Map 1. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential observed since 1 October 2025 (i.e. current wave)

Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.

Notes: Refer to the disclaimer available on this webpage for the names and boundaries in this map. The final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. The final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Source: United Nations Geospatial. 2020. Map of the World. [Cited July 2026]. Modified with GLW 4 data and Emergency Prevention System Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i), WOAH and National Authorities data, 2025.

Map 2. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential* observed in the period 1 October 2024 to 30 September 2025 (i.e. previous wave)

Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.

Notes: Refer to the disclaimer available on this webpage for the names and boundaries in this map. Final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Source: United Nations Geospatial. 2020. Map of the World. [Cited October 2025]. Modified with GLW 4 data and Emergency Prevention System Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i), WOAH and National Authorities data, 2024.

Recent publications

Domestic

Features of the epizootic process and ways to improve measures to combat avian flu. Br Poult Sci, 2026 Jun 29:1-10. [reference]

Biosecurity deficiencies in HPAI-affected poultry farms in Korea, 2020/2021–2024/2025 seasons. Front Vet Sci, 13:1863522. [reference]

Spatiotemporal distribution trends and driving factors of avian influenza in poultry in China. One Health, 23:101483. [reference]

Characterization of practices influencing avian influenza virus transmission risk in live bird markets in Northern Vietnam. Prev Vet Med, 255:106958. [reference]

Review of avian influenza outbreaks in Nigeria 2006-2025. Open Vet J, 15(12):6146-6165. [reference]

Characterization of oseltamivir-resistant A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b, genotype D1.1 variants identified in poultry farms of British Columbia, Canada. Emerg Microbes Infect, 15(1):2686474. [reference]

Facilitated Molting as a Management Strategy During a Low-Pathogenic H1N2 Avian Influenza Outbreak in a Breeder Turkey Flock. Avian Dis, 70(2):224-227. [reference]

Post-vaccination surveillance during the first year of duck vaccination against highly pathogenic avian influenza in France: Adherence to protocols and first outcomes in terms of viral circulation. Prev Vet Med, 255:106956. [reference]

Molecular Characterization of H5N1 Clade 2.3.4.4b Virus in Vaccinated Layer Chickens. Viruses, 18(6):589. [reference]

Early challenge with LPAI-H9N2 followed by vNDV-VII.1.1 in vaccinated and unvaccinated broilers: a comprehensive study. Avian Pathol, 55(4):469-486. [reference]

Virus and host-associated variations in the interaction of low-pathogenic avian influenza viruses with the epithelial target tissue of the chicken reproductive tract. Vet Res, 57(1):116. [reference]

Wild

Between-species contagion drives HPAI transmission and mass mortality in seabirds. J Anim Ecol, 2026 Jul 6. [reference]

Ecological shifts in avian influenza viruses following HPAIV introductions in southwestern Alaska, 2011-2024. Npj Viruses, 2026 Jul 17. [reference]

Rapid Expansion of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Clade 2.3.4.4b Genotype D1.1 Virus across Flyway Regions, North America, Fall 2024. Emerg Infect Dis, 32(8). [reference]

An outbreak of H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b highly pathogenic avian influenza in California condors (Gymnogyps californianus). Vet Pathol, 2026 Jul 3:3009858261457964. [reference]

Spatial association of seabirds and aquatic birds with highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) outbreaks in Brazil: A nationwide ecological and statistical modelling approach. PLoS One, 21(7):e0350505. [reference]

Marked Antigenic Divergence and Evolutionary Analysis of H5 AIVs from Wild Birds in East China, 2013-2022. Animals (Basel), 16(13):2109. [reference]

Clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV from Migratory Birds in Beidaihe Wetland, North China. Viruses, 18(6):595. [reference]

High pathogenicity avian influenza A (H5N1) viruses isolated from poultry and wild birds in Japan during the 2024-2025 season. Microbiol Spectr, 2026 Jul 14:e0029326. [reference]

Sero-epidemiological profiling of duck viral hepatitis, avian influenza, and Newcastle disease in transboundary waterfowl populations along the Indonesia-Malaysia border of West Kalimantan. Vet World, 19(5):2160-2171. [reference]

As bird flu threatens, New Zealand vaccinates endangered birds., 393(6807):126-127. [reference]

Ecology of Low Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus H7 in Wild Birds in South-Eastern Australia Prior to Emergence of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H7 in Poultry. Influenza Other Respir Viruses. 2026 Jul;20(7):e70285. [reference]

Mammal

High Mortality and Reduced Pup Production in Eared Seals Following the 2023 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak in Patagonia. Biol Bull, 249(1):30-45. [reference]

Mass mortality events in aquatic mammals caused by avian influenza viruses. Curr Opin Virol, 77:101566. [reference]

Effectiveness of baloxavir marboxil in nonhuman primates infected with highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H7N9) virus. EBioMedicine, 129:106350. [reference]

Detection of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Clade 2.3.4.4b Genotype D1.2 Virus in Swine after Experimental Inoculation. Emerg Infect Dis, 32(8). [reference]

Receptor profiling and growth assessment of influenza A virus in porcine mammary and non-mammary tissues and derived cells. J Virol, 2026 Jul 6:e0061526. [reference]

Single-cell and spatial transcriptomic profiling reveals distinct immune landscapes in murine lungs infected with H1N1 versus H5N1 influenza viruses. J Virol, 2026 Jun 29:e0074626. [reference]

Dairy

Detection of antibodies against avian influenza in European dairy cattle, the Netherlands, January 2026. Euro Surveill, 31(25):2600464. [reference]

Isolation and characterization of a clade 2.3.4.4b genotype D1.1 H5N1 virus from dairy cattle in Wisconsin. J Virol, 2026 Jul 10:e0076126. [reference]

Cellular tropism of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses in human respiratory and bovine mammary epithelial cells. Microbiol Spectr, 2026 Jul 17:e0137726. [reference]

Isolation of Infectious Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus from Fetal Bovine Serum, United States, 2025. Emerg Infect Dis, 32(8). [reference]

Beyond H5N1: Influenza A virus infection in bovine udder organoids. Emerg Microbes Infect, 2026 Jul 2:2698239. [reference]

Bovine-derived H5N1 influenza virus efficiently infects lactating swine via the mammary gland. bioRxiv, 2026.07.18.739312. [reference Preprint]

A bovine H5N1 virus efficiently replicates in differentiated human nasal epithelial cells. Npj Viruses, 2026 Jun 24. [reference]

Investigation of vehicles as potential pathways for between-farm transmission of influenza A virus in US dairy herds. JDS Commun, 7(4):518-522. [reference]

Viruses

The receptor landscape of influenza A viruses. J Virol. 2026 Jul 16:e0144325. [reference]

Lactylation of Influenza Virus Polymerase Acidic Protein Promotes Viral Replication and Pathogenicity. bioRxiv, 2026.07.10.737663. [reference Preprint]

Emergence of Novel Reassortant H3N2 Avian Influenza Viruses in Southern China: Genetic Complexity and Pathogenicity in Chickens and Mice. Animals (Basel), 16(12):1765. [reference]

Comparative study of hemagglutinin adsorption from influenza A H1N1, H3N2, and H5N1 strains on model surfaces using a quartz crystal microbalance. Colloids Surf B Biointerfaces, 267:115964. [reference]

Emerged N193S mutation of PA-X protein disabled the immunity of mucosal dendritic cells for regulating virulence of clade 2.3.4.4b H5 subtype virus. Emerg Microbes Infect, 15(1):2695530. [reference]

Characterization and pathogenicity of a novel triple-reassortant H6N6 avian influenza virus associated with reproductive failure in breeding ducks. Poult Sci, 105(10):107308. [reference]

Characterization of the novel H6N1 avian influenza viruses in a broiler duck farm in Korea from 2023 to 2024. Vet Res Commun, 50(5):420. [reference]

Autoantibodies against type I interferons in patients with zoonotic H7N9 influenza: an observational case-control study. EBioMedicine, 130:106387. [reference]

Deciphering interferon functions in avian influenza using receptor knockout models in the natural host. Elife, 14:RP107855. [reference]

In vitro and in vivo studies of GAPLINC identify it as a critical host factor involved in the regulation of influenza A virus infection. Vet Res, 57(136). [reference]

Research Progress on Avian Influenza Virus and Autophagy: A Review. Pathogens, 15(6):623. [reference]

Complete genome sequence of BLRI-developed inactivated avian influenza A/H9N2 vaccine strain in Bangladesh. Microbiol Resour Announc, 2026 Jun 25:e0030426. [reference]

Epidemiological and Virological Characteristics of H9N2 Avian Influenza Virus in Jiangsu Province, China, 2024. Viruses, 18(6):687. [reference]

HA thermostability mutations S84F, G167N, and D168N potentiate H9N2 virus transmission in a warming environment. Emerg Microbes Infect, 15(1):2695528. [reference]

Severe pneumonia and acute respiratory distress syndrome caused by avian influenza A (H10N3) in a young female: a case report. Infection, 2026 Jul 17. [reference]

Assay

Supporting molecular detection of A(H5N1) through development and characterization of RNA reference materials. Anal Bioanal Chem. 2026 Jul 22. [reference]

Evaluation of serologic assays for detection and quantification of influenza antibodies in milk samples from H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus infected dairy cows. Front. Vet. Sci. [reference]

Validation of sample pooling for high-throughput RT-qPCR subtyping of avian influenza A(H5). Microbiol Spectr, 2026 Jul 13:e0085026. [reference]

Evaluation of IndiMix JOE with Intype IC-RNA as an Alternative to AgPath-ID for Influenza A Virus Detection in Avian and Bovine Samples. Pathogens, 15(6):600. [reference]

Toward a quality-managed operational architecture for wastewater surveillance of zoonotic and emerging pathogens. Appl Environ Microbiol, 2026 Jul 10:e0095026. [reference]

Analysis & Modelling

From Clustered to Sporadic: Structural Shifts in the Spatiotemporal Dynamics of HPAI Following the 2017 Policy Reinforcement in South Korea (2003-2025). Transbound Emerg Dis, 2026(1):e5747471. [reference]

Modeling and control of highly pathogenic avian influenza in poultry using network disease dynamics. Infect Dis Model, 11(4):1624-1644. [reference]

Avian Influenza at the Wild Bird-Poultry Interface: An Asia-Focused Review with Ecological Risk Scenarios for China. Animals (Basel), 16(13):1937. [reference]

A phylogeny-informed mathematical modeling of HPAI H5N1 transmission dynamics and effectiveness of control measures. One Health, 23:101490. [reference]

A Unified Benchmark and Conditional Sequence Modeling Framework for Future Influenza Evolution Prediction. In: Bioinformatics Research and Applications. ISBRA 2026. Springer, Singapore. [reference]

Overview

Perspective on human diagnostic and national reference laboratory preparedness for zoonotic influenza in Europe. Euro Surveill, 31(27):2500918. [reference]

Avian influenza overview March-May 2026. EFSA J, 24(7):e10196. [reference]

Avian influenza virus H5N1 and H9N2 subtypes in different birds and humans: Findings from an extensive evaluation. Open Vet J, 16(1):1-14. [reference]

Occupational Zoonotic Risk at India's Human-Animal Interface: Statutory Origins and a Regulatory Pathway for the Compensation-Prevention Disconnect. Am J Ind Med, 2026 Jul 14. [reference]

Preparing for the Next Pandemic: Learning From COVID-19 to Build What Comes Next. Open Forum Infect Dis, 13(7):ofag348. [reference]

FAO's support to countries

Global level

• FAO participated to the third KAPPA-FLU annual meeting held on 30 June – 2 July in Kalmar, Sweden, where participants presented their progress on research projects addressing various topics related to avian influenza. [link]
• FAO and Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venezie (IZSVe, FAO Reference Centres for avian influenza) are currently conducting Avian Influenza Proficiency Testing for 7 countries - West & Central Africa (3), Southern Africa (2), Eastern Africa and Central Asia (1 each).
• An update of the joint FAO-WHO-WOAH public health assessment of recent high pathogenicity avian influenza A(H5) virus events in animals and people based on data as of 1 March 2026 is now available. [link]
• FAO and OFFLU (WOAH/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza) will participate in the WHO Global Influenza Programme polymerase chain reaction (PCR), next-generation sequencing (NGS) and antiviral working group meetings in June 2026.
• FAO and OFFLU (WOAH/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza) experts are participating in the WHO Tool for Influenza Pandemic Risk Assessment (TIPRA) exercise, assessing influenza A(H9N2) clades B4.7.2.
• FAO organized a national workshop on the FAO Avian Influenza Decision Support Tool in Tema, Ghana from 14 to 17 April to customize the tool and the map, characterize predicted AI spillover hotspots from wild to domestic birds, and provide hands-on training.
• OFFLU published a perspective examining the spillover of HPAI H5Nx viruses into mammals, outlining impacts across species, associated risks, and how surveillance systems may need to adapt in response to the increasing frequency of mammalian cases. [link]
• On 4 March 2026, OFFLU released a comprehensive report 'Global overview of the spread and impact of H5 clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI virus in wildlife, 2020-2024' which explained that Clade 2.3.4.4b high pathogenicity avian influenza H5 has shown unprecedented geographic expansion in wild birds in recent years. In this OFFLU report, experts from around the world reviewed its spread and expanding host range, as well as associated mortality events in wild birds and mammals from 2020 to 2024. To translate this knowledge into action, a priority list of high-level recommendations was described that could improve current HPAI surveillance, preparedness and response, and strengthen wildlife population resilience. [link]
• The open access online course “Introduction to Avian Influenza” is available at the FAO Virtual Learning Centers platform in English, Spanish and Portuguese. [link]

Regional/country level

• Americas
• A regional meeting under the Global Framework for the Progressive Control of Transboundary Animal Diseases (GF-TADs) will be held virtually on 11th June 2026 and involve the HPAI working group.
• The project named “Preventing Infections through Vigilance at the Origin of Transmission in Latin America and the Caribbean (PIVOT)” was approved by the Pandemic Fund under the third call for proposals. This regional project aims to reduce the risk of zoonotic disease transmission across Latin America and the Caribbean through a One Health approach. It is led by the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), in partnership with three implementing entities namely FAO, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the World Bank, and with the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO/PANAFTOSA) as a strategic partner. Additional information can be found on the dedicated webpage of the PIVOT project [link]. The first coordination meeting was held on the week of 12 May 2026 in Costa Rica. [link]
• As part of the Project “Strengthening prevention, preparedness and responses to emerging health threats in Eastern Caribbean countries” funded by the Pandemic Fund, a workshop was conducted on the Prioritization of Zoonotic Diseases in Dominica on 14-15 May 2026. In addition, under the same project, a webinar on “Advancing Emergency Preparedness in Animal Health: Practical Tools for Caribbean Countries” was delivered on 12 May 2026.
• Within the framework of the GCP/GLO/1140/USA project in Chile on epidemiological intelligence and biosecurity, a final workshop was held on 20-21 July in Santiago, Chile to strengthen veterinary services technical capacities in risk communication during animal health threats and emergencies. Other countries will be invited to share their experience in risk communication.
• The last week of July, a HPAI tabletop simulation exercise will be carried out in Trinidad and Tobago including field and laboratory drills as well as communicational training. This activity is part of the current Technical Cooperation Programme: Animal Disease Outbreak Response in Trinidad and Tobago.
• FAO and the veterinary services of Peru (SENASA) initiated discussions to explore collaboration on HPAI and Newcastle disease compartmentalization, and other related areas of animal health preparedness and disease prevention.
• In June 2026, in response to a request for technical assistance from the Government of Honduras following the declaration of a national animal health emergency due to HPAI, FAO initiated technical support under the regional Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF) project "Strengthening Avian Influenza Surveillance and Risk Management for Safe Trade in the SICA Region" to strengthen the country's surveillance and diagnostic capacities. Support includes the procurement of priority supplies for field sampling and laboratory diagnosis.
• On 21 May FAO organized an online meeting to promote regional engagement with OFFLU by encouraging countries to submit avian influenza samples to the Federal Laboratory for Agricultural Defense in São Paulo (LFDA-SP) in Brazil, a FAO/WOAH Reference Centre. Key topics included the avian influenza matching (AIM) project and contributions to the WHO vaccine composition meeting (VCM).
• A GF-TADs regional online meeting was done on 15 April to update the epidemiological situation of avian influenza across different production systems and relevant species in the Americas region.
• FAO, in collaboration with the Organismo Internacional Regional de Sanidad Agropecuaria (OIRSA), organized a subregional workshop on the integration, systematization and analysis of epidemiological data for surveillance and decision-making on 14-15 April in Mexico.
• A national workshop on community animal diseases surveillance was conducted in Honduras on 27–30 April.
• FAO released ALERT on avian influenza - Risk of upsurge and regional spread through wild birds in Latin America and the Caribbean, on 8 April 2026. [link]
• A regional review and update in the diagnosis of influenza in birds and other animal species will be done on 25 March 2026. Laboratory specialists of the regional labs will be invited, including public and private ones. Experts from the Federal Agricultural Defense Laboratory-Sao Paulo (LFDA-SP) and the Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venezie (IZSVe), both FAO Reference Centres for avian influenza, will also be participating in this event.
• The regional Global Framework for the Progressive Control of Transboundary Animal Diseases (GF-TADs) organized a webinar entitled “Update of the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) situation in Latin America and the Caribbean Region”. Chief Veterinary Officers from the region, key epidemiological, laboratory and private sector participated. Experiences and current situation were presented by Argentina, Cayman Islands, Chile, the United States of America, and the Federal Agricultural Defense Laboratory-Sao Paulo (LFDA-SP), Brazil - WOAH/FAO reference laboratory for HPAI.
• A national workshop for the veterinary service (Servicio Agrícola y Ganadero [SAG]) is schedule for 27 - 30 April in Santiago, Chile under a project on risk mitigation at the Human–Animal–Plant–Environment Interface. The workshop aims to strengthen avian influenza prevention through early warning and rapid risk assessment in One Health approach. It will enhance disease intelligence to forecast outbreaks and support timely preventive decision making, promote improved biosecurity at the human–animal–environment interface using structured, evidence based analysis, and reinforce coordination between regional and central levels of SAG to enable a more proactive and effective response.

• Africa
  • West Africa region has experienced renewed high-risk waves of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1, characterized by the continued dominance of the clade 2.3.4.4b genotype. Since early 2025, HPAI events have been confirmed by the national veterinary laboratories in Nigeria (n=45), Ghana (n=1), Liberia (n=1), Niger (n=3), and Togo (n=4). FAO has assisted countries in sending samples to IZSVe, a FAO reference center in Padova, for further confirmation and genetic characterization. The results highlighted ongoing situation in the region. In Nigeria, all the isolates belonged to clade 2.3.4.4b, broadly consistent with the viruses circulating in West Africa. However, the complete genomes sequencing indicated a novel genotype EA-2024-DV. The presence of HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b was confirmed also in Ghana. Whole-genome sequencing revealed two distinct genotypes: usual genotype already identified in Ghana in 2024, and EA-2024-DI.2 genotype (predominant in Europe during 2024-2025) which could be a new introduction to West Africa. In early 2025, Togo confirmed the presence of HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b, a new genotype which had not been previously reported in the country, a highest genetic similarity was found with H5N1 sequences from Ghana and Israel. Liberia also reported its first detection of HPAI H5N1 outbreak in early 2025 confirmed by the national veterinary laboratory, but no samples were sent to the IZSVe for further confirmation and sequencing. In Niger, the last HPAI H5N1 outbreak confirmed by the national veterinary laboratory was in 2024, but no samples were sent to the IZSVe either. FAO has provided diagnostic reagents/consumables for Avian Influenza for the veterinary laboratories to enhance early detection capabilities. According to recently published papers, the clade 2.3.4.4b EA-2024-DI.2 genotype was confirmed in Namibia in specimens collected in 2025/26, which closely related to an EA-2024-DI.2 virus detected in a tern in Uganda in December 2024; and a virus of EA‐2024‐DI genotype has also been detected in South Africa.
  • FAO Burundi has recently supported several initiatives aiming at strengthening surveillance, diagnosis and preparedness for health emergencies, as part of efforts to early detect, prevent and control HPAI. These initiatives include the development, updating, validation and harmonisation of standard operating procedures for the safe handling of biological samples for the benefit of the National Veterinary Laboratory.
  • FAO Guinea supported the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock during HPAI outbreak suspicions by reviewing laboratory requirements and providing appropriate diagnostic protocols for testing samples collected through field investigations.
  • A week-long hands-on training session for laboratory technician from Cabo Verde and Guinea-Bissau at LNERV in Dakar, Senegal to strengthen laboratory capacity under preparation under FAO’s Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) through a subregional project (TCP/SFW/4002).
  • In Ghana, the first simulation exercise on interoperability between the Event Mobile Application (EMA-i+) developed by FAO and SILAB (Laboratory information system) was held in April. After the technical demonstrations, a live simulation was conducted on-site, followed by a national stakeholder workshop to review the exercise results.
  • In Nigeria, where HPAI outbreaks have been reported also last month, government is advocating biosecurity measures including communication through local radio targeting poultry value chain actors; FAO has assisted veterinary services by sharing technical knowledge and supported in sending samples to IZSVe for genetic characterization.

• North Africa and Middle East
• Regional One Health Coordination Mechanism (ROHCM) continues to function as the ongoing regional governance structure, bringing together the Quadripartite Regional One Health Coordination Group and its three technical working groups (Zoonoses, antimicrobial resistance [AMR], Food Safety). The mechanism is guided by the endorsed Regional One Health Action Plan (2025–2027) and remains the backbone for coordinated One Health implementation across the region. The current conflict situation in the region is adding substantial complexity to the implementation of ongoing activities across multiple sectors; however, efforts continue at regional and country levels to limit its impact and maintain progress wherever possible.
• FAO Egypt is planning a One Health simulation exercise on HPAI for 2026; and preparations for a 5‑day Infectious Substance Shipment training for veterinary and public health laboratory personnel are underway, tentatively scheduled for 21–25 June 2026, both under the Egypt Pandemic Fund project.
• In Tunisia, an advanced media and audiovisual communication training was held from 24 to 25 March under the Pandemic Fund project, aimed at strengthening the capacity of Tunisian veterinary officials to effectively communicate during animal health crises. It focused on enhancing practical skills in delivering clear messages, handling sensitive media interactions, and responding strategically in pandemic preparedness and response contexts. Three training sessions on digital communication applied to the management of animal health crises will be organized during April and May as part of the Pandemic Fund Tunisia project.

• Asia and the Pacific
• Building on FAO’s previous support, Bangladesh will implement targeted, field-level actions to strengthen HPAI surveillance and response through FAO’s Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) project. Sink surveillance, a cost-effective, targeted surveillance strategy primarily focused on Live Bird Markets, will be conducted in Dhaka and Chattogram, with monthly support for sample collection, storage, and transport. Refresher training for Market Environment Surveillance Officers (MESOs) and regular coordination meetings will ensure consistent field implementation. Outbreak investigations will be carried out as required across the country. Monitoring of potential mammalian adaptation will include quarterly raw milk sampling in Dhaka, along with sampling from cats and other animals presenting with severe respiratory illness. Laboratories will be supported with essential reagents for Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) and Next-Generation Sequencing (NGS) to enable timely testing. Surveillance data will be regularly analysed and entered into Bangladesh Animal Health Intelligence System (BAHIS) to inform decision-making. The Department of Livestock Services (DLS) messaging will be reviewed and updated, and outreach will be conducted to raise awareness among veterinarians and relevant stakeholders on avian influenza risks.
• FAO Indonesia introduced and trained multisectoral government stakeholder on the utilization of the Joint Outbreak Investigation (JOIN) tool during a Workshop to Strengthen Provincial Rapid Response Team (RRT) on the Coordinated Investigation of Avian Influenza Events by the Ministry of Health (MoH) in South Sulawesi, 30 March - 2 April 2026. During the workshop, provincial and district officers from the local health services, animal health services, and the natural resource conservation agency identified the current state, gaps, challenges, and solutions of cross-sectoral coordination, communication, and outbreak metrics related to Avian Influenza events through discussions and table-top exercises. The JOIN tool, developed by FAO in 2019, helped participants assess the linkages between epidemiological and laboratory data from the public health and animal health sectors, including wildlife, and cross-sectoral joint investigation processes. Similar workshops are being conducted in South Sumatra and South Kalimantan provinces by MoH.
• In Lao PDR, FAO-supported technical engagements continued to address avian influenza with zoonotic potential as an important animal and public health concern. In January 2026, FAO contributed to a Lao PDR–Viet Nam cross-border workshop that reviewed the avian influenza situation, including H5N1, and highlighted the need for stronger surveillance, laboratory capacity, information sharing, and coordinated outbreak response in border provinces. This was followed in early February 2026 by a Lao–Viet Nam technical exchange on transboundary animal disease diagnosis, which included highly pathogenic avian influenza among the priority diseases for strengthened diagnostic capacity and cross-border collaboration. In March 2026, FAO also supported Rapid Response Team training in Phongsaly Province to strengthen local preparedness for avian influenza outbreaks, including surveillance, outbreak investigation, biosafety, risk communication, and sample collection.
• FAO Nepal supplied diagnostics kits for avian influenza as requested by the Central Veterinary Laboratory amidst ongoing avian influenza outbreaks in the country. Further, one of the FAO Nepal staff is actively involved in the control of avian influenza outbreaks in Koshi province along with government officials. FAO conducted biosecurity training to poultry farmers.

Recommendations for affected countries and those at risk

For high-level, the recommendations from the FAO Global Dialogue - Tackling high pathogenicity avian influenza together provide a clear framework for coordinated science-based actions on Early detection, Rapid response, Biosecurity, Vaccination, Business and trade dimensions, One Health and systems-based approaches, Public-private partnerships.

For grass root level. the practical recommendations for day-to-day activities are suggested below to mitigate risk and reduce impact of HPAI.

General recommendations
It is important to report sick or dead birds – both wild birds and poultry - or wild mammals to local authorities (veterinary services, public health officials, community leaders etc.). These should be tested for avian influenza viruses.

Recommendations to poultry producers
Farmers and poultry producers should step up their biosecurity measures in order to prevent potential virus introduction from wild birds or their faeces.

Recommendations to hunters
Hunting associations and wildlife authorities should be aware that avian influenza viruses might be present in waterfowl and some other species hunted and that hunting, handling and dressing of shot game carries the risk of spreading avian influenza viruses to susceptible poultry.

Recommendations to national authorities
Increase surveillance efforts for the early detection of influenza viruses in poultry and dead wild species including certain mammals.

For full recommendations including non-avian species please see [link].

Important links

• FAO Avian influenza dashboard [link]
• FAO & WOAH Global strategy for the prevention and control of high pathogenicity avian influenza (2024–2033) - Achieving sustainable, resilient poultry production systems
• FAO/WHO/WOAH Updated joint FAO/WHO/WOAH public health assessment of recent influenza A(H5) virus events in animals and people - July 2025
• OECD‑FAO Agricultural Outlook 2026‑2035 [link]
• FAO HPAI website [link1, link2]
• FAO Recommendations from the FAO Global Dialogue - Tackling high pathogenicity avian influenza together.
• FAO Iguaçu statement from the 'Global Science, Policy and Private Sector Dialogue ― Tackling HPAI Together’
• FAO Improving poultry health and productivity - Practical training materials for veterinarians and farmers for better farm management
• FAO Global Farmer Field School Platform
• FAO webinar series on pandemic prevention and response
• FAO Outbreak Costing Tool (OutCosT) and its webinar “Estimating the costs of disease outbreaks: Application of the OutCost tool” [recording]
• FAO An evidence-based approach towards improving poultry biosecurity in Ashaiman Municipal District (Greater Accra Region, Ghana)
• GF-TADs webinar: Update on latest initiatives for avian influenza prevention and control [webinar1, webinar2]
• OFFLU website
• OFFLU Beyond poultry: Rethinking monitoring and control of HPAI H5Nx anticipating spillover risks for mammals
• OFFLU Guidelines for High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus Risk Mitigation in Cattle
• ggFlu - global H5 genotyping system public web server
• EFSA Avian influenza overview March-May 2026
• EFSA Avian influenza overview December 2025–February 2026
• PAHO Epidemiological Update Avian Influenza A(H5N1) in the Americas Region, 11 March 2026
• Scientific Task Force on Avian Influenza and Wild Birds H5N1 High pathogenicity avian influenza in wild birds - Unprecedented conservation impacts and urgent needs
• WHO Influenza at the human-animal interface summary and assessment, 7 July 2026
• WOAH High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza (HPAI) Situation Report 81 - 7 May 2026
• WOAH Surveillance of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza for Smallholder Poultry Systems in Resource-Limited Settings
• The list of wild bird and mammalian species which have been infected with H5Nx HPAI [link]

Note: many publication links have been moved into ‘More important links’ below.

Disclaimer

Information provided herein is current as of the date of issue. Information added or changed since the last Global AIV with Zoonotic Potential situation update appears in orange. Human cases are depicted in the geographic location of their report. For some cases, exposure may have occurred in one geographic location but reported in another. For cases with unknown onset date, reporting date was used instead. FAO compiles information drawn from multiple national (Ministries of Agriculture or Livestock, Ministries of Health, Provincial Government websites; Centers for Disease Prevention and Control [CDC]) and international sources (World Health Organization [WHO], World Organisation for Animal Health [WOAH]), as well as peer reviewed scientific articles. FAO makes every effort to ensure, but does not guarantee, accuracy, completeness or authenticity of the information. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these map(s) do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of FAO concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers and boundaries. Dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.