18 June 2026, 08:30 hours, Rome
Hazard: African swine fever (ASF) is a viral disease affecting pigs and wild boar with up to 100% case fatality rate.
ASF reported countries since August 2018: China, Mongolia, Viet Nam, Cambodia, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, The Philippines, Republic of Korea, Timor-Leste, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, India, Malaysia, Bhutan, Thailand, Nepal, Singapore, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
Map 1. ASF situation in Asia (for the past 10 weeks)

Notes: Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Source: United Nations Geospatial. 2020. Map of the World. [Cited June 2026]. Modified with data from WOAH WAHIS & media information (Republic of Korea, Viet Nam), WOAH WAHIS & government websites (India & the Philippines), official database ‘isikhnas’ (Indonesia), WOAH WAHIS and National Authorities (Other) using Emergency Prevention System Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i+), 2026.
India: Since the first ASF outbreaks occurred in Assam State in January 2020 [reference1], ASF outbreaks have officially been reported in 22 out of its 28 states and National Capital Territory. In 2024, more than 150 000 pigs died or were destroyed due to ASF [reference2]. In Nagaland State, a new outbreak has also been reported in Dimapur [reference3], Medziphema , Tseminyu, and Phek districts in May [reference4] and Kohima and Wokha districts in June 2026 [reference5, reference6]. In Assam State, new ASF outbreaks have been confirmed in North Rangpuria Village, Kakopathar, Sadiya Sub-Division [reference7] and Ouguri Village, Rupai Siding, Doomdooma Sub-Division [reference8] of Tinsukia District and Lakhimpur District, according to media [reference9]. In Meghalaya State, ASF outbreaks re-emerged in April 2026 and have been confirmed in four districts (Ri-Bhoi, East Khasi Hills, West Khasi Hills and Eastern West Khasi Hills), with Ri-Bhoi being the most affected district [reference10], where media also reported confirmed cases in the Regional Pig Breeding Farm at Kyrdemkulai [reference11] and the outbreak was quickly brought under control [reference12]. Media also reported new outbreaks in Kerala State on a pig farm in June 2026 [reference13].
Disputed territory (Arunachal Pradesh): In April 2020, ASF outbreak occurred in eight districts [reference1, reference2]. Deaths of wild boars were also reported, according to media [reference3, reference4]. Between December 2021 and February 2022, ASF was confirmed in pigs that died in Nirjuli area [reference5]; in 2022, nearly 10 000 pigs were lost due to ASF [reference6]. In 2025, ASF outbreaks have been confirmed in Luaksim village [reference7], West Siang District [reference8] and Papum Pare District [reference9], according to media.
Sri Lanka: The Department of Animal Production and Health declared the confirmation of the first ASF case on 25 October 2024 [reference1]. Initially, ASF was confirmed in Western Province and North Western Province [reference2]. Meanwhile, over 100 wild boars have been found dead in several forest areas in Southern and Uva provinces, and the samples tested positive for both ASF and PRRS [reference3, reference4], according to media. On 2 January 2025, an additional 135 ASF confirmations were reported on pig farms in 13 districts in 6 out of 9 provinces: Central (2 districts), North Central (2), North Western (2), Sabaragamuwa (2), Uva (2) and Western (3) [reference5]. As of 3 July, a total of 67 000 pigs and wild boars have died and at least 1 594 pig farms have been affected by ASF, according to media [reference6, reference7]. Meanwhile, media reported that ASF had spread to all 9 provinces in the country affecting 1 594 pig farms and causing 61 695 pigs deaths [reference8, reference9].
Action taken by Mongolia: Control measures have been implemented [reference1, reference2].
Actions taken by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea developed the National Strategy for ASF prevention and control during 2020-2025 (issued in May 2021). In response to the outbreaks in 2024, authorities have imposed movement restrictions on livestock facilities in six locations across Pyeongannam-do and eight areas in Pyeonganbuk-do, according to media [reference].
Actions taken by the Republic of Korea: Following the detection of IGR-I ASFV genetic material in porcine plasma protein-derived feed ingredients and compound feed, MAFRA implemented a daily surveillance system for the slaughterhouses supplying porcine blood for feed production from 12 March 2026 [reference1]. Effective from 25 March, MAFRA revised quarantine standards for pig farms by prohibiting entry and exit of people, including owners, to/from barns that lack an anteroom [reference2]. In April 2026, the Animal and Plant Quarantine Agency (APQA) granted export-only authorization for two ASF vaccines developed by Choong Ang Vaccine Laboratories and Komipharm [reference3, reference4]. Jeonbuk-do will implement intensified ASF prevention measures between June and October this year, including inspections of all pig farms, strengthened surveillance of wild boars and high-risk facilities, and enhanced biosecurity, monitoring, and farmer awareness [reference5], according to media.
Actions taken by China: April 2021, MARA issued the “Work Plan for Regional Prevention and Control of African Swine Fever and Other Major Animal Diseases (Trial)”. The whole country was divided into five regions, and pig movement has been restricted to within each respective region. ASF-free zones are created in each region, only pigs from the free zones, breeding pigs and piglets are allowed to move beyond their respective regions [reference1]. In 2025, MARA expanded the “Livestock and Veterinary Cloud Platform” to enable real-time tracking of pig transport and epidemic data, according to media [reference2]. In Hong Kong SAR, a wild-pig capture operation in Wong Tai Sin District was conducted to reduce the number of wild pigs in the area [reference3].
Actions taken by the Philippines: The local authorities are mandated to strictly follow the National Zoning and Movement Plan depending on the level of ASF risk [reference1]. On 11 November 2025, DA issued new guidelines to strengthen the country’s defence against ASF while ensuring safe importation of swine and pork products, and introduced ASF regionalization, allowing the recognition of ASF-free zones in line with WOAH standards [reference2]. DA is implementing government-controlled ASF vaccination, and its report in December 2025 shows nearly 500 000 pigs vaccinated in Batangas, Rizal, Laguna, Bulacan, Tarlac, and Pampanga, achieving a reported 90% efficacy rate in healthy and ASF-negative pigs [reference3]. DA launched the Animal Vaccine Development Program (AVDP) aiming at local vaccine development, including ASF or avian influenza vaccines, in partnership with the DA-National Livestock Program, the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI), the Philippine Carabao Center (PCC), and the Central Luzon State University (CLSU). A Biosafety Level 3 facility will be established to safely handle high-risk animal pathogens [reference4, reference5]. Meanwhile, as a part of the Unified Package for Livelihoods, Industry, Food, and Transport (UPLIFT) agenda to mitigate the impact of the Middle East crisis on the economy, the President issued Executive Order No. 116, increasing the minimum access volume (MAV) for pork meat in 2026 from 54 210 metric tons (MT) to 204 210 MT to address the existing supply gap in pork, ensure adequate and affordable food for consumers, and mitigate inflationary pressures [reference6].
Actions taken by Malaysia: After the first confirmed outbreak in Sabah State in 2021, surveillance has been intensified in the whole country [reference1]. On 8 January 2026, the Selangor Government announced its plan to restructure pig farming by centralizing commercial pig farming in Bukit Tagar, Hulu Selangor, or another new location, as a long-term strategic step to restructure the pig farming industry, starting in 2030. The move aims to ensure the pig farming is conducted in a more orderly, sustainable manner consistent with public health and environmental aspects. Since January, the state government is emptying existing farms in Tanjong Sepat, Kuala Langat, and has stopped issuing pig farming licenses; approx. 80 out of 115 pig farms have been closed [reference2, reference3, reference4, reference5].
Actions taken by Singapore: After confirming the first case of ASF in wild boar, the government is monitoring the health of wild boars in nature reserves, parks, and green spaces [reference1, reference2].
Actions taken by Indonesia: In December 2019, the Ministry of Agriculture recommended that the public apply biosecurity measures and good management of pig farms as the main strategic steps to prevent ASF, as well as strict and intensive monitoring of high-risk areas [reference1]; the Livestock and Animal Health Services (DG PKH) formed Emergency Posts with Rapid Response Teams at all levels [reference2]. The Directorate General of Animal Husbandry and Animal Health has issued a Circular letter No. 8492 dated 19 August 2025 to increase strict biosecurity in ASF prevention and improve outbreak reporting [reference3]. The emergency use of the AVAC ASF live vaccine in pigs has been approved in Decree 3693/Kep/Kpts/Pk.350/f/04/2025, dated 23 April 2025 [reference4]. The first batch of 120 000 vaccine doses was imported on 9 June 2025 [reference5, reference6] and distribution to local authorities is planned in June 2026, according to media [reference7].
Actions taken by Timor-Leste: To move pigs, a transport license for the driver, and pre-movement testing of pigs are required; and all stakeholders are encouraged to follow biosecurity measures [reference1]; a Biosecurity Development Program has been implemented since April 2023 [reference2, reference3], according to media. MAF has introduced EpiCollect 5.0 for data collection since 2021, and progressively improved diagnostic capacity through LAMP testing, portable laboratories, and PCR [reference4].
Actions taken by Papua New Guinea: NAQIA stepped up its ASF national risk communications and awareness campaign; strengthened responses for affected provinces and preparedness for non-infected provinces along the highway; and urged farmers to practice biosecurity measures. “Quarantine Areas” and checkpoints at strategic locations have been set to control the movements of pigs and pork products. A restricted pig movement permit system has been implemented [reference1, reference2]. In response to the outbreak in West Sepik Province (WSP) (near the border with Indonesia) in early 2026, movement restrictions have been imposed on all pigs and pig products - including raw and cooked pig meat - within WSP and between WSP and the neighbouring East Sepik Province (ESP) [reference3]. Border control measures remain heightened, with bans on live pigs, pig meat, and pig products still enforced at the Wutung and Vanimo border posts for all travellers entering Papua New Guinea [reference4].
Actions taken by Viet Nam: The “National Plan for the Prevention and Control of African Swine Fever for the period of 2020 – 2025” was endorsed on 7 July 2020 (972/QD-TTg). Following the conclusion of the National Plan, a new National Plan for the Prevention and Control of AI, FMD and ASF for the period of 2026-2030 was issued, directing strengthened ASF control through increased vaccination coverage, establishment of disease-free zones and facilities, stricter control of the animal-derived food chain, enhanced diagnostic capacity and timely outbreak response [reference1]. The Department of Animal Health and Production (DAHP) announced the licensing of NAVET-ASFVAC (manufactured by NAVETCO [National Veterinary Joint Stock Company]) in June 2022, AVAC ASF LIVE (manufactured by AVAC) in February 2023 [reference2], and DACOVAC-ASF2 by DABACO Group in March 2025 [reference3]. On 20 May 2026, DAHP sent an official letter to animal health management authorities of all provinces/municipalities to provide updates on the currently circulating ASF virus and recommendations for vaccine selection. According to the letter, gene sequencing conducted in 2026 revealed that 83.6% (357/427) of the representative samples were recombinant from genotype I and genotype II [reference4], similar to the 2025 results [reference5].
Actions taken by Lao People’s Democratic Republic: In response to the re-emergence of ASF in Xaysomboum Province, the local authorities have designated the province a red area, prohibited the processing and sale of infected pigs, strengthen biosecurity and increased surveillance [reference1, reference2].
Actions taken by Cambodia: Cambodia temporarily suspended imports of pigs from neighbouring countries [reference1, reference2], in-country pig movement control has also been strengthened [reference3, reference4, reference5] according to media.
Actions taken by Thailand: DLD implements an ASF contingency plan with clinical practice guidelines [reference1] while the provinces monitor and follow-up on the situation in accordance with the guidelines [reference2].
Actions taken by Myanmar: Various control measures including movement control, surveillance, and official carcass disposal have been implemented and awareness has been raised on good animal husbandry practices [reference]. On 20 April 2026, the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation released an alert to inform people about ASF prevention and control measures [reference2].
Actions taken by Bangladesh: Various control measures including inspection, disinfection, vector control, movement control, official disposal of carcasses, by-products and waste, surveillance and screening were implemented [reference].
Actions taken by Bhutan: The authority implemented 3D (Depopulation, Disposal and Disinfection) operation, surveillance, movement control, awareness raising, import ban, and encouraged farmers to adopt good pig farming practices [reference1]. The Government is advising pig farmers to safeguard their farms and improve biosecurity; requested the general public and hoteliers to refrain from illegal importation of pigs and pig products and report suspected imports through the toll-free number; and warned that any person found not adhering to this notification shall be firmly dealt with the relevant laws [reference2].
Actions taken by Nepal: FAO ECTAD Nepal supported biosecurity trainings for pig farmers in some districts. A pig value chain study is being conducted through the pandemic fund project to understand the pig value chain and associated disease risks. The Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development formed a committee to study the status of Lumpy Skin Disease and ASF in domestic animals and determine effective measures to control the outbreaks, according to media [reference].
Actions taken by India: The Department of Animal Husbandry & Dairying (DAHD) released the Disease Control Strategy Plan in June 2020 as guidance for State / Union territory (UT) Governments for ASF prevention, control and containment [reference1]. In response to the outbreaks, multiple states have imposed strict measures including a complete ban on slaughtering pigs, import and export of pigs and piglets, as well as transportation of pigs and pork [reference2, reference3, reference4, reference5, reference6, reference7]. On 6 May 2026, Assam State released Protocols on biosecurity, zoning and compartmentalization for control of ASF in pig farms to prevent ASF spread by isolating and quarantining pigs, controlling entry and movement, enforcing hygiene and disinfection, monitoring health daily, and rapidly containing outbreaks [reference8]. DAHD released an ASF awareness film and a booklet titled “Good Husbandry Practices in Pig Farming”, which emphasizes strict biosecurity, controlled movement, hygiene, and proper disposal as the primary measures for prevention and control of ASF [reference9].Actions taken by Arunachal Pradesh: In response to the new outbreak near Tinsukia District, Assam State in May 2026, multiple districts issued advisories promoting reporting, restricting pig movement, strengthening biosecurity, and ensuring safe disposal to prevent disease spread [reference1, reference2, reference3].
Actions taken by Sri Lanka: After ASF confirmation in October 2024, an ‘extraordinary order’ banning movement, sales, slaughter and artificial insemination of pigs, sales of pork, pork products etc. was implemented until 4 November [reference1, reference2, reference3]. On 3 October 2025, a new special gazette No. 2456/59 designated all districts in Sri Lanka as ASF-susceptible for three months to strengthen containment efforts. It emphasized that only licensed slaughter is allowed and all pigs for slaughter, fattening, or breeding must test negative for ASF, with strict bans on unpermitted sale, transportation or processing of pigs or pork [reference4].
ASF virus can be transmitted through pork and pork products (raw/frozen/dried/under-cooked) in which the virus can survive for a long time. Intensive border/customs control of passengers’ luggage at airports and seaports, parcels at international post offices is recommended. The test results of border control in China showed the new reassortant ASF virus may be transported by travellers. Warning signs should be placed clearly at the border/customs entry including airports and seaports, stating the consequences of bringing pork and pork products from ASF-infected countries/regions, and instructing passengers to discard pork products in designated disposal places or to hand over to the customs personnel.
Countries of the region
National Considerations, Inter-Regional Collaboration and Solidarity
2023
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China: Anhui, Heilongjiang, Henan, Jilin, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shanxi, Yunnan, Hunan, Guizhou, Hubei, Jiangxi, Fujian, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Qinghai, Guangdong, Gansu, Shandong, Hainan Hebei and Taiwan provinces,
Tianjin, Chongqing, Shanghai and Beijing municipalities, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia Hui, Guangxi Zhuang, Xinjiang Uygur, and Tibet (Xizang) autonomous regions and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR).
Mongolia:
Bulgan, Darkhan-Uul, Dundgovi, Orkhon, Selenge, Töv provinces and Ulaanbaatar
Viet Nam: All provinces and municipalities.
Cambodia: Ratanakiri,
Tboung Khmum, Svay Rieng, Takeo, Kandal, Siem Reap, Kampong Cham and Battambang provinces.
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Chagang-Do.
Lao People’s Democratic Republic:
All provinces and municipality.
Myanmar: Shan, Kachin, Kayah states and Sagaing Region.
The Philippines: Abra, Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur,
Aklan, Albay, Antique, Apayao, Aurora, Bataan, Batangas, Benguet, Biliran, Bohol, Bulacan, Cagayan, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Camiguin, Capiz, Catanduanes, Cavite, Cebu, Davao de Oro, Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur, Davao Occidental, Davao Oriental,
Dinagat Islands, Eastern Samar, Guimaras, Ifugao, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Iloilo, Isabela, Kalinga, La Union, Laguna, Lanao del Norte, Leyte, Marinduque, Masbate, Maguindanao del Norte, Maguindanao del Sur, Mindoro Oriental, Misamis Occidental,
Misamis Oriental, Mountain, Negros Oriental, Negros Occidental, North Cotabato, Northern Samar, Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Occidental Mindoro, Oriental Mindoro, Palawan, Pampanga, Pangasinan, Quezon, Quirino, Rizal, Romblon, Samar,Sarangani, Sorsogon,
Southern Leyte, Sultan Kudarat, Surigao del Norte, Surigao del Sur, Tarlac, Zambales, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur provinces and Metro Manila (Caloocan, Malabon and Quezon cities).
Republic of Korea:
Gyeonggi-do, Gangwon-do, Incheon City, Chungcheongnam-do, Gyeongsangbuk-do, Jeollanam-do, Jeonbuk-do, Gyeongsangnam-do, Ulsan, Busan and Daegu cities.
Timor-Leste: All districts.
Indonesia:
Aceh, North Sumatra, Riau, Riau Islands, West Sumatra, South Sumatra, Lampung, Jambi, Bangka Belitung; Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta, Banten, East Java; Bali; East Nusa Tenggara, West Nusa Tenggara; West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan,
East Kalimantan, South Kalimantan and North Kalimantan; South Sulawesi, North Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, West Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi; Central Papua, Highland Papua, West Papua and Papua provinces.
Papua New Guinea:
Southern Highlands, Enga, Hela, Western Highlands, Jiwaka, Simbu, East Sepik and West Sepik provinces.
India: Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, Bihar, Kerala, Punjab, Haryana, Tripura, Andhra Pradesh,
Goa, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand states, and Delhi National Capital Territory.
Disputed territory: Arunachal Pradesh.
Malaysia: Sabah, Sarawak; Perak, Pahang, Malacca, Johor, Negeri Sembilan, Selangor, Trengganu, Kelantan
and Penang (Pulau Pinang) states.
Bhutan: Chhukha, Samdrup Jongkhar, Sarpang, Dagana, Trashigang, and Pemagatshel, Bumthang, Wangdue Phodran, Punakha, Paro, Zhemgang and Tsirang districts.
Thailand:
Buri Ram, Chachoengsao, Chaiyaphum, Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, Chumphon, Kalasin, Kamphaeng Phet, Khon Kaen, Krabi, Mae Hong Son, Maha Sarakham, Mukdahan, Nakhon Phanom, Nakhon Phanom, Nakhon Sawan, Nakhon Si Thammarat, Nakhon Ratchasima, Nan, Nong Bua
Lam Phu, Nong Khai, Phangnga, Phatthalung, Phetchaburi, Phichit, Prachuap Khiri Khan, Ranong, Ratchaburi, Roi Et, Si Sa Ket, Songkhla, Suphan Buri, Trang, Ubon Ratchathani, Udon Thani provinces and Bangkok.
Nepal:
Bhaktapur, Kathmandu, Lalitpur, Kavrepalanchok, Jajarkot, Jhapa, Morang , Chitwan, Bardiva, Dang, Kaski, Surkhet, Sunsari, Kailali, Syangia, Bara, Jajarkot, Kanchanpur, Dadeldhura, Doti, Lamjung, Tanahu, Nawalparasi West, Solukhumbu, and Gorkha districts.
Singapore
Bangladesh: Chittagong Division.
Sri Lanka: Central, North Central, North Western, Sabaragamuwa, Uva and Western provinces.
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Information provided herein is current as of the date of issue. Information added since the last ASF situation update in Asia & Pacific appears in orange. For cases with unknown onset date, reporting date was used instead. FAO compiles information drawn from multiple national (Ministries of Agriculture or Livestock and international sources (World Organisation for Animal Health [WOAH]), as well as peer-reviewed scientific articles. FAO makes every effort to ensure, but does not guarantee, accuracy, completeness, or authenticity of the information. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these map(s) do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of FAO concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers and boundaries. Dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.
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