numerous ecologically important wild bird species. . In 2026, H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b virus reached Australia and New Zealand, with evidence suggesting introduction through migratory wild birds originating from sub‑Antarctic/Antarctic zones. Since 2024, H5N1 2.3.4.4b caused infection in goats (1 farm), alpaca (1 backyard farm), swine (1 farm) and dairy cattle (1 190 farms in 20 states, as of 21 October 2026) in the United States of America, see HERE. In 2025, H5N1 2.3.4.4b caused infection in sheep in the United Kingdom, see HERE; and H5 antibodies were also found in sheep in Norway. [link1, link2] Clade 2.3.4.4b A (H5N1) viruses have caused few human cases but have resulted in multiple mammalian cases including aquatic mammals. For an updated list of bird and mammalian species affected with A(H5Nx) see HERE. Among the other Gs/GD-related virus clades that remain endemic in specific areas are clade 2.3.2.1a H5N1 viruses that have persisted in South Asia since 2010 and rarely associated with disease in humans. Clade 2.3.2.1g viruses have been present in Indonesia since 2012 and clade 2.3.2.1c/e viruses are still circulating in Cambodia, Viet Nam and Lao People’s Democratic Republic. A novel reassortant influenza A(H5N1) virus has been detected in poultry in Cambodia (since 2023), Lao People's Democratic Republic and Viet Nam (since 2022) and was also detected in the human cases reported from Cambodia since late 2023 and Viet Nam in 2024. This virus contains the surface proteins from clade 2.3.2.1c that has circulated locally, but internal genes from a more recent clade 2.3.4.4b virus. [link] For an updated list of confirmed human cases with A(H5N1) see HERE and HERE. In addition, since the first human case of A(H5N6) was reported in Sichuan, China in 2014, 94 human cases have been associated with clade 2.3.4.4b and 2.3.4.4h A(H5N6) viruses with most of these occurring in 2021 and 2022 [link]. The first human cases (asymptomatic) of A(H5N8) were reported in Astrakhan Oblast, Russian Federation [link] in adults who engaged in depopulation on a layer farm due to H5N8 HPAI in December 2020 [link]. The influenza A(H5N8) viruses isolated from this poultry outbreak in Astrakhan belonged to clade 2.3.4.4b [GISAID EPI_ISL_1038924]; the first human case (fatal) of A(H5N5) was reported in November 2025 in the United States of America with reported exposure to poultry. [link] |
| Avian origin H3N8 LPAI | An Influenza A(H3N8) virus lineage emerged in live bird markets in southern China in mid-2021. Since then, three human cases of Influenza A(H3N8) have been reported: In April 2022, the first human clinical case associated with this lineage was reported in Henan Province, China and was associated with severe disease [link]. In May 2022, a 5-year-old boy was diagnosed with a mild influenza A(H3N8) infection in Changsha City, Hunan Province, China. On 27 March 2023, a third human case was reported from Guangdong Province, China in a 56-year-old female with underlying illness who subsequently died. One of the A(H3N8) viruses isolated from a human was found to be transmissible by air in ferrets [link] but no evidence of sustained human transmission has been reported. |
H5N5 HPAI (2025) | One human case in China with reported exposure to poultry. [link] |
H7N4 LPAI (2017) | The first human case (fatal) was reported in November 2025 in the United States of America with reported exposure to poultry. [link] |
H7N7 LPAI | One human case of H7N7 was reported in a duck farmer in Taiwan Province of China. More than 90 cases have been reported since 1959, mostly mild with one fatal case. [link] |
H7N9 LPAI (2013) & HPAI (2017) | Reported only in China with over 1 000 human cases between 2013 and 2017 with a marked increase in 2017 compared to previous waves. Most human cases exposed in live bird markets. Nation-wide vaccination campaign in poultry since Sep 2017: Last reported human case in 2019 [link]. See FAO H7N9 situation update Figure 5. |
| H9N2 LPAI | First human case reported in 1998. To date, 185 influenza A(H9N2) human cases diagnosed worldwide, many of them were reported from China since December 2015. Most cases mild and involving children. Only two fatal cases reported. [link] Endemic in multiple countries in Africa and Asia, a cause of significant production losses and mortalities in poultry production systems. Three major lineages and multiple genotypes. |
| H10Nx LPAI | To date, seven influenza A(H10N3) human infections have been reported globally [link]. In May 2021, the first case in Jiangsu Province, China [link], then in Zhejiang (2022), Yunnan and Guangxi (2024) and Shaanxi and Guangdong (2025) provinces in China. The first influenza A(H10N5) human infection was reported in Zhejiang Province, China [link]. Since 2013, three influenza A(H10N8) human infections have been reported in Jiangxi Province, China. [link] |
For high-level, the recommendations from the FAO Global Dialogue - Tackling high pathogenicity avian influenza together provide a clear framework for coordinated science-based actions on Early detection, Rapid response, Biosecurity, Vaccination, Business and trade dimensions, One Health and systems-based approaches, Public-private partnerships.
For grass root level. the practical recommendations for day-to-day activities are suggested below to mitigate risk and reduce impact of HPAI.
General recommendations
It is important to report sick or dead birds – both wild birds and poultry - or wild mammals to local authorities (veterinary services, public health officials, community leaders etc.). These should be tested for avian
influenza viruses.
Recommendations to poultry producers
Farmers and poultry producers should step up their biosecurity measures in order to prevent potential virus introduction from wild birds or their faeces.
For full recommendations including non-avian species please see [link].
Note: many publication links have been moved into ‘More important links’ below.
Next issue: 26 Nov. 2026
Information provided herein is current as of the date of issue. Information added or changed since the last Global AIV with Zoonotic Potential situation update appears in orange. Human cases are depicted in the geographic location of their report. For some cases, exposure may have occurred in one geographic location but reported in another. For cases with unknown onset date, reporting date was used instead. FAO compiles information drawn from multiple national (Ministries of Agriculture or Livestock, Ministries of Health, Provincial Government websites; Centers for Disease Prevention and Control [CDC]) and international sources (World Health Organization [WHO], World Organisation for Animal Health [WOAH]), as well as peer reviewed scientific articles. FAO makes every effort to ensure, but does not guarantee, accuracy, completeness or authenticity of the information. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these map(s) do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of FAO concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers and boundaries. Dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.
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