Map 1. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential observed since 1 October 2025 (i.e. current wave)

Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.

Notes: Refer to the disclaimer available on this webpage for the names and boundaries in this map. The final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. The final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Source: United Nations Geospatial. 2020. Map of the World. [Cited June 2026]. Modified with GLW 4 data and Emergency Prevention System Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i), WOAH and National Authorities data, 2025.

Map 2. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential* observed in the period 1 October 2024 to 30 September 2025 (i.e. previous wave)

Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.

Notes: Refer to the disclaimer available on this webpage for the names and boundaries in this map. Final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Source: United Nations Geospatial. 2020. Map of the World. [Cited October 2025]. Modified with GLW 4 data and Emergency Prevention System Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i), WOAH and National Authorities data, 2024.

Recent publications

OVERVIEW

Giacinti, J.A., Signore, A., Torchetti, M., Enrique Valdez-Gómez, H., Javier Alcazar-Ramiro, C., Berhane, Y., Bevins S, et al. 2026. North American perspective on the highly pathogenic avian influenza H5Nx clade 2.3.4.4b outbreak (November 2021 - March 2025). Can J Microbiol, 2026 May 11. [reference]

Brown, I.H. 2026. The Gordon Memorial Lecture: A paradigm shift in high pathogenicity avian influenza and perspectives for the future. Br Poult Sci, 1-19. [reference]

Mohammad, I., Hajelbashir, M.I., El-Bidawy, M.H., Abuderman, A., Satea, M., Arafah, A.M.R., Ansari, M.R., et al. 2026. Deciphering HPAI Influenza A Virus (H5N1): Molecular Basis of Pathogenicity, Zoonotic Potential, and Advances in Vaccination Strategies. Viruses, 18(4):410. [reference]

DOMESTIC

Meseko, C., Zecchin, B., Go-Maro, E.W., Dianati, M., Mkpuma, N., Inuwa, B., Bakam, J., et al. 2026. Emergence and Rapid Spread of a New Reassortant High Pathogenicity H5N1 Clade 2.3.4.4b Avian Influenza Virus in Nigeria. Influenza Other Respir Viruses, 20(5): e70260. [reference]

Oremush, R., Aubry, P., Parmley, E.J., Poljak, Z. & Greer, A. 2026. Determining the Environmental and Ecological Factors Associated With Poultry Farm Spillover of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (H5N1) in British Columbia, Canada. Zoonoses Public Health, 2026 May 15. [reference]

Crespo-Bellido, A., Trovão, N.S., Puryear, W., Maksiaev, A., Pekar, J.E., Baele, G., Dellicour, S. & Nelson MI. 2026. Emergence of D1.1 reassortant H5N1 avian influenza viruses in North America. bioRxiv, 2026 Apr 20:2025.12.19.695329. [reference] Preprint

Chang, T., Lee, S., Kim, J.I. & Min, K.-D. 2026. Spatiotemporal Dynamics of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5 Virus Introductions and Regional Spread in the Republic of Korea. BioRxiv, 2026.05.21.726857 [reference] Preprint

Chen, L.H., Lin, Y.J., Liu, Y.P., Li, W.C., Tu, Y.C., Hu, S.C., Hsu, W.C., et al. 2026. Distinct infectivity, pathogenicity, and adaptive evolution of clade 2.3.4.4 H5N2 avian influenza viruses in chickens in Taiwan. Poult Sci, 105(7):106913. [reference]

Goujgoulova, G., Stoimenov, G. & Koev, K. 2026. Molecular Characterization of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 Viruses Circulating in Bulgaria During 2024-2025: Evidence for Hidden Circulation and Zoonotic Risk Markers. Int J Mol Sci, 27(4):1711. [reference]

Höller, P., Asp, E., Pärssinen, J., Phouthana, V., Soulinthone, N., Keopaseuth, S., Chanda, K., Ling, J., Lindahl, J.F. & Naguib, M.M. 2026. Avian influenza and coronaviruses in live animal and wet markets in Laos: prevalence and public health considerations. Front Cell Infect Microbiol, 16:1786183. [reference]

Hartady, T., Sugandi, S.D. & Viqih, M. 2026. A Case of Avian Influenza Co-Infection and Multifactorial Diseases in a Broiler Chicken Farm in Majalengka, West Java, Indonesia. Vet Sci, 13(4):364. [reference]

Briand, F.X., Martenot, C., Massin, P., Cherbonnel, M., Orosco, A., Souchaud, F., Louboutin, K., et al. 2026. Re-emergence of a highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus of clade 2.3.4.4b in poultry in France. Infect Genet Evol, 142:105958.  [reference]

Chen, Y., Xiong, J., Wang, Y., Huang, S., Fan, M., Yang, H., Hu, Z., et al. 2026. Host Factors Potentially Contributing to Increased Susceptibility in Certain Layer Chicken Lines. Curr Issues Mol Biol, 48(4):359. [reference]

EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ). 2026. Risk to public and/or animal health of the treatment of dead-in-shell chicks (Category 2 material) to be used as raw material for the production of biogas or compost with Category 3 approved method. EFSA J, 13(11):4306. [reference]

WILD

Günther, A., Herrmann, C., Sehl-Ewert, J., Piro, S., Ahrens, A.K., Calvelage, S., Pohlmann, A., Beer, M. & Harder, T. 2026. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Clade 2.3.4.4b Virus and Mass Mortality in Eurasian Cranes, Germany, 2025. Emerg Infect Dis, 32(5): 779-783. [reference]

Benedetti, E., Artuso, M.C., Byrne, A., Garibotto, M.B., Avaro, M., Piccini, L., Chamorro, A., et al. 2026. Emergence and Evolution of Triple Reassortant Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus, Argentina, 2025. Viruses, 18(5):525. [reference]

Marandino, A., Tomás, G., Panzera, Y., Uriarte, V., Russi, V., Pérez, R., et al. 2026. Reassortant High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Viruses During the Reemergence in Uruguay Suggest Increasing Genetic Diversity in South America. Viruses, 18(5):558. [reference]

Clessin, A., Brusselmans, M., Hong, S.L., Tornos, J., Lejeune, M., Shao, Y., Briand, F.X., et al. 2026. Dispersal, adaptation and persistence of H5N1 in the sub-Antarctic and Antarctica. bioRxiv, 2026 Mar 31:2026.03.20.713283. [reference] Preprint

Vanstreels, R.E.T., Serafini, P.P., Giacinti, J., Younger, J., Huyvaert, K.P., Wille, M., Roberts, L., Gamble, A. & Uhart, M.M. 2026. A public database to monitor the spread and impacts of high pathogenicity avian influenza viruses on albatrosses and petrels. Biodivers Data J, 2026 May 15;14:e186836. [reference & reference]

Provencher, J.F., Morrill, A., Hennin, H.L., Giacinti, J.A., Berhane, Y., Zhmendak, D., Xu, W., Love, O.P., Forbes, M.R. & Gilchrist, H.G. 2026. Interannual differences in common eider duck exposure to avian influenza viruses at an Arctic colony. Conserv Physiol, 14(1): coag033. [reference]

Knief, U., Bouwhuis, S., Globig, A., Günther, A. & Courtens W. 2026. Counting cases, conserving species: addressing highly pathogenic avian influenza in wildlife. Biol Rev Camb Philos Soc, 2026 May 8. [reference]

Wang, X., Ling, Z., Chen, X., Mishra, S. & Dong, L. Host-Pathogen Network and Eco-Evolutionary Drivers of Avian Influenza Transmission in Wild Birds. Ecol Lett, 29(6):e70391. [reference]

MAMMAL

Günther, A., Wassermann, J., Heck, J., Bussi, M., Aebischer, A., Staubach, C., Bergmann, H., et al. 2026. Serologic Surveillance of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus Subtype H5 in Wildlife, Northeast Germany, 2023-2025. Emerg Infect Dis, 32(5). [reference]

Dressler, A., Wagner-Wiening, C., Tegtmeyer, B., Haag-Milz, S., Demattio, B., Dürrwald, R., Harder, T., Salditt, A.& Köster, J. 2026. Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) in poultry and domestic cats and occupational exposure among veterinary and other first responders, Germany, February 2026. Euro Surveill, 31(17). [reference]

Quirk, G.E., Vu, M.N., Le Sage, V., Bushfield-Thomason, K., Nguyen, H.D.& Lakdawala, S.S. 2026. Variable transmission efficiency of mammalian origin HPAI D1.1 H5N1 strains in ferrets. bioRxiv, 2026.05.07.722809.  [reference] Preprint

Wong, F.Y., Cronin, P., Zhang, R., Hidano, A., Siegers, J.Y., Low, D.H.W., Holt, H., et al. 2026. Multiplex serological profiling reveals diverse avian and mammalian influenza A virus exposure in swine. iScience, 29(5):115743. [reference]
DAIRY
Lee, C., Tarbuck, N.N., Cochran, H.J., Foreman, B.M., Boley, P., Khatiwada, S., Dhakal, A., et al. 2026. Dairy cows infected with influenza A(H5N1) reveals low infectious dose and transmission barriers. Nat Commun, 2026 May 24. [reference]

Puchades-Colera, P., Girón-Guzmán, I., Moragas, G.S., Pérez-Cataluña, A. 2026. Methods for detecting highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus in dairy processing environments. Front Microbiol Sec. Food Microbiology [reference]

Malladi, S., Carestia, A., Seys, S.A., Ssematimba, A., Leone, W., Remmenga, M., Stenkamp-Strahm, C., Lombard, J.E. 2026. Estimating the Within-herd Transmission Rate of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 Virus in a Dairy Herd using an Approximate Bayesian Computation Approach. J Dairy Sci, 2026 May 18:S0022-0302(26)02842-0. [reference]

Ding, K. & Ding, Y. 2026. H5N1 avian influenza in dairy cattle: Molecular adaptation, transmission mechanisms, and control strategies. Virology, 621:110927. [reference]

Wiggins, J., Madapong, A. & Weaver, E.A. 2026. Dual-route H5N1 vaccination induces systemic and mucosal immunity in murine and bovine models. NPJ Vaccines, 2026 Apr 21. [reference]

Stenkamp-Strahm, C., Melody, B., Brinson, P., McCluskey, B. & Lombard, J. 2026. A longitudinal study of influenza A viral detection in bulk tank and pen-level milk collected from dairy farms in California affected by Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1. J Dairy Sci, 2026 May 4:S0022-0302(26)01737-6. [reference]

Schafers, J., Warren, C.J., Yang, J., Zhang, J., Cole, S.J., Cooper, J., Drewek, K., et al. 2026. Stability of influenza viruses in the milk of cows and sheep. J Gen Virol, 107(5):002257. [reference]

Miller, M.R., Frost, K., Smith, E.L., Jin, Y., Ulaszek, J., Kmet, M., Hettwer, K., et al. 2026. Evaluation of PCR-Based H5N1 Influenza Detection Methods in Milk from an Inter-laboratory Comparison Study Demonstrating Method-Dependent Sensitivity Variability. J Food Prot, 2026 May 6:100798. [reference]

HUMAN

Nguyen, P.N.T., Hung, N.T., Minh, N.N.Q., Hong, N.T.T., Huong, N.T.T., Hiep, C.M., Nhan, L.N.T., et al. 2026. Central Nervous System Involvement by Novel Clade 2.3.2.1e H5N1 Avian Influenza Virus in a Paediatric Patient. Open Forum Infectious Diseases, ofag283. [reference]

Kibiger, L., Oltean, H.N., Leitz, L., Krause, E., Barrett, D., Halloran, A., Yomogida, K., et al. 2026. Fatal Human Case of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N5) in a Backyard Flock Owner - Washington, November 2025. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep, 75(17):221-225. [reference]

Vaughan, A., Joyce, A., Traub, E., Jae, M., Beeler, E., Paiva, E., Ananian, K., et al. 2026. Serologic Evidence of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus Infection in a Veterinary Professional Exposed to an Infected Domestic Cat - Los Angeles County, California, December 2024-January 2025. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep, 75(17):215-220. [reference]

Cordero-Ortiz, M., Solís-Hernández, M., Cayetano-Mondragón, M., Guzmán, N.C., Valenzuela, O., Mata-Haro, V., Giménez-Lirola, L.G. & Hernández, J. 2026. Antibody Recognition of Highly and Low-Pathogenic A/H5Nx Influenza Viruses in Sera of Mexican Donors. Pathogens, 15(4):352. [reference]

Lite, T.L., Goya, S., Davis, M.L., Morris, A.E., Bryson-Cahn, C., Vengerovsky, A., Corpuz, C.G., et al. 2026. Human Infection with Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N5) Virus. N Engl J Med, 2026 May 7. [reference]

Vargas-Maldonado, N., Shetty, N., Ferreri, L.M., Pauly, M.D., Patatanian, K., Danzy, S., Shephard, M.J., et al. 2026. Controlled human influenza infection reveals heterogeneous expulsion of infectious virus into air. Cell, 189(10):2834-2844.e23. [reference]

Budt, M., Barac, I., Kohs, J., Krischuns, T., Naffakh, N. & Wolff, T. 2026. Historical Pandemic and Contemporary Influenza A Viruses Reveal PB2 M631L as a Convergent Adaptation to Human ANP32. Microorganisms, 14(4):859. [reference]

Gill, D. & Oxford, J. 2026. The 'Spanish' influenza pandemic: new evidence for influenza outbreaks in England and France prior to 1918. Med Hist, 2026 Apr 22:1-20. [reference]

Wang, W., Xing, J., Jiang, H., Lu, F., Huang, H., Zhang, Y., Sun, A., et al. 2026. Human infections with avian influenza A(H5) viruses with potential pandemic risk: 1997-2025. Natl Sci Rev, 13(7):nwaf471. [reference]

VIRUS

Oh, H. 2026. Fever as thermal barrier: avian‑origin PB1 enables influenza A viruses to overcome mammalian febrile defense. Signal Transduct Target Ther, 11(1):187. [reference]

Steiner, J., Mwanga, M., Oberholster, L., Licheri, M., Licheri, M.F., Nathues, H., Dijkman, R. & Kelly, J.N. 2026. Concurrent Detection of Swine-Origin Influenza A(H1N1) Virus in Pigs and Farmer, Switzerland. Emerg Infect Dis, 32(6). [reference]

Zhao, Y., Liu, C., Xia, C., Li, Y., Wang, Y., Hou, B., Gao, H., et al. 2026. Genetic characterization of a novel triple-reassortant influenza A (H1N2) virus from pigs, China, 2021. Front Microbiol, 17:1779293. [reference]

Daines, R., Sadeyen, J.-R., Chang, P. & Iqbal, M. 2026. Mapping hemagglutinin residues driving antigenic diversity in H5Nx avian influenza viruses. J Virol, 2026 Apr 30:e0009526. [reference]

Miao, X., Zhao, X., Zhang, N., Yin, Y., Xu, X., Wang, J., Chen, S., Wu, H., Peng, D., Qin, T. & Liu, X. 2026. Surveillance and biological characterization of H3 subtype avian influenza viruses in Eastern China. Virulence, 17(1):2673657.  [reference]

Yehia, N., Ibrahim, M., Shady, R.M., Mohamed, A.A.E., Said, D., Taha, M.E., Arafa, A., et al. 2026. Concurrent circulation of avian influenza viruses H5N1 and H9N2 enhances the genetic evolution of reassortant viruses in Egyptian poultry populations. PLoS One, 21(5):e0348609. [reference]

Deng, L., Shah, T., Wang, Y., Cheng, P., Kui, Y., Wang, B. & Xia, X. 2026. Characterization and Genetic Evolution of H6N2 Subtype AIV Isolates from Aquatic Birds. Microorganisms, 14(4):895. [reference]

Shen, J., Liu, L., Zhang, N., Guan, M., Zhang, Y., Cui, P., Lin, W., et al. 2026. Genesis and biological features of H7 avian influenza viruses in migratory birds and implications for cross-species infection. Journal of Integrative Agriculture, 2026. [reference]

Qu, R., Yang, L., Li, S., Chen, C., Zhang, H., Cao, K., Zhou, W., et al. 2026. Disentangling the drivers and host-mediated global spread of H7 influenza A virus. Nat Commun, 2026 May 6. [reference]

Chen, X., Liu, H., Jiang, L., Hong, X., Kong, M., Wang, X., Hu, Z., et al. 2026. PA-X I94V mutation modulates the pathogenicity of the highly pathogenic H7N9 influenza A virus in mice and chickens. Vet Microbiol, 319:111044.  [reference]

Zhao, Y., Liu, C., Li, Y., Wang, Y., Hou, B., Gao, H., Liu, Z., et al. 2026. Genetic and biological characterization of H9N2 avian influenza viruses isolated from swine in China. BMC Vet Res, 2026 May 8. [reference]

Garcia-Glaessner, A., Crespo-Bellido, A., Muñoz-Saavedra, B., Juarez, D., Barrera, P., Salmon-Mulanovich, G. & Checahuari-Jarata, S.E. 2026. Outbreak of H9N2 avian influenza viruses in lesser rhea in Peru, June-July 2025. BioRxiv, 2026.05.08.723762 [reference] Preprint

Mu, Y., Wang, X., Xu, J., Yang, Y., Wang, J., Liu, J. & Chen, L. 2026. Pathogen identification and analysis of broiler bronchial obstruction syndrome using high-throughput sequencing technology. Poult Sci, 105(8):107032. [reference]

Pariani, E., Puzelli, S., Del Castillo, G., Romano, G., Mezzadri, L., Galli, C., Sciabica, I.M., et al. 2026. Collaborating Centres’ Study Group on Influenza. Imported case of avian influenza A(H9N2) virus infection in a patient with miliary tuberculosis, Italy, March 2026. Euro Surveill, 31(15):2600285. [reference]

Bhat, S., Sadeyen, J.R., Yang, J., Chrzastek, K., Karunarathna, T.K., Schlachter, A.L., Qureshi, M., et al. 2026. A G57 (BJ/94-like) H9N2 avian influenza virus exhibits enhanced replication and tissue dissemination in chickens compared with a G1-B virus. J Gen Virol, 107(5). [reference]

Liu, Z., Fan, M., Zheng, Y., Zeng, Y., Hou, C. & Ping, J. 2026. Gga-miR-449c suppresses H9N2 influenza virus replication via targeting the viral genome and suppressor of cytokine signaling 3. Int J Biol Macromol, 2026 May 12:152524. [reference]

Singh, G., Bhavsar, D., Ferreri, L.M., Nardulli, J.R., Gleason, C., Lyttle, N., Chen, Y., Lowen, A.C., Simon, V. & Krammer, F. 2026. Cross-reactive human antibody responses to H9N2 influenza virus, New York, United States, 2025. Euro Surveill, 31(20). [reference]

Wang, W., Yang, F., Liu, K., Cai, M., Guo, Y., Duan, X., Fang, Z., Olovo, C.V., Shi, W., Liu, S., Zhou, J., Wang, X. & Zhang, P. 2026. A mouse model of human-derived H10N3 influenza enables preclinical evaluation of antiviral efficacy. Antiviral Res, 2026 May 18:106436. [reference]

Zhu, M., Wang, R., Li, X., Zhou, H. & Chen, Y. 2026. Canine influenza virus at the human-animal interface: origins, adaptive evolution, and implications for public health. Virology, 621:110943. [reference]

ASSAY

Frederick, J.C., Lacek, K.A., Wersebe, M.J., Shu, B., Keong, L.M., DaSilva, J., Wilson, M.M., et al. 2026. Next-Generation Sequencing Strategies During the 2024-2025 Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Emergency Response in the U.S. Viruses, 18(4):482. [reference]

Shao, Y., Suchard, M.A., Rambaut, A., Ji, X., Lemey, P., Vasylyeva, T.I.& Baele, G. 2026. Parallel algorithms for phylogenetic inference under a structured coalescent approximation. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 123(18):e2602412123.  [reference]

Perlas, A., Reska, T., Sánchez-Cano, A., Mejías-Molina, C., Gygax, D., Martínez-Puchol, S., Rusiñol, M., et al. 2026. Real-time genomic pathogen, resistance, and host range characterization from passive water sampling of wetland ecosystems. Appl Environ Microbiol, 2026 Apr 24:e0254325. [reference]

ASSESSMENT/MODELLING

Rolfes, M.A., Bauck, L., Lipton, B.A., Margrey, S.F., Campagna, R.A., Harker, E., Basler, C.A., et al. 2026. Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices Regarding Avian Influenza Among Owners of Backyard Flocks - United States, July-December 2025. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep, 75(18):234-239. [reference]

Chanchaidechachai, T., Stegeman, A., Velkers, F.C., Gonzales, J.L. & Fischer, E.A.J. 2026. Assessing the impact of outdoor farming, farm size, and farm density on highly pathogenic avian influenza epidemics: A modelling study in the Netherlands. One Health, 22:101424. [reference]

Fathelrahman, E., Mohamed Ali, M, Challa, T.G., Osman, R., Elawad, A.I., Al Nuaimat, M.H., Saeed, M.M., et al. 2026. Modeling and assessing Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) spread, epidemiological control measures, and cost. PLoS One, 21(4):e0340004. [reference]

Wang, M., Laison, E.K.E., Philippsen, T., Ghaemi, S., Liu, J., Moyles, I., Signore, A., Ma, J. & Nasri, B. 2026. Mechanistic modelling of highly pathogenic avian influenza: A scoping review revealing critical gaps in cross-species transmission models. PLoS One, 21(4):e0347929. [reference]

Jindal, M., Lim, S. & MacIntyre, C.R. 2026. Machine Learning-Based Geospatial Risk Modeling of Global Avian Influenza Outbreaks. Transbound Emerg Dis, 2026:6615342. [reference]

Guirales-Medrano, S., Ocaña, K., Obeid, K., Alexander, R., Ford, C.T. & Janies, D. 2026. Computational Structural Analysis Predicts Host-Range Promiscuity and Antiviral Resistance in North American H5N1 Lineages. Comput Struct Biotechnol J, 35(1):0066. [reference]

FAO's support to countries

Global level

• An update of the joint FAO-WHO-WOAH public health assessment of recent high pathogenicity avian influenza A(H5) virus events in animals and people based on data as of 1 March 2026 is now available. [link]
• FAO and OFFLU (WOAH/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza) will participate in the WHO Global Influenza Programme polymerase chain reaction (PCR), next-generation sequencing (NGS) and antiviral working group meetings in June 2026.
• FAO and OFFLU (WOAH/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza) experts are participating in the WHO Tool for Influenza Pandemic Risk Assessment (TIPRA) exercise, assessing influenza A(H9N2) clades B4.7.2.
• FAO organized a national workshop on the FAO Avian Influenza Decision Support Tool in Tema, Ghana from 14 to 17 April to customize the tool and the map, characterize predicted AI spillover hotspots from wild to domestic birds, and provide hands-on training.
• OFFLU published a perspective examining the spillover of HPAI H5Nx viruses into mammals, outlining impacts across species, associated risks, and how surveillance systems may need to adapt in response to the increasing frequency of mammalian cases. [link]
• On 4 March 2026, OFFLU released a comprehensive report 'Global overview of the spread and impact of H5 clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI virus in wildlife, 2020-2024' which explained that Clade 2.3.4.4b high pathogenicity avian influenza H5 has shown unprecedented geographic expansion in wild birds in recent years. In this OFFLU report, experts from around the world reviewed its spread and expanding host range, as well as associated mortality events in wild birds and mammals from 2020 to 2024. To translate this knowledge into action, a priority list of high-level recommendations was described that could improve current HPAI surveillance, preparedness and response, and strengthen wildlife population resilience. [link]
• The open access online course “Introduction to Avian Influenza” is available at the FAO Virtual Learning Centers platform in English, Spanish and Portuguese. [link]

Regional/country level

• Americas
• A regional meeting under the Global Framework for the Progressive Control of Transboundary Animal Diseases (GF-TADs) will be held virtually on 11th June 2026 and involve the HPAI working group.
• The project named “Preventing Infections through Vigilance at the Origin of Transmission in Latin America and the Caribbean (PIVOT)” was approved by the Pandemic Fund under the third call for proposals. This regional project aims to reduce the risk of zoonotic disease transmission across Latin America and the Caribbean through a One Health approach. It is led by the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), in partnership with three implementing entities namely FAO, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the World Bank, and with the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO/PANAFTOSA) as a strategic partner. Additional information can be found on the dedicated webpage of the PIVOT project [link]. The first coordination meeting was held on the week of 12 May 2026 in Costa Rica. [link]
• As part of the Project “Strengthening prevention, preparedness and responses to emerging health threats in Eastern Caribbean countries” funded by the Pandemic Fund, a workshop was conducted on the Prioritization of Zoonotic Diseases in Dominica on 14-15 May 2026. In addition, under the same project, a webinar on “Advancing Emergency Preparedness in Animal Health: Practical Tools for Caribbean Countries” was delivered on 12 May 2026.
• Within the framework of the GCP/GLO/1140/USA project in Chile on epidemiological intelligence and biosecurity, a final workshop will be held in mid-July to strengthen veterinary services technical capacities in risk communication during animal health threats. Other countries will be invited to share their experience in risk communication.
• On 21 May FAO organized an online meeting to promote regional engagement with OFFLU by encouraging countries to submit avian influenza samples to the Federal Laboratory for Agricultural Defense in São Paulo (LFDA-SP) in Brazil, a FAO/WOAH Reference Centre. Key topics included the avian influenza matching (AIM) project and contributions to the WHO vaccine composition meeting (VCM).
• A GF-TADs regional online meeting was done on 15 April to update the epidemiological situation of avian influenza across different production systems and relevant species in the Americas region.
• FAO, in collaboration with the Organismo Internacional Regional de Sanidad Agropecuaria (OIRSA), organized a subregional workshop on the integration, systematization and analysis of epidemiological data for surveillance and decision-making on 14-15 April in Mexico.
• A national workshop on community animal diseases surveillance was conducted in Honduras on 27–30 April.
• FAO released ALERT on avian influenza - Risk of upsurge and regional spread through wild birds in Latin America and the Caribbean, on 8 April 2026. [link]
• A regional review and update in the diagnosis of influenza in birds and other animal species will be done on 25 March 2026. Laboratory specialists of the regional labs will be invited, including public and private ones. Experts from the Federal Agricultural Defense Laboratory-Sao Paulo (LFDA-SP) and the Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venezie (IZSVe), both FAO Reference Centres for avian influenza, will also be participating in this event.
• The regional Global Framework for the Progressive Control of Transboundary Animal Diseases (GF-TADs) organized a webinar entitled “Update of the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) situation in Latin America and the Caribbean Region”. Chief Veterinary Officers from the region, key epidemiological, laboratory and private sector participated. Experiences and current situation were presented by Argentina, Cayman Islands, Chile, the United States of America, and the Federal Agricultural Defense Laboratory-Sao Paulo (LFDA-SP), Brazil - WOAH/FAO reference laboratory for HPAI.
• A national workshop for the veterinary service (Servicio Agrícola y Ganadero [SAG]) is schedule for 27 - 30 April in Santiago, Chile under a project on risk mitigation at the Human–Animal–Plant–Environment Interface. The workshop aims to strengthen avian influenza prevention through early warning and rapid risk assessment in One Health approach. It will enhance disease intelligence to forecast outbreaks and support timely preventive decision making, promote improved biosecurity at the human–animal–environment interface using structured, evidence based analysis, and reinforce coordination between regional and central levels of SAG to enable a more proactive and effective response.
• In Paraguay, a meeting on the development of National One Health Action Plan (PANUS) to support improving preparedness, prevention, detection, response, and recovery from health threats was organized on 27 March with technical cooperation from FAO through the Pandemic Fund project, in order to strengthen national health security. PANUS will serve as a strategic framework to operationalize the One Health approach and enhance intersectoral governance and resilience. The initiative is led by the Ministry of Public Health, in collaboration with animal health, plant health, and environmental authorities. A multi institutional technical workshop with key stakeholders was convened to define strategic priorities, indicators, and coordinated actions.
• In El Salvador, a good emergency management practice training was held in March, focusing on New World Screwworm but also reviewed and revised the steps for potential animal health emergency in the country thoroughly.

• Africa
  • West Africa region has experienced renewed high-risk waves of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1, characterized by the continued dominance of the clade 2.3.4.4b genotype. Since early 2025, HPAI events have been confirmed by the national veterinary laboratories in Nigeria (n=45), Ghana (n=1), Liberia (n=1), Niger (n=3), and Togo (n=4). FAO has assisted countries in sending samples to IZSVe, a FAO reference center in Padova, for further confirmation and genetic characterization. The results highlighted ongoing situation in the region. In Nigeria, all the isolates belonged to clade 2.3.4.4b, broadly consistent with the viruses circulating in West Africa. However, the complete genomes sequencing indicated a novel genotype EA-2024-DV. The presence of HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b was confirmed also in Ghana. Whole-genome sequencing revealed two distinct genotypes: usual genotype already identified in Ghana in 2024, and EA-2024-DI.2 genotype (predominant in Europe during 2024-2025) which could be a new introduction to West Africa. In early 2025, Togo confirmed the presence of HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b, a new genotype which had not been previously reported in the country, a highest genetic similarity was found with H5N1 sequences from Ghana and Israel. Liberia also reported its first detection of HPAI H5N1 outbreak in early 2025 confirmed by the national veterinary laboratory, but no samples were sent to the IZSVe for further confirmation and sequencing. In Niger, the last HPAI H5N1 outbreak confirmed by the national veterinary laboratory was in 2024, but no samples were sent to the IZSVe either. FAO has provided diagnostic reagents/consumables for Avian Influenza for the veterinary laboratories to enhance early detection capabilities.
  • A week-long hands-on training session for laboratory technician from Cabo Verde and Guinea-Bissau at LNERV in Dakar, Senegal to strengthen laboratory capacity under preparation under FAO’s Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) through a subregional project (TCP/SFW/4002).
  • In Cote d'Ivoire, FAO is monitoring the situation after the outbreak response activities (disinfection, movement control and surveillance within the restricted zone) were implemented by the Veterinary Services since the occurrence of a HPAI (H5N1) outbreak in Tankessé in the Eastern region on 16 March 2026, in which 95 000 deaths of poultry were reported (mortality 100%). The early warning system has been activated with the involvement of poultry associations to detect and report any new outbreaks. It’s important to highlight that since 2006, FAO has contributed to building strong national capacities for early detection and rapid response to HPAI outbreak that are well used by the country.
  • In Ghana, the first simulation exercise on interoperability between the Event Mobile Application (EMA-i+) developed by FAO and SILAB (Laboratory information system) was held in April. After the technical demonstrations, a live simulation was conducted on-site, followed by a national stakeholder workshop to review the exercise results.
  • In Nigeria, where HPAI outbreaks have been reported also last month, government is advocating biosecurity measures including communication through local radio targeting poultry value chain actors; FAO has assisted veterinary services by sharing technical knowledge and supported in sending samples to IZSVe for genetic characterization.

• North Africa and Middle East
• Regional One Health Coordination Mechanism (ROHCM) continues to function as the ongoing regional governance structure, bringing together the Quadripartite Regional One Health Coordination Group and its three technical working groups (Zoonoses, antimicrobial resistance [AMR], Food Safety). The mechanism is guided by the endorsed Regional One Health Action Plan (2025–2027) and remains the backbone for coordinated One Health implementation across the region. The current conflict situation in the region is adding substantial complexity to the implementation of ongoing activities across multiple sectors; however, efforts continue at regional and country levels to limit its impact and maintain progress wherever possible.
• FAO Egypt is planning a One Health simulation exercise on HPAI for 2026; and preparations for a 5‑day Infectious Substance Shipment training for veterinary and public health laboratory personnel are underway, tentatively scheduled for 21–25 June 2026, both under the Egypt Pandemic Fund project.
• In Tunisia, an advanced media and audiovisual communication training was held from 24 to 25 March under the Pandemic Fund project, aimed at strengthening the capacity of Tunisian veterinary officials to effectively communicate during animal health crises. It focused on enhancing practical skills in delivering clear messages, handling sensitive media interactions, and responding strategically in pandemic preparedness and response contexts. Three training sessions on digital communication applied to the management of animal health crises will be organized during April and May as part of the Pandemic Fund Tunisia project.
• Training sessions on veterinary laboratory biosafety and on sampling techniques are planned for June under the Pandemic Fund Tunisia project, with the aim of further strengthening technical capacities and standardizing practices across laboratories.

• Asia and the Pacific
• Building on FAO’s previous support, Bangladesh will implement targeted, field-level actions to strengthen HPAI surveillance and response through FAO’s Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) project. Sink surveillance, a cost-effective, targeted surveillance strategy primarily focused on Live Bird Markets, will be conducted in Dhaka and Chattogram, with monthly support for sample collection, storage, and transport. Refresher training for Market Environment Surveillance Officers (MESOs) and regular coordination meetings will ensure consistent field implementation. Outbreak investigations will be carried out as required across the country. Monitoring of potential mammalian adaptation will include quarterly raw milk sampling in Dhaka, along with sampling from cats and other animals presenting with severe respiratory illness. Laboratories will be supported with essential reagents for Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) and Next-Generation Sequencing (NGS) to enable timely testing. Surveillance data will be regularly analysed and entered into Bangladesh Animal Health Intelligence System (BAHIS) to inform decision-making. The Department of Livestock Services (DLS) messaging will be reviewed and updated, and outreach will be conducted to raise awareness among veterinarians and relevant stakeholders on avian influenza risks.
• FAO Indonesia introduced and trained multisectoral government stakeholder on the utilization of the Joint Outbreak Investigation (JOIN) tool during a Workshop to Strengthen Provincial Rapid Response Team (RRT) on the Coordinated Investigation of Avian Influenza Events by the Ministry of Health (MoH) in South Sulawesi, 30 March - 2 April 2026. During the workshop, provincial and district officers from the local health services, animal health services, and the natural resource conservation agency identified the current state, gaps, challenges, and solutions of cross-sectoral coordination, communication, and outbreak metrics related to Avian Influenza events through discussions and table-top exercises. The JOIN tool, developed by FAO in 2019, helped participants assess the linkages between epidemiological and laboratory data from the public health and animal health sectors, including wildlife, and cross-sectoral joint investigation processes. Similar workshops are being conducted in South Sumatra and South Kalimantan provinces by MoH.
• In Lao PDR, FAO-supported technical engagements continued to address avian influenza with zoonotic potential as an important animal and public health concern. In January 2026, FAO contributed to a Lao PDR–Viet Nam cross-border workshop that reviewed the avian influenza situation, including H5N1, and highlighted the need for stronger surveillance, laboratory capacity, information sharing, and coordinated outbreak response in border provinces. This was followed in early February 2026 by a Lao–Viet Nam technical exchange on transboundary animal disease diagnosis, which included highly pathogenic avian influenza among the priority diseases for strengthened diagnostic capacity and cross-border collaboration. In March 2026, FAO also supported Rapid Response Team training in Phongsaly Province to strengthen local preparedness for avian influenza outbreaks, including surveillance, outbreak investigation, biosafety, risk communication, and sample collection.
• FAO Nepal supplied diagnostics kits for avian influenza as requested by the Central Veterinary Laboratory amidst ongoing avian influenza outbreaks in the country. Further, one of the FAO Nepal staff is actively involved in the control of avian influenza outbreaks in Koshi province along with government officials. FAO conducted biosecurity training to poultry farmers.
• FAO Philippines in partnership with the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI) conducted Local Animal Disease Detection and Emergency Response (LADDER) Training for veterinarians, animal health workers, and veterinary students in Central Luzon, CALABARZON, Ilocos region, and SOCKSARGEN in October 2025 to March 2026 supported by the Pandemic Fund. Through this training, the participants learned and conducted basic risk analysis, priority TADs and updated list of priority zoonotic diseases, disease reporting, outbreak investigation and response, and proper necropsy, sample collection and management prior to submission to the laboratories. The FAO Philippines, through its partnership with the Philippine College of Veterinary Epidemiologist conducted Risk Analysis Training for animal health and quarantine officers of the BAI. This training aimed at expanding participants understanding and application of on RA as tool for identifying, analysing, and managing the risks using real life scenarios. Moreover, the Philippines has conducted ISO 17043 and 17025 awareness trainings for the National (ADDRL) and Regional Laboratories (Northern Mindanao and SOCKSARGEN) to improve their capacities and quality of tests results.
• FAO Viet Nam is conducting cross-border poultry value chain analysis in four border provinces including Tuyen Quang, Ha Tinh, Dong Thap and An Giang. The activity is also supported by Japan through International Organisation for Migration (IOM), with the goal to identify hotspot for AI transmission in conjunction with human movement. The results will be used to guide the training of commune animal health workers and establishing provincial One Health zoonoses response teams.
• FAO Viet Nam, with financial support from Japan through IOM and in collaboration with DAHP and provincial animal health management authorities, implemented four standardized three-day training courses targeting local animal health professionals in An Giang, Dong Thap, Ha Tinh and Tuyen Quang provinces. Between January and March 2026, a total of 149 regional and commune-level animal health workers participated in the training which covered animal disease surveillance, outbreak detection and investigation, national reporting requirements, biosafety and biosecurity, safe sample collection and transport, and hands-on necropsy procedures. FAO also procured and delivered critical diagnostic equipment to enhance laboratory capacity for avian influenza detection that can be used across the four target border provinces.
• FAO laboratory experts conducted an assessment using FAO Laboratory Mapping Tool (LMT) at the National Centre for Veterinary Diagnostics No.I (NCVD1, Ha Noi, Viet Nam) from 9 to 10 March 2026, and at NCVD2 (Ho Chị Minh City) from 16 to 17 March 2026. The assessments provided an updated, structured overview of laboratory capacity, biosafety and biosecurity practices, quality management systems, and human resources, helping to pinpoint key gaps and priority areas for targeted follow-up support. In addition to the external evaluations, NCVD staff were also trained to develop self-assessment capacity and sustain continuous improvement of the laboratories function and capacity in the future. This was followed by a training on the introduction to ISO/IEC 17043: Proficiency Testing Provider from 10 to 13 March 2026 at NCVD1, organized by FAO in collaboration with the Department of Animal Health and Production (DAHP). The training aims to increase the participants’ understanding of proficiency testing (PT) requirements under ISO/IEC 17043, roles and responsibilities for PT provider, and key quality management elements. Following the training, NCVD1 will develop a structured plan and roadmap outlining the steps needed for laboratories to advance toward PT provider accreditation.

Recommendations for affected countries and those at risk

For high-level, the recommendations from the FAO Global Dialogue - Tackling high pathogenicity avian influenza together provide a clear framework for coordinated science-based actions on Early detection, Rapid response, Biosecurity, Vaccination, Business and trade dimensions, One Health and systems-based approaches, Public-private partnerships.

For grass root level. the practical recommendations for day-to-day activities are suggested below to mitigate risk and reduce impact of HPAI.

General recommendations
It is important to report sick or dead birds – both wild birds and poultry - or wild mammals to local authorities (veterinary services, public health officials, community leaders etc.). These should be tested for avian influenza viruses.

Recommendations to poultry producers
Farmers and poultry producers should step up their biosecurity measures in order to prevent potential virus introduction from wild birds or their faeces.

Recommendations to hunters
Hunting associations and wildlife authorities should be aware that avian influenza viruses might be present in waterfowl and some other species hunted and that hunting, handling and dressing of shot game carries the risk of spreading avian influenza viruses to susceptible poultry.

Recommendations to national authorities
Increase surveillance efforts for the early detection of influenza viruses in poultry and dead wild species including certain mammals.

For full recommendations including non-avian species please see [link].

Important links

• FAO & WOAH Global strategy for the prevention and control of high pathogenicity avian influenza (2024–2033) - Achieving sustainable, resilient poultry production systems
• FAO/WHO/WOAH Updated joint FAO/WHO/WOAH public health assessment of recent influenza A(H5) virus events in animals and people - July 2025
• FAO HPAI website [link1, link2]
• FAO Recommendations from the FAO Global Dialogue - Tackling high pathogenicity avian influenza together.
• FAO Iguaçu statement from the 'Global Science, Policy and Private Sector Dialogue ― Tackling HPAI Together’
• FAO Improving poultry health and productivity - Practical training materials for veterinarians and farmers for better farm management
• FAO Global Farmer Field School Platform
• FAO webinar series on pandemic prevention and response
• FAO Outbreak Costing Tool (OutCosT) and its webinar “Estimating the costs of disease outbreaks: Application of the OutCost tool” [recording]
• FAO An evidence-based approach towards improving poultry biosecurity in Ashaiman Municipal District (Greater Accra Region, Ghana)
• GF-TADs webinar: Update on latest initiatives for avian influenza prevention and control [webinar1, webinar2]
• OFFLU website
• OFFLU Beyond poultry: Rethinking monitoring and control of HPAI H5Nx anticipating spillover risks for mammals
• OFFLU Guidelines for High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus Risk Mitigation in Cattle
• ggFlu - global H5 genotyping system public web server
• EFSA Avian influenza overview December 2025–February 2026
• PAHO Epidemiological Update Avian Influenza A(H5N1) in the Americas Region, 11 March 2026
• Scientific Task Force on Avian Influenza and Wild Birds H5N1 High pathogenicity avian influenza in wild birds - Unprecedented conservation impacts and urgent needs
• WHO Influenza at the human-animal interface summary and assessment, 31 March 2026
• WOAH High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza (HPAI) Situation Report 81 - 7 May 2026
• WOAH Surveillance of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza for Smallholder Poultry Systems in Resource-Limited Settings
• The list of wild bird and mammalian species which have been infected with H5Nx HPAI [link]

Note: many publication links have been moved into ‘More important links’ below.

Disclaimer

Information provided herein is current as of the date of issue. Information added or changed since the last Global AIV with Zoonotic Potential situation update appears in orange. Human cases are depicted in the geographic location of their report. For some cases, exposure may have occurred in one geographic location but reported in another. For cases with unknown onset date, reporting date was used instead. FAO compiles information drawn from multiple national (Ministries of Agriculture or Livestock, Ministries of Health, Provincial Government websites; Centers for Disease Prevention and Control [CDC]) and international sources (World Health Organization [WHO], World Organisation for Animal Health [WOAH]), as well as peer reviewed scientific articles. FAO makes every effort to ensure, but does not guarantee, accuracy, completeness or authenticity of the information. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these map(s) do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of FAO concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers and boundaries. Dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.