Map 1. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential observed since 1 October 2025 (i.e. current wave)

Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.

Notes: Refer to the disclaimer available on this webpage for the names and boundaries in this map. The final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. The final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Source: United Nations Geospatial. 2020. Map of the World. [Cited August 2026]. Modified with GLW 4 data and Emergency Prevention System Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i), WOAH and National Authorities data, 2025.

Map 2. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential* observed in the period 1 October 2024 to 30 September 2025 (i.e. previous wave)

Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.

Notes: Refer to the disclaimer available on this webpage for the names and boundaries in this map. Final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Source: United Nations Geospatial. 2020. Map of the World. [Cited October 2025]. Modified with GLW 4 data and Emergency Prevention System Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i), WOAH and National Authorities data, 2025.

Recent publications

Domestic

Risk assessment of transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5 viruses into French broiler and layer farms from other poultry sectors. Prev Vet Med, 256:106981. [reference]

Aerosol transmission of infectious diseases in poultry: microbiology, pathogenesis, and control measures. Front Microbiol, 17:1886873. [reference]

Biosecurity deficiencies in HPAI-affected poultry farms in Korea, 2020/2021-2024/2025 seasons. Front Vet Sci, 13:1863522. [reference]

Detection of H5N1 HPAIV Clade 2.3.4.4b Avian Influenza Virus in Backyard Chickens in Costa Rica. Viruses, 18(7):799. [reference]

Genetic and Epidemiological Evidence of Avian Influenza A(H9N2) Detection Among Poultry in Ghana, 2022. Viruses, 18(7):725. [reference]

Regulatory Implications and Control Measures for Lumpy Skin Disease, Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, and Foot-and-Mouth Disease in European Livestock. Viruses, 18(7):777. [reference]

Wild

Long-Term Monitoring of Influenza A Viruses in Wild Waterfowl: Evidence from the Lake Baikal Basin (2018-2024). Viruses, 18(7):761. [reference]

Expert Commentary: What do we know about H5 bird flu? [reference]

Genomic and Clinicopathological Characterization of a Reassortant HPAI H5N1 (Clade 2.3.4.4b) in an Endangered Cinereous Vulture (Aegypius monachus) in South Korea, 2026. Transbound Emerg Dis, 2026, 2623621, 15 pages. [reference]

Emerging threat of avian influenza to the world's vultures. Conservation Biology, e70372. [reference]

Clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza detected in wild bird feces, Eastern Mongolia, 2024. J Vet Sci, 27(4):e38. [reference]

Evolving dynamics of H5Nx avian influenza in China revealed by long-term wild bird surveillance. Nat Commun, 17(1):9011. [reference]

Global dynamics of avian influenza: a twenty-year analysis of highly pathogenic viruses linking the Caspian Basin, Eurasia and Africa sectors (2005-2025). Front Cell Infect Microbiol, 16:1795327. [reference]

Genetic Determinants Analysis of PB1 and PB2 Genes in H5N1 Avian Influenza Strains from Romania. Pathogens, 15(7):768. [reference]

Multiple introductions of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses into the High Arctic: Svalbard and Jan Mayen, 2022-2025. J Gen Virol, 107(8):002305. [reference]

Spatiotemporal dynamics and ecological risk factors of high pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) in Canadian wildlife: A One Health surveillance analysis. Comp Immunol Microbiol Infect Dis, 129:102499. [reference]

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 in South America, 2022-2025: Spread, Affected Species, and Southward Expansion into the Antarctic Region. Viruses, 18(7):764. [reference]

Skuas as sentinels of high pathogenicity avian influenza H5N1 on the Antarctic Peninsula in the 2024/2025 austral summer. Microb Genom, 12(8):001724. [reference]

Transboundary Spread and Ecological Drivers of HPAI H5N1 Clade 2.3.4.4b During the 2022-2023 Outbreak in Chile: An Integrated Genomic and Spatial Epidemiology Framework. Transbound Emerg Dis, 2026(1):e1266281. [reference]

Genomic Surveillance Uncovers the Silent Spread of Avian Influenza Virus (H5N1 2.3.4.4b) Among Wild Birds and Mammals Along Brazil's Southern Coast. Viruses, 18(7):738. [reference]

Detection of H5N1-Related PB1 Sequences in a Low Pathogenic H11N2 Virus from South American Migratory Shorebirds. Viruses, 18(7):710. [reference]

Emerging threat of avian influenza to the world's vultures. Conserv Biol, 2026 Aug 19:e70372. [reference]

Avian influenza amplified age-related mortality in a long-lived seabird. Nat Commun, 17(1):8653. [reference]

Mammal

Enhanced Pathogenicity and Contact Transmissibility of Human-origin Avian Influenza H5N1 Clade 2.3.4.4b Genotype B3.13 Compared to D1.1 in Ferrets. BioRxiv, 2026 Aug 17:2026.08.10.744032 [reference] Preprint

Neuropathology, novel tissue tropism, and evidence of vertical transmission in South American pinnipeds naturally infected with high pathogenicity avian influenza H5N1 virus in Argentina.Vet Pathol, 2026 Aug 3:3009858261465443. [reference]

Evolution of swine influenza surveillance and one health governance in Taiwan: from zoonotic risk management to integrated preparedness. Vet Res Commun, 50(5):475. [reference]

Identification and characterization of PB2 mutations associated with mammalian adaptation of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza viruses. Front Microbiol, 17:1867604. [reference]

Heterogeneous viral-host response at single-cell resolution and viral adaptive mutational atlas in birds and mammals upon H5 influenza virus infection. Natl Sci Rev, 13(14):nwag380. [reference]

Dairy

Evaluation of serologic assays for detection and quantification of influenza antibodies in milk samples from H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus infected dairy cows. Front Vet Sci, 13:1902594. [reference]

Seroprevalence of Influenza A(H5N1) Virus in Domestic Cats at Epicenter of Dairy Cattle Outbreaks, California, USA, 2024-2026. Emerg Infect Dis, 32(9). [reference]

Long-term milk-yield impact and recovery in HPAI-affected cows across consecutive lactations and its association with antibody response. J Dairy Sci, 2026 Jul 27:S0022-0302(26)03149-8. [reference]

Acquisition of specific human respiratory tract binding by 2.3.4.4b H5N1 hemagglutinins requires multiple mutations. J Virol, 2026 Aug 10:e0106526. [reference]

Standing HA phenotypic breadth shapes H5N1 cross-host potential. Res Sq, rs.3.rs-10349790. [reference] Preprint

Viruses

Influenza. Nat Rev Dis Primers, 12(1):51. [reference]

Deciphering viral action on host genome structure: a computational physics perspective. Biochim Biophys Acta Mol Basis Dis, 1872(8):168394. [reference]

Complete coding sequence of influenza A virus subtype H1N3 from guinea fowl in Republic of Serbia. Microbiol Resour Announc, 2026 Jul 29:e0021326. [reference]

The emergence of novel H3N8 and H3N3 avian influenza viruses in chickens during multi-province surveillance in China and their potential public health risk. Vet J, 318:106789. [reference]

Risk assessment of avian influenza A(H5N5) virus from the first human case using the ferret model. J Virol, 2026 Aug 11:e0085626. [reference]

A lethal human H5N5 influenza virus isolate exhibits low pandemic risk traits. BioRxiv, 2026 Jul 22:2026.07.20.739507. [reference] Preprint

Protective effect of A(H5N8) stockpiled vaccine against a virus genetically identical to a human isolate of bovine A(H5N1) influenza virus. EBioMedicine, 131:106430, [reference]

Genomic characterization of H6N1 avian influenza viruses from wild birds and domestic ducks in the republic of Korea and Mongolia (2022-2024). Arch Virol, 171(8):238. [reference]

Neutralizing and protective monoclonal antibodies identify antigenic sites in influenza H7 hemagglutinin and select for amino acid substitutions rarely observed at the global level. Microbiol Spectr, 2026 Aug 6:e0109126. [reference]

Impact of prior low-pathogenicity avian influenza H7N7 exposure on susceptibility and protection against homologous high-pathogenicity avian influenza H7N7 challenge in chickens. Virology, 2026 Aug 7;624:111047. [reference]

Interfering with innate immunity: type I IFNs and avian influenza susceptibility. EBioMedicine, 131:106414. [reference]

Identification and functional characterization of a novel antiviral chicken interferon-υ. Vet Microbiol, 321:111175. [reference]

Defining the molecular interaction between influenza hemagglutinin and MHC-II. bioRxiv, 2026 Jul 22:2026.07.17.738765. [reference] Preprint

Genetic diversity of H9N2 avian influenza viruses in Iran over the past two decades. Vet Res Forum, 17(3):207-216. [reference]

Genetic characterization and zoonotic potential of G1-Lineage H9N2 avian influenza viruses isolated from poultry in Pakistan, 2023. Avian Pathol, 2026 Aug 7:1-12. [reference]

Genetic evolution, phylodynamics, geographic spread of H9N2 avian influenza viruses in China from 2014 to 2025: an increasing potential zoonotic risk. Emerg Microbes Infect, 2026 Aug 3:2713320. [reference]

Epidemiological and clinical characterization of human infections with H9N2 avian influenza virus in Changsha city, China, 2015-2025. J Public Health Res, 15(3):22799036261470475. [reference]

A cross-sectional study of avian influenza virus in poultry markets of Guangdong China, 2025. Front Cell Infect Microbiol, 16:1914072. [reference]

Novel Reassortant H9N2 Avian Influenza Viruses with Dual Receptor-Binding Capacity and Evidence of Direct Mammalian Infectivity Circulating in Northeast China Live Poultry Markets. Viruses, 18(7):771. [reference]

D347G in PA is critical for the pathogenicity of H9N2 avian influenza A virus in mice. Virulence, 17(1):2711518. [reference]

Assay

Development of a multi-species luciferase-based double-antigen ELISA for the detection of antibodies against influenza A virus H5 clade 2.3.4.4b. J Clin Microbiol, 2026 Aug 13:e0190725. [reference]

Optimization of filters and processing conditions for aerosol detection of relevant avian respiratory viruses in poultry under experimental and field conditions. Vet Microbiol, 321:111159. [reference]

Monitoring of antimicrobial resistance genes and influenza viruses in avian-populated water bodies. Sustain Microbiol, 2(2):qvaf013. [reference]

Assessment

Evaluating transient risk factors for avian influenza outbreaks in Canada using case-crossover study and machine learning. Poult Sci, 105(11):107364. [reference]

A cohort study of persons exposed to highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) at premises with infected animals, England, 2023 to 2025. Euro Surveill, 31(31). [reference]

The complexity of protecting poultry from HPAIV: Findings from a case-control study in Sweden. Prev Vet Med, 256:106985. [reference]

Avian influenza risk mapping in India using machine learning. Front Vet Sci, 13:1842591. [reference]

Overview

Avian influenza and One Health: bridging animal and human health through integrated surveillance and vaccination. Front Cell Infect Microbiol, 16:1659738. [reference]

FAO's support to countries

Global level

• FAO participated in the VETLAB Network Coordination Meeting with directors of African and Asian veterinary laboratories organized by the Joint FAO/IAEA Centre (Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture) (CJN) at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna, Austria.
• OFFLU (WOAH/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza) released a statement entitled Incursion of HPAI H5 into Australia and New Zealand with potential impact on wildlife populations and to spread further in Oceania. [link]
• FAO participated to the third KAPPA-FLU annual meeting held on 30 June – 2 July in Kalmar, Sweden, where participants presented their progress on research projects addressing various topics related to avian influenza. [link]
• FAO and OFFLU participated in the WHO Global Influenza Programme polymerase chain reaction (PCR), next-generation sequencing (NGS) and antiviral working group meetings in June 2026.

Regional/country level

• Americas
• The Quadripartite (FAO, WOAH, PAHO/WHO and UNEP), together with regional partners (Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture [IICA] and Organismo Internacional Regional de Sanidad Agropecuaria [OIRSA]), signed a Joint Declaration on One Health in the Americas in July 2026, marking the first regional agreement to strengthen coordination and collaborative action on zoonotic diseases, antimicrobial resistance, food safety, and environmental health threats with a One health approach. The Joint Declaration reinforces commitment to the One Health approach in the Americas. [link]
• In Chile, a workshop on risk communication during animal health threats and emergencies was held on 11-12 August in Santiago to strengthen veterinary services technical capacities under a project on epidemiological intelligence and biosecurity (GCP/GLO/1140/USA). Other countries were invited to share their experiences in risk communication, e.g. Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago in Mesoamerica region. And a technical meeting was held on 24-25 August, discussed experiences, lesson learned and improvements to be done to the emergency response process for HPAI in the country, followed by the official closing ceremony with the national authorities.
• An HPAI simulation exercise was conducted in Trinidad and Tobago from 27 to 31 August under the Technical Cooperation Programme: Animal Disease Outbreak Response in Trinidad and Tobago. The activities included a tabletop simulation on both islands, field and laboratory drills as well as emergency communicational training. Around 100 participants actively participated in the activities.
• FAO and the veterinary services of Peru (SENASA) will carry out an online training concerning the compartmentalization of domestic birds in relation to HPAI and Newcastle disease, and other areas of animal health preparedness and disease prevention.
• In June 2026, following the declaration of a national animal health emergency due to HPAI, FAO initiated technical support under the regional Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF) project "Strengthening Avian Influenza Surveillance and Risk Management for Safe Trade in the SICA Region" in response to a request for technical assistance from the Government of Honduras. The support includes the procurement of priority supplies for field sampling and laboratory diagnosis.

• Africa
  • As part of the World Bank Pandemic Fund project in Africa, FAO is supporting some veterinary laboratories in Sub-Saharan African countries namely Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Sierra Leone, United Republic of Tanzania, and Zambia in their participation in the proficiency testing for the diagnosis of avian influenza (AI), Newcastle disease (ND), and rabies, coordinated by the Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venezie (IZSVe, FAO Reference Centre for avian influenza) in Padua, Italy.
  • FAO is organizing a regional training workshop on transport of infectious substances in accordance with the International Air Transport Association (IATA) Dangerous Goods Regulations (DGR) as part of the World Bank Pandemic Fund project in Africa. The training course, to be held in Rwanda from 7 to 11 September 2026, will train participants from veterinary laboratories in 10 sub-Saharan African countries namely Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
  • FAO Burundi has recently supported several initiatives aiming at strengthening surveillance, diagnosis and preparedness for health emergencies, as part of efforts to early detect, prevent and control HPAI. These initiatives include the development, updating, validation and harmonisation of standard operating procedures for the safe handling of biological samples for the benefit of the National Veterinary Laboratory.
  • In the Gambia, with support from FAO and the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Department of Livestock Services has validated a new HPAI contingency plan, upgraded its laboratory to run PCR tests and deployed rapid test kits for field testing. Personnel continue to be trained to use FAO Event Mobile Application (EMA-i) and KoboCollect for real-time reporting.
  • FAO is leading field missions in Ghana under the Ghana Pandemic Fund project to plan infrastructure renovations at its seven regional veterinary laboratories to boost their diagnostic capacities. The renovation would enhance capacity of laboratories in high-density poultry zones which is critical to effectively detecting and characterize infectious agents including avian influenza.

• North Africa and Middle East
• In June 2026, the 32nd meeting of the Mediterranean Animal Health Network (REMESA) was held in Cyprus. The Chief Veterinary Officers and experts from various Mediterranean nations including North Africa and Middle East, FAO and WOAH discussed joint regional actions against transboundary animal diseases and emerging health threats.
• Regional One Health Coordination Mechanism (ROHCM) continues to function as the ongoing regional governance structure, bringing together the Quadripartite Regional One Health Coordination Group and its three technical working groups (Zoonoses, antimicrobial resistance [AMR], Food Safety). The mechanism is guided by the endorsed Regional One Health Action Plan (2025–2027) and remains the backbone for coordinated One Health implementation across the region. The current conflict situation in the region is adding substantial complexity to the implementation of ongoing activities across multiple sectors; however, efforts continue at regional and country levels to limit its impact and maintain progress wherever possible.
• FAO Egypt organized a 5-day national training workshop on Infectious Substance Shipment for veterinary and public health laboratory personnel in June 2026 under the Egypt Pandemic Fund project.
• In Tunisia, FAO trained 30 veterinarians from 11 to 13 August 2026 under the ASCO (Appui aux Services de Contrôles Officiels des Produits Animaux et Végétaux) project to strengthen the prevention, early detection and management of health risks in poultry farms. This three-day training combined biosecurity, inspection procedures, regulatory knowledge, crisis management and practical exercises to harmonize veterinary controls and enhance the resilience of the poultry sector, with a second session scheduled from 1 to 3 September 2026.

• Asia and the Pacific
• In Cambodia, FAO continued strengthening technical field capacity to the animal health officers at sub-national level including: In June, HPAI Standard Operation Procedures (SOP) training for field officers responsible for outbreak investigation in Kampong Thom from 10 - 11 June, with participation from the Office of Animal Health and Production (OAHP) representatives from five provinces. In July, the After Action Review (AAR) for A/H5N1 Outbreak Response was conducted in Svay Rieng province on 23 July, co-organized with the General Directorate of Animal Health and Production (GDAHP), attended by officers from the OAHP of Svay Rieng province, as well as representatives from the Ministry of Health (MoH), Ministry of Environment (MoE), General Directorate of Forestry and Wildlife (GDFo), WHO and several development partners including Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), Agronomes & vétérinaires sans frontières (AVSF) and local authorities from the province. In August, the second-round training on HPAI virus Decontamination in the Field was held on 19–20 August, trained 33 national and provincial animal health and production offices from 9 provinces on practical knowledge based on FAO and GDAHP’s updated Technical Guidelines for HPAI Decontamination. Besides the technical guidance, participants are putting knowledge into practice through hands-on exercises, including preparing disinfectants, correctly using PPE and applying decontamination procedures in practical settings.
• In Lao PDR, FAO-supported technical engagements continued to address avian influenza with zoonotic potential as an important animal and public health concern. From 24 to 25 June 2026, FAO supported the Tabletop Exercise Workshop on the revised Joint Preparedness and Contingency Plan for Zoonotic Influenza at the sub-national level in Xaysomboun Province. In addition, FAO supported Rapid Response Team training in Bokeo Province from 30 June to 2 July 2026 to strengthen provincial preparedness for avian influenza outbreaks, including surveillance, outbreak investigation, biosafety, risk communication, and sample collection.
• In Nepal, FAO supported to conduct 2 slots of rapid response team (RRT) trainings during 16-17 July and 21-22 July 2026 in Kathmandu valley reaching to 60 animal health professionals to tackle with the increasing highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreaks in the country. Likewise, an emergency supply of PCR kits was provided to the Central Veterinary Laboratory to aid in rapid diagnosis of HPAI.
• On 11 August, FAO supported a poultry sector assessment workshop in Niue to better understand the current state of the poultry sector, including its key challenges and opportunities. The consultation workshop brought together village council representatives, government agencies, poultry producers, and other stakeholders to validate assessment findings, identify priority issues, and develop practical recommendations to strengthen poultry production across Niue. [link]
• In Pakistan, FAO has developed the National Guidelines for Sample Collection and Referral Mechanism. A Consultative Workshop was held on 29–30 July 2026 in Islamabad, under the FAO-implemented component of the Pakistan Pandemic Fund project, brought together animal health laboratory’s dedicated personnel from the federal reference laboratories and provincial veterinary diagnostic laboratories, together with academia, the University of Veterinary and Animal Sciences (UVAS), University of Sargodha, and Pir Mehr Ali Shah Arid Agriculture University, Rawalpindi. The main objective was to review current field practices, refine national guidelines, and specific requirements for implementation and training plan for zoonotic disease sample collection, transportation and referral mechanism.
• FAO Pakistan and Pakistan National Veterinary Laboratory (NVL) organized the Animal Health Laboratory Networking Group (#NLNG, established since 2020) on 31 July 2026 in Islamabad with support from Pakistan Pandemic Fund project. The meeting brought together animal health laboratories, provincial livestock authorities, academia, and development partners to discuss and find consensus on national strategic laboratory priorities that will strengthen animal health laboratory systems for pandemic prevention, preparedness and response, while promoting coordinated networking among federal and provincial veterinary laboratories.
• In the Philippines, FAO conducted Local Animal Disease Detection and Emergency Response (LADDER) in August, including Tabletop Simulation Exercise on Avian Influenza in Regions 5, 10, and 13, to increase awareness and strengthen local preparedness on avian influenza and other transboundary animal diseases.
• FAO is planning to conduct an HPAI awareness and preparedness training in Solomon Islands in early October. In addition to staff from Biosecurity, Livestock, and Extension services, selected provincial staff will also participate in the training. The training will strengthen Solomon Islands’ capacity for HPAI prevention and preparedness, including the early identification, reporting, and communication of suspected cases, as well as an understanding of the basic procedures and actions to be undertaken in response to a suspected HPAI incident.
• In July, FAO supported a poultry capacity-building mission in Tuvalu, to help strengthen local egg production through practical farm management training, enhanced government–farmer collaboration, and improved disease preparedness. The mission provided hands-on training in Funafuti, Tuvalu on poultry production, biosecurity, animal welfare, record-keeping, and cost-of-production analysis. Participants also received training on avian influenza awareness and preparedness to support disease prevention and early detection. [link]
• In Viet Nam, FAO, in collaboration with the Department of Animal Health and Production (DAHP) of the Ministry of Agriculture and Environment, will conduct active surveillance for avian influenza along the poultry value chain between September and December 2026.

Recommendations for affected countries and those at risk

For high-level, the recommendations from the FAO Global Dialogue - Tackling high pathogenicity avian influenza together provide a clear framework for coordinated science-based actions on Early detection, Rapid response, Biosecurity, Vaccination, Business and trade dimensions, One Health and systems-based approaches, Public-private partnerships...

For grass root level. the practical recommendations for day-to-day activities are suggested below to mitigate risk and reduce impact of HPAI...

General recommendations
It is important to report sick or dead birds – both wild birds and poultry - or wild mammals to local authorities (veterinary services, public health officials, community leaders etc.). These should be tested for avian influenza viruses...

Recommendations to poultry producers
Farmers and poultry producers should step up their biosecurity measures in order to prevent potential virus introduction from wild birds or their faeces...

Recommendations to hunters
Hunting associations and wildlife authorities should be aware that avian influenza viruses might be present in waterfowl and some other species hunted and that hunting, handling and dressing of shot game carries the risk of spreading avian influenza viruses to susceptible poultry...

Recommendations to national authorities
Increase surveillance efforts for the early detection of influenza viruses in poultry and dead wild species including certain mammals...

For full recommendations including non-avian species please see [link].

Important links

• FAO Avian influenza dashboard [link]
• FAO & WOAH Global strategy for the prevention and control of high pathogenicity avian influenza (2024–2033) - Achieving sustainable, resilient poultry production systems
• FAO/WHO/WOAH Updated joint FAO/WHO/WOAH public health assessment of recent influenza A(H5) virus events in animals and people - March 2026
• OECD‑FAO Agricultural Outlook 2026‑2035 [link]
• FAO HPAI website [link1, link2]
• FAO Recommendations from the FAO Global Dialogue - Tackling high pathogenicity avian influenza together.
• FAO Iguaçu statement from the 'Global Science, Policy and Private Sector Dialogue ― Tackling HPAI Together’
• FAO Improving poultry health and productivity - Practical training materials for veterinarians and farmers for better farm management
• FAO Virtual Learning Centers open access course “Introduction to Avian Influenza” - English, Spanish, Portuguese
• FAO Global Farmer Field School Platform
• FAO webinar series on pandemic prevention and response
• FAO Outbreak Costing Tool (OutCosT) and its webinar “Estimating the costs of disease outbreaks: Application of the OutCost tool” [recording]
• FAO An evidence-based approach towards improving poultry biosecurity in Ashaiman Municipal District (Greater Accra Region, Ghana)
• GF-TADs webinar: Update on latest initiatives for avian influenza prevention and control [webinar1, webinar2]
• OFFLU website
• OFFLU Beyond poultry: Rethinking monitoring and control of HPAI H5Nx anticipating spillover risks for mammals
• OFFLU Guidelines for High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus Risk Mitigation in Cattle
• ggFlu - global H5 genotyping system public web server
• EFSA Avian influenza overview March-May 2026
• PAHO Epidemiological Update Avian Influenza A(H5N1) in the Americas Region, 26 August 2026
• Scientific Task Force on Avian Influenza and Wild Birds H5N1 High pathogenicity avian influenza in wild birds - Unprecedented conservation impacts and urgent needs
• WHO Influenza at the human-animal interface summary and assessment, 7 August 2026
• WOAH High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza (HPAI) Situation Report 81, 17 August 2026
• WOAH Surveillance of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza for Smallholder Poultry Systems in Resource-Limited Settings
• The list of wild bird and mammalian species which have been infected with H5Nx HPAI [link]

Note: many publication links have been moved into ‘More important links’ below.

Disclaimer

Information provided herein is current as of the date of issue. Information added or changed since the last Global AIV with Zoonotic Potential situation update appears in orange. Human cases are depicted in the geographic location of their report. For some cases, exposure may have occurred in one geographic location but reported in another. For cases with unknown onset date, reporting date was used instead. FAO compiles information drawn from multiple national (Ministries of Agriculture or Livestock, Ministries of Health, Provincial Government websites; Centers for Disease Prevention and Control [CDC]) and international sources (World Health Organization [WHO], World Organisation for Animal Health [WOAH]), as well as peer reviewed scientific articles. FAO makes every effort to ensure, but does not guarantee, accuracy, completeness or authenticity of the information. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these map(s) do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of FAO concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers and boundaries. Dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.