28 March 2024, 08:30 hours; Rome
This update covers avian influenza viruses (AIV) with zoonotic potential occurring worldwide, i.e. H5Nx, H7Nx high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) viruses and H3N8, H5Nx, H6N1, H7Nx, H9N2, H10Nx and H11 low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI).
Specific information is available for Avian Influenza A(H7N9) virus viruses and Sub-Saharan Africa HPAI in related FAO Avian Influenza situation updates.
HPAI outbreaks in animals officially reported since last update (28 December 2023): in total, 484 outbreaks/events have been reported in five geographic regions caused by H5Nx (14), H5N1 (428), H5N2 (1), H5N5 (24), H5N8 (1), H7N3 (12) and H7N6 (4). (see Table 1 for details)
LPAI events in animals officially reported since the last update (25 January 2024): 1 new event was reported.
Number of human cases officially reported since last update (25 January 2024): 5 new events were reported.1,2,3,4,5,6
1 https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/influenza/human-animal-interface-risk-assessments/influenza_summary_ira_ha_interface_feb_2024.pdf?sfvrsn=9a552ade_2&download=true
2 https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/wpro---documents/emergency/surveillance/avian-influenza/ai_20240315.pdf?sfvrsn=5bc7c406_39
3 https://quochoitv.vn/truong-hop-dau-tien-nhiem-cum-a-h5n1-tu-vong-215392.htm
Map 1. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential* observed since 1 October 2023 (i.e. current wave)
Note: Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.
Map 2. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential* observed in the period 1 October 2022 to 30 September 2023 (i.e. previous wave)
Note: Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.
Table 1. High pathogenicity avian influenza viruses with zoonotic potential
Virus | Country/Area | Last observed outbreak | # events reported since the last update | Total # events reported since 1 October 2023 | Species affected during the reporting preiod |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
H5 |
Antarctica |
21/01/2024 |
1 |
1 |
South Polar Skua |
Colombia |
19/12/2023 |
1 |
14 |
Great Frigatebird |
|
Japan |
19/03/2024 |
1 |
1 |
Large-billed crow |
|
Sweden |
14/03/2024 |
4 |
6 |
Farmed pheasants; Canada Goose, Mute Swan |
|
United States of America3 |
18/02/2024 |
7 |
98 |
American green-winged teal, Great black-backed gull, Mallard, Northern shoveler |
|
H5N1 |
Austria |
26/02/2024 |
5 |
29 |
Greylag Goose, Mute Swan, unspecified Strigiformes |
Brazil |
27/02/2024 |
6 |
61 |
Cabot's tern, Common Tern |
|
Bulgaria |
12/03/2024 |
2 |
9 |
Poultry |
|
Burkina Faso |
01/03/2024 |
1 |
1 |
Poultry |
|
Canada1 |
16/02/2024 |
14 |
152 |
Farmed Pheasants, Partridges and Chickens; American Crow, American goshawk, Canada Goose, Double-crested Cormorant, Great Horned Owl, Snow Goose, Trumpeter Swan |
|
China |
22/03/2024 |
18 |
46 |
Domestic chicken and duck; Grey heron |
|
Czech Republic |
14/03/2024 |
11 |
39 |
Non-poultry/hobby flocks of hens, Muscovy ducks, geese; Mute Swan |
|
Denmark |
03/03/2024 |
30 |
96 |
Barnacle Goose, Common Barn-Owl, Common Buzzard, Common Magpie, Eurasian Sparrowhawk, Greylag Goose, Herring Gull, Mew Gull, Mute Swan |
|
Ecuador |
27/02/2024 |
3 |
9 |
Backyard poultry of various species; Blue-footed Booby, Yellow-crowned Night-heron |
|
France |
04/03/2024 |
1 |
16 |
Herring Gull |
|
Germany |
18/03/2024 |
42 |
182 (incl. |
Domestic non-poultry birds; Accipitridae, Anatidae, Charadriidae, Cygnus, Laridae; Racoon, Red Fox |
|
Hungary |
13/03/2024 |
3 |
127 |
Common Buzzard, Mute Swan |
|
Israel |
31/01/2024 |
4 |
14 |
Black-headed Gull, Common Crane, Grey Heron, Herring Gull |
|
Japan |
16/03/2024 |
12 |
124 (incl. |
Chicken; |
|
H5N1 |
Mexico |
03/01/2024 |
9 |
17 |
Unspecified domestic Poultry, fighting cocks; Brandt's Cormorant, Cooper's Hawk, Snow Goose, Turkey Vulture |
Republic of Moldova |
14/02/2024 |
2 |
64 |
Poultry |
|
Nigeria |
27/02/2024 |
2 |
3 |
Farmed peacock, Geese |
|
Poland |
06/03/2024 |
14 |
55 |
Poultry; Common Buzzard, Mute Swan |
|
Romania |
15/03/2024 |
5 |
37 |
Mute Swan, Whooper Swan |
|
Slovenia |
28/02/2024 |
3 |
13 |
Mute Swan |
|
Sweden |
16/02/2024 |
2 |
34 |
Canada Goose, Mute Swan |
|
Ukraine |
28/02/2024 |
2 |
14 |
Unspecified Domestic Birds; Mute Swan |
|
United Kingdom of |
Week 8 |
1 |
24 |
Herring Gull |
|
United States of America3 |
21/03/2024 |
233 |
1 813 |
Turkey, Poultry, Unspecified WOAH-non-poultry; American black duck, American crow, American green-winged teal, American white pelican, American wigeon, Bald eagle, Barred owl, Canada goose, Cattle egret, Cinnamon teal, Common raven, Crow (unidentified), Golden eagle, Great horned owl, Greater white-fronted goose, Herring gull, Hooded merganser, Mallard, Mallard/Black duck hybrid, Merlin, Mute swan, Northern pintail, Northern shoveler, Peregrine falcon, Redhead duck, Red-tailed hawk, Ruddy duck, Snow goose, Turkey vulture, Western gull, Western sandpiper, Wood duck; Dairy milking cows, Domestic neonatal goats, Mountain lion, Striped skunk |
|
Viet Nam |
January |
3 |
>4 |
Unspecified poultry |
|
H5N2 |
Mexico |
06/03/2024 |
1 |
1 |
Unspecified domestic non-Poultry |
|
Germany |
16/02/2024 |
2 |
6 |
Laridae |
Japan |
12/03/2024 |
16 |
27 |
Common pochard, Large-billed crow |
|
Norway |
21/02/2024 |
2 |
8 |
Red Fox |
|
United Kingdom |
07/03/2024 |
4 |
8 |
Common Buzzard, Sparrowhawk |
|
H5N8 |
Germany |
28/02/2024 |
1 |
1 |
Charadriidae |
H7N3 |
Mexico |
15/08/2023 |
12 |
29 |
Poultry |
H7N6 |
South Africa |
18/12/2023 |
4 |
79 |
Poultry |
Data was retrieved from WOAH WAHIS portal, government websites. Data cut off time: reported on 22 February 2024 8:30 CEST. $:estimate.
The full list of bird and mammalian species affected by H5Nx HPAI are available HERE.
Notes: Only those reporting events in animals since 24 August 2023 are listed in the table, those reporting for the first time since 1 October 2023 in orange. Codes: D:domestic, C:captivity, W:wild birds, F: Feral, E:Environment, M: mammalian species other than humans, example: W123 indicates 123 wild birds affected. EA: Fully Eurasian; rEN: Reassortment Eurasian and North American.
1 the total includes events with sample collection date since 1 October 2023 data issued from the Canada Food and Inspection Agency dashboard [link]
2 a detailed list of wild bird species affected, consult weekly findings report on avian influenza in wild birds from Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) [link]
3 for more information, consult dedicated webpage of the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA/APHIS) [link]
§: British Antarctic Survey (BAS) [link]
Table 2. Low Pathogenicity Avian Influenza A Viruses with zoonotic potential: events reported in animals or the environment since the last update
Virus | Country/Area | Last detection | # events reported since the last update | Total # events reported since 1 October 2023 | Species affected during the reporting preiod |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
H7N1 | China (Taiwan Province) | 21/01/2024 | 1 | 2 | Feces of Anatidae |
Source: Veterinary authorities.
MAMMALS
APHIS (Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service). 2024. Federal and State Veterinary, Public Health Agencies Share Update on HPAI Detection in Kansas, Texas Dairy Herds. 2024. In: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, US Department of Agriculture. Greenport, USDA. reference
Minnesota Board of Animal Health. 2024. Stevens County goat tests positive for same influenza virus affecting poultry. 2024. In: News. Saint Paul, Minnesota Board of Animal Health. reference
Arruda, B., Baker, A.L.V., Buckley, A., Anderson, T.K., Torchetti, M., Bergeson, N.H., Killian, M.L. & Lantz, K. 2024. Divergent Pathogenesis and Transmission of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) in Swine. Emerg Infect Dis, 30(4):738-751. reference
ENETWILD Consortium, Occhibove Flavia, Knauf Sascha, Sauter-Louis Carola, Staubach Christoph, Allendorf Valerie, Anton Alina, et al. 2024. The role of mammals in Avian Influenza: a review. EFSA Supporting Publications, 21 (3): 8692E. reference
Ly, H. 2023. Highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus infection of companion animals. Virulence, 15(1):2289780. reference
Lee, K., Yeom, M., Vu, T.T.H., Do, H.Q., Na, W., Lee, M., Jeong, D.G., Cheon, D.S. & Song, D. 2023. Characterization of highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) viruses isolated from cats in South Korea, 2023. Emerg Microbes Infect, 13(1):2290835. reference
Rimondi, A., Vanstreels, R.E.T., Olivera, V., Donini, A., Lauriente, M.M. & Uhart, M.M. 2024. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Viruses from Multispecies Outbreak, Argentina, August 2023. Emerg Infect Dis, 30(4):812-814. reference
Plaza, P.I., Gamarra-Toledo, V., Rodríguez Euguí, J., Rosciano, N. & Lambertucci, S.A. 2024. Pacific and Atlantic sea lion mortality caused by highly pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) in South America. Travel Med Infect Dis, 59:102712. reference
Pulit-Penaloza, J.A., Brock, N., Belser, J.A., Sun, X., Pappas, C., Kieran, T.J., Thakur, P.B., et al. 2024. Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus of clade 2.3.4.4b isolated from a human case in Chile causes fatal disease and transmits between co-housed ferrets. Emerg Microbes Infect, 2332667. reference
Plaza PI, Gamarra-Toledo V, Euguí JR, Lambertucci SA. 2024. Recent Changes in Patterns of Mammal Infection with Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus Worldwide. Emerg Infect Dis, 30(3):444-452. reference
WILD BIRDS
Mills G. 2024. Avian flu causes concerning falls in seabird numbers. Vet Rec, 194(5):172-173. reference
Kim, J.Y., Jeong, S., Kim, D.W., Lee, D.W., Lee, D.H., Kim, D. & Kwon, J.H. 2024. Genomic epidemiology of highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) virus in wild birds in South Korea during 2021–2022: Changes in viral epidemic patterns. Virus Evolution, 10(1):veae014. reference
Sheta, B., Waheed, O., Ayad, E., Habbak, L. & Hyder, A. 2024. Constitutive immunity is influenced by avian influenza virus-induced modification of gut microbiota in Eurasian teal (Anas crecca). Comp Biochem Physiol C Toxicol Pharmacol, 278:109867. reference
Mao, Q., Li, Z., Li, Y., Zhang, Y., Liu, S., Yin, X., Peng, C., et al. 2024. H5N1 high pathogenicity avian influenza virus in migratory birds exhibiting low pathogenicity in mallards increases its risk of transmission and spread in poultry. Vet Microbiol, 292:110038. reference
DOMESTIC
Wibawa, H., Wibowo, P.E., Supriyadi, A., Lestari, L., Silaban, J., Fuadi, A.A., Fiqri, A.J., et al. 2024. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus Clade 2.3.4.4b in Domestic Ducks, Indonesia, 2022. Emerg Infect Dis, 30(3):586-590. reference
Paternina, D., Herazo, R., Oviedo, M. & Mattar, S. 2024. Dramatic re-emergence of avian influenza in Colombia and Latin America. Travel Med Infect Dis, 102711. reference
Monjane, I.V.A., Djedje, H., Tamele, E., Nhabomba, V., Tivane, A.R., Massicame, Z.E., Arone, D.M., et al. 2024. H7N6 highly pathogenic avian influenza in Mozambique, 2023. Emerg Microbes Infect, 13(1):2321993. reference
Al-Natour, M.Q., Rohaim, M.A., El Naggar, R.F., Abdelsabour, M.A., Afify, A.F., Madbouly, Y.M. & Munir, M. 2024. Respiratory disease complex due to mixed viral infections in chicken in Jordan. Poult Sci, 103(4):103565. reference
Valentin, J., Ingrao, F., Rauw, F. & Lambrecht, B. 2024. Protection conferred by an H5 DNA vaccine against highly pathogenic avian influenza in chickens: The effect of vaccination schedules. Vaccine, 42(7):1487-1497. reference
Mao, Q., Zhou, S., Liu, S., Peng, C., Yin, X., Li, J., Zhang, Y., Zhou, W., Hou, G., Jiang, W. & Liu, H. 2024. Emergence of novel reassortant H3N3 avian influenza viruses with increased pathogenicity in chickens in 2023. Emerg Microbes Infect, 13(1):2287683. reference
VIRUSES
Xing, X., Shi, J., Cui, P., Yan, C., Zhang, Y., Zhang, Y., Wang, C., et al. 2024. Evolution and biological characterization of H5N1 influenza viruses bearing the clade 2.3.2.1 hemagglutinin gene. Emerg Microbes Infect, 13(1):2284294. reference
ASSAY
Welch, J.L., Shrestha, R., Hutchings, H., Pal, N., Levings, R., Robbe-Austerman, S., Palinski, R. & Shanmuganatham, K.K. 2024. Inactivation of highly transmissible livestock and avian viruses including influenza A and Newcastle disease virus for molecular diagnostics. Front Vet Sci, 11:1304022. reference
Szeredi, L., Thuma, Á., Gyuris, É., Ursu, K., Bálint, Á. & Solymosi, N. 2024. Comparative examination of a rapid immunocytochemical test for the detection of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus in domestic birds in field outbreaks. Avian Pathol, 2024 Mar 4:1-6. reference
ASSESSMENT
Miller, L.N., Saadawi, W.K., Hamouda, W.B., Elgari, A.S., Abdulkarim, E.A., Lmrabet, A.M.M., Elbukhmari, A.E., et al. 2024. Assessing One Health capacities for transboundary zoonotic diseases at the Libya-Tunisia border. One Health Outlook, 6(1):3. reference
Mahadevan, C., Mikkilineni, R., Vyas, N. & Karabasanavar, N. 2024. Assessment of Knowledge and Biosecurity Practices Related to Avian Influenza Among Poultry Workers in a District of South India. J Public Health Manag Pract, 2024 Mar 15. reference
Tammes, P. 2024. Spread of avian influenza among poultry specialists in England during winter 2022/23: National poultry housing order and environmental drivers. Dialogues Health, 4:100165. reference
HUMANS
Wang, Y., Yang, C., Liu, Y., Zhang, J., Qu, W., Liang, J., Tu, C., et al. 2024. Seroprevalence of Avian Influenza A(H5N6) Virus Infection, Guangdong Province, China, 2022. Emerg Infect Dis, 30(4):826-828. reference
Zhuang, Y., Wang, M., Liang, L., Mao, Y., Wang, K., Yang, S., Deng, A., et al. 2024. First Known Human Death After Infection With the Avian Influenza A/H3N8 Virus: Guangdong Province, China, March 2023. Clin Infect Dis, 78(3):646-650. reference
America
Asia
North Africa and Middle East
Sub-Saharan Africa
Figure 1. Number of countries reported HPAI since 01 October 2023 by subtype (left) and by region (right) as of 22 March 2024 (territory/area for sub/Antarctic zone)
Table 3. Epidemiological overview for avian influenza viruses viruses known to have caused zoonotic infections in the past 20 years
Subtype |
Epidemiological situation overview |
---|---|
H5Nx Gs/GD* HPAI (1996) |
High pathogenicity avian influenza viruses within the Goose/Guangdong/1/96- lineage (Gs/GD) were first detected in geese in Guangdong Province, China in 1996. They have persisted, as high pathogenicity viruses, since then and have caused outbreaks in poultry across all regions globally other than Oceania. The initial viruses in this lineage were of the A(H5N1) subtype but other subtypes (including H5N2, H5N3 H5N5, H5N6, H5N8) have emerged, mainly in the past 10 years, as a result of reassortment with other avian influenza viruses. The common feature of these viruses is an HA gene related back to the original Gs/GD/96 virus. The HA gene of these viruses has evolved over the past 28 years, initially into 10 clades (clade 0 to 9) of which descendents of clade 2 viruses are the only ones that continue to circulate. Multiple 5th order clades persist such as the one that is currently dominant globally – clade 2.3.4.4b - whereas others have emerged and disappeared. Multiple genotypes carrying different combinations of the eight influenza A segmented genes have emerged presumably as a result of co-infection of birds with different avian inluenza viruses that also facilitated reassortment. Some important genotypes have been named unofficially (e.g. Z genotype in Hong Kong SAR, China in 2002, BB genotype derived from gulls in Europe in 2022 onwards). Of considerable significance has been reassortment with enzootic A(H9N2) viruses. Some of these Gs/GD viruses have produced severe zoonotic infections in humans, first identified in 1997 when an A(H5N1) clade 0 virus in the Gs/GD lineage in Hong Kong SAR, China caused disease outbreaks in poultry in farms and markets as well as severe disease in humans. In several cases there was some evidence of limited onward transmission in humans and this event raised concerns that it might be the beginning of a human influenza pandemic. Despite the successful efforts to eradicate this particular strain, other viruses within this lineage persisted and evolved in China, becoming more adept at infecting domestic ducks. By 2003 spread of these viruses via wild birds and live bird trade occurred across East and Southeast Asia, resulting in additional zoonotic infection in humans [link]. The important role of wild birds in the transmission of these viruses over long distances became apparent in 2005 when a Gs/GD virus (clade 2.2) spread, primarily via wild birds, across Eurasia, and parts of Africa from western China. Most high-income countries eliminated this virus from poultry, but it persisted in several low and middle- income countries. Viruses within the Gs/GD lineage continued to evolve and spread. Additional intercontinental waves of transmission have occurred with the two most significant being those in 2014 (clade 2.3.4.4c) and from 2016 onwards (clade 2.3.4.4b) that also resulted in spread of these viruses to North America (2014-15 and 2021-22), with the latest outbreak extending through central and South America and to sub-Antarctic islands. These waves involved multiple N subtypes. In 2022/2023, H5N1 2.3.4.4b caused extensive infection in coastal seabirds and mass die- offs of numerous ecologically important wild bird species. For an updated list of bird species affected with A(H5Nx) see HERE Among the other Gs/GD virus clades that remain endemic in specific areas are clade 2.3.2.1a H5N1 viruses that have persisted in South Asia since 2010 and rarely associated with disease in humans. Clade 2.3.2.1c/e viruses have been present in Indonesia since 2012 and related viruses are still circulating in Cambodia, Viet Nam and Lao People’s Democratic Republic with nine recent human cases, four of which were fatal recorded in Cambodia. For an updated list of confirmed human cases with A(H5N1) see HERE In addition, more than 80 human cases have been associated with clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5Nx/y) and 2.3.4.4h A(H5N6) viruses with most of these occurring in 2021 and 2022. Clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1) viruses have caused few human cases but have resulted in multiple mammalian cases including aquatic mammals. For an updated list of mammalian species affected with A(H5Nx) see HERE |
Avian origin H3N8 LPAI |
An Influenza A(H3N8) virus lineage emerged in live bird markets in southern China in mid 2021 [link]. Since then, three human cases of Influenza A(H3N8) have been reported: In April 2022, the first human clinical case associated with this lineage was reported in Henan Province, China and was associated with severe disease. In May 2022, a 5-year-old boy was diagnosed with a mild influenza A(H3N8) infection in Changsha City, Hunan Province, China. On 27 March 2023, a third human case was reported from Guangdong Province, China in a 56-year-old female with underlying illneses who subsequently died. One of the A(H3N8) viruses isolated from a human was found to be transmissible by air in ferrets [link] but no evidence of sustained human transmission has been reported. |
H7N4 LPAI (2017) |
One human case in China with reported exposure to poultry. |
H7N9 LPAI (2013) & HPAI (2017) |
Reported only in China with over 1 000 human cases between 2013 and 2017 with a marked increase in 2017 compared to previous waves. Most human cases exposed in live bird markets. Nation-wide vaccination campaign in poultry since Sep 2017: Last reported human case in 2019 [link]. See FAO H7N9 situation update |
H9N2 LPAI |
First human case reported in 1998. To date, about 100 influenza A(H9N2) human cases diagnosed worldwide, many of them were reported from China since December 2015. Most cases mild and involving children. Only two fatal cases reported [link] Endemic in multiple countries in Africa and Asia, a cause of significant production losses and mortalities in poultry production systems. Three major lineages and multiple genotypes. |
H10Nx LPAI |
To date, two influenza A(H10N3) human infections have been reported globally [link]. In May 2021, the first case in Jiangsu Province, China [link], in September 2022, a second case in Zhejiang Province, China [link] The first influenza A(H10N5) human infection was reported in Zhejiang Province, China [link]. |
FAO recommends intensified surveillance and awareness raising by national authorities.
General recommendations
It is important to report sick or dead birds – both wild birds and poultry - or wild mammals to local authorities (veterinary services, public health officials, community leaders etc.). These should be tested for avian
influenza viruses.
Recommendations to poultry producers
Farmers and poultry producers should step up their biosecurity measures in order to prevent potential virus introduction from wild birds or their faeces.
Recommendations to hunters
Hunting associations and wildlife authorities should be aware that avian influenza viruses might be present in waterfowl and some other species hunted and that hunting, handling and dressing of shot game carries the risk
of spreading avian influenza viruses to susceptible poultry.
Recommendations to national authorities
Increase surveillance efforts for the early detection of influenza viruses in poultry and dead wild species including certain mammals.
For full recommendations including non-avian species please see [link].
Next issue: 25 Apr. 2024
Information provided herein is current as of the date of issue. Information added or changed since the last Global AIV with Zoonotic Potential situation update appears in orange. Human cases are depicted in the geographic location of their report. For some cases, exposure may have occurred in one geographic location but reported in another. For cases with unknown onset date, reporting date was used instead. FAO compiles information drawn from multiple national (Ministries of Agriculture or Livestock, Ministries of Health, Provincial Government websites; Centers for Disease Prevention and Control [CDC]) and international sources (World Health Organization [WHO], World Organisation for Animal Health [WOAH]), as well as peer reviewed scientific articles. FAO makes every effort to ensure, but does not guarantee, accuracy, completeness or authenticity of the information. The designation employed and the presentation of material on the map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of FAO concerning the legal or constitutional status of any country, territory or sea area, or concerning the delimitation of frontiers.
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